diff options
Diffstat (limited to '.github/workflows/claude.yml')
| -rw-r--r-- | .github/workflows/claude.yml | 51 |
1 files changed, 35 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/.github/workflows/claude.yml b/.github/workflows/claude.yml index a6ea7e396..66e36897c 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/claude.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/claude.yml @@ -6,27 +6,37 @@ on: pull_request_review_comment: types: [created] issues: - types: [opened, assigned] + # only "opened" — an issue's author_association gates the summon below; + # "assigned" would gate on the issue author, not the assigner, so a + # maintainer assigning an outsider's issue would be wrongly skipped. + types: [opened] pull_request_review: types: [submitted] jobs: claude: + # Only trusted actors (repo owner/member/collaborator) may summon @claude, so the + # write-scoped token and OAuth secret are never issued for an outside contributor's + # comment on this public repo. Defense-in-depth on top of the action's own check. if: | - (github.event_name == 'issue_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude')) || - (github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude')) || - (github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' && contains(github.event.review.body, '@claude')) || - (github.event_name == 'issues' && (contains(github.event.issue.body, '@claude') || contains(github.event.issue.title, '@claude'))) + (github.event_name == 'issue_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude') && + contains(fromJSON('["OWNER", "MEMBER", "COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.comment.author_association)) || + (github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude') && + contains(fromJSON('["OWNER", "MEMBER", "COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.comment.author_association)) || + (github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' && contains(github.event.review.body, '@claude') && + contains(fromJSON('["OWNER", "MEMBER", "COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.review.author_association)) || + (github.event_name == 'issues' && (contains(github.event.issue.body, '@claude') || contains(github.event.issue.title, '@claude')) && + contains(fromJSON('["OWNER", "MEMBER", "COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.issue.author_association)) runs-on: ubuntu-latest permissions: - contents: read - pull-requests: read - issues: read + contents: write # allow Claude to push commits/branches when asked + pull-requests: write # allow Claude to comment on / update PRs + issues: write # allow Claude to comment on / update issues id-token: write actions: read # Required for Claude to read CI results on PRs steps: - name: Checkout repository - uses: actions/checkout@v4 + uses: actions/checkout@v6 with: fetch-depth: 1 @@ -34,16 +44,25 @@ jobs: id: claude uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 with: - anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }} + claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }} # This is an optional setting that allows Claude to read CI results on PRs additional_permissions: | actions: read - # Optional: Give a custom prompt to Claude. If this is not specified, Claude will perform the instructions specified in the comment that tagged it. - # prompt: 'Update the pull request description to include a summary of changes.' + # Sign the bot's commits so they show as "Verified". The action commits + # automatically — on a PR comment it pushes to that PR's branch; on an + # issue comment it opens a new claude/* branch + PR with the fix. + use_commit_signing: true - # Optional: Add claude_args to customize behavior and configuration - # See https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action/blob/main/docs/usage.md - # or https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/claude-code/sdk#command-line for available options - # claude_args: '--model claude-opus-4-1-20250805 --allowed-tools Bash(gh pr:*)' + # No custom prompt: Claude performs the instructions in the @claude comment. + + # Deliberately NO Bash in the tool allowlist. @claude can be summoned on a + # fork PR (claude-code-review.yml even directs fork PRs here), and this job + # holds the OAuth secret + a write token. Any build/interpreter command + # (python -c, cmake/make custom targets, etc.) run against attacker- + # controlled PR content is arbitrary code + network execution, so no + # command allowlist can safely contain it. Claude still edits files and + # the action commits/opens the PR; the resulting commit is verified by the + # repo's CircleCI matrix. --max-turns gives room to investigate + fix. + claude_args: '--max-turns 30' |