u-boot.git/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c, branch v2020.10

efi_loader: save global data pointer on RISC-V

2020-09-14T21:28:52+00:00

On RISC-V the global data pointer is stored in register gp. When a UEFI
binary calls the EFI API we have to restore it.

Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt

efi_loader: remove duplicate image size check

2020-09-06T19:21:41+00:00

The image size is checked in efi_load_pe(). Avoid checking it twice.

Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt

efi_loader: document efi_save_gd(), efi_restore_gd()

2020-07-22T10:32:42+00:00

Provide function descriptions for efi_save_gd() and efi_restore_gd().

Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt

efi_loader: fix efi_get_child_controllers()

2020-07-11T21:14:16+00:00

Don't call calloc(0, ..).
Consider return value of efi_get_child_controllers().

Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt

efi_loader: allow compiling with clang

2020-06-03T15:19:17+00:00

On ARM systems gd is stored in register r9 or x18. When compiling with
clang gd is defined as a macro calling function gd_ptr(). So we can not
make assignments to gd.

In the UEFI sub-system we need to save gd when leaving to UEFI binaries and
have to restore gd when reentering U-Boot.

Define a new function set_gd() for setting gd and use it in the UEFI
sub-system.

Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt 
Tested-by: Tom Rini

common: Drop log.h from common header

2020-05-19T01:19:18+00:00

Move this header out of the common header.

Signed-off-by: Simon Glass

efi_loader: image_loader: support image authentication

2020-04-16T06:12:46+00:00

With this commit, image validation can be enforced, as UEFI specification
section 32.5 describes, if CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT is enabled.

Currently we support
* authentication based on db and dbx,
  so dbx-validated image will always be rejected.
* following signature types:
    EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID (SHA256 digest for unsigned images)
    EFI_CERT_X509_GUID (x509 certificate for signed images)
Timestamp-based certificate revocation is not supported here.

Internally, authentication data is stored in one of certificates tables
of PE image (See efi_image_parse()) and will be verified by
efi_image_authenticate() before loading a given image.

It seems that UEFI specification defines the verification process
in a bit ambiguous way. I tried to implement it as closely to as
EDK2 does.

Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro

efi_loader: export a couple of protocol related functions

2020-03-17T07:29:52+00:00

This is a preparatory patch.
Those functions will be used in an implementation of UEFI firmware
management protocol as part of my capsule update patch.

Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro

efi_loader: unnecessary assignment in efi_queue_event

2020-03-11T07:23:05+00:00

The assigned value NULL is never used.

Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt

efi_loader: describe returning of control

2020-01-14T23:51:51+00:00

Provide a sober description of how control can be returned by a UEFI
binary.

Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt