For passing the optional data of the load option to the loaded imaged protocol we need its size. efi_deserialize_load_option() is changed to return the size of the optional data. As a by-product we get a partial validation of the load option. Checking the length of the device path remains to be implemented. Some Coverity defects identified the load options as user input because get_unaligned_le32() and get_unaligned_le16() is called. But non of these Coverity defects can be resolved without marking functions with Coverity specific tags. Reported-by: Coverity (CID 303760) Reported-by: Coverity (CID 303768) Reported-by: Coverity (CID 303776) Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
The UEFI specification does not define a device sub-type for virtio. Let's use a vendor hardware node here. This avoids creation of two handles with the same device path indicating our root node. Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Move this header out of the common header. Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Move this uncommon header out of the common header. Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Virtually all callers of this function do the rounding on their own. Some do it right, some don't. Instead of doing this in each caller, do the rounding in efi_add_memory_map(). Change the size parameter to bytes instead of pages and remove aligning and size calculation in all callers. There is no more need to make the original efi_add_memory_map() (which takes pages as size) available outside the module. Thus rename it to efi_add_memory_map_pg() and make it static to prevent further misuse outside the module. Signed-off-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> Add missing comma in sunxi_display.c. Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
This function will check if a given handle to device is an EFI system partition. It will be utilised in implementing capsule-on-disk feature. Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Add function description. Return bool. Reviewed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
The guard doesn't make any difference, so remove it. Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Suggested-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
In subsequent patches UEFI variables shalled be stored on the EFI system partition. Hence we need to identify the EFI system partition. Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
With this commit, image validation can be enforced, as UEFI specification
section 32.5 describes, if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is enabled.
Currently we support
* authentication based on db and dbx,
so dbx-validated image will always be rejected.
* following signature types:
EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID (SHA256 digest for unsigned images)
EFI_CERT_X509_GUID (x509 certificate for signed images)
Timestamp-based certificate revocation is not supported here.
Internally, authentication data is stored in one of certificates tables
of PE image (See efi_image_parse()) and will be verified by
efi_image_authenticate() before loading a given image.
It seems that UEFI specification defines the verification process
in a bit ambiguous way. I tried to implement it as closely to as
EDK2 does.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
With this commit, EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS
is supported for authenticated variables and the system secure state
will transfer between setup mode and user mode as UEFI specification
section 32.3 describes.
Internally, authentication data is stored as part of authenticated
variable's value. It is nothing but a pkcs7 message (but we need some
wrapper, see efi_variable_parse_signature()) and will be validated by
efi_variable_authenticate(), hence efi_signature_verify_with_db().
Associated time value will be encoded in "{...,time=...}" along with
other UEFI variable's attributes.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>