The Driver Model description in README was removed by commit
65eb659e56fa (README: remove description about driver model
configuration options), and was revived by mistake by commit
b79dadf846e5 when resolving the conflict.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Acked-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>

621766: Under a specific set of conditions, executing a sequence of
	NEON or vfp load instructions can cause processor deadlock
Impacts: Every Cortex-A8 processors with revision lower than r2p1
Work around: Set L1NEON to 1

Based on ARM errata Document revision 20.0 (13 Nov 2010)

Signed-off-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Tested-by: Matt Porter <mporter@konsulko.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>

430973: Stale prediction on replaced inter working branch causes
	Cortex-A8 to execute in the wrong ARM/Thumb state
Impacts: Every Cortex-A8 processors with revision lower than r2p1
Work around: Set IBE to 1

Based on ARM errata Document revision 20.0 (13 Nov 2010)

Signed-off-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Tested-by: Matt Porter <mporter@konsulko.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>

454179: Stale prediction may inhibit target address misprediction on
	next predicted taken branch
Impacts: Every Cortex-A8 processors with revision lower than r2p1
Work around:  Set IBE and disable branch size mispredict to 1

Also provide a hook for SoC specific handling to take place if needed.

Based on ARM errata Document revision 20.0 (13 Nov 2010)

Signed-off-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Tested-by: Matt Porter <mporter@konsulko.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>

Add workaround for Cortex-A15 ARM erratum 798870 which says
"If back-to-back speculative cache line fills (fill A and fill B) are
issued from the L1 data cache of a CPU to the L2 cache, the second
request (fill B) is then cancelled, and the second request would have
detected a hazard against a recent write or eviction (write B) to the
same cache line as fill B then the L2 logic might deadlock."

Implementations for SoC families such as Exynos, OMAP5/DRA7 etc
will be widely different.

Every SoC has slightly different manner of setting up access to L2ACLR
and similar registers since the Secure Monitor handling of Secure
Monitor Call(smc) is diverse. Hence an weak function is introduced
which may be overriden to implement SoC specific accessor implementation.

Based on ARM errata Document revision 18.0 (22 Nov 2013)

Signed-off-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Tested-by: Matt Porter <mporter@konsulko.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>

Conflicts:
	README

Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>

All the DM-related configuration options are described in Kconfig
helps.  They should not be duplicated in README.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.m@jp.panasonic.com>
Acked-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>

At present SPL uses a single stack, either CONFIG_SPL_STACK or
CONFIG_SYS_INIT_SP_ADDR. Since some SPL features (such as MMC and
environment) require a lot of stack, some boards set CONFIG_SPL_STACK to
point into SDRAM. They then set up SDRAM very early, before board_init_f(),
so that the larger stack can be used.

This is an abuse of lowlevel_init(). That function should only be used for
essential start-up code which cannot be delayed. An example of a valid use is
when only part of the SPL code is visible/executable, and the SoC must be set
up so that board_init_f() can be reached. It should not be used for SDRAM
init, console init, etc.

Add a CONFIG_SPL_STACK_R option, which allows the stack to be moved to a new
address before board_init_r() is called in SPL.

The expected SPL flow (for CONFIG_SPL_FRAMEWORK) is documented in the README.

Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
For version 1:
Acked-by: Albert ARIBAUD <albert.u.boot@aribaud.net>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Roese <sr@denx.de>
Tested-by: Bo Shen <voice.shen@atmel.com>
Acked-by: Bo Shen <voice.shen@atmel.com>
Acked-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>
Tested-by: Heiko Schocher <hs@denx.de>

Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>

When the CPU is in non-secure (NS) mode (when running U-Boot under a
secure monitor), certain actions cannot be taken, since they would need
to write to secure-only registers. One example is configuring the ARM
architectural timer's CNTFRQ register.

We could support this in one of two ways:
1) Compile twice, once for secure mode (in which case anything goes) and
   once for non-secure mode (in which case certain actions are disabled).
   This complicates things, since everyone needs to keep track of
   different U-Boot binaries for different situations.
2) Detect NS mode at run-time, and optionally skip any impossible actions.
   This has the advantage of a single U-Boot binary working in all cases.

(2) is not possible on ARM in general, since there's no architectural way
to detect secure-vs-non-secure. However, there is a Tegra-specific way to
detect this.

This patches uses that feature to detect secure vs. NS mode on Tegra, and
uses that to:

* Skip the ARM arch timer initialization.

* Set/clear an environment variable so that boot scripts can take
  different action depending on which mode the CPU is in. This might be
  something like:
  if CPU is secure:
    load secure monitor code into RAM.
    boot secure monitor.
    secure monitor will restart (a new copy of) U-Boot in NS mode.
  else:
    execute normal boot process

Signed-off-by: Stephen Warren <swarren@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Warren <twarren@nvidia.com>