rt-thread.git/.github/workflows, branch copilot/fix-aarch64-github-actions-job

ci: install device-tree-compiler for aarch64 builds to fix zynqmp BSP compilation

2026-06-08T01:40:40Z

[bsp][zynqmp-a53-dfzu2eg] enable full dm

2026-06-07T11:13:39Z

This is a builtin fdt example BSP Signed-off-by: GuEe-GUI <2991707448@qq.com>

[feat][ci]: verify bsp dist build

2026-06-02T10:06:01Z

Add picolib support to bsp/x86, default to newlib

2026-05-25T01:51:06Z

- add i686-atxhua-picolib-elf-gcc toolchain - add picolib option to bsp/x86 - add necessary picolib require library

Add X86 i686 gcc 15.2.0 (#11388)

2026-05-12T07:00:32Z

* add i686 x86 newlib toolchain * add missing x86 gcc option to manual_dist.yml * fix typo

[ci]: restrict utest workflow triggers

2026-05-06T10:00:00Z

[action][utest]:Expand kernel auto-run matrix and sync test configs

2026-04-19T12:37:38Z

[ci][format] fix the issue of CLA verification interception

2026-03-20T09:57:25Z

fix(ci): prevent expression injection in pr_format_bot.yml

2026-03-20T09:55:47Z

Move user-controlled GitHub Actions context expressions (github.event.pull_request.head.ref, head.repo.full_name, pull_request.number, event.action) from direct interpolation in run: blocks to env: variables. Direct interpolation of these values in shell scripts allows attackers to inject arbitrary commands via crafted branch names under pull_request_target, which runs in the base repo context. Using env: variables ensures values are treated as literal strings by the shell, preventing command injection. Ref: https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/ Reported-by: Wilson Cyber Research (@sourcecodereviewer) Security: expression-injection

ci:arm_smart ci build erro (#11113)

2026-01-03T07:22:29Z