From c0c21d67f0654f9d3641b9dd3bdfd635110c2bc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heinrich Schuchardt Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2020 11:05:38 +0100 Subject: efi_loader: make variable store size customizable Currently the size of the buffer to keep UEFI variables in memory is fixed at 16384 bytes. This size has proven to be too small for some use cases. Make the size of the memory buffer for UEFI variables customizable. Reported-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas --- lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig index 073d90c802c..e7804913574 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig @@ -77,6 +77,20 @@ config EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE endif +config EFI_VAR_BUF_SIZE + int "Memory size of the UEFI variable store" + default 16384 + range 4096 2147483647 + help + This defines the size in bytes of the memory area reserved for keeping + UEFI variables. + + When using StandAloneMM (CONFIG_EFI_MM_COMM_TEE=y) this value should + match the value of PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize used to compile the + StandAloneMM module. + + Minimum 4096, default 16384. + config EFI_GET_TIME bool "GetTime() runtime service" depends on DM_RTC -- cgit v1.3.1 From ffa375e6e56f890468baf22bcb50ee3d0292a0c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ilias Apalodimas Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2020 13:25:00 +0200 Subject: efi_loader: Extra checks while opening an OPTEE session When opening an OP-TEE session we need to check the internal return value of OP-TEE call arguments as well the return code of the function itself. The code was also ignoring to close the OP-TEE session in case the shared memory registration failed. Fixes: f042e47e8fb43 ("efi_loader: Implement EFI variable handling via OP-TEE") Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt --- lib/efi_loader/efi_variable_tee.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable_tee.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable_tee.c index be6f3dfad46..b8808fdecad 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable_tee.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable_tee.c @@ -36,20 +36,29 @@ static int get_connection(struct mm_connection *conn) static const struct tee_optee_ta_uuid uuid = PTA_STMM_UUID; struct udevice *tee = NULL; struct tee_open_session_arg arg; - int rc; + int rc = -ENODEV; tee = tee_find_device(tee, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (!tee) - return -ENODEV; + goto out; memset(&arg, 0, sizeof(arg)); tee_optee_ta_uuid_to_octets(arg.uuid, &uuid); rc = tee_open_session(tee, &arg, 0, NULL); - if (!rc) { - conn->tee = tee; - conn->session = arg.session; + if (rc) + goto out; + + /* Check the internal OP-TEE result */ + if (arg.ret != TEE_SUCCESS) { + rc = -EIO; + goto out; } + conn->tee = tee; + conn->session = arg.session; + + return 0; +out: return rc; } @@ -88,6 +97,7 @@ static efi_status_t optee_mm_communicate(void *comm_buf, ulong dsize) if (tee_shm_register(conn.tee, comm_buf, buf_size, 0, &shm)) { log_err("Unable to register shared memory\n"); + tee_close_session(conn.tee, conn.session); return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; } -- cgit v1.3.1 From db6288de85dce4482712ac5ed59d78ef22cd9ab6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heinrich Schuchardt Date: Sun, 27 Dec 2020 15:33:09 +0100 Subject: efi_loader: missing parentheses after if IS_ENABLED() contains parentheses. But we should still put extra parentheses around it in an if statement for readability. Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt --- lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c index 03053e8660d..3ab5eb5ccc2 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c @@ -2161,7 +2161,7 @@ static efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_exit_boot_services(efi_handle_t image_handle, } if (!efi_st_keep_devices) { - if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB_DEVICE) + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_USB_DEVICE)) udc_disconnect(); board_quiesce_devices(); dm_remove_devices_flags(DM_REMOVE_ACTIVE_ALL); -- cgit v1.3.1 From 97d36f069d3362cd09b481fba94ee1de01a1f51b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heinrich Schuchardt Date: Sun, 27 Dec 2020 14:47:50 +0100 Subject: efi_loader: escape key handling Up to now the escape key was not correctly detected in UEFI applications. We had to hit it twice for a single escape to be recognized. Use a 10 ms delay to detect if we are dealing with the escape key or an escape sequence. Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt --- lib/efi_loader/efi_console.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_console.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_console.c index 011accab789..705109596eb 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_console.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_console.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #define EFI_COUT_MODE_2 2 #define EFI_MAX_COUT_MODE 3 @@ -688,6 +689,17 @@ static efi_status_t efi_cin_read_key(struct efi_key_data *key) switch (ch) { case 0x1b: + /* + * If a second key is received within 10 ms, assume that we are + * dealing with an escape sequence. Otherwise consider this the + * escape key being hit. 10 ms is long enough to work fine at + * 1200 baud and above. + */ + udelay(10000); + if (!tstc()) { + pressed_key.scan_code = 23; + break; + } /* * Xterm Control Sequences * https://www.xfree86.org/4.8.0/ctlseqs.html -- cgit v1.3.1 From 2a68cd492e91692f33425d02e7a0dcb24e06efc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heinrich Schuchardt Date: Sun, 27 Dec 2020 15:46:00 +0100 Subject: efi_loader: avoid invalid free load_options passed from do_efibootmgr() to do_bootefi_exec() may contain invalid data from the stack which will lead to an invalid free(). Fixes: 0ad64007feb9 ("efi_loader: set load options in boot manager") Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt --- lib/efi_loader/efi_bootmgr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_bootmgr.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_bootmgr.c index 61dc72a23da..d3be2f94c60 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_bootmgr.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_bootmgr.c @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static efi_status_t try_load_entry(u16 n, efi_handle_t *handle, memcpy(*load_options, lo.optional_data, size); ret = efi_set_load_options(*handle, size, *load_options); } else { - load_options = NULL; + *load_options = NULL; } error: -- cgit v1.3.1 From 2a0f80f058a7ebc65cfdf863801d5ac26ad68d4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heinrich Schuchardt Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2020 00:59:09 +0100 Subject: efi_loader: efi_signal_event() fix comment typos Add missing commas. Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt --- lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c index 3ab5eb5ccc2..a08630eef9f 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c @@ -274,8 +274,8 @@ efi_status_t is_valid_tpl(efi_uintn_t tpl) * efi_signal_event() - signal an EFI event * @event: event to signal * - * This function signals an event. If the event belongs to an event group all - * events of the group are signaled. If they are of type EVT_NOTIFY_SIGNAL + * This function signals an event. If the event belongs to an event group, all + * events of the group are signaled. If they are of type EVT_NOTIFY_SIGNAL, * their notification function is queued. * * For the SignalEvent service see efi_signal_event_ext. -- cgit v1.3.1 From f8212f09702f802ffab42769133e3114bd6e5e77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heinrich Schuchardt Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2020 23:24:40 +0100 Subject: efi_loader: use after free in efi_exit() Do not use data from the loaded image object after deleting it. Fixes: 126a43f15b36 ("efi_loader: unload applications upon Exit()") Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt --- include/efi_loader.h | 4 ++-- lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h index 280225a7c15..62a6c3de5a0 100644 --- a/include/efi_loader.h +++ b/include/efi_loader.h @@ -311,10 +311,10 @@ enum efi_image_auth_status { */ struct efi_loaded_image_obj { struct efi_object header; - efi_status_t exit_status; + efi_status_t *exit_status; efi_uintn_t *exit_data_size; u16 **exit_data; - struct jmp_buf_data exit_jmp; + struct jmp_buf_data *exit_jmp; EFIAPI efi_status_t (*entry)(efi_handle_t image_handle, struct efi_system_table *st); u16 image_type; diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c index a08630eef9f..b799fcf1f22 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c @@ -2978,6 +2978,8 @@ efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_start_image(efi_handle_t image_handle, efi_status_t ret; void *info; efi_handle_t parent_image = current_image; + efi_status_t exit_status; + struct jmp_buf_data exit_jmp; EFI_ENTRY("%p, %p, %p", image_handle, exit_data_size, exit_data); @@ -2999,9 +3001,11 @@ efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_start_image(efi_handle_t image_handle, image_obj->exit_data_size = exit_data_size; image_obj->exit_data = exit_data; + image_obj->exit_status = &exit_status; + image_obj->exit_jmp = &exit_jmp; /* call the image! */ - if (setjmp(&image_obj->exit_jmp)) { + if (setjmp(&exit_jmp)) { /* * We called the entry point of the child image with EFI_CALL * in the lines below. The child image called the Exit() boot @@ -3023,10 +3027,10 @@ efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_start_image(efi_handle_t image_handle, */ assert(__efi_entry_check()); EFI_PRINT("%lu returned by started image\n", - (unsigned long)((uintptr_t)image_obj->exit_status & + (unsigned long)((uintptr_t)exit_status & ~EFI_ERROR_MASK)); current_image = parent_image; - return EFI_EXIT(image_obj->exit_status); + return EFI_EXIT(exit_status); } current_image = image_handle; @@ -3209,6 +3213,7 @@ static efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_exit(efi_handle_t image_handle, struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_protocol; struct efi_loaded_image_obj *image_obj = (struct efi_loaded_image_obj *)image_handle; + struct jmp_buf_data *exit_jmp; EFI_ENTRY("%p, %ld, %zu, %p", image_handle, exit_status, exit_data_size, exit_data); @@ -3250,6 +3255,9 @@ static efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_exit(efi_handle_t image_handle, if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) EFI_PRINT("%s: out of memory\n", __func__); } + /* efi_delete_image() frees image_obj. Copy before the call. */ + exit_jmp = image_obj->exit_jmp; + *image_obj->exit_status = exit_status; if (image_obj->image_type == IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION || exit_status != EFI_SUCCESS) efi_delete_image(image_obj, loaded_image_protocol); @@ -3263,8 +3271,7 @@ static efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_exit(efi_handle_t image_handle, */ efi_restore_gd(); - image_obj->exit_status = exit_status; - longjmp(&image_obj->exit_jmp, 1); + longjmp(exit_jmp, 1); panic("EFI application exited"); out: -- cgit v1.3.1 From 0c4445283212599a1d59684f89428b23e63d19c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ilias Apalodimas Date: Thu, 31 Dec 2020 12:33:23 +0200 Subject: efi_loader: Remove unused headers from efi_load_initrd.c dm.h and env.h serve no purpose here. Remove them and sort the remaining in alphabetical order. Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt --- lib/efi_loader/efi_load_initrd.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_load_initrd.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_load_initrd.c index 4bf3b5ef684..b9ee8839054 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_load_initrd.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_load_initrd.c @@ -4,13 +4,11 @@ */ #include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include #include #include +#include +#include +#include static efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_load_file2_initrd(struct efi_load_file_protocol *this, -- cgit v1.3.1 From 47d2b3b9c98e1adf231f8143bc01b0046ebd5c9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ilias Apalodimas Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2020 17:07:14 +0200 Subject: efi_loader: Remove unconditional installation of file2 protocol for initrd Up to now we install the EFI_LOAD_FILE2_PROTOCOL to load an initrd unconditionally. Although we correctly return various EFI exit codes depending on the file status (i.e EFI_NO_MEDIA, EFI_NOT_FOUND etc), the kernel loader only falls back to the cmdline interpreted initrd if the protocol is not installed. This creates a problem for EFI installers, since they won't be able to load their own initrd and start the installation. A following patch introduces a different logic where we search for an initrd path defined in an EFI variable named 'Initrd####'. If the bootmgr is used to launch the EFI payload, we'll will try to match the BootCurrent value and find the corresponding initrd (i.e Boot0000 -> Initrd0000 etc). If the file is found, we'll install the required protocol which the kernel's efi-stub can use and load our initrd. Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt --- lib/efi_loader/efi_setup.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_setup.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_setup.c index ce6292f559b..5800cbf6d46 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_setup.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_setup.c @@ -257,11 +257,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_init_obj_list(void) if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) goto out; #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_LOAD_FILE2_INITRD - ret = efi_initrd_register(); - if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) - goto out; -#endif #ifdef CONFIG_NET ret = efi_net_register(); if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) -- cgit v1.3.1 From fe179d7fb5c10d8a4e299af06c766f47f2c8d51a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ilias Apalodimas Date: Thu, 31 Dec 2020 12:26:46 +0200 Subject: efi_loader: Add size checks to efi_create_indexed_name() Although the function description states the caller must provide a sufficient buffer, it's better to have in function checks that the destination buffer can hold the intended value. So let's add an extra argument with the buffer size and check that before doing any copying. Signed-off-by: Ilias Apalodimas Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt --- include/efi_loader.h | 3 ++- lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c | 7 ++++--- lib/efi_loader/efi_string.c | 10 ++++++++-- test/unicode_ut.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h index 62a6c3de5a0..790d4bf64c9 100644 --- a/include/efi_loader.h +++ b/include/efi_loader.h @@ -824,7 +824,8 @@ bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp, void efi_memcpy_runtime(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n); /* commonly used helper function */ -u16 *efi_create_indexed_name(u16 *buffer, const char *name, unsigned int index); +u16 *efi_create_indexed_name(u16 *buffer, size_t buffer_size, const char *name, + unsigned int index); extern const struct efi_firmware_management_protocol efi_fmp_fit; extern const struct efi_firmware_management_protocol efi_fmp_raw; diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c index ea22ee79684..4ef25462678 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c @@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ void set_capsule_result(int index, struct efi_capsule_header *capsule, struct efi_time time; efi_status_t ret; - efi_create_indexed_name(variable_name16, "Capsule", index); - + efi_create_indexed_name(variable_name16, sizeof(variable_name16), + "Capsule", index); result.variable_total_size = sizeof(result); result.capsule_guid = capsule->capsule_guid; ret = EFI_CALL((*efi_runtime_services.get_time)(&time, NULL)); @@ -896,7 +896,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_launch_capsules(void) free(files); /* CapsuleLast */ - efi_create_indexed_name(variable_name16, "Capsule", index - 1); + efi_create_indexed_name(variable_name16, sizeof(variable_name16), + "Capsule", index - 1); efi_set_variable_int(L"CapsuleLast", &efi_guid_capsule_report, EFI_VARIABLE_READ_ONLY | EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_string.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_string.c index 3de721f06c7..96272422886 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_string.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_string.c @@ -23,13 +23,19 @@ * Return: A pointer to the next position after the created string * in @buffer, or NULL otherwise */ -u16 *efi_create_indexed_name(u16 *buffer, const char *name, unsigned int index) +u16 *efi_create_indexed_name(u16 *buffer, size_t buffer_size, const char *name, + unsigned int index) { u16 *p = buffer; char index_buf[5]; + size_t size; + size = (utf8_utf16_strlen(name) * sizeof(u16) + + sizeof(index_buf) * sizeof(u16)); + if (buffer_size < size) + return NULL; utf8_utf16_strcpy(&p, name); - sprintf(index_buf, "%04X", index); + snprintf(index_buf, sizeof(index_buf), "%04X", index); utf8_utf16_strcpy(&p, index_buf); return p; diff --git a/test/unicode_ut.c b/test/unicode_ut.c index 33fc8b0ee1e..6130ef0b549 100644 --- a/test/unicode_ut.c +++ b/test/unicode_ut.c @@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ static int unicode_test_efi_create_indexed_name(struct unit_test_state *uts) u16 *pos; memset(buf, 0xeb, sizeof(buf)); - pos = efi_create_indexed_name(buf, "Capsule", 0x0af9); + pos = efi_create_indexed_name(buf, sizeof(buf), "Capsule", 0x0af9); ut_asserteq_mem(expected, buf, sizeof(expected)); ut_asserteq(pos - buf, u16_strnlen(buf, SIZE_MAX)); -- cgit v1.3.1 From b7d186f07168eca28ca0719a0fc13fb21a97b6e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heinrich Schuchardt Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2020 00:25:34 +0100 Subject: efi_loader: event queueing When a new event is queued we have to process the event queue by calling efi_process_event_queue(). But there is not reason to call the function when the event is not queueable. Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt --- lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c index b799fcf1f22..b2cb0160c08 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_boottime.c @@ -247,8 +247,8 @@ static void efi_queue_event(struct efi_event *event) } if (event) list_add_tail(&event->queue_link, &efi_event_queue); + efi_process_event_queue(); } - efi_process_event_queue(); } /** -- cgit v1.3.1 From 4366a2440ae141c44d2041c92f3662016c6869e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sughosh Ganu Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2020 19:27:01 +0530 Subject: crypto: Fix the logic to calculate hash with authattributes set RFC 2315 Section 9.3 describes the message digesting process. The digest calculated depends on whether the authenticated attributes are present. In case of a scenario where the authenticated attributes are present, the message digest that gets signed and is part of the pkcs7 message is computed from the auth attributes rather than the contents field. Check if the auth attributes are present, and if set, use the auth attributes to compute the hash that would be compared with the encrypted hash on the pkcs7 message. Signed-off-by: Sughosh Ganu --- lib/crypto/pkcs7_verify.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/crypto/pkcs7_verify.c b/lib/crypto/pkcs7_verify.c index 320ba49f79d..58683ef614c 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/lib/crypto/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -50,8 +50,15 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, struct image_region regions[2]; int ret = 0; - /* The digest was calculated already. */ - if (sig->digest) + /* + * [RFC2315 9.3] + * If the authenticated attributes are present, + * the message-digest is calculated on the + * attributes present in the + * authenticatedAttributes field and not just + * the contents field + */ + if (!sinfo->authattrs && sig->digest) return 0; if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo) @@ -63,17 +70,25 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, else return -ENOPKG; - sig->digest = calloc(1, sig->digest_size); - if (!sig->digest) { - pr_warn("Sig %u: Out of memory\n", sinfo->index); - return -ENOMEM; - } + /* + * Calculate the hash only if the data is present. + * In case of authenticated variable and capsule, + * the hash has already been calculated on the + * efi_image_regions and populated + */ + if (pkcs7->data) { + sig->digest = calloc(1, sig->digest_size); + if (!sig->digest) { + pr_warn("Sig %u: Out of memory\n", sinfo->index); + return -ENOMEM; + } - regions[0].data = pkcs7->data; - regions[0].size = pkcs7->data_len; + regions[0].data = pkcs7->data; + regions[0].size = pkcs7->data_len; - /* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */ - hash_calculate(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, regions, 1, sig->digest); + /* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */ + hash_calculate(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, regions, 1, sig->digest); + } /* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a * message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the -- cgit v1.3.1 From 675b62e12f9db639bd5ebcfd6c68b46d66a46a3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sughosh Ganu Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2020 19:27:05 +0530 Subject: efi_loader: Add logic to parse EDKII specific fmp payload header When building the capsule using scripts in edk2, a fmp header is added on top of the binary payload. Add logic to detect presence of the header. When present, the pointer to the image needs to be adjusted as per the size of the header to point to the actual binary payload. Signed-off-by: Sughosh Ganu --- lib/efi_loader/efi_firmware.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_firmware.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_firmware.c index 72c560dbc22..5d2ecde2f15 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_firmware.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_firmware.c @@ -11,8 +11,30 @@ #include #include #include +#include + #include +#define FMP_PAYLOAD_HDR_SIGNATURE SIGNATURE_32('M', 'S', 'S', '1') + +/** + * struct fmp_payload_header - EDK2 header for the FMP payload + * + * This structure describes the header which is preprended to the + * FMP payload by the edk2 capsule generation scripts. + * + * @signature: Header signature used to identify the header + * @header_size: Size of the structure + * @fw_version: Firmware versions used + * @lowest_supported_version: Lowest supported version + */ +struct fmp_payload_header { + u32 signature; + u32 header_size; + u32 fw_version; + u32 lowest_supported_version; +}; + /* Place holder; not supported */ static efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_firmware_get_image_unsupported( @@ -379,12 +401,31 @@ efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_firmware_raw_set_image( efi_status_t (*progress)(efi_uintn_t completion), u16 **abort_reason) { + u32 fmp_hdr_signature; + struct fmp_payload_header *header; + EFI_ENTRY("%p %d %p %ld %p %p %p\n", this, image_index, image, image_size, vendor_code, progress, abort_reason); if (!image) return EFI_EXIT(EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER); + fmp_hdr_signature = FMP_PAYLOAD_HDR_SIGNATURE; + header = (void *)image; + + if (!memcmp(&header->signature, &fmp_hdr_signature, + sizeof(fmp_hdr_signature))) { + /* + * When building the capsule with the scripts in + * edk2, a FMP header is inserted above the capsule + * payload. Compensate for this header to get the + * actual payload that is to be updated. + */ + image += header->header_size; + image_size -= header->header_size; + + } + if (dfu_write_by_alt(image_index - 1, (void *)image, image_size, NULL, NULL)) return EFI_EXIT(EFI_DEVICE_ERROR); -- cgit v1.3.1 From 201b8068f35385c1c7794f24d0a3ac427210f241 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sughosh Ganu Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2020 19:27:07 +0530 Subject: efi_loader: Make the pkcs7 header parsing function an extern The pkcs7 header parsing functionality is pretty generic, and can be used by other features like capsule authentication. Make the function an extern, also changing it's name to efi_parse_pkcs7_header Signed-off-by: Sughosh Ganu --- include/efi_loader.h | 4 ++ lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c | 93 ++---------------------------------------- 3 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h index 790d4bf64c9..f1dfb1d33fd 100644 --- a/include/efi_loader.h +++ b/include/efi_loader.h @@ -820,6 +820,10 @@ bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void); bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp, WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len); +struct pkcs7_message *efi_parse_pkcs7_header(const void *buf, + size_t buflen, + u8 **tmpbuf); + /* runtime implementation of memcpy() */ void efi_memcpy_runtime(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n); diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c index 79dee27421b..9ab071b6114 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c @@ -27,6 +27,91 @@ const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID; #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT +static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = { + /* SEQUENCE */ + 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7, + /* OID: pkcs7-signedData */ + 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02, + /* Context Structured? */ + 0xa0, 0x82, 0x05, 0xb8, +}; + +/** + * efi_parse_pkcs7_header - parse a signature in payload + * @buf: Pointer to payload's value + * @buflen: Length of @buf + * @tmpbuf: Pointer to temporary buffer + * + * Parse a signature embedded in payload's value and instantiate + * a pkcs7_message structure. Since pkcs7_parse_message() accepts only + * pkcs7's signedData, some header needed be prepended for correctly + * parsing authentication data + * A temporary buffer will be allocated if needed, and it should be + * kept valid during the authentication because some data in the buffer + * will be referenced by efi_signature_verify(). + * + * Return: Pointer to pkcs7_message structure on success, NULL on error + */ +struct pkcs7_message *efi_parse_pkcs7_header(const void *buf, + size_t buflen, + u8 **tmpbuf) +{ + u8 *ebuf; + size_t ebuflen, len; + struct pkcs7_message *msg; + + /* + * This is the best assumption to check if the binary is + * already in a form of pkcs7's signedData. + */ + if (buflen > sizeof(pkcs7_hdr) && + !memcmp(&((u8 *)buf)[4], &pkcs7_hdr[4], 11)) { + msg = pkcs7_parse_message(buf, buflen); + if (IS_ERR(msg)) + return NULL; + return msg; + } + + /* + * Otherwise, we should add a dummy prefix sequence for pkcs7 + * message parser to be able to process. + * NOTE: EDK2 also uses similar hack in WrapPkcs7Data() + * in CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/Pk/CryptPkcs7VerifyCommon.c + * TODO: + * The header should be composed in a more refined manner. + */ + EFI_PRINT("Makeshift prefix added to authentication data\n"); + ebuflen = sizeof(pkcs7_hdr) + buflen; + if (ebuflen <= 0x7f) { + EFI_PRINT("Data is too short\n"); + return NULL; + } + + ebuf = malloc(ebuflen); + if (!ebuf) { + EFI_PRINT("Out of memory\n"); + return NULL; + } + + memcpy(ebuf, pkcs7_hdr, sizeof(pkcs7_hdr)); + memcpy(ebuf + sizeof(pkcs7_hdr), buf, buflen); + len = ebuflen - 4; + ebuf[2] = (len >> 8) & 0xff; + ebuf[3] = len & 0xff; + len = ebuflen - 0x13; + ebuf[0x11] = (len >> 8) & 0xff; + ebuf[0x12] = len & 0xff; + + msg = pkcs7_parse_message(ebuf, ebuflen); + + if (IS_ERR(msg)) { + free(ebuf); + return NULL; + } + + *tmpbuf = ebuf; + return msg; +} /** * efi_hash_regions - calculate a hash value diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c index 0c689cfb470..ba0874e9e78 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_variable.c @@ -24,91 +24,6 @@ #include #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT -static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = { - /* SEQUENCE */ - 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7, - /* OID: pkcs7-signedData */ - 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02, - /* Context Structured? */ - 0xa0, 0x82, 0x05, 0xb8, -}; - -/** - * efi_variable_parse_signature - parse a signature in variable - * @buf: Pointer to variable's value - * @buflen: Length of @buf - * @tmpbuf: Pointer to temporary buffer - * - * Parse a signature embedded in variable's value and instantiate - * a pkcs7_message structure. Since pkcs7_parse_message() accepts only - * pkcs7's signedData, some header needed be prepended for correctly - * parsing authentication data, particularly for variable's. - * A temporary buffer will be allocated if needed, and it should be - * kept valid during the authentication because some data in the buffer - * will be referenced by efi_signature_verify(). - * - * Return: Pointer to pkcs7_message structure on success, NULL on error - */ -static struct pkcs7_message *efi_variable_parse_signature(const void *buf, - size_t buflen, - u8 **tmpbuf) -{ - u8 *ebuf; - size_t ebuflen, len; - struct pkcs7_message *msg; - - /* - * This is the best assumption to check if the binary is - * already in a form of pkcs7's signedData. - */ - if (buflen > sizeof(pkcs7_hdr) && - !memcmp(&((u8 *)buf)[4], &pkcs7_hdr[4], 11)) { - msg = pkcs7_parse_message(buf, buflen); - if (IS_ERR(msg)) - return NULL; - return msg; - } - - /* - * Otherwise, we should add a dummy prefix sequence for pkcs7 - * message parser to be able to process. - * NOTE: EDK2 also uses similar hack in WrapPkcs7Data() - * in CryptoPkg/Library/BaseCryptLib/Pk/CryptPkcs7VerifyCommon.c - * TODO: - * The header should be composed in a more refined manner. - */ - EFI_PRINT("Makeshift prefix added to authentication data\n"); - ebuflen = sizeof(pkcs7_hdr) + buflen; - if (ebuflen <= 0x7f) { - EFI_PRINT("Data is too short\n"); - return NULL; - } - - ebuf = malloc(ebuflen); - if (!ebuf) { - EFI_PRINT("Out of memory\n"); - return NULL; - } - - memcpy(ebuf, pkcs7_hdr, sizeof(pkcs7_hdr)); - memcpy(ebuf + sizeof(pkcs7_hdr), buf, buflen); - len = ebuflen - 4; - ebuf[2] = (len >> 8) & 0xff; - ebuf[3] = len & 0xff; - len = ebuflen - 0x13; - ebuf[0x11] = (len >> 8) & 0xff; - ebuf[0x12] = len & 0xff; - - msg = pkcs7_parse_message(ebuf, ebuflen); - - if (IS_ERR(msg)) { - free(ebuf); - return NULL; - } - - *tmpbuf = ebuf; - return msg; -} /** * efi_variable_authenticate - authenticate a variable @@ -215,10 +130,10 @@ static efi_status_t efi_variable_authenticate(u16 *variable, goto err; /* ebuf should be kept valid during the authentication */ - var_sig = efi_variable_parse_signature(auth->auth_info.cert_data, - auth->auth_info.hdr.dwLength - - sizeof(auth->auth_info), - &ebuf); + var_sig = efi_parse_pkcs7_header(auth->auth_info.cert_data, + auth->auth_info.hdr.dwLength + - sizeof(auth->auth_info), + &ebuf); if (!var_sig) { EFI_PRINT("Parsing variable's signature failed\n"); goto err; -- cgit v1.3.1 From b4f20a5d83f0b8a5c30128966eabe68748631e66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sughosh Ganu Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2020 19:27:08 +0530 Subject: efi_loader: Re-factor code to build the signature store from efi signature list The efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb function reads the uefi authenticated variable, stored in the signature database format and builds the signature store structure. Factor out the code for building the signature store. This can then be used by the capsule authentication routine to build the signature store even when the signature database is not stored as an uefi authenticated variable Signed-off-by: Sughosh Ganu --- include/efi_loader.h | 2 + lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h index f1dfb1d33fd..7fd65eeb8db 100644 --- a/include/efi_loader.h +++ b/include/efi_loader.h @@ -813,6 +813,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs, int nocheck); void efi_sigstore_free(struct efi_signature_store *sigstore); +struct efi_signature_store *efi_build_signature_store(void *sig_list, + efi_uintn_t size); struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name); bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void); diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c index 9ab071b6114..87525bdc804 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c @@ -736,6 +736,63 @@ err: return NULL; } +/** + * efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb - parse the signature list and populate + * the signature store + * + * @sig_list: Pointer to the signature list + * @size: Size of the signature list + * + * Parse the efi signature list and instantiate a signature store + * structure. + * + * Return: Pointer to signature store on success, NULL on error + */ +struct efi_signature_store *efi_build_signature_store(void *sig_list, + efi_uintn_t size) +{ + struct efi_signature_list *esl; + struct efi_signature_store *sigstore = NULL, *siglist; + + esl = sig_list; + while (size > 0) { + /* List must exist if there is remaining data. */ + if (size < sizeof(*esl)) { + EFI_PRINT("Signature list in wrong format\n"); + goto err; + } + + if (size < esl->signature_list_size) { + EFI_PRINT("Signature list in wrong format\n"); + goto err; + } + + /* Parse a single siglist. */ + siglist = efi_sigstore_parse_siglist(esl); + if (!siglist) { + EFI_PRINT("Parsing of signature list of failed\n"); + goto err; + } + + /* Append siglist */ + siglist->next = sigstore; + sigstore = siglist; + + /* Next */ + size -= esl->signature_list_size; + esl = (void *)esl + esl->signature_list_size; + } + free(sig_list); + + return sigstore; + +err: + efi_sigstore_free(sigstore); + free(sig_list); + + return NULL; +} + /** * efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb - parse a signature database variable * @name: Variable's name @@ -747,8 +804,7 @@ err: */ struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name) { - struct efi_signature_store *sigstore = NULL, *siglist; - struct efi_signature_list *esl; + struct efi_signature_store *sigstore = NULL; const efi_guid_t *vendor; void *db; efi_uintn_t db_size; @@ -784,47 +840,10 @@ struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name) ret = EFI_CALL(efi_get_variable(name, vendor, NULL, &db_size, db)); if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { EFI_PRINT("Getting variable, %ls, failed\n", name); - goto err; - } - - /* Parse siglist list */ - esl = db; - while (db_size > 0) { - /* List must exist if there is remaining data. */ - if (db_size < sizeof(*esl)) { - EFI_PRINT("variable, %ls, in wrong format\n", name); - goto err; - } - - if (db_size < esl->signature_list_size) { - EFI_PRINT("variable, %ls, in wrong format\n", name); - goto err; - } - - /* Parse a single siglist. */ - siglist = efi_sigstore_parse_siglist(esl); - if (!siglist) { - EFI_PRINT("Parsing signature list of %ls failed\n", - name); - goto err; - } - - /* Append siglist */ - siglist->next = sigstore; - sigstore = siglist; - - /* Next */ - db_size -= esl->signature_list_size; - esl = (void *)esl + esl->signature_list_size; + free(db); + return NULL; } - free(db); - - return sigstore; -err: - efi_sigstore_free(sigstore); - free(db); - - return NULL; + return efi_build_signature_store(db, db_size); } #endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ -- cgit v1.3.1 From 04be98bd6bcfccf3ab028fda0ca962dd00f61260 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sughosh Ganu Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2020 19:27:09 +0530 Subject: efi: capsule: Add support for uefi capsule authentication Add support for authenticating uefi capsules. Most of the signature verification functionality is shared with the uefi secure boot feature. The root certificate containing the public key used for the signature verification is stored as part of the device tree blob. The root certificate is stored as an efi signature list(esl) file -- this file contains the x509 certificate which is the root certificate. Signed-off-by: Sughosh Ganu --- board/emulation/common/Makefile | 1 + board/emulation/common/qemu_capsule.c | 48 +++++++++++++ include/efi_api.h | 18 +++++ include/efi_loader.h | 6 ++ lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 17 +++++ lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c | 122 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 4 +- 7 files changed, 214 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 board/emulation/common/qemu_capsule.c (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/board/emulation/common/Makefile b/board/emulation/common/Makefile index c5b452e7e34..7ed447a69dc 100644 --- a/board/emulation/common/Makefile +++ b/board/emulation/common/Makefile @@ -2,3 +2,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYS_MTDPARTS_RUNTIME) += qemu_mtdparts.o obj-$(CONFIG_SET_DFU_ALT_INFO) += qemu_dfu.o +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT) += qemu_capsule.o diff --git a/board/emulation/common/qemu_capsule.c b/board/emulation/common/qemu_capsule.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f1d403501a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/board/emulation/common/qemu_capsule.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2020 Linaro Limited + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR; + +int efi_get_public_key_data(void **pkey, efi_uintn_t *pkey_len) +{ + const void *fdt_blob = gd->fdt_blob; + const void *blob; + const char *cnode_name = "capsule-key"; + const char *snode_name = "signature"; + int sig_node; + int len; + + sig_node = fdt_subnode_offset(fdt_blob, 0, snode_name); + if (sig_node < 0) { + EFI_PRINT("Unable to get signature node offset\n"); + return -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND; + } + + blob = fdt_getprop(fdt_blob, sig_node, cnode_name, &len); + + if (!blob || len < 0) { + EFI_PRINT("Unable to get capsule-key value\n"); + *pkey = NULL; + *pkey_len = 0; + return -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND; + } + + *pkey = (void *)blob; + *pkey_len = len; + + return 0; +} + +bool efi_capsule_auth_enabled(void) +{ + return env_get("capsule_authentication_enabled") != NULL ? + true : false; +} diff --git a/include/efi_api.h b/include/efi_api.h index e82d4ca9ff4..ecb43a06070 100644 --- a/include/efi_api.h +++ b/include/efi_api.h @@ -1812,6 +1812,24 @@ struct efi_variable_authentication_2 { struct win_certificate_uefi_guid auth_info; } __attribute__((__packed__)); +/** + * efi_firmware_image_authentication - Capsule authentication method + * descriptor + * + * This structure describes an authentication information for + * a capsule with IMAGE_ATTRIBUTE_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED set + * and should be included as part of the capsule. + * Only EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID is accepted. + * + * @monotonic_count: Count to prevent replay + * @auth_info: Authentication info + */ +struct efi_firmware_image_authentication { + uint64_t monotonic_count; + struct win_certificate_uefi_guid auth_info; +} __attribute__((__packed__)); + + /** * efi_signature_data - A format of signature * diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h index 7fd65eeb8db..4719fa93f06 100644 --- a/include/efi_loader.h +++ b/include/efi_loader.h @@ -819,6 +819,8 @@ struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name); bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void); +bool efi_capsule_auth_enabled(void); + bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp, WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len); @@ -847,6 +849,10 @@ efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_query_capsule_caps( u64 *maximum_capsule_size, u32 *reset_type); +efi_status_t efi_capsule_authenticate(const void *capsule, + efi_uintn_t capsule_size, + void **image, efi_uintn_t *image_size); + #define EFI_CAPSULE_DIR L"\\EFI\\UpdateCapsule\\" /* Hook at initialization */ diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig index e7804913574..fdf245dea30 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig @@ -153,6 +153,23 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT Select this option if you want to enable capsule-based firmware update using Firmware Management Protocol. +config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE + bool "Update Capsule authentication" + depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE + depends on EFI_CAPSULE_ON_DISK + depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT + select SHA256 + select RSA + select RSA_VERIFY + select RSA_VERIFY_WITH_PKEY + select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER + select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER + select PKCS7_VERIFY + default n + help + Select this option if you want to enable capsule + authentication + config EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_FIT bool "FMP driver for FIT image" depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c index 4ef25462678..dad1b0fcf7c 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_capsule.c @@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ #include #include +#include +#include +#include + const efi_guid_t efi_guid_capsule_report = EFI_CAPSULE_REPORT_GUID; static const efi_guid_t efi_guid_firmware_management_capsule_id = EFI_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT_CAPSULE_ID_GUID; @@ -191,6 +195,124 @@ skip: return NULL; } +#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE) + +const efi_guid_t efi_guid_capsule_root_cert_guid = + EFI_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT_CAPSULE_ID_GUID; + +__weak int efi_get_public_key_data(void **pkey, efi_uintn_t *pkey_len) +{ + /* The platform is supposed to provide + * a method for getting the public key + * stored in the form of efi signature + * list + */ + return 0; +} + +efi_status_t efi_capsule_authenticate(const void *capsule, efi_uintn_t capsule_size, + void **image, efi_uintn_t *image_size) +{ + u8 *buf; + int ret; + void *fdt_pkey, *pkey; + efi_uintn_t pkey_len; + uint64_t monotonic_count; + struct efi_signature_store *truststore; + struct pkcs7_message *capsule_sig; + struct efi_image_regions *regs; + struct efi_firmware_image_authentication *auth_hdr; + efi_status_t status; + + status = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; + capsule_sig = NULL; + truststore = NULL; + regs = NULL; + + /* Sanity checks */ + if (capsule == NULL || capsule_size == 0) + goto out; + + auth_hdr = (struct efi_firmware_image_authentication *)capsule; + if (capsule_size < sizeof(*auth_hdr)) + goto out; + + if (auth_hdr->auth_info.hdr.dwLength <= + offsetof(struct win_certificate_uefi_guid, cert_data)) + goto out; + + if (guidcmp(&auth_hdr->auth_info.cert_type, &efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7)) + goto out; + + *image = (uint8_t *)capsule + sizeof(auth_hdr->monotonic_count) + + auth_hdr->auth_info.hdr.dwLength; + *image_size = capsule_size - auth_hdr->auth_info.hdr.dwLength - + sizeof(auth_hdr->monotonic_count); + memcpy(&monotonic_count, &auth_hdr->monotonic_count, + sizeof(monotonic_count)); + + /* data to be digested */ + regs = calloc(sizeof(*regs) + sizeof(struct image_region) * 2, 1); + if (!regs) + goto out; + + regs->max = 2; + efi_image_region_add(regs, (uint8_t *)*image, + (uint8_t *)*image + *image_size, 1); + + efi_image_region_add(regs, (uint8_t *)&monotonic_count, + (uint8_t *)&monotonic_count + sizeof(monotonic_count), + 1); + + capsule_sig = efi_parse_pkcs7_header(auth_hdr->auth_info.cert_data, + auth_hdr->auth_info.hdr.dwLength + - sizeof(auth_hdr->auth_info), + &buf); + if (IS_ERR(capsule_sig)) { + debug("Parsing variable's pkcs7 header failed\n"); + capsule_sig = NULL; + goto out; + } + + ret = efi_get_public_key_data(&fdt_pkey, &pkey_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + pkey = malloc(pkey_len); + if (!pkey) + goto out; + + memcpy(pkey, fdt_pkey, pkey_len); + truststore = efi_build_signature_store(pkey, pkey_len); + if (!truststore) + goto out; + + /* verify signature */ + if (efi_signature_verify(regs, capsule_sig, truststore, NULL)) { + debug("Verified\n"); + } else { + debug("Verifying variable's signature failed\n"); + goto out; + } + + status = EFI_SUCCESS; + +out: + efi_sigstore_free(truststore); + pkcs7_free_message(capsule_sig); + free(regs); + + return status; +} +#else +efi_status_t efi_capsule_authenticate(const void *capsule, efi_uintn_t capsule_size, + void **image, efi_uintn_t *image_size) +{ + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE */ + + /** * efi_capsule_update_firmware - update firmware from capsule * @capsule_data: Capsule diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c index 87525bdc804..c7ec2754147 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509 = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID; -#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT +#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT) || defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE) static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = { /* SEQUENCE */ 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7, @@ -846,4 +846,4 @@ struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name) return efi_build_signature_store(db, db_size); } -#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT */ +#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT || CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE */ -- cgit v1.3.1 From 88a2ef2720f58508d763c66e1033604edb97590b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sughosh Ganu Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2020 19:27:10 +0530 Subject: efi_loader: Enable uefi capsule authentication Add support for enabling uefi capsule authentication. This feature is enabled by setting the environment variable "capsule_authentication_enabled". The following configs are needed for enabling uefi capsule update and capsule authentication features on the platform. CONFIG_EFI_HAVE_CAPSULE_SUPPORT=y CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_ON_DISK=y CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT=y CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE=y CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_RAW=y CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE=y Signed-off-by: Sughosh Ganu --- lib/efi_loader/efi_firmware.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_firmware.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_firmware.c index 5d2ecde2f15..5e401bbca2b 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_firmware.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_firmware.c @@ -184,9 +184,16 @@ static efi_status_t efi_get_dfu_info( image_info[i].version_name = NULL; /* not supported */ image_info[i].size = 0; image_info[i].attributes_supported = - IMAGE_ATTRIBUTE_IMAGE_UPDATABLE; + IMAGE_ATTRIBUTE_IMAGE_UPDATABLE | + IMAGE_ATTRIBUTE_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED; image_info[i].attributes_setting = IMAGE_ATTRIBUTE_IMAGE_UPDATABLE; + + /* Check if the capsule authentication is enabled */ + if (env_get("capsule_authentication_enabled")) + image_info[0].attributes_setting |= + IMAGE_ATTRIBUTE_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED; + image_info[i].lowest_supported_image_version = 0; image_info[i].last_attempt_version = 0; image_info[i].last_attempt_status = LAST_ATTEMPT_STATUS_SUCCESS; @@ -403,6 +410,9 @@ efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_firmware_raw_set_image( { u32 fmp_hdr_signature; struct fmp_payload_header *header; + void *capsule_payload; + efi_status_t status; + efi_uintn_t capsule_payload_size; EFI_ENTRY("%p %d %p %ld %p %p %p\n", this, image_index, image, image_size, vendor_code, progress, abort_reason); @@ -410,6 +420,30 @@ efi_status_t EFIAPI efi_firmware_raw_set_image( if (!image) return EFI_EXIT(EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER); + /* Authenticate the capsule if authentication enabled */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE) && + env_get("capsule_authentication_enabled")) { + capsule_payload = NULL; + capsule_payload_size = 0; + status = efi_capsule_authenticate(image, image_size, + &capsule_payload, + &capsule_payload_size); + + if (status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + printf("Capsule authentication check failed. Aborting update\n"); + return EFI_EXIT(status); + } else if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + return EFI_EXIT(status); + } + + debug("Capsule authentication successfull\n"); + image = capsule_payload; + image_size = capsule_payload_size; + } else { + debug("Capsule authentication disabled. "); + debug("Updating capsule without authenticating.\n"); + } + fmp_hdr_signature = FMP_PAYLOAD_HDR_SIGNATURE; header = (void *)image; -- cgit v1.3.1