From 0344c602eadc0802776b65ff90f0a02c856cf53c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tom Rini Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 13:56:50 -0600 Subject: Squashed 'lib/mbedtls/external/mbedtls/' content from commit 2ca6c285a0dd git-subtree-dir: lib/mbedtls/external/mbedtls git-subtree-split: 2ca6c285a0dd3f33982dd57299012dacab1ff206 --- library/.gitignore | 11 + library/CMakeLists.txt | 357 + library/Makefile | 403 + library/aes.c | 2294 ++++++ library/aesce.c | 618 ++ library/aesce.h | 136 + library/aesni.c | 835 ++ library/aesni.h | 162 + library/alignment.h | 684 ++ library/aria.c | 969 +++ library/asn1parse.c | 468 ++ library/asn1write.c | 437 ++ library/base64.c | 299 + library/base64_internal.h | 45 + library/bignum.c | 2464 ++++++ library/bignum_core.c | 895 +++ library/bignum_core.h | 763 ++ library/bignum_mod.c | 394 + library/bignum_mod.h | 452 ++ library/bignum_mod_raw.c | 276 + library/bignum_mod_raw.h | 416 + library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h | 34 + library/block_cipher.c | 203 + library/block_cipher_internal.h | 99 + library/bn_mul.h | 1094 +++ library/camellia.c | 1058 +++ library/ccm.c | 763 ++ library/chacha20.c | 497 ++ library/chachapoly.c | 478 ++ library/check_crypto_config.h | 141 + library/cipher.c | 1680 ++++ library/cipher_wrap.c | 2482 ++++++ library/cipher_wrap.h | 178 + library/cmac.c | 1067 +++ library/common.h | 435 ++ library/constant_time.c | 248 + library/constant_time_impl.h | 556 ++ library/constant_time_internal.h | 579 ++ library/ctr.h | 35 + library/ctr_drbg.c | 1016 +++ library/debug.c | 465 ++ library/debug_internal.h | 172 + library/des.c | 1042 +++ library/dhm.c | 712 ++ library/ecdh.c | 694 ++ library/ecdsa.c | 867 +++ library/ecjpake.c | 1216 +++ library/ecp.c | 3703 +++++++++ library/ecp_curves.c | 5460 +++++++++++++ library/ecp_curves_new.c | 6036 ++++++++++++++ library/ecp_internal_alt.h | 287 + library/ecp_invasive.h | 325 + library/entropy.c | 676 ++ library/entropy_poll.c | 229 + library/entropy_poll.h | 64 + library/error.c | 880 +++ library/gcm.c | 1330 ++++ library/hkdf.c | 161 + library/hmac_drbg.c | 633 ++ library/lmots.c | 778 ++ library/lmots.h | 288 + library/lms.c | 761 ++ library/md.c | 1108 +++ library/md5.c | 426 + library/md_psa.h | 26 + library/md_wrap.h | 46 + library/memory_buffer_alloc.c | 745 ++ library/mps_common.h | 181 + library/mps_error.h | 89 + library/mps_reader.c | 538 ++ library/mps_reader.h | 366 + library/mps_trace.c | 112 + library/mps_trace.h | 154 + library/net_sockets.c | 696 ++ library/nist_kw.c | 725 ++ library/oid.c | 1166 +++ library/padlock.c | 157 + library/padlock.h | 111 + library/pem.c | 547 ++ library/pk.c | 1531 ++++ library/pk_ecc.c | 255 + library/pk_internal.h | 207 + library/pk_wrap.c | 1584 ++++ library/pk_wrap.h | 138 + library/pkcs12.c | 437 ++ library/pkcs5.c | 500 ++ library/pkcs7.c | 773 ++ library/pkparse.c | 1392 ++++ library/pkwrite.c | 621 ++ library/pkwrite.h | 121 + library/platform.c | 402 + library/platform_util.c | 263 + library/poly1305.c | 492 ++ library/psa_crypto.c | 9166 ++++++++++++++++++++++ library/psa_crypto_aead.c | 649 ++ library/psa_crypto_aead.h | 499 ++ library/psa_crypto_cipher.c | 724 ++ library/psa_crypto_cipher.h | 316 + library/psa_crypto_client.c | 22 + library/psa_crypto_core.h | 957 +++ library/psa_crypto_core_common.h | 52 + library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h | 2897 +++++++ library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c | 256 + library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h | 31 + library/psa_crypto_ecp.c | 596 ++ library/psa_crypto_ecp.h | 267 + library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c | 321 + library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h | 131 + library/psa_crypto_hash.c | 470 ++ library/psa_crypto_hash.h | 211 + library/psa_crypto_invasive.h | 92 + library/psa_crypto_its.h | 131 + library/psa_crypto_mac.c | 496 ++ library/psa_crypto_mac.h | 264 + library/psa_crypto_pake.c | 571 ++ library/psa_crypto_pake.h | 159 + library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h | 135 + library/psa_crypto_rsa.c | 706 ++ library/psa_crypto_rsa.h | 327 + library/psa_crypto_se.c | 373 + library/psa_crypto_se.h | 192 + library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 685 ++ library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h | 285 + library/psa_crypto_storage.c | 481 ++ library/psa_crypto_storage.h | 385 + library/psa_its_file.c | 254 + library/psa_util.c | 602 ++ library/psa_util_internal.h | 100 + library/ripemd160.c | 490 ++ library/rsa.c | 3065 ++++++++ library/rsa_alt_helpers.c | 447 ++ library/rsa_alt_helpers.h | 206 + library/rsa_internal.h | 121 + library/sha1.c | 480 ++ library/sha256.c | 976 +++ library/sha3.c | 721 ++ library/sha512.c | 1112 +++ library/ssl_cache.c | 410 + library/ssl_ciphersuites.c | 2050 +++++ library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h | 154 + library/ssl_client.c | 1017 +++ library/ssl_client.h | 22 + library/ssl_cookie.c | 380 + library/ssl_debug_helpers.h | 83 + library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c | 251 + library/ssl_misc.h | 2983 +++++++ library/ssl_msg.c | 6368 +++++++++++++++ library/ssl_ticket.c | 552 ++ library/ssl_tls.c | 9922 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ library/ssl_tls12_client.c | 3601 +++++++++ library/ssl_tls12_server.c | 4432 +++++++++++ library/ssl_tls13_client.c | 3181 ++++++++ library/ssl_tls13_generic.c | 1853 +++++ library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h | 23 + library/ssl_tls13_keys.c | 1885 +++++ library/ssl_tls13_keys.h | 651 ++ library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 3599 +++++++++ library/threading.c | 195 + library/timing.c | 154 + library/version.c | 32 + library/version_features.c | 841 ++ library/x509.c | 1776 +++++ library/x509_create.c | 563 ++ library/x509_crl.c | 713 ++ library/x509_crt.c | 3301 ++++++++ library/x509_csr.c | 639 ++ library/x509_internal.h | 86 + library/x509write.c | 174 + library/x509write_crt.c | 682 ++ library/x509write_csr.c | 331 + 170 files changed, 153034 insertions(+) create mode 100644 library/.gitignore create mode 100644 library/CMakeLists.txt create mode 100644 library/Makefile create mode 100644 library/aes.c create mode 100644 library/aesce.c create mode 100644 library/aesce.h create mode 100644 library/aesni.c create mode 100644 library/aesni.h create mode 100644 library/alignment.h create mode 100644 library/aria.c create mode 100644 library/asn1parse.c create mode 100644 library/asn1write.c create mode 100644 library/base64.c create mode 100644 library/base64_internal.h create mode 100644 library/bignum.c create mode 100644 library/bignum_core.c create mode 100644 library/bignum_core.h create mode 100644 library/bignum_mod.c create mode 100644 library/bignum_mod.h create mode 100644 library/bignum_mod_raw.c create mode 100644 library/bignum_mod_raw.h create mode 100644 library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h create mode 100644 library/block_cipher.c create mode 100644 library/block_cipher_internal.h create mode 100644 library/bn_mul.h create mode 100644 library/camellia.c create mode 100644 library/ccm.c create mode 100644 library/chacha20.c create mode 100644 library/chachapoly.c create mode 100644 library/check_crypto_config.h create mode 100644 library/cipher.c create mode 100644 library/cipher_wrap.c create mode 100644 library/cipher_wrap.h create mode 100644 library/cmac.c create mode 100644 library/common.h create mode 100644 library/constant_time.c create mode 100644 library/constant_time_impl.h create mode 100644 library/constant_time_internal.h create mode 100644 library/ctr.h create mode 100644 library/ctr_drbg.c create mode 100644 library/debug.c create mode 100644 library/debug_internal.h create mode 100644 library/des.c create mode 100644 library/dhm.c create mode 100644 library/ecdh.c create mode 100644 library/ecdsa.c create mode 100644 library/ecjpake.c create mode 100644 library/ecp.c create mode 100644 library/ecp_curves.c create mode 100644 library/ecp_curves_new.c create mode 100644 library/ecp_internal_alt.h create mode 100644 library/ecp_invasive.h create mode 100644 library/entropy.c create mode 100644 library/entropy_poll.c create mode 100644 library/entropy_poll.h create mode 100644 library/error.c create mode 100644 library/gcm.c create mode 100644 library/hkdf.c create mode 100644 library/hmac_drbg.c create mode 100644 library/lmots.c create mode 100644 library/lmots.h create mode 100644 library/lms.c create mode 100644 library/md.c create mode 100644 library/md5.c create mode 100644 library/md_psa.h create mode 100644 library/md_wrap.h create mode 100644 library/memory_buffer_alloc.c create mode 100644 library/mps_common.h create mode 100644 library/mps_error.h create mode 100644 library/mps_reader.c create mode 100644 library/mps_reader.h create mode 100644 library/mps_trace.c create mode 100644 library/mps_trace.h create mode 100644 library/net_sockets.c create mode 100644 library/nist_kw.c create mode 100644 library/oid.c create mode 100644 library/padlock.c create mode 100644 library/padlock.h create mode 100644 library/pem.c create mode 100644 library/pk.c create mode 100644 library/pk_ecc.c create mode 100644 library/pk_internal.h create mode 100644 library/pk_wrap.c create mode 100644 library/pk_wrap.h create mode 100644 library/pkcs12.c create mode 100644 library/pkcs5.c create mode 100644 library/pkcs7.c create mode 100644 library/pkparse.c create mode 100644 library/pkwrite.c create mode 100644 library/pkwrite.h create mode 100644 library/platform.c create mode 100644 library/platform_util.c create mode 100644 library/poly1305.c create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto.c create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_aead.c create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_aead.h create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_cipher.c create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_cipher.h create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_client.c create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_core.h create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_core_common.h create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_ecp.c create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_ecp.h create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_hash.c create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_hash.h create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_invasive.h create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_its.h create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_mac.c create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_mac.h create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_pake.c create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_pake.h create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_rsa.c create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_rsa.h create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_se.c create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_se.h create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_storage.c create mode 100644 library/psa_crypto_storage.h create mode 100644 library/psa_its_file.c create mode 100644 library/psa_util.c create mode 100644 library/psa_util_internal.h create mode 100644 library/ripemd160.c create mode 100644 library/rsa.c create mode 100644 library/rsa_alt_helpers.c create mode 100644 library/rsa_alt_helpers.h create mode 100644 library/rsa_internal.h create mode 100644 library/sha1.c create mode 100644 library/sha256.c create mode 100644 library/sha3.c create mode 100644 library/sha512.c create mode 100644 library/ssl_cache.c create mode 100644 library/ssl_ciphersuites.c create mode 100644 library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h create mode 100644 library/ssl_client.c create mode 100644 library/ssl_client.h create mode 100644 library/ssl_cookie.c create mode 100644 library/ssl_debug_helpers.h create mode 100644 library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c create mode 100644 library/ssl_misc.h create mode 100644 library/ssl_msg.c create mode 100644 library/ssl_ticket.c create mode 100644 library/ssl_tls.c create mode 100644 library/ssl_tls12_client.c create mode 100644 library/ssl_tls12_server.c create mode 100644 library/ssl_tls13_client.c create mode 100644 library/ssl_tls13_generic.c create mode 100644 library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h create mode 100644 library/ssl_tls13_keys.c create mode 100644 library/ssl_tls13_keys.h create mode 100644 library/ssl_tls13_server.c create mode 100644 library/threading.c create mode 100644 library/timing.c create mode 100644 library/version.c create mode 100644 library/version_features.c create mode 100644 library/x509.c create mode 100644 library/x509_create.c create mode 100644 library/x509_crl.c create mode 100644 library/x509_crt.c create mode 100644 library/x509_csr.c create mode 100644 library/x509_internal.h create mode 100644 library/x509write.c create mode 100644 library/x509write_crt.c create mode 100644 library/x509write_csr.c (limited to 'library') diff --git a/library/.gitignore b/library/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3351e8bfc61 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +libmbed* +*.sln +*.vcxproj + +####START_COMMENTED_GENERATED_FILES### +#/error.c +#/version_features.c +#/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c +#/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h +#/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c +####END_COMMENTED_GENERATED_FILES### diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e6705de5583 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt @@ -0,0 +1,357 @@ +option(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY "Build Mbed TLS static library." ON) +option(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY "Build Mbed TLS shared library." OFF) +option(LINK_WITH_PTHREAD "Explicitly link Mbed TLS library to pthread." OFF) +option(LINK_WITH_TRUSTED_STORAGE "Explicitly link Mbed TLS library to trusted_storage." OFF) + +# Set the project root directory if it's not already defined, as may happen if +# the library folder is included directly by a parent project, without +# including the top level CMakeLists.txt. +if(NOT DEFINED MBEDTLS_DIR) + set(MBEDTLS_DIR ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}) +endif() + +set(src_crypto + aes.c + aesni.c + aesce.c + aria.c + asn1parse.c + asn1write.c + base64.c + bignum.c + bignum_core.c + bignum_mod.c + bignum_mod_raw.c + block_cipher.c + camellia.c + ccm.c + chacha20.c + chachapoly.c + cipher.c + cipher_wrap.c + constant_time.c + cmac.c + ctr_drbg.c + des.c + dhm.c + ecdh.c + ecdsa.c + ecjpake.c + ecp.c + ecp_curves.c + ecp_curves_new.c + entropy.c + entropy_poll.c + error.c + gcm.c + hkdf.c + hmac_drbg.c + lmots.c + lms.c + md.c + md5.c + memory_buffer_alloc.c + nist_kw.c + oid.c + padlock.c + pem.c + pk.c + pk_ecc.c + pk_wrap.c + pkcs12.c + pkcs5.c + pkparse.c + pkwrite.c + platform.c + platform_util.c + poly1305.c + psa_crypto.c + psa_crypto_aead.c + psa_crypto_cipher.c + psa_crypto_client.c + psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c + psa_crypto_ecp.c + psa_crypto_ffdh.c + psa_crypto_hash.c + psa_crypto_mac.c + psa_crypto_pake.c + psa_crypto_rsa.c + psa_crypto_se.c + psa_crypto_slot_management.c + psa_crypto_storage.c + psa_its_file.c + psa_util.c + ripemd160.c + rsa.c + rsa_alt_helpers.c + sha1.c + sha256.c + sha512.c + sha3.c + threading.c + timing.c + version.c + version_features.c +) + +set(src_x509 + pkcs7.c + x509.c + x509_create.c + x509_crl.c + x509_crt.c + x509_csr.c + x509write.c + x509write_crt.c + x509write_csr.c +) + +set(src_tls + debug.c + mps_reader.c + mps_trace.c + net_sockets.c + ssl_cache.c + ssl_ciphersuites.c + ssl_client.c + ssl_cookie.c + ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c + ssl_msg.c + ssl_ticket.c + ssl_tls.c + ssl_tls12_client.c + ssl_tls12_server.c + ssl_tls13_keys.c + ssl_tls13_server.c + ssl_tls13_client.c + ssl_tls13_generic.c +) + +if(GEN_FILES) + find_package(Perl REQUIRED) + + file(GLOB error_headers ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/mbedtls/*.h) + add_custom_command( + OUTPUT + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/error.c + COMMAND + ${PERL_EXECUTABLE} + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_errors.pl + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/mbedtls + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/data_files + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/error.c + DEPENDS + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_errors.pl + ${error_headers} + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/data_files/error.fmt + ) + + add_custom_command( + OUTPUT + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/version_features.c + COMMAND + ${PERL_EXECUTABLE} + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_features.pl + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/mbedtls + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/data_files + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/version_features.c + DEPENDS + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_features.pl + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/data_files/version_features.fmt + ) + + add_custom_command( + OUTPUT + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c + COMMAND + ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE} + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_ssl_debug_helpers.py + --mbedtls-root ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/.. + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR} + DEPENDS + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_ssl_debug_helpers.py + ${error_headers} + ) + + add_custom_command( + OUTPUT + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c + COMMAND + ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE} + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_driver_wrappers.py + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR} + DEPENDS + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_driver_wrappers.py + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c.jinja + ) + + +else() + link_to_source(error.c) + link_to_source(version_features.c) + link_to_source(ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c) + link_to_source(psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c) +endif() + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCC) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wmissing-declarations -Wmissing-prototypes") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCC) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wmissing-declarations -Wmissing-prototypes -Wdocumentation -Wno-documentation-deprecated-sync -Wunreachable-code") +endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG) + +if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_MSVC) + option(MSVC_STATIC_RUNTIME "Build the libraries with /MT compiler flag" OFF) + if(MSVC_STATIC_RUNTIME) + foreach(flag_var + CMAKE_C_FLAGS CMAKE_C_FLAGS_DEBUG CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE + CMAKE_C_FLAGS_MINSIZEREL CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELWITHDEBINFO + CMAKE_C_FLAGS_CHECK) + string(REGEX REPLACE "/MD" "/MT" ${flag_var} "${${flag_var}}") + endforeach(flag_var) + endif() +endif() + +if(WIN32) + set(libs ${libs} ws2_32 bcrypt) +endif(WIN32) + +if(${CMAKE_SYSTEM_NAME} MATCHES "Darwin") + SET(CMAKE_C_ARCHIVE_CREATE " Scr ") + SET(CMAKE_CXX_ARCHIVE_CREATE " Scr ") + SET(CMAKE_C_ARCHIVE_FINISH " -no_warning_for_no_symbols -c ") + SET(CMAKE_CXX_ARCHIVE_FINISH " -no_warning_for_no_symbols -c ") +endif() + +if(HAIKU) + set(libs ${libs} network) +endif(HAIKU) + +if(LINK_WITH_PTHREAD) + set(libs ${libs} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}) +endif() + +if(LINK_WITH_TRUSTED_STORAGE) + set(libs ${libs} trusted_storage) +endif() + +if (NOT USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND NOT USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + message(FATAL_ERROR "Need to choose static or shared mbedtls build!") +endif(NOT USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND NOT USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + +set(mbedtls_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}mbedtls") +set(mbedx509_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}mbedx509") +set(mbedcrypto_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}mbedcrypto") + +set(mbedtls_target ${mbedtls_target} PARENT_SCOPE) +set(mbedx509_target ${mbedx509_target} PARENT_SCOPE) +set(mbedcrypto_target ${mbedcrypto_target} PARENT_SCOPE) + +if (USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + set(mbedtls_static_target ${mbedtls_target}) + set(mbedx509_static_target ${mbedx509_target}) + set(mbedcrypto_static_target ${mbedcrypto_target}) +endif() + +set(target_libraries ${mbedcrypto_target} ${mbedx509_target} ${mbedtls_target}) + +if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + string(APPEND mbedtls_static_target "_static") + string(APPEND mbedx509_static_target "_static") + string(APPEND mbedcrypto_static_target "_static") + + list(APPEND target_libraries + ${mbedcrypto_static_target} + ${mbedx509_static_target} + ${mbedtls_static_target}) +endif() + +set(p256m_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}p256m") +set(everest_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}everest") + +if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + add_library(${mbedcrypto_static_target} STATIC ${src_crypto}) + set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedcrypto) + target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC ${libs}) + + if(TARGET ${everest_target}) + target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC ${everest_target}) + endif() + + if(TARGET ${p256m_target}) + target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC ${p256m_target}) + endif() + + add_library(${mbedx509_static_target} STATIC ${src_x509}) + set_target_properties(${mbedx509_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedx509) + target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_static_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_static_target}) + + add_library(${mbedtls_static_target} STATIC ${src_tls}) + set_target_properties(${mbedtls_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedtls) + target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_static_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_static_target}) +endif(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + +if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}) + add_library(${mbedcrypto_target} SHARED ${src_crypto}) + set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.0 SOVERSION 16) + target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${libs}) + + if(TARGET ${everest_target}) + target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${everest_target}) + endif() + + if(TARGET ${p256m_target}) + target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${p256m_target}) + endif() + + add_library(${mbedx509_target} SHARED ${src_x509}) + set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.0 SOVERSION 7) + target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_target}) + + add_library(${mbedtls_target} SHARED ${src_tls}) + set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.0 SOVERSION 21) + target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_target}) +endif(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + +foreach(target IN LISTS target_libraries) + add_library(MbedTLS::${target} ALIAS ${target}) # add_subdirectory support + # Include public header files from /include and other directories + # declared by /3rdparty/**/CMakeLists.txt. Include private header files + # from /library and others declared by /3rdparty/**/CMakeLists.txt. + # /library needs to be listed explicitly when building .c files outside + # of /library (which currently means: under /3rdparty). + target_include_directories(${target} + PUBLIC $ + $ + PRIVATE ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/library/ + # Needed to include psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h + ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}) + # Pass-through MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE and MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE + if(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) + target_compile_definitions(${target} + PUBLIC MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE="${MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE}") + endif() + if(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE) + target_compile_definitions(${target} + PUBLIC MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE="${MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE}") + endif() + install( + TARGETS ${target} + EXPORT MbedTLSTargets + ARCHIVE DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR} + LIBRARY DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR} + RUNTIME DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_BINDIR} + PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ) +endforeach(target) + +set(lib_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}lib") + +add_custom_target(${lib_target} DEPENDS ${mbedcrypto_target} ${mbedx509_target} ${mbedtls_target}) +if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) + add_dependencies(${lib_target} ${mbedcrypto_static_target} ${mbedx509_static_target} ${mbedtls_static_target}) +endif() diff --git a/library/Makefile b/library/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a5e023e1782 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,403 @@ +ifndef MBEDTLS_PATH +MBEDTLS_PATH := .. +endif + +GENERATED_FILES := \ + error.c version_features.c \ + ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c \ + psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h \ + psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c + +ifneq ($(GENERATED_FILES),$(wildcard $(GENERATED_FILES))) + ifeq (,$(wildcard $(MBEDTLS_PATH)/framework/exported.make)) + # Use the define keyword to get a multi-line message. + # GNU make appends ". Stop.", so tweak the ending of our message accordingly. + define error_message +$(MBEDTLS_PATH)/framework/exported.make not found. +Run `git submodule update --init` to fetch the submodule contents. +This is a fatal error + endef + $(error $(error_message)) + endif + include $(MBEDTLS_PATH)/framework/exported.make +endif + +# Also see "include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h" + +CFLAGS ?= -O2 +WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral +LDFLAGS ?= + +# Include ../include for public headers and . for private headers. +# Note that . needs to be included explicitly for the sake of library +# files that are not in the /library directory (which currently means +# under /3rdparty). +LOCAL_CFLAGS = $(WARNING_CFLAGS) -I. -I../include -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 +LOCAL_LDFLAGS = + +ifdef DEBUG +LOCAL_CFLAGS += -g3 +endif + +# MicroBlaze specific options: +# CFLAGS += -mno-xl-soft-mul -mxl-barrel-shift + +# To compile on Plan9: +# CFLAGS += -D_BSD_EXTENSION + +PERL ?= perl + +ifdef WINDOWS +PYTHON ?= python +else +PYTHON ?= $(shell if type python3 >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then echo python3; else echo python; fi) +endif + +# if were running on Windows build for Windows +ifdef WINDOWS +WINDOWS_BUILD=1 +else ifeq ($(shell uname -s),Darwin) +ifeq ($(AR),ar) +APPLE_BUILD ?= 1 +endif +endif + +ifdef WINDOWS_BUILD +LOCAL_LDFLAGS += -lbcrypt +endif + +# To compile as a shared library: +ifdef SHARED +# all code is position-indep with mingw, avoid warning about useless flag +ifndef WINDOWS_BUILD +LOCAL_CFLAGS += -fPIC -fpic +endif +endif + +SOEXT_TLS?=so.21 +SOEXT_X509?=so.7 +SOEXT_CRYPTO?=so.16 + +# Set AR_DASH= (empty string) to use an ar implementation that does not accept +# the - prefix for command line options (e.g. llvm-ar) +AR_DASH ?= - + +ARFLAGS = $(AR_DASH)src +ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) +ARFLAGS = $(AR_DASH)Src +RLFLAGS = -no_warning_for_no_symbols -c +RL ?= ranlib +endif +endif + +DLEXT ?= so +ifdef WINDOWS_BUILD +# Windows shared library extension: +DLEXT = dll +else ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) +# Mac OS X shared library extension: +DLEXT = dylib +endif +endif + +OBJS_CRYPTO= \ + aes.o \ + aesni.o \ + aesce.o \ + aria.o \ + asn1parse.o \ + asn1write.o \ + base64.o \ + bignum.o \ + bignum_core.o \ + bignum_mod.o \ + bignum_mod_raw.o \ + block_cipher.o \ + camellia.o \ + ccm.o \ + chacha20.o \ + chachapoly.o \ + cipher.o \ + cipher_wrap.o \ + cmac.o \ + constant_time.o \ + ctr_drbg.o \ + des.o \ + dhm.o \ + ecdh.o \ + ecdsa.o \ + ecjpake.o \ + ecp.o \ + ecp_curves.o \ + ecp_curves_new.o \ + entropy.o \ + entropy_poll.o \ + error.o \ + gcm.o \ + hkdf.o \ + hmac_drbg.o \ + lmots.o \ + lms.o \ + md.o \ + md5.o \ + memory_buffer_alloc.o \ + nist_kw.o \ + oid.o \ + padlock.o \ + pem.o \ + pk.o \ + pk_ecc.o \ + pk_wrap.o \ + pkcs12.o \ + pkcs5.o \ + pkparse.o \ + pkwrite.o \ + platform.o \ + platform_util.o \ + poly1305.o \ + psa_crypto.o \ + psa_crypto_aead.o \ + psa_crypto_cipher.o \ + psa_crypto_client.o \ + psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.o \ + psa_crypto_ecp.o \ + psa_crypto_ffdh.o \ + psa_crypto_hash.o \ + psa_crypto_mac.o \ + psa_crypto_pake.o \ + psa_crypto_rsa.o \ + psa_crypto_se.o \ + psa_crypto_slot_management.o \ + psa_crypto_storage.o \ + psa_its_file.o \ + psa_util.o \ + ripemd160.o \ + rsa.o \ + rsa_alt_helpers.o \ + sha1.o \ + sha256.o \ + sha512.o \ + sha3.o \ + threading.o \ + timing.o \ + version.o \ + version_features.o \ + # This line is intentionally left blank + +include ../3rdparty/Makefile.inc +LOCAL_CFLAGS+=$(THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES) +OBJS_CRYPTO+=$(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS) + +OBJS_X509= \ + x509.o \ + x509_create.o \ + x509_crl.o \ + x509_crt.o \ + x509_csr.o \ + x509write.o \ + x509write_crt.o \ + x509write_csr.o \ + pkcs7.o \ + # This line is intentionally left blank + +OBJS_TLS= \ + debug.o \ + mps_reader.o \ + mps_trace.o \ + net_sockets.o \ + ssl_cache.o \ + ssl_ciphersuites.o \ + ssl_client.o \ + ssl_cookie.o \ + ssl_debug_helpers_generated.o \ + ssl_msg.o \ + ssl_ticket.o \ + ssl_tls.o \ + ssl_tls12_client.o \ + ssl_tls12_server.o \ + ssl_tls13_keys.o \ + ssl_tls13_client.o \ + ssl_tls13_server.o \ + ssl_tls13_generic.o \ + # This line is intentionally left blank + +.SILENT: + +.PHONY: all static shared clean + +ifndef SHARED +all: static +else +all: shared static +endif + +static: libmbedcrypto.a libmbedx509.a libmbedtls.a + cd ../tests && echo "This is a seedfile that contains 64 bytes (65 on Windows)......" > seedfile + +shared: libmbedcrypto.$(DLEXT) libmbedx509.$(DLEXT) libmbedtls.$(DLEXT) + +# Windows builds under Mingw can fail if make tries to create archives in the same +# directory at the same time - see https://bugs.launchpad.net/gcc-arm-embedded/+bug/1848002. +# This forces builds of the .a files to be serialised. +ifdef WINDOWS +libmbedtls.a: | libmbedx509.a +libmbedx509.a: | libmbedcrypto.a +endif + +# tls +libmbedtls.a: $(OBJS_TLS) + echo " AR $@" + $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $@ $(OBJS_TLS) +ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) + echo " RL $@" + $(RL) $(RLFLAGS) $@ +endif +endif + +libmbedtls.$(SOEXT_TLS): $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.so + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) -L. -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +ifneq ($(SOEXT_TLS),so) +libmbedtls.so: libmbedtls.$(SOEXT_TLS) + echo " LN $@ -> $<" + ln -sf $< $@ +endif + +libmbedtls.dylib: $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.dylib + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -dynamiclib -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) -L. -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +libmbedtls.dll: $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.dll + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -L. -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +# x509 +libmbedx509.a: $(OBJS_X509) + echo " AR $@" + $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $@ $(OBJS_X509) +ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) + echo " RL $@" + $(RL) $(RLFLAGS) $@ +endif +endif + +libmbedx509.$(SOEXT_X509): $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.so + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) -L. -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +ifneq ($(SOEXT_X509),so) +libmbedx509.so: libmbedx509.$(SOEXT_X509) + echo " LN $@ -> $<" + ln -sf $< $@ +endif + +libmbedx509.dylib: $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.dylib + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -dynamiclib -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) -L. -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +libmbedx509.dll: $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.dll + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -L. -lmbedcrypto -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +# crypto +libmbedcrypto.a: $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + echo " AR $@" + $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) +ifdef APPLE_BUILD +ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0) + echo " RL $@" + $(RL) $(RLFLAGS) $@ +endif +endif + +libmbedcrypto.$(SOEXT_CRYPTO): $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +ifneq ($(SOEXT_CRYPTO),so) +libmbedcrypto.so: libmbedcrypto.$(SOEXT_CRYPTO) + echo " LN $@ -> $<" + ln -sf $< $@ +endif + +libmbedcrypto.dylib: $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -dynamiclib -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +libmbedcrypto.dll: $(OBJS_CRYPTO) + echo " LD $@" + $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) + +.c.o: + echo " CC $<" + $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ -c $< + +.PHONY: generated_files +generated_files: $(GENERATED_FILES) + +# See root Makefile +GEN_FILES ?= +ifdef GEN_FILES +gen_file_dep = +else +gen_file_dep = | +endif + +error.c: $(gen_file_dep) ../scripts/generate_errors.pl +error.c: $(gen_file_dep) ../scripts/data_files/error.fmt +error.c: $(gen_file_dep) $(filter-out %config%,$(wildcard ../include/mbedtls/*.h)) +error.c: + echo " Gen $@" + $(PERL) ../scripts/generate_errors.pl + +ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c: $(gen_file_dep) ../scripts/generate_ssl_debug_helpers.py +ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c: $(gen_file_dep) $(filter-out %config%,$(wildcard ../include/mbedtls/*.h)) +ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c: + echo " Gen $@" + $(PYTHON) ../scripts/generate_ssl_debug_helpers.py --mbedtls-root .. . + +version_features.c: $(gen_file_dep) ../scripts/generate_features.pl +version_features.c: $(gen_file_dep) ../scripts/data_files/version_features.fmt +## The generated file only depends on the options that are present in mbedtls_config.h, +## not on which options are set. To avoid regenerating this file all the time +## when switching between configurations, don't declare mbedtls_config.h as a +## dependency. Remove this file from your working tree if you've just added or +## removed an option in mbedtls_config.h. +#version_features.c: ../include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h +version_features.c: + echo " Gen $@" + $(PERL) ../scripts/generate_features.pl + +GENERATED_WRAPPER_FILES = \ + psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h \ + psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c +$(GENERATED_WRAPPER_FILES): ../scripts/generate_driver_wrappers.py +$(GENERATED_WRAPPER_FILES): ../scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja +$(GENERATED_WRAPPER_FILES): ../scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c.jinja +$(GENERATED_WRAPPER_FILES): + echo " Gen $(GENERATED_WRAPPER_FILES)" + $(PYTHON) ../scripts/generate_driver_wrappers.py + +psa_crypto.o:psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h + +clean: +ifndef WINDOWS + rm -f *.o libmbed* + rm -f $(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS) +else + if exist *.o del /Q /F *.o + if exist libmbed* del /Q /F libmbed* + del /Q /F del_errors_out_if_the_file_list_is_empty_but_not_if_a_file_does_not_exist $(subst /,\,$(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS)) +endif + +neat: clean +ifndef WINDOWS + rm -f $(GENERATED_FILES) +else + for %f in ($(subst /,\,$(GENERATED_FILES))) if exist %f del /Q /F %f +endif diff --git a/library/aes.c b/library/aes.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b1a5c3ed104 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/aes.c @@ -0,0 +1,2294 @@ +/* + * FIPS-197 compliant AES implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * The AES block cipher was designed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen. + * + * https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-standards-and-guidelines/documents/aes-development/rijndael-ammended.pdf + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) +#if !((defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) && defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) && defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C))) +#error "MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#error "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) +#error "MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY cannot be defined when " \ + "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C is set" +#endif +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) +#include "padlock.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) +#include "aesni.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) +#include "aesce.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "ctr.h" + +/* + * This is a convenience shorthand macro to check if we need reverse S-box and + * reverse tables. It's private and only defined in this file. + */ +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) || \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY))) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +#define MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) +static int aes_padlock_ace = -1; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) +/* + * Forward S-box + */ +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const unsigned char FSb[256] = +{ + 0x63, 0x7C, 0x77, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC5, + 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xAB, 0x76, + 0xCA, 0x82, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x47, 0xF0, + 0xAD, 0xD4, 0xA2, 0xAF, 0x9C, 0xA4, 0x72, 0xC0, + 0xB7, 0xFD, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3F, 0xF7, 0xCC, + 0x34, 0xA5, 0xE5, 0xF1, 0x71, 0xD8, 0x31, 0x15, + 0x04, 0xC7, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9A, + 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xE2, 0xEB, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x75, + 0x09, 0x83, 0x2C, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xA0, + 0x52, 0x3B, 0xD6, 0xB3, 0x29, 0xE3, 0x2F, 0x84, + 0x53, 0xD1, 0x00, 0xED, 0x20, 0xFC, 0xB1, 0x5B, + 0x6A, 0xCB, 0xBE, 0x39, 0x4A, 0x4C, 0x58, 0xCF, + 0xD0, 0xEF, 0xAA, 0xFB, 0x43, 0x4D, 0x33, 0x85, + 0x45, 0xF9, 0x02, 0x7F, 0x50, 0x3C, 0x9F, 0xA8, + 0x51, 0xA3, 0x40, 0x8F, 0x92, 0x9D, 0x38, 0xF5, + 0xBC, 0xB6, 0xDA, 0x21, 0x10, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0xD2, + 0xCD, 0x0C, 0x13, 0xEC, 0x5F, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, + 0xC4, 0xA7, 0x7E, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x5D, 0x19, 0x73, + 0x60, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x22, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x88, + 0x46, 0xEE, 0xB8, 0x14, 0xDE, 0x5E, 0x0B, 0xDB, + 0xE0, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x0A, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5C, + 0xC2, 0xD3, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xE4, 0x79, + 0xE7, 0xC8, 0x37, 0x6D, 0x8D, 0xD5, 0x4E, 0xA9, + 0x6C, 0x56, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0x65, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0x08, + 0xBA, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2E, 0x1C, 0xA6, 0xB4, 0xC6, + 0xE8, 0xDD, 0x74, 0x1F, 0x4B, 0xBD, 0x8B, 0x8A, + 0x70, 0x3E, 0xB5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xF6, 0x0E, + 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x86, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0x9E, + 0xE1, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xD9, 0x8E, 0x94, + 0x9B, 0x1E, 0x87, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0x55, 0x28, 0xDF, + 0x8C, 0xA1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x42, 0x68, + 0x41, 0x99, 0x2D, 0x0F, 0xB0, 0x54, 0xBB, 0x16 +}; + +/* + * Forward tables + */ +#define FT \ +\ + V(A5, 63, 63, C6), V(84, 7C, 7C, F8), V(99, 77, 77, EE), V(8D, 7B, 7B, F6), \ + V(0D, F2, F2, FF), V(BD, 6B, 6B, D6), V(B1, 6F, 6F, DE), V(54, C5, C5, 91), \ + V(50, 30, 30, 60), V(03, 01, 01, 02), V(A9, 67, 67, CE), V(7D, 2B, 2B, 56), \ + V(19, FE, FE, E7), V(62, D7, D7, B5), V(E6, AB, AB, 4D), V(9A, 76, 76, EC), \ + V(45, CA, CA, 8F), V(9D, 82, 82, 1F), V(40, C9, C9, 89), V(87, 7D, 7D, FA), \ + V(15, FA, FA, EF), V(EB, 59, 59, B2), V(C9, 47, 47, 8E), V(0B, F0, F0, FB), \ + V(EC, AD, AD, 41), V(67, D4, D4, B3), V(FD, A2, A2, 5F), V(EA, AF, AF, 45), \ + V(BF, 9C, 9C, 23), V(F7, A4, A4, 53), V(96, 72, 72, E4), V(5B, C0, C0, 9B), \ + V(C2, B7, B7, 75), V(1C, FD, FD, E1), V(AE, 93, 93, 3D), V(6A, 26, 26, 4C), \ + V(5A, 36, 36, 6C), V(41, 3F, 3F, 7E), V(02, F7, F7, F5), V(4F, CC, CC, 83), \ + V(5C, 34, 34, 68), V(F4, A5, A5, 51), V(34, E5, E5, D1), V(08, F1, F1, F9), \ + V(93, 71, 71, E2), V(73, D8, D8, AB), V(53, 31, 31, 62), V(3F, 15, 15, 2A), \ + V(0C, 04, 04, 08), V(52, C7, C7, 95), V(65, 23, 23, 46), V(5E, C3, C3, 9D), \ + V(28, 18, 18, 30), V(A1, 96, 96, 37), V(0F, 05, 05, 0A), V(B5, 9A, 9A, 2F), \ + V(09, 07, 07, 0E), V(36, 12, 12, 24), V(9B, 80, 80, 1B), V(3D, E2, E2, DF), \ + V(26, EB, EB, CD), V(69, 27, 27, 4E), V(CD, B2, B2, 7F), V(9F, 75, 75, EA), \ + V(1B, 09, 09, 12), V(9E, 83, 83, 1D), V(74, 2C, 2C, 58), V(2E, 1A, 1A, 34), \ + V(2D, 1B, 1B, 36), V(B2, 6E, 6E, DC), V(EE, 5A, 5A, B4), V(FB, A0, A0, 5B), \ + V(F6, 52, 52, A4), V(4D, 3B, 3B, 76), V(61, D6, D6, B7), V(CE, B3, B3, 7D), \ + V(7B, 29, 29, 52), V(3E, E3, E3, DD), V(71, 2F, 2F, 5E), V(97, 84, 84, 13), \ + V(F5, 53, 53, A6), V(68, D1, D1, B9), V(00, 00, 00, 00), V(2C, ED, ED, C1), \ + V(60, 20, 20, 40), V(1F, FC, FC, E3), V(C8, B1, B1, 79), V(ED, 5B, 5B, B6), \ + V(BE, 6A, 6A, D4), V(46, CB, CB, 8D), V(D9, BE, BE, 67), V(4B, 39, 39, 72), \ + V(DE, 4A, 4A, 94), V(D4, 4C, 4C, 98), V(E8, 58, 58, B0), V(4A, CF, CF, 85), \ + V(6B, D0, D0, BB), V(2A, EF, EF, C5), V(E5, AA, AA, 4F), V(16, FB, FB, ED), \ + V(C5, 43, 43, 86), V(D7, 4D, 4D, 9A), V(55, 33, 33, 66), V(94, 85, 85, 11), \ + V(CF, 45, 45, 8A), V(10, F9, F9, E9), V(06, 02, 02, 04), V(81, 7F, 7F, FE), \ + V(F0, 50, 50, A0), V(44, 3C, 3C, 78), V(BA, 9F, 9F, 25), V(E3, A8, A8, 4B), \ + V(F3, 51, 51, A2), V(FE, A3, A3, 5D), V(C0, 40, 40, 80), V(8A, 8F, 8F, 05), \ + V(AD, 92, 92, 3F), V(BC, 9D, 9D, 21), V(48, 38, 38, 70), V(04, F5, F5, F1), \ + V(DF, BC, BC, 63), V(C1, B6, B6, 77), V(75, DA, DA, AF), V(63, 21, 21, 42), \ + V(30, 10, 10, 20), V(1A, FF, FF, E5), V(0E, F3, F3, FD), V(6D, D2, D2, BF), \ + V(4C, CD, CD, 81), V(14, 0C, 0C, 18), V(35, 13, 13, 26), V(2F, EC, EC, C3), \ + V(E1, 5F, 5F, BE), V(A2, 97, 97, 35), V(CC, 44, 44, 88), V(39, 17, 17, 2E), \ + V(57, C4, C4, 93), V(F2, A7, A7, 55), V(82, 7E, 7E, FC), V(47, 3D, 3D, 7A), \ + V(AC, 64, 64, C8), V(E7, 5D, 5D, BA), V(2B, 19, 19, 32), V(95, 73, 73, E6), \ + V(A0, 60, 60, C0), V(98, 81, 81, 19), V(D1, 4F, 4F, 9E), V(7F, DC, DC, A3), \ + V(66, 22, 22, 44), V(7E, 2A, 2A, 54), V(AB, 90, 90, 3B), V(83, 88, 88, 0B), \ + V(CA, 46, 46, 8C), V(29, EE, EE, C7), V(D3, B8, B8, 6B), V(3C, 14, 14, 28), \ + V(79, DE, DE, A7), V(E2, 5E, 5E, BC), V(1D, 0B, 0B, 16), V(76, DB, DB, AD), \ + V(3B, E0, E0, DB), V(56, 32, 32, 64), V(4E, 3A, 3A, 74), V(1E, 0A, 0A, 14), \ + V(DB, 49, 49, 92), V(0A, 06, 06, 0C), V(6C, 24, 24, 48), V(E4, 5C, 5C, B8), \ + V(5D, C2, C2, 9F), V(6E, D3, D3, BD), V(EF, AC, AC, 43), V(A6, 62, 62, C4), \ + V(A8, 91, 91, 39), V(A4, 95, 95, 31), V(37, E4, E4, D3), V(8B, 79, 79, F2), \ + V(32, E7, E7, D5), V(43, C8, C8, 8B), V(59, 37, 37, 6E), V(B7, 6D, 6D, DA), \ + V(8C, 8D, 8D, 01), V(64, D5, D5, B1), V(D2, 4E, 4E, 9C), V(E0, A9, A9, 49), \ + V(B4, 6C, 6C, D8), V(FA, 56, 56, AC), V(07, F4, F4, F3), V(25, EA, EA, CF), \ + V(AF, 65, 65, CA), V(8E, 7A, 7A, F4), V(E9, AE, AE, 47), V(18, 08, 08, 10), \ + V(D5, BA, BA, 6F), V(88, 78, 78, F0), V(6F, 25, 25, 4A), V(72, 2E, 2E, 5C), \ + V(24, 1C, 1C, 38), V(F1, A6, A6, 57), V(C7, B4, B4, 73), V(51, C6, C6, 97), \ + V(23, E8, E8, CB), V(7C, DD, DD, A1), V(9C, 74, 74, E8), V(21, 1F, 1F, 3E), \ + V(DD, 4B, 4B, 96), V(DC, BD, BD, 61), V(86, 8B, 8B, 0D), V(85, 8A, 8A, 0F), \ + V(90, 70, 70, E0), V(42, 3E, 3E, 7C), V(C4, B5, B5, 71), V(AA, 66, 66, CC), \ + V(D8, 48, 48, 90), V(05, 03, 03, 06), V(01, F6, F6, F7), V(12, 0E, 0E, 1C), \ + V(A3, 61, 61, C2), V(5F, 35, 35, 6A), V(F9, 57, 57, AE), V(D0, B9, B9, 69), \ + V(91, 86, 86, 17), V(58, C1, C1, 99), V(27, 1D, 1D, 3A), V(B9, 9E, 9E, 27), \ + V(38, E1, E1, D9), V(13, F8, F8, EB), V(B3, 98, 98, 2B), V(33, 11, 11, 22), \ + V(BB, 69, 69, D2), V(70, D9, D9, A9), V(89, 8E, 8E, 07), V(A7, 94, 94, 33), \ + V(B6, 9B, 9B, 2D), V(22, 1E, 1E, 3C), V(92, 87, 87, 15), V(20, E9, E9, C9), \ + V(49, CE, CE, 87), V(FF, 55, 55, AA), V(78, 28, 28, 50), V(7A, DF, DF, A5), \ + V(8F, 8C, 8C, 03), V(F8, A1, A1, 59), V(80, 89, 89, 09), V(17, 0D, 0D, 1A), \ + V(DA, BF, BF, 65), V(31, E6, E6, D7), V(C6, 42, 42, 84), V(B8, 68, 68, D0), \ + V(C3, 41, 41, 82), V(B0, 99, 99, 29), V(77, 2D, 2D, 5A), V(11, 0F, 0F, 1E), \ + V(CB, B0, B0, 7B), V(FC, 54, 54, A8), V(D6, BB, BB, 6D), V(3A, 16, 16, 2C) + +#define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##a##b##c##d +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t FT0[256] = { FT }; +#undef V + +#define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##b##c##d##a +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t FT1[256] = { FT }; +#undef V + +#define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##c##d##a##b +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t FT2[256] = { FT }; +#undef V + +#define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##d##a##b##c +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t FT3[256] = { FT }; +#undef V + +#undef FT + +/* + * Reverse S-box + */ +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const unsigned char RSb[256] = +{ + 0x52, 0x09, 0x6A, 0xD5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xA5, 0x38, + 0xBF, 0x40, 0xA3, 0x9E, 0x81, 0xF3, 0xD7, 0xFB, + 0x7C, 0xE3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9B, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x87, + 0x34, 0x8E, 0x43, 0x44, 0xC4, 0xDE, 0xE9, 0xCB, + 0x54, 0x7B, 0x94, 0x32, 0xA6, 0xC2, 0x23, 0x3D, + 0xEE, 0x4C, 0x95, 0x0B, 0x42, 0xFA, 0xC3, 0x4E, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xA1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x24, 0xB2, + 0x76, 0x5B, 0xA2, 0x49, 0x6D, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x25, + 0x72, 0xF8, 0xF6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16, + 0xD4, 0xA4, 0x5C, 0xCC, 0x5D, 0x65, 0xB6, 0x92, + 0x6C, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xFD, 0xED, 0xB9, 0xDA, + 0x5E, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0x84, + 0x90, 0xD8, 0xAB, 0x00, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0xD3, 0x0A, + 0xF7, 0xE4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xB8, 0xB3, 0x45, 0x06, + 0xD0, 0x2C, 0x1E, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x3F, 0x0F, 0x02, + 0xC1, 0xAF, 0xBD, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8A, 0x6B, + 0x3A, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4F, 0x67, 0xDC, 0xEA, + 0x97, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0xCE, 0xF0, 0xB4, 0xE6, 0x73, + 0x96, 0xAC, 0x74, 0x22, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x35, 0x85, + 0xE2, 0xF9, 0x37, 0xE8, 0x1C, 0x75, 0xDF, 0x6E, + 0x47, 0xF1, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x1D, 0x29, 0xC5, 0x89, + 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x62, 0x0E, 0xAA, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x1B, + 0xFC, 0x56, 0x3E, 0x4B, 0xC6, 0xD2, 0x79, 0x20, + 0x9A, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xCD, 0x5A, 0xF4, + 0x1F, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xC7, 0x31, + 0xB1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xEC, 0x5F, + 0x60, 0x51, 0x7F, 0xA9, 0x19, 0xB5, 0x4A, 0x0D, + 0x2D, 0xE5, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0x93, 0xC9, 0x9C, 0xEF, + 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0xAE, 0x2A, 0xF5, 0xB0, + 0xC8, 0xEB, 0xBB, 0x3C, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61, + 0x17, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x7E, 0xBA, 0x77, 0xD6, 0x26, + 0xE1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x7D +}; + +/* + * Reverse tables + */ +#define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define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##a##b##c##d +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RT0[256] = { RT }; +#undef V + +#define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##b##c##d##a +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RT1[256] = { RT }; +#undef V + +#define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##c##d##a##b +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RT2[256] = { RT }; +#undef V + +#define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##d##a##b##c +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RT3[256] = { RT }; +#undef V + +#undef RT + +/* + * Round constants + */ +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t round_constants[10] = +{ + 0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x00000004, 0x00000008, + 0x00000010, 0x00000020, 0x00000040, 0x00000080, + 0x0000001B, 0x00000036 +}; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ + +/* + * Forward S-box & tables + */ +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static unsigned char FSb[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t FT0[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t FT1[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t FT2[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t FT3[256]; + +/* + * Reverse S-box & tables + */ +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static unsigned char RSb[256]; + +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RT0[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RT1[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RT2[256]; +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RT3[256]; + +/* + * Round constants + */ +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t round_constants[10]; + +/* + * Tables generation code + */ +#define ROTL8(x) (((x) << 8) & 0xFFFFFFFF) | ((x) >> 24) +#define XTIME(x) (((x) << 1) ^ (((x) & 0x80) ? 0x1B : 0x00)) +#define MUL(x, y) (((x) && (y)) ? pow[(log[(x)]+log[(y)]) % 255] : 0) + +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static int aes_init_done = 0; + +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static void aes_gen_tables(void) +{ + int i; + uint8_t x, y, z; + uint8_t pow[256]; + uint8_t log[256]; + + /* + * compute pow and log tables over GF(2^8) + */ + for (i = 0, x = 1; i < 256; i++) { + pow[i] = x; + log[x] = (uint8_t) i; + x ^= XTIME(x); + } + + /* + * calculate the round constants + */ + for (i = 0, x = 1; i < 10; i++) { + round_constants[i] = x; + x = XTIME(x); + } + + /* + * generate the forward and reverse S-boxes + */ + FSb[0x00] = 0x63; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES) + RSb[0x63] = 0x00; +#endif + + for (i = 1; i < 256; i++) { + x = pow[255 - log[i]]; + + y = x; y = (y << 1) | (y >> 7); + x ^= y; y = (y << 1) | (y >> 7); + x ^= y; y = (y << 1) | (y >> 7); + x ^= y; y = (y << 1) | (y >> 7); + x ^= y ^ 0x63; + + FSb[i] = x; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES) + RSb[x] = (unsigned char) i; +#endif + } + + /* + * generate the forward and reverse tables + */ + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { + x = FSb[i]; + y = XTIME(x); + z = y ^ x; + + FT0[i] = ((uint32_t) y) ^ + ((uint32_t) x << 8) ^ + ((uint32_t) x << 16) ^ + ((uint32_t) z << 24); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + FT1[i] = ROTL8(FT0[i]); + FT2[i] = ROTL8(FT1[i]); + FT3[i] = ROTL8(FT2[i]); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES) + x = RSb[i]; + + RT0[i] = ((uint32_t) MUL(0x0E, x)) ^ + ((uint32_t) MUL(0x09, x) << 8) ^ + ((uint32_t) MUL(0x0D, x) << 16) ^ + ((uint32_t) MUL(0x0B, x) << 24); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + RT1[i] = ROTL8(RT0[i]); + RT2[i] = ROTL8(RT1[i]); + RT3[i] = ROTL8(RT2[i]); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES */ + } +} + +#undef ROTL8 + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + +#define ROTL8(x) ((uint32_t) ((x) << 8) + (uint32_t) ((x) >> 24)) +#define ROTL16(x) ((uint32_t) ((x) << 16) + (uint32_t) ((x) >> 16)) +#define ROTL24(x) ((uint32_t) ((x) << 24) + (uint32_t) ((x) >> 8)) + +#define AES_RT0(idx) RT0[idx] +#define AES_RT1(idx) ROTL8(RT0[idx]) +#define AES_RT2(idx) ROTL16(RT0[idx]) +#define AES_RT3(idx) ROTL24(RT0[idx]) + +#define AES_FT0(idx) FT0[idx] +#define AES_FT1(idx) ROTL8(FT0[idx]) +#define AES_FT2(idx) ROTL16(FT0[idx]) +#define AES_FT3(idx) ROTL24(FT0[idx]) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + +#define AES_RT0(idx) RT0[idx] +#define AES_RT1(idx) RT1[idx] +#define AES_RT2(idx) RT2[idx] +#define AES_RT3(idx) RT3[idx] + +#define AES_FT0(idx) FT0[idx] +#define AES_FT1(idx) FT1[idx] +#define AES_FT2(idx) FT2[idx] +#define AES_FT3(idx) FT3[idx] + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ + +void mbedtls_aes_init(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_aes_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_aes_free(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_aes_context)); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +void mbedtls_aes_xts_init(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->crypt); + mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->tweak); +} + +void mbedtls_aes_xts_free(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx->crypt); + mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx->tweak); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +/* Some implementations need the round keys to be aligned. + * Return an offset to be added to buf, such that (buf + offset) is + * correctly aligned. + * Note that the offset is in units of elements of buf, i.e. 32-bit words, + * i.e. an offset of 1 means 4 bytes and so on. + */ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2) +#define MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN +#endif + +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static unsigned mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(uint32_t *buf) +{ +#if defined(MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN) + int align_16_bytes = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) + if (aes_padlock_ace == -1) { + aes_padlock_ace = mbedtls_padlock_has_support(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE); + } + if (aes_padlock_ace) { + align_16_bytes = 1; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2 + if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) { + align_16_bytes = 1; + } +#endif + + if (align_16_bytes) { + /* These implementations needs 16-byte alignment + * for the round key array. */ + unsigned delta = ((uintptr_t) buf & 0x0000000fU) / 4; + if (delta == 0) { + return 0; + } else { + return 4 - delta; // 16 bytes = 4 uint32_t + } + } +#else /* MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN */ + (void) buf; +#endif /* MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN */ + + return 0; +} + +/* + * AES key schedule (encryption) + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) +int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits) +{ + uint32_t *RK; + + switch (keybits) { + case 128: ctx->nr = 10; break; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + case 192: ctx->nr = 12; break; + case 256: ctx->nr = 14; break; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ + default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) + if (aes_init_done == 0) { + aes_gen_tables(); + aes_init_done = 1; + } +#endif + + ctx->rk_offset = mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf); + RK = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) + if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) { + return mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc((unsigned char *) RK, key, keybits); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + return mbedtls_aesce_setkey_enc((unsigned char *) RK, key, keybits); + } +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < (keybits >> 5); i++) { + RK[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, i << 2); + } + + switch (ctx->nr) { + case 10: + + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 10; i++, RK += 4) { + RK[4] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[3])]) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[3])] << 8) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(RK[3])] << 16) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(RK[3])] << 24); + + RK[5] = RK[1] ^ RK[4]; + RK[6] = RK[2] ^ RK[5]; + RK[7] = RK[3] ^ RK[6]; + } + break; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + case 12: + + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 8; i++, RK += 6) { + RK[6] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[5])]) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[5])] << 8) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(RK[5])] << 16) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(RK[5])] << 24); + + RK[7] = RK[1] ^ RK[6]; + RK[8] = RK[2] ^ RK[7]; + RK[9] = RK[3] ^ RK[8]; + RK[10] = RK[4] ^ RK[9]; + RK[11] = RK[5] ^ RK[10]; + } + break; + + case 14: + + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 7; i++, RK += 8) { + RK[8] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[7])]) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[7])] << 8) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(RK[7])] << 16) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(RK[7])] << 24); + + RK[9] = RK[1] ^ RK[8]; + RK[10] = RK[2] ^ RK[9]; + RK[11] = RK[3] ^ RK[10]; + + RK[12] = RK[4] ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(RK[11])]) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[11])] << 8) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[11])] << 16) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(RK[11])] << 24); + + RK[13] = RK[5] ^ RK[12]; + RK[14] = RK[6] ^ RK[13]; + RK[15] = RK[7] ^ RK[14]; + } + break; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ + } + + return 0; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */ +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT */ + +/* + * AES key schedule (decryption) + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + uint32_t *SK; +#endif + int ret; + mbedtls_aes_context cty; + uint32_t *RK; + + + mbedtls_aes_init(&cty); + + ctx->rk_offset = mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf); + RK = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; + + /* Also checks keybits */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&cty, key, keybits)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ctx->nr = cty.nr; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) + if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) { + mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key((unsigned char *) RK, + (const unsigned char *) (cty.buf + cty.rk_offset), ctx->nr); + goto exit; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + mbedtls_aesce_inverse_key( + (unsigned char *) RK, + (const unsigned char *) (cty.buf + cty.rk_offset), + ctx->nr); + goto exit; + } +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + SK = cty.buf + cty.rk_offset + cty.nr * 4; + + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + SK -= 8; + for (int i = ctx->nr - 1; i > 0; i--, SK -= 8) { + for (int j = 0; j < 4; j++, SK++) { + *RK++ = AES_RT0(FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(*SK)]) ^ + AES_RT1(FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*SK)]) ^ + AES_RT2(FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(*SK)]) ^ + AES_RT3(FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(*SK)]); + } + } + + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */ +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free(&cty); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT && !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +static int mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys(const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits, + const unsigned char **key1, + unsigned int *key1bits, + const unsigned char **key2, + unsigned int *key2bits) +{ + const unsigned int half_keybits = keybits / 2; + const unsigned int half_keybytes = half_keybits / 8; + + switch (keybits) { + case 256: break; + case 512: break; + default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH; + } + + *key1bits = half_keybits; + *key2bits = half_keybits; + *key1 = &key[0]; + *key2 = &key[half_keybytes]; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *key1, *key2; + unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; + + ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys(key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits, + &key2, &key2bits); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Set the tweak key. Always set tweak key for the encryption mode. */ + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->tweak, key2, key2bits); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Set crypt key for encryption. */ + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->crypt, key1, key1bits); +} + +int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *key1, *key2; + unsigned int key1bits, key2bits; + + ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys(key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits, + &key2, &key2bits); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Set the tweak key. Always set tweak key for encryption. */ + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->tweak, key2, key2bits); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Set crypt key for decryption. */ + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx->crypt, key1, key1bits); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#define AES_FROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3) \ + do \ + { \ + (X0) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(Y0)) ^ \ + AES_FT1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(Y1)) ^ \ + AES_FT2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(Y2)) ^ \ + AES_FT3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(Y3)); \ + \ + (X1) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(Y1)) ^ \ + AES_FT1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(Y2)) ^ \ + AES_FT2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(Y3)) ^ \ + AES_FT3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(Y0)); \ + \ + (X2) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(Y2)) ^ \ + AES_FT1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(Y3)) ^ \ + AES_FT2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(Y0)) ^ \ + AES_FT3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(Y1)); \ + \ + (X3) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(Y3)) ^ \ + AES_FT1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(Y0)) ^ \ + AES_FT2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(Y1)) ^ \ + AES_FT3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(Y2)); \ + } while (0) + +#define AES_RROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3) \ + do \ + { \ + (X0) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(Y0)) ^ \ + AES_RT1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(Y3)) ^ \ + AES_RT2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(Y2)) ^ \ + AES_RT3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(Y1)); \ + \ + (X1) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(Y1)) ^ \ + AES_RT1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(Y0)) ^ \ + AES_RT2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(Y3)) ^ \ + AES_RT3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(Y2)); \ + \ + (X2) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(Y2)) ^ \ + AES_RT1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(Y1)) ^ \ + AES_RT2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(Y0)) ^ \ + AES_RT3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(Y3)); \ + \ + (X3) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(Y3)) ^ \ + AES_RT1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(Y2)) ^ \ + AES_RT2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(Y1)) ^ \ + AES_RT3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(Y0)); \ + } while (0) + +/* + * AES-ECB block encryption + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]) +{ + int i; + uint32_t *RK = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; + struct { + uint32_t X[4]; + uint32_t Y[4]; + } t; + + t.X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 0); t.X[0] ^= *RK++; + t.X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 4); t.X[1] ^= *RK++; + t.X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 8); t.X[2] ^= *RK++; + t.X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 12); t.X[3] ^= *RK++; + + for (i = (ctx->nr >> 1) - 1; i > 0; i--) { + AES_FROUND(t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3]); + AES_FROUND(t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3], t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3]); + } + + AES_FROUND(t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3]); + + t.X[0] = *RK++ ^ \ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(t.Y[0])]) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(t.Y[1])] << 8) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(t.Y[2])] << 16) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(t.Y[3])] << 24); + + t.X[1] = *RK++ ^ \ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(t.Y[1])]) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(t.Y[2])] << 8) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(t.Y[3])] << 16) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(t.Y[0])] << 24); + + t.X[2] = *RK++ ^ \ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(t.Y[2])]) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(t.Y[3])] << 8) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(t.Y[0])] << 16) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(t.Y[1])] << 24); + + t.X[3] = *RK++ ^ \ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(t.Y[3])]) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(t.Y[0])] << 8) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(t.Y[1])] << 16) ^ + ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(t.Y[2])] << 24); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(t.X[0], output, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(t.X[1], output, 4); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(t.X[2], output, 8); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(t.X[3], output, 12); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&t, sizeof(t)); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */ + +/* + * AES-ECB block decryption + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]) +{ + int i; + uint32_t *RK = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; + struct { + uint32_t X[4]; + uint32_t Y[4]; + } t; + + t.X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 0); t.X[0] ^= *RK++; + t.X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 4); t.X[1] ^= *RK++; + t.X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 8); t.X[2] ^= *RK++; + t.X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 12); t.X[3] ^= *RK++; + + for (i = (ctx->nr >> 1) - 1; i > 0; i--) { + AES_RROUND(t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3]); + AES_RROUND(t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3], t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3]); + } + + AES_RROUND(t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3]); + + t.X[0] = *RK++ ^ \ + ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(t.Y[0])]) ^ + ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(t.Y[3])] << 8) ^ + ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(t.Y[2])] << 16) ^ + ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(t.Y[1])] << 24); + + t.X[1] = *RK++ ^ \ + ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(t.Y[1])]) ^ + ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(t.Y[0])] << 8) ^ + ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(t.Y[3])] << 16) ^ + ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(t.Y[2])] << 24); + + t.X[2] = *RK++ ^ \ + ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(t.Y[2])]) ^ + ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(t.Y[1])] << 8) ^ + ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(t.Y[0])] << 16) ^ + ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(t.Y[3])] << 24); + + t.X[3] = *RK++ ^ \ + ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(t.Y[3])]) ^ + ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(t.Y[2])] << 8) ^ + ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(t.Y[1])] << 16) ^ + ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(t.Y[0])] << 24); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(t.X[0], output, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(t.X[1], output, 4); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(t.X[2], output, 8); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(t.X[3], output, 12); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&t, sizeof(t)); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT && !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ + +/* VIA Padlock and our intrinsics-based implementation of AESNI require + * the round keys to be aligned on a 16-byte boundary. We take care of this + * before creating them, but the AES context may have moved (this can happen + * if the library is called from a language with managed memory), and in later + * calls it might have a different alignment with respect to 16-byte memory. + * So we may need to realign. + */ +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static void aes_maybe_realign(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx) +{ + unsigned new_offset = mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf); + if (new_offset != ctx->rk_offset) { + memmove(ctx->buf + new_offset, // new address + ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset, // current address + (ctx->nr + 1) * 16); // number of round keys * bytes per rk + ctx->rk_offset = new_offset; + } +} + +/* + * AES-ECB block encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]) +{ + if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN) + aes_maybe_realign(ctx); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) + if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) { + return mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + return mbedtls_aesce_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) + if (aes_padlock_ace > 0) { + return mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb(ctx, mode, input, output); + } +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + return mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt(ctx, input, output); + } else +#endif + { + return mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt(ctx, input, output); + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + +/* + * AES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char temp[16]; + + if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Nothing to do if length is zero. */ + if (length == 0) { + return 0; + } + + if (length % 16) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) + if (aes_padlock_ace > 0) { + if (mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc(ctx, mode, length, iv, input, output) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + // If padlock data misaligned, we just fall back to + // unaccelerated mode + // + } +#endif + + const unsigned char *ivp = iv; + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + while (length > 0) { + memcpy(temp, input, 16); + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + /* Avoid using the NEON implementation of mbedtls_xor. Because of the dependency on + * the result for the next block in CBC, and the cost of transferring that data from + * NEON registers, NEON is slower on aarch64. */ + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(output, output, iv, 16); + + memcpy(iv, temp, 16); + + input += 16; + output += 16; + length -= 16; + } + } else { + while (length > 0) { + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(output, input, ivp, 16); + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, output, output); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ivp = output; + + input += 16; + output += 16; + length -= 16; + } + memcpy(iv, ivp, 16); + } + ret = 0; + +exit: + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + +typedef unsigned char mbedtls_be128[16]; + +/* + * GF(2^128) multiplication function + * + * This function multiplies a field element by x in the polynomial field + * representation. It uses 64-bit word operations to gain speed but compensates + * for machine endianness and hence works correctly on both big and little + * endian machines. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) +MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE +#endif +static inline void mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble(unsigned char r[16], + const unsigned char x[16]) +{ + uint64_t a, b, ra, rb; + + a = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE(x, 0); + b = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE(x, 8); + + ra = (a << 1) ^ 0x0087 >> (8 - ((b >> 63) << 3)); + rb = (a >> 63) | (b << 1); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(ra, r, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(rb, r, 8); +} + +/* + * AES-XTS buffer encryption/decryption + * + * Use of MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE here and for mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble() + * is a 3x performance improvement for gcc -Os, if we have hardware AES support. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) +MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE +#endif +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + const unsigned char data_unit[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t blocks = length / 16; + size_t leftover = length % 16; + unsigned char tweak[16]; + unsigned char prev_tweak[16]; + unsigned char tmp[16]; + + if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Data units must be at least 16 bytes long. */ + if (length < 16) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; + } + + /* NIST SP 800-38E disallows data units larger than 2**20 blocks. */ + if (length > (1 << 20) * 16) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; + } + + /* Compute the tweak. */ + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->tweak, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + data_unit, tweak); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + while (blocks--) { + if (MBEDTLS_UNLIKELY(leftover && (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) && blocks == 0)) { + /* We are on the last block in a decrypt operation that has + * leftover bytes, so we need to use the next tweak for this block, + * and this tweak for the leftover bytes. Save the current tweak for + * the leftovers and then update the current tweak for use on this, + * the last full block. */ + memcpy(prev_tweak, tweak, sizeof(tweak)); + mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble(tweak, tweak); + } + + mbedtls_xor(tmp, input, tweak, 16); + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_xor(output, tmp, tweak, 16); + + /* Update the tweak for the next block. */ + mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble(tweak, tweak); + + output += 16; + input += 16; + } + + if (leftover) { + /* If we are on the leftover bytes in a decrypt operation, we need to + * use the previous tweak for these bytes (as saved in prev_tweak). */ + unsigned char *t = mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ? prev_tweak : tweak; + + /* We are now on the final part of the data unit, which doesn't divide + * evenly by 16. It's time for ciphertext stealing. */ + size_t i; + unsigned char *prev_output = output - 16; + + /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block to our output for each + * byte of ciphertext we won't steal. */ + for (i = 0; i < leftover; i++) { + output[i] = prev_output[i]; + } + + /* Copy the remainder of the input for this final round. */ + mbedtls_xor(tmp, input, t, leftover); + + /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block for input in this + * round. */ + mbedtls_xor(tmp + i, prev_output + i, t + i, 16 - i); + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Write the result back to the previous block, overriding the previous + * output we copied. */ + mbedtls_xor(prev_output, tmp, t, 16); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/* + * AES-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + + if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + n = *iv_off; + + if (n > 15) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + while (length--) { + if (n == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char) (c ^ iv[n]); + iv[n] = (unsigned char) c; + + n = (n + 1) & 0x0F; + } + } else { + while (length--) { + if (n == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char) (iv[n] ^ *input++); + + n = (n + 1) & 0x0F; + } + } + + *iv_off = n; + ret = 0; + +exit: + return ret; +} + +/* + * AES-CFB8 buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char c; + unsigned char ov[17]; + + if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + while (length--) { + memcpy(ov, iv, 16); + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + ov[16] = *input; + } + + c = *output++ = (unsigned char) (iv[0] ^ *input++); + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT) { + ov[16] = c; + } + + memcpy(iv, ov + 1, 16); + } + ret = 0; + +exit: + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +/* + * AES-OFB (Output Feedback Mode) buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t n; + + n = *iv_off; + + if (n > 15) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + while (length--) { + if (n == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + *output++ = *input++ ^ iv[n]; + + n = (n + 1) & 0x0F; + } + + *iv_off = n; + +exit: + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * AES-CTR buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[16], + unsigned char stream_block[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + size_t offset = *nc_off; + + if (offset > 0x0F) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + for (size_t i = 0; i < length;) { + size_t n = 16; + if (offset == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, stream_block); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(nonce_counter); + } else { + n -= offset; + } + + if (n > (length - i)) { + n = (length - i); + } + mbedtls_xor(&output[i], &input[i], &stream_block[offset], n); + // offset might be non-zero for the last block, but in that case, we don't use it again + offset = 0; + i += n; + } + + // capture offset for future resumption + *nc_off = (*nc_off + length) % 16; + + ret = 0; + +exit: + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * AES test vectors from: + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/archive/aes/rijndael/rijndael-vals.zip + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_dec[][16] = +{ + { 0x44, 0x41, 0x6A, 0xC2, 0xD1, 0xF5, 0x3C, 0x58, + 0x33, 0x03, 0x91, 0x7E, 0x6B, 0xE9, 0xEB, 0xE0 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { 0x48, 0xE3, 0x1E, 0x9E, 0x25, 0x67, 0x18, 0xF2, + 0x92, 0x29, 0x31, 0x9C, 0x19, 0xF1, 0x5B, 0xA4 }, + { 0x05, 0x8C, 0xCF, 0xFD, 0xBB, 0xCB, 0x38, 0x2D, + 0x1F, 0x6F, 0x56, 0x58, 0x5D, 0x8A, 0x4A, 0xDE } +#endif +}; +#endif + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_enc[][16] = +{ + { 0xC3, 0x4C, 0x05, 0x2C, 0xC0, 0xDA, 0x8D, 0x73, + 0x45, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0x5F, 0x03, 0xBE, 0x29, 0x7F }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { 0xF3, 0xF6, 0x75, 0x2A, 0xE8, 0xD7, 0x83, 0x11, + 0x38, 0xF0, 0x41, 0x56, 0x06, 0x31, 0xB1, 0x14 }, + { 0x8B, 0x79, 0xEE, 0xCC, 0x93, 0xA0, 0xEE, 0x5D, + 0xFF, 0x30, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x21, 0x63, 0x6D, 0xA4 } +#endif +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_dec[][16] = +{ + { 0xFA, 0xCA, 0x37, 0xE0, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0x53, 0x73, + 0xDF, 0x70, 0x6E, 0x73, 0xF7, 0xC9, 0xAF, 0x86 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { 0x5D, 0xF6, 0x78, 0xDD, 0x17, 0xBA, 0x4E, 0x75, + 0xB6, 0x17, 0x68, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0xEF, 0x7C, 0x7B }, + { 0x48, 0x04, 0xE1, 0x81, 0x8F, 0xE6, 0x29, 0x75, + 0x19, 0xA3, 0xE8, 0x8C, 0x57, 0x31, 0x04, 0x13 } +#endif +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_enc[][16] = +{ + { 0x8A, 0x05, 0xFC, 0x5E, 0x09, 0x5A, 0xF4, 0x84, + 0x8A, 0x08, 0xD3, 0x28, 0xD3, 0x68, 0x8E, 0x3D }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { 0x7B, 0xD9, 0x66, 0xD5, 0x3A, 0xD8, 0xC1, 0xBB, + 0x85, 0xD2, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE8, 0x7B, 0xB1, 0x04 }, + { 0xFE, 0x3C, 0x53, 0x65, 0x3E, 0x2F, 0x45, 0xB5, + 0x6F, 0xCD, 0x88, 0xB2, 0xCC, 0x89, 0x8F, 0xF0 } +#endif +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/* + * AES-CFB128 test vectors from: + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf + */ +static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_key[][32] = +{ + { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6, + 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52, + 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5, + 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B }, + { 0x60, 0x3D, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x15, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xBE, + 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81, + 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7, + 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 } +#endif +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_iv[16] = +{ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_pt[64] = +{ + 0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96, + 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A, + 0xAE, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x1E, 0x03, 0xAC, 0x9C, + 0x9E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xAC, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x8E, 0x51, + 0x30, 0xC8, 0x1C, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x5C, 0xE4, 0x11, + 0xE5, 0xFB, 0xC1, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x52, 0xEF, + 0xF6, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x4F, 0x9B, 0x17, + 0xAD, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0x6C, 0x37, 0x10 +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_ct[][64] = +{ + { 0x3B, 0x3F, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x20, + 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xF8, 0xE8, 0x3C, 0xFB, 0x4A, + 0xC8, 0xA6, 0x45, 0x37, 0xA0, 0xB3, 0xA9, 0x3F, + 0xCD, 0xE3, 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x9F, 0x1C, 0xE5, 0x8B, + 0x26, 0x75, 0x1F, 0x67, 0xA3, 0xCB, 0xB1, 0x40, + 0xB1, 0x80, 0x8C, 0xF1, 0x87, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0xDF, + 0xC0, 0x4B, 0x05, 0x35, 0x7C, 0x5D, 0x1C, 0x0E, + 0xEA, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0xF7, 0xF2, 0xE6 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { 0xCD, 0xC8, 0x0D, 0x6F, 0xDD, 0xF1, 0x8C, 0xAB, + 0x34, 0xC2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xC9, 0x9A, 0x41, 0x74, + 0x67, 0xCE, 0x7F, 0x7F, 0x81, 0x17, 0x36, 0x21, + 0x96, 0x1A, 0x2B, 0x70, 0x17, 0x1D, 0x3D, 0x7A, + 0x2E, 0x1E, 0x8A, 0x1D, 0xD5, 0x9B, 0x88, 0xB1, + 0xC8, 0xE6, 0x0F, 0xED, 0x1E, 0xFA, 0xC4, 0xC9, + 0xC0, 0x5F, 0x9F, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0x83, 0x4F, 0xA0, + 0x42, 0xAE, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0x58, 0x4B, 0x09, 0xFF }, + { 0xDC, 0x7E, 0x84, 0xBF, 0xDA, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4B, + 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5D, 0x38, 0x60, + 0x39, 0xFF, 0xED, 0x14, 0x3B, 0x28, 0xB1, 0xC8, + 0x32, 0x11, 0x3C, 0x63, 0x31, 0xE5, 0x40, 0x7B, + 0xDF, 0x10, 0x13, 0x24, 0x15, 0xE5, 0x4B, 0x92, + 0xA1, 0x3E, 0xD0, 0xA8, 0x26, 0x7A, 0xE2, 0xF9, + 0x75, 0xA3, 0x85, 0x74, 0x1A, 0xB9, 0xCE, 0xF8, + 0x20, 0x31, 0x62, 0x3D, 0x55, 0xB1, 0xE4, 0x71 } +#endif +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +/* + * AES-OFB test vectors from: + * + * https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38a/final + */ +static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_key[][32] = +{ + { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6, + 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52, + 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5, + 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B }, + { 0x60, 0x3D, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x15, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xBE, + 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81, + 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7, + 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 } +#endif +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_iv[16] = +{ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_pt[64] = +{ + 0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96, + 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A, + 0xAE, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x1E, 0x03, 0xAC, 0x9C, + 0x9E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xAC, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x8E, 0x51, + 0x30, 0xC8, 0x1C, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x5C, 0xE4, 0x11, + 0xE5, 0xFB, 0xC1, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x52, 0xEF, + 0xF6, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x4F, 0x9B, 0x17, + 0xAD, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0x6C, 0x37, 0x10 +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_ct[][64] = +{ + { 0x3B, 0x3F, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x20, + 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xF8, 0xE8, 0x3C, 0xFB, 0x4A, + 0x77, 0x89, 0x50, 0x8d, 0x16, 0x91, 0x8f, 0x03, + 0xf5, 0x3c, 0x52, 0xda, 0xc5, 0x4e, 0xd8, 0x25, + 0x97, 0x40, 0x05, 0x1e, 0x9c, 0x5f, 0xec, 0xf6, + 0x43, 0x44, 0xf7, 0xa8, 0x22, 0x60, 0xed, 0xcc, + 0x30, 0x4c, 0x65, 0x28, 0xf6, 0x59, 0xc7, 0x78, + 0x66, 0xa5, 0x10, 0xd9, 0xc1, 0xd6, 0xae, 0x5e }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { 0xCD, 0xC8, 0x0D, 0x6F, 0xDD, 0xF1, 0x8C, 0xAB, + 0x34, 0xC2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xC9, 0x9A, 0x41, 0x74, + 0xfc, 0xc2, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0x4c, 0x63, 0x83, 0x7c, + 0x09, 0xe8, 0x17, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x10, 0x04, 0x01, + 0x8d, 0x9a, 0x9a, 0xea, 0xc0, 0xf6, 0x59, 0x6f, + 0x55, 0x9c, 0x6d, 0x4d, 0xaf, 0x59, 0xa5, 0xf2, + 0x6d, 0x9f, 0x20, 0x08, 0x57, 0xca, 0x6c, 0x3e, + 0x9c, 0xac, 0x52, 0x4b, 0xd9, 0xac, 0xc9, 0x2a }, + { 0xDC, 0x7E, 0x84, 0xBF, 0xDA, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4B, + 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5D, 0x38, 0x60, + 0x4f, 0xeb, 0xdc, 0x67, 0x40, 0xd2, 0x0b, 0x3a, + 0xc8, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xd8, 0x2a, 0x4f, 0xb0, 0x8d, + 0x71, 0xab, 0x47, 0xa0, 0x86, 0xe8, 0x6e, 0xed, + 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x1c, 0x5b, 0xba, 0x97, 0xc4, 0x08, + 0x01, 0x26, 0x14, 0x1d, 0x67, 0xf3, 0x7b, 0xe8, + 0x53, 0x8f, 0x5a, 0x8b, 0xe7, 0x40, 0xe4, 0x84 } +#endif +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * AES-CTR test vectors from: + * + * http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3686.html + */ + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_key[][16] = +{ + { 0xAE, 0x68, 0x52, 0xF8, 0x12, 0x10, 0x67, 0xCC, + 0x4B, 0xF7, 0xA5, 0x76, 0x55, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x9E }, + { 0x7E, 0x24, 0x06, 0x78, 0x17, 0xFA, 0xE0, 0xD7, + 0x43, 0xD6, 0xCE, 0x1F, 0x32, 0x53, 0x91, 0x63 }, + { 0x76, 0x91, 0xBE, 0x03, 0x5E, 0x50, 0x20, 0xA8, + 0xAC, 0x6E, 0x61, 0x85, 0x29, 0xF9, 0xA0, 0xDC } +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[][16] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }, + { 0x00, 0x6C, 0xB6, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0x54, 0x3B, 0x59, + 0xDA, 0x48, 0xD9, 0x0B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }, + { 0x00, 0xE0, 0x01, 0x7B, 0x27, 0x77, 0x7F, 0x3F, + 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 } +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_pt[][48] = +{ + { 0x53, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x20, 0x62, + 0x6C, 0x6F, 0x63, 0x6B, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x73, 0x67 }, + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F }, + + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F, + 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23 } +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_ct[][48] = +{ + { 0xE4, 0x09, 0x5D, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xA7, 0xB3, 0x79, + 0x2D, 0x61, 0x75, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x13, 0x11, 0xB8 }, + { 0x51, 0x04, 0xA1, 0x06, 0x16, 0x8A, 0x72, 0xD9, + 0x79, 0x0D, 0x41, 0xEE, 0x8E, 0xDA, 0xD3, 0x88, + 0xEB, 0x2E, 0x1E, 0xFC, 0x46, 0xDA, 0x57, 0xC8, + 0xFC, 0xE6, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x91, 0x41, 0xBE, 0x28 }, + { 0xC1, 0xCF, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x9F, 0x2F, 0xFD, 0xD9, + 0xCF, 0x46, 0x52, 0xE9, 0xEF, 0xDB, 0x72, 0xD7, + 0x45, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x2B, 0xDE, 0x6D, 0x78, 0x36, + 0xD5, 0x9A, 0x5C, 0xEA, 0xAE, 0xF3, 0x10, 0x53, + 0x25, 0xB2, 0x07, 0x2F } +}; + +static const int aes_test_ctr_len[3] = +{ 16, 32, 36 }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +/* + * AES-XTS test vectors from: + * + * IEEE P1619/D16 Annex B + * https://web.archive.org/web/20150629024421/http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/pdf00086.pdf + * (Archived from original at http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/pdf00086.pdf) + */ +static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_key[][32] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, + 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22 }, + { 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0xfc, 0xfb, 0xfa, 0xf9, 0xf8, + 0xf7, 0xf6, 0xf5, 0xf4, 0xf3, 0xf2, 0xf1, 0xf0, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22 }, +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_pt32[][32] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44 }, + { 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, + 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44 }, +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_ct32[][32] = +{ + { 0x91, 0x7c, 0xf6, 0x9e, 0xbd, 0x68, 0xb2, 0xec, + 0x9b, 0x9f, 0xe9, 0xa3, 0xea, 0xdd, 0xa6, 0x92, + 0xcd, 0x43, 0xd2, 0xf5, 0x95, 0x98, 0xed, 0x85, + 0x8c, 0x02, 0xc2, 0x65, 0x2f, 0xbf, 0x92, 0x2e }, + { 0xc4, 0x54, 0x18, 0x5e, 0x6a, 0x16, 0x93, 0x6e, + 0x39, 0x33, 0x40, 0x38, 0xac, 0xef, 0x83, 0x8b, + 0xfb, 0x18, 0x6f, 0xff, 0x74, 0x80, 0xad, 0xc4, + 0x28, 0x93, 0x82, 0xec, 0xd6, 0xd3, 0x94, 0xf0 }, + { 0xaf, 0x85, 0x33, 0x6b, 0x59, 0x7a, 0xfc, 0x1a, + 0x90, 0x0b, 0x2e, 0xb2, 0x1e, 0xc9, 0x49, 0xd2, + 0x92, 0xdf, 0x4c, 0x04, 0x7e, 0x0b, 0x21, 0x53, + 0x21, 0x86, 0xa5, 0x97, 0x1a, 0x22, 0x7a, 0x89 }, +}; + +static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_data_unit[][16] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, +}; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_aes_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int ret = 0, i, j, u, mode; + unsigned int keybits; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char buf[64]; + const unsigned char *aes_tests; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + unsigned char iv[16]; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + unsigned char prv[16]; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + size_t offset; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + int len; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + unsigned char nonce_counter[16]; + unsigned char stream_block[16]; +#endif + mbedtls_aes_context ctx; + + memset(key, 0, 32); + mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx); + + if (verbose != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: alternative implementation.\n"); +#else /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) +#if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 1 + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: AESNI code present (assembly implementation).\n"); +#elif MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2 + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: AESNI code present (intrinsics implementation).\n"); +#else +#error "Unrecognised value for MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE" +#endif + if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using AESNI.\n"); + } else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) + if (mbedtls_padlock_has_support(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE)) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using VIA Padlock.\n"); + } else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using AESCE.\n"); + } else +#endif + { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + mbedtls_printf(" AES note: built-in implementation.\n"); +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ + } + + /* + * ECB mode + */ + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_ecb_enc) / sizeof(*aes_test_ecb_enc); + + for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-ECB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + } + continue; + } +#endif + + memset(buf, 0, 16); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, keybits); + aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_dec[u]; + } else +#endif + { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); + aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_enc[u]; + } + + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + continue; + } else if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + for (j = 0; j < 10000; j++) { + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx, mode, buf, buf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 16) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + /* + * CBC mode + */ + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_cbc_dec) / sizeof(*aes_test_cbc_dec); + + for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-CBC-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } + + memset(iv, 0, 16); + memset(prv, 0, 16); + memset(buf, 0, 16); + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, keybits); + aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_dec[u]; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); + aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_enc[u]; + } + + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + continue; + } else if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + for (j = 0; j < 10000; j++) { + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT) { + unsigned char tmp[16]; + + memcpy(tmp, prv, 16); + memcpy(prv, buf, 16); + memcpy(buf, tmp, 16); + } + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&ctx, mode, 16, iv, buf, buf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + } + + if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 16) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + /* + * CFB128 mode + */ + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_cfb128_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_cfb128_key); + + for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-CFB128-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } + + memcpy(iv, aes_test_cfb128_iv, 16); + memcpy(key, aes_test_cfb128_key[u], keybits / 8); + + offset = 0; + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + continue; + } else if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_cfb128_ct[u], 64); + aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_pt; + } else { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_cfb128_pt, 64); + aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_ct[u]; + } + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128(&ctx, mode, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 64) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + /* + * OFB mode + */ + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_ofb_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_ofb_key); + + for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + keybits = 128 + u * 64; + mode = i & 1; + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-OFB-%3u (%s): ", keybits, + (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } + + memcpy(iv, aes_test_ofb_iv, 16); + memcpy(key, aes_test_ofb_key[u], keybits / 8); + + offset = 0; + ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits); + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + continue; + } else if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_ofb_ct[u], 64); + aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_pt; + } else { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_ofb_pt, 64); + aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_ct[u]; + } + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb(&ctx, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 64) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + /* + * CTR mode + */ + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_ctr_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_ctr_key); + + for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + mode = i & 1; + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-CTR-128 (%s): ", + (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } + + memcpy(nonce_counter, aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[u], 16); + memcpy(key, aes_test_ctr_key[u], 16); + + offset = 0; + if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, 128)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + len = aes_test_ctr_len[u]; + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_ctr_ct[u], len); + aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_pt[u]; + } else { + memcpy(buf, aes_test_ctr_pt[u], len); + aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_ct[u]; + } + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(&ctx, len, &offset, nonce_counter, + stream_block, buf, buf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, len) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + /* + * XTS mode + */ + { + static const int num_tests = + sizeof(aes_test_xts_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_xts_key); + mbedtls_aes_xts_context ctx_xts; + + mbedtls_aes_xts_init(&ctx_xts); + + for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) { + const unsigned char *data_unit; + u = i >> 1; + mode = i & 1; + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-XTS-128 (%s): ", + (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } + + memset(key, 0, sizeof(key)); + memcpy(key, aes_test_xts_key[u], 32); + data_unit = aes_test_xts_data_unit[u]; + + len = sizeof(*aes_test_xts_ct32); + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec(&ctx_xts, key, 256); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + memcpy(buf, aes_test_xts_ct32[u], len); + aes_tests = aes_test_xts_pt32[u]; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc(&ctx_xts, key, 256); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + memcpy(buf, aes_test_xts_pt32[u], len); + aes_tests = aes_test_xts_ct32[u]; + } + + + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(&ctx_xts, mode, len, data_unit, + buf, buf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, len) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + mbedtls_aes_xts_free(&ctx_xts); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + + ret = 0; + +exit: + if (ret != 0 && verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx); + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ diff --git a/library/aesce.c b/library/aesce.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..6a9e0a1c6bd --- /dev/null +++ b/library/aesce.c @@ -0,0 +1,618 @@ +/* + * Armv8-A Cryptographic Extension support functions for Aarch64 + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#if defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 4) + +/* Ideally, we would simply use MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A in the following #if, + * but that is defined by build_info.h, and we need this block to happen first. */ +#if defined(__ARM_ARCH) +#if __ARM_ARCH >= 8 +#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO) +/* TODO: Re-consider above after https://reviews.llvm.org/D131064 merged. + * + * The intrinsic declaration are guarded by predefined ACLE macros in clang: + * these are normally only enabled by the -march option on the command line. + * By defining the macros ourselves we gain access to those declarations without + * requiring -march on the command line. + * + * `arm_neon.h` is included by common.h, so we put these defines + * at the top of this file, before any includes. + */ +#define __ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO 1 +/* See: https://arm-software.github.io/acle/main/acle.html#cryptographic-extensions + * + * `__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO` is deprecated, but we need to continue to specify it + * for older compilers. + */ +#define __ARM_FEATURE_AES 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG +#endif + +#endif /* defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 4) */ + +#include +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) + +#include "aesce.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + +/* Compiler version checks. */ +#if defined(__clang__) +# if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) && (__clang_major__ < 11) +# error "Minimum version of Clang for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C on 32-bit Arm or Thumb is 11.0." +# elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) && (__clang_major__ < 4) +# error "Minimum version of Clang for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C on aarch64 is 4.0." +# endif +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +# if __GNUC__ < 6 +# error "Minimum version of GCC for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C is 6.0." +# endif +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +/* TODO: We haven't verified MSVC from 1920 to 1928. If someone verified that, + * please update this and document of `MBEDTLS_AESCE_C` in + * `mbedtls_config.h`. */ +# if _MSC_VER < 1929 +# error "Minimum version of MSVC for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C is 2019 version 16.11.2." +# endif +#elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) +# if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) && (__ARMCC_VERSION < 6200002) +/* TODO: We haven't verified armclang for 32-bit Arm/Thumb prior to 6.20. + * If someone verified that, please update this and document of + * `MBEDTLS_AESCE_C` in `mbedtls_config.h`. */ +# error "Minimum version of armclang for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C on 32-bit Arm is 6.20." +# elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) && (__ARMCC_VERSION < 6060000) +# error "Minimum version of armclang for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C on aarch64 is 6.6." +# endif +#endif + +#if !(defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO) || defined(__ARM_FEATURE_AES)) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG) +# if defined(__ARMCOMPILER_VERSION) +# if __ARMCOMPILER_VERSION <= 6090000 +# error "Must use minimum -march=armv8-a+crypto for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C" +# else +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("aes"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# endif +# elif defined(__clang__) +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("aes"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# elif defined(__GNUC__) +# pragma GCC push_options +# pragma GCC target ("+crypto") +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# elif defined(_MSC_VER) +# error "Required feature(__ARM_FEATURE_AES) is not enabled." +# endif +#endif /* !(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO || __ARM_FEATURE_AES) || + MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG */ + +#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + +#include +#if !defined(HWCAP_NEON) +#define HWCAP_NEON (1 << 12) +#endif +#if !defined(HWCAP2_AES) +#define HWCAP2_AES (1 << 0) +#endif +#if !defined(HWCAP_AES) +#define HWCAP_AES (1 << 3) +#endif +#if !defined(HWCAP_ASIMD) +#define HWCAP_ASIMD (1 << 1) +#endif + +signed char mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = -1; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) +/* + * AES instruction support detection routine + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_has_support_impl(void) +{ + /* To avoid many calls to getauxval, cache the result. This is + * thread-safe, because we store the result in a char so cannot + * be vulnerable to non-atomic updates. + * It is possible that we could end up setting result more than + * once, but that is harmless. + */ + if (mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result == -1) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) + unsigned long auxval = getauxval(AT_HWCAP); + unsigned long auxval2 = getauxval(AT_HWCAP2); + if (((auxval & HWCAP_NEON) == HWCAP_NEON) && + ((auxval2 & HWCAP2_AES) == HWCAP2_AES)) { + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = 1; + } else { + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = 0; + } +#else + unsigned long auxval = getauxval(AT_HWCAP); + if ((auxval & (HWCAP_ASIMD | HWCAP_AES)) == + (HWCAP_ASIMD | HWCAP_AES)) { + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = 1; + } else { + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = 0; + } +#endif + } + return mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result; +} +#endif + +#endif /* defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) */ + +/* Single round of AESCE encryption */ +#define AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND \ + block = vaeseq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); \ + block = vaesmcq_u8(block); \ + keys += 16 +/* Two rounds of AESCE encryption */ +#define AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2 AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND; AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND + +MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE +static uint8x16_t aesce_encrypt_block(uint8x16_t block, + unsigned char *keys, + int rounds) +{ + /* 10, 12 or 14 rounds. Unroll loop. */ + if (rounds == 10) { + goto rounds_10; + } + if (rounds == 12) { + goto rounds_12; + } + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; +rounds_12: + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; +rounds_10: + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND; + + /* AES AddRoundKey for the previous round. + * SubBytes, ShiftRows for the final round. */ + block = vaeseq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); + keys += 16; + + /* Final round: no MixColumns */ + + /* Final AddRoundKey */ + block = veorq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); + + return block; +} + +/* Single round of AESCE decryption + * + * AES AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows + * + * block = vaesdq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); + * + * AES inverse MixColumns for the next round. + * + * This means that we switch the order of the inverse AddRoundKey and + * inverse MixColumns operations. We have to do this as AddRoundKey is + * done in an atomic instruction together with the inverses of SubBytes + * and ShiftRows. + * + * It works because MixColumns is a linear operation over GF(2^8) and + * AddRoundKey is an exclusive or, which is equivalent to addition over + * GF(2^8). (The inverse of MixColumns needs to be applied to the + * affected round keys separately which has been done when the + * decryption round keys were calculated.) + * + * block = vaesimcq_u8(block); + */ +#define AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND \ + block = vaesdq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); \ + block = vaesimcq_u8(block); \ + keys += 16 +/* Two rounds of AESCE decryption */ +#define AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2 AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND; AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +static uint8x16_t aesce_decrypt_block(uint8x16_t block, + unsigned char *keys, + int rounds) +{ + /* 10, 12 or 14 rounds. Unroll loop. */ + if (rounds == 10) { + goto rounds_10; + } + if (rounds == 12) { + goto rounds_12; + } + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; +rounds_12: + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; +rounds_10: + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2; + AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND; + + /* The inverses of AES AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows finishing up the + * last full round. */ + block = vaesdq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); + keys += 16; + + /* Inverse AddRoundKey for inverting the initial round key addition. */ + block = veorq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); + + return block; +} +#endif + +/* + * AES-ECB block en(de)cryption + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]) +{ + uint8x16_t block = vld1q_u8(&input[0]); + unsigned char *keys = (unsigned char *) (ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + block = aesce_decrypt_block(block, keys, ctx->nr); + } else +#else + (void) mode; +#endif + { + block = aesce_encrypt_block(block, keys, ctx->nr); + } + vst1q_u8(&output[0], block); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Compute decryption round keys from encryption round keys + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +void mbedtls_aesce_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, + const unsigned char *fwdkey, + int nr) +{ + int i, j; + j = nr; + vst1q_u8(invkey, vld1q_u8(fwdkey + j * 16)); + for (i = 1, j--; j > 0; i++, j--) { + vst1q_u8(invkey + i * 16, + vaesimcq_u8(vld1q_u8(fwdkey + j * 16))); + } + vst1q_u8(invkey + i * 16, vld1q_u8(fwdkey + j * 16)); + +} +#endif + +static inline uint32_t aes_rot_word(uint32_t word) +{ + return (word << (32 - 8)) | (word >> 8); +} + +static inline uint32_t aes_sub_word(uint32_t in) +{ + uint8x16_t v = vreinterpretq_u8_u32(vdupq_n_u32(in)); + uint8x16_t zero = vdupq_n_u8(0); + + /* vaeseq_u8 does both SubBytes and ShiftRows. Taking the first row yields + * the correct result as ShiftRows doesn't change the first row. */ + v = vaeseq_u8(zero, v); + return vgetq_lane_u32(vreinterpretq_u32_u8(v), 0); +} + +/* + * Key expansion function + */ +static void aesce_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key, + const size_t key_bit_length) +{ + static uint8_t const rcon[] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, + 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1b, 0x36 }; + /* See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.197.pdf + * - Section 5, Nr = Nk + 6 + * - Section 5.2, the length of round keys is Nb*(Nr+1) + */ + const size_t key_len_in_words = key_bit_length / 32; /* Nk */ + const size_t round_key_len_in_words = 4; /* Nb */ + const size_t rounds_needed = key_len_in_words + 6; /* Nr */ + const size_t round_keys_len_in_words = + round_key_len_in_words * (rounds_needed + 1); /* Nb*(Nr+1) */ + const uint32_t *rko_end = (uint32_t *) rk + round_keys_len_in_words; + + memcpy(rk, key, key_len_in_words * 4); + + for (uint32_t *rki = (uint32_t *) rk; + rki + key_len_in_words < rko_end; + rki += key_len_in_words) { + + size_t iteration = (size_t) (rki - (uint32_t *) rk) / key_len_in_words; + uint32_t *rko; + rko = rki + key_len_in_words; + rko[0] = aes_rot_word(aes_sub_word(rki[key_len_in_words - 1])); + rko[0] ^= rcon[iteration] ^ rki[0]; + rko[1] = rko[0] ^ rki[1]; + rko[2] = rko[1] ^ rki[2]; + rko[3] = rko[2] ^ rki[3]; + if (rko + key_len_in_words > rko_end) { + /* Do not write overflow words.*/ + continue; + } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + switch (key_bit_length) { + case 128: + break; + case 192: + rko[4] = rko[3] ^ rki[4]; + rko[5] = rko[4] ^ rki[5]; + break; + case 256: + rko[4] = aes_sub_word(rko[3]) ^ rki[4]; + rko[5] = rko[4] ^ rki[5]; + rko[6] = rko[5] ^ rki[6]; + rko[7] = rko[6] ^ rki[7]; + break; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ + } +} + +/* + * Key expansion, wrapper + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t bits) +{ + switch (bits) { + case 128: + case 192: + case 256: + aesce_setkey_enc(rk, key, bits); + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) + +#if defined(__clang__) +/* On clang for A32/T32, work around some missing intrinsics and types which are listed in + * [ACLE](https://arm-software.github.io/acle/neon_intrinsics/advsimd.html#polynomial-1) + * These are only required for GCM. + */ +#define vreinterpretq_u64_p64(a) ((uint64x2_t) a) + +typedef uint8x16_t poly128_t; + +static inline poly128_t vmull_p64(poly64_t a, poly64_t b) +{ + poly128_t r; + asm ("vmull.p64 %[r], %[a], %[b]" : [r] "=w" (r) : [a] "w" (a), [b] "w" (b) :); + return r; +} + +/* This is set to cause some more missing intrinsics to be defined below */ +#define COMMON_MISSING_INTRINSICS + +static inline poly128_t vmull_high_p64(poly64x2_t a, poly64x2_t b) +{ + return vmull_p64((poly64_t) (vget_high_u64((uint64x2_t) a)), + (poly64_t) (vget_high_u64((uint64x2_t) b))); +} + +#endif /* defined(__clang__) */ + +static inline uint8x16_t vrbitq_u8(uint8x16_t x) +{ + /* There is no vrbitq_u8 instruction in A32/T32, so provide + * an equivalent non-Neon implementation. Reverse bit order in each + * byte with 4x rbit, rev. */ + asm ("ldm %[p], { r2-r5 } \n\t" + "rbit r2, r2 \n\t" + "rev r2, r2 \n\t" + "rbit r3, r3 \n\t" + "rev r3, r3 \n\t" + "rbit r4, r4 \n\t" + "rev r4, r4 \n\t" + "rbit r5, r5 \n\t" + "rev r5, r5 \n\t" + "stm %[p], { r2-r5 } \n\t" + : + /* Output: 16 bytes of memory pointed to by &x */ + "+m" (*(uint8_t(*)[16]) &x) + : + [p] "r" (&x) + : + "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5" + ); + return x; +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && __GNUC__ == 5 +/* Some intrinsics are not available for GCC 5.X. */ +#define COMMON_MISSING_INTRINSICS +#endif /* MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC && __GNUC__ == 5 */ + + +#if defined(COMMON_MISSING_INTRINSICS) + +/* Missing intrinsics common to both GCC 5, and Clang on 32-bit */ + +#define vreinterpretq_p64_u8(a) ((poly64x2_t) a) +#define vreinterpretq_u8_p128(a) ((uint8x16_t) a) + +static inline poly64x1_t vget_low_p64(poly64x2_t a) +{ + uint64x1_t r = vget_low_u64(vreinterpretq_u64_p64(a)); + return (poly64x1_t) r; + +} + +#endif /* COMMON_MISSING_INTRINSICS */ + +/* vmull_p64/vmull_high_p64 wrappers. + * + * Older compilers miss some intrinsic functions for `poly*_t`. We use + * uint8x16_t and uint8x16x3_t as input/output parameters. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) +/* GCC reports incompatible type error without cast. GCC think poly64_t and + * poly64x1_t are different, that is different with MSVC and Clang. */ +#define MBEDTLS_VMULL_P64(a, b) vmull_p64((poly64_t) a, (poly64_t) b) +#else +/* MSVC reports `error C2440: 'type cast'` with cast. Clang does not report + * error with/without cast. And I think poly64_t and poly64x1_t are same, no + * cast for clang also. */ +#define MBEDTLS_VMULL_P64(a, b) vmull_p64(a, b) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC */ + +static inline uint8x16_t pmull_low(uint8x16_t a, uint8x16_t b) +{ + + return vreinterpretq_u8_p128( + MBEDTLS_VMULL_P64( + (poly64_t) vget_low_p64(vreinterpretq_p64_u8(a)), + (poly64_t) vget_low_p64(vreinterpretq_p64_u8(b)) + )); +} + +static inline uint8x16_t pmull_high(uint8x16_t a, uint8x16_t b) +{ + return vreinterpretq_u8_p128( + vmull_high_p64(vreinterpretq_p64_u8(a), + vreinterpretq_p64_u8(b))); +} + +/* GHASH does 128b polynomial multiplication on block in GF(2^128) defined by + * `x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1`. + * + * Arm64 only has 64b->128b polynomial multipliers, we need to do 4 64b + * multiplies to generate a 128b. + * + * `poly_mult_128` executes polynomial multiplication and outputs 256b that + * represented by 3 128b due to code size optimization. + * + * Output layout: + * | | | | + * |------------|-------------|-------------| + * | ret.val[0] | h3:h2:00:00 | high 128b | + * | ret.val[1] | :m2:m1:00 | middle 128b | + * | ret.val[2] | : :l1:l0 | low 128b | + */ +static inline uint8x16x3_t poly_mult_128(uint8x16_t a, uint8x16_t b) +{ + uint8x16x3_t ret; + uint8x16_t h, m, l; /* retval high/middle/low */ + uint8x16_t c, d, e; + + h = pmull_high(a, b); /* h3:h2:00:00 = a1*b1 */ + l = pmull_low(a, b); /* : :l1:l0 = a0*b0 */ + c = vextq_u8(b, b, 8); /* :c1:c0 = b0:b1 */ + d = pmull_high(a, c); /* :d2:d1:00 = a1*b0 */ + e = pmull_low(a, c); /* :e2:e1:00 = a0*b1 */ + m = veorq_u8(d, e); /* :m2:m1:00 = d + e */ + + ret.val[0] = h; + ret.val[1] = m; + ret.val[2] = l; + return ret; +} + +/* + * Modulo reduction. + * + * See: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285612706_Implementing_GCM_on_ARMv8 + * + * Section 4.3 + * + * Modular reduction is slightly more complex. Write the GCM modulus as f(z) = + * z^128 +r(z), where r(z) = z^7+z^2+z+ 1. The well known approach is to + * consider that z^128 ≡r(z) (mod z^128 +r(z)), allowing us to write the 256-bit + * operand to be reduced as a(z) = h(z)z^128 +l(z)≡h(z)r(z) + l(z). That is, we + * simply multiply the higher part of the operand by r(z) and add it to l(z). If + * the result is still larger than 128 bits, we reduce again. + */ +static inline uint8x16_t poly_mult_reduce(uint8x16x3_t input) +{ + uint8x16_t const ZERO = vdupq_n_u8(0); + + uint64x2_t r = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vdupq_n_u8(0x87)); +#if defined(__GNUC__) + /* use 'asm' as an optimisation barrier to prevent loading MODULO from + * memory. It is for GNUC compatible compilers. + */ + asm volatile ("" : "+w" (r)); +#endif + uint8x16_t const MODULO = vreinterpretq_u8_u64(vshrq_n_u64(r, 64 - 8)); + uint8x16_t h, m, l; /* input high/middle/low 128b */ + uint8x16_t c, d, e, f, g, n, o; + h = input.val[0]; /* h3:h2:00:00 */ + m = input.val[1]; /* :m2:m1:00 */ + l = input.val[2]; /* : :l1:l0 */ + c = pmull_high(h, MODULO); /* :c2:c1:00 = reduction of h3 */ + d = pmull_low(h, MODULO); /* : :d1:d0 = reduction of h2 */ + e = veorq_u8(c, m); /* :e2:e1:00 = m2:m1:00 + c2:c1:00 */ + f = pmull_high(e, MODULO); /* : :f1:f0 = reduction of e2 */ + g = vextq_u8(ZERO, e, 8); /* : :g1:00 = e1:00 */ + n = veorq_u8(d, l); /* : :n1:n0 = d1:d0 + l1:l0 */ + o = veorq_u8(n, f); /* o1:o0 = f1:f0 + n1:n0 */ + return veorq_u8(o, g); /* = o1:o0 + g1:00 */ +} + +/* + * GCM multiplication: c = a times b in GF(2^128) + */ +void mbedtls_aesce_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], + const unsigned char a[16], + const unsigned char b[16]) +{ + uint8x16_t va, vb, vc; + va = vrbitq_u8(vld1q_u8(&a[0])); + vb = vrbitq_u8(vld1q_u8(&b[0])); + vc = vrbitq_u8(poly_mult_reduce(poly_mult_128(va, vb))); + vst1q_u8(&c[0], vc); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA) +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang attribute pop +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +#pragma GCC pop_options +#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_C */ diff --git a/library/aesce.h b/library/aesce.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a14d085efa2 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/aesce.h @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +/** + * \file aesce.h + * + * \brief Support hardware AES acceleration on Armv8-A processors with + * the Armv8-A Cryptographic Extension. + * + * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call them directly. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_AESCE_H +#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) \ + && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS) \ + && (defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) || defined(__clang__) || defined(MSC_VER)) + +/* MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE is defined if we have a suitable target platform, and a + * potentially suitable compiler (compiler version & flags are not checked when defining + * this). */ +#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + +extern signed char mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result; + +/** + * \brief Internal function to detect the crypto extension in CPUs. + * + * \return 1 if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_has_support_impl(void); + +#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT() (mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result == -1 ? \ + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_impl() : \ + mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result) + +#else /* defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) */ + +/* If we are not on Linux, we can't detect support so assume that it's supported. + * Similarly, assume support if MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY is set. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT() 1 + +#endif /* defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) */ + +/** + * \brief Internal AES-ECB block encryption and decryption + * + * \warning This assumes that the context specifies either 10, 12 or 14 + * rounds and will behave incorrectly if this is not the case. + * + * \param ctx AES context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT + * \param input 16-byte input block + * \param output 16-byte output block + * + * \return 0 on success (cannot fail) + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]); + +/** + * \brief Internal GCM multiplication: c = a * b in GF(2^128) + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param c Result + * \param a First operand + * \param b Second operand + * + * \note Both operands and result are bit strings interpreted as + * elements of GF(2^128) as per the GCM spec. + */ +void mbedtls_aesce_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], + const unsigned char a[16], + const unsigned char b[16]); + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +/** + * \brief Internal round key inversion. This function computes + * decryption round keys from the encryption round keys. + * + * \param invkey Round keys for the equivalent inverse cipher + * \param fwdkey Original round keys (for encryption) + * \param nr Number of rounds (that is, number of round keys minus one) + */ +void mbedtls_aesce_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, + const unsigned char *fwdkey, + int nr); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ + +/** + * \brief Internal key expansion for encryption + * + * \param rk Destination buffer where the round keys are written + * \param key Encryption key + * \param bits Key size in bits (must be 128, 192 or 256) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH + */ +int mbedtls_aesce_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t bits); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#else + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) +#error "AES hardware acceleration not supported on this platform / compiler" +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_C && MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A && MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS && + (MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC || __clang__ || MSC_VER) */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_H */ diff --git a/library/aesni.c b/library/aesni.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..8e5bd55ab90 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/aesni.c @@ -0,0 +1,835 @@ +/* + * AES-NI support functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * [AES-WP] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/tool/intel-advanced-encryption-standard-aes-instructions-set.html + * [CLMUL-WP] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/download/intel-carry-less-multiplication-instruction-and-its-usage-for-computing-the-gcm-mode.html + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) + +#include "aesni.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) + +#if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2 +#if defined(__GNUC__) +#include +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +#include +#else +#error "`__cpuid` required by MBEDTLS_AESNI_C is not supported by the compiler" +#endif +#include +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) +#pragma GCC push_options +#pragma GCC target ("pclmul,sse2,aes") +#define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#elif defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 5) +#pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("pclmul,sse2,aes"))), apply_to=function) +#define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#endif +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) +/* + * AES-NI support detection routine + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_has_support(unsigned int what) +{ + static int done = 0; + static unsigned int c = 0; + + if (!done) { +#if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2 + static int info[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 }; +#if defined(_MSC_VER) + __cpuid(info, 1); +#else + __cpuid(1, info[0], info[1], info[2], info[3]); +#endif + c = info[2]; +#else /* AESNI using asm */ + asm ("movl $1, %%eax \n\t" + "cpuid \n\t" + : "=c" (c) + : + : "eax", "ebx", "edx"); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */ + done = 1; + } + + return (c & what) != 0; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */ + +#if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2 + +/* + * AES-NI AES-ECB block en(de)cryption + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]) +{ + const __m128i *rk = (const __m128i *) (ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset); + unsigned nr = ctx->nr; // Number of remaining rounds + + // Load round key 0 + __m128i state; + memcpy(&state, input, 16); + state = _mm_xor_si128(state, rk[0]); // state ^= *rk; + ++rk; + --nr; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) { + while (nr != 0) { + state = _mm_aesdec_si128(state, *rk); + ++rk; + --nr; + } + state = _mm_aesdeclast_si128(state, *rk); + } else +#else + (void) mode; +#endif + { + while (nr != 0) { + state = _mm_aesenc_si128(state, *rk); + ++rk; + --nr; + } + state = _mm_aesenclast_si128(state, *rk); + } + + memcpy(output, &state, 16); + return 0; +} + +/* + * GCM multiplication: c = a times b in GF(2^128) + * Based on [CLMUL-WP] algorithms 1 (with equation 27) and 5. + */ + +static void gcm_clmul(const __m128i aa, const __m128i bb, + __m128i *cc, __m128i *dd) +{ + /* + * Caryless multiplication dd:cc = aa * bb + * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 1 (p. 12). + */ + *cc = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(aa, bb, 0x00); // a0*b0 = c1:c0 + *dd = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(aa, bb, 0x11); // a1*b1 = d1:d0 + __m128i ee = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(aa, bb, 0x10); // a0*b1 = e1:e0 + __m128i ff = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(aa, bb, 0x01); // a1*b0 = f1:f0 + ff = _mm_xor_si128(ff, ee); // e1+f1:e0+f0 + ee = ff; // e1+f1:e0+f0 + ff = _mm_srli_si128(ff, 8); // 0:e1+f1 + ee = _mm_slli_si128(ee, 8); // e0+f0:0 + *dd = _mm_xor_si128(*dd, ff); // d1:d0+e1+f1 + *cc = _mm_xor_si128(*cc, ee); // c1+e0+f0:c0 +} + +static void gcm_shift(__m128i *cc, __m128i *dd) +{ + /* [CMUCL-WP] Algorithm 5 Step 1: shift cc:dd one bit to the left, + * taking advantage of [CLMUL-WP] eq 27 (p. 18). */ + // // *cc = r1:r0 + // // *dd = r3:r2 + __m128i cc_lo = _mm_slli_epi64(*cc, 1); // r1<<1:r0<<1 + __m128i dd_lo = _mm_slli_epi64(*dd, 1); // r3<<1:r2<<1 + __m128i cc_hi = _mm_srli_epi64(*cc, 63); // r1>>63:r0>>63 + __m128i dd_hi = _mm_srli_epi64(*dd, 63); // r3>>63:r2>>63 + __m128i xmm5 = _mm_srli_si128(cc_hi, 8); // 0:r1>>63 + cc_hi = _mm_slli_si128(cc_hi, 8); // r0>>63:0 + dd_hi = _mm_slli_si128(dd_hi, 8); // 0:r1>>63 + + *cc = _mm_or_si128(cc_lo, cc_hi); // r1<<1|r0>>63:r0<<1 + *dd = _mm_or_si128(_mm_or_si128(dd_lo, dd_hi), xmm5); // r3<<1|r2>>62:r2<<1|r1>>63 +} + +static __m128i gcm_reduce(__m128i xx) +{ + // // xx = x1:x0 + /* [CLMUL-WP] Algorithm 5 Step 2 */ + __m128i aa = _mm_slli_epi64(xx, 63); // x1<<63:x0<<63 = stuff:a + __m128i bb = _mm_slli_epi64(xx, 62); // x1<<62:x0<<62 = stuff:b + __m128i cc = _mm_slli_epi64(xx, 57); // x1<<57:x0<<57 = stuff:c + __m128i dd = _mm_slli_si128(_mm_xor_si128(_mm_xor_si128(aa, bb), cc), 8); // a+b+c:0 + return _mm_xor_si128(dd, xx); // x1+a+b+c:x0 = d:x0 +} + +static __m128i gcm_mix(__m128i dx) +{ + /* [CLMUL-WP] Algorithm 5 Steps 3 and 4 */ + __m128i ee = _mm_srli_epi64(dx, 1); // e1:x0>>1 = e1:e0' + __m128i ff = _mm_srli_epi64(dx, 2); // f1:x0>>2 = f1:f0' + __m128i gg = _mm_srli_epi64(dx, 7); // g1:x0>>7 = g1:g0' + + // e0'+f0'+g0' is almost e0+f0+g0, except for some missing + // bits carried from d. Now get those bits back in. + __m128i eh = _mm_slli_epi64(dx, 63); // d<<63:stuff + __m128i fh = _mm_slli_epi64(dx, 62); // d<<62:stuff + __m128i gh = _mm_slli_epi64(dx, 57); // d<<57:stuff + __m128i hh = _mm_srli_si128(_mm_xor_si128(_mm_xor_si128(eh, fh), gh), 8); // 0:missing bits of d + + return _mm_xor_si128(_mm_xor_si128(_mm_xor_si128(_mm_xor_si128(ee, ff), gg), hh), dx); +} + +void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], + const unsigned char a[16], + const unsigned char b[16]) +{ + __m128i aa = { 0 }, bb = { 0 }, cc, dd; + + /* The inputs are in big-endian order, so byte-reverse them */ + for (size_t i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + ((uint8_t *) &aa)[i] = a[15 - i]; + ((uint8_t *) &bb)[i] = b[15 - i]; + } + + gcm_clmul(aa, bb, &cc, &dd); + gcm_shift(&cc, &dd); + /* + * Now reduce modulo the GCM polynomial x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1 + * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 5 (p. 18). + * Currently dd:cc holds x3:x2:x1:x0 (already shifted). + */ + __m128i dx = gcm_reduce(cc); + __m128i xh = gcm_mix(dx); + cc = _mm_xor_si128(xh, dd); // x3+h1:x2+h0 + + /* Now byte-reverse the outputs */ + for (size_t i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + c[i] = ((uint8_t *) &cc)[15 - i]; + } + + return; +} + +/* + * Compute decryption round keys from encryption round keys + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, + const unsigned char *fwdkey, int nr) +{ + __m128i *ik = (__m128i *) invkey; + const __m128i *fk = (const __m128i *) fwdkey + nr; + + *ik = *fk; + for (--fk, ++ik; fk > (const __m128i *) fwdkey; --fk, ++ik) { + *ik = _mm_aesimc_si128(*fk); + } + *ik = *fk; +} +#endif + +/* + * Key expansion, 128-bit case + */ +static __m128i aesni_set_rk_128(__m128i state, __m128i xword) +{ + /* + * Finish generating the next round key. + * + * On entry state is r3:r2:r1:r0 and xword is X:stuff:stuff:stuff + * with X = rot( sub( r3 ) ) ^ RCON (obtained with AESKEYGENASSIST). + * + * On exit, xword is r7:r6:r5:r4 + * with r4 = X + r0, r5 = r4 + r1, r6 = r5 + r2, r7 = r6 + r3 + * and this is returned, to be written to the round key buffer. + */ + xword = _mm_shuffle_epi32(xword, 0xff); // X:X:X:X + xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state); // X+r3:X+r2:X+r1:r4 + state = _mm_slli_si128(state, 4); // r2:r1:r0:0 + xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state); // X+r3+r2:X+r2+r1:r5:r4 + state = _mm_slli_si128(state, 4); // r1:r0:0:0 + xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state); // X+r3+r2+r1:r6:r5:r4 + state = _mm_slli_si128(state, 4); // r0:0:0:0 + state = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state); // r7:r6:r5:r4 + return state; +} + +static void aesni_setkey_enc_128(unsigned char *rk_bytes, + const unsigned char *key) +{ + __m128i *rk = (__m128i *) rk_bytes; + + memcpy(&rk[0], key, 16); + rk[1] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[0], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[0], 0x01)); + rk[2] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[1], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[1], 0x02)); + rk[3] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[2], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[2], 0x04)); + rk[4] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[3], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[3], 0x08)); + rk[5] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[4], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[4], 0x10)); + rk[6] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[5], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[5], 0x20)); + rk[7] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[6], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[6], 0x40)); + rk[8] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[7], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[7], 0x80)); + rk[9] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[8], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[8], 0x1B)); + rk[10] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[9], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[9], 0x36)); +} + +/* + * Key expansion, 192-bit case + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static void aesni_set_rk_192(__m128i *state0, __m128i *state1, __m128i xword, + unsigned char *rk) +{ + /* + * Finish generating the next 6 quarter-keys. + * + * On entry state0 is r3:r2:r1:r0, state1 is stuff:stuff:r5:r4 + * and xword is stuff:stuff:X:stuff with X = rot( sub( r3 ) ) ^ RCON + * (obtained with AESKEYGENASSIST). + * + * On exit, state0 is r9:r8:r7:r6 and state1 is stuff:stuff:r11:r10 + * and those are written to the round key buffer. + */ + xword = _mm_shuffle_epi32(xword, 0x55); // X:X:X:X + xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state0); // X+r3:X+r2:X+r1:X+r0 + *state0 = _mm_slli_si128(*state0, 4); // r2:r1:r0:0 + xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state0); // X+r3+r2:X+r2+r1:X+r1+r0:X+r0 + *state0 = _mm_slli_si128(*state0, 4); // r1:r0:0:0 + xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state0); // X+r3+r2+r1:X+r2+r1+r0:X+r1+r0:X+r0 + *state0 = _mm_slli_si128(*state0, 4); // r0:0:0:0 + xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state0); // X+r3+r2+r1+r0:X+r2+r1+r0:X+r1+r0:X+r0 + *state0 = xword; // = r9:r8:r7:r6 + + xword = _mm_shuffle_epi32(xword, 0xff); // r9:r9:r9:r9 + xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state1); // stuff:stuff:r9+r5:r9+r4 + *state1 = _mm_slli_si128(*state1, 4); // stuff:stuff:r4:0 + xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state1); // stuff:stuff:r9+r5+r4:r9+r4 + *state1 = xword; // = stuff:stuff:r11:r10 + + /* Store state0 and the low half of state1 into rk, which is conceptually + * an array of 24-byte elements. Since 24 is not a multiple of 16, + * rk is not necessarily aligned so just `*rk = *state0` doesn't work. */ + memcpy(rk, state0, 16); + memcpy(rk + 16, state1, 8); +} + +static void aesni_setkey_enc_192(unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key) +{ + /* First round: use original key */ + memcpy(rk, key, 24); + /* aes.c guarantees that rk is aligned on a 16-byte boundary. */ + __m128i state0 = ((__m128i *) rk)[0]; + __m128i state1 = _mm_loadl_epi64(((__m128i *) rk) + 1); + + aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x01), rk + 24 * 1); + aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x02), rk + 24 * 2); + aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x04), rk + 24 * 3); + aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x08), rk + 24 * 4); + aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x10), rk + 24 * 5); + aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x20), rk + 24 * 6); + aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x40), rk + 24 * 7); + aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x80), rk + 24 * 8); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ + +/* + * Key expansion, 256-bit case + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static void aesni_set_rk_256(__m128i state0, __m128i state1, __m128i xword, + __m128i *rk0, __m128i *rk1) +{ + /* + * Finish generating the next two round keys. + * + * On entry state0 is r3:r2:r1:r0, state1 is r7:r6:r5:r4 and + * xword is X:stuff:stuff:stuff with X = rot( sub( r7 )) ^ RCON + * (obtained with AESKEYGENASSIST). + * + * On exit, *rk0 is r11:r10:r9:r8 and *rk1 is r15:r14:r13:r12 + */ + xword = _mm_shuffle_epi32(xword, 0xff); + xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state0); + state0 = _mm_slli_si128(state0, 4); + xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state0); + state0 = _mm_slli_si128(state0, 4); + xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state0); + state0 = _mm_slli_si128(state0, 4); + state0 = _mm_xor_si128(state0, xword); + *rk0 = state0; + + /* Set xword to stuff:Y:stuff:stuff with Y = subword( r11 ) + * and proceed to generate next round key from there */ + xword = _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state0, 0x00); + xword = _mm_shuffle_epi32(xword, 0xaa); + xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state1); + state1 = _mm_slli_si128(state1, 4); + xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state1); + state1 = _mm_slli_si128(state1, 4); + xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state1); + state1 = _mm_slli_si128(state1, 4); + state1 = _mm_xor_si128(state1, xword); + *rk1 = state1; +} + +static void aesni_setkey_enc_256(unsigned char *rk_bytes, + const unsigned char *key) +{ + __m128i *rk = (__m128i *) rk_bytes; + + memcpy(&rk[0], key, 16); + memcpy(&rk[1], key + 16, 16); + + /* + * Main "loop" - Generating one more key than necessary, + * see definition of mbedtls_aes_context.buf + */ + aesni_set_rk_256(rk[0], rk[1], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[1], 0x01), &rk[2], &rk[3]); + aesni_set_rk_256(rk[2], rk[3], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[3], 0x02), &rk[4], &rk[5]); + aesni_set_rk_256(rk[4], rk[5], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[5], 0x04), &rk[6], &rk[7]); + aesni_set_rk_256(rk[6], rk[7], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[7], 0x08), &rk[8], &rk[9]); + aesni_set_rk_256(rk[8], rk[9], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[9], 0x10), &rk[10], &rk[11]); + aesni_set_rk_256(rk[10], rk[11], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[11], 0x20), &rk[12], &rk[13]); + aesni_set_rk_256(rk[12], rk[13], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[13], 0x40), &rk[14], &rk[15]); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA) +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang attribute pop +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +#pragma GCC pop_options +#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#endif + +#else /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 1 */ + +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) +#warning \ + "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C is known to cause spurious error reports with some memory sanitizers as they do not understand the assembly code." +#endif +#endif + +/* + * Binutils needs to be at least 2.19 to support AES-NI instructions. + * Unfortunately, a lot of users have a lower version now (2014-04). + * Emit bytecode directly in order to support "old" version of gas. + * + * Opcodes from the Intel architecture reference manual, vol. 3. + * We always use registers, so we don't need prefixes for memory operands. + * Operand macros are in gas order (src, dst) as opposed to Intel order + * (dst, src) in order to blend better into the surrounding assembly code. + */ +#define AESDEC(regs) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDE," regs "\n\t" +#define AESDECLAST(regs) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDF," regs "\n\t" +#define AESENC(regs) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDC," regs "\n\t" +#define AESENCLAST(regs) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDD," regs "\n\t" +#define AESIMC(regs) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDB," regs "\n\t" +#define AESKEYGENA(regs, imm) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x3A,0xDF," regs "," imm "\n\t" +#define PCLMULQDQ(regs, imm) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x3A,0x44," regs "," imm "\n\t" + +#define xmm0_xmm0 "0xC0" +#define xmm0_xmm1 "0xC8" +#define xmm0_xmm2 "0xD0" +#define xmm0_xmm3 "0xD8" +#define xmm0_xmm4 "0xE0" +#define xmm1_xmm0 "0xC1" +#define xmm1_xmm2 "0xD1" + +/* + * AES-NI AES-ECB block en(de)cryption + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]) +{ + asm ("movdqu (%3), %%xmm0 \n\t" // load input + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key 0 + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // round 0 + "add $16, %1 \n\t" // point to next round key + "subl $1, %0 \n\t" // normal rounds = nr - 1 + "test %2, %2 \n\t" // mode? + "jz 2f \n\t" // 0 = decrypt + + "1: \n\t" // encryption loop + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key + AESENC(xmm1_xmm0) // do round + "add $16, %1 \n\t" // point to next round key + "subl $1, %0 \n\t" // loop + "jnz 1b \n\t" + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key + AESENCLAST(xmm1_xmm0) // last round +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + "jmp 3f \n\t" + + "2: \n\t" // decryption loop + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" + AESDEC(xmm1_xmm0) // do round + "add $16, %1 \n\t" + "subl $1, %0 \n\t" + "jnz 2b \n\t" + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key + AESDECLAST(xmm1_xmm0) // last round +#endif + + "3: \n\t" + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%4) \n\t" // export output + : + : "r" (ctx->nr), "r" (ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset), "r" (mode), "r" (input), "r" (output) + : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1"); + + + return 0; +} + +/* + * GCM multiplication: c = a times b in GF(2^128) + * Based on [CLMUL-WP] algorithms 1 (with equation 27) and 5. + */ +void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], + const unsigned char a[16], + const unsigned char b[16]) +{ + unsigned char aa[16], bb[16], cc[16]; + size_t i; + + /* The inputs are in big-endian order, so byte-reverse them */ + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + aa[i] = a[15 - i]; + bb[i] = b[15 - i]; + } + + asm ("movdqu (%0), %%xmm0 \n\t" // a1:a0 + "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // b1:b0 + + /* + * Caryless multiplication xmm2:xmm1 = xmm0 * xmm1 + * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 1 (p. 12). + */ + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" // copy of b1:b0 + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm3 \n\t" // same + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm4 \n\t" // same + PCLMULQDQ(xmm0_xmm1, "0x00") // a0*b0 = c1:c0 + PCLMULQDQ(xmm0_xmm2, "0x11") // a1*b1 = d1:d0 + PCLMULQDQ(xmm0_xmm3, "0x10") // a0*b1 = e1:e0 + PCLMULQDQ(xmm0_xmm4, "0x01") // a1*b0 = f1:f0 + "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm4 \n\t" // e1+f1:e0+f0 + "movdqa %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // same + "psrldq $8, %%xmm4 \n\t" // 0:e1+f1 + "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // e0+f0:0 + "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm2 \n\t" // d1:d0+e1+f1 + "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // c1+e0+f1:c0 + + /* + * Now shift the result one bit to the left, + * taking advantage of [CLMUL-WP] eq 27 (p. 18) + */ + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r1:r0 + "movdqa %%xmm2, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r3:r2 + "psllq $1, %%xmm1 \n\t" // r1<<1:r0<<1 + "psllq $1, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1:r2<<1 + "psrlq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r1>>63:r0>>63 + "psrlq $63, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r3>>63:r2>>63 + "movdqa %%xmm3, %%xmm5 \n\t" // r1>>63:r0>>63 + "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r0>>63:0 + "pslldq $8, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r2>>63:0 + "psrldq $8, %%xmm5 \n\t" // 0:r1>>63 + "por %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // r1<<1|r0>>63:r0<<1 + "por %%xmm4, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1|r2>>62:r2<<1 + "por %%xmm5, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1|r2>>62:r2<<1|r1>>63 + + /* + * Now reduce modulo the GCM polynomial x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1 + * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 5 (p. 18). + * Currently xmm2:xmm1 holds x3:x2:x1:x0 (already shifted). + */ + /* Step 2 (1) */ + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm3 \n\t" // x1:x0 + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm4 \n\t" // same + "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm5 \n\t" // same + "psllq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // x1<<63:x0<<63 = stuff:a + "psllq $62, %%xmm4 \n\t" // x1<<62:x0<<62 = stuff:b + "psllq $57, %%xmm5 \n\t" // x1<<57:x0<<57 = stuff:c + + /* Step 2 (2) */ + "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // stuff:a+b + "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm3 \n\t" // stuff:a+b+c + "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // a+b+c:0 + "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // x1+a+b+c:x0 = d:x0 + + /* Steps 3 and 4 */ + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm0 \n\t" // d:x0 + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm4 \n\t" // same + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm5 \n\t" // same + "psrlq $1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1:x0>>1 = e1:e0' + "psrlq $2, %%xmm4 \n\t" // f1:x0>>2 = f1:f0' + "psrlq $7, %%xmm5 \n\t" // g1:x0>>7 = g1:g0' + "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1:e0'+f0' + "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1+g1:e0'+f0'+g0' + // e0'+f0'+g0' is almost e0+f0+g0, ex\tcept for some missing + // bits carried from d. Now get those\t bits back in. + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm3 \n\t" // d:x0 + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm4 \n\t" // same + "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm5 \n\t" // same + "psllq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // d<<63:stuff + "psllq $62, %%xmm4 \n\t" // d<<62:stuff + "psllq $57, %%xmm5 \n\t" // d<<57:stuff + "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // d<<63+d<<62:stuff + "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm3 \n\t" // missing bits of d:stuff + "psrldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // 0:missing bits of d + "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1+g1:e0+f0+g0 + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // h1:h0 + "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm0 \n\t" // x3+h1:x2+h0 + + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%2) \n\t" // done + : + : "r" (aa), "r" (bb), "r" (cc) + : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1", "xmm2", "xmm3", "xmm4", "xmm5"); + + /* Now byte-reverse the outputs */ + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + c[i] = cc[15 - i]; + } + + return; +} + +/* + * Compute decryption round keys from encryption round keys + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, + const unsigned char *fwdkey, int nr) +{ + unsigned char *ik = invkey; + const unsigned char *fk = fwdkey + 16 * nr; + + memcpy(ik, fk, 16); + + for (fk -= 16, ik += 16; fk > fwdkey; fk -= 16, ik += 16) { + asm ("movdqu (%0), %%xmm0 \n\t" + AESIMC(xmm0_xmm0) + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%1) \n\t" + : + : "r" (fk), "r" (ik) + : "memory", "xmm0"); + } + + memcpy(ik, fk, 16); +} +#endif + +/* + * Key expansion, 128-bit case + */ +static void aesni_setkey_enc_128(unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key) +{ + asm ("movdqu (%1), %%xmm0 \n\t" // copy the original key + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" // as round key 0 + "jmp 2f \n\t" // skip auxiliary routine + + /* + * Finish generating the next round key. + * + * On entry xmm0 is r3:r2:r1:r0 and xmm1 is X:stuff:stuff:stuff + * with X = rot( sub( r3 ) ) ^ RCON. + * + * On exit, xmm0 is r7:r6:r5:r4 + * with r4 = X + r0, r5 = r4 + r1, r6 = r5 + r2, r7 = r6 + r3 + * and those are written to the round key buffer. + */ + "1: \n\t" + "pshufd $0xff, %%xmm1, %%xmm1 \n\t" // X:X:X:X + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm1 \n\t" // X+r3:X+r2:X+r1:r4 + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // r2:r1:r0:0 + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm1 \n\t" // X+r3+r2:X+r2+r1:r5:r4 + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // etc + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm1 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // update xmm0 for next time! + "add $16, %0 \n\t" // point to next round key + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" // write it + "ret \n\t" + + /* Main "loop" */ + "2: \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x01") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x02") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x04") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x08") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x10") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x20") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x40") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x80") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x1B") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x36") "call 1b \n\t" + : + : "r" (rk), "r" (key) + : "memory", "cc", "0"); +} + +/* + * Key expansion, 192-bit case + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static void aesni_setkey_enc_192(unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key) +{ + asm ("movdqu (%1), %%xmm0 \n\t" // copy original round key + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" + "add $16, %0 \n\t" + "movq 16(%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" + "movq %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t" + "add $8, %0 \n\t" + "jmp 2f \n\t" // skip auxiliary routine + + /* + * Finish generating the next 6 quarter-keys. + * + * On entry xmm0 is r3:r2:r1:r0, xmm1 is stuff:stuff:r5:r4 + * and xmm2 is stuff:stuff:X:stuff with X = rot( sub( r3 ) ) ^ RCON. + * + * On exit, xmm0 is r9:r8:r7:r6 and xmm1 is stuff:stuff:r11:r10 + * and those are written to the round key buffer. + */ + "1: \n\t" + "pshufd $0x55, %%xmm2, %%xmm2 \n\t" // X:X:X:X + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" // X+r3:X+r2:X+r1:r4 + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // etc + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm0 \n\t" // update xmm0 = r9:r8:r7:r6 + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" + "add $16, %0 \n\t" + "pshufd $0xff, %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r9:r9:r9:r9 + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" // stuff:stuff:r9+r5:r10 + "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t" // r2:r1:r0:0 + "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm1 \n\t" // xmm1 = stuff:stuff:r11:r10 + "movq %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t" + "add $8, %0 \n\t" + "ret \n\t" + + "2: \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x01") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x02") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x04") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x08") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x10") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x20") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x40") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x80") "call 1b \n\t" + + : + : "r" (rk), "r" (key) + : "memory", "cc", "0"); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ + +/* + * Key expansion, 256-bit case + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static void aesni_setkey_enc_256(unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key) +{ + asm ("movdqu (%1), %%xmm0 \n\t" + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" + "add $16, %0 \n\t" + "movdqu 16(%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" + "movdqu %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t" + "jmp 2f \n\t" // skip auxiliary routine + + /* + * Finish generating the next two round keys. + * + * On entry xmm0 is r3:r2:r1:r0, xmm1 is r7:r6:r5:r4 and + * xmm2 is X:stuff:stuff:stuff with X = rot( sub( r7 )) ^ RCON + * + * On exit, xmm0 is r11:r10:r9:r8 and xmm1 is r15:r14:r13:r12 + * and those have been written to the output buffer. + */ + "1: \n\t" + "pshufd $0xff, %%xmm2, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm0 \n\t" + "add $16, %0 \n\t" + "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" + + /* Set xmm2 to stuff:Y:stuff:stuff with Y = subword( r11 ) + * and proceed to generate next round key from there */ + AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm2, "0x00") + "pshufd $0xaa, %%xmm2, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" + "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t" + "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm1 \n\t" + "add $16, %0 \n\t" + "movdqu %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t" + "ret \n\t" + + /* + * Main "loop" - Generating one more key than necessary, + * see definition of mbedtls_aes_context.buf + */ + "2: \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x01") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x02") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x04") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x08") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x10") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x20") "call 1b \n\t" + AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x40") "call 1b \n\t" + : + : "r" (rk), "r" (key) + : "memory", "cc", "0"); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */ + +/* + * Key expansion, wrapper + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t bits) +{ + switch (bits) { + case 128: aesni_setkey_enc_128(rk, key); break; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + case 192: aesni_setkey_enc_192(rk, key); break; + case 256: aesni_setkey_enc_256(rk, key); break; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ + default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH; + } + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C */ diff --git a/library/aesni.h b/library/aesni.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..59e27afd3ec --- /dev/null +++ b/library/aesni.h @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +/** + * \file aesni.h + * + * \brief AES-NI for hardware AES acceleration on some Intel processors + * + * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call them directly. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_AESNI_H +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" + +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES 0x02000000u +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL 0x00000002u + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86)) + +/* Can we do AESNI with intrinsics? + * (Only implemented with certain compilers, only for certain targets.) + */ +#undef MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__clang__) +/* Visual Studio supports AESNI intrinsics since VS 2008 SP1. We only support + * VS 2013 and up for other reasons anyway, so no need to check the version. */ +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS +#endif +/* GCC-like compilers: currently, we only support intrinsics if the requisite + * target flag is enabled when building the library (e.g. `gcc -mpclmul -msse2` + * or `clang -maes -mpclmul`). */ +#if (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) && defined(__AES__) && defined(__PCLMUL__) +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS +#endif +/* For 32-bit, we only support intrinsics */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) && (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS +#endif + +/* Choose the implementation of AESNI, if one is available. + * + * Favor the intrinsics-based implementation if it's available, for better + * maintainability. + * Performance is about the same (see #7380). + * In the long run, we will likely remove the assembly implementation. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS) +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE 2 // via intrinsics +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) +/* Can we do AESNI with inline assembly? + * (Only implemented with gas syntax, only for 64-bit.) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE 1 // via assembly +#else +#error "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C defined, but neither intrinsics nor assembly available" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Internal function to detect the AES-NI feature in CPUs. + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param what The feature to detect + * (MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES or MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL) + * + * \return 1 if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) +int mbedtls_aesni_has_support(unsigned int what); +#else +#define mbedtls_aesni_has_support(what) 1 +#endif + +/** + * \brief Internal AES-NI AES-ECB block encryption and decryption + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param ctx AES context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT + * \param input 16-byte input block + * \param output 16-byte output block + * + * \return 0 on success (cannot fail) + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]); + +/** + * \brief Internal GCM multiplication: c = a * b in GF(2^128) + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param c Result + * \param a First operand + * \param b Second operand + * + * \note Both operands and result are bit strings interpreted as + * elements of GF(2^128) as per the GCM spec. + */ +void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16], + const unsigned char a[16], + const unsigned char b[16]); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +/** + * \brief Internal round key inversion. This function computes + * decryption round keys from the encryption round keys. + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param invkey Round keys for the equivalent inverse cipher + * \param fwdkey Original round keys (for encryption) + * \param nr Number of rounds (that is, number of round keys minus one) + */ +void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey, + const unsigned char *fwdkey, + int nr); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ + +/** + * \brief Internal key expansion for encryption + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param rk Destination buffer where the round keys are written + * \param key Encryption key + * \param bits Key size in bits (must be 128, 192 or 256) + * + * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH + */ +int mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t bits); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C && (MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64 || MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_H */ diff --git a/library/alignment.h b/library/alignment.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a17001dd91b --- /dev/null +++ b/library/alignment.h @@ -0,0 +1,684 @@ +/** + * \file alignment.h + * + * \brief Utility code for dealing with unaligned memory accesses + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_ALIGNMENT_H +#define MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_ALIGNMENT_H + +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * Define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS for architectures where unaligned memory + * accesses are known to be efficient. + * + * All functions defined here will behave correctly regardless, but might be less + * efficient when this is not defined. + */ +#if defined(__ARM_FEATURE_UNALIGNED) \ + || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) \ + || defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +/* + * __ARM_FEATURE_UNALIGNED is defined where appropriate by armcc, gcc 7, clang 9 + * (and later versions) for Arm v7 and later; all x86 platforms should have + * efficient unaligned access. + * + * https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/build/arm64-windows-abi-conventions?view=msvc-170#alignment + * specifies that on Windows-on-Arm64, unaligned access is safe (except for uncached + * device memory). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS +#endif + +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) \ + || defined(__ICCRX__) || defined(__ICCRL78__) || defined(__ICCRISCV__)) +#pragma language=save +#pragma language=extended +#define MBEDTLS_POP_IAR_LANGUAGE_PRAGMA +/* IAR recommend this technique for accessing unaligned data in + * https://www.iar.com/knowledge/support/technical-notes/compiler/accessing-unaligned-data + * This results in a single load / store instruction (if unaligned access is supported). + * According to that document, this is only supported on certain architectures. + */ + #define UINT_UNALIGNED +typedef uint16_t __packed mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t; +typedef uint32_t __packed mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t; +typedef uint64_t __packed mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 40504) && \ + ((MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION < 60300) || (!defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))) +/* + * gcc may generate a branch to memcpy for calls like `memcpy(dest, src, 4)` rather than + * generating some LDR or LDRB instructions (similar for stores). + * + * This is architecture dependent: x86-64 seems fine even with old gcc; 32-bit Arm + * is affected. To keep it simple, we enable for all architectures. + * + * For versions of gcc < 5.4.0 this issue always happens. + * For gcc < 6.3.0, this issue happens at -O0 + * For all versions, this issue happens iff unaligned access is not supported. + * + * For gcc 4.x, this implementation will generate byte-by-byte loads even if unaligned access is + * supported, which is correct but not optimal. + * + * For performance (and code size, in some cases), we want to avoid the branch and just generate + * some inline load/store instructions since the access is small and constant-size. + * + * The manual states: + * "The packed attribute specifies that a variable or structure field should have the smallest + * possible alignment—one byte for a variable" + * https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.5.4/gcc/Variable-Attributes.html + * + * Previous implementations used __attribute__((__aligned__(1)), but had issues with a gcc bug: + * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=94662 + * + * Tested with several versions of GCC from 4.5.0 up to 13.2.0 + * We don't enable for older than 4.5.0 as this has not been tested. + */ + #define UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT +typedef struct { + uint16_t x; +} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t; +typedef struct { + uint32_t x; +} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t; +typedef struct { + uint64_t x; +} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; + #endif + +/* + * We try to force mbedtls_(get|put)_unaligned_uintXX to be always inline, because this results + * in code that is both smaller and faster. IAR and gcc both benefit from this when optimising + * for size. + */ + +/** + * Read the unsigned 16 bits integer from the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 2 bytes of data + * \return Data at the given address + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p) +{ + uint16_t r; +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; + r = *p16; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; + r = p16->x; +#else + memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r)); +#endif + return r; +} + +/** + * Write the unsigned 16 bits integer to the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 2 bytes of data + * \param x data to write + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x) +{ +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; + *p16 = x; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; + p16->x = x; +#else + memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); +#endif +} + +/** + * Read the unsigned 32 bits integer from the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 4 bytes of data + * \return Data at the given address + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p) +{ + uint32_t r; +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; + r = *p32; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; + r = p32->x; +#else + memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r)); +#endif + return r; +} + +/** + * Write the unsigned 32 bits integer to the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 4 bytes of data + * \param x data to write + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x) +{ +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; + *p32 = x; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; + p32->x = x; +#else + memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); +#endif +} + +/** + * Read the unsigned 64 bits integer from the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 8 bytes of data + * \return Data at the given address + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p) +{ + uint64_t r; +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; + r = *p64; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; + r = p64->x; +#else + memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r)); +#endif + return r; +} + +/** + * Write the unsigned 64 bits integer to the given address, which need not + * be aligned. + * + * \param p pointer to 8 bytes of data + * \param x data to write + */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(void *p, uint64_t x) +{ +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; + *p64 = x; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) + mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; + p64->x = x; +#else + memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); +#endif +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_IAR_LANGUAGE_PRAGMA) +#pragma language=restore +#endif + +/** Byte Reading Macros + * + * Given a multi-byte integer \p x, MBEDTLS_BYTE_n retrieves the n-th + * byte from x, where byte 0 is the least significant byte. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x) ((uint8_t) ((x) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 8) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 16) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 24) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_4(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 32) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_5(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 40) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_6(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 48) & 0xff)) +#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_7(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 56) & 0xff)) + +/* + * Detect GCC built-in byteswap routines + */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ) +#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4, 8) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 __builtin_bswap16 +#endif /* __GNUC_PREREQ(4,8) */ +#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4, 3) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __builtin_bswap32 +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 __builtin_bswap64 +#endif /* __GNUC_PREREQ(4,3) */ +#endif /* defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ) */ + +/* + * Detect Clang built-in byteswap routines + */ +#if defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin) +#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap16) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 __builtin_bswap16 +#endif /* __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap16) */ +#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __builtin_bswap32 +#endif /* __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32) */ +#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 __builtin_bswap64 +#endif /* __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64) */ +#endif /* defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin) */ + +/* + * Detect MSVC built-in byteswap routines + */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 _byteswap_ushort +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 _byteswap_ulong +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 _byteswap_uint64 +#endif +#endif /* defined(_MSC_VER) */ + +/* Detect armcc built-in byteswap routine */ +#if defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && (__ARMCC_VERSION >= 410000) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32) +#if defined(__ARM_ACLE) /* ARM Compiler 6 - earlier versions don't need a header */ +#include +#endif +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __rev +#endif + +/* Detect IAR built-in byteswap routine */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#if defined(__ARM_ACLE) +#include +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16(x) ((uint16_t) __rev16((uint32_t) (x))) +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __rev +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 __revll +#endif +#endif + +/* + * Where compiler built-ins are not present, fall back to C code that the + * compiler may be able to detect and transform into the relevant bswap or + * similar instruction. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16) +static inline uint16_t mbedtls_bswap16(uint16_t x) +{ + return + (x & 0x00ff) << 8 | + (x & 0xff00) >> 8; +} +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 mbedtls_bswap16 +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16) */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32) +static inline uint32_t mbedtls_bswap32(uint32_t x) +{ + return + (x & 0x000000ff) << 24 | + (x & 0x0000ff00) << 8 | + (x & 0x00ff0000) >> 8 | + (x & 0xff000000) >> 24; +} +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 mbedtls_bswap32 +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32) */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64) +static inline uint64_t mbedtls_bswap64(uint64_t x) +{ + return + (x & 0x00000000000000ffULL) << 56 | + (x & 0x000000000000ff00ULL) << 40 | + (x & 0x0000000000ff0000ULL) << 24 | + (x & 0x00000000ff000000ULL) << 8 | + (x & 0x000000ff00000000ULL) >> 8 | + (x & 0x0000ff0000000000ULL) >> 24 | + (x & 0x00ff000000000000ULL) >> 40 | + (x & 0xff00000000000000ULL) >> 56; +} +#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 mbedtls_bswap64 +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64) */ + +#if !defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) + +#if defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) +/* IAR defines __xxx_ENDIAN__, but not __BYTE_ORDER__ */ +#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 0 +#elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN__) +#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 1 +#else +static const uint16_t mbedtls_byte_order_detector = { 0x100 }; +#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN (*((unsigned char *) (&mbedtls_byte_order_detector)) == 0x01) +#endif + +#else + +#if (__BYTE_ORDER__) == (__ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__) +#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 1 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 0 +#endif + +#endif /* !defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) */ + +/** + * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and most significant + * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset)) \ + : MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset))) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the most significant + * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), (uint32_t) (n)); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP32((uint32_t) (n))); \ + } \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and least significant + * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset))) \ + : mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset)) \ + ) + + +/** + * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the least significant + * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP32((uint32_t) (n))); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), ((uint32_t) (n))); \ + } \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and least significant + * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? MBEDTLS_BSWAP16(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset))) \ + : mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset)) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the least significant + * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP16((uint16_t) (n))); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), (uint16_t) (n)); \ + } \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and most significant + * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset)) \ + : MBEDTLS_BSWAP16(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset))) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the most significant + * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), (uint16_t) (n)); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP16((uint16_t) (n))); \ + } \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 24 bits integer corresponding to three bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the three bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and most significant + * byte of the three bytes to build the 24 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(data, offset) \ + ( \ + ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset)] << 16) \ + | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 8) \ + | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 2]) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 24 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 24 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 24 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the most significant + * byte of the 24 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); \ + (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ + (data)[(offset) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 24 bits integer corresponding to three bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the three bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and least significant + * byte of the three bytes to build the 24 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_LE(data, offset) \ + ( \ + ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset)]) \ + | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 8) \ + | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 2] << 16) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 24 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 24 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 24 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the least significant + * byte of the 24 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_LE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ + (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ + (data)[(offset) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in + * big-endian order (MSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and most significant + * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset)) \ + : MBEDTLS_BSWAP64(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset))) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order. + * + * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the most significant + * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), (uint64_t) (n)); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP64((uint64_t) (n))); \ + } \ + } + +/** + * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in + * little-endian order (LSB first). + * + * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from. + * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and least significant + * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned + * integer from. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE(data, offset) \ + ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + ? MBEDTLS_BSWAP64(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset))) \ + : mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset)) \ + ) + +/** + * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order. + * + * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory. + * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64 + * bits unsigned integer in. + * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the least significant + * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(n, data, offset) \ + { \ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP64((uint64_t) (n))); \ + } \ + else \ + { \ + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), (uint64_t) (n)); \ + } \ + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_ALIGNMENT_H */ diff --git a/library/aria.c b/library/aria.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d9f84cc59d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/aria.c @@ -0,0 +1,969 @@ +/* + * ARIA implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * This implementation is based on the following standards: + * [1] http://210.104.33.10/ARIA/doc/ARIA-specification-e.pdf + * [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5794 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/aria.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT) + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +/* + * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( B A D C ), i.e. swap pairs of bytes + * + * This is submatrix P1 in [1] Appendix B.1 + * + * Common compilers fail to translate this to minimal number of instructions, + * so let's provide asm versions for common platforms with C fallback. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#if defined(__arm__) /* rev16 available from v6 up */ +/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ + (!defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000) && \ + __ARM_ARCH >= 6 +static inline uint32_t aria_p1(uint32_t x) +{ + uint32_t r; + __asm("rev16 %0, %1" : "=l" (r) : "l" (x)); + return r; +} +#define ARIA_P1 aria_p1 +#elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && __ARMCC_VERSION < 6000000 && \ + (__TARGET_ARCH_ARM >= 6 || __TARGET_ARCH_THUMB >= 3) +static inline uint32_t aria_p1(uint32_t x) +{ + uint32_t r; + __asm("rev16 r, x"); + return r; +} +#define ARIA_P1 aria_p1 +#endif +#endif /* arm */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ + defined(__i386__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) +/* I couldn't find an Intel equivalent of rev16, so two instructions */ +#define ARIA_P1(x) ARIA_P2(ARIA_P3(x)) +#endif /* x86 gnuc */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && GNUC */ +#if !defined(ARIA_P1) +#define ARIA_P1(x) ((((x) >> 8) & 0x00FF00FF) ^ (((x) & 0x00FF00FF) << 8)) +#endif + +/* + * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( C D A B ), i.e. rotate by 16 bits + * + * This is submatrix P2 in [1] Appendix B.1 + * + * Common compilers will translate this to a single instruction. + */ +#define ARIA_P2(x) (((x) >> 16) ^ ((x) << 16)) + +/* + * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( D C B A ), i.e. change endianness + * + * This is submatrix P3 in [1] Appendix B.1 + */ +#define ARIA_P3(x) MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(x) + +/* + * ARIA Affine Transform + * (a, b, c, d) = state in/out + * + * If we denote the first byte of input by 0, ..., the last byte by f, + * then inputs are: a = 0123, b = 4567, c = 89ab, d = cdef. + * + * Reading [1] 2.4 or [2] 2.4.3 in columns and performing simple + * rearrangements on adjacent pairs, output is: + * + * a = 3210 + 4545 + 6767 + 88aa + 99bb + dccd + effe + * = 3210 + 4567 + 6745 + 89ab + 98ba + dcfe + efcd + * b = 0101 + 2323 + 5476 + 8998 + baab + eecc + ffdd + * = 0123 + 2301 + 5476 + 89ab + ba98 + efcd + fedc + * c = 0022 + 1133 + 4554 + 7667 + ab89 + dcdc + fefe + * = 0123 + 1032 + 4567 + 7654 + ab89 + dcfe + fedc + * d = 1001 + 2332 + 6644 + 7755 + 9898 + baba + cdef + * = 1032 + 2301 + 6745 + 7654 + 98ba + ba98 + cdef + * + * Note: another presentation of the A transform can be found as the first + * half of App. B.1 in [1] in terms of 4-byte operators P1, P2, P3 and P4. + * The implementation below uses only P1 and P2 as they are sufficient. + */ +static inline void aria_a(uint32_t *a, uint32_t *b, + uint32_t *c, uint32_t *d) +{ + uint32_t ta, tb, tc; + ta = *b; // 4567 + *b = *a; // 0123 + *a = ARIA_P2(ta); // 6745 + tb = ARIA_P2(*d); // efcd + *d = ARIA_P1(*c); // 98ba + *c = ARIA_P1(tb); // fedc + ta ^= *d; // 4567+98ba + tc = ARIA_P2(*b); // 2301 + ta = ARIA_P1(ta) ^ tc ^ *c; // 2301+5476+89ab+fedc + tb ^= ARIA_P2(*d); // ba98+efcd + tc ^= ARIA_P1(*a); // 2301+7654 + *b ^= ta ^ tb; // 0123+2301+5476+89ab+ba98+efcd+fedc OUT + tb = ARIA_P2(tb) ^ ta; // 2301+5476+89ab+98ba+cdef+fedc + *a ^= ARIA_P1(tb); // 3210+4567+6745+89ab+98ba+dcfe+efcd OUT + ta = ARIA_P2(ta); // 0123+7654+ab89+dcfe + *d ^= ARIA_P1(ta) ^ tc; // 1032+2301+6745+7654+98ba+ba98+cdef OUT + tc = ARIA_P2(tc); // 0123+5476 + *c ^= ARIA_P1(tc) ^ ta; // 0123+1032+4567+7654+ab89+dcfe+fedc OUT +} + +/* + * ARIA Substitution Layer SL1 / SL2 + * (a, b, c, d) = state in/out + * (sa, sb, sc, sd) = 256 8-bit S-Boxes (see below) + * + * By passing sb1, sb2, is1, is2 as S-Boxes you get SL1 + * By passing is1, is2, sb1, sb2 as S-Boxes you get SL2 + */ +static inline void aria_sl(uint32_t *a, uint32_t *b, + uint32_t *c, uint32_t *d, + const uint8_t sa[256], const uint8_t sb[256], + const uint8_t sc[256], const uint8_t sd[256]) +{ + *a = ((uint32_t) sa[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(*a)]) ^ + (((uint32_t) sb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*a)]) << 8) ^ + (((uint32_t) sc[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(*a)]) << 16) ^ + (((uint32_t) sd[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(*a)]) << 24); + *b = ((uint32_t) sa[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(*b)]) ^ + (((uint32_t) sb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*b)]) << 8) ^ + (((uint32_t) sc[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(*b)]) << 16) ^ + (((uint32_t) sd[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(*b)]) << 24); + *c = ((uint32_t) sa[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(*c)]) ^ + (((uint32_t) sb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*c)]) << 8) ^ + (((uint32_t) sc[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(*c)]) << 16) ^ + (((uint32_t) sd[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(*c)]) << 24); + *d = ((uint32_t) sa[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(*d)]) ^ + (((uint32_t) sb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*d)]) << 8) ^ + (((uint32_t) sc[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(*d)]) << 16) ^ + (((uint32_t) sd[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(*d)]) << 24); +} + +/* + * S-Boxes + */ +static const uint8_t aria_sb1[256] = +{ + 0x63, 0x7C, 0x77, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2B, + 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xAB, 0x76, 0xCA, 0x82, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x47, 0xF0, + 0xAD, 0xD4, 0xA2, 0xAF, 0x9C, 0xA4, 0x72, 0xC0, 0xB7, 0xFD, 0x93, 0x26, + 0x36, 0x3F, 0xF7, 0xCC, 0x34, 0xA5, 0xE5, 0xF1, 0x71, 0xD8, 0x31, 0x15, + 0x04, 0xC7, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9A, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xE2, + 0xEB, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x75, 0x09, 0x83, 0x2C, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xA0, + 0x52, 0x3B, 0xD6, 0xB3, 0x29, 0xE3, 0x2F, 0x84, 0x53, 0xD1, 0x00, 0xED, + 0x20, 0xFC, 0xB1, 0x5B, 0x6A, 0xCB, 0xBE, 0x39, 0x4A, 0x4C, 0x58, 0xCF, + 0xD0, 0xEF, 0xAA, 0xFB, 0x43, 0x4D, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x02, 0x7F, + 0x50, 0x3C, 0x9F, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xA3, 0x40, 0x8F, 0x92, 0x9D, 0x38, 0xF5, + 0xBC, 0xB6, 0xDA, 0x21, 0x10, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0xD2, 0xCD, 0x0C, 0x13, 0xEC, + 0x5F, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xC4, 0xA7, 0x7E, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x5D, 0x19, 0x73, + 0x60, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x22, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xEE, 0xB8, 0x14, + 0xDE, 0x5E, 0x0B, 0xDB, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x0A, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5C, + 0xC2, 0xD3, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xE4, 0x79, 0xE7, 0xC8, 0x37, 0x6D, + 0x8D, 0xD5, 0x4E, 0xA9, 0x6C, 0x56, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0x65, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0x08, + 0xBA, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2E, 0x1C, 0xA6, 0xB4, 0xC6, 0xE8, 0xDD, 0x74, 0x1F, + 0x4B, 0xBD, 0x8B, 0x8A, 0x70, 0x3E, 0xB5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xF6, 0x0E, + 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x86, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0x9E, 0xE1, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x11, + 0x69, 0xD9, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x9B, 0x1E, 0x87, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0x55, 0x28, 0xDF, + 0x8C, 0xA1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2D, 0x0F, + 0xB0, 0x54, 0xBB, 0x16 +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_sb2[256] = +{ + 0xE2, 0x4E, 0x54, 0xFC, 0x94, 0xC2, 0x4A, 0xCC, 0x62, 0x0D, 0x6A, 0x46, + 0x3C, 0x4D, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x5E, 0xFA, 0x64, 0xCB, 0xB4, 0x97, 0xBE, 0x2B, + 0xBC, 0x77, 0x2E, 0x03, 0xD3, 0x19, 0x59, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0x06, 0x41, 0x6B, + 0x55, 0xF0, 0x99, 0x69, 0xEA, 0x9C, 0x18, 0xAE, 0x63, 0xDF, 0xE7, 0xBB, + 0x00, 0x73, 0x66, 0xFB, 0x96, 0x4C, 0x85, 0xE4, 0x3A, 0x09, 0x45, 0xAA, + 0x0F, 0xEE, 0x10, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x7F, 0xF4, 0x29, 0xAC, 0xCF, 0xAD, 0x91, + 0x8D, 0x78, 0xC8, 0x95, 0xF9, 0x2F, 0xCE, 0xCD, 0x08, 0x7A, 0x88, 0x38, + 0x5C, 0x83, 0x2A, 0x28, 0x47, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0xC7, 0x93, 0xA4, 0x12, 0x53, + 0xFF, 0x87, 0x0E, 0x31, 0x36, 0x21, 0x58, 0x48, 0x01, 0x8E, 0x37, 0x74, + 0x32, 0xCA, 0xE9, 0xB1, 0xB7, 0xAB, 0x0C, 0xD7, 0xC4, 0x56, 0x42, 0x26, + 0x07, 0x98, 0x60, 0xD9, 0xB6, 0xB9, 0x11, 0x40, 0xEC, 0x20, 0x8C, 0xBD, + 0xA0, 0xC9, 0x84, 0x04, 0x49, 0x23, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0x50, 0x1F, 0x13, 0xDC, + 0xD8, 0xC0, 0x9E, 0x57, 0xE3, 0xC3, 0x7B, 0x65, 0x3B, 0x02, 0x8F, 0x3E, + 0xE8, 0x25, 0x92, 0xE5, 0x15, 0xDD, 0xFD, 0x17, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xD4, 0x9A, + 0x7E, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x67, 0xFE, 0x76, 0x9D, 0x43, 0xA7, 0xE1, 0xD0, 0xF5, + 0x68, 0xF2, 0x1B, 0x34, 0x70, 0x05, 0xA3, 0x8A, 0xD5, 0x79, 0x86, 0xA8, + 0x30, 0xC6, 0x51, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0xA6, 0x27, 0xF6, 0x35, 0xD2, 0x6E, 0x24, + 0x16, 0x82, 0x5F, 0xDA, 0xE6, 0x75, 0xA2, 0xEF, 0x2C, 0xB2, 0x1C, 0x9F, + 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x80, 0x0A, 0x72, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x6C, 0x90, 0x0B, 0x5B, 0x33, + 0x7D, 0x5A, 0x52, 0xF3, 0x61, 0xA1, 0xF7, 0xB0, 0xD6, 0x3F, 0x7C, 0x6D, + 0xED, 0x14, 0xE0, 0xA5, 0x3D, 0x22, 0xB3, 0xF8, 0x89, 0xDE, 0x71, 0x1A, + 0xAF, 0xBA, 0xB5, 0x81 +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_is1[256] = +{ + 0x52, 0x09, 0x6A, 0xD5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xA5, 0x38, 0xBF, 0x40, 0xA3, 0x9E, + 0x81, 0xF3, 0xD7, 0xFB, 0x7C, 0xE3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9B, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x87, + 0x34, 0x8E, 0x43, 0x44, 0xC4, 0xDE, 0xE9, 0xCB, 0x54, 0x7B, 0x94, 0x32, + 0xA6, 0xC2, 0x23, 0x3D, 0xEE, 0x4C, 0x95, 0x0B, 0x42, 0xFA, 0xC3, 0x4E, + 0x08, 0x2E, 0xA1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x24, 0xB2, 0x76, 0x5B, 0xA2, 0x49, + 0x6D, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x25, 0x72, 0xF8, 0xF6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16, + 0xD4, 0xA4, 0x5C, 0xCC, 0x5D, 0x65, 0xB6, 0x92, 0x6C, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, + 0xFD, 0xED, 0xB9, 0xDA, 0x5E, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0x84, + 0x90, 0xD8, 0xAB, 0x00, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0xD3, 0x0A, 0xF7, 0xE4, 0x58, 0x05, + 0xB8, 0xB3, 0x45, 0x06, 0xD0, 0x2C, 0x1E, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x3F, 0x0F, 0x02, + 0xC1, 0xAF, 0xBD, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8A, 0x6B, 0x3A, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, + 0x4F, 0x67, 0xDC, 0xEA, 0x97, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0xCE, 0xF0, 0xB4, 0xE6, 0x73, + 0x96, 0xAC, 0x74, 0x22, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x35, 0x85, 0xE2, 0xF9, 0x37, 0xE8, + 0x1C, 0x75, 0xDF, 0x6E, 0x47, 0xF1, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x1D, 0x29, 0xC5, 0x89, + 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x62, 0x0E, 0xAA, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x1B, 0xFC, 0x56, 0x3E, 0x4B, + 0xC6, 0xD2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xCD, 0x5A, 0xF4, + 0x1F, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xC7, 0x31, 0xB1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, + 0x27, 0x80, 0xEC, 0x5F, 0x60, 0x51, 0x7F, 0xA9, 0x19, 0xB5, 0x4A, 0x0D, + 0x2D, 0xE5, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0x93, 0xC9, 0x9C, 0xEF, 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x3B, 0x4D, + 0xAE, 0x2A, 0xF5, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0xEB, 0xBB, 0x3C, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61, + 0x17, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x7E, 0xBA, 0x77, 0xD6, 0x26, 0xE1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, + 0x55, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x7D +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_is2[256] = +{ + 0x30, 0x68, 0x99, 0x1B, 0x87, 0xB9, 0x21, 0x78, 0x50, 0x39, 0xDB, 0xE1, + 0x72, 0x09, 0x62, 0x3C, 0x3E, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0xA0, 0xCC, 0xA3, + 0x2A, 0x1D, 0xFB, 0xB6, 0xD6, 0x20, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0x81, 0x65, 0xF5, 0x89, + 0xCB, 0x9D, 0x77, 0xC6, 0x57, 0x43, 0x56, 0x17, 0xD4, 0x40, 0x1A, 0x4D, + 0xC0, 0x63, 0x6C, 0xE3, 0xB7, 0xC8, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x53, 0xAA, 0x38, 0x98, + 0x0C, 0xF4, 0x9B, 0xED, 0x7F, 0x22, 0x76, 0xAF, 0xDD, 0x3A, 0x0B, 0x58, + 0x67, 0x88, 0x06, 0xC3, 0x35, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x8B, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0xE6, 0x5F, + 0x02, 0x24, 0x75, 0x93, 0x66, 0x1E, 0xE5, 0xE2, 0x54, 0xD8, 0x10, 0xCE, + 0x7A, 0xE8, 0x08, 0x2C, 0x12, 0x97, 0x32, 0xAB, 0xB4, 0x27, 0x0A, 0x23, + 0xDF, 0xEF, 0xCA, 0xD9, 0xB8, 0xFA, 0xDC, 0x31, 0x6B, 0xD1, 0xAD, 0x19, + 0x49, 0xBD, 0x51, 0x96, 0xEE, 0xE4, 0xA8, 0x41, 0xDA, 0xFF, 0xCD, 0x55, + 0x86, 0x36, 0xBE, 0x61, 0x52, 0xF8, 0xBB, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x48, 0x69, 0x9A, + 0xE0, 0x47, 0x9E, 0x5C, 0x04, 0x4B, 0x34, 0x15, 0x79, 0x26, 0xA7, 0xDE, + 0x29, 0xAE, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x84, 0xE9, 0xD2, 0xBA, 0x5D, 0xF3, 0xC5, 0xB0, + 0xBF, 0xA4, 0x3B, 0x71, 0x44, 0x46, 0x2B, 0xFC, 0xEB, 0x6F, 0xD5, 0xF6, + 0x14, 0xFE, 0x7C, 0x70, 0x5A, 0x7D, 0xFD, 0x2F, 0x18, 0x83, 0x16, 0xA5, + 0x91, 0x1F, 0x05, 0x95, 0x74, 0xA9, 0xC1, 0x5B, 0x4A, 0x85, 0x6D, 0x13, + 0x07, 0x4F, 0x4E, 0x45, 0xB2, 0x0F, 0xC9, 0x1C, 0xA6, 0xBC, 0xEC, 0x73, + 0x90, 0x7B, 0xCF, 0x59, 0x8F, 0xA1, 0xF9, 0x2D, 0xF2, 0xB1, 0x00, 0x94, + 0x37, 0x9F, 0xD0, 0x2E, 0x9C, 0x6E, 0x28, 0x3F, 0x80, 0xF0, 0x3D, 0xD3, + 0x25, 0x8A, 0xB5, 0xE7, 0x42, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0xEA, 0xF7, 0x4C, 0x11, 0x33, + 0x03, 0xA2, 0xAC, 0x60 +}; + +/* + * Helper for key schedule: r = FO( p, k ) ^ x + */ +static void aria_fo_xor(uint32_t r[4], const uint32_t p[4], + const uint32_t k[4], const uint32_t x[4]) +{ + uint32_t a, b, c, d; + + a = p[0] ^ k[0]; + b = p[1] ^ k[1]; + c = p[2] ^ k[2]; + d = p[3] ^ k[3]; + + aria_sl(&a, &b, &c, &d, aria_sb1, aria_sb2, aria_is1, aria_is2); + aria_a(&a, &b, &c, &d); + + r[0] = a ^ x[0]; + r[1] = b ^ x[1]; + r[2] = c ^ x[2]; + r[3] = d ^ x[3]; +} + +/* + * Helper for key schedule: r = FE( p, k ) ^ x + */ +static void aria_fe_xor(uint32_t r[4], const uint32_t p[4], + const uint32_t k[4], const uint32_t x[4]) +{ + uint32_t a, b, c, d; + + a = p[0] ^ k[0]; + b = p[1] ^ k[1]; + c = p[2] ^ k[2]; + d = p[3] ^ k[3]; + + aria_sl(&a, &b, &c, &d, aria_is1, aria_is2, aria_sb1, aria_sb2); + aria_a(&a, &b, &c, &d); + + r[0] = a ^ x[0]; + r[1] = b ^ x[1]; + r[2] = c ^ x[2]; + r[3] = d ^ x[3]; +} + +/* + * Big endian 128-bit rotation: r = a ^ (b <<< n), used only in key setup. + * + * We chose to store bytes into 32-bit words in little-endian format (see + * MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE / MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE ) so we need to reverse + * bytes here. + */ +static void aria_rot128(uint32_t r[4], const uint32_t a[4], + const uint32_t b[4], uint8_t n) +{ + uint8_t i, j; + uint32_t t, u; + + const uint8_t n1 = n % 32; // bit offset + const uint8_t n2 = n1 ? 32 - n1 : 0; // reverse bit offset + + j = (n / 32) % 4; // initial word offset + t = ARIA_P3(b[j]); // big endian + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { + j = (j + 1) % 4; // get next word, big endian + u = ARIA_P3(b[j]); + t <<= n1; // rotate + t |= u >> n2; + t = ARIA_P3(t); // back to little endian + r[i] = a[i] ^ t; // store + t = u; // move to next word + } +} + +/* + * Set encryption key + */ +int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits) +{ + /* round constant masks */ + const uint32_t rc[3][4] = + { + { 0xB7C17C51, 0x940A2227, 0xE8AB13FE, 0xE06E9AFA }, + { 0xCC4AB16D, 0x20C8219E, 0xD5B128FF, 0xB0E25DEF }, + { 0x1D3792DB, 0x70E92621, 0x75972403, 0x0EC9E804 } + }; + + int i; + uint32_t w[4][4], *w2; + + if (keybits != 128 && keybits != 192 && keybits != 256) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Copy key to W0 (and potential remainder to W1) */ + w[0][0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 0); + w[0][1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 4); + w[0][2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 8); + w[0][3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 12); + + memset(w[1], 0, 16); + if (keybits >= 192) { + w[1][0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 16); // 192 bit key + w[1][1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 20); + } + if (keybits == 256) { + w[1][2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 24); // 256 bit key + w[1][3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 28); + } + + i = (keybits - 128) >> 6; // index: 0, 1, 2 + ctx->nr = 12 + 2 * i; // no. rounds: 12, 14, 16 + + aria_fo_xor(w[1], w[0], rc[i], w[1]); // W1 = FO(W0, CK1) ^ KR + i = i < 2 ? i + 1 : 0; + aria_fe_xor(w[2], w[1], rc[i], w[0]); // W2 = FE(W1, CK2) ^ W0 + i = i < 2 ? i + 1 : 0; + aria_fo_xor(w[3], w[2], rc[i], w[1]); // W3 = FO(W2, CK3) ^ W1 + + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { // create round keys + w2 = w[(i + 1) & 3]; + aria_rot128(ctx->rk[i], w[i], w2, 128 - 19); + aria_rot128(ctx->rk[i + 4], w[i], w2, 128 - 31); + aria_rot128(ctx->rk[i + 8], w[i], w2, 61); + aria_rot128(ctx->rk[i + 12], w[i], w2, 31); + } + aria_rot128(ctx->rk[16], w[0], w[1], 19); + + /* w holds enough info to reconstruct the round keys */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(w, sizeof(w)); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Set decryption key + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits) +{ + int i, j, k, ret; + + ret = mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(ctx, key, keybits); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* flip the order of round keys */ + for (i = 0, j = ctx->nr; i < j; i++, j--) { + for (k = 0; k < 4; k++) { + uint32_t t = ctx->rk[i][k]; + ctx->rk[i][k] = ctx->rk[j][k]; + ctx->rk[j][k] = t; + } + } + + /* apply affine transform to middle keys */ + for (i = 1; i < ctx->nr; i++) { + aria_a(&ctx->rk[i][0], &ctx->rk[i][1], + &ctx->rk[i][2], &ctx->rk[i][3]); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ + +/* + * Encrypt a block + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]) +{ + int i; + + uint32_t a, b, c, d; + + a = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 0); + b = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 4); + c = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 8); + d = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 12); + + i = 0; + while (1) { + a ^= ctx->rk[i][0]; + b ^= ctx->rk[i][1]; + c ^= ctx->rk[i][2]; + d ^= ctx->rk[i][3]; + i++; + + aria_sl(&a, &b, &c, &d, aria_sb1, aria_sb2, aria_is1, aria_is2); + aria_a(&a, &b, &c, &d); + + a ^= ctx->rk[i][0]; + b ^= ctx->rk[i][1]; + c ^= ctx->rk[i][2]; + d ^= ctx->rk[i][3]; + i++; + + aria_sl(&a, &b, &c, &d, aria_is1, aria_is2, aria_sb1, aria_sb2); + if (i >= ctx->nr) { + break; + } + aria_a(&a, &b, &c, &d); + } + + /* final key mixing */ + a ^= ctx->rk[i][0]; + b ^= ctx->rk[i][1]; + c ^= ctx->rk[i][2]; + d ^= ctx->rk[i][3]; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(a, output, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(b, output, 4); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(c, output, 8); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(d, output, 12); + + return 0; +} + +/* Initialize context */ +void mbedtls_aria_init(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_aria_context)); +} + +/* Clear context */ +void mbedtls_aria_free(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_aria_context)); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * ARIA-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + unsigned char temp[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; + + if ((mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT) && (mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (length % MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; + } + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT) { + while (length > 0) { + memcpy(temp, input, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(ctx, input, output); + + mbedtls_xor(output, output, iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); + + memcpy(iv, temp, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); + + input += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + output += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + length -= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + } + } else { + while (length > 0) { + mbedtls_xor(output, input, iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); + + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(ctx, output, output); + memcpy(iv, output, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); + + input += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + output += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + length -= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; + } + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/* + * ARIA-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + unsigned char c; + size_t n; + + if ((mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT) && (mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + n = *iv_off; + + /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited + * buffer overflow. */ + if (n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT) { + while (length--) { + if (n == 0) { + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(ctx, iv, iv); + } + + c = *input++; + *output++ = c ^ iv[n]; + iv[n] = c; + + n = (n + 1) & 0x0F; + } + } else { + while (length--) { + if (n == 0) { + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(ctx, iv, iv); + } + + iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char) (iv[n] ^ *input++); + + n = (n + 1) & 0x0F; + } + } + + *iv_off = n; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * ARIA-CTR buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int c, i; + size_t n; + + n = *nc_off; + /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited + * buffer overflow. */ + if (n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + while (length--) { + if (n == 0) { + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(ctx, nonce_counter, + stream_block); + + for (i = MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i--) { + if (++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0) { + break; + } + } + } + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char) (c ^ stream_block[n]); + + n = (n + 1) & 0x0F; + } + + *nc_off = n; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * Basic ARIA ECB test vectors from RFC 5794 + */ +static const uint8_t aria_test1_ecb_key[32] = // test key +{ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, // 128 bit + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, // 192 bit + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F // 256 bit +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_test1_ecb_pt[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] = // plaintext +{ + 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, // same for all + 0x88, 0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF // key sizes +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_test1_ecb_ct[3][MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] = // ciphertext +{ + { 0xD7, 0x18, 0xFB, 0xD6, 0xAB, 0x64, 0x4C, 0x73, // 128 bit + 0x9D, 0xA9, 0x5F, 0x3B, 0xE6, 0x45, 0x17, 0x78 }, + { 0x26, 0x44, 0x9C, 0x18, 0x05, 0xDB, 0xE7, 0xAA, // 192 bit + 0x25, 0xA4, 0x68, 0xCE, 0x26, 0x3A, 0x9E, 0x79 }, + { 0xF9, 0x2B, 0xD7, 0xC7, 0x9F, 0xB7, 0x2E, 0x2F, // 256 bit + 0x2B, 0x8F, 0x80, 0xC1, 0x97, 0x2D, 0x24, 0xFC } +}; + +/* + * Mode tests from "Test Vectors for ARIA" Version 1.0 + * http://210.104.33.10/ARIA/doc/ARIA-testvector-e.pdf + */ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)) +static const uint8_t aria_test2_key[32] = +{ + 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, // 128 bit + 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff, + 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, // 192 bit + 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff // 256 bit +}; + +static const uint8_t aria_test2_pt[48] = +{ + 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, // same for all + 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, + 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, + 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, + 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, +}; +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)) +static const uint8_t aria_test2_iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] = +{ + 0x0f, 0x1e, 0x2d, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x5a, 0x69, 0x78, // same for CBC, CFB + 0x87, 0x96, 0xa5, 0xb4, 0xc3, 0xd2, 0xe1, 0xf0 // CTR has zero IV +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const uint8_t aria_test2_cbc_ct[3][48] = // CBC ciphertext +{ + { 0x49, 0xd6, 0x18, 0x60, 0xb1, 0x49, 0x09, 0x10, // 128-bit key + 0x9c, 0xef, 0x0d, 0x22, 0xa9, 0x26, 0x81, 0x34, + 0xfa, 0xdf, 0x9f, 0xb2, 0x31, 0x51, 0xe9, 0x64, + 0x5f, 0xba, 0x75, 0x01, 0x8b, 0xdb, 0x15, 0x38, + 0xb5, 0x33, 0x34, 0x63, 0x4b, 0xbf, 0x7d, 0x4c, + 0xd4, 0xb5, 0x37, 0x70, 0x33, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x15 }, + { 0xaf, 0xe6, 0xcf, 0x23, 0x97, 0x4b, 0x53, 0x3c, // 192-bit key + 0x67, 0x2a, 0x82, 0x62, 0x64, 0xea, 0x78, 0x5f, + 0x4e, 0x4f, 0x7f, 0x78, 0x0d, 0xc7, 0xf3, 0xf1, + 0xe0, 0x96, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x23, 0x86, 0xd5, + 0x14, 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xe7, 0x72, 0x59, 0xde, 0x92, + 0xdd, 0x11, 0x02, 0xff, 0xab, 0x08, 0x6c, 0x1e }, + { 0x52, 0x3a, 0x8a, 0x80, 0x6a, 0xe6, 0x21, 0xf1, // 256-bit key + 0x55, 0xfd, 0xd2, 0x8d, 0xbc, 0x34, 0xe1, 0xab, + 0x7b, 0x9b, 0x42, 0x43, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0xb2, 0xef, + 0xb9, 0x6e, 0x23, 0xb1, 0x3f, 0x0a, 0x6e, 0x52, + 0xf3, 0x61, 0x85, 0xd5, 0x0a, 0xd0, 0x02, 0xc5, + 0xf6, 0x01, 0xbe, 0xe5, 0x49, 0x3f, 0x11, 0x8b } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static const uint8_t aria_test2_cfb_ct[3][48] = // CFB ciphertext +{ + { 0x37, 0x20, 0xe5, 0x3b, 0xa7, 0xd6, 0x15, 0x38, // 128-bit key + 0x34, 0x06, 0xb0, 0x9f, 0x0a, 0x05, 0xa2, 0x00, + 0xc0, 0x7c, 0x21, 0xe6, 0x37, 0x0f, 0x41, 0x3a, + 0x5d, 0x13, 0x25, 0x00, 0xa6, 0x82, 0x85, 0x01, + 0x7c, 0x61, 0xb4, 0x34, 0xc7, 0xb7, 0xca, 0x96, + 0x85, 0xa5, 0x10, 0x71, 0x86, 0x1e, 0x4d, 0x4b }, + { 0x41, 0x71, 0xf7, 0x19, 0x2b, 0xf4, 0x49, 0x54, // 192-bit key + 0x94, 0xd2, 0x73, 0x61, 0x29, 0x64, 0x0f, 0x5c, + 0x4d, 0x87, 0xa9, 0xa2, 0x13, 0x66, 0x4c, 0x94, + 0x48, 0x47, 0x7c, 0x6e, 0xcc, 0x20, 0x13, 0x59, + 0x8d, 0x97, 0x66, 0x95, 0x2d, 0xd8, 0xc3, 0x86, + 0x8f, 0x17, 0xe3, 0x6e, 0xf6, 0x6f, 0xd8, 0x4b }, + { 0x26, 0x83, 0x47, 0x05, 0xb0, 0xf2, 0xc0, 0xe2, // 256-bit key + 0x58, 0x8d, 0x4a, 0x7f, 0x09, 0x00, 0x96, 0x35, + 0xf2, 0x8b, 0xb9, 0x3d, 0x8c, 0x31, 0xf8, 0x70, + 0xec, 0x1e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0x08, 0x2b, 0x66, 0xfa, + 0x40, 0x2d, 0xd9, 0xc2, 0x02, 0xbe, 0x30, 0x0c, + 0x45, 0x17, 0xd1, 0x96, 0xb1, 0x4d, 0x4c, 0xe1 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static const uint8_t aria_test2_ctr_ct[3][48] = // CTR ciphertext +{ + { 0xac, 0x5d, 0x7d, 0xe8, 0x05, 0xa0, 0xbf, 0x1c, // 128-bit key + 0x57, 0xc8, 0x54, 0x50, 0x1a, 0xf6, 0x0f, 0xa1, + 0x14, 0x97, 0xe2, 0xa3, 0x45, 0x19, 0xde, 0xa1, + 0x56, 0x9e, 0x91, 0xe5, 0xb5, 0xcc, 0xae, 0x2f, + 0xf3, 0xbf, 0xa1, 0xbf, 0x97, 0x5f, 0x45, 0x71, + 0xf4, 0x8b, 0xe1, 0x91, 0x61, 0x35, 0x46, 0xc3 }, + { 0x08, 0x62, 0x5c, 0xa8, 0xfe, 0x56, 0x9c, 0x19, // 192-bit key + 0xba, 0x7a, 0xf3, 0x76, 0x0a, 0x6e, 0xd1, 0xce, + 0xf4, 0xd1, 0x99, 0x26, 0x3e, 0x99, 0x9d, 0xde, + 0x14, 0x08, 0x2d, 0xbb, 0xa7, 0x56, 0x0b, 0x79, + 0xa4, 0xc6, 0xb4, 0x56, 0xb8, 0x70, 0x7d, 0xce, + 0x75, 0x1f, 0x98, 0x54, 0xf1, 0x88, 0x93, 0xdf }, + { 0x30, 0x02, 0x6c, 0x32, 0x96, 0x66, 0x14, 0x17, // 256-bit key + 0x21, 0x17, 0x8b, 0x99, 0xc0, 0xa1, 0xf1, 0xb2, + 0xf0, 0x69, 0x40, 0x25, 0x3f, 0x7b, 0x30, 0x89, + 0xe2, 0xa3, 0x0e, 0xa8, 0x6a, 0xa3, 0xc8, 0x8f, + 0x59, 0x40, 0xf0, 0x5a, 0xd7, 0xee, 0x41, 0xd7, + 0x13, 0x47, 0xbb, 0x72, 0x61, 0xe3, 0x48, 0xf1 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#define ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT(cond) \ + do { \ + if (cond) { \ + if (verbose) \ + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); \ + goto exit; \ + } else { \ + if (verbose) \ + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_aria_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int i; + uint8_t blk[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; + mbedtls_aria_context ctx; + int ret = 1; + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)) + size_t j; +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)) + uint8_t buf[48], iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; +#endif + + mbedtls_aria_init(&ctx); + + /* + * Test set 1 + */ + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + /* test ECB encryption */ + if (verbose) { + mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-ECB-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i); + } + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(&ctx, aria_test1_ecb_key, 128 + 64 * i); + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(&ctx, aria_test1_ecb_pt, blk); + ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT( + memcmp(blk, aria_test1_ecb_ct[i], MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) + != 0); + + /* test ECB decryption */ + if (verbose) { + mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-ECB-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); +#endif + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec(&ctx, aria_test1_ecb_key, 128 + 64 * i); + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(&ctx, aria_test1_ecb_ct[i], blk); + ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT( + memcmp(blk, aria_test1_ecb_pt, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) + != 0); +#endif + } + if (verbose) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + /* + * Test set 2 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + /* Test CBC encryption */ + if (verbose) { + mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-CBC-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i); + } + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(&ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i); + memcpy(iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); + memset(buf, 0x55, sizeof(buf)); + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc(&ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, 48, iv, + aria_test2_pt, buf); + ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, aria_test2_cbc_ct[i], 48) + != 0); + + /* Test CBC decryption */ + if (verbose) { + mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-CBC-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i); + } + mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec(&ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i); + memcpy(iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); + memset(buf, 0xAA, sizeof(buf)); + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc(&ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT, 48, iv, + aria_test2_cbc_ct[i], buf); + ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, aria_test2_pt, 48) != 0); + } + if (verbose) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + /* Test CFB encryption */ + if (verbose) { + mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-CFB-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i); + } + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(&ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i); + memcpy(iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); + memset(buf, 0x55, sizeof(buf)); + j = 0; + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128(&ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, 48, &j, iv, + aria_test2_pt, buf); + ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, aria_test2_cfb_ct[i], 48) != 0); + + /* Test CFB decryption */ + if (verbose) { + mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-CFB-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i); + } + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(&ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i); + memcpy(iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); + memset(buf, 0xAA, sizeof(buf)); + j = 0; + mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128(&ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT, 48, &j, + iv, aria_test2_cfb_ct[i], buf); + ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, aria_test2_pt, 48) != 0); + } + if (verbose) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + /* Test CTR encryption */ + if (verbose) { + mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-CTR-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i); + } + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(&ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i); + memset(iv, 0, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); // IV = 0 + memset(buf, 0x55, sizeof(buf)); + j = 0; + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr(&ctx, 48, &j, iv, blk, + aria_test2_pt, buf); + ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, aria_test2_ctr_ct[i], 48) != 0); + + /* Test CTR decryption */ + if (verbose) { + mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-CTR-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i); + } + mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(&ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i); + memset(iv, 0, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); // IV = 0 + memset(buf, 0xAA, sizeof(buf)); + j = 0; + mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr(&ctx, 48, &j, iv, blk, + aria_test2_ctr_ct[i], buf); + ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, aria_test2_pt, 48) != 0); + } + if (verbose) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_aria_free(&ctx); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ diff --git a/library/asn1parse.c b/library/asn1parse.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e33fdf71da6 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/asn1parse.c @@ -0,0 +1,468 @@ +/* + * Generic ASN.1 parsing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +/* + * ASN.1 DER decoding routines + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_len(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len) +{ + if ((end - *p) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; + } + + if ((**p & 0x80) == 0) { + *len = *(*p)++; + } else { + int n = (**p) & 0x7F; + if (n == 0 || n > 4) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + } + if ((end - *p) <= n) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; + } + *len = 0; + (*p)++; + while (n--) { + *len = (*len << 8) | **p; + (*p)++; + } + } + + if (*len > (size_t) (end - *p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len, int tag) +{ + if ((end - *p) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; + } + + if (**p != tag) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG; + } + + (*p)++; + + return mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, len); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +int mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (len != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + } + + *val = (**p != 0) ? 1 : 0; + (*p)++; + + return 0; +} + +static int asn1_get_tagged_int(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int tag, int *val) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, tag)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* + * len==0 is malformed (0 must be represented as 020100 for INTEGER, + * or 0A0100 for ENUMERATED tags + */ + if (len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + } + /* This is a cryptography library. Reject negative integers. */ + if ((**p & 0x80) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + } + + /* Skip leading zeros. */ + while (len > 0 && **p == 0) { + ++(*p); + --len; + } + + /* Reject integers that don't fit in an int. This code assumes that + * the int type has no padding bit. */ + if (len > sizeof(int)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + } + if (len == sizeof(int) && (**p & 0x80) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + } + + *val = 0; + while (len-- > 0) { + *val = (*val << 8) | **p; + (*p)++; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_int(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val) +{ + return asn1_get_tagged_int(p, end, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER, val); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_enum(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *val) +{ + return asn1_get_tagged_int(p, end, MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED, val); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +int mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(X, *p, len); + + *p += len; + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_bitstring *bs) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Certificate type is a single byte bitstring */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &bs->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Check length, subtract one for actual bit string length */ + if (bs->len < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; + } + bs->len -= 1; + + /* Get number of unused bits, ensure unused bits <= 7 */ + bs->unused_bits = **p; + if (bs->unused_bits > 7) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + } + (*p)++; + + /* Get actual bitstring */ + bs->p = *p; + *p += bs->len; + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Traverse an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF " + * and call a callback for each entry found. + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of( + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char tag_must_mask, unsigned char tag_must_val, + unsigned char tag_may_mask, unsigned char tag_may_val, + int (*cb)(void *ctx, int tag, + unsigned char *start, size_t len), + void *ctx) +{ + int ret; + size_t len; + + /* Get main sequence tag */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (*p + len != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + while (*p < end) { + unsigned char const tag = *(*p)++; + + if ((tag & tag_must_mask) != tag_must_val) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, &len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((tag & tag_may_mask) == tag_may_val) { + if (cb != NULL) { + ret = cb(ctx, tag, *p, len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + } + + *p += len; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Get a bit string without unused bits + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + size_t *len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (*len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + --(*len); + + if (**p != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + ++(*p); + + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(mbedtls_asn1_sequence *seq) +{ + while (seq != NULL) { + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next = seq->next; + mbedtls_free(seq); + seq = next; + } +} + +typedef struct { + int tag; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur; +} asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t; + +static int asn1_get_sequence_of_cb(void *ctx, + int tag, + unsigned char *start, + size_t len) +{ + asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t *cb_ctx = + (asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t *) ctx; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = + cb_ctx->cur; + + if (cur->buf.p != NULL) { + cur->next = + mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_sequence)); + + if (cur->next == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + + cur->buf.p = start; + cur->buf.len = len; + cur->buf.tag = tag; + + cb_ctx->cur = cur; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parses and splits an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF " + */ +int mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur, + int tag) +{ + asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t cb_ctx = { tag, cur }; + memset(cur, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_sequence)); + return mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of( + p, end, 0xFF, tag, 0, 0, + asn1_get_sequence_of_cb, &cb_ctx); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((end - *p) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; + } + + alg->tag = **p; + end = *p + len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &alg->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + alg->p = *p; + *p += alg->len; + + if (*p == end) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(params, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf)); + return 0; + } + + params->tag = **p; + (*p)++; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, ¶ms->len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + params->p = *p; + *p += params->len; + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_asn1_buf params; + + memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf)); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(p, end, alg, ¶ms)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((params.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL && params.tag != 0) || params.len != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur) +{ + if (cur == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_free(cur->oid.p); + mbedtls_free(cur->val.p); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cur, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_named_data)); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur; + + while ((cur = *head) != NULL) { + *head = cur->next; + mbedtls_free(cur->oid.p); + mbedtls_free(cur->val.p); + mbedtls_free(cur); + } +} + +void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *name) +{ + for (mbedtls_asn1_named_data *next; name != NULL; name = next) { + next = name->next; + mbedtls_free(name); + } +} + +const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, + const char *oid, size_t len) +{ + while (list != NULL) { + if (list->oid.len == len && + memcmp(list->oid.p, oid, len) == 0) { + break; + } + + list = list->next; + } + + return list; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/library/asn1write.c b/library/asn1write.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..775a9ef530f --- /dev/null +++ b/library/asn1write.c @@ -0,0 +1,437 @@ +/* + * ASN.1 buffer writing functionality + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) + +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#endif + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_len(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, size_t len) +{ +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFF + if (len > 0xFFFFFFFF) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + } +#endif + + int required = 1; + + if (len >= 0x80) { + for (size_t l = len; l != 0; l >>= 8) { + required++; + } + } + + if (required > (*p - start)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + do { + *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len); + len >>= 8; + } while (len); + + if (required > 1) { + *--(*p) = (unsigned char) (0x80 + required - 1); + } + + return required; +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, unsigned char tag) +{ + if (*p - start < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + *--(*p) = tag; + + return 1; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) +static int mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *start, + size_t len, + unsigned char tag) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, tag)); + + return (int) len; +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t size) +{ + size_t len = 0; + + if (*p < start || (size_t) (*p - start) < size) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + len = size; + (*p) -= len; + memcpy(*p, buf, len); + + return (int) len; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + // Write the MPI + // + len = mbedtls_mpi_size(X); + + /* DER represents 0 with a sign bit (0=nonnegative) and 7 value bits, not + * as 0 digits. We need to end up with 020100, not with 0200. */ + if (len == 0) { + len = 1; + } + + if (*p < start || (size_t) (*p - start) < len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + (*p) -= len; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(X, *p, len)); + + // DER format assumes 2s complement for numbers, so the leftmost bit + // should be 0 for positive numbers and 1 for negative numbers. + // + if (X->s == 1 && **p & 0x80) { + if (*p - start < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + *--(*p) = 0x00; + len += 1; + } + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start) +{ + // Write NULL + // + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, 0, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(p, start, + (const unsigned char *) oid, oid_len)); + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + size_t par_len) +{ + return mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(p, start, oid, oid_len, par_len, 1); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + size_t par_len, int has_par) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + if (has_par) { + if (par_len == 0) { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_null(p, start)); + } else { + len += par_len; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(p, start, oid, oid_len)); + + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int boolean) +{ + size_t len = 0; + + if (*p - start < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + *--(*p) = (boolean) ? 255 : 0; + len++; + + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN); +} + +static int asn1_write_tagged_int(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val, int tag) +{ + size_t len = 0; + + do { + if (*p - start < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + len += 1; + *--(*p) = val & 0xff; + val >>= 8; + } while (val > 0); + + if (**p & 0x80) { + if (*p - start < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + *--(*p) = 0x00; + len += 1; + } + + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, tag); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_int(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val) +{ + return asn1_write_tagged_int(p, start, val, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val) +{ + return asn1_write_tagged_int(p, start, val, MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int tag, + const char *text, size_t text_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(p, start, + (const unsigned char *) text, + text_len)); + + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, tag); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len) +{ + return mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING, text, text_len); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len) +{ + return mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING, text, + text_len); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + const char *text, size_t text_len) +{ + return mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING, text, text_len); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t bits) +{ + size_t unused_bits, byte_len; + const unsigned char *cur_byte; + unsigned char cur_byte_shifted; + unsigned char bit; + + byte_len = (bits + 7) / 8; + unused_bits = (byte_len * 8) - bits; + + /* + * Named bitstrings require that trailing 0s are excluded in the encoding + * of the bitstring. Trailing 0s are considered part of the 'unused' bits + * when encoding this value in the first content octet + */ + if (bits != 0) { + cur_byte = buf + byte_len - 1; + cur_byte_shifted = *cur_byte >> unused_bits; + + for (;;) { + bit = cur_byte_shifted & 0x1; + cur_byte_shifted >>= 1; + + if (bit != 0) { + break; + } + + bits--; + if (bits == 0) { + break; + } + + if (bits % 8 == 0) { + cur_byte_shifted = *--cur_byte; + } + } + } + + return mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(p, start, buf, bits); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits) +{ + size_t len = 0; + size_t unused_bits, byte_len; + + byte_len = (bits + 7) / 8; + unused_bits = (byte_len * 8) - bits; + + if (*p < start || (size_t) (*p - start) < byte_len + 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + len = byte_len + 1; + + /* Write the bitstring. Ensure the unused bits are zeroed */ + if (byte_len > 0) { + byte_len--; + *--(*p) = buf[byte_len] & ~((0x1 << unused_bits) - 1); + (*p) -= byte_len; + memcpy(*p, buf, byte_len); + } + + /* Write unused bits */ + *--(*p) = (unsigned char) unused_bits; + + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING); +} + +int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t size) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(p, start, buf, size)); + + return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); +} + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +/* This is a copy of the ASN.1 parsing function mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(), + * which is replicated to avoid a dependency ASN1_WRITE_C on ASN1_PARSE_C. */ +static mbedtls_asn1_named_data *asn1_find_named_data( + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list, + const char *oid, size_t len) +{ + while (list != NULL) { + if (list->oid.len == len && + memcmp(list->oid.p, oid, len) == 0) { + break; + } + + list = list->next; + } + + return list; +} +#else +#define asn1_find_named_data(list, oid, len) \ + ((mbedtls_asn1_named_data *) mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(list, oid, len)) +#endif + +mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( + mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + const unsigned char *val, + size_t val_len) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur; + + if ((cur = asn1_find_named_data(*head, oid, oid_len)) == NULL) { + // Add new entry if not present yet based on OID + // + cur = (mbedtls_asn1_named_data *) mbedtls_calloc(1, + sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_named_data)); + if (cur == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + cur->oid.len = oid_len; + cur->oid.p = mbedtls_calloc(1, oid_len); + if (cur->oid.p == NULL) { + mbedtls_free(cur); + return NULL; + } + + memcpy(cur->oid.p, oid, oid_len); + + cur->val.len = val_len; + if (val_len != 0) { + cur->val.p = mbedtls_calloc(1, val_len); + if (cur->val.p == NULL) { + mbedtls_free(cur->oid.p); + mbedtls_free(cur); + return NULL; + } + } + + cur->next = *head; + *head = cur; + } else if (val_len == 0) { + mbedtls_free(cur->val.p); + cur->val.p = NULL; + } else if (cur->val.len != val_len) { + /* + * Enlarge existing value buffer if needed + * Preserve old data until the allocation succeeded, to leave list in + * a consistent state in case allocation fails. + */ + void *p = mbedtls_calloc(1, val_len); + if (p == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + mbedtls_free(cur->val.p); + cur->val.p = p; + cur->val.len = val_len; + } + + if (val != NULL && val_len != 0) { + memcpy(cur->val.p, val, val_len); + } + + return cur; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/library/base64.c b/library/base64.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9677dee5b29 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/base64.c @@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ +/* + * RFC 1521 base64 encoding/decoding + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "base64_internal.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char(unsigned char value) +{ + unsigned char digit = 0; + /* For each range of values, if value is in that range, mask digit with + * the corresponding value. Since value can only be in a single range, + * only at most one masking will change digit. */ + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(0, 25, value, 'A' + value); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(26, 51, value, 'a' + value - 26); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(52, 61, value, '0' + value - 52); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(62, 62, value, '+'); + digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(63, 63, value, '/'); + return digit; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value(unsigned char c) +{ + unsigned char val = 0; + /* For each range of digits, if c is in that range, mask val with + * the corresponding value. Since c can only be in a single range, + * only at most one masking will change val. Set val to one plus + * the desired value so that it stays 0 if c is in none of the ranges. */ + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('A', 'Z', c, c - 'A' + 0 + 1); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('a', 'z', c, c - 'a' + 26 + 1); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('0', '9', c, c - '0' + 52 + 1); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('+', '+', c, c - '+' + 62 + 1); + val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('/', '/', c, c - '/' + 63 + 1); + /* At this point, val is 0 if c is an invalid digit and v+1 if c is + * a digit with the value v. */ + return val - 1; +} + +/* + * Encode a buffer into base64 format + */ +int mbedtls_base64_encode(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *src, size_t slen) +{ + size_t i, n; + int C1, C2, C3; + unsigned char *p; + + if (slen == 0) { + *olen = 0; + return 0; + } + + n = slen / 3 + (slen % 3 != 0); + + if (n > (SIZE_MAX - 1) / 4) { + *olen = SIZE_MAX; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + n *= 4; + + if ((dlen < n + 1) || (NULL == dst)) { + *olen = n + 1; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + n = (slen / 3) * 3; + + for (i = 0, p = dst; i < n; i += 3) { + C1 = *src++; + C2 = *src++; + C3 = *src++; + + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char((C1 >> 2) & 0x3F); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char((((C1 & 3) << 4) + (C2 >> 4)) + & 0x3F); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char((((C2 & 15) << 2) + (C3 >> 6)) + & 0x3F); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char(C3 & 0x3F); + } + + if (i < slen) { + C1 = *src++; + C2 = ((i + 1) < slen) ? *src++ : 0; + + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char((C1 >> 2) & 0x3F); + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char((((C1 & 3) << 4) + (C2 >> 4)) + & 0x3F); + + if ((i + 1) < slen) { + *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char(((C2 & 15) << 2) & 0x3F); + } else { + *p++ = '='; + } + + *p++ = '='; + } + + *olen = (size_t) (p - dst); + *p = 0; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Decode a base64-formatted buffer + */ +int mbedtls_base64_decode(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *src, size_t slen) +{ + size_t i; /* index in source */ + size_t n; /* number of digits or trailing = in source */ + uint32_t x; /* value accumulator */ + unsigned accumulated_digits = 0; + unsigned equals = 0; + int spaces_present = 0; + unsigned char *p; + + /* First pass: check for validity and get output length */ + for (i = n = 0; i < slen; i++) { + /* Skip spaces before checking for EOL */ + spaces_present = 0; + while (i < slen && src[i] == ' ') { + ++i; + spaces_present = 1; + } + + /* Spaces at end of buffer are OK */ + if (i == slen) { + break; + } + + if ((slen - i) >= 2 && + src[i] == '\r' && src[i + 1] == '\n') { + continue; + } + + if (src[i] == '\n') { + continue; + } + + /* Space inside a line is an error */ + if (spaces_present) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER; + } + + if (src[i] > 127) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER; + } + + if (src[i] == '=') { + if (++equals > 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER; + } + } else { + if (equals != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER; + } + if (mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value(src[i]) < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER; + } + } + n++; + } + + if (n == 0) { + *olen = 0; + return 0; + } + + /* The following expression is to calculate the following formula without + * risk of integer overflow in n: + * n = ( ( n * 6 ) + 7 ) >> 3; + */ + n = (6 * (n >> 3)) + ((6 * (n & 0x7) + 7) >> 3); + n -= equals; + + if (dst == NULL || dlen < n) { + *olen = n; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + equals = 0; + for (x = 0, p = dst; i > 0; i--, src++) { + if (*src == '\r' || *src == '\n' || *src == ' ') { + continue; + } + + x = x << 6; + if (*src == '=') { + ++equals; + } else { + x |= mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value(*src); + } + + if (++accumulated_digits == 4) { + accumulated_digits = 0; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(x); + if (equals <= 1) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(x); + } + if (equals <= 0) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x); + } + } + } + + *olen = (size_t) (p - dst); + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +static const unsigned char base64_test_dec[64] = +{ + 0x24, 0x48, 0x6E, 0x56, 0x87, 0x62, 0x5A, 0xBD, + 0xBF, 0x17, 0xD9, 0xA2, 0xC4, 0x17, 0x1A, 0x01, + 0x94, 0xED, 0x8F, 0x1E, 0x11, 0xB3, 0xD7, 0x09, + 0x0C, 0xB6, 0xE9, 0x10, 0x6F, 0x22, 0xEE, 0x13, + 0xCA, 0xB3, 0x07, 0x05, 0x76, 0xC9, 0xFA, 0x31, + 0x6C, 0x08, 0x34, 0xFF, 0x8D, 0xC2, 0x6C, 0x38, + 0x00, 0x43, 0xE9, 0x54, 0x97, 0xAF, 0x50, 0x4B, + 0xD1, 0x41, 0xBA, 0x95, 0x31, 0x5A, 0x0B, 0x97 +}; + +static const unsigned char base64_test_enc[] = + "JEhuVodiWr2/F9mixBcaAZTtjx4Rs9cJDLbpEG8i7hPK" + "swcFdsn6MWwINP+Nwmw4AEPpVJevUEvRQbqVMVoLlw=="; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_base64_self_test(int verbose) +{ + size_t len; + const unsigned char *src; + unsigned char buffer[128]; + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" Base64 encoding test: "); + } + + src = base64_test_dec; + + if (mbedtls_base64_encode(buffer, sizeof(buffer), &len, src, 64) != 0 || + memcmp(base64_test_enc, buffer, 88) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + return 1; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n Base64 decoding test: "); + } + + src = base64_test_enc; + + if (mbedtls_base64_decode(buffer, sizeof(buffer), &len, src, 88) != 0 || + memcmp(base64_test_dec, buffer, 64) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + return 1; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n\n"); + } + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ diff --git a/library/base64_internal.h b/library/base64_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a09bd237771 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/base64_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/** + * \file base64_internal.h + * + * \brief RFC 1521 base64 encoding/decoding: interfaces for invasive testing + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BASE64_INTERNAL +#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_INTERNAL + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + +/** Given a value in the range 0..63, return the corresponding Base64 digit. + * + * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII + * but not EBCDIC). + * + * \param value A value in the range 0..63. + * + * \return A base64 digit converted from \p value. + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char(unsigned char value); + +/** Given a Base64 digit, return its value. + * + * If c is not a Base64 digit ('A'..'Z', 'a'..'z', '0'..'9', '+' or '/'), + * return -1. + * + * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII + * but not EBCDIC). + * + * \param c A base64 digit. + * + * \return The value of the base64 digit \p c. + */ +signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value(unsigned char c); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_INTERNAL */ diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c45fd5bf248 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/bignum.c @@ -0,0 +1,2464 @@ +/* + * Multi-precision integer library + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * The following sources were referenced in the design of this Multi-precision + * Integer library: + * + * [1] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997 + * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone + * + * [2] Multi-Precision Math + * Tom St Denis + * https://github.com/libtom/libtommath/blob/develop/tommath.pdf + * + * [3] GNU Multi-Precision Arithmetic Library + * https://gmplib.org/manual/index.html + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "bn_mul.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + + + +/* + * Conditionally select an MPI sign in constant time. + * (MPI sign is the field s in mbedtls_mpi. It is unsigned short and only 1 and -1 are valid + * values.) + */ +static inline signed short mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t cond, + signed short sign1, signed short sign2) +{ + return (signed short) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(cond, sign1 + 1, sign2 + 1) - 1; +} + +/* + * Compare signed values in constant time + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(const mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned *ret) +{ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t different_sign, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative, result; + + if (X->n != Y->n) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * Set N_is_negative to MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if N >= 0, MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if N < 0. + * We know that N->s == 1 if N >= 0 and N->s == -1 if N < 0. + */ + X_is_negative = mbedtls_ct_bool((X->s & 2) >> 1); + Y_is_negative = mbedtls_ct_bool((Y->s & 2) >> 1); + + /* + * If the signs are different, then the positive operand is the bigger. + * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it + * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0). + */ + different_sign = mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(X_is_negative, Y_is_negative); // true if different sign + result = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(different_sign, X_is_negative); + + /* + * Assuming signs are the same, compare X and Y. We switch the comparison + * order if they are negative so that we get the right result, regardles of + * sign. + */ + + /* This array is used to conditionally swap the pointers in const time */ + void * const p[2] = { X->p, Y->p }; + size_t i = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(X_is_negative, 1); + mbedtls_ct_condition_t lt = mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(p[i], p[i ^ 1], X->n); + + /* + * Store in result iff the signs are the same (i.e., iff different_sign == false). If + * the signs differ, result has already been set, so we don't change it. + */ + result = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(result, + mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_bool_not(different_sign), lt)); + + *ret = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(result, 1); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information + * about whether the assignment was made or not. + * (Leaking information about the respective sizes of X and Y is ok however.) + */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) && \ + (_MSC_FULL_VER < 193131103) +/* + * MSVC miscompiles this function if it's inlined prior to Visual Studio 2022 version 17.1. See: + * https://developercommunity.visualstudio.com/t/c-compiler-miscompiles-part-of-mbedtls-library-on/1646989 + */ +__declspec(noinline) +#endif +int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned char assign) +{ + int ret = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n)); + + { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool(assign); + + X->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(do_assign, Y->s, X->s); + + mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X->p, Y->p, Y->n, do_assign); + + mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_not_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool_not(do_assign); + for (size_t i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++) { + X->p[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(do_not_assign, X->p[i]); + } + } + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information + * about whether the swap was made or not. + * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which would lead to + * different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi *Y, + unsigned char swap) +{ + int ret = 0; + int s; + + if (X == Y) { + return 0; + } + + mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_swap = mbedtls_ct_bool(swap); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(Y, X->n)); + + s = X->s; + X->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(do_swap, Y->s, X->s); + Y->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(do_swap, s, Y->s); + + mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(X->p, Y->p, X->n, do_swap); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */ +#define mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(v, n) mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(v, ciL * (n)) + +/* + * Initialize one MPI + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_init(mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + X->s = 1; + X->n = 0; + X->p = NULL; +} + +/* + * Unallocate one MPI + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_free(mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + if (X == NULL) { + return; + } + + if (X->p != NULL) { + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(X->p, X->n); + } + + X->s = 1; + X->n = 0; + X->p = NULL; +} + +/* + * Enlarge to the specified number of limbs + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_grow(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + + if (nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + if (X->n < nblimbs) { + if ((p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mbedtls_calloc(nblimbs, ciL)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + if (X->p != NULL) { + memcpy(p, X->p, X->n * ciL); + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(X->p, X->n); + } + + /* nblimbs fits in n because we ensure that MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS + * fits, and we've checked that nblimbs <= MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS. */ + X->n = (unsigned short) nblimbs; + X->p = p; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Resize down as much as possible, + * while keeping at least the specified number of limbs + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shrink(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + size_t i; + + if (nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + /* Actually resize up if there are currently fewer than nblimbs limbs. */ + if (X->n <= nblimbs) { + return mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, nblimbs); + } + /* After this point, then X->n > nblimbs and in particular X->n > 0. */ + + for (i = X->n - 1; i > 0; i--) { + if (X->p[i] != 0) { + break; + } + } + i++; + + if (i < nblimbs) { + i = nblimbs; + } + + if ((p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mbedtls_calloc(i, ciL)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + if (X->p != NULL) { + memcpy(p, X->p, i * ciL); + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(X->p, X->n); + } + + /* i fits in n because we ensure that MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS + * fits, and we've checked that i <= nblimbs <= MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS. */ + X->n = (unsigned short) i; + X->p = p; + + return 0; +} + +/* Resize X to have exactly n limbs and set it to 0. */ +static int mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t limbs) +{ + if (limbs == 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_free(X); + return 0; + } else if (X->n == limbs) { + memset(X->p, 0, limbs * ciL); + X->s = 1; + return 0; + } else { + mbedtls_mpi_free(X); + return mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, limbs); + } +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of Y into X. + * + * This function is not constant-time. Leading zeros in Y may be removed. + * + * Ensure that X does not shrink. This is not guaranteed by the public API, + * but some code in the bignum module might still rely on this property. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_copy(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i; + + if (X == Y) { + return 0; + } + + if (Y->n == 0) { + if (X->n != 0) { + X->s = 1; + memset(X->p, 0, X->n * ciL); + } + return 0; + } + + for (i = Y->n - 1; i > 0; i--) { + if (Y->p[i] != 0) { + break; + } + } + i++; + + X->s = Y->s; + + if (X->n < i) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, i)); + } else { + memset(X->p + i, 0, (X->n - i) * ciL); + } + + memcpy(X->p, Y->p, i * ciL); + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Swap the contents of X and Y + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y) +{ + mbedtls_mpi T; + + memcpy(&T, X, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + memcpy(X, Y, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + memcpy(Y, &T, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); +} + +static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sint_abs(mbedtls_mpi_sint z) +{ + if (z >= 0) { + return z; + } + /* Take care to handle the most negative value (-2^(biL-1)) correctly. + * A naive -z would have undefined behavior. + * Write this in a way that makes popular compilers happy (GCC, Clang, + * MSVC). */ + return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0 - (mbedtls_mpi_uint) z; +} + +/* Convert x to a sign, i.e. to 1, if x is positive, or -1, if x is negative. + * This looks awkward but generates smaller code than (x < 0 ? -1 : 1) */ +#define TO_SIGN(x) ((mbedtls_mpi_sint) (((mbedtls_mpi_uint) x) >> (biL - 1)) * -2 + 1) + +/* + * Set value from integer + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_lset(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, 1)); + memset(X->p, 0, X->n * ciL); + + X->p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(z); + X->s = TO_SIGN(z); + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Get a specific bit + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos) +{ + if (X->n * biL <= pos) { + return 0; + } + + return (X->p[pos / biL] >> (pos % biL)) & 0x01; +} + +/* + * Set a bit to a specific value of 0 or 1 + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t off = pos / biL; + size_t idx = pos % biL; + + if (val != 0 && val != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (X->n * biL <= pos) { + if (val == 0) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, off + 1)); + } + + X->p[off] &= ~((mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0x01 << idx); + X->p[off] |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) val << idx; + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Return the number of less significant zero-bits + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_lsb(const mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + size_t i; + +#if defined(__has_builtin) +#if (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == UINT_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_ctz) + #define mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz __builtin_ctz +#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_ctzl) + #define mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz __builtin_ctzl +#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULLONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_ctzll) + #define mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz __builtin_ctzll +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz) + for (i = 0; i < X->n; i++) { + if (X->p[i] != 0) { + return i * biL + mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz(X->p[i]); + } + } +#else + size_t count = 0; + for (i = 0; i < X->n; i++) { + for (size_t j = 0; j < biL; j++, count++) { + if (((X->p[i] >> j) & 1) != 0) { + return count; + } + } + } +#endif + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return the number of bits + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(const mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + return mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(X->p, X->n); +} + +/* + * Return the total size in bytes + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_size(const mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + return (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(X) + 7) >> 3; +} + +/* + * Convert an ASCII character to digit value + */ +static int mpi_get_digit(mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, int radix, char c) +{ + *d = 255; + + if (c >= 0x30 && c <= 0x39) { + *d = c - 0x30; + } + if (c >= 0x41 && c <= 0x46) { + *d = c - 0x37; + } + if (c >= 0x61 && c <= 0x66) { + *d = c - 0x57; + } + + if (*d >= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) radix) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Import from an ASCII string + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_string(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, j, slen, n; + int sign = 1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint d; + mbedtls_mpi T; + + if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + if (s[0] == 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_free(X); + return 0; + } + + if (s[0] == '-') { + ++s; + sign = -1; + } + + slen = strlen(s); + + if (radix == 16) { + if (slen > SIZE_MAX >> 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + n = BITS_TO_LIMBS(slen << 2); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, n)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 0)); + + for (i = slen, j = 0; i > 0; i--, j++) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_get_digit(&d, radix, s[i - 1])); + X->p[j / (2 * ciL)] |= d << ((j % (2 * ciL)) << 2); + } + } else { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 0)); + + for (i = 0; i < slen; i++) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_get_digit(&d, radix, s[i])); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(&T, X, radix)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(X, &T, d)); + } + } + + if (sign < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(X) != 0) { + X->s = -1; + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Helper to write the digits high-order first. + */ +static int mpi_write_hlp(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, + char **p, const size_t buflen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r; + size_t length = 0; + char *p_end = *p + buflen; + + do { + if (length >= buflen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(&r, X, radix)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_int(X, NULL, X, radix)); + /* + * Write the residue in the current position, as an ASCII character. + */ + if (r < 0xA) { + *(--p_end) = (char) ('0' + r); + } else { + *(--p_end) = (char) ('A' + (r - 0xA)); + } + + length++; + } while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, 0) != 0); + + memmove(*p, p_end, length); + *p += length; + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Export into an ASCII string + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_string(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, + char *buf, size_t buflen, size_t *olen) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t n; + char *p; + mbedtls_mpi T; + + if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + n = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(X); /* Number of bits necessary to present `n`. */ + if (radix >= 4) { + n >>= 1; /* Number of 4-adic digits necessary to present + * `n`. If radix > 4, this might be a strict + * overapproximation of the number of + * radix-adic digits needed to present `n`. */ + } + if (radix >= 16) { + n >>= 1; /* Number of hexadecimal digits necessary to + * present `n`. */ + + } + n += 1; /* Terminating null byte */ + n += 1; /* Compensate for the divisions above, which round down `n` + * in case it's not even. */ + n += 1; /* Potential '-'-sign. */ + n += (n & 1); /* Make n even to have enough space for hexadecimal writing, + * which always uses an even number of hex-digits. */ + + if (buflen < n) { + *olen = n; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + p = buf; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + if (X->s == -1) { + *p++ = '-'; + buflen--; + } + + if (radix == 16) { + int c; + size_t i, j, k; + + for (i = X->n, k = 0; i > 0; i--) { + for (j = ciL; j > 0; j--) { + c = (X->p[i - 1] >> ((j - 1) << 3)) & 0xFF; + + if (c == 0 && k == 0 && (i + j) != 2) { + continue; + } + + *(p++) = "0123456789ABCDEF" [c / 16]; + *(p++) = "0123456789ABCDEF" [c % 16]; + k = 1; + } + } + } else { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&T, X)); + + if (T.s == -1) { + T.s = 1; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_write_hlp(&T, radix, &p, buflen)); + } + + *p++ = '\0'; + *olen = (size_t) (p - buf); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Read X from an opened file + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_file(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint d; + size_t slen; + char *p; + /* + * Buffer should have space for (short) label and decimal formatted MPI, + * newline characters and '\0' + */ + char s[MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE]; + + if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memset(s, 0, sizeof(s)); + if (fgets(s, sizeof(s) - 1, fin) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + + slen = strlen(s); + if (slen == sizeof(s) - 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (slen > 0 && s[slen - 1] == '\n') { + slen--; s[slen] = '\0'; + } + if (slen > 0 && s[slen - 1] == '\r') { + slen--; s[slen] = '\0'; + } + + p = s + slen; + while (p-- > s) { + if (mpi_get_digit(&d, radix, *p) != 0) { + break; + } + } + + return mbedtls_mpi_read_string(X, radix, p + 1); +} + +/* + * Write X into an opened file (or stdout if fout == NULL) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_file(const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fout) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n, slen, plen; + /* + * Buffer should have space for (short) label and decimal formatted MPI, + * newline characters and '\0' + */ + char s[MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE]; + + if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memset(s, 0, sizeof(s)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_string(X, radix, s, sizeof(s) - 2, &n)); + + if (p == NULL) { + p = ""; + } + + plen = strlen(p); + slen = strlen(s); + s[slen++] = '\r'; + s[slen++] = '\n'; + + if (fout != NULL) { + if (fwrite(p, 1, plen, fout) != plen || + fwrite(s, 1, slen, fout) != slen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + } else { + mbedtls_printf("%s%s", p, s); + } + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +/* + * Import X from unsigned binary data, little endian + * + * This function is guaranteed to return an MPI with exactly the necessary + * number of limbs (in particular, it does not skip 0s in the input). + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le(mbedtls_mpi *X, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(buflen); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, limbs)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_read_le(X->p, X->n, buf, buflen)); + +cleanup: + + /* + * This function is also used to import keys. However, wiping the buffers + * upon failure is not necessary because failure only can happen before any + * input is copied. + */ + return ret; +} + +/* + * Import X from unsigned binary data, big endian + * + * This function is guaranteed to return an MPI with exactly the necessary + * number of limbs (in particular, it does not skip 0s in the input). + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(buflen); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, limbs)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_read_be(X->p, X->n, buf, buflen)); + +cleanup: + + /* + * This function is also used to import keys. However, wiping the buffers + * upon failure is not necessary because failure only can happen before any + * input is copied. + */ + return ret; +} + +/* + * Export X into unsigned binary data, little endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(const mbedtls_mpi *X, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + return mbedtls_mpi_core_write_le(X->p, X->n, buf, buflen); +} + +/* + * Export X into unsigned binary data, big endian + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(const mbedtls_mpi *X, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + return mbedtls_mpi_core_write_be(X->p, X->n, buf, buflen); +} + +/* + * Left-shift: X <<= count + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + + i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(X) + count; + + if (X->n * biL < i) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, BITS_TO_LIMBS(i))); + } + + ret = 0; + + mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_l(X->p, X->n, count); +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Right-shift: X >>= count + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count) +{ + if (X->n != 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(X->p, X->n, count); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Compare unsigned values + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) +{ + size_t i, j; + + for (i = X->n; i > 0; i--) { + if (X->p[i - 1] != 0) { + break; + } + } + + for (j = Y->n; j > 0; j--) { + if (Y->p[j - 1] != 0) { + break; + } + } + + /* If i == j == 0, i.e. abs(X) == abs(Y), + * we end up returning 0 at the end of the function. */ + + if (i > j) { + return 1; + } + if (j > i) { + return -1; + } + + for (; i > 0; i--) { + if (X->p[i - 1] > Y->p[i - 1]) { + return 1; + } + if (X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1]) { + return -1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Compare signed values + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) +{ + size_t i, j; + + for (i = X->n; i > 0; i--) { + if (X->p[i - 1] != 0) { + break; + } + } + + for (j = Y->n; j > 0; j--) { + if (Y->p[j - 1] != 0) { + break; + } + } + + if (i == 0 && j == 0) { + return 0; + } + + if (i > j) { + return X->s; + } + if (j > i) { + return -Y->s; + } + + if (X->s > 0 && Y->s < 0) { + return 1; + } + if (Y->s > 0 && X->s < 0) { + return -1; + } + + for (; i > 0; i--) { + if (X->p[i - 1] > Y->p[i - 1]) { + return X->s; + } + if (X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1]) { + return -X->s; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Compare signed values + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z) +{ + mbedtls_mpi Y; + mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + + *p = mpi_sint_abs(z); + Y.s = TO_SIGN(z); + Y.n = 1; + Y.p = p; + + return mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(X, &Y); +} + +/* + * Unsigned addition: X = |A| + |B| (HAC 14.7) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t j; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c; + + if (X == B) { + const mbedtls_mpi *T = A; A = X; B = T; + } + + if (X != A) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, A)); + } + + /* + * X must always be positive as a result of unsigned additions. + */ + X->s = 1; + + for (j = B->n; j > 0; j--) { + if (B->p[j - 1] != 0) { + break; + } + } + + /* Exit early to avoid undefined behavior on NULL+0 when X->n == 0 + * and B is 0 (of any size). */ + if (j == 0) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, j)); + + /* j is the number of non-zero limbs of B. Add those to X. */ + + p = X->p; + + c = mbedtls_mpi_core_add(p, p, B->p, j); + + p += j; + + /* Now propagate any carry */ + + while (c != 0) { + if (j >= X->n) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, j + 1)); + p = X->p + j; + } + + *p += c; c = (*p < c); j++; p++; + } + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Unsigned subtraction: X = |A| - |B| (HAC 14.9, 14.10) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + mbedtls_mpi_uint carry; + + for (n = B->n; n > 0; n--) { + if (B->p[n - 1] != 0) { + break; + } + } + if (n > A->n) { + /* B >= (2^ciL)^n > A */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, A->n)); + + /* Set the high limbs of X to match A. Don't touch the lower limbs + * because X might be aliased to B, and we must not overwrite the + * significant digits of B. */ + if (A->n > n && A != X) { + memcpy(X->p + n, A->p + n, (A->n - n) * ciL); + } + if (X->n > A->n) { + memset(X->p + A->n, 0, (X->n - A->n) * ciL); + } + + carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X->p, A->p, B->p, n); + if (carry != 0) { + /* Propagate the carry through the rest of X. */ + carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int(X->p + n, X->p + n, carry, X->n - n); + + /* If we have further carry/borrow, the result is negative. */ + if (carry != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* X should always be positive as a result of unsigned subtractions. */ + X->s = 1; + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* Common function for signed addition and subtraction. + * Calculate A + B * flip_B where flip_B is 1 or -1. + */ +static int add_sub_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B, + int flip_B) +{ + int ret, s; + + s = A->s; + if (A->s * B->s * flip_B < 0) { + int cmp = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs(A, B); + if (cmp >= 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(X, A, B)); + /* If |A| = |B|, the result is 0 and we must set the sign bit + * to +1 regardless of which of A or B was negative. Otherwise, + * since |A| > |B|, the sign is the sign of A. */ + X->s = cmp == 0 ? 1 : s; + } else { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(X, B, A)); + /* Since |A| < |B|, the sign is the opposite of A. */ + X->s = -s; + } + } else { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(X, A, B)); + X->s = s; + } + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Signed addition: X = A + B + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B) +{ + return add_sub_mpi(X, A, B, 1); +} + +/* + * Signed subtraction: X = A - B + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B) +{ + return add_sub_mpi(X, A, B, -1); +} + +/* + * Signed addition: X = A + b + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_add_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b) +{ + mbedtls_mpi B; + mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + + p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b); + B.s = TO_SIGN(b); + B.n = 1; + B.p = p; + + return mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(X, A, &B); +} + +/* + * Signed subtraction: X = A - b + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b) +{ + mbedtls_mpi B; + mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + + p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b); + B.s = TO_SIGN(b); + B.n = 1; + B.p = p; + + return mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(X, A, &B); +} + +/* + * Baseline multiplication: X = A * B (HAC 14.12) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, j; + mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; + int result_is_zero = 0; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&TA); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&TB); + + if (X == A) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TA, A)); A = &TA; + } + if (X == B) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TB, B)); B = &TB; + } + + for (i = A->n; i > 0; i--) { + if (A->p[i - 1] != 0) { + break; + } + } + if (i == 0) { + result_is_zero = 1; + } + + for (j = B->n; j > 0; j--) { + if (B->p[j - 1] != 0) { + break; + } + } + if (j == 0) { + result_is_zero = 1; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, i + j)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 0)); + + mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(X->p, A->p, i, B->p, j); + + /* If the result is 0, we don't shortcut the operation, which reduces + * but does not eliminate side channels leaking the zero-ness. We do + * need to take care to set the sign bit properly since the library does + * not fully support an MPI object with a value of 0 and s == -1. */ + if (result_is_zero) { + X->s = 1; + } else { + X->s = A->s * B->s; + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&TB); mbedtls_mpi_free(&TA); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Baseline multiplication: X = A * b + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_uint b) +{ + size_t n = A->n; + while (n > 0 && A->p[n - 1] == 0) { + --n; + } + + /* The general method below doesn't work if b==0. */ + if (b == 0 || n == 0) { + return mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 0); + } + + /* Calculate A*b as A + A*(b-1) to take advantage of mbedtls_mpi_core_mla */ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* In general, A * b requires 1 limb more than b. If + * A->p[n - 1] * b / b == A->p[n - 1], then A * b fits in the same + * number of limbs as A and the call to grow() is not required since + * copy() will take care of the growth if needed. However, experimentally, + * making the call to grow() unconditional causes slightly fewer + * calls to calloc() in ECP code, presumably because it reuses the + * same mpi for a while and this way the mpi is more likely to directly + * grow to its final size. + * + * Note that calculating A*b as 0 + A*b doesn't work as-is because + * A,X can be the same. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, n + 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, A)); + mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(X->p, X->n, A->p, n, b - 1); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Unsigned integer divide - double mbedtls_mpi_uint dividend, u1/u0, and + * mbedtls_mpi_uint divisor, d + */ +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_int_div_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint u1, + mbedtls_mpi_uint u0, + mbedtls_mpi_uint d, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *r) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL) + mbedtls_t_udbl dividend, quotient; +#else + const mbedtls_mpi_uint radix = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << biH; + const mbedtls_mpi_uint uint_halfword_mask = ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << biH) - 1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint d0, d1, q0, q1, rAX, r0, quotient; + mbedtls_mpi_uint u0_msw, u0_lsw; + size_t s; +#endif + + /* + * Check for overflow + */ + if (0 == d || u1 >= d) { + if (r != NULL) { + *r = ~(mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0u; + } + + return ~(mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0u; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL) + dividend = (mbedtls_t_udbl) u1 << biL; + dividend |= (mbedtls_t_udbl) u0; + quotient = dividend / d; + if (quotient > ((mbedtls_t_udbl) 1 << biL) - 1) { + quotient = ((mbedtls_t_udbl) 1 << biL) - 1; + } + + if (r != NULL) { + *r = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (dividend - (quotient * d)); + } + + return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) quotient; +#else + + /* + * Algorithm D, Section 4.3.1 - The Art of Computer Programming + * Vol. 2 - Seminumerical Algorithms, Knuth + */ + + /* + * Normalize the divisor, d, and dividend, u0, u1 + */ + s = mbedtls_mpi_core_clz(d); + d = d << s; + + u1 = u1 << s; + u1 |= (u0 >> (biL - s)) & (-(mbedtls_mpi_sint) s >> (biL - 1)); + u0 = u0 << s; + + d1 = d >> biH; + d0 = d & uint_halfword_mask; + + u0_msw = u0 >> biH; + u0_lsw = u0 & uint_halfword_mask; + + /* + * Find the first quotient and remainder + */ + q1 = u1 / d1; + r0 = u1 - d1 * q1; + + while (q1 >= radix || (q1 * d0 > radix * r0 + u0_msw)) { + q1 -= 1; + r0 += d1; + + if (r0 >= radix) { + break; + } + } + + rAX = (u1 * radix) + (u0_msw - q1 * d); + q0 = rAX / d1; + r0 = rAX - q0 * d1; + + while (q0 >= radix || (q0 * d0 > radix * r0 + u0_lsw)) { + q0 -= 1; + r0 += d1; + + if (r0 >= radix) { + break; + } + } + + if (r != NULL) { + *r = (rAX * radix + u0_lsw - q0 * d) >> s; + } + + quotient = q1 * radix + q0; + + return quotient; +#endif +} + +/* + * Division by mbedtls_mpi: A = Q * B + R (HAC 14.20) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, n, t, k; + mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, T1, T2; + mbedtls_mpi_uint TP2[3]; + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(B, 0) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); mbedtls_mpi_init(&Y); mbedtls_mpi_init(&Z); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T1); + /* + * Avoid dynamic memory allocations for constant-size T2. + * + * T2 is used for comparison only and the 3 limbs are assigned explicitly, + * so nobody increase the size of the MPI and we're safe to use an on-stack + * buffer. + */ + T2.s = 1; + T2.n = sizeof(TP2) / sizeof(*TP2); + T2.p = TP2; + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs(A, B) < 0) { + if (Q != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(Q, 0)); + } + if (R != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(R, A)); + } + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&X, A)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&Y, B)); + X.s = Y.s = 1; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&Z, A->n + 2)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&Z, 0)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&T1, A->n + 2)); + + k = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&Y) % biL; + if (k < biL - 1) { + k = biL - 1 - k; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&X, k)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&Y, k)); + } else { + k = 0; + } + + n = X.n - 1; + t = Y.n - 1; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&Y, biL * (n - t))); + + while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&X, &Y) >= 0) { + Z.p[n - t]++; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&X, &X, &Y)); + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&Y, biL * (n - t))); + + for (i = n; i > t; i--) { + if (X.p[i] >= Y.p[t]) { + Z.p[i - t - 1] = ~(mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0u; + } else { + Z.p[i - t - 1] = mbedtls_int_div_int(X.p[i], X.p[i - 1], + Y.p[t], NULL); + } + + T2.p[0] = (i < 2) ? 0 : X.p[i - 2]; + T2.p[1] = (i < 1) ? 0 : X.p[i - 1]; + T2.p[2] = X.p[i]; + + Z.p[i - t - 1]++; + do { + Z.p[i - t - 1]--; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&T1, 0)); + T1.p[0] = (t < 1) ? 0 : Y.p[t - 1]; + T1.p[1] = Y.p[t]; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(&T1, &T1, Z.p[i - t - 1])); + } while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&T1, &T2) > 0); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(&T1, &Y, Z.p[i - t - 1])); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&T1, biL * (i - t - 1))); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&X, &X, &T1)); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&X, 0) < 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&T1, &Y)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&T1, biL * (i - t - 1))); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&X, &X, &T1)); + Z.p[i - t - 1]--; + } + } + + if (Q != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(Q, &Z)); + Q->s = A->s * B->s; + } + + if (R != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&X, k)); + X.s = A->s; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(R, &X)); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(R, 0) == 0) { + R->s = 1; + } + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); mbedtls_mpi_free(&Y); mbedtls_mpi_free(&Z); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T1); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(TP2, sizeof(TP2)); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Division by int: A = Q * b + R + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_div_int(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_sint b) +{ + mbedtls_mpi B; + mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; + + p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b); + B.s = TO_SIGN(b); + B.n = 1; + B.p = p; + + return mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(Q, R, A, &B); +} + +/* + * Modulo: R = A mod B + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(B, 0) < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(NULL, R, A, B)); + + while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(R, 0) < 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(R, R, B)); + } + + while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(R, B) >= 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(R, R, B)); + } + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Modulo: r = A mod b + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b) +{ + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint x, y, z; + + if (b == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO; + } + + if (b < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; + } + + /* + * handle trivial cases + */ + if (b == 1 || A->n == 0) { + *r = 0; + return 0; + } + + if (b == 2) { + *r = A->p[0] & 1; + return 0; + } + + /* + * general case + */ + for (i = A->n, y = 0; i > 0; i--) { + x = A->p[i - 1]; + y = (y << biH) | (x >> biH); + z = y / b; + y -= z * b; + + x <<= biH; + y = (y << biH) | (x >> biH); + z = y / b; + y -= z * b; + } + + /* + * If A is negative, then the current y represents a negative value. + * Flipping it to the positive side. + */ + if (A->s < 0 && y != 0) { + y = b - y; + } + + *r = y; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N, + mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 0) <= 0 || (N->p[0] & 1) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(E, 0) < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(E) > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(N) > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * Ensure that the exponent that we are passing to the core is not NULL. + */ + if (E->n == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 1); + return ret; + } + + /* + * Allocate working memory for mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod() + */ + size_t T_limbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(N->n, E->n); + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mbedtls_calloc(T_limbs, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + if (T == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_mpi RR; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); + + /* + * If 1st call, pre-compute R^2 mod N + */ + if (prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, N)); + + if (prec_RR != NULL) { + *prec_RR = RR; + } + } else { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(prec_RR, N->n)); + RR = *prec_RR; + } + + /* + * To preserve constness we need to make a copy of A. Using X for this to + * save memory. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, A)); + + /* + * Compensate for negative A (and correct at the end). + */ + X->s = 1; + + /* + * Make sure that X is in a form that is safe for consumption by + * the core functions. + * + * - The core functions will not touch the limbs of X above N->n. The + * result will be correct if those limbs are 0, which the mod call + * ensures. + * - Also, X must have at least as many limbs as N for the calls to the + * core functions. + */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(X, N) >= 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(X, X, N)); + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, N->n)); + + /* + * Convert to and from Montgomery around mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(). + */ + { + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p); + mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, mm, RR.p, T); + mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, E->p, E->n, RR.p, T); + mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, mm, T); + } + + /* + * Correct for negative A. + */ + if (A->s == -1 && (E->p[0] & 1) != 0) { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t is_x_non_zero = mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(X->p, X->n); + X->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(is_x_non_zero, -1, 1); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(X, N, X)); + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(T, T_limbs); + + if (prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL) { + mbedtls_mpi_free(&RR); + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Greatest common divisor: G = gcd(A, B) (HAC 14.54) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_gcd(mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t lz, lzt; + mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&TA); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TB); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TA, A)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TB, B)); + + lz = mbedtls_mpi_lsb(&TA); + lzt = mbedtls_mpi_lsb(&TB); + + /* The loop below gives the correct result when A==0 but not when B==0. + * So have a special case for B==0. Leverage the fact that we just + * calculated the lsb and lsb(B)==0 iff B is odd or 0 to make the test + * slightly more efficient than cmp_int(). */ + if (lzt == 0 && mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&TB, 0) == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(G, A); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (lzt < lz) { + lz = lzt; + } + + TA.s = TB.s = 1; + + /* We mostly follow the procedure described in HAC 14.54, but with some + * minor differences: + * - Sequences of multiplications or divisions by 2 are grouped into a + * single shift operation. + * - The procedure in HAC assumes that 0 < TB <= TA. + * - The condition TB <= TA is not actually necessary for correctness. + * TA and TB have symmetric roles except for the loop termination + * condition, and the shifts at the beginning of the loop body + * remove any significance from the ordering of TA vs TB before + * the shifts. + * - If TA = 0, the loop goes through 0 iterations and the result is + * correctly TB. + * - The case TB = 0 was short-circuited above. + * + * For the correctness proof below, decompose the original values of + * A and B as + * A = sa * 2^a * A' with A'=0 or A' odd, and sa = +-1 + * B = sb * 2^b * B' with B'=0 or B' odd, and sb = +-1 + * Then gcd(A, B) = 2^{min(a,b)} * gcd(A',B'), + * and gcd(A',B') is odd or 0. + * + * At the beginning, we have TA = |A| and TB = |B| so gcd(A,B) = gcd(TA,TB). + * The code maintains the following invariant: + * gcd(A,B) = 2^k * gcd(TA,TB) for some k (I) + */ + + /* Proof that the loop terminates: + * At each iteration, either the right-shift by 1 is made on a nonzero + * value and the nonnegative integer bitlen(TA) + bitlen(TB) decreases + * by at least 1, or the right-shift by 1 is made on zero and then + * TA becomes 0 which ends the loop (TB cannot be 0 if it is right-shifted + * since in that case TB is calculated from TB-TA with the condition TB>TA). + */ + while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&TA, 0) != 0) { + /* Divisions by 2 preserve the invariant (I). */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&TA, mbedtls_mpi_lsb(&TA))); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&TB, mbedtls_mpi_lsb(&TB))); + + /* Set either TA or TB to |TA-TB|/2. Since TA and TB are both odd, + * TA-TB is even so the division by 2 has an integer result. + * Invariant (I) is preserved since any odd divisor of both TA and TB + * also divides |TA-TB|/2, and any odd divisor of both TA and |TA-TB|/2 + * also divides TB, and any odd divisor of both TB and |TA-TB|/2 also + * divides TA. + */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&TA, &TB) >= 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(&TA, &TA, &TB)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&TA, 1)); + } else { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(&TB, &TB, &TA)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&TB, 1)); + } + /* Note that one of TA or TB is still odd. */ + } + + /* By invariant (I), gcd(A,B) = 2^k * gcd(TA,TB) for some k. + * At the loop exit, TA = 0, so gcd(TA,TB) = TB. + * - If there was at least one loop iteration, then one of TA or TB is odd, + * and TA = 0, so TB is odd and gcd(TA,TB) = gcd(A',B'). In this case, + * lz = min(a,b) so gcd(A,B) = 2^lz * TB. + * - If there was no loop iteration, then A was 0, and gcd(A,B) = B. + * In this case, lz = 0 and B = TB so gcd(A,B) = B = 2^lz * TB as well. + */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&TB, lz)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(G, &TB)); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&TA); mbedtls_mpi_free(&TB); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Fill X with size bytes of random. + * The bytes returned from the RNG are used in a specific order which + * is suitable for deterministic ECDSA (see the specification of + * mbedtls_mpi_random() and the implementation in mbedtls_mpi_fill_random()). + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(size); + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, limbs)); + if (size == 0) { + return 0; + } + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_fill_random(X->p, X->n, size, f_rng, p_rng); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_random(mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi_sint min, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + if (min < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, min) <= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the same number of limbs + * as the upper bound, even if the upper bound has leading zeros. + * This is necessary for mbedtls_mpi_core_random. */ + int ret = mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, N->n); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return mbedtls_mpi_core_random(X->p, min, N->p, X->n, f_rng, p_rng); +} + +/* + * Modular inverse: X = A^-1 mod N (HAC 14.61 / 14.64) + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi G, TA, TU, U1, U2, TB, TV, V1, V2; + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 1) <= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&TA); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TU); mbedtls_mpi_init(&U1); mbedtls_mpi_init(&U2); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&G); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TB); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TV); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&V1); mbedtls_mpi_init(&V2); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&G, A, N)); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&G, 1) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&TA, A, N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TU, &TA)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TB, N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TV, N)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&U1, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&U2, 0)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&V1, 0)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&V2, 1)); + + do { + while ((TU.p[0] & 1) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&TU, 1)); + + if ((U1.p[0] & 1) != 0 || (U2.p[0] & 1) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&U1, &U1, &TB)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&U2, &U2, &TA)); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&U1, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&U2, 1)); + } + + while ((TV.p[0] & 1) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&TV, 1)); + + if ((V1.p[0] & 1) != 0 || (V2.p[0] & 1) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&V1, &V1, &TB)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&V2, &V2, &TA)); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&V1, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&V2, 1)); + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&TU, &TV) >= 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&TU, &TU, &TV)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&U1, &U1, &V1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&U2, &U2, &V2)); + } else { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&TV, &TV, &TU)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&V1, &V1, &U1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&V2, &V2, &U2)); + } + } while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&TU, 0) != 0); + + while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&V1, 0) < 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&V1, &V1, N)); + } + + while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&V1, N) >= 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&V1, &V1, N)); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, &V1)); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&TA); mbedtls_mpi_free(&TU); mbedtls_mpi_free(&U1); mbedtls_mpi_free(&U2); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&G); mbedtls_mpi_free(&TB); mbedtls_mpi_free(&TV); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&V1); mbedtls_mpi_free(&V2); + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + +/* Gaps between primes, starting at 3. https://oeis.org/A001223 */ +static const unsigned char small_prime_gaps[] = { + 2, 2, 4, 2, 4, 2, 4, 6, + 2, 6, 4, 2, 4, 6, 6, 2, + 6, 4, 2, 6, 4, 6, 8, 4, + 2, 4, 2, 4, 14, 4, 6, 2, + 10, 2, 6, 6, 4, 6, 6, 2, + 10, 2, 4, 2, 12, 12, 4, 2, + 4, 6, 2, 10, 6, 6, 6, 2, + 6, 4, 2, 10, 14, 4, 2, 4, + 14, 6, 10, 2, 4, 6, 8, 6, + 6, 4, 6, 8, 4, 8, 10, 2, + 10, 2, 6, 4, 6, 8, 4, 2, + 4, 12, 8, 4, 8, 4, 6, 12, + 2, 18, 6, 10, 6, 6, 2, 6, + 10, 6, 6, 2, 6, 6, 4, 2, + 12, 10, 2, 4, 6, 6, 2, 12, + 4, 6, 8, 10, 8, 10, 8, 6, + 6, 4, 8, 6, 4, 8, 4, 14, + 10, 12, 2, 10, 2, 4, 2, 10, + 14, 4, 2, 4, 14, 4, 2, 4, + 20, 4, 8, 10, 8, 4, 6, 6, + 14, 4, 6, 6, 8, 6, /*reaches 997*/ + 0 /* the last entry is effectively unused */ +}; + +/* + * Small divisors test (X must be positive) + * + * Return values: + * 0: no small factor (possible prime, more tests needed) + * 1: certain prime + * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: certain non-prime + * other negative: error + */ +static int mpi_check_small_factors(const mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r; + unsigned p = 3; /* The first odd prime */ + + if ((X->p[0] & 1) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + } + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(small_prime_gaps); p += small_prime_gaps[i], i++) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(&r, X, p)); + if (r == 0) { + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, p) == 0) { + return 1; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + } + } + } + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Miller-Rabin pseudo-primality test (HAC 4.24) + */ +static int mpi_miller_rabin(const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t rounds, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret, count; + size_t i, j, k, s; + mbedtls_mpi W, R, T, A, RR; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&W); mbedtls_mpi_init(&R); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); mbedtls_mpi_init(&A); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); + + /* + * W = |X| - 1 + * R = W >> lsb( W ) + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&W, X, 1)); + s = mbedtls_mpi_lsb(&W); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&R, &W)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&R, s)); + + for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) { + /* + * pick a random A, 1 < A < |X| - 1 + */ + count = 0; + do { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&A, X->n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng)); + + j = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&A); + k = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&W); + if (j > k) { + A.p[A.n - 1] &= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << (k - (A.n - 1) * biL - 1)) - 1; + } + + if (count++ > 30) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + + } while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&A, &W) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&A, 1) <= 0); + + /* + * A = A^R mod |X| + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&A, &A, &R, X, &RR)); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&A, &W) == 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&A, 1) == 0) { + continue; + } + + j = 1; + while (j < s && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&A, &W) != 0) { + /* + * A = A * A mod |X| + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &A, &A)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&A, &T, X)); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&A, 1) == 0) { + break; + } + + j++; + } + + /* + * not prime if A != |X| - 1 or A == 1 + */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&A, &W) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&A, 1) == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + break; + } + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&W); mbedtls_mpi_free(&R); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); mbedtls_mpi_free(&A); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&RR); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Pseudo-primality test: small factors, then Miller-Rabin + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi XX; + + XX.s = 1; + XX.n = X->n; + XX.p = X->p; + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&XX, 0) == 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&XX, 1) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&XX, 2) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + if ((ret = mpi_check_small_factors(&XX)) != 0) { + if (ret == 1) { + return 0; + } + + return ret; + } + + return mpi_miller_rabin(&XX, rounds, f_rng, p_rng); +} + +/* + * Prime number generation + * + * To generate an RSA key in a way recommended by FIPS 186-4, both primes must + * be either 1024 bits or 1536 bits long, and flags must contain + * MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ +#ifdef MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 +// ceil(2^63.5) +#define CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2 0xb504f333f9de6485ULL +#else +// ceil(2^31.5) +#define CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2 0xb504f334U +#endif + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + size_t k, n; + int rounds; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r; + mbedtls_mpi Y; + + if (nbits < 3 || nbits > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&Y); + + n = BITS_TO_LIMBS(nbits); + + if ((flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR) == 0) { + /* + * 2^-80 error probability, number of rounds chosen per HAC, table 4.4 + */ + rounds = ((nbits >= 1300) ? 2 : (nbits >= 850) ? 3 : + (nbits >= 650) ? 4 : (nbits >= 350) ? 8 : + (nbits >= 250) ? 12 : (nbits >= 150) ? 18 : 27); + } else { + /* + * 2^-100 error probability, number of rounds computed based on HAC, + * fact 4.48 + */ + rounds = ((nbits >= 1450) ? 4 : (nbits >= 1150) ? 5 : + (nbits >= 1000) ? 6 : (nbits >= 850) ? 7 : + (nbits >= 750) ? 8 : (nbits >= 500) ? 13 : + (nbits >= 250) ? 28 : (nbits >= 150) ? 40 : 51); + } + + while (1) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(X, n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng)); + /* make sure generated number is at least (nbits-1)+0.5 bits (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.3 steps 4.4, 5.5) */ + if (X->p[n-1] < CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2) { + continue; + } + + k = n * biL; + if (k > nbits) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(X, k - nbits)); + } + X->p[0] |= 1; + + if ((flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH) == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng); + + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) { + goto cleanup; + } + } else { + /* + * A necessary condition for Y and X = 2Y + 1 to be prime + * is X = 2 mod 3 (which is equivalent to Y = 2 mod 3). + * Make sure it is satisfied, while keeping X = 3 mod 4 + */ + + X->p[0] |= 2; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(&r, X, 3)); + if (r == 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(X, X, 8)); + } else if (r == 1) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(X, X, 4)); + } + + /* Set Y = (X-1) / 2, which is X / 2 because X is odd */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&Y, X)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&Y, 1)); + + while (1) { + /* + * First, check small factors for X and Y + * before doing Miller-Rabin on any of them + */ + if ((ret = mpi_check_small_factors(X)) == 0 && + (ret = mpi_check_small_factors(&Y)) == 0 && + (ret = mpi_miller_rabin(X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng)) + == 0 && + (ret = mpi_miller_rabin(&Y, rounds, f_rng, p_rng)) + == 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Next candidates. We want to preserve Y = (X-1) / 2 and + * Y = 1 mod 2 and Y = 2 mod 3 (eq X = 3 mod 4 and X = 2 mod 3) + * so up Y by 6 and X by 12. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(X, X, 12)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&Y, &Y, 6)); + } + } + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&Y); + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#define GCD_PAIR_COUNT 3 + +static const int gcd_pairs[GCD_PAIR_COUNT][3] = +{ + { 693, 609, 21 }, + { 1764, 868, 28 }, + { 768454923, 542167814, 1 } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int ret, i; + mbedtls_mpi A, E, N, X, Y, U, V; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&A); mbedtls_mpi_init(&E); mbedtls_mpi_init(&N); mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&Y); mbedtls_mpi_init(&U); mbedtls_mpi_init(&V); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&A, 16, + "EFE021C2645FD1DC586E69184AF4A31E" \ + "D5F53E93B5F123FA41680867BA110131" \ + "944FE7952E2517337780CB0DB80E61AA" \ + "E7C8DDC6C5C6AADEB34EB38A2F40D5E6")); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&E, 16, + "B2E7EFD37075B9F03FF989C7C5051C20" \ + "34D2A323810251127E7BF8625A4F49A5" \ + "F3E27F4DA8BD59C47D6DAABA4C8127BD" \ + "5B5C25763222FEFCCFC38B832366C29E")); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&N, 16, + "0066A198186C18C10B2F5ED9B522752A" \ + "9830B69916E535C8F047518A889A43A5" \ + "94B6BED27A168D31D4A52F88925AA8F5")); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&X, &A, &N)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&U, 16, + "602AB7ECA597A3D6B56FF9829A5E8B85" \ + "9E857EA95A03512E2BAE7391688D264A" \ + "A5663B0341DB9CCFD2C4C5F421FEC814" \ + "8001B72E848A38CAE1C65F78E56ABDEF" \ + "E12D3C039B8A02D6BE593F0BBBDA56F1" \ + "ECF677152EF804370C1A305CAF3B5BF1" \ + "30879B56C61DE584A0F53A2447A51E")); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" MPI test #1 (mul_mpi): "); + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&X, &U) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(&X, &Y, &A, &N)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&U, 16, + "256567336059E52CAE22925474705F39A94")); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&V, 16, + "6613F26162223DF488E9CD48CC132C7A" \ + "0AC93C701B001B092E4E5B9F73BCD27B" \ + "9EE50D0657C77F374E903CDFA4C642")); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" MPI test #2 (div_mpi): "); + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&X, &U) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&Y, &V) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&X, &A, &E, &N, NULL)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&U, 16, + "36E139AEA55215609D2816998ED020BB" \ + "BD96C37890F65171D948E9BC7CBAA4D9" \ + "325D24D6A3C12710F10A09FA08AB87")); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" MPI test #3 (exp_mod): "); + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&X, &U) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&X, &A, &N)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&U, 16, + "003A0AAEDD7E784FC07D8F9EC6E3BFD5" \ + "C3DBA76456363A10869622EAC2DD84EC" \ + "C5B8A74DAC4D09E03B5E0BE779F2DF61")); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" MPI test #4 (inv_mod): "); + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&X, &U) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" MPI test #5 (simple gcd): "); + } + + for (i = 0; i < GCD_PAIR_COUNT; i++) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&X, gcd_pairs[i][0])); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&Y, gcd_pairs[i][1])); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&A, &X, &Y)); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&A, gcd_pairs[i][2]) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed at %d\n", i); + } + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + +cleanup: + + if (ret != 0 && verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", (unsigned int) ret); + } + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&A); mbedtls_mpi_free(&E); mbedtls_mpi_free(&N); mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&Y); mbedtls_mpi_free(&U); mbedtls_mpi_free(&V); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ diff --git a/library/bignum_core.c b/library/bignum_core.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1a3e0b9b6f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/bignum_core.c @@ -0,0 +1,895 @@ +/* + * Core bignum functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "bn_mul.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_clz(mbedtls_mpi_uint a) +{ +#if defined(__has_builtin) +#if (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == UINT_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_clz) + #define core_clz __builtin_clz +#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_clzl) + #define core_clz __builtin_clzl +#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULLONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_clzll) + #define core_clz __builtin_clzll +#endif +#endif +#if defined(core_clz) + return (size_t) core_clz(a); +#else + size_t j; + mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << (biL - 1); + + for (j = 0; j < biL; j++) { + if (a & mask) { + break; + } + + mask >>= 1; + } + + return j; +#endif +} + +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs) +{ + int i; + size_t j; + + for (i = ((int) A_limbs) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + if (A[i] != 0) { + j = biL - mbedtls_mpi_core_clz(A[i]); + return (i * biL) + j; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_bigendian_to_host(mbedtls_mpi_uint a) +{ + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) { + /* Nothing to do on bigendian systems. */ + return a; + } else { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) + return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(a); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) MBEDTLS_BSWAP64(a); +#endif + } +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host(mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_left; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_right; + if (A_limbs == 0) { + return; + } + + /* + * Traverse limbs and + * - adapt byte-order in each limb + * - swap the limbs themselves. + * For that, simultaneously traverse the limbs from left to right + * and from right to left, as long as the left index is not bigger + * than the right index (it's not a problem if limbs is odd and the + * indices coincide in the last iteration). + */ + for (cur_limb_left = A, cur_limb_right = A + (A_limbs - 1); + cur_limb_left <= cur_limb_right; + cur_limb_left++, cur_limb_right--) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp; + /* Note that if cur_limb_left == cur_limb_right, + * this code effectively swaps the bytes only once. */ + tmp = mpi_bigendian_to_host(*cur_limb_left); + *cur_limb_left = mpi_bigendian_to_host(*cur_limb_right); + *cur_limb_right = tmp; + } +} + +/* Whether min <= A, in constant time. + * A_limbs must be at least 1. */ +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_uint_le_mpi(mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs) +{ + /* min <= least significant limb? */ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t min_le_lsl = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(A[0], min); + + /* limbs other than the least significant one are all zero? */ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t msll_mask = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE; + for (size_t i = 1; i < A_limbs; i++) { + msll_mask = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(msll_mask, mbedtls_ct_bool(A[i])); + } + + /* min <= A iff the lowest limb of A is >= min or the other limbs + * are not all zero. */ + return mbedtls_ct_bool_or(msll_mask, min_le_lsl); +} + +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs) +{ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t ret = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE, cond = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE, done = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE; + + for (size_t i = limbs; i > 0; i--) { + /* + * If B[i - 1] < A[i - 1] then A < B is false and the result must + * remain 0. + * + * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and + * the fact that we are done and continue looping. + */ + cond = mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(B[i - 1], A[i - 1]); + done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(done, cond); + + /* + * If A[i - 1] < B[i - 1] then A < B is true. + * + * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and + * the fact that we are done and continue looping. + */ + cond = mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(A[i - 1], B[i - 1]); + ret = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(ret, mbedtls_ct_bool_and(cond, mbedtls_ct_bool_not(done))); + done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(done, cond); + } + + /* + * If all the limbs were equal, then the numbers are equal, A < B is false + * and leaving the result 0 is correct. + */ + + return ret; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t assign) +{ + if (X == A) { + return; + } + + /* This function is very performance-sensitive for RSA. For this reason + * we have the loop below, instead of calling mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if + * (this is more optimal since here we don't have to handle the case where + * we copy awkwardly sized data). + */ + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + X[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(assign, A[i], X[i]); + } +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y, + size_t limbs, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t swap) +{ + if (X == Y) { + return; + } + + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp = X[i]; + X[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(swap, Y[i], X[i]); + Y[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(swap, tmp, Y[i]); + } +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_read_le(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(input_length); + + if (X_limbs < limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (X != NULL) { + memset(X, 0, X_limbs * ciL); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < input_length; i++) { + size_t offset = ((i % ciL) << 3); + X[i / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) input[i]) << offset; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_read_be(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(input_length); + + if (X_limbs < limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* If X_limbs is 0, input_length must also be 0 (from previous test). + * Nothing to do. */ + if (X_limbs == 0) { + return 0; + } + + memset(X, 0, X_limbs * ciL); + + /* memcpy() with (NULL, 0) is undefined behaviour */ + if (input_length != 0) { + size_t overhead = (X_limbs * ciL) - input_length; + unsigned char *Xp = (unsigned char *) X; + memcpy(Xp + overhead, input, input_length); + } + + mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host(X, X_limbs); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_write_le(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + size_t stored_bytes = A_limbs * ciL; + size_t bytes_to_copy; + + if (stored_bytes < output_length) { + bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; + } else { + bytes_to_copy = output_length; + + /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of A. + * However A may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ + for (size_t i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++) { + if (GET_BYTE(A, i) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + } + } + + for (size_t i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++) { + output[i] = GET_BYTE(A, i); + } + + if (stored_bytes < output_length) { + /* Write trailing 0 bytes */ + memset(output + stored_bytes, 0, output_length - stored_bytes); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_write_be(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + size_t stored_bytes; + size_t bytes_to_copy; + unsigned char *p; + + stored_bytes = X_limbs * ciL; + + if (stored_bytes < output_length) { + /* There is enough space in the output buffer. Write initial + * null bytes and record the position at which to start + * writing the significant bytes. In this case, the execution + * trace of this function does not depend on the value of the + * number. */ + bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes; + p = output + output_length - stored_bytes; + memset(output, 0, output_length - stored_bytes); + } else { + /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X. + * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */ + bytes_to_copy = output_length; + p = output; + for (size_t i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++) { + if (GET_BYTE(X, i) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + } + } + + for (size_t i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++) { + p[bytes_to_copy - i - 1] = GET_BYTE(X, i); + } + + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t limbs, + size_t count) +{ + size_t i, v0, v1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; + + v0 = count / biL; + v1 = count & (biL - 1); + + if (v0 > limbs || (v0 == limbs && v1 > 0)) { + memset(X, 0, limbs * ciL); + return; + } + + /* + * shift by count / limb_size + */ + if (v0 > 0) { + for (i = 0; i < limbs - v0; i++) { + X[i] = X[i + v0]; + } + + for (; i < limbs; i++) { + X[i] = 0; + } + } + + /* + * shift by count % limb_size + */ + if (v1 > 0) { + for (i = limbs; i > 0; i--) { + r1 = X[i - 1] << (biL - v1); + X[i - 1] >>= v1; + X[i - 1] |= r0; + r0 = r1; + } + } +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t limbs, + size_t count) +{ + size_t i, v0, v1; + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1; + + v0 = count / (biL); + v1 = count & (biL - 1); + + /* + * shift by count / limb_size + */ + if (v0 > 0) { + for (i = limbs; i > v0; i--) { + X[i - 1] = X[i - v0 - 1]; + } + + for (; i > 0; i--) { + X[i - 1] = 0; + } + } + + /* + * shift by count % limb_size + */ + if (v1 > 0) { + for (i = v0; i < limbs; i++) { + r1 = X[i] >> (biL - v1); + X[i] <<= v1; + X[i] |= r0; + r0 = r1; + } + } +} + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_add(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint t = c + A[i]; + c = (t < A[i]); + t += B[i]; + c += (t < B[i]); + X[i] = t; + } + + return c; +} + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs, + unsigned cond) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + + mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_add = mbedtls_ct_bool(cond); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint add = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(do_add, A[i]); + mbedtls_mpi_uint t = c + X[i]; + c = (t < X[i]); + t += add; + c += (t < add); + X[i] = t; + } + + return c; +} + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint z = (A[i] < c); + mbedtls_mpi_uint t = A[i] - c; + c = (t < B[i]) + z; + X[i] = t - B[i]; + } + + return c; +} + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, size_t d_len, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, size_t s_len, + mbedtls_mpi_uint b) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; /* carry */ + /* + * It is a documented precondition of this function that d_len >= s_len. + * If that's not the case, we swap these round: this turns what would be + * a buffer overflow into an incorrect result. + */ + if (d_len < s_len) { + s_len = d_len; + } + size_t excess_len = d_len - s_len; + size_t steps_x8 = s_len / 8; + size_t steps_x1 = s_len & 7; + + while (steps_x8--) { + MULADDC_X8_INIT + MULADDC_X8_CORE + MULADDC_X8_STOP + } + + while (steps_x1--) { + MULADDC_X1_INIT + MULADDC_X1_CORE + MULADDC_X1_STOP + } + + while (excess_len--) { + *d += c; + c = (*d < c); + d++; + } + + return c; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, size_t B_limbs) +{ + memset(X, 0, (A_limbs + B_limbs) * ciL); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < B_limbs; i++) { + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(X + i, A_limbs + 1, A, A_limbs, B[i]); + } +} + +/* + * Fast Montgomery initialization (thanks to Tom St Denis). + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint x = N[0]; + + x += ((N[0] + 2) & 4) << 1; + + for (unsigned int i = biL; i >= 8; i /= 2) { + x *= (2 - (N[0] * x)); + } + + return ~x + 1; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t B_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + memset(T, 0, (2 * AN_limbs + 1) * ciL); + + for (size_t i = 0; i < AN_limbs; i++) { + /* T = (T + u0*B + u1*N) / 2^biL */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint u0 = A[i]; + mbedtls_mpi_uint u1 = (T[0] + u0 * B[0]) * mm; + + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(T, AN_limbs + 2, B, B_limbs, u0); + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(T, AN_limbs + 2, N, AN_limbs, u1); + + T++; + } + + /* + * The result we want is (T >= N) ? T - N : T. + * + * For better constant-time properties in this function, we always do the + * subtraction, with the result in X. + * + * We also look to see if there was any carry in the final additions in the + * loop above. + */ + + mbedtls_mpi_uint carry = T[AN_limbs]; + mbedtls_mpi_uint borrow = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, T, N, AN_limbs); + + /* + * Using R as the Montgomery radix (auxiliary modulus) i.e. 2^(biL*AN_limbs): + * + * T can be in one of 3 ranges: + * + * 1) T < N : (carry, borrow) = (0, 1): we want T + * 2) N <= T < R : (carry, borrow) = (0, 0): we want X + * 3) T >= R : (carry, borrow) = (1, 1): we want X + * + * and (carry, borrow) = (1, 0) can't happen. + * + * So the correct return value is already in X if (carry ^ borrow) = 0, + * but is in (the lower AN_limbs limbs of) T if (carry ^ borrow) = 1. + */ + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_bool(carry ^ borrow), + (unsigned char *) X, + (unsigned char *) T, + NULL, + AN_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(X, N->n * 2 * biL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(X, X, N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shrink(X, N->n)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +void mbedtls_mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *table, + size_t limbs, + size_t count, + size_t index) +{ + for (size_t i = 0; i < count; i++, table += limbs) { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t assign = mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(i, index); + mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(dest, table, limbs, assign); + } +} + +/* Fill X with n_bytes random bytes. + * X must already have room for those bytes. + * The ordering of the bytes returned from the RNG is suitable for + * deterministic ECDSA (see RFC 6979 §3.3 and the specification of + * mbedtls_mpi_core_random()). + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_fill_random( + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs, + size_t n_bytes, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(n_bytes); + const size_t overhead = (limbs * ciL) - n_bytes; + + if (X_limbs < limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memset(X, 0, overhead); + memset((unsigned char *) X + limbs * ciL, 0, (X_limbs - limbs) * ciL); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(f_rng(p_rng, (unsigned char *) X + overhead, n_bytes)); + mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host(X, limbs); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_core_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t limbs, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t ge_lower = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, lt_upper = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE; + size_t n_bits = mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(N, limbs); + size_t n_bytes = (n_bits + 7) / 8; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * When min == 0, each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing + * (the msb has a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will + * be < N), so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30). + * + * When N is just below a power of 2, as is the case when generating + * a random scalar on most elliptic curves, 1 try is enough with + * overwhelming probability. When N is just above a power of 2, + * as when generating a random scalar on secp224k1, each try has + * a probability of failing that is almost 1/2. + * + * The probabilities are almost the same if min is nonzero but negligible + * compared to N. This is always the case when N is crypto-sized, but + * it's convenient to support small N for testing purposes. When N + * is small, use a higher repeat count, otherwise the probability of + * failure is macroscopic. + */ + int count = (n_bytes > 4 ? 30 : 250); + + /* + * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when f_rng is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG: + * - use the same byte ordering; + * - keep the leftmost n_bits bits of the generated octet string; + * - try until result is in the desired range. + * This also avoids any bias, which is especially important for ECDSA. + */ + do { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_fill_random(X, limbs, + n_bytes, + f_rng, p_rng)); + mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(X, limbs, 8 * n_bytes - n_bits); + + if (--count == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + + ge_lower = mbedtls_mpi_core_uint_le_mpi(min, X, limbs); + lt_upper = mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(X, N, limbs); + } while (mbedtls_ct_bool_and(ge_lower, lt_upper) == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +static size_t exp_mod_get_window_size(size_t Ebits) +{ +#if MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE >= 6 + return (Ebits > 671) ? 6 : (Ebits > 239) ? 5 : (Ebits > 79) ? 4 : 1; +#elif MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE == 5 + return (Ebits > 239) ? 5 : (Ebits > 79) ? 4 : 1; +#elif MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE > 1 + return (Ebits > 79) ? MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE : 1; +#else + (void) Ebits; + return 1; +#endif +} + +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs, size_t E_limbs) +{ + const size_t wsize = exp_mod_get_window_size(E_limbs * biL); + const size_t welem = ((size_t) 1) << wsize; + + /* How big does each part of the working memory pool need to be? */ + const size_t table_limbs = welem * AN_limbs; + const size_t select_limbs = AN_limbs; + const size_t temp_limbs = 2 * AN_limbs + 1; + + return table_limbs + select_limbs + temp_limbs; +} + +static void exp_mod_precompute_window(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR, + size_t welem, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wtable, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *temp) +{ + /* W[0] = 1 (in Montgomery presentation) */ + memset(Wtable, 0, AN_limbs * ciL); + Wtable[0] = 1; + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(Wtable, Wtable, RR, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, temp); + + /* W[1] = A (already in Montgomery presentation) */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *W1 = Wtable + AN_limbs; + memcpy(W1, A, AN_limbs * ciL); + + /* W[i+1] = W[i] * W[1], i >= 2 */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wprev = W1; + for (size_t i = 2; i < welem; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wcur = Wprev + AN_limbs; + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(Wcur, Wprev, W1, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, temp); + Wprev = Wcur; + } +} + +/* Exponentiation: X := A^E mod N. + * + * A must already be in Montgomery form. + * + * As in other bignum functions, assume that AN_limbs and E_limbs are nonzero. + * + * RR must contain 2^{2*biL} mod N. + * + * The algorithm is a variant of Left-to-right k-ary exponentiation: HAC 14.82 + * (The difference is that the body in our loop processes a single bit instead + * of a full window.) + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E, + size_t E_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + const size_t wsize = exp_mod_get_window_size(E_limbs * biL); + const size_t welem = ((size_t) 1) << wsize; + + /* This is how we will use the temporary storage T, which must have space + * for table_limbs, select_limbs and (2 * AN_limbs + 1) for montmul. */ + const size_t table_limbs = welem * AN_limbs; + const size_t select_limbs = AN_limbs; + + /* Pointers to specific parts of the temporary working memory pool */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *const Wtable = T; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *const Wselect = Wtable + table_limbs; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *const temp = Wselect + select_limbs; + + /* + * Window precomputation + */ + + const mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N); + + /* Set Wtable[i] = A^(2^i) (in Montgomery representation) */ + exp_mod_precompute_window(A, N, AN_limbs, + mm, RR, + welem, Wtable, temp); + + /* + * Fixed window exponentiation + */ + + /* X = 1 (in Montgomery presentation) initially */ + memcpy(X, Wtable, AN_limbs * ciL); + + /* We'll process the bits of E from most significant + * (limb_index=E_limbs-1, E_bit_index=biL-1) to least significant + * (limb_index=0, E_bit_index=0). */ + size_t E_limb_index = E_limbs; + size_t E_bit_index = 0; + /* At any given time, window contains window_bits bits from E. + * window_bits can go up to wsize. */ + size_t window_bits = 0; + mbedtls_mpi_uint window = 0; + + do { + /* Square */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, X, X, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, temp); + + /* Move to the next bit of the exponent */ + if (E_bit_index == 0) { + --E_limb_index; + E_bit_index = biL - 1; + } else { + --E_bit_index; + } + /* Insert next exponent bit into window */ + ++window_bits; + window <<= 1; + window |= (E[E_limb_index] >> E_bit_index) & 1; + + /* Clear window if it's full. Also clear the window at the end, + * when we've finished processing the exponent. */ + if (window_bits == wsize || + (E_bit_index == 0 && E_limb_index == 0)) { + /* Select Wtable[window] without leaking window through + * memory access patterns. */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup(Wselect, Wtable, + AN_limbs, welem, window); + /* Multiply X by the selected element. */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, X, Wselect, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, + temp); + window = 0; + window_bits = 0; + } + } while (!(E_bit_index == 0 && E_limb_index == 0)); +} + +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + mbedtls_mpi_uint c, /* doubles as carry */ + size_t limbs) +{ + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_uint s = A[i]; + mbedtls_mpi_uint t = s - c; + c = (t > s); + X[i] = t; + } + + return c; +} + +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs) +{ + volatile const mbedtls_mpi_uint *force_read_A = A; + mbedtls_mpi_uint bits = 0; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) { + bits |= force_read_A[i]; + } + + return mbedtls_ct_bool(bits); +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *rr, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, A, rr, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, T); +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rinv = 1; /* 1/R in Mont. rep => 1 */ + + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, A, &Rinv, 1, N, AN_limbs, mm, T); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ diff --git a/library/bignum_core.h b/library/bignum_core.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..92c8d47db56 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/bignum_core.h @@ -0,0 +1,763 @@ +/** + * Core bignum functions + * + * This interface should only be used by the legacy bignum module (bignum.h) + * and the modular bignum modules (bignum_mod.c, bignum_mod_raw.c). All other + * modules should use the high-level modular bignum interface (bignum_mod.h) + * or the legacy bignum interface (bignum.h). + * + * This module is about processing non-negative integers with a fixed upper + * bound that's of the form 2^n-1 where n is a multiple of #biL. + * These can be thought of integers written in base 2^#biL with a fixed + * number of digits. Digits in this base are called *limbs*. + * Many operations treat these numbers as the principal representation of + * a number modulo 2^n or a smaller bound. + * + * The functions in this module obey the following conventions unless + * explicitly indicated otherwise: + * + * - **Overflow**: some functions indicate overflow from the range + * [0, 2^n-1] by returning carry parameters, while others operate + * modulo and so cannot overflow. This should be clear from the function + * documentation. + * - **Bignum parameters**: Bignums are passed as pointers to an array of + * limbs. A limb has the type #mbedtls_mpi_uint. Unless otherwise specified: + * - Bignum parameters called \p A, \p B, ... are inputs, and are + * not modified by the function. + * - For operations modulo some number, the modulus is called \p N + * and is input-only. + * - Bignum parameters called \p X, \p Y are outputs or input-output. + * The initial content of output-only parameters is ignored. + * - Some functions use different names that reflect traditional + * naming of operands of certain operations (e.g. + * divisor/dividend/quotient/remainder). + * - \p T is a temporary storage area. The initial content of such + * parameter is ignored and the final content is unspecified. + * - **Bignum sizes**: bignum sizes are always expressed in limbs. + * Most functions work on bignums of a given size and take a single + * \p limbs parameter that applies to all parameters that are limb arrays. + * All bignum sizes must be at least 1 and must be significantly less than + * #SIZE_MAX. The behavior if a size is 0 is undefined. The behavior if the + * total size of all parameters overflows #SIZE_MAX is undefined. + * - **Parameter ordering**: for bignum parameters, outputs come before inputs. + * Temporaries come last. + * - **Aliasing**: in general, output bignums may be aliased to one or more + * inputs. As an exception, parameters that are documented as a modulus value + * may not be aliased to an output. Outputs may not be aliased to one another. + * Temporaries may not be aliased to any other parameter. + * - **Overlap**: apart from aliasing of limb array pointers (where two + * arguments are equal pointers), overlap is not supported and may result + * in undefined behavior. + * - **Error handling**: This is a low-level module. Functions generally do not + * try to protect against invalid arguments such as nonsensical sizes or + * null pointers. Note that some functions that operate on bignums of + * different sizes have constraints about their size, and violating those + * constraints may lead to buffer overflows. + * - **Modular representatives**: functions that operate modulo \p N expect + * all modular inputs to be in the range [0, \p N - 1] and guarantee outputs + * in the range [0, \p N - 1]. If an input is out of range, outputs are + * fully unspecified, though bignum values out of range should not cause + * buffer overflows (beware that this is not extensively tested). + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_H +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /** chars in limb */ +#define biL (ciL << 3) /** bits in limb */ +#define biH (ciL << 2) /** half limb size */ + +/* + * Convert between bits/chars and number of limbs + * Divide first in order to avoid potential overflows + */ +#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(i) ((i) / biL + ((i) % biL != 0)) +#define CHARS_TO_LIMBS(i) ((i) / ciL + ((i) % ciL != 0)) +/* Get a specific byte, without range checks. */ +#define GET_BYTE(X, i) \ + (((X)[(i) / ciL] >> (((i) % ciL) * 8)) & 0xff) + +/** Count leading zero bits in a given integer. + * + * \warning The result is undefined if \p a == 0 + * + * \param a Integer to count leading zero bits. + * + * \return The number of leading zero bits in \p a, if \p a != 0. + * If \p a == 0, the result is undefined. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_clz(mbedtls_mpi_uint a); + +/** Return the minimum number of bits required to represent the value held + * in the MPI. + * + * \note This function returns 0 if all the limbs of \p A are 0. + * + * \param[in] A The address of the MPI. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * + * \return The number of bits in \p A. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs); + +/** Convert a big-endian byte array aligned to the size of mbedtls_mpi_uint + * into the storage form used by mbedtls_mpi. + * + * \param[in,out] A The address of the MPI. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host(mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs); + +/** \brief Compare a machine integer with an MPI. + * + * This function operates in constant time with respect + * to the values of \p min and \p A. + * + * \param min A machine integer. + * \param[in] A An MPI. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * This must be at least 1. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p min is less than or equal to \p A, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_uint_le_mpi(mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs); + +/** + * \brief Check if one unsigned MPI is less than another in constant + * time. + * + * \param A The left-hand MPI. This must point to an array of limbs + * with the same allocated length as \p B. + * \param B The right-hand MPI. This must point to an array of limbs + * with the same allocated length as \p A. + * \param limbs The number of limbs in \p A and \p B. + * This must not be 0. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p A is less than \p B. + * MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if \p A is greater than or equal to \p B. + */ +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs); + +/** + * \brief Perform a safe conditional copy of an MPI which doesn't reveal + * whether assignment was done or not. + * + * \param[out] X The address of the destination MPI. + * This must be initialized. Must have enough limbs to + * store the full value of \p A. + * \param[in] A The address of the source MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * \param assign The condition deciding whether to perform the + * assignment or not. Callers will need to use + * the constant time interface (e.g. `mbedtls_ct_bool()`) + * to construct this argument. + * + * \note This function avoids leaking any information about whether + * the assignment was done or not. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t assign); + +/** + * \brief Perform a safe conditional swap of two MPIs which doesn't reveal + * whether the swap was done or not. + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the first MPI. + * This must be initialized. + * \param[in,out] Y The address of the second MPI. + * This must be initialized. + * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p X and \p Y. + * \param swap The condition deciding whether to perform + * the swap or not. + * + * \note This function avoids leaking any information about whether + * the swap was done or not. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y, + size_t limbs, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t swap); + +/** Import X from unsigned binary data, little-endian. + * + * The MPI needs to have enough limbs to store the full value (including any + * most significant zero bytes in the input). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the MPI. + * \param X_limbs The number of limbs of \p X. + * \param[in] input The input buffer to import from. + * \param input_length The length bytes of \p input. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p X isn't + * large enough to hold the value in \p input. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_read_le(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Import X from unsigned binary data, big-endian. + * + * The MPI needs to have enough limbs to store the full value (including any + * most significant zero bytes in the input). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the MPI. + * May only be #NULL if \p X_limbs is 0 and \p input_length + * is 0. + * \param X_limbs The number of limbs of \p X. + * \param[in] input The input buffer to import from. + * May only be #NULL if \p input_length is 0. + * \param input_length The length in bytes of \p input. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p X isn't + * large enough to hold the value in \p input. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_read_be(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Export A into unsigned binary data, little-endian. + * + * \note If \p output is shorter than \p A the export is still successful if the + * value held in \p A fits in the buffer (that is, if enough of the most + * significant bytes of \p A are 0). + * + * \param[in] A The address of the MPI. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * \param[out] output The output buffer to export to. + * \param output_length The length in bytes of \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p output isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p A. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_write_le(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length); + +/** Export A into unsigned binary data, big-endian. + * + * \note If \p output is shorter than \p A the export is still successful if the + * value held in \p A fits in the buffer (that is, if enough of the most + * significant bytes of \p A are 0). + * + * \param[in] A The address of the MPI. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * \param[out] output The output buffer to export to. + * \param output_length The length in bytes of \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p output isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p A. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_write_be(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t A_limbs, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length); + +/** \brief Shift an MPI in-place right by a number of bits. + * + * Shifting by more bits than there are bit positions + * in \p X is valid and results in setting \p X to 0. + * + * This function's execution time depends on the value + * of \p count (and of course \p limbs). + * + * \param[in,out] X The number to shift. + * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p X. This must be at least 1. + * \param count The number of bits to shift by. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t limbs, + size_t count); + +/** + * \brief Shift an MPI in-place left by a number of bits. + * + * Shifting by more bits than there are bit positions + * in \p X will produce an unspecified result. + * + * This function's execution time depends on the value + * of \p count (and of course \p limbs). + * \param[in,out] X The number to shift. + * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p X. This must be at least 1. + * \param count The number of bits to shift by. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t limbs, + size_t count); + +/** + * \brief Add two fixed-size large unsigned integers, returning the carry. + * + * Calculates `A + B` where `A` and `B` have the same size. + * + * This function operates modulo `2^(biL*limbs)` and returns the carry + * (1 if there was a wraparound, and 0 otherwise). + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the addition. + * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of the left operand. + * \param[in] B Little-endian presentation of the right operand. + * \param limbs Number of limbs of \p X, \p A and \p B. + * + * \return 1 if `A + B >= 2^(biL*limbs)`, 0 otherwise. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_add(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs); + +/** + * \brief Conditional addition of two fixed-size large unsigned integers, + * returning the carry. + * + * Functionally equivalent to + * + * ``` + * if( cond ) + * X += A; + * return carry; + * ``` + * + * This function operates modulo `2^(biL*limbs)`. + * + * \param[in,out] X The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the bignum to accumulate onto. + * \param[in] A The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the bignum to conditionally add + * to \p X. This may be aliased to \p X but may not + * overlap otherwise. + * \param limbs Number of limbs of \p X and \p A. + * \param cond Condition bit dictating whether addition should + * happen or not. This must be \c 0 or \c 1. + * + * \warning If \p cond is neither 0 nor 1, the result of this function + * is unspecified, and the resulting value in \p X might be + * neither its original value nor \p X + \p A. + * + * \return 1 if `X + cond * A >= 2^(biL*limbs)`, 0 otherwise. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs, + unsigned cond); + +/** + * \brief Subtract two fixed-size large unsigned integers, returning the borrow. + * + * Calculate `A - B` where \p A and \p B have the same size. + * This function operates modulo `2^(biL*limbs)` and returns the carry + * (1 if there was a wraparound, i.e. if `A < B`, and 0 otherwise). + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the subtraction. + * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of left operand. + * \param[in] B Little-endian presentation of right operand. + * \param limbs Number of limbs of \p X, \p A and \p B. + * + * \return 1 if `A < B`. + * 0 if `A >= B`. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + size_t limbs); + +/** + * \brief Perform a fixed-size multiply accumulate operation: X += b * A + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A (when \p X_limbs == \p A_limbs), but may not + * otherwise overlap. + * + * This function operates modulo `2^(biL*X_limbs)`. + * + * \param[in,out] X The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the bignum to accumulate onto. + * \param X_limbs The number of limbs of \p X. This must be + * at least \p A_limbs. + * \param[in] A The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the bignum to multiply with. + * This may be aliased to \p X but may not overlap + * otherwise. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A. + * \param b X scalar to multiply with. + * + * \return The carry at the end of the operation. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint b); + +/** + * \brief Perform a known-size multiplication + * + * \p X may not be aliased to any of the inputs for this function. + * \p A may be aliased to \p B. + * + * \param[out] X The pointer to the (little-endian) array to receive + * the product of \p A_limbs and \p B_limbs. + * This must be of length \p A_limbs + \p B_limbs. + * \param[in] A The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the first factor. + * \param A_limbs The number of limbs in \p A. + * \param[in] B The pointer to the (little-endian) array + * representing the second factor. + * \param B_limbs The number of limbs in \p B. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, size_t B_limbs); + +/** + * \brief Calculate initialisation value for fast Montgomery modular + * multiplication + * + * \param[in] N Little-endian presentation of the modulus. This must have + * at least one limb. + * + * \return The initialisation value for fast Montgomery modular multiplication + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N); + +/** + * \brief Montgomery multiplication: X = A * B * R^-1 mod N (HAC 14.36) + * + * \p A and \p B must be in canonical form. That is, < \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p N, or even \p B (if \p AN_limbs == + * \p B_limbs) but may not overlap any parameters otherwise. + * + * \p A and \p B may alias each other, if \p AN_limbs == \p B_limbs. They may + * not alias \p N (since they must be in canonical form, they cannot == \p N). + * + * \param[out] X The destination MPI, as a little-endian array of + * length \p AN_limbs. + * On successful completion, X contains the result of + * the multiplication `A * B * R^-1` mod N where + * `R = 2^(biL*AN_limbs)`. + * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of first operand. + * Must have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * \param[in] B Little-endian presentation of second operand. + * \param[in] B_limbs The number of limbs in \p B. + * Must be <= \p AN_limbs. + * \param[in] N Little-endian presentation of the modulus. + * This must be odd, and have exactly the same number + * of limbs as \p A. + * It may alias \p X, but must not alias or otherwise + * overlap any of the other parameters. + * \param[in] AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p X, \p A and \p N. + * \param mm The Montgomery constant for \p N: -N^-1 mod 2^biL. + * This can be calculated by `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init()`. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of size at least 2*AN_limbs+1 limbs. + * Its initial content is unused and + * its final content is indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the + * other parameters. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, size_t B_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +/** + * \brief Calculate the square of the Montgomery constant. (Needed + * for conversion and operations in Montgomery form.) + * + * \param[out] X A pointer to the result of the calculation of + * the square of the Montgomery constant: + * 2^{2*n*biL} mod N. + * \param[in] N Little-endian presentation of the modulus, which must be odd. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if there is not enough space + * to store the value of Montgomery constant squared. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p N modulus is zero. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p N modulus is negative. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *N); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +/** + * Copy an MPI from a table without leaking the index. + * + * \param dest The destination buffer. This must point to a writable + * buffer of at least \p limbs limbs. + * \param table The address of the table. This must point to a readable + * array of \p count elements of \p limbs limbs each. + * \param limbs The number of limbs in each table entry. + * \param count The number of entries in \p table. + * \param index The (secret) table index to look up. This must be in the + * range `0 .. count-1`. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *table, + size_t limbs, + size_t count, + size_t index); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +/** + * \brief Fill an integer with a number of random bytes. + * + * \param X The destination MPI. + * \param X_limbs The number of limbs of \p X. + * \param bytes The number of random bytes to generate. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be + * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * enough room for \p bytes bytes. + * \return A negative error code on RNG failure. + * + * \note The bytes obtained from the RNG are interpreted + * as a big-endian representation of an MPI; this can + * be relevant in applications like deterministic ECDSA. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_fill_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs, + size_t bytes, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + +/** Generate a random number uniformly in a range. + * + * This function generates a random number between \p min inclusive and + * \p N exclusive. + * + * The procedure complies with RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when the RNG is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG + * and \p min is \c 1. + * + * \note There are `N - min` possible outputs. The lower bound + * \p min can be reached, but the upper bound \p N cannot. + * + * \param X The destination MPI, with \p limbs limbs. + * It must not be aliased with \p N or otherwise overlap it. + * \param min The minimum value to return. + * \param N The upper bound of the range, exclusive, with \p limbs limbs. + * In other words, this is one plus the maximum value to return. + * \p N must be strictly larger than \p min. + * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p N and \p X. + * This must not be 0. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if the implementation was + * unable to find a suitable value within a limited number + * of attempts. This has a negligible probability if \p N + * is significantly larger than \p min, which is the case + * for all usual cryptographic applications. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_core_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t limbs, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + +/** + * \brief Returns the number of limbs of working memory required for + * a call to `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`. + * + * \note This will always be at least + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(AN_limbs)`, + * i.e. sufficient for a call to `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()`. + * + * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in the input `A` and the modulus `N` + * (they must be the same size) that will be given to + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`. + * \param E_limbs The number of limbs in the exponent `E` that will be given + * to `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`. + * + * \return The number of limbs of working memory required by + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs, size_t E_limbs); + +/** + * \brief Perform a modular exponentiation with secret exponent: + * X = A^E mod N, where \p A is already in Montgomery form. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but not to \p RR or \p E, even if \p E_limbs == + * \p AN_limbs. + * + * \param[out] X The destination MPI, as a little endian array of length + * \p AN_limbs. + * \param[in] A The base MPI, as a little endian array of length \p AN_limbs. + * Must be in Montgomery form. + * \param[in] N The modulus, as a little endian array of length \p AN_limbs. + * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p X, \p A, \p N, \p RR. + * \param[in] E The exponent, as a little endian array of length \p E_limbs. + * \param E_limbs The number of limbs in \p E. + * \param[in] RR The precomputed residue of 2^{2*biL} modulo N, as a little + * endian array of length \p AN_limbs. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of at least the number of limbs returned + * by `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs()`. + * Its initial content is unused and its final content is + * indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the other + * parameters. + * It is up to the caller to zeroize \p T when it is no + * longer needed, and before freeing it if it was dynamically + * allocated. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, size_t AN_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E, size_t E_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +/** + * \brief Subtract unsigned integer from known-size large unsigned integers. + * Return the borrow. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the subtraction. + * \param[in] A The left operand. + * \param b The unsigned scalar to subtract. + * \param limbs Number of limbs of \p X and \p A. + * + * \return 1 if `A < b`. + * 0 if `A >= b`. + */ +mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + mbedtls_mpi_uint b, + size_t limbs); + +/** + * \brief Determine if a given MPI has the value \c 0 in constant time with + * respect to the value (but not with respect to the number of limbs). + * + * \param[in] A The MPI to test. + * \param limbs Number of limbs in \p A. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if `A == 0` + * MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if `A != 0`. + */ +mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs); + +/** + * \brief Returns the number of limbs of working memory required for + * a call to `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()`. + * + * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in the input `A` and the modulus `N` + * (they must be the same size) that will be given to + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()` or one of the other functions + * that specifies this as the amount of working memory needed. + * + * \return The number of limbs of working memory required by + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()` (or other similar function). + */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs) +{ + return 2 * AN_limbs + 1; +} + +/** Convert an MPI into Montgomery form. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but may not otherwise overlap it. + * + * \p X may not alias \p N (it is in canonical form, so must be strictly less + * than \p N). Nor may it alias or overlap \p rr (this is unlikely to be + * required in practice.) + * + * This function is a thin wrapper around `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()` that is + * an alternative to calling `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep()` when we + * don't want to allocate memory. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the conversion. + * Must have the same number of limbs as \p A. + * \param[in] A The MPI to convert into Montgomery form. + * Must have the same number of limbs as the modulus. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus, which gives the size of + * the base `R` = 2^(biL*N->limbs). + * \param[in] AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p X, \p A, \p N and \p rr. + * \param mm The Montgomery constant for \p N: -N^-1 mod 2^biL. + * This can be determined by calling + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init()`. + * \param[in] rr The residue for `2^{2*n*biL} mod N`. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of size at least + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(AN_limbs)` + * limbs. + * Its initial content is unused and + * its final content is indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the + * other parameters. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *rr, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +/** Convert an MPI from Montgomery form. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but may not otherwise overlap it. + * + * \p X may not alias \p N (it is in canonical form, so must be strictly less + * than \p N). + * + * This function is a thin wrapper around `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()` that is + * an alternative to calling `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep()` when we + * don't want to allocate memory. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the conversion. + * Must have the same number of limbs as \p A. + * \param[in] A The MPI to convert from Montgomery form. + * Must have the same number of limbs as the modulus. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus, which gives the size of + * the base `R` = 2^(biL*N->limbs). + * \param[in] AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p X, \p A and \p N. + * \param mm The Montgomery constant for \p N: -N^-1 mod 2^biL. + * This can be determined by calling + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init()`. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of size at least + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(AN_limbs)` + * limbs. + * Its initial content is unused and + * its final content is indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the + * other parameters. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_H */ diff --git a/library/bignum_mod.c b/library/bignum_mod.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..dfd332a7034 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/bignum_mod.c @@ -0,0 +1,394 @@ +/** + * Modular bignum functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "bignum_mod.h" +#include "bignum_mod_raw.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs) +{ + if (p_limbs != N->limbs || !mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(p, N->p, N->limbs)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + r->limbs = N->limbs; + r->p = p; + + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_release(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r) +{ + if (r == NULL) { + return; + } + + r->limbs = 0; + r->p = NULL; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (N == NULL) { + return; + } + + N->p = NULL; + N->limbs = 0; + N->bits = 0; + N->int_rep = MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (N == NULL) { + return; + } + + switch (N->int_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY: + if (N->rep.mont.rr != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free((mbedtls_mpi_uint *) N->rep.mont.rr, + N->limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + N->rep.mont.rr = NULL; + } + N->rep.mont.mm = 0; + break; + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED: + N->rep.ored.modp = NULL; + break; + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID: + break; + } + + N->p = NULL; + N->limbs = 0; + N->bits = 0; + N->int_rep = MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID; +} + +static int set_mont_const_square(const mbedtls_mpi_uint **X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + size_t limbs) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi N; + mbedtls_mpi RR; + *X = NULL; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&N); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); + + if (A == NULL || limbs == 0 || limbs >= (MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS / 2) - 2) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_grow(&N, limbs)) { + goto cleanup; + } + + memcpy(N.p, A, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * limbs); + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, &N); + + if (ret == 0) { + *X = RR.p; + RR.p = NULL; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&N); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&RR); + ret = (ret != 0) ? MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED : 0; + return ret; +} + +static inline void standard_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector int_rep) +{ + N->p = p; + N->limbs = p_limbs; + N->bits = mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(p, p_limbs); + N->int_rep = int_rep; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs) +{ + int ret = 0; + standard_modulus_setup(N, p, p_limbs, MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY); + N->rep.mont.mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p); + ret = set_mont_const_square(&N->rep.mont.rr, N->p, N->limbs); + + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(N); + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_optred_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn modp) +{ + standard_modulus_setup(N, p, p_limbs, MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED); + N->rep.ored.modp = modp; + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mul(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (N->limbs == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (X->limbs != N->limbs || A->limbs != N->limbs || B->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T = mbedtls_calloc(N->limbs * 2 + 1, ciL); + if (T == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_mul(X->p, A->p, B->p, N, T); + + mbedtls_free(T); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (X->limbs != N->limbs || A->limbs != N->limbs || B->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub(X->p, A->p, B->p, N); + + return 0; +} + +static int mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv_mont(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *working_memory) +{ + /* Input already in Montgomery form, so there's little to do */ + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime(X->p, A->p, + N->p, N->limbs, + N->rep.mont.rr, + working_memory); + return 0; +} + +static int mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv_non_mont(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *working_memory) +{ + /* Need to convert input into Montgomery form */ + + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus Nmont; + mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init(&Nmont); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(&Nmont, N->p, N->limbs)); + + /* We'll use X->p to hold the Montgomery form of the input A->p */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(X->p, A->p, Nmont.p, Nmont.limbs, + Nmont.rep.mont.mm, Nmont.rep.mont.rr, + working_memory); + + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime(X->p, X->p, + Nmont.p, Nmont.limbs, + Nmont.rep.mont.rr, + working_memory); + + /* And convert back from Montgomery form */ + + mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(X->p, X->p, Nmont.p, Nmont.limbs, + Nmont.rep.mont.mm, working_memory); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(&Nmont); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (X->limbs != N->limbs || A->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Zero has the same value regardless of Montgomery form or not */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(A->p, A->limbs) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + size_t working_limbs = + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs(N->limbs); + + mbedtls_mpi_uint *working_memory = mbedtls_calloc(working_limbs, + sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + if (working_memory == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch (N->int_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY: + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv_mont(X, A, N, working_memory); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED: + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv_non_mont(X, A, N, working_memory); + break; + default: + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + break; + } + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(working_memory, + working_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_add(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + if (X->limbs != N->limbs || A->limbs != N->limbs || B->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add(X->p, A->p, B->p, N); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_random(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + if (X->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_random(X->p, min, N, f_rng, p_rng); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_read(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + /* Do our best to check if r and m have been set up */ + if (r->limbs == 0 || N->limbs == 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + if (r->limbs != N->limbs) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_read(r->p, N, buf, buflen, ext_rep); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + r->limbs = N->limbs; + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_canonical_to_modulus_rep(r->p, N); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_write(const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep) +{ + /* Do our best to check if r and m have been set up */ + if (r->limbs == 0 || N->limbs == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (r->limbs != N->limbs) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *working_memory = r->p; + size_t working_memory_len = sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * r->limbs; + + if (N->int_rep == MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY) { + + working_memory = mbedtls_calloc(r->limbs, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + + if (working_memory == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + memcpy(working_memory, r->p, working_memory_len); + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep(working_memory, N); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_write(working_memory, N, buf, buflen, ext_rep); + +cleanup: + + if (N->int_rep == MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY && + working_memory != NULL) { + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(working_memory, working_memory_len); + } + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */ diff --git a/library/bignum_mod.h b/library/bignum_mod.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..963d8881ace --- /dev/null +++ b/library/bignum_mod.h @@ -0,0 +1,452 @@ +/** + * Modular bignum functions + * + * This module implements operations on integers modulo some fixed modulus. + * + * The functions in this module obey the following conventions unless + * explicitly indicated otherwise: + * + * - **Modulus parameters**: the modulus is passed as a pointer to a structure + * of type #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus. The structure must be set up with an + * array of limbs storing the bignum value of the modulus. The modulus must + * be odd and is assumed to have no leading zeroes. The modulus is usually + * named \c N and is usually input-only. Functions which take a parameter + * of type \c const #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus* must not modify its value. + * - **Bignum parameters**: Bignums are passed as pointers to an array of + * limbs or to a #mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue structure. A limb has the type + * #mbedtls_mpi_uint. Residues must be initialized before use, and must be + * associated with the modulus \c N. Unless otherwise specified: + * - Bignum parameters called \c A, \c B, ... are inputs and are not + * modified by the function. Functions which take a parameter of + * type \c const #mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue* must not modify its value. + * - Bignum parameters called \c X, \c Y, ... are outputs or input-output. + * The initial bignum value of output-only parameters is ignored, but + * they must be set up and associated with the modulus \c N. Some + * functions (typically constant-flow) require that the limbs in an + * output residue are initialized. + * - Bignum parameters called \c p are inputs used to set up a modulus or + * residue. These must be pointers to an array of limbs. + * - \c T is a temporary storage area. The initial content of such a + * parameter is ignored and the final content is unspecified. + * - Some functions use different names, such as \c r for the residue. + * - **Bignum sizes**: bignum sizes are always expressed in limbs. Both + * #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus and #mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue have a \c limbs + * member storing its size. All bignum parameters must have the same + * number of limbs as the modulus. All bignum sizes must be at least 1 and + * must be significantly less than #SIZE_MAX. The behavior if a size is 0 is + * undefined. + * - **Bignum representation**: the representation of inputs and outputs is + * specified by the \c int_rep field of the modulus. + * - **Parameter ordering**: for bignum parameters, outputs come before inputs. + * The modulus is passed after residues. Temporaries come last. + * - **Aliasing**: in general, output bignums may be aliased to one or more + * inputs. Modulus values may not be aliased to any other parameter. Outputs + * may not be aliased to one another. Temporaries may not be aliased to any + * other parameter. + * - **Overlap**: apart from aliasing of residue pointers (where two residue + * arguments are equal pointers), overlap is not supported and may result + * in undefined behavior. + * - **Error handling**: functions generally check compatibility of input + * sizes. Most functions will not check that input values are in canonical + * form (i.e. that \c A < \c N), this is only checked during setup of a + * residue structure. + * - **Modular representatives**: all functions expect inputs to be in the + * range [0, \c N - 1] and guarantee outputs in the range [0, \c N - 1]. + * Residues are set up with an associated modulus, and operations are only + * guaranteed to work if the modulus is associated with all residue + * parameters. If a residue is passed with a modulus other than the one it + * is associated with, then it may be out of range. If an input is out of + * range, outputs are fully unspecified, though bignum values out of range + * should not cause buffer overflows (beware that this is not extensively + * tested). + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_H +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +/** How residues associated with a modulus are represented. + * + * This also determines which fields of the modulus structure are valid and + * what their contents are (see #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus). + */ +typedef enum { + /** Representation not chosen (makes the modulus structure invalid). */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID = 0, + /* Skip 1 as it is slightly easier to accidentally pass to functions. */ + /** Montgomery representation. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY = 2, + /* Optimised reduction available. This indicates a coordinate modulus (P) + * and one or more of the following have been configured: + * - A nist curve (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECPXXXR1_ENABLED) & MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM. + * - A Kobliz Curve. + * - A Fast Reduction Curve CURVE25519 or CURVE448. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED, +} mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector; + +/* Make mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector and mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep disjoint to + * make it easier to catch when they are accidentally swapped. */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_INVALID = 0, + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE = 8, + MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE +} mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep; + +typedef struct { + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + size_t limbs; +} mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue; + +typedef struct { + mbedtls_mpi_uint const *rr; /* The residue for 2^{2*n*biL} mod N */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint mm; /* Montgomery const for -N^{-1} mod 2^{ciL} */ +} mbedtls_mpi_mont_struct; + +typedef int (*mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn)(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +typedef struct { + mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn modp; /* The optimised reduction function pointer */ +} mbedtls_mpi_opt_red_struct; + +typedef struct { + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; + size_t limbs; // number of limbs + size_t bits; // bitlen of p + mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector int_rep; // selector to signal the active member of the union + union rep { + /* if int_rep == #MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY */ + mbedtls_mpi_mont_struct mont; + /* if int_rep == #MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED */ + mbedtls_mpi_opt_red_struct ored; + } rep; +} mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus; + +/** Setup a residue structure. + * + * The residue will be set up with the buffer \p p and modulus \p N. + * + * The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by the resulting residue structure. + * The value at the pointed-to memory will be the initial value of \p r and must + * hold a value that is less than the modulus. This value will be used as-is + * and interpreted according to the value of the `N->int_rep` field. + * + * The modulus \p N will be the modulus associated with \p r. The residue \p r + * should only be used in operations where the modulus is \p N. + * + * \param[out] r The address of the residue to setup. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p r. + * \param[in] p The address of the limb array containing the value of \p r. + * The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by \p r and must + * not be modified in any way until after + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_release() is called. The data + * pointed to by \p p must be less than the modulus (the value + * pointed to by `N->p`) and already in the representation + * indicated by `N->int_rep`. + * \param p_limbs The number of limbs of \p p. Must be the same as the number + * of limbs in the modulus \p N. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p p_limbs is less than the + * limbs in \p N or if \p p is not less than \p N. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs); + +/** Unbind elements of a residue structure. + * + * This function removes the reference to the limb array that was passed to + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup() to make it safe to free or use again. + * + * This function invalidates \p r and it must not be used until after + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup() is called on it again. + * + * \param[out] r The address of residue to release. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_release(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r); + +/** Initialize a modulus structure. + * + * \param[out] N The address of the modulus structure to initialize. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Setup a modulus structure. + * + * \param[out] N The address of the modulus structure to populate. + * \param[in] p The address of the limb array storing the value of \p N. + * The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by \p N and must + * not be modified in any way until after + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free() is called. + * \param p_limbs The number of limbs of \p p. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs); + +/** Setup an optimised-reduction compatible modulus structure. + * + * \param[out] N The address of the modulus structure to populate. + * \param[in] p The address of the limb array storing the value of \p N. + * The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by \p N and must + * not be modified in any way until after + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free() is called. + * \param p_limbs The number of limbs of \p p. + * \param modp A pointer to the optimised reduction function to use. \p p. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_optred_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, + size_t p_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn modp); + +/** Free elements of a modulus structure. + * + * This function frees any memory allocated by mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(). + * + * \warning This function does not free the limb array passed to + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup() only removes the reference to it, + * making it safe to free or to use it again. + * + * \param[in,out] N The address of the modulus structure to free. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** \brief Multiply two residues, returning the residue modulo the specified + * modulus. + * + * \note Currently handles the case when `N->int_rep` is + * MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY. + * + * The size of the operation is determined by \p N. \p A, \p B and \p X must + * all be associated with the modulus \p N and must all have the same number + * of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. They may not alias \p N (since they must be in canonical + * form, they cannot == \p N). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the result MPI. Must have the same + * number of limbs as \p N. + * On successful completion, \p X contains the result of + * the multiplication `A * B * R^-1` mod N where + * `R = 2^(biL * N->limbs)`. + * \param[in] A The address of the first MPI. + * \param[in] B The address of the second MPI. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo + * operation on the result of the multiplication. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if all the parameters do not + * have the same number of limbs or \p N is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mul(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** + * \brief Perform a fixed-size modular subtraction. + * + * Calculate `A - B modulo N`. + * + * \p A, \p B and \p X must all have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. + * + * \note This function does not check that \p A or \p B are in canonical + * form (that is, are < \p N) - that will have been done by + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup(). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the result MPI. Must be initialized. + * Must have the same number of limbs as the modulus \p N. + * \param[in] A The address of the first MPI. + * \param[in] B The address of the second MPI. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo + * operation on the result of the subtraction. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the given MPIs do not + * have the correct number of limbs. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** + * \brief Perform modular inversion of an MPI with respect to a modulus \p N. + * + * \p A and \p X must be associated with the modulus \p N and will therefore + * have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A. + * + * \warning Currently only supports prime moduli, but does not check for them. + * + * \param[out] X The modular inverse of \p A with respect to \p N. + * \param[in] A The number to calculate the modular inverse of. + * Must not be 0. + * \param[in] N The modulus to use. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p A and \p N do not + * have the same number of limbs. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p A is zero. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if couldn't allocate enough + * memory (needed for conversion to and from Mongtomery form + * when not in Montgomery form already, and for temporary use + * by the inversion calculation itself). + */ + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); +/** + * \brief Perform a fixed-size modular addition. + * + * Calculate `A + B modulo N`. + * + * \p A, \p B and \p X must all be associated with the modulus \p N and must + * all have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. + * + * \note This function does not check that \p A or \p B are in canonical + * form (that is, are < \p N) - that will have been done by + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup(). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the result residue. Must be initialized. + * Must have the same number of limbs as the modulus \p N. + * \param[in] A The address of the first input residue. + * \param[in] B The address of the second input residue. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo + * operation on the result of the addition. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the given MPIs do not + * have the correct number of limbs. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_add(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Generate a random number uniformly in a range. + * + * This function generates a random number between \p min inclusive and + * \p N exclusive. + * + * The procedure complies with RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when the RNG is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG + * and \p min is \c 1. + * + * \note There are `N - min` possible outputs. The lower bound + * \p min can be reached, but the upper bound \p N cannot. + * + * \param X The destination residue. + * \param min The minimum value to return. It must be strictly smaller + * than \b N. + * \param N The modulus. + * This is the upper bound of the output range, exclusive. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if the implementation was + * unable to find a suitable value within a limited number + * of attempts. This has a negligible probability if \p N + * is significantly larger than \p min, which is the case + * for all usual cryptographic applications. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_random(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + +/** Read a residue from a byte buffer. + * + * The residue will be automatically converted to the internal representation + * based on the value of the `N->int_rep` field. + * + * The modulus \p N will be the modulus associated with \p r. The residue \p r + * should only be used in operations where the modulus is \p N or a modulus + * equivalent to \p N (in the sense that all their fields or memory pointed by + * their fields hold the same value). + * + * \param[out] r The address of the residue. It must have exactly the same + * number of limbs as the modulus \p N. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. + * \param[in] buf The input buffer to import from. + * \param buflen The length in bytes of \p buf. + * \param ext_rep The endianness of the number in the input buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p r isn't + * large enough to hold the value in \p buf. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p ext_rep + * is invalid or the value in the buffer is not less than \p N. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_read(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep); + +/** Write a residue into a byte buffer. + * + * The modulus \p N must be the modulus associated with \p r (see + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup() and mbedtls_mpi_mod_read()). + * + * The residue will be automatically converted from the internal representation + * based on the value of `N->int_rep` field. + * + * \warning If the buffer is smaller than `N->bits`, the number of + * leading zeroes is leaked through timing. If \p r is + * secret, the caller must ensure that \p buflen is at least + * (`N->bits`+7)/8. + * + * \param[in] r The address of the residue. It must have the same number of + * limbs as the modulus \p N. (\p r is an input parameter, but + * its value will be modified during execution and restored + * before the function returns.) + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus associated with \p r. + * \param[out] buf The output buffer to export to. + * \param buflen The length in bytes of \p buf. + * \param ext_rep The endianness in which the number should be written into + * the output buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p r (without leading + * zeroes). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p ext_rep is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if couldn't allocate enough + * memory for conversion. Can occur only for moduli with + * MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_write(const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_H */ diff --git a/library/bignum_mod_raw.c b/library/bignum_mod_raw.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..5343bc650d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/bignum_mod_raw.c @@ -0,0 +1,276 @@ +/* + * Low-level modular bignum functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "bignum_mod_raw.h" +#include "bignum_mod.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include "bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h" + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char assign) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X, A, N->limbs, mbedtls_ct_bool(assign)); +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char swap) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(X, Y, N->limbs, mbedtls_ct_bool(swap)); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_read(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch (ext_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE: + ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_read_le(X, N->limbs, + input, input_length); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE: + ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_read_be(X, N->limbs, + input, input_length); + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(X, N->p, N->limbs)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_write(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep) +{ + switch (ext_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE: + return mbedtls_mpi_core_write_le(A, N->limbs, + output, output_length); + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE: + return mbedtls_mpi_core_write_be(A, N->limbs, + output, output_length); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, A, B, N->limbs); + + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) c); +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, X, N->p, N->limbs); + + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) c); +} + + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_mul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + /* Standard (A * B) multiplication stored into pre-allocated T + * buffer of fixed limb size of (2N + 1). + * + * The space may not not fully filled by when + * MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED is used. */ + const size_t T_limbs = BITS_TO_LIMBS(N->bits) * 2; + switch (N->int_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY: + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, A, B, N->limbs, N->p, N->limbs, + N->rep.mont.mm, T); + break; + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED: + mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(T, A, N->limbs, B, N->limbs); + + /* Optimised Reduction */ + (*N->rep.ored.modp)(T, T_limbs); + + /* Convert back to canonical representation */ + mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(T, N); + memcpy(X, T, N->limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + break; + default: + break; + } + +} + +size_t mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs) +{ + /* mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime() needs a temporary for the exponent, + * which will be the same size as the modulus and input (AN_limbs), + * and additional space to pass to mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(). */ + return AN_limbs + + mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(AN_limbs, AN_limbs); +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T) +{ + /* Inversion by power: g^|G| = 1 => g^(-1) = g^(|G|-1), and + * |G| = N - 1, so we want + * g^(|G|-1) = g^(N - 2) + */ + + /* Use the first AN_limbs of T to hold N - 2 */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Nminus2 = T; + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int(Nminus2, N, 2, AN_limbs); + + /* Rest of T is given to exp_mod for its working space */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(X, + A, N, AN_limbs, Nminus2, AN_limbs, + RR, T + AN_limbs); +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint carry, borrow; + carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, A, B, N->limbs); + borrow = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, X, N->p, N->limbs); + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) (carry ^ borrow)); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_canonical_to_modulus_rep( + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + switch (N->int_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY: + return mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep(X, N); + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED: + return 0; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_modulus_to_canonical_rep( + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + switch (N->int_rep) { + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY: + return mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep(X, N); + case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED: + return 0; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_random(X, min, N->p, N->limbs, f_rng, p_rng); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + return mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_canonical_to_modulus_rep(X, N); +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T; + const size_t t_limbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(N->limbs); + + if ((T = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mbedtls_calloc(t_limbs, ciL)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(X, X, N->p, N->limbs, + N->rep.mont.mm, N->rep.mont.rr, T); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(T, t_limbs * ciL); + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + const size_t t_limbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(N->limbs); + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T; + + if ((T = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mbedtls_calloc(t_limbs, ciL)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(X, X, N->p, N->limbs, N->rep.mont.mm, T); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(T, t_limbs * ciL); + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_neg(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, N->p, A, N->limbs); + + /* If A=0 initially, then X=N now. Detect this by + * subtracting N and catching the carry. */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint borrow = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, X, N->p, N->limbs); + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) borrow); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */ diff --git a/library/bignum_mod_raw.h b/library/bignum_mod_raw.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7bb4ca3cf52 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/bignum_mod_raw.h @@ -0,0 +1,416 @@ +/** + * Low-level modular bignum functions + * + * This interface should only be used by the higher-level modular bignum + * module (bignum_mod.c) and the ECP module (ecp.c, ecp_curves.c). All other + * modules should use the high-level modular bignum interface (bignum_mod.h) + * or the legacy bignum interface (bignum.h). + * + * This is a low-level interface to operations on integers modulo which + * has no protection against passing invalid arguments such as arrays of + * the wrong size. The functions in bignum_mod.h provide a higher-level + * interface that includes protections against accidental misuse, at the + * expense of code size and sometimes more cumbersome memory management. + * + * The functions in this module obey the following conventions unless + * explicitly indicated otherwise: + * - **Modulus parameters**: the modulus is passed as a pointer to a structure + * of type #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus. The structure must be set up with an + * array of limbs storing the bignum value of the modulus. The modulus must + * be odd and is assumed to have no leading zeroes. The modulus is usually + * named \c N and is usually input-only. + * - **Bignum parameters**: Bignums are passed as pointers to an array of + * limbs. A limb has the type #mbedtls_mpi_uint. Unless otherwise specified: + * - Bignum parameters called \c A, \c B, ... are inputs, and are not + * modified by the function. + * - Bignum parameters called \c X, \c Y are outputs or input-output. + * The initial content of output-only parameters is ignored. + * - \c T is a temporary storage area. The initial content of such a + * parameter is ignored and the final content is unspecified. + * - **Bignum sizes**: bignum sizes are usually expressed by the \c limbs + * member of the modulus argument. All bignum parameters must have the same + * number of limbs as the modulus. All bignum sizes must be at least 1 and + * must be significantly less than #SIZE_MAX. The behavior if a size is 0 is + * undefined. + * - **Bignum representation**: the representation of inputs and outputs is + * specified by the \c int_rep field of the modulus for arithmetic + * functions. Utility functions may allow for different representation. + * - **Parameter ordering**: for bignum parameters, outputs come before inputs. + * The modulus is passed after other bignum input parameters. Temporaries + * come last. + * - **Aliasing**: in general, output bignums may be aliased to one or more + * inputs. Modulus values may not be aliased to any other parameter. Outputs + * may not be aliased to one another. Temporaries may not be aliased to any + * other parameter. + * - **Overlap**: apart from aliasing of limb array pointers (where two + * arguments are equal pointers), overlap is not supported and may result + * in undefined behavior. + * - **Error handling**: This is a low-level module. Functions generally do not + * try to protect against invalid arguments such as nonsensical sizes or + * null pointers. Note that passing bignums with a different size than the + * modulus may lead to buffer overflows. Some functions which allocate + * memory or handle reading/writing of bignums will return an error if + * memory allocation fails or if buffer sizes are invalid. + * - **Modular representatives**: all functions expect inputs to be in the + * range [0, \c N - 1] and guarantee outputs in the range [0, \c N - 1]. If + * an input is out of range, outputs are fully unspecified, though bignum + * values out of range should not cause buffer overflows (beware that this is + * not extensively tested). + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_H +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#include "bignum_mod.h" + +/** + * \brief Perform a safe conditional copy of an MPI which doesn't reveal + * whether the assignment was done or not. + * + * The size to copy is determined by \p N. + * + * \param[out] X The address of the destination MPI. + * This must be initialized. Must have enough limbs to + * store the full value of \p A. + * \param[in] A The address of the source MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p X and \p A. + * \param assign The condition deciding whether to perform the + * assignment or not. Must be either 0 or 1: + * * \c 1: Perform the assignment `X = A`. + * * \c 0: Keep the original value of \p X. + * + * \note This function avoids leaking any information about whether + * the assignment was done or not. + * + * \warning If \p assign is neither 0 nor 1, the result of this function + * is indeterminate, and the resulting value in \p X might be + * neither its original value nor the value in \p A. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char assign); + +/** + * \brief Perform a safe conditional swap of two MPIs which doesn't reveal + * whether the swap was done or not. + * + * The size to swap is determined by \p N. + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the first MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param[in,out] Y The address of the second MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p X and \p Y. + * \param swap The condition deciding whether to perform + * the swap or not. Must be either 0 or 1: + * * \c 1: Swap the values of \p X and \p Y. + * * \c 0: Keep the original values of \p X and \p Y. + * + * \note This function avoids leaking any information about whether + * the swap was done or not. + * + * \warning If \p swap is neither 0 nor 1, the result of this function + * is indeterminate, and both \p X and \p Y might end up with + * values different to either of the original ones. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char swap); + +/** Import X from unsigned binary data. + * + * The MPI needs to have enough limbs to store the full value (including any + * most significant zero bytes in the input). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the MPI. The size is determined by \p N. + * (In particular, it must have at least as many limbs as + * the modulus \p N.) + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p X. + * \param[in] input The input buffer to import from. + * \param input_length The length in bytes of \p input. + * \param ext_rep The endianness of the number in the input buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p X isn't + * large enough to hold the value in \p input. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the external representation + * of \p N is invalid or \p X is not less than \p N. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_read(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t input_length, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep); + +/** Export A into unsigned binary data. + * + * \param[in] A The address of the MPI. The size is determined by \p N. + * (In particular, it must have at least as many limbs as + * the modulus \p N.) + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p A. + * \param[out] output The output buffer to export to. + * \param output_length The length in bytes of \p output. + * \param ext_rep The endianness in which the number should be written into the output buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p output isn't + * large enough to hold the value of \p A. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the external representation + * of \p N is invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_write(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_length, + mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep); + +/** \brief Subtract two MPIs, returning the residue modulo the specified + * modulus. + * + * The size of the operation is determined by \p N. \p A and \p B must have + * the same number of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. + * + * \param[out] X The address of the result MPI. + * This must be initialized. Must have enough limbs to + * store the full value of the result. + * \param[in] A The address of the first MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param[in] B The address of the second MPI. This must be initialized. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo + * operation on the result of the subtraction. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** \brief Multiply two MPIs, returning the residue modulo the specified + * modulus. + * + * \note Currently handles the case when `N->int_rep` is + * MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY. + * + * The size of the operation is determined by \p N. \p A, \p B and \p X must + * all be associated with the modulus \p N and must all have the same number + * of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. They may not alias \p N (since they must be in canonical + * form, they cannot == \p N). + * + * \param[out] X The address of the result MPI. Must have the same + * number of limbs as \p N. + * On successful completion, \p X contains the result of + * the multiplication `A * B * R^-1` mod N where + * `R = 2^(biL * N->limbs)`. + * \param[in] A The address of the first MPI. + * \param[in] B The address of the second MPI. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo + * operation on the result of the multiplication. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of size at least 2 * N->limbs + 1 + * limbs. Its initial content is unused and + * its final content is indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the + * other parameters. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_mul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +/** + * \brief Returns the number of limbs of working memory required for + * a call to `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime()`. + * + * \note This will always be at least + * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(AN_limbs)`, + * i.e. sufficient for a call to `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()`. + * + * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in the input `A` and the modulus `N` + * (they must be the same size) that will be given to + * `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime()`. + * + * \return The number of limbs of working memory required by + * `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime()`. + */ +size_t mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs); + +/** + * \brief Perform fixed-width modular inversion of a Montgomery-form MPI with + * respect to a modulus \p N that must be prime. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but not to \p N or \p RR. + * + * \param[out] X The modular inverse of \p A with respect to \p N. + * Will be in Montgomery form. + * \param[in] A The number to calculate the modular inverse of. + * Must be in Montgomery form. Must not be 0. + * \param[in] N The modulus, as a little-endian array of length \p AN_limbs. + * Must be prime. + * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p A, \p N and \p RR. + * \param[in] RR The precomputed residue of 2^{2*biL} modulo N, as a little- + * endian array of length \p AN_limbs. + * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of at least the number of limbs returned + * by `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs()`. + * Its initial content is unused and its final content is + * indeterminate. + * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the other + * parameters. + * It is up to the caller to zeroize \p T when it is no + * longer needed, and before freeing it if it was dynamically + * allocated. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, + size_t AN_limbs, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *T); + +/** + * \brief Perform a known-size modular addition. + * + * Calculate `A + B modulo N`. + * + * The number of limbs in each operand, and the result, is given by the + * modulus \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap + * either otherwise. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the modular addition. + * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of the left operand. This + * must be smaller than \p N. + * \param[in] B Little-endian presentation of the right operand. This + * must be smaller than \p N. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Convert an MPI from canonical representation (little-endian limb array) + * to the representation associated with the modulus. + * + * \param[in,out] X The limb array to convert. + * It must have as many limbs as \p N. + * It is converted in place. + * If this function returns an error, the content of \p X + * is unspecified. + * \param[in] N The modulus structure. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * Otherwise an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx error code. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_canonical_to_modulus_rep( + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Convert an MPI from the representation associated with the modulus + * to canonical representation (little-endian limb array). + * + * \param[in,out] X The limb array to convert. + * It must have as many limbs as \p N. + * It is converted in place. + * If this function returns an error, the content of \p X + * is unspecified. + * \param[in] N The modulus structure. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * Otherwise an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx error code. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_modulus_to_canonical_rep( + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Generate a random number uniformly in a range. + * + * This function generates a random number between \p min inclusive and + * \p N exclusive. + * + * The procedure complies with RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA) + * when the RNG is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG + * and \p min is \c 1. + * + * \note There are `N - min` possible outputs. The lower bound + * \p min can be reached, but the upper bound \p N cannot. + * + * \param X The destination MPI, in canonical representation modulo \p N. + * It must not be aliased with \p N or otherwise overlap it. + * \param min The minimum value to return. It must be strictly smaller + * than \b N. + * \param N The modulus. + * This is the upper bound of the output range, exclusive. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if the implementation was + * unable to find a suitable value within a limited number + * of attempts. This has a negligible probability if \p N + * is significantly larger than \p min, which is the case + * for all usual cryptographic applications. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + mbedtls_mpi_uint min, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + +/** Convert an MPI into Montgomery form. + * + * \param X The address of the MPI. + * Must have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * \param N The address of the modulus, which gives the size of + * the base `R` = 2^(biL*N->limbs). + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** Convert an MPI back from Montgomery representation. + * + * \param X The address of the MPI. + * Must have the same number of limbs as \p N. + * \param N The address of the modulus, which gives the size of + * the base `R`= 2^(biL*N->limbs). + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +/** \brief Perform fixed width modular negation. + * + * The size of the operation is determined by \p N. \p A must have + * the same number of limbs as \p N. + * + * \p X may be aliased to \p A. + * + * \param[out] X The result of the modular negation. + * This must be initialized. + * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of the input operand. This + * must be less than or equal to \p N. + * \param[in] N The modulus to use. + */ +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_neg(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_H */ diff --git a/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h b/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..94a0d06cf0f --- /dev/null +++ b/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +/** + * \file bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h + * + * \brief Function declarations for invasive functions of Low-level + * modular bignum. + */ +/** + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_INVASIVE_H +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_INVASIVE_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "bignum_mod.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + +/** Convert the result of a quasi-reduction to its canonical representative. + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. Must have the + * same number of limbs as \p N. The input value must + * be in range 0 <= X < 2N. + * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/library/block_cipher.c b/library/block_cipher.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..04cd7fb444a --- /dev/null +++ b/library/block_cipher.c @@ -0,0 +1,203 @@ +/** + * \file block_cipher.c + * + * \brief Lightweight abstraction layer for block ciphers with 128 bit blocks, + * for use by the GCM and CCM modules. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#endif + +#include "block_cipher_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) +static psa_key_type_t psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t cipher_id) +{ + switch (cipher_id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES: + return PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA: + return PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA: + return PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; +#endif + default: + return PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + } +} + +static int mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status) +{ + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, psa_to_cipher_errors, + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */ + +void mbedtls_block_cipher_free(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_destroy_key(ctx->psa_key_id); + return; + } +#endif + switch (ctx->id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES: + mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx->ctx.aes); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA: + mbedtls_aria_free(&ctx->ctx.aria); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA: + mbedtls_camellia_free(&ctx->ctx.camellia); + break; +#endif + default: + break; + } + ctx->id = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE; +} + +int mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id) +{ + ctx->id = (cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES : + (cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA : + (cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA : + MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) + psa_key_type_t psa_key_type = psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(ctx->id); + if (psa_key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE && + psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING)) { + ctx->engine = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA; + return 0; + } + ctx->engine = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_LEGACY; +#endif + + switch (ctx->id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES: + mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->ctx.aes); + return 0; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA: + mbedtls_aria_init(&ctx->ctx.aria); + return 0; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA: + mbedtls_camellia_init(&ctx->ctx.camellia); + return 0; +#endif + default: + ctx->id = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +int mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned key_bitlen) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + + psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(ctx->id)); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attr, key_bitlen); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attr, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + + status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, key, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bitlen), &ctx->psa_key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(status); + } + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */ + + switch (ctx->id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES: + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->ctx.aes, key, key_bitlen); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA: + return mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(&ctx->ctx.aria, key, key_bitlen); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA: + return mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(&ctx->ctx.camellia, key, key_bitlen); +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT; + } +} + +int mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_status_t status; + size_t olen; + + status = psa_cipher_encrypt(ctx->psa_key_id, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING, + input, 16, output, 16, &olen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(status); + } + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */ + + switch (ctx->id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES: + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->ctx.aes, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + input, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA: + return mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(&ctx->ctx.aria, input, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA: + return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(&ctx->ctx.camellia, + MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, + input, output); +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT; + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C */ diff --git a/library/block_cipher_internal.h b/library/block_cipher_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c57338b751e --- /dev/null +++ b/library/block_cipher_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +/** + * \file block_cipher_internal.h + * + * \brief Lightweight abstraction layer for block ciphers with 128 bit blocks, + * for use by the GCM and CCM modules. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#include "mbedtls/block_cipher.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Initialize the context. + * This must be the first API call before using the context. + * + * \param ctx The context to initialize. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_block_cipher_init(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +/** + * \brief Set the block cipher to use with this context. + * This must be called after mbedtls_block_cipher_init(). + * + * \param ctx The context to set up. + * \param cipher_id The identifier of the cipher to use. + * This must be either AES, ARIA or Camellia. + * Warning: this is a ::mbedtls_cipher_id_t, + * not a ::mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t! + * + * \retval \c 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p cipher_id was + * invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id); + +/** + * \brief Set the key into the context. + * + * \param ctx The context to configure. + * \param key The buffer holding the key material. + * \param key_bitlen The size of the key in bits. + * + * \retval \c 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT if the context was not + * properly set up before calling this function. + * \retval One of #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p key_bitlen is + * invalid. + */ +int mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned key_bitlen); + +/** + * \brief Encrypt one block (16 bytes) with the configured key. + * + * \param ctx The context holding the key. + * \param input The buffer holding the input block. Must be 16 bytes. + * \param output The buffer to which the output block will be written. + * Must be writable and 16 bytes long. + * This must either not overlap with \p input, or be equal. + * + * \retval \c 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT if the context was not + * properly set up before calling this function. + * \retval Another negative value if encryption failed. + */ +int mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]); +/** + * \brief Clear the context. + * + * \param ctx The context to clear. + */ +void mbedtls_block_cipher_free(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/library/bn_mul.h b/library/bn_mul.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0738469db4f --- /dev/null +++ b/library/bn_mul.h @@ -0,0 +1,1094 @@ +/** + * \file bn_mul.h + * + * \brief Multi-precision integer library + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * Multiply source vector [s] with b, add result + * to destination vector [d] and set carry c. + * + * Currently supports: + * + * . IA-32 (386+) . AMD64 / EM64T + * . IA-32 (SSE2) . Motorola 68000 + * . PowerPC, 32-bit . MicroBlaze + * . PowerPC, 64-bit . TriCore + * . SPARC v8 . ARM v3+ + * . Alpha . MIPS32 + * . C, longlong . C, generic + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H +#define MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" + + +/* + * Conversion macros for embedded constants: + * build lists of mbedtls_mpi_uint's from lists of unsigned char's grouped by 8, 4 or 2 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(a, b, c, d) \ + ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (a) << 0) | \ + ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (b) << 8) | \ + ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (c) << 16) | \ + ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (d) << 24) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(a, b) \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(a, b, 0, 0) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(a, b, c, d), \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(e, f, g, h) + +#else /* 64-bits */ + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) \ + ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (a) << 0) | \ + ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (b) << 8) | \ + ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (c) << 16) | \ + ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (d) << 24) | \ + ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (e) << 32) | \ + ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (f) << 40) | \ + ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (g) << 48) | \ + ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (h) << 56) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(a, b, c, d) \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(a, b, c, d, 0, 0, 0, 0) + +#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(a, b) \ + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(a, b, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) + +#endif /* bits in mbedtls_mpi_uint */ + +/* *INDENT-OFF* */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) + +/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && \ + ( !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000 ) + +/* + * GCC < 5.0 treated the x86 ebx (which is used for the GOT) as a + * fixed reserved register when building as PIC, leading to errors + * like: bn_mul.h:46:13: error: PIC register clobbered by 'ebx' in 'asm' + * + * This is fixed by an improved register allocator in GCC 5+. From the + * release notes: + * Register allocation improvements: Reuse of the PIC hard register, + * instead of using a fixed register, was implemented on x86/x86-64 + * targets. This improves generated PIC code performance as more hard + * registers can be used. + */ +#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ < 5 && defined(__PIC__) +#define MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_EBX +#endif + +/* + * Disable use of the i386 assembly code below if option -O0, to disable all + * compiler optimisations, is passed, detected with __OPTIMIZE__ + * This is done as the number of registers used in the assembly code doesn't + * work with the -O0 option. + */ +#if defined(__i386__) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && !defined(MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_EBX) + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + { mbedtls_mpi_uint t; \ + asm( \ + "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t" \ + "movl %5, %%esi \n\t" \ + "movl %6, %%edi \n\t" \ + "movl %7, %%ecx \n\t" \ + "movl %8, %%ebx \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + "lodsl \n\t" \ + "mull %%ebx \n\t" \ + "addl %%ecx, %%eax \n\t" \ + "adcl $0, %%edx \n\t" \ + "addl (%%edi), %%eax \n\t" \ + "adcl $0, %%edx \n\t" \ + "movl %%edx, %%ecx \n\t" \ + "stosl \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \ + "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \ + "movl %%edi, %2 \n\t" \ + "movl %%esi, %3 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \ + ); } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) + +#define MULADDC_X8_INIT MULADDC_X1_INIT + +#define MULADDC_X8_CORE \ + "movd %%ecx, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd %%ebx, %%mm0 \n\t" \ + "movd (%%edi), %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd (%%esi), %%mm2 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm2 \n\t" \ + "movd 4(%%esi), %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "movd 8(%%esi), %%mm6 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm6 \n\t" \ + "movd 12(%%esi), %%mm7 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm7 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm2, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 4(%%edi), %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm4, %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "movd 8(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm6, %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "movd 12(%%edi), %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm4, %%mm7 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, (%%edi) \n\t" \ + "movd 16(%%esi), %%mm2 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm2 \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 20(%%esi), %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 24(%%esi), %%mm6 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm6 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 4(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 28(%%esi), %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm5, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 16(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm5, %%mm2 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 8(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm7, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 20(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm5, %%mm4 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 12(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm2, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 24(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm5, %%mm6 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 16(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm4, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd 28(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm5, %%mm3 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 20(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm6, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 24(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, 28(%%edi) \n\t" \ + "addl $32, %%edi \n\t" \ + "addl $32, %%esi \n\t" \ + "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \ + "movd %%mm1, %%ecx \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X8_STOP \ + "emms \n\t" \ + "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \ + "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \ + "movl %%edi, %2 \n\t" \ + "movl %%esi, %3 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \ + ); } \ + +#endif /* SSE2 */ + +#endif /* i386 */ + +#if defined(__amd64__) || defined (__x86_64__) + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + asm( \ + "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n" + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + "movq (%%rsi), %%rax\n" \ + "mulq %%rbx\n" \ + "addq $8, %%rsi\n" \ + "addq %%rcx, %%rax\n" \ + "movq %%r8, %%rcx\n" \ + "adcq $0, %%rdx\n" \ + "nop \n" \ + "addq %%rax, (%%rdi)\n" \ + "adcq %%rdx, %%rcx\n" \ + "addq $8, %%rdi\n" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + : "+c" (c), "+D" (d), "+S" (s), "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d) \ + : "b" (b), "m" (*(const uint64_t (*)[16]) s) \ + : "rax", "rdx", "r8" \ + ); + +#endif /* AMD64 */ + +// The following assembly code assumes that a pointer will fit in a 64-bit register +// (including ILP32 __aarch64__ ABIs such as on watchOS, hence the 2^32 - 1) +#if defined(__aarch64__) && (UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffful || UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffffffffffful) + +/* + * There are some issues around different compilers requiring different constraint + * syntax for updating pointers from assembly code (see notes for + * MBEDTLS_ASM_AARCH64_PTR_CONSTRAINT in common.h), especially on aarch64_32 (aka ILP32). + * + * For this reason we cast the pointers to/from uintptr_t here. + */ +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + do { uintptr_t muladdc_d = (uintptr_t) d, muladdc_s = (uintptr_t) s; asm( + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + "ldr x4, [%x2], #8 \n\t" \ + "ldr x5, [%x1] \n\t" \ + "mul x6, x4, %4 \n\t" \ + "umulh x7, x4, %4 \n\t" \ + "adds x5, x5, x6 \n\t" \ + "adc x7, x7, xzr \n\t" \ + "adds x5, x5, %0 \n\t" \ + "adc %0, x7, xzr \n\t" \ + "str x5, [%x1], #8 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + : "+r" (c), \ + "+r" (muladdc_d), \ + "+r" (muladdc_s), \ + "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d) \ + : "r" (b), "m" (*(const uint64_t (*)[16]) s) \ + : "x4", "x5", "x6", "x7", "cc" \ + ); d = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)muladdc_d; s = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)muladdc_s; } while (0); + +#endif /* Aarch64 */ + +#if defined(__mc68020__) || defined(__mcpu32__) + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + asm( \ + "movl %3, %%a2 \n\t" \ + "movl %4, %%a3 \n\t" \ + "movl %5, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "movl %6, %%d2 \n\t" \ + "moveq #0, %%d0 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "moveq #0, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d4, %%d3 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + "movl %%d3, %0 \n\t" \ + "movl %%a3, %1 \n\t" \ + "movl %%a2, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "d0", "d1", "d2", "d3", "d4", "a2", "a3" \ + ); + +#define MULADDC_X8_INIT MULADDC_X1_INIT + +#define MULADDC_X8_CORE \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \ + "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X8_STOP MULADDC_X1_STOP + +#endif /* MC68000 */ + +#if defined(__powerpc64__) || defined(__ppc64__) + +#if defined(__MACH__) && defined(__APPLE__) + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ld r3, %3 \n\t" \ + "ld r4, %4 \n\t" \ + "ld r5, %5 \n\t" \ + "ld r6, %6 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, -8 \n\t" \ + "addi r4, r4, -8 \n\t" \ + "addic r5, r5, 0 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + "ldu r7, 8(r3) \n\t" \ + "mulld r8, r7, r6 \n\t" \ + "mulhdu r9, r7, r6 \n\t" \ + "adde r8, r8, r5 \n\t" \ + "ld r7, 8(r4) \n\t" \ + "addze r5, r9 \n\t" \ + "addc r8, r8, r7 \n\t" \ + "stdu r8, 8(r4) \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + "addze r5, r5 \n\t" \ + "addi r4, r4, 8 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, 8 \n\t" \ + "std r5, %0 \n\t" \ + "std r4, %1 \n\t" \ + "std r3, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ + ); + + +#else /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ld %%r3, %3 \n\t" \ + "ld %%r4, %4 \n\t" \ + "ld %%r5, %5 \n\t" \ + "ld %%r6, %6 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r3, %%r3, -8 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r4, %%r4, -8 \n\t" \ + "addic %%r5, %%r5, 0 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + "ldu %%r7, 8(%%r3) \n\t" \ + "mulld %%r8, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ + "mulhdu %%r9, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ + "adde %%r8, %%r8, %%r5 \n\t" \ + "ld %%r7, 8(%%r4) \n\t" \ + "addze %%r5, %%r9 \n\t" \ + "addc %%r8, %%r8, %%r7 \n\t" \ + "stdu %%r8, 8(%%r4) \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + "addze %%r5, %%r5 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r4, %%r4, 8 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r3, %%r3, 8 \n\t" \ + "std %%r5, %0 \n\t" \ + "std %%r4, %1 \n\t" \ + "std %%r3, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ + ); + +#endif /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ + +#elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) /* end PPC64/begin PPC32 */ + +#if defined(__MACH__) && defined(__APPLE__) + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + asm( \ + "lwz r3, %3 \n\t" \ + "lwz r4, %4 \n\t" \ + "lwz r5, %5 \n\t" \ + "lwz r6, %6 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, -4 \n\t" \ + "addi r4, r4, -4 \n\t" \ + "addic r5, r5, 0 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + "lwzu r7, 4(r3) \n\t" \ + "mullw r8, r7, r6 \n\t" \ + "mulhwu r9, r7, r6 \n\t" \ + "adde r8, r8, r5 \n\t" \ + "lwz r7, 4(r4) \n\t" \ + "addze r5, r9 \n\t" \ + "addc r8, r8, r7 \n\t" \ + "stwu r8, 4(r4) \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + "addze r5, r5 \n\t" \ + "addi r4, r4, 4 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, 4 \n\t" \ + "stw r5, %0 \n\t" \ + "stw r4, %1 \n\t" \ + "stw r3, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ + ); + +#else /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + asm( \ + "lwz %%r3, %3 \n\t" \ + "lwz %%r4, %4 \n\t" \ + "lwz %%r5, %5 \n\t" \ + "lwz %%r6, %6 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r3, %%r3, -4 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r4, %%r4, -4 \n\t" \ + "addic %%r5, %%r5, 0 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + "lwzu %%r7, 4(%%r3) \n\t" \ + "mullw %%r8, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ + "mulhwu %%r9, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \ + "adde %%r8, %%r8, %%r5 \n\t" \ + "lwz %%r7, 4(%%r4) \n\t" \ + "addze %%r5, %%r9 \n\t" \ + "addc %%r8, %%r8, %%r7 \n\t" \ + "stwu %%r8, 4(%%r4) \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + "addze %%r5, %%r5 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r4, %%r4, 4 \n\t" \ + "addi %%r3, %%r3, 4 \n\t" \ + "stw %%r5, %0 \n\t" \ + "stw %%r4, %1 \n\t" \ + "stw %%r3, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \ + ); + +#endif /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */ + +#endif /* PPC32 */ + +/* + * The Sparc(64) assembly is reported to be broken. + * Disable it for now, until we're able to fix it. + */ +#if 0 && defined(__sparc__) +#if defined(__sparc64__) + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ldx %3, %%o0 \n\t" \ + "ldx %4, %%o1 \n\t" \ + "ld %5, %%o2 \n\t" \ + "ld %6, %%o3 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + "ld [%%o0], %%o4 \n\t" \ + "inc 4, %%o0 \n\t" \ + "ld [%%o1], %%o5 \n\t" \ + "umul %%o3, %%o4, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "addcc %%o4, %%o2, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "rd %%y, %%g1 \n\t" \ + "addx %%g1, 0, %%g1 \n\t" \ + "addcc %%o4, %%o5, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "st %%o4, [%%o1] \n\t" \ + "addx %%g1, 0, %%o2 \n\t" \ + "inc 4, %%o1 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + "st %%o2, %0 \n\t" \ + "stx %%o1, %1 \n\t" \ + "stx %%o0, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "g1", "o0", "o1", "o2", "o3", "o4", \ + "o5" \ + ); + +#else /* __sparc64__ */ + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ld %3, %%o0 \n\t" \ + "ld %4, %%o1 \n\t" \ + "ld %5, %%o2 \n\t" \ + "ld %6, %%o3 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + "ld [%%o0], %%o4 \n\t" \ + "inc 4, %%o0 \n\t" \ + "ld [%%o1], %%o5 \n\t" \ + "umul %%o3, %%o4, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "addcc %%o4, %%o2, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "rd %%y, %%g1 \n\t" \ + "addx %%g1, 0, %%g1 \n\t" \ + "addcc %%o4, %%o5, %%o4 \n\t" \ + "st %%o4, [%%o1] \n\t" \ + "addx %%g1, 0, %%o2 \n\t" \ + "inc 4, %%o1 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + "st %%o2, %0 \n\t" \ + "st %%o1, %1 \n\t" \ + "st %%o0, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "g1", "o0", "o1", "o2", "o3", "o4", \ + "o5" \ + ); + +#endif /* __sparc64__ */ +#endif /* __sparc__ */ + +#if defined(__microblaze__) || defined(microblaze) + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + asm( \ + "lwi r3, %3 \n\t" \ + "lwi r4, %4 \n\t" \ + "lwi r5, %5 \n\t" \ + "lwi r6, %6 \n\t" \ + "andi r7, r6, 0xffff \n\t" \ + "bsrli r6, r6, 16 \n\t" + +#if(__BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__) +#define MULADDC_LHUI \ + "lhui r9, r3, 0 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, 2 \n\t" \ + "lhui r8, r3, 0 \n\t" +#else +#define MULADDC_LHUI \ + "lhui r8, r3, 0 \n\t" \ + "addi r3, r3, 2 \n\t" \ + "lhui r9, r3, 0 \n\t" +#endif + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + MULADDC_LHUI \ + "addi r3, r3, 2 \n\t" \ + "mul r10, r9, r6 \n\t" \ + "mul r11, r8, r7 \n\t" \ + "mul r12, r9, r7 \n\t" \ + "mul r13, r8, r6 \n\t" \ + "bsrli r8, r10, 16 \n\t" \ + "bsrli r9, r11, 16 \n\t" \ + "add r13, r13, r8 \n\t" \ + "add r13, r13, r9 \n\t" \ + "bslli r10, r10, 16 \n\t" \ + "bslli r11, r11, 16 \n\t" \ + "add r12, r12, r10 \n\t" \ + "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \ + "add r12, r12, r11 \n\t" \ + "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \ + "lwi r10, r4, 0 \n\t" \ + "add r12, r12, r10 \n\t" \ + "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \ + "add r12, r12, r5 \n\t" \ + "addc r5, r13, r0 \n\t" \ + "swi r12, r4, 0 \n\t" \ + "addi r4, r4, 4 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + "swi r5, %0 \n\t" \ + "swi r4, %1 \n\t" \ + "swi r3, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", \ + "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13" \ + ); + +#endif /* MicroBlaze */ + +#if defined(__tricore__) + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ld.a %%a2, %3 \n\t" \ + "ld.a %%a3, %4 \n\t" \ + "ld.w %%d4, %5 \n\t" \ + "ld.w %%d1, %6 \n\t" \ + "xor %%d5, %%d5 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + "ld.w %%d0, [%%a2+] \n\t" \ + "madd.u %%e2, %%e4, %%d0, %%d1 \n\t" \ + "ld.w %%d0, [%%a3] \n\t" \ + "addx %%d2, %%d2, %%d0 \n\t" \ + "addc %%d3, %%d3, 0 \n\t" \ + "mov %%d4, %%d3 \n\t" \ + "st.w [%%a3+], %%d2 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + "st.w %0, %%d4 \n\t" \ + "st.a %1, %%a3 \n\t" \ + "st.a %2, %%a2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "d0", "d1", "e2", "d4", "a2", "a3" \ + ); + +#endif /* TriCore */ + +#if defined(__arm__) + +#if defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) +/* + * Thumb 1 ISA. This code path has only been tested successfully on gcc; + * it does not compile on clang or armclang. + */ + +#if !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(__GNUC__) +/* + * Note, gcc -O0 by default uses r7 for the frame pointer, so it complains about + * our use of r7 below, unless -fomit-frame-pointer is passed. + * + * On the other hand, -fomit-frame-pointer is implied by any -Ox options with + * x !=0, which we can detect using __OPTIMIZE__ (which is also defined by + * clang and armcc5 under the same conditions). + * + * If gcc needs to use r7, we use r1 as a scratch register and have a few extra + * instructions to preserve/restore it; otherwise, we can use r7 and avoid + * the preserve/restore overhead. + */ +#define MULADDC_SCRATCH "RS .req r1 \n\t" +#define MULADDC_PRESERVE_SCRATCH "mov r10, r1 \n\t" +#define MULADDC_RESTORE_SCRATCH "mov r1, r10 \n\t" +#define MULADDC_SCRATCH_CLOBBER "r10" +#else /* !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(__GNUC__) */ +#define MULADDC_SCRATCH "RS .req r7 \n\t" +#define MULADDC_PRESERVE_SCRATCH "" +#define MULADDC_RESTORE_SCRATCH "" +#define MULADDC_SCRATCH_CLOBBER "r7" +#endif /* !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(__GNUC__) */ + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + asm( \ + MULADDC_SCRATCH \ + "ldr r0, %3 \n\t" \ + "ldr r1, %4 \n\t" \ + "ldr r2, %5 \n\t" \ + "ldr r3, %6 \n\t" \ + "lsr r4, r3, #16 \n\t" \ + "mov r9, r4 \n\t" \ + "lsl r4, r3, #16 \n\t" \ + "lsr r4, r4, #16 \n\t" \ + "mov r8, r4 \n\t" \ + + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + MULADDC_PRESERVE_SCRATCH \ + "ldmia r0!, {r6} \n\t" \ + "lsr RS, r6, #16 \n\t" \ + "lsl r6, r6, #16 \n\t" \ + "lsr r6, r6, #16 \n\t" \ + "mov r4, r8 \n\t" \ + "mul r4, r6 \n\t" \ + "mov r3, r9 \n\t" \ + "mul r6, r3 \n\t" \ + "mov r5, r9 \n\t" \ + "mul r5, RS \n\t" \ + "mov r3, r8 \n\t" \ + "mul RS, r3 \n\t" \ + "lsr r3, r6, #16 \n\t" \ + "add r5, r5, r3 \n\t" \ + "lsr r3, RS, #16 \n\t" \ + "add r5, r5, r3 \n\t" \ + "add r4, r4, r2 \n\t" \ + "mov r2, #0 \n\t" \ + "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ + "lsl r3, r6, #16 \n\t" \ + "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ + "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ + "lsl r3, RS, #16 \n\t" \ + "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ + "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \ + MULADDC_RESTORE_SCRATCH \ + "ldr r3, [r1] \n\t" \ + "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \ + "adc r2, r5 \n\t" \ + "stmia r1!, {r4} \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + "str r2, %0 \n\t" \ + "str r1, %1 \n\t" \ + "str r0, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5", \ + "r6", MULADDC_SCRATCH_CLOBBER, "r8", "r9", "cc" \ + ); +#endif /* !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && !defined(__clang__) */ + +#elif (__ARM_ARCH >= 6) && \ + defined (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP) && (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP == 1) +/* Armv6-M (or later) with DSP Instruction Set Extensions. + * Requires support for either Thumb 2 or Arm ISA. + */ + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + { \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp_a, tmp_b; \ + asm volatile ( + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + ".p2align 2 \n\t" \ + "ldr %[a], [%[in]], #4 \n\t" \ + "ldr %[b], [%[acc]] \n\t" \ + "umaal %[b], %[carry], %[scalar], %[a] \n\t" \ + "str %[b], [%[acc]], #4 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + : [a] "=&r" (tmp_a), \ + [b] "=&r" (tmp_b), \ + [in] "+r" (s), \ + [acc] "+r" (d), \ + [carry] "+l" (c) \ + : [scalar] "r" (b) \ + : "memory" \ + ); \ + } + +#define MULADDC_X2_INIT \ + { \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp_a0, tmp_b0; \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp_a1, tmp_b1; \ + asm volatile ( + + /* - Make sure loop is 4-byte aligned to avoid stalls + * upon repeated non-word aligned instructions in + * some microarchitectures. + * - Don't use ldm with post-increment or back-to-back + * loads with post-increment and same address register + * to avoid stalls on some microarchitectures. + * - Bunch loads and stores to reduce latency on some + * microarchitectures. E.g., on Cortex-M4, the first + * in a series of load/store operations has latency + * 2 cycles, while subsequent loads/stores are single-cycle. */ +#define MULADDC_X2_CORE \ + ".p2align 2 \n\t" \ + "ldr %[a0], [%[in]], #+8 \n\t" \ + "ldr %[b0], [%[acc]], #+8 \n\t" \ + "ldr %[a1], [%[in], #-4] \n\t" \ + "ldr %[b1], [%[acc], #-4] \n\t" \ + "umaal %[b0], %[carry], %[scalar], %[a0] \n\t" \ + "umaal %[b1], %[carry], %[scalar], %[a1] \n\t" \ + "str %[b0], [%[acc], #-8] \n\t" \ + "str %[b1], [%[acc], #-4] \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X2_STOP \ + : [a0] "=&r" (tmp_a0), \ + [b0] "=&r" (tmp_b0), \ + [a1] "=&r" (tmp_a1), \ + [b1] "=&r" (tmp_b1), \ + [in] "+r" (s), \ + [acc] "+r" (d), \ + [carry] "+l" (c) \ + : [scalar] "r" (b) \ + : "memory" \ + ); \ + } + +#else /* Thumb 2 or Arm ISA, without DSP extensions */ + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ldr r0, %3 \n\t" \ + "ldr r1, %4 \n\t" \ + "ldr r2, %5 \n\t" \ + "ldr r3, %6 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + "ldr r4, [r0], #4 \n\t" \ + "mov r5, #0 \n\t" \ + "ldr r6, [r1] \n\t" \ + "umlal r2, r5, r3, r4 \n\t" \ + "adds r4, r6, r2 \n\t" \ + "adc r2, r5, #0 \n\t" \ + "str r4, [r1], #4 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + "str r2, %0 \n\t" \ + "str r1, %1 \n\t" \ + "str r0, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5", \ + "r6", "cc" \ + ); + +#endif /* ISA codepath selection */ + +#endif /* defined(__arm__) */ + +#if defined(__alpha__) + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + asm( \ + "ldq $1, %3 \n\t" \ + "ldq $2, %4 \n\t" \ + "ldq $3, %5 \n\t" \ + "ldq $4, %6 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + "ldq $6, 0($1) \n\t" \ + "addq $1, 8, $1 \n\t" \ + "mulq $6, $4, $7 \n\t" \ + "umulh $6, $4, $6 \n\t" \ + "addq $7, $3, $7 \n\t" \ + "cmpult $7, $3, $3 \n\t" \ + "ldq $5, 0($2) \n\t" \ + "addq $7, $5, $7 \n\t" \ + "cmpult $7, $5, $5 \n\t" \ + "stq $7, 0($2) \n\t" \ + "addq $2, 8, $2 \n\t" \ + "addq $6, $3, $3 \n\t" \ + "addq $5, $3, $3 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + "stq $3, %0 \n\t" \ + "stq $2, %1 \n\t" \ + "stq $1, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "$1", "$2", "$3", "$4", "$5", "$6", "$7" \ + ); +#endif /* Alpha */ + +#if defined(__mips__) && !defined(__mips64) + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + asm( \ + "lw $10, %3 \n\t" \ + "lw $11, %4 \n\t" \ + "lw $12, %5 \n\t" \ + "lw $13, %6 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + "lw $14, 0($10) \n\t" \ + "multu $13, $14 \n\t" \ + "addi $10, $10, 4 \n\t" \ + "mflo $14 \n\t" \ + "mfhi $9 \n\t" \ + "addu $14, $12, $14 \n\t" \ + "lw $15, 0($11) \n\t" \ + "sltu $12, $14, $12 \n\t" \ + "addu $15, $14, $15 \n\t" \ + "sltu $14, $15, $14 \n\t" \ + "addu $12, $12, $9 \n\t" \ + "sw $15, 0($11) \n\t" \ + "addu $12, $12, $14 \n\t" \ + "addi $11, $11, 4 \n\t" + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + "sw $12, %0 \n\t" \ + "sw $11, %1 \n\t" \ + "sw $10, %2 \n\t" \ + : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \ + : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \ + : "$9", "$10", "$11", "$12", "$13", "$14", "$15", "lo", "hi" \ + ); + +#endif /* MIPS */ +#endif /* GNUC */ + +#if (defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86)) || defined(__WATCOMC__) + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ + __asm mov esi, s \ + __asm mov edi, d \ + __asm mov ecx, c \ + __asm mov ebx, b + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + __asm lodsd \ + __asm mul ebx \ + __asm add eax, ecx \ + __asm adc edx, 0 \ + __asm add eax, [edi] \ + __asm adc edx, 0 \ + __asm mov ecx, edx \ + __asm stosd + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ + __asm mov c, ecx \ + __asm mov d, edi \ + __asm mov s, esi + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) + +#define EMIT __asm _emit + +#define MULADDC_X8_INIT MULADDC_X1_INIT + +#define MULADDC_X8_CORE \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0xC9 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0xC3 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x1F \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x16 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x66 EMIT 0x04 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xE0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x76 EMIT 0x08 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x0C \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF8 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCA \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x5F EMIT 0x04 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xDC \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x08 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xEE \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x67 EMIT 0x0C \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xFC \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x0F \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x56 EMIT 0x10 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x66 EMIT 0x14 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xE0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x76 EMIT 0x18 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF0 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x04 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x5E EMIT 0x1C \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD8 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCD \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x10 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xD5 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x08 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCF \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x14 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xE5 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x0C \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCA \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x18 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xF5 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x10 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCC \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x1C \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xDD \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x14 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCE \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x18 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x1C \ + EMIT 0x83 EMIT 0xC7 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x83 EMIT 0xC6 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0xC9 + +#define MULADDC_X8_STOP \ + EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x77 \ + __asm mov c, ecx \ + __asm mov d, edi \ + __asm mov s, esi + +#endif /* SSE2 */ +#endif /* MSVC */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ + +#if !defined(MULADDC_X1_CORE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL) + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ +{ \ + mbedtls_t_udbl r; \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0, r1; + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + r = *(s++) * (mbedtls_t_udbl) b; \ + r0 = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) r; \ + r1 = (mbedtls_mpi_uint)( r >> biL ); \ + r0 += c; r1 += (r0 < c); \ + r0 += *d; r1 += (r0 < *d); \ + c = r1; *(d++) = r0; + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL */ + +#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \ +{ \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint s0, s1, b0, b1; \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint r0, r1, rx, ry; \ + b0 = ( b << biH ) >> biH; \ + b1 = ( b >> biH ); + +#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \ + s0 = ( *s << biH ) >> biH; \ + s1 = ( *s >> biH ); s++; \ + rx = s0 * b1; r0 = s0 * b0; \ + ry = s1 * b0; r1 = s1 * b1; \ + r1 += ( rx >> biH ); \ + r1 += ( ry >> biH ); \ + rx <<= biH; ry <<= biH; \ + r0 += rx; r1 += (r0 < rx); \ + r0 += ry; r1 += (r0 < ry); \ + r0 += c; r1 += (r0 < c); \ + r0 += *d; r1 += (r0 < *d); \ + c = r1; *(d++) = r0; + +#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \ +} + +#endif /* C (longlong) */ +#endif /* C (generic) */ + +#if !defined(MULADDC_X2_CORE) +#define MULADDC_X2_INIT MULADDC_X1_INIT +#define MULADDC_X2_STOP MULADDC_X1_STOP +#define MULADDC_X2_CORE MULADDC_X1_CORE MULADDC_X1_CORE +#endif /* MULADDC_X2_CORE */ + +#if !defined(MULADDC_X4_CORE) +#define MULADDC_X4_INIT MULADDC_X2_INIT +#define MULADDC_X4_STOP MULADDC_X2_STOP +#define MULADDC_X4_CORE MULADDC_X2_CORE MULADDC_X2_CORE +#endif /* MULADDC_X4_CORE */ + +#if !defined(MULADDC_X8_CORE) +#define MULADDC_X8_INIT MULADDC_X4_INIT +#define MULADDC_X8_STOP MULADDC_X4_STOP +#define MULADDC_X8_CORE MULADDC_X4_CORE MULADDC_X4_CORE +#endif /* MULADDC_X8_CORE */ + +/* *INDENT-ON* */ +#endif /* bn_mul.h */ diff --git a/library/camellia.c b/library/camellia.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b1c0a08ca23 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/camellia.c @@ -0,0 +1,1058 @@ +/* + * Camellia implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * The Camellia block cipher was designed by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric + * Corporation. + * + * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/dl/01espec.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT) + +static const unsigned char SIGMA_CHARS[6][8] = +{ + { 0xa0, 0x9e, 0x66, 0x7f, 0x3b, 0xcc, 0x90, 0x8b }, + { 0xb6, 0x7a, 0xe8, 0x58, 0x4c, 0xaa, 0x73, 0xb2 }, + { 0xc6, 0xef, 0x37, 0x2f, 0xe9, 0x4f, 0x82, 0xbe }, + { 0x54, 0xff, 0x53, 0xa5, 0xf1, 0xd3, 0x6f, 0x1c }, + { 0x10, 0xe5, 0x27, 0xfa, 0xde, 0x68, 0x2d, 0x1d }, + { 0xb0, 0x56, 0x88, 0xc2, 0xb3, 0xe6, 0xc1, 0xfd } +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY) + +static const unsigned char FSb[256] = +{ + 112, 130, 44, 236, 179, 39, 192, 229, 228, 133, 87, 53, 234, 12, 174, 65, + 35, 239, 107, 147, 69, 25, 165, 33, 237, 14, 79, 78, 29, 101, 146, 189, + 134, 184, 175, 143, 124, 235, 31, 206, 62, 48, 220, 95, 94, 197, 11, 26, + 166, 225, 57, 202, 213, 71, 93, 61, 217, 1, 90, 214, 81, 86, 108, 77, + 139, 13, 154, 102, 251, 204, 176, 45, 116, 18, 43, 32, 240, 177, 132, 153, + 223, 76, 203, 194, 52, 126, 118, 5, 109, 183, 169, 49, 209, 23, 4, 215, + 20, 88, 58, 97, 222, 27, 17, 28, 50, 15, 156, 22, 83, 24, 242, 34, + 254, 68, 207, 178, 195, 181, 122, 145, 36, 8, 232, 168, 96, 252, 105, 80, + 170, 208, 160, 125, 161, 137, 98, 151, 84, 91, 30, 149, 224, 255, 100, 210, + 16, 196, 0, 72, 163, 247, 117, 219, 138, 3, 230, 218, 9, 63, 221, 148, + 135, 92, 131, 2, 205, 74, 144, 51, 115, 103, 246, 243, 157, 127, 191, 226, + 82, 155, 216, 38, 200, 55, 198, 59, 129, 150, 111, 75, 19, 190, 99, 46, + 233, 121, 167, 140, 159, 110, 188, 142, 41, 245, 249, 182, 47, 253, 180, 89, + 120, 152, 6, 106, 231, 70, 113, 186, 212, 37, 171, 66, 136, 162, 141, 250, + 114, 7, 185, 85, 248, 238, 172, 10, 54, 73, 42, 104, 60, 56, 241, 164, + 64, 40, 211, 123, 187, 201, 67, 193, 21, 227, 173, 244, 119, 199, 128, 158 +}; + +#define SBOX1(n) FSb[(n)] +#define SBOX2(n) (unsigned char) ((FSb[(n)] >> 7 ^ FSb[(n)] << 1) & 0xff) +#define SBOX3(n) (unsigned char) ((FSb[(n)] >> 1 ^ FSb[(n)] << 7) & 0xff) +#define SBOX4(n) FSb[((n) << 1 ^ (n) >> 7) &0xff] + +#else /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY */ + +static const unsigned char FSb[256] = +{ + 112, 130, 44, 236, 179, 39, 192, 229, 228, 133, 87, 53, 234, 12, 174, 65, + 35, 239, 107, 147, 69, 25, 165, 33, 237, 14, 79, 78, 29, 101, 146, 189, + 134, 184, 175, 143, 124, 235, 31, 206, 62, 48, 220, 95, 94, 197, 11, 26, + 166, 225, 57, 202, 213, 71, 93, 61, 217, 1, 90, 214, 81, 86, 108, 77, + 139, 13, 154, 102, 251, 204, 176, 45, 116, 18, 43, 32, 240, 177, 132, 153, + 223, 76, 203, 194, 52, 126, 118, 5, 109, 183, 169, 49, 209, 23, 4, 215, + 20, 88, 58, 97, 222, 27, 17, 28, 50, 15, 156, 22, 83, 24, 242, 34, + 254, 68, 207, 178, 195, 181, 122, 145, 36, 8, 232, 168, 96, 252, 105, 80, + 170, 208, 160, 125, 161, 137, 98, 151, 84, 91, 30, 149, 224, 255, 100, 210, + 16, 196, 0, 72, 163, 247, 117, 219, 138, 3, 230, 218, 9, 63, 221, 148, + 135, 92, 131, 2, 205, 74, 144, 51, 115, 103, 246, 243, 157, 127, 191, 226, + 82, 155, 216, 38, 200, 55, 198, 59, 129, 150, 111, 75, 19, 190, 99, 46, + 233, 121, 167, 140, 159, 110, 188, 142, 41, 245, 249, 182, 47, 253, 180, 89, + 120, 152, 6, 106, 231, 70, 113, 186, 212, 37, 171, 66, 136, 162, 141, 250, + 114, 7, 185, 85, 248, 238, 172, 10, 54, 73, 42, 104, 60, 56, 241, 164, + 64, 40, 211, 123, 187, 201, 67, 193, 21, 227, 173, 244, 119, 199, 128, 158 +}; + +static const unsigned char FSb2[256] = +{ + 224, 5, 88, 217, 103, 78, 129, 203, 201, 11, 174, 106, 213, 24, 93, 130, + 70, 223, 214, 39, 138, 50, 75, 66, 219, 28, 158, 156, 58, 202, 37, 123, + 13, 113, 95, 31, 248, 215, 62, 157, 124, 96, 185, 190, 188, 139, 22, 52, + 77, 195, 114, 149, 171, 142, 186, 122, 179, 2, 180, 173, 162, 172, 216, 154, + 23, 26, 53, 204, 247, 153, 97, 90, 232, 36, 86, 64, 225, 99, 9, 51, + 191, 152, 151, 133, 104, 252, 236, 10, 218, 111, 83, 98, 163, 46, 8, 175, + 40, 176, 116, 194, 189, 54, 34, 56, 100, 30, 57, 44, 166, 48, 229, 68, + 253, 136, 159, 101, 135, 107, 244, 35, 72, 16, 209, 81, 192, 249, 210, 160, + 85, 161, 65, 250, 67, 19, 196, 47, 168, 182, 60, 43, 193, 255, 200, 165, + 32, 137, 0, 144, 71, 239, 234, 183, 21, 6, 205, 181, 18, 126, 187, 41, + 15, 184, 7, 4, 155, 148, 33, 102, 230, 206, 237, 231, 59, 254, 127, 197, + 164, 55, 177, 76, 145, 110, 141, 118, 3, 45, 222, 150, 38, 125, 198, 92, + 211, 242, 79, 25, 63, 220, 121, 29, 82, 235, 243, 109, 94, 251, 105, 178, + 240, 49, 12, 212, 207, 140, 226, 117, 169, 74, 87, 132, 17, 69, 27, 245, + 228, 14, 115, 170, 241, 221, 89, 20, 108, 146, 84, 208, 120, 112, 227, 73, + 128, 80, 167, 246, 119, 147, 134, 131, 42, 199, 91, 233, 238, 143, 1, 61 +}; + +static const unsigned char FSb3[256] = +{ + 56, 65, 22, 118, 217, 147, 96, 242, 114, 194, 171, 154, 117, 6, 87, 160, + 145, 247, 181, 201, 162, 140, 210, 144, 246, 7, 167, 39, 142, 178, 73, 222, + 67, 92, 215, 199, 62, 245, 143, 103, 31, 24, 110, 175, 47, 226, 133, 13, + 83, 240, 156, 101, 234, 163, 174, 158, 236, 128, 45, 107, 168, 43, 54, 166, + 197, 134, 77, 51, 253, 102, 88, 150, 58, 9, 149, 16, 120, 216, 66, 204, + 239, 38, 229, 97, 26, 63, 59, 130, 182, 219, 212, 152, 232, 139, 2, 235, + 10, 44, 29, 176, 111, 141, 136, 14, 25, 135, 78, 11, 169, 12, 121, 17, + 127, 34, 231, 89, 225, 218, 61, 200, 18, 4, 116, 84, 48, 126, 180, 40, + 85, 104, 80, 190, 208, 196, 49, 203, 42, 173, 15, 202, 112, 255, 50, 105, + 8, 98, 0, 36, 209, 251, 186, 237, 69, 129, 115, 109, 132, 159, 238, 74, + 195, 46, 193, 1, 230, 37, 72, 153, 185, 179, 123, 249, 206, 191, 223, 113, + 41, 205, 108, 19, 100, 155, 99, 157, 192, 75, 183, 165, 137, 95, 177, 23, + 244, 188, 211, 70, 207, 55, 94, 71, 148, 250, 252, 91, 151, 254, 90, 172, + 60, 76, 3, 53, 243, 35, 184, 93, 106, 146, 213, 33, 68, 81, 198, 125, + 57, 131, 220, 170, 124, 119, 86, 5, 27, 164, 21, 52, 30, 28, 248, 82, + 32, 20, 233, 189, 221, 228, 161, 224, 138, 241, 214, 122, 187, 227, 64, 79 +}; + +static const unsigned char FSb4[256] = +{ + 112, 44, 179, 192, 228, 87, 234, 174, 35, 107, 69, 165, 237, 79, 29, 146, + 134, 175, 124, 31, 62, 220, 94, 11, 166, 57, 213, 93, 217, 90, 81, 108, + 139, 154, 251, 176, 116, 43, 240, 132, 223, 203, 52, 118, 109, 169, 209, 4, + 20, 58, 222, 17, 50, 156, 83, 242, 254, 207, 195, 122, 36, 232, 96, 105, + 170, 160, 161, 98, 84, 30, 224, 100, 16, 0, 163, 117, 138, 230, 9, 221, + 135, 131, 205, 144, 115, 246, 157, 191, 82, 216, 200, 198, 129, 111, 19, 99, + 233, 167, 159, 188, 41, 249, 47, 180, 120, 6, 231, 113, 212, 171, 136, 141, + 114, 185, 248, 172, 54, 42, 60, 241, 64, 211, 187, 67, 21, 173, 119, 128, + 130, 236, 39, 229, 133, 53, 12, 65, 239, 147, 25, 33, 14, 78, 101, 189, + 184, 143, 235, 206, 48, 95, 197, 26, 225, 202, 71, 61, 1, 214, 86, 77, + 13, 102, 204, 45, 18, 32, 177, 153, 76, 194, 126, 5, 183, 49, 23, 215, + 88, 97, 27, 28, 15, 22, 24, 34, 68, 178, 181, 145, 8, 168, 252, 80, + 208, 125, 137, 151, 91, 149, 255, 210, 196, 72, 247, 219, 3, 218, 63, 148, + 92, 2, 74, 51, 103, 243, 127, 226, 155, 38, 55, 59, 150, 75, 190, 46, + 121, 140, 110, 142, 245, 182, 253, 89, 152, 106, 70, 186, 37, 66, 162, 250, + 7, 85, 238, 10, 73, 104, 56, 164, 40, 123, 201, 193, 227, 244, 199, 158 +}; + +#define SBOX1(n) FSb[(n)] +#define SBOX2(n) FSb2[(n)] +#define SBOX3(n) FSb3[(n)] +#define SBOX4(n) FSb4[(n)] + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY */ + +static const unsigned char shifts[2][4][4] = +{ + { + { 1, 1, 1, 1 }, /* KL */ + { 0, 0, 0, 0 }, /* KR */ + { 1, 1, 1, 1 }, /* KA */ + { 0, 0, 0, 0 } /* KB */ + }, + { + { 1, 0, 1, 1 }, /* KL */ + { 1, 1, 0, 1 }, /* KR */ + { 1, 1, 1, 0 }, /* KA */ + { 1, 1, 0, 1 } /* KB */ + } +}; + +static const signed char indexes[2][4][20] = +{ + { + { 0, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 38, 39, + 36, 37, 23, 20, 21, 22, 27, -1, -1, 26 }, /* KL -> RK */ + { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 }, /* KR -> RK */ + { 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, + 18, 19, -1, 24, 25, -1, 31, 28, 29, 30 }, /* KA -> RK */ + { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 } /* KB -> RK */ + }, + { + { 0, 1, 2, 3, 61, 62, 63, 60, -1, -1, + -1, -1, 27, 24, 25, 26, 35, 32, 33, 34 }, /* KL -> RK */ + { -1, -1, -1, -1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, + 18, 19, -1, -1, -1, -1, 39, 36, 37, 38 }, /* KR -> RK */ + { -1, -1, -1, -1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 58, 59, + 56, 57, 31, 28, 29, 30, -1, -1, -1, -1 }, /* KA -> RK */ + { 4, 5, 6, 7, 65, 66, 67, 64, 20, 21, + 22, 23, -1, -1, -1, -1, 43, 40, 41, 42 } /* KB -> RK */ + } +}; + +static const signed char transposes[2][20] = +{ + { + 21, 22, 23, 20, + -1, -1, -1, -1, + 18, 19, 16, 17, + 11, 8, 9, 10, + 15, 12, 13, 14 + }, + { + 25, 26, 27, 24, + 29, 30, 31, 28, + 18, 19, 16, 17, + -1, -1, -1, -1, + -1, -1, -1, -1 + } +}; + +/* Shift macro for 128 bit strings with rotation smaller than 32 bits (!) */ +#define ROTL(DEST, SRC, SHIFT) \ + { \ + (DEST)[0] = (SRC)[0] << (SHIFT) ^ (SRC)[1] >> (32 - (SHIFT)); \ + (DEST)[1] = (SRC)[1] << (SHIFT) ^ (SRC)[2] >> (32 - (SHIFT)); \ + (DEST)[2] = (SRC)[2] << (SHIFT) ^ (SRC)[3] >> (32 - (SHIFT)); \ + (DEST)[3] = (SRC)[3] << (SHIFT) ^ (SRC)[0] >> (32 - (SHIFT)); \ + } + +#define FL(XL, XR, KL, KR) \ + { \ + (XR) = ((((XL) &(KL)) << 1) | (((XL) &(KL)) >> 31)) ^ (XR); \ + (XL) = ((XR) | (KR)) ^ (XL); \ + } + +#define FLInv(YL, YR, KL, KR) \ + { \ + (YL) = ((YR) | (KR)) ^ (YL); \ + (YR) = ((((YL) &(KL)) << 1) | (((YL) &(KL)) >> 31)) ^ (YR); \ + } + +#define SHIFT_AND_PLACE(INDEX, OFFSET) \ + { \ + TK[0] = KC[(OFFSET) * 4 + 0]; \ + TK[1] = KC[(OFFSET) * 4 + 1]; \ + TK[2] = KC[(OFFSET) * 4 + 2]; \ + TK[3] = KC[(OFFSET) * 4 + 3]; \ + \ + for (i = 1; i <= 4; i++) \ + if (shifts[(INDEX)][(OFFSET)][i -1]) \ + ROTL(TK + i * 4, TK, (15 * i) % 32); \ + \ + for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) \ + if (indexes[(INDEX)][(OFFSET)][i] != -1) { \ + RK[indexes[(INDEX)][(OFFSET)][i]] = TK[i]; \ + } \ + } + +static void camellia_feistel(const uint32_t x[2], const uint32_t k[2], + uint32_t z[2]) +{ + uint32_t I0, I1; + I0 = x[0] ^ k[0]; + I1 = x[1] ^ k[1]; + + I0 = ((uint32_t) SBOX1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(I0)) << 24) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(I0)) << 16) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(I0)) << 8) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX4(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(I0))); + I1 = ((uint32_t) SBOX2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(I1)) << 24) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(I1)) << 16) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX4(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(I1)) << 8) | + ((uint32_t) SBOX1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(I1))); + + I0 ^= (I1 << 8) | (I1 >> 24); + I1 ^= (I0 << 16) | (I0 >> 16); + I0 ^= (I1 >> 8) | (I1 << 24); + I1 ^= (I0 >> 8) | (I0 << 24); + + z[0] ^= I1; + z[1] ^= I0; +} + +void mbedtls_camellia_init(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_camellia_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_camellia_free(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_camellia_context)); +} + +/* + * Camellia key schedule (encryption) + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits) +{ + int idx; + size_t i; + uint32_t *RK; + unsigned char t[64]; + uint32_t SIGMA[6][2]; + uint32_t KC[16]; + uint32_t TK[20]; + + RK = ctx->rk; + + memset(t, 0, 64); + memset(RK, 0, sizeof(ctx->rk)); + + switch (keybits) { + case 128: ctx->nr = 3; idx = 0; break; + case 192: + case 256: ctx->nr = 4; idx = 1; break; + default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + for (i = 0; i < keybits / 8; ++i) { + t[i] = key[i]; + } + + if (keybits == 192) { + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + t[24 + i] = ~t[16 + i]; + } + } + + /* + * Prepare SIGMA values + */ + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { + SIGMA[i][0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(SIGMA_CHARS[i], 0); + SIGMA[i][1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(SIGMA_CHARS[i], 4); + } + + /* + * Key storage in KC + * Order: KL, KR, KA, KB + */ + memset(KC, 0, sizeof(KC)); + + /* Store KL, KR */ + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + KC[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(t, i * 4); + } + + /* Generate KA */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { + KC[8 + i] = KC[i] ^ KC[4 + i]; + } + + camellia_feistel(KC + 8, SIGMA[0], KC + 10); + camellia_feistel(KC + 10, SIGMA[1], KC + 8); + + for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { + KC[8 + i] ^= KC[i]; + } + + camellia_feistel(KC + 8, SIGMA[2], KC + 10); + camellia_feistel(KC + 10, SIGMA[3], KC + 8); + + if (keybits > 128) { + /* Generate KB */ + for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { + KC[12 + i] = KC[4 + i] ^ KC[8 + i]; + } + + camellia_feistel(KC + 12, SIGMA[4], KC + 14); + camellia_feistel(KC + 14, SIGMA[5], KC + 12); + } + + /* + * Generating subkeys + */ + + /* Manipulating KL */ + SHIFT_AND_PLACE(idx, 0); + + /* Manipulating KR */ + if (keybits > 128) { + SHIFT_AND_PLACE(idx, 1); + } + + /* Manipulating KA */ + SHIFT_AND_PLACE(idx, 2); + + /* Manipulating KB */ + if (keybits > 128) { + SHIFT_AND_PLACE(idx, 3); + } + + /* Do transpositions */ + for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { + if (transposes[idx][i] != -1) { + RK[32 + 12 * idx + i] = RK[transposes[idx][i]]; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Camellia key schedule (decryption) + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits) +{ + int idx, ret; + size_t i; + mbedtls_camellia_context cty; + uint32_t *RK; + uint32_t *SK; + + mbedtls_camellia_init(&cty); + + /* Also checks keybits */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(&cty, key, keybits)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ctx->nr = cty.nr; + idx = (ctx->nr == 4); + + RK = ctx->rk; + SK = cty.rk + 24 * 2 + 8 * idx * 2; + + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + + for (i = 22 + 8 * idx, SK -= 6; i > 0; i--, SK -= 4) { + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + } + + SK -= 2; + + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + *RK++ = *SK++; + +exit: + mbedtls_camellia_free(&cty); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ + +/* + * Camellia-ECB block encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]) +{ + int NR; + uint32_t *RK, X[4]; + if (mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ((void) mode); + + NR = ctx->nr; + RK = ctx->rk; + + X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 0); + X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 4); + X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 8); + X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 12); + + X[0] ^= *RK++; + X[1] ^= *RK++; + X[2] ^= *RK++; + X[3] ^= *RK++; + + while (NR) { + --NR; + camellia_feistel(X, RK, X + 2); + RK += 2; + camellia_feistel(X + 2, RK, X); + RK += 2; + camellia_feistel(X, RK, X + 2); + RK += 2; + camellia_feistel(X + 2, RK, X); + RK += 2; + camellia_feistel(X, RK, X + 2); + RK += 2; + camellia_feistel(X + 2, RK, X); + RK += 2; + + if (NR) { + FL(X[0], X[1], RK[0], RK[1]); + RK += 2; + FLInv(X[2], X[3], RK[0], RK[1]); + RK += 2; + } + } + + X[2] ^= *RK++; + X[3] ^= *RK++; + X[0] ^= *RK++; + X[1] ^= *RK++; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(X[2], output, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(X[3], output, 4); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(X[0], output, 8); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(X[1], output, 12); + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * Camellia-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + unsigned char temp[16]; + if (mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (length % 16) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; + } + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + while (length > 0) { + memcpy(temp, input, 16); + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output); + + mbedtls_xor(output, output, iv, 16); + + memcpy(iv, temp, 16); + + input += 16; + output += 16; + length -= 16; + } + } else { + while (length > 0) { + mbedtls_xor(output, input, iv, 16); + + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, output, output); + memcpy(iv, output, 16); + + input += 16; + output += 16; + length -= 16; + } + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +/* + * Camellia-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int c; + size_t n; + if (mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + n = *iv_off; + if (n >= 16) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + while (length--) { + if (n == 0) { + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, iv, iv); + } + + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char) (c ^ iv[n]); + iv[n] = (unsigned char) c; + + n = (n + 1) & 0x0F; + } + } else { + while (length--) { + if (n == 0) { + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, iv, iv); + } + + iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char) (iv[n] ^ *input++); + + n = (n + 1) & 0x0F; + } + } + + *iv_off = n; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * Camellia-CTR buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx, + size_t length, + size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char nonce_counter[16], + unsigned char stream_block[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int c, i; + size_t n; + + n = *nc_off; + if (n >= 16) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + while (length--) { + if (n == 0) { + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, + stream_block); + + for (i = 16; i > 0; i--) { + if (++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0) { + break; + } + } + } + c = *input++; + *output++ = (unsigned char) (c ^ stream_block[n]); + + n = (n + 1) & 0x0F; + } + + *nc_off = n; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * Camellia test vectors from: + * + * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/technology.html: + * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/dl/cryptrec/intermediate.txt + * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/dl/cryptrec/t_camellia.txt + * (For each bitlength: Key 0, Nr 39) + */ +#define CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB 2 + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ecb_key[3][CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB][32] = +{ + { + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, + 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } + }, + { + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, + 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10, + 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77 }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } + }, + { + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, + 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10, + 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, + 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } + }, +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ecb_plain[CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB][16] = +{ + { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, + 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 }, + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 } +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ecb_cipher[3][CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB][16] = +{ + { + { 0x67, 0x67, 0x31, 0x38, 0x54, 0x96, 0x69, 0x73, + 0x08, 0x57, 0x06, 0x56, 0x48, 0xea, 0xbe, 0x43 }, + { 0x38, 0x3C, 0x6C, 0x2A, 0xAB, 0xEF, 0x7F, 0xDE, + 0x25, 0xCD, 0x47, 0x0B, 0xF7, 0x74, 0xA3, 0x31 } + }, + { + { 0xb4, 0x99, 0x34, 0x01, 0xb3, 0xe9, 0x96, 0xf8, + 0x4e, 0xe5, 0xce, 0xe7, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0x09, 0xb9 }, + { 0xD1, 0x76, 0x3F, 0xC0, 0x19, 0xD7, 0x7C, 0xC9, + 0x30, 0xBF, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x6F, 0x7C, 0x93, 0x64 } + }, + { + { 0x9a, 0xcc, 0x23, 0x7d, 0xff, 0x16, 0xd7, 0x6c, + 0x20, 0xef, 0x7c, 0x91, 0x9e, 0x3a, 0x75, 0x09 }, + { 0x05, 0x03, 0xFB, 0x10, 0xAB, 0x24, 0x1E, 0x7C, + 0xF4, 0x5D, 0x8C, 0xDE, 0xEE, 0x47, 0x43, 0x35 } + } +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +#define CAMELLIA_TESTS_CBC 3 + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_cbc_key[3][32] = +{ + { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6, + 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C } + , + { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52, + 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5, + 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B } + , + { 0x60, 0x3D, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x15, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xBE, + 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81, + 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7, + 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 } +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_cbc_iv[16] = + +{ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F } +; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_cbc_plain[CAMELLIA_TESTS_CBC][16] = +{ + { 0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96, + 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A }, + { 0xAE, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x1E, 0x03, 0xAC, 0x9C, + 0x9E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xAC, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x8E, 0x51 }, + { 0x30, 0xC8, 0x1C, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x5C, 0xE4, 0x11, + 0xE5, 0xFB, 0xC1, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x52, 0xEF } + +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_cbc_cipher[3][CAMELLIA_TESTS_CBC][16] = +{ + { + { 0x16, 0x07, 0xCF, 0x49, 0x4B, 0x36, 0xBB, 0xF0, + 0x0D, 0xAE, 0xB0, 0xB5, 0x03, 0xC8, 0x31, 0xAB }, + { 0xA2, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0x67, 0x16, 0x29, 0xEF, 0x78, + 0x40, 0xC5, 0xA5, 0xDF, 0xB5, 0x07, 0x48, 0x87 }, + { 0x0F, 0x06, 0x16, 0x50, 0x08, 0xCF, 0x8B, 0x8B, + 0x5A, 0x63, 0x58, 0x63, 0x62, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x54 } + }, + { + { 0x2A, 0x48, 0x30, 0xAB, 0x5A, 0xC4, 0xA1, 0xA2, + 0x40, 0x59, 0x55, 0xFD, 0x21, 0x95, 0xCF, 0x93 }, + { 0x5D, 0x5A, 0x86, 0x9B, 0xD1, 0x4C, 0xE5, 0x42, + 0x64, 0xF8, 0x92, 0xA6, 0xDD, 0x2E, 0xC3, 0xD5 }, + { 0x37, 0xD3, 0x59, 0xC3, 0x34, 0x98, 0x36, 0xD8, + 0x84, 0xE3, 0x10, 0xAD, 0xDF, 0x68, 0xC4, 0x49 } + }, + { + { 0xE6, 0xCF, 0xA3, 0x5F, 0xC0, 0x2B, 0x13, 0x4A, + 0x4D, 0x2C, 0x0B, 0x67, 0x37, 0xAC, 0x3E, 0xDA }, + { 0x36, 0xCB, 0xEB, 0x73, 0xBD, 0x50, 0x4B, 0x40, + 0x70, 0xB1, 0xB7, 0xDE, 0x2B, 0x21, 0xEB, 0x50 }, + { 0xE3, 0x1A, 0x60, 0x55, 0x29, 0x7D, 0x96, 0xCA, + 0x33, 0x30, 0xCD, 0xF1, 0xB1, 0x86, 0x0A, 0x83 } + } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +/* + * Camellia-CTR test vectors from: + * + * http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc5528.html + */ + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ctr_key[3][16] = +{ + { 0xAE, 0x68, 0x52, 0xF8, 0x12, 0x10, 0x67, 0xCC, + 0x4B, 0xF7, 0xA5, 0x76, 0x55, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x9E }, + { 0x7E, 0x24, 0x06, 0x78, 0x17, 0xFA, 0xE0, 0xD7, + 0x43, 0xD6, 0xCE, 0x1F, 0x32, 0x53, 0x91, 0x63 }, + { 0x76, 0x91, 0xBE, 0x03, 0x5E, 0x50, 0x20, 0xA8, + 0xAC, 0x6E, 0x61, 0x85, 0x29, 0xF9, 0xA0, 0xDC } +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ctr_nonce_counter[3][16] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }, + { 0x00, 0x6C, 0xB6, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0x54, 0x3B, 0x59, + 0xDA, 0x48, 0xD9, 0x0B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }, + { 0x00, 0xE0, 0x01, 0x7B, 0x27, 0x77, 0x7F, 0x3F, + 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 } +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ctr_pt[3][48] = +{ + { 0x53, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x20, 0x62, + 0x6C, 0x6F, 0x63, 0x6B, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x73, 0x67 }, + + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F }, + + { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F, + 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23 } +}; + +static const unsigned char camellia_test_ctr_ct[3][48] = +{ + { 0xD0, 0x9D, 0xC2, 0x9A, 0x82, 0x14, 0x61, 0x9A, + 0x20, 0x87, 0x7C, 0x76, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x0B, 0x3F }, + { 0xDB, 0xF3, 0xC7, 0x8D, 0xC0, 0x83, 0x96, 0xD4, + 0xDA, 0x7C, 0x90, 0x77, 0x65, 0xBB, 0xCB, 0x44, + 0x2B, 0x8E, 0x8E, 0x0F, 0x31, 0xF0, 0xDC, 0xA7, + 0x2C, 0x74, 0x17, 0xE3, 0x53, 0x60, 0xE0, 0x48 }, + { 0xB1, 0x9D, 0x1F, 0xCD, 0xCB, 0x75, 0xEB, 0x88, + 0x2F, 0x84, 0x9C, 0xE2, 0x4D, 0x85, 0xCF, 0x73, + 0x9C, 0xE6, 0x4B, 0x2B, 0x5C, 0x9D, 0x73, 0xF1, + 0x4F, 0x2D, 0x5D, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x98, 0x89, 0xCD, + 0xDF, 0x50, 0x86, 0x96 } +}; + +static const int camellia_test_ctr_len[3] = +{ 16, 32, 36 }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_camellia_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int i, j, u, v; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char buf[64]; + unsigned char src[16]; + unsigned char dst[16]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + unsigned char iv[16]; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + size_t offset, len; + unsigned char nonce_counter[16]; + unsigned char stream_block[16]; +#endif + int ret = 1; + + mbedtls_camellia_context ctx; + + mbedtls_camellia_init(&ctx); + memset(key, 0, 32); + + for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) { + u = j >> 1; + v = j & 1; + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" CAMELLIA-ECB-%3d (%s): ", 128 + u * 64, + (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + } + continue; + } +#endif + + for (i = 0; i < CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB; i++) { + memcpy(key, camellia_test_ecb_key[u][i], 16 + 8 * u); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, 128 + u * 64); + memcpy(src, camellia_test_ecb_cipher[u][i], 16); + memcpy(dst, camellia_test_ecb_plain[i], 16); + } else +#endif + { /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT */ + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, 128 + u * 64); + memcpy(src, camellia_test_ecb_plain[i], 16); + memcpy(dst, camellia_test_ecb_cipher[u][i], 16); + } + + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(&ctx, v, src, buf); + + if (memcmp(buf, dst, 16) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + goto exit; + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + /* + * CBC mode + */ + for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) { + u = j >> 1; + v = j & 1; + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" CAMELLIA-CBC-%3d (%s): ", 128 + u * 64, + (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } + + memcpy(src, camellia_test_cbc_iv, 16); + memcpy(dst, camellia_test_cbc_iv, 16); + memcpy(key, camellia_test_cbc_key[u], 16 + 8 * u); + + if (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, 128 + u * 64); + } else { + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, 128 + u * 64); + } + + for (i = 0; i < CAMELLIA_TESTS_CBC; i++) { + + if (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + memcpy(iv, src, 16); + memcpy(src, camellia_test_cbc_cipher[u][i], 16); + memcpy(dst, camellia_test_cbc_plain[i], 16); + } else { /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT */ + memcpy(iv, dst, 16); + memcpy(src, camellia_test_cbc_plain[i], 16); + memcpy(dst, camellia_test_cbc_cipher[u][i], 16); + } + + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc(&ctx, v, 16, iv, src, buf); + + if (memcmp(buf, dst, 16) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + goto exit; + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + /* + * CTR mode + */ + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + v = i & 1; + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" CAMELLIA-CTR-128 (%s): ", + (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } + + memcpy(nonce_counter, camellia_test_ctr_nonce_counter[u], 16); + memcpy(key, camellia_test_ctr_key[u], 16); + + offset = 0; + mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, 128); + + if (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) { + len = camellia_test_ctr_len[u]; + memcpy(buf, camellia_test_ctr_ct[u], len); + + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr(&ctx, len, &offset, nonce_counter, stream_block, + buf, buf); + + if (memcmp(buf, camellia_test_ctr_pt[u], len) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + goto exit; + } + } else { + len = camellia_test_ctr_len[u]; + memcpy(buf, camellia_test_ctr_pt[u], len); + + mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr(&ctx, len, &offset, nonce_counter, stream_block, + buf, buf); + + if (memcmp(buf, camellia_test_ctr_ct[u], len) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + goto exit; + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_camellia_free(&ctx); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ diff --git a/library/ccm.c b/library/ccm.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..45ed697dd32 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ccm.c @@ -0,0 +1,763 @@ +/* + * NIST SP800-38C compliant CCM implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * Definition of CCM: + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C_updated-July20_2007.pdf + * RFC 3610 "Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)" + * + * Related: + * RFC 5116 "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption" + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) +#include "block_cipher_internal.h" +#endif + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include +#define mbedtls_printf printf +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT) + + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ccm_init(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ccm_context)); +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_setkey(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, cipher)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, key, keybits)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } +#else + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher, keybits, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB); + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(cipher_info) != 16) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&ctx->cipher_ctx, key, keybits, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ccm_free(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx); +#else + mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx); +#endif + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_ccm_context)); +} + +#define CCM_STATE__CLEAR 0 +#define CCM_STATE__STARTED (1 << 0) +#define CCM_STATE__LENGTHS_SET (1 << 1) +#define CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED (1 << 2) +#define CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED (1 << 3) +#define CCM_STATE__ERROR (1 << 4) + +/* + * Encrypt or decrypt a partial block with CTR + */ +static int mbedtls_ccm_crypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + size_t offset, size_t use_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char tmp_buf[16] = { 0 }; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->ctr, tmp_buf); +#else + size_t olen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->ctr, 16, tmp_buf, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf)); + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_xor(output, input, tmp_buf + offset, use_len); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf)); + return ret; +} + +static void mbedtls_ccm_clear_state(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->state = CCM_STATE__CLEAR; + memset(ctx->y, 0, 16); + memset(ctx->ctr, 0, 16); +} + +static int ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char i; + size_t len_left; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + size_t olen; +#endif + + /* length calculation can be done only after both + * mbedtls_ccm_starts() and mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() have been executed + */ + if (!(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__STARTED) || !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__LENGTHS_SET)) { + return 0; + } + + /* CCM expects non-empty tag. + * CCM* allows empty tag. For CCM* without tag, ignore plaintext length. + */ + if (ctx->tag_len == 0) { + if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT || ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT) { + ctx->plaintext_len = 0; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + } + + /* + * First block: + * 0 .. 0 flags + * 1 .. iv_len nonce (aka iv) - set by: mbedtls_ccm_starts() + * iv_len+1 .. 15 length + * + * With flags as (bits): + * 7 0 + * 6 add present? + * 5 .. 3 (t - 2) / 2 + * 2 .. 0 q - 1 + */ + ctx->y[0] |= (ctx->add_len > 0) << 6; + ctx->y[0] |= ((ctx->tag_len - 2) / 2) << 3; + ctx->y[0] |= ctx->q - 1; + + for (i = 0, len_left = ctx->plaintext_len; i < ctx->q; i++, len_left >>= 8) { + ctx->y[15-i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len_left); + } + + if (len_left > 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + /* Start CBC-MAC with first block*/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_starts(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len) +{ + /* Also implies q is within bounds */ + if (iv_len < 7 || iv_len > 13) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + ctx->mode = mode; + ctx->q = 16 - 1 - (unsigned char) iv_len; + + /* + * Prepare counter block for encryption: + * 0 .. 0 flags + * 1 .. iv_len nonce (aka iv) + * iv_len+1 .. 15 counter (initially 1) + * + * With flags as (bits): + * 7 .. 3 0 + * 2 .. 0 q - 1 + */ + memset(ctx->ctr, 0, 16); + ctx->ctr[0] = ctx->q - 1; + memcpy(ctx->ctr + 1, iv, iv_len); + memset(ctx->ctr + 1 + iv_len, 0, ctx->q); + ctx->ctr[15] = 1; + + /* + * See ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready() for block layout description + */ + memcpy(ctx->y + 1, iv, iv_len); + + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__STARTED; + return ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(ctx); +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + size_t total_ad_len, + size_t plaintext_len, + size_t tag_len) +{ + /* + * Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1 + * Additional requirement: a < 2^16 - 2^8 to simplify the code. + * 'length' checked later (when writing it to the first block) + * + * Also, loosen the requirements to enable support for CCM* (IEEE 802.15.4). + */ + if (tag_len == 2 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (total_ad_len >= 0xFF00) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + ctx->plaintext_len = plaintext_len; + ctx->add_len = total_ad_len; + ctx->tag_len = tag_len; + ctx->processed = 0; + + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__LENGTHS_SET; + return ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(ctx); +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t use_len, offset; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + size_t olen; +#endif + + if (ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (add_len > 0) { + if (ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (!(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED)) { + if (add_len > ctx->add_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + ctx->y[0] ^= (unsigned char) ((ctx->add_len >> 8) & 0xFF); + ctx->y[1] ^= (unsigned char) ((ctx->add_len) & 0xFF); + + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED; + } else if (ctx->processed + add_len > ctx->add_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + while (add_len > 0) { + offset = (ctx->processed + 2) % 16; /* account for y[0] and y[1] + * holding total auth data length */ + use_len = 16 - offset; + + if (use_len > add_len) { + use_len = add_len; + } + + mbedtls_xor(ctx->y + offset, ctx->y + offset, add, use_len); + + ctx->processed += use_len; + add_len -= use_len; + add += use_len; + + if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->add_len) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; + return ret; + } + } + } + + if (ctx->processed == ctx->add_len) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED; + ctx->processed = 0; // prepare for mbedtls_ccm_update() + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_update(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char i; + size_t use_len, offset; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + size_t olen; +#endif + + unsigned char local_output[16]; + + if (ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + /* Check against plaintext length only if performing operation with + * authentication + */ + if (ctx->tag_len != 0 && ctx->processed + input_len > ctx->plaintext_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (output_size < input_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + *output_len = input_len; + + ret = 0; + + while (input_len > 0) { + offset = ctx->processed % 16; + + use_len = 16 - offset; + + if (use_len > input_len) { + use_len = input_len; + } + + ctx->processed += use_len; + + if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT || \ + ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT) { + mbedtls_xor(ctx->y + offset, ctx->y + offset, input, use_len); + + if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; + goto exit; + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt(ctx, offset, use_len, input, output); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT || \ + ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT) { + /* Since output may be in shared memory, we cannot be sure that + * it will contain what we wrote to it. Therefore, we should avoid using + * it as input to any operations. + * Write decrypted data to local_output to avoid using output variable as + * input in the XOR operation for Y. + */ + ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt(ctx, offset, use_len, input, local_output); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_xor(ctx->y + offset, ctx->y + offset, local_output, use_len); + + memcpy(output, local_output, use_len); + + if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR; + goto exit; + } + } + } + + if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len) { + for (i = 0; i < ctx->q; i++) { + if (++(ctx->ctr)[15-i] != 0) { + break; + } + } + } + + input_len -= use_len; + input += use_len; + output += use_len; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(local_output, 16); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_finish(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char i; + + if (ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + if (ctx->add_len > 0 && !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (ctx->plaintext_len > 0 && ctx->processed != ctx->plaintext_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + /* + * Authentication: reset counter and crypt/mask internal tag + */ + for (i = 0; i < ctx->q; i++) { + ctx->ctr[15-i] = 0; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt(ctx, 0, 16, ctx->y, ctx->y); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + if (tag != NULL) { + memcpy(tag, ctx->y, tag_len); + } + mbedtls_ccm_clear_state(ctx); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Authenticated encryption or decryption + */ +static int ccm_auth_crypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_starts(ctx, mode, iv, iv_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(ctx, add_len, length, tag_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(ctx, add, add_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_update(ctx, input, length, + output, length, &olen)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_finish(ctx, tag, tag_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Authenticated encryption + */ +int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ + return ccm_auth_crypt(ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len, + add, add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len); +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ + return ccm_auth_crypt(ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len, + add, add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len); +} + +/* + * Authenticated decryption + */ +static int mbedtls_ccm_compare_tags(const unsigned char *tag1, + const unsigned char *tag2, + size_t tag_len) +{ + /* Check tag in "constant-time" */ + int diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag1, tag2, tag_len); + + if (diff != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int ccm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char check_tag[16]; + + if ((ret = ccm_auth_crypt(ctx, mode, length, + iv, iv_len, add, add_len, + input, output, check_tag, tag_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_compare_tags(tag, check_tag, tag_len)) != 0) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(output, length); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ + return ccm_auth_decrypt(ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT, length, + iv, iv_len, add, add_len, + input, output, tag, tag_len); +} + +int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ + return ccm_auth_decrypt(ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT, length, + iv, iv_len, add, add_len, + input, output, tag, tag_len); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) +/* + * Examples 1 to 3 from SP800-38C Appendix C + */ + +#define NB_TESTS 3 +#define CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN 24 +#define CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN 32 +/* + * The data is the same for all tests, only the used length changes + */ +static const unsigned char key_test_data[] = { + 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, + 0x48, 0x49, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f +}; + +static const unsigned char iv_test_data[] = { + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, + 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b +}; + +static const unsigned char ad_test_data[] = { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13 +}; + +static const unsigned char msg_test_data[CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN] = { + 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, + 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f, + 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, +}; + +static const size_t iv_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 7, 8, 12 }; +static const size_t add_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 8, 16, 20 }; +static const size_t msg_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 16, 24 }; +static const size_t tag_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 6, 8 }; + +static const unsigned char res_test_data[NB_TESTS][CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN] = { + { 0x71, 0x62, 0x01, 0x5b, 0x4d, 0xac, 0x25, 0x5d }, + { 0xd2, 0xa1, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0x51, 0xea, 0x5f, 0x62, + 0x08, 0x1a, 0x77, 0x92, 0x07, 0x3d, 0x59, 0x3d, + 0x1f, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0xbf, 0xac, 0xcd }, + { 0xe3, 0xb2, 0x01, 0xa9, 0xf5, 0xb7, 0x1a, 0x7a, + 0x9b, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xec, 0xcd, 0x97, 0xe7, 0x0b, + 0x61, 0x76, 0xaa, 0xd9, 0xa4, 0x42, 0x8a, 0xa5, + 0x48, 0x43, 0x92, 0xfb, 0xc1, 0xb0, 0x99, 0x51 } +}; + +int mbedtls_ccm_self_test(int verbose) +{ + mbedtls_ccm_context ctx; + /* + * Some hardware accelerators require the input and output buffers + * would be in RAM, because the flash is not accessible. + * Use buffers on the stack to hold the test vectors data. + */ + unsigned char plaintext[CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN]; + unsigned char ciphertext[CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN]; + size_t i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_ccm_init(&ctx); + + if (mbedtls_ccm_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key_test_data, + 8 * sizeof(key_test_data)) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" CCM: setup failed"); + } + + return 1; + } + + for (i = 0; i < NB_TESTS; i++) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" CCM-AES #%u: ", (unsigned int) i + 1); + } + + memset(plaintext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN); + memset(ciphertext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN); + memcpy(plaintext, msg_test_data, msg_len_test_data[i]); + + ret = mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(&ctx, msg_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data, iv_len_test_data[i], + ad_test_data, add_len_test_data[i], + plaintext, ciphertext, + ciphertext + msg_len_test_data[i], + tag_len_test_data[i]); + + if (ret != 0 || + memcmp(ciphertext, res_test_data[i], + msg_len_test_data[i] + tag_len_test_data[i]) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + return 1; + } + memset(plaintext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN); + + ret = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(&ctx, msg_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data, iv_len_test_data[i], + ad_test_data, add_len_test_data[i], + ciphertext, plaintext, + ciphertext + msg_len_test_data[i], + tag_len_test_data[i]); + + if (ret != 0 || + memcmp(plaintext, msg_test_data, msg_len_test_data[i]) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + return 1; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + mbedtls_ccm_free(&ctx); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ diff --git a/library/chacha20.c b/library/chacha20.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..acaae5b2e98 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/chacha20.c @@ -0,0 +1,497 @@ +/** + * \file chacha20.c + * + * \brief ChaCha20 cipher. + * + * \author Daniel King + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) + +#define ROTL32(value, amount) \ + ((uint32_t) ((value) << (amount)) | ((value) >> (32 - (amount)))) + +#define CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX (12U) + +#define CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES (4U * 16U) + +/** + * \brief ChaCha20 quarter round operation. + * + * The quarter round is defined as follows (from RFC 7539): + * 1. a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 16; + * 2. c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 12; + * 3. a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 8; + * 4. c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 7; + * + * \param state ChaCha20 state to modify. + * \param a The index of 'a' in the state. + * \param b The index of 'b' in the state. + * \param c The index of 'c' in the state. + * \param d The index of 'd' in the state. + */ +static inline void chacha20_quarter_round(uint32_t state[16], + size_t a, + size_t b, + size_t c, + size_t d) +{ + /* a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 16; */ + state[a] += state[b]; + state[d] ^= state[a]; + state[d] = ROTL32(state[d], 16); + + /* c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 12 */ + state[c] += state[d]; + state[b] ^= state[c]; + state[b] = ROTL32(state[b], 12); + + /* a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 8; */ + state[a] += state[b]; + state[d] ^= state[a]; + state[d] = ROTL32(state[d], 8); + + /* c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 7; */ + state[c] += state[d]; + state[b] ^= state[c]; + state[b] = ROTL32(state[b], 7); +} + +/** + * \brief Perform the ChaCha20 inner block operation. + * + * This function performs two rounds: the column round and the + * diagonal round. + * + * \param state The ChaCha20 state to update. + */ +static void chacha20_inner_block(uint32_t state[16]) +{ + chacha20_quarter_round(state, 0, 4, 8, 12); + chacha20_quarter_round(state, 1, 5, 9, 13); + chacha20_quarter_round(state, 2, 6, 10, 14); + chacha20_quarter_round(state, 3, 7, 11, 15); + + chacha20_quarter_round(state, 0, 5, 10, 15); + chacha20_quarter_round(state, 1, 6, 11, 12); + chacha20_quarter_round(state, 2, 7, 8, 13); + chacha20_quarter_round(state, 3, 4, 9, 14); +} + +/** + * \brief Generates a keystream block. + * + * \param initial_state The initial ChaCha20 state (key, nonce, counter). + * \param keystream Generated keystream bytes are written to this buffer. + */ +static void chacha20_block(const uint32_t initial_state[16], + unsigned char keystream[64]) +{ + uint32_t working_state[16]; + size_t i; + + memcpy(working_state, + initial_state, + CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES); + + for (i = 0U; i < 10U; i++) { + chacha20_inner_block(working_state); + } + + working_state[0] += initial_state[0]; + working_state[1] += initial_state[1]; + working_state[2] += initial_state[2]; + working_state[3] += initial_state[3]; + working_state[4] += initial_state[4]; + working_state[5] += initial_state[5]; + working_state[6] += initial_state[6]; + working_state[7] += initial_state[7]; + working_state[8] += initial_state[8]; + working_state[9] += initial_state[9]; + working_state[10] += initial_state[10]; + working_state[11] += initial_state[11]; + working_state[12] += initial_state[12]; + working_state[13] += initial_state[13]; + working_state[14] += initial_state[14]; + working_state[15] += initial_state[15]; + + for (i = 0U; i < 16; i++) { + size_t offset = i * 4U; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(working_state[i], keystream, offset); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(working_state, sizeof(working_state)); +} + +void mbedtls_chacha20_init(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->state, sizeof(ctx->state)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->keystream8, sizeof(ctx->keystream8)); + + /* Initially, there's no keystream bytes available */ + ctx->keystream_bytes_used = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; +} + +void mbedtls_chacha20_free(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx != NULL) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_chacha20_context)); + } +} + +int mbedtls_chacha20_setkey(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[32]) +{ + /* ChaCha20 constants - the string "expand 32-byte k" */ + ctx->state[0] = 0x61707865; + ctx->state[1] = 0x3320646e; + ctx->state[2] = 0x79622d32; + ctx->state[3] = 0x6b206574; + + /* Set key */ + ctx->state[4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 0); + ctx->state[5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 4); + ctx->state[6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 8); + ctx->state[7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 12); + ctx->state[8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 16); + ctx->state[9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 20); + ctx->state[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 24); + ctx->state[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 28); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_chacha20_starts(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + uint32_t counter) +{ + /* Counter */ + ctx->state[12] = counter; + + /* Nonce */ + ctx->state[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(nonce, 0); + ctx->state[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(nonce, 4); + ctx->state[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(nonce, 8); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->keystream8, sizeof(ctx->keystream8)); + + /* Initially, there's no keystream bytes available */ + ctx->keystream_bytes_used = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_chacha20_update(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx, + size_t size, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + size_t offset = 0U; + + /* Use leftover keystream bytes, if available */ + while (size > 0U && ctx->keystream_bytes_used < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES) { + output[offset] = input[offset] + ^ ctx->keystream8[ctx->keystream_bytes_used]; + + ctx->keystream_bytes_used++; + offset++; + size--; + } + + /* Process full blocks */ + while (size >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES) { + /* Generate new keystream block and increment counter */ + chacha20_block(ctx->state, ctx->keystream8); + ctx->state[CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX]++; + + mbedtls_xor(output + offset, input + offset, ctx->keystream8, 64U); + + offset += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + size -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + } + + /* Last (partial) block */ + if (size > 0U) { + /* Generate new keystream block and increment counter */ + chacha20_block(ctx->state, ctx->keystream8); + ctx->state[CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX]++; + + mbedtls_xor(output + offset, input + offset, ctx->keystream8, size); + + ctx->keystream_bytes_used = size; + + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_chacha20_crypt(const unsigned char key[32], + const unsigned char nonce[12], + uint32_t counter, + size_t data_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + mbedtls_chacha20_context ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_chacha20_init(&ctx); + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_setkey(&ctx, key); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_starts(&ctx, nonce, counter); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update(&ctx, data_len, input, output); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_chacha20_free(&ctx); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +static const unsigned char test_keys[2][32] = +{ + { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 + }, + { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_nonces[2][12] = +{ + { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 + }, + { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02 + } +}; + +static const uint32_t test_counters[2] = +{ + 0U, + 1U +}; + +static const unsigned char test_input[2][375] = +{ + { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 + }, + { + 0x41, 0x6e, 0x79, 0x20, 0x73, 0x75, 0x62, 0x6d, + 0x69, 0x73, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, + 0x6f, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x49, 0x45, + 0x54, 0x46, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6e, + 0x64, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x62, 0x79, 0x20, 0x74, + 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x72, + 0x69, 0x62, 0x75, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x66, + 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x70, 0x75, 0x62, 0x6c, 0x69, + 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x61, + 0x73, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x72, + 0x20, 0x70, 0x61, 0x72, 0x74, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, + 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x49, 0x45, 0x54, 0x46, + 0x20, 0x49, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6e, 0x65, + 0x74, 0x2d, 0x44, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x74, 0x20, + 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x52, 0x46, 0x43, 0x20, 0x61, + 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x79, 0x20, 0x73, + 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, + 0x20, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x64, 0x65, 0x20, 0x77, 0x69, + 0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, + 0x20, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x65, 0x78, 0x74, + 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x49, + 0x45, 0x54, 0x46, 0x20, 0x61, 0x63, 0x74, 0x69, + 0x76, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, + 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, + 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x22, 0x49, + 0x45, 0x54, 0x46, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x74, + 0x72, 0x69, 0x62, 0x75, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, + 0x22, 0x2e, 0x20, 0x53, 0x75, 0x63, 0x68, 0x20, + 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e, + 0x74, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x75, + 0x64, 0x65, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x20, + 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e, + 0x74, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x49, 0x45, + 0x54, 0x46, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73, 0x69, + 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x61, 0x73, 0x20, + 0x77, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x61, 0x73, 0x20, + 0x77, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x20, + 0x61, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x63, + 0x74, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x63, 0x20, 0x63, + 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, + 0x74, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x61, + 0x64, 0x65, 0x20, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, + 0x79, 0x20, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x20, 0x6f, + 0x72, 0x20, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x63, 0x65, 0x2c, + 0x20, 0x77, 0x68, 0x69, 0x63, 0x68, 0x20, 0x61, + 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x61, 0x64, 0x64, 0x72, 0x65, + 0x73, 0x73, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6f + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_output[2][375] = +{ + { + 0x76, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xad, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x3d, 0x90, + 0x40, 0x5d, 0x6a, 0xe5, 0x53, 0x86, 0xbd, 0x28, + 0xbd, 0xd2, 0x19, 0xb8, 0xa0, 0x8d, 0xed, 0x1a, + 0xa8, 0x36, 0xef, 0xcc, 0x8b, 0x77, 0x0d, 0xc7, + 0xda, 0x41, 0x59, 0x7c, 0x51, 0x57, 0x48, 0x8d, + 0x77, 0x24, 0xe0, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0xd8, 0x4a, 0x37, + 0x6a, 0x43, 0xb8, 0xf4, 0x15, 0x18, 0xa1, 0x1c, + 0xc3, 0x87, 0xb6, 0x69, 0xb2, 0xee, 0x65, 0x86 + }, + { + 0xa3, 0xfb, 0xf0, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0xfa, 0x2f, 0xde, + 0x4f, 0x37, 0x6c, 0xa2, 0x3e, 0x82, 0x73, 0x70, + 0x41, 0x60, 0x5d, 0x9f, 0x4f, 0x4f, 0x57, 0xbd, + 0x8c, 0xff, 0x2c, 0x1d, 0x4b, 0x79, 0x55, 0xec, + 0x2a, 0x97, 0x94, 0x8b, 0xd3, 0x72, 0x29, 0x15, + 0xc8, 0xf3, 0xd3, 0x37, 0xf7, 0xd3, 0x70, 0x05, + 0x0e, 0x9e, 0x96, 0xd6, 0x47, 0xb7, 0xc3, 0x9f, + 0x56, 0xe0, 0x31, 0xca, 0x5e, 0xb6, 0x25, 0x0d, + 0x40, 0x42, 0xe0, 0x27, 0x85, 0xec, 0xec, 0xfa, + 0x4b, 0x4b, 0xb5, 0xe8, 0xea, 0xd0, 0x44, 0x0e, + 0x20, 0xb6, 0xe8, 0xdb, 0x09, 0xd8, 0x81, 0xa7, + 0xc6, 0x13, 0x2f, 0x42, 0x0e, 0x52, 0x79, 0x50, + 0x42, 0xbd, 0xfa, 0x77, 0x73, 0xd8, 0xa9, 0x05, + 0x14, 0x47, 0xb3, 0x29, 0x1c, 0xe1, 0x41, 0x1c, + 0x68, 0x04, 0x65, 0x55, 0x2a, 0xa6, 0xc4, 0x05, + 0xb7, 0x76, 0x4d, 0x5e, 0x87, 0xbe, 0xa8, 0x5a, + 0xd0, 0x0f, 0x84, 0x49, 0xed, 0x8f, 0x72, 0xd0, + 0xd6, 0x62, 0xab, 0x05, 0x26, 0x91, 0xca, 0x66, + 0x42, 0x4b, 0xc8, 0x6d, 0x2d, 0xf8, 0x0e, 0xa4, + 0x1f, 0x43, 0xab, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xd3, 0x25, 0x9d, + 0xc4, 0xb2, 0xd0, 0xdf, 0xb4, 0x8a, 0x6c, 0x91, + 0x39, 0xdd, 0xd7, 0xf7, 0x69, 0x66, 0xe9, 0x28, + 0xe6, 0x35, 0x55, 0x3b, 0xa7, 0x6c, 0x5c, 0x87, + 0x9d, 0x7b, 0x35, 0xd4, 0x9e, 0xb2, 0xe6, 0x2b, + 0x08, 0x71, 0xcd, 0xac, 0x63, 0x89, 0x39, 0xe2, + 0x5e, 0x8a, 0x1e, 0x0e, 0xf9, 0xd5, 0x28, 0x0f, + 0xa8, 0xca, 0x32, 0x8b, 0x35, 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x76, + 0x59, 0x89, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0x3d, 0xaa, 0x8b, 0x6c, + 0xcc, 0x3a, 0xaf, 0x9f, 0x39, 0x79, 0xc9, 0x2b, + 0x37, 0x20, 0xfc, 0x88, 0xdc, 0x95, 0xed, 0x84, + 0xa1, 0xbe, 0x05, 0x9c, 0x64, 0x99, 0xb9, 0xfd, + 0xa2, 0x36, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0x18, 0xb0, 0x4b, 0x0b, + 0xc3, 0x9c, 0x1e, 0x87, 0x6b, 0x19, 0x3b, 0xfe, + 0x55, 0x69, 0x75, 0x3f, 0x88, 0x12, 0x8c, 0xc0, + 0x8a, 0xaa, 0x9b, 0x63, 0xd1, 0xa1, 0x6f, 0x80, + 0xef, 0x25, 0x54, 0xd7, 0x18, 0x9c, 0x41, 0x1f, + 0x58, 0x69, 0xca, 0x52, 0xc5, 0xb8, 0x3f, 0xa3, + 0x6f, 0xf2, 0x16, 0xb9, 0xc1, 0xd3, 0x00, 0x62, + 0xbe, 0xbc, 0xfd, 0x2d, 0xc5, 0xbc, 0xe0, 0x91, + 0x19, 0x34, 0xfd, 0xa7, 0x9a, 0x86, 0xf6, 0xe6, + 0x98, 0xce, 0xd7, 0x59, 0xc3, 0xff, 0x9b, 0x64, + 0x77, 0x33, 0x8f, 0x3d, 0xa4, 0xf9, 0xcd, 0x85, + 0x14, 0xea, 0x99, 0x82, 0xcc, 0xaf, 0xb3, 0x41, + 0xb2, 0x38, 0x4d, 0xd9, 0x02, 0xf3, 0xd1, 0xab, + 0x7a, 0xc6, 0x1d, 0xd2, 0x9c, 0x6f, 0x21, 0xba, + 0x5b, 0x86, 0x2f, 0x37, 0x30, 0xe3, 0x7c, 0xfd, + 0xc4, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x6c, 0x22, 0xf2, 0x21 + } +}; + +static const size_t test_lengths[2] = +{ + 64U, + 375U +}; + +/* Make sure no other definition is already present. */ +#undef ASSERT + +#define ASSERT(cond, args) \ + do \ + { \ + if (!(cond)) \ + { \ + if (verbose != 0) \ + mbedtls_printf args; \ + \ + return -1; \ + } \ + } \ + while (0) + +int mbedtls_chacha20_self_test(int verbose) +{ + unsigned char output[381]; + unsigned i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + for (i = 0U; i < 2U; i++) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" ChaCha20 test %u ", i); + } + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_crypt(test_keys[i], + test_nonces[i], + test_counters[i], + test_lengths[i], + test_input[i], + output); + + ASSERT(0 == ret, ("error code: %i\n", ret)); + + ASSERT(0 == memcmp(output, test_output[i], test_lengths[i]), + ("failed (output)\n")); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ diff --git a/library/chachapoly.c b/library/chachapoly.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a1314eab6df --- /dev/null +++ b/library/chachapoly.c @@ -0,0 +1,478 @@ +/** + * \file chachapoly.c + * + * \brief ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD construction based on RFC 7539. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) + +#define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT (0) +#define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD (1) +#define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT (2) /* Encrypting or decrypting */ +#define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_FINISHED (3) + +/** + * \brief Adds nul bytes to pad the AAD for Poly1305. + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. + */ +static int chachapoly_pad_aad(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx) +{ + uint32_t partial_block_len = (uint32_t) (ctx->aad_len % 16U); + unsigned char zeroes[15]; + + if (partial_block_len == 0U) { + return 0; + } + + memset(zeroes, 0, sizeof(zeroes)); + + return mbedtls_poly1305_update(&ctx->poly1305_ctx, + zeroes, + 16U - partial_block_len); +} + +/** + * \brief Adds nul bytes to pad the ciphertext for Poly1305. + * + * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. + */ +static int chachapoly_pad_ciphertext(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx) +{ + uint32_t partial_block_len = (uint32_t) (ctx->ciphertext_len % 16U); + unsigned char zeroes[15]; + + if (partial_block_len == 0U) { + return 0; + } + + memset(zeroes, 0, sizeof(zeroes)); + return mbedtls_poly1305_update(&ctx->poly1305_ctx, + zeroes, + 16U - partial_block_len); +} + +void mbedtls_chachapoly_init(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_chacha20_init(&ctx->chacha20_ctx); + mbedtls_poly1305_init(&ctx->poly1305_ctx); + ctx->aad_len = 0U; + ctx->ciphertext_len = 0U; + ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT; + ctx->mode = MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT; +} + +void mbedtls_chachapoly_free(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_chacha20_free(&ctx->chacha20_ctx); + mbedtls_poly1305_free(&ctx->poly1305_ctx); + ctx->aad_len = 0U; + ctx->ciphertext_len = 0U; + ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT; + ctx->mode = MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT; +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[32]) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_setkey(&ctx->chacha20_ctx, key); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_starts(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char poly1305_key[64]; + + /* Set counter = 0, will be update to 1 when generating Poly1305 key */ + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_starts(&ctx->chacha20_ctx, nonce, 0U); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Generate the Poly1305 key by getting the ChaCha20 keystream output with + * counter = 0. This is the same as encrypting a buffer of zeroes. + * Only the first 256-bits (32 bytes) of the key is used for Poly1305. + * The other 256 bits are discarded. + */ + memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key)); + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update(&ctx->chacha20_ctx, sizeof(poly1305_key), + poly1305_key, poly1305_key); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_starts(&ctx->poly1305_ctx, poly1305_key); + + if (ret == 0) { + ctx->aad_len = 0U; + ctx->ciphertext_len = 0U; + ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD; + ctx->mode = mode; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(poly1305_key, 64U); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len) +{ + if (ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE; + } + + ctx->aad_len += aad_len; + + return mbedtls_poly1305_update(&ctx->poly1305_ctx, aad, aad_len); +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_update(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + size_t len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD) && + (ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD) { + ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT; + + ret = chachapoly_pad_aad(ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + ctx->ciphertext_len += len; + + if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT) { + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update(&ctx->chacha20_ctx, len, input, output); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_update(&ctx->poly1305_ctx, output, len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } else { /* DECRYPT */ + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_update(&ctx->poly1305_ctx, input, len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update(&ctx->chacha20_ctx, len, input, output); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + unsigned char mac[16]) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char len_block[16]; + + if (ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD) { + ret = chachapoly_pad_aad(ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } else if (ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT) { + ret = chachapoly_pad_ciphertext(ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_FINISHED; + + /* The lengths of the AAD and ciphertext are processed by + * Poly1305 as the final 128-bit block, encoded as little-endian integers. + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(ctx->aad_len, len_block, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(ctx->ciphertext_len, len_block, 8); + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_update(&ctx->poly1305_ctx, len_block, 16U); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_finish(&ctx->poly1305_ctx, mac); + + return ret; +} + +static int chachapoly_crypt_and_tag(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode, + size_t length, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + unsigned char tag[16]) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_starts(ctx, nonce, mode); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad(ctx, aad, aad_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_update(ctx, length, input, output); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(ctx, tag); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + unsigned char tag[16]) +{ + return chachapoly_crypt_and_tag(ctx, MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT, + length, nonce, aad, aad_len, + input, output, tag); +} + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char nonce[12], + const unsigned char *aad, + size_t aad_len, + const unsigned char tag[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char check_tag[16]; + int diff; + + if ((ret = chachapoly_crypt_and_tag(ctx, + MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT, length, nonce, + aad, aad_len, input, output, check_tag)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Check tag in "constant-time" */ + diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, sizeof(check_tag)); + + if (diff != 0) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(output, length); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +static const unsigned char test_key[1][32] = +{ + { + 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87, + 0x88, 0x89, 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x8f, + 0x90, 0x91, 0x92, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, 0x97, + 0x98, 0x99, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0x9e, 0x9f + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_nonce[1][12] = +{ + { + 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* 32-bit common part */ + 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47 /* 64-bit IV */ + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_aad[1][12] = +{ + { + 0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, + 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7 + } +}; + +static const size_t test_aad_len[1] = +{ + 12U +}; + +static const unsigned char test_input[1][114] = +{ + { + 0x4c, 0x61, 0x64, 0x69, 0x65, 0x73, 0x20, 0x61, + 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x47, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x6c, + 0x65, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x20, + 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x73, + 0x73, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x20, 0x27, 0x39, 0x39, + 0x3a, 0x20, 0x49, 0x66, 0x20, 0x49, 0x20, 0x63, + 0x6f, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x64, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x66, + 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x79, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x20, 0x6f, + 0x6e, 0x6c, 0x79, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x20, + 0x74, 0x69, 0x70, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, + 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x66, 0x75, 0x74, 0x75, + 0x72, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x73, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x73, + 0x63, 0x72, 0x65, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x77, 0x6f, + 0x75, 0x6c, 0x64, 0x20, 0x62, 0x65, 0x20, 0x69, + 0x74, 0x2e + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_output[1][114] = +{ + { + 0xd3, 0x1a, 0x8d, 0x34, 0x64, 0x8e, 0x60, 0xdb, + 0x7b, 0x86, 0xaf, 0xbc, 0x53, 0xef, 0x7e, 0xc2, + 0xa4, 0xad, 0xed, 0x51, 0x29, 0x6e, 0x08, 0xfe, + 0xa9, 0xe2, 0xb5, 0xa7, 0x36, 0xee, 0x62, 0xd6, + 0x3d, 0xbe, 0xa4, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xa9, 0x67, 0x12, + 0x82, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0x69, 0xda, 0x92, 0x72, 0x8b, + 0x1a, 0x71, 0xde, 0x0a, 0x9e, 0x06, 0x0b, 0x29, + 0x05, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xb6, 0x7e, 0xcd, 0x3b, 0x36, + 0x92, 0xdd, 0xbd, 0x7f, 0x2d, 0x77, 0x8b, 0x8c, + 0x98, 0x03, 0xae, 0xe3, 0x28, 0x09, 0x1b, 0x58, + 0xfa, 0xb3, 0x24, 0xe4, 0xfa, 0xd6, 0x75, 0x94, + 0x55, 0x85, 0x80, 0x8b, 0x48, 0x31, 0xd7, 0xbc, + 0x3f, 0xf4, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x8e, 0x4b, 0x7a, 0x9d, + 0xe5, 0x76, 0xd2, 0x65, 0x86, 0xce, 0xc6, 0x4b, + 0x61, 0x16 + } +}; + +static const size_t test_input_len[1] = +{ + 114U +}; + +static const unsigned char test_mac[1][16] = +{ + { + 0x1a, 0xe1, 0x0b, 0x59, 0x4f, 0x09, 0xe2, 0x6a, + 0x7e, 0x90, 0x2e, 0xcb, 0xd0, 0x60, 0x06, 0x91 + } +}; + +/* Make sure no other definition is already present. */ +#undef ASSERT + +#define ASSERT(cond, args) \ + do \ + { \ + if (!(cond)) \ + { \ + if (verbose != 0) \ + mbedtls_printf args; \ + \ + return -1; \ + } \ + } \ + while (0) + +int mbedtls_chachapoly_self_test(int verbose) +{ + mbedtls_chachapoly_context ctx; + unsigned i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char output[200]; + unsigned char mac[16]; + + for (i = 0U; i < 1U; i++) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" ChaCha20-Poly1305 test %u ", i); + } + + mbedtls_chachapoly_init(&ctx); + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(&ctx, test_key[i]); + ASSERT(0 == ret, ("setkey() error code: %i\n", ret)); + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag(&ctx, + test_input_len[i], + test_nonce[i], + test_aad[i], + test_aad_len[i], + test_input[i], + output, + mac); + + ASSERT(0 == ret, ("crypt_and_tag() error code: %i\n", ret)); + + ASSERT(0 == memcmp(output, test_output[i], test_input_len[i]), + ("failure (wrong output)\n")); + + ASSERT(0 == memcmp(mac, test_mac[i], 16U), + ("failure (wrong MAC)\n")); + + mbedtls_chachapoly_free(&ctx); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ diff --git a/library/check_crypto_config.h b/library/check_crypto_config.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..6469e9f4393 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/check_crypto_config.h @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +/** + * \file check_crypto_config.h + * + * \brief Consistency checks for PSA configuration options + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * It is recommended to include this file from your crypto_config.h + * in order to catch dependency issues early. + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H +#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) && \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) && \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES)) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) && \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) && \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) && \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) && \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP) && \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) && \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)) && \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_xxx defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) && \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_xxx defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) && \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_xxx defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR is deprecated and will be removed in a \ + future version of Mbed TLS. Please switch to new PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_xxx \ + symbols, where xxx can be: USE, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR is deprecated and will be removed in a \ + future version of Mbed TLS. Please switch to new PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_xxx \ + symbols, where xxx can be: USE, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR is deprecated and will be removed in a \ + future version of Mbed TLS. Please switch to new PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_xxx \ + symbols, where xxx can be: USE, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) +#warning "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR is deprecated and will be removed in a \ + future version of Mbed TLS. Please switch to new PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_xxx \ + symbols, where xxx can be: USE, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE defined, but feature is not supported" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE defined, but feature is not supported" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + !(defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512)) +#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) && \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) +#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */ diff --git a/library/cipher.c b/library/cipher.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0683677edaa --- /dev/null +++ b/library/cipher.c @@ -0,0 +1,1680 @@ +/** + * \file cipher.c + * + * \brief Generic cipher wrapper for Mbed TLS + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "cipher_wrap.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +static int supported_init = 0; + +static inline const mbedtls_cipher_base_t *mbedtls_cipher_get_base( + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info) +{ + return mbedtls_cipher_base_lookup_table[info->base_idx]; +} + +const int *mbedtls_cipher_list(void) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; + int *type; + + if (!supported_init) { + def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions; + type = mbedtls_cipher_supported; + + while (def->type != 0) { + *type++ = (*def++).type; + } + + *type = 0; + + supported_init = 1; + } + + return mbedtls_cipher_supported; +} + +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( + const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; + + for (def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions; def->info != NULL; def++) { + if (def->type == cipher_type) { + return def->info; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string( + const char *cipher_name) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; + + if (NULL == cipher_name) { + return NULL; + } + + for (def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions; def->info != NULL; def++) { + if (!strcmp(def->info->name, cipher_name)) { + return def->info; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( + const mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id, + int key_bitlen, + const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def; + + for (def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions; def->info != NULL; def++) { + if (mbedtls_cipher_get_base(def->info)->cipher == cipher_id && + mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(def->info) == (unsigned) key_bitlen && + def->info->mode == mode) { + return def->info; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +static inline psa_key_type_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher) +{ + switch (cipher) { + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB: + return PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + + /* ARIA not yet supported in PSA. */ + /* case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC: + return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ); */ + + default: + return 0; + } +} + +static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode( + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode, size_t taglen) +{ + switch (mode) { + case MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB: + return PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING; + case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: + return PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, taglen); + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: + return PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen); + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + return PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG; + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC: + if (taglen == 0) { + return PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + } else { + return 0; + } + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +void mbedtls_cipher_init(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t)); +} + +void mbedtls_cipher_free(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { + if (ctx->cipher_ctx != NULL) { + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + if (cipher_psa->slot_state == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED) { + /* xxx_free() doesn't allow to return failures. */ + (void) psa_destroy_key(cipher_psa->slot); + } + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(cipher_psa, sizeof(*cipher_psa)); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t)); + return; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + if (ctx->cmac_ctx) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ctx->cmac_ctx, + sizeof(mbedtls_cmac_context_t)); + } +#endif + + if (ctx->cipher_ctx) { + mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->ctx_free_func(ctx->cipher_ctx); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t)); +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_setup(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info) +{ + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t)); + + if (mbedtls_cipher_get_base(cipher_info)->ctx_alloc_func != NULL) { + ctx->cipher_ctx = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(cipher_info)->ctx_alloc_func(); + if (ctx->cipher_ctx == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + } + + ctx->cipher_info = cipher_info; + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, + size_t taglen) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg; + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *cipher_psa; + + if (NULL == cipher_info || NULL == ctx) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Check that the underlying cipher mode and cipher type are + * supported by the underlying PSA Crypto implementation. */ + alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode(((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) cipher_info->mode), taglen); + if (alg == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + if (mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type(((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) cipher_info->type)) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t)); + + cipher_psa = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa)); + if (cipher_psa == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + cipher_psa->alg = alg; + ctx->cipher_ctx = cipher_psa; + ctx->cipher_info = cipher_info; + ctx->psa_enabled = 1; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +int mbedtls_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + int key_bitlen, + const mbedtls_operation_t operation) +{ + if (operation != MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT && operation != MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) && + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT == operation) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + size_t const key_bytelen = ((size_t) key_bitlen + 7) / 8; + + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + /* PSA Crypto API only accepts byte-aligned keys. */ + if (key_bitlen % 8 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Don't allow keys to be set multiple times. */ + if (cipher_psa->slot_state != MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_UNSET) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + key_type = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type( + ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)); + if (key_type == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key_type); + + /* Mbed TLS' cipher layer doesn't enforce the mode of operation + * (encrypt vs. decrypt): it is possible to setup a key for encryption + * and use it for AEAD decryption. Until tests relying on this + * are changed, allow any usage in PSA. */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, cipher_psa->alg); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_bytelen, + &cipher_psa->slot); + switch (status) { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + break; + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + /* Indicate that we own the key slot and need to + * destroy it in mbedtls_cipher_free(). */ + cipher_psa->slot_state = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED; + + ctx->key_bitlen = key_bitlen; + ctx->operation = operation; + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + + if ((ctx->cipher_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN) == 0 && + (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(ctx->cipher_info) != key_bitlen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->key_bitlen = key_bitlen; + ctx->operation = operation; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + /* + * For OFB, CFB and CTR mode always use the encryption key schedule + */ + if (MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT == operation || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + return mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->setkey_enc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, key, + ctx->key_bitlen); + } + + if (MBEDTLS_DECRYPT == operation) { + return mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->setkey_dec_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, key, + ctx->key_bitlen); + } +#else + if (operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT || operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) { + return mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->setkey_enc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, key, + ctx->key_bitlen); + } +#endif + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len) +{ + size_t actual_iv_size; + + if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + + /* avoid buffer overflow in ctx->iv */ + if (iv_len > MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + if ((ctx->cipher_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN) != 0) { + actual_iv_size = iv_len; + } else { + actual_iv_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(ctx->cipher_info); + + /* avoid reading past the end of input buffer */ + if (actual_iv_size > iv_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + if (((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type) == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20) { + /* Even though the actual_iv_size is overwritten with a correct value + * of 12 from the cipher info, return an error to indicate that + * the input iv_len is wrong. */ + if (iv_len != 12) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_chacha20_starts((mbedtls_chacha20_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + iv, + 0U)) { /* Initial counter value */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if (((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type) == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 && + iv_len != 12) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + return mbedtls_gcm_starts((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, + iv, iv_len); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + int set_lengths_result; + int ccm_star_mode; + + set_lengths_result = mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( + (mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + 0, 0, 0); + if (set_lengths_result != 0) { + return set_lengths_result; + } + + if (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) { + ccm_star_mode = MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT; + } else if (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT) { + ccm_star_mode = MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return mbedtls_ccm_starts((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ccm_star_mode, + iv, iv_len); + } +#endif + + if (actual_iv_size != 0) { + memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, actual_iv_size); + ctx->iv_size = actual_iv_size; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_reset(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) +{ + if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { + /* We don't support resetting PSA-based + * cipher contexts, yet. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + + ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len) +{ + if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + return mbedtls_gcm_update_ad((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ad, ad_len); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) { + int result; + mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode; + + mode = (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT) + ? MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT + : MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT; + + result = mbedtls_chachapoly_starts((mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->iv, + mode); + if (result != 0) { + return result; + } + + return mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad((mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ad, ad_len); + } +#endif + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t block_size; + + if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + + *olen = 0; + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(ctx); + if (0 == block_size) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT; + } + + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB) { + if (ilen != block_size) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED; + } + + *olen = ilen; + + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->ecb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, input, + output))) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM) { + return mbedtls_gcm_update((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + input, ilen, + output, ilen, olen); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) { + return mbedtls_ccm_update((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + input, ilen, + output, ilen, olen); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if (((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type) == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + *olen = ilen; + return mbedtls_chachapoly_update((mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, input, output); + } +#endif + + if (input == output && + (ctx->unprocessed_len != 0 || ilen % block_size)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { + size_t copy_len = 0; + + /* + * If there is not enough data for a full block, cache it. + */ + if ((ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT && NULL != ctx->add_padding && + ilen <= block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len) || + (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT && NULL == ctx->add_padding && + ilen < block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len) || + (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT && + ilen < block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len)) { + memcpy(&(ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len]), input, + ilen); + + ctx->unprocessed_len += ilen; + return 0; + } + + /* + * Process cached data first + */ + if (0 != ctx->unprocessed_len) { + copy_len = block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len; + + memcpy(&(ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len]), input, + copy_len); + + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, + block_size, ctx->iv, + ctx-> + unprocessed_data, + output))) { + return ret; + } + + *olen += block_size; + output += block_size; + ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + + input += copy_len; + ilen -= copy_len; + } + + /* + * Cache final, incomplete block + */ + if (0 != ilen) { + /* Encryption: only cache partial blocks + * Decryption w/ padding: always keep at least one whole block + * Decryption w/o padding: only cache partial blocks + */ + copy_len = ilen % block_size; + if (copy_len == 0 && + ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT && + NULL != ctx->add_padding) { + copy_len = block_size; + } + + memcpy(ctx->unprocessed_data, &(input[ilen - copy_len]), + copy_len); + + ctx->unprocessed_len += copy_len; + ilen -= copy_len; + } + + /* + * Process remaining full blocks + */ + if (ilen) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, + ilen, ctx->iv, + input, + output))) { + return ret; + } + + *olen += ilen; + } + + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->cfb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, ilen, + &ctx->unprocessed_len, + ctx->iv, + input, output))) { + return ret; + } + + *olen = ilen; + + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->ofb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, + &ctx->unprocessed_len, + ctx->iv, + input, output))) { + return ret; + } + + *olen = ilen; + + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->ctr_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, + &ctx->unprocessed_len, + ctx->iv, + ctx->unprocessed_data, + input, output))) { + return ret; + } + + *olen = ilen; + + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS) { + if (ctx->unprocessed_len > 0) { + /* We can only process an entire data unit at a time. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->xts_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, + ilen, + ctx->iv, + input, + output); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + *olen = ilen; + + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM) { + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->stream_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, input, + output))) { + return ret; + } + + *olen = ilen; + + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM */ + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) +/* + * PKCS7 (and PKCS5) padding: fill with ll bytes, with ll = padding_len + */ +static void add_pkcs_padding(unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t data_len) +{ + size_t padding_len = output_len - data_len; + unsigned char i; + + for (i = 0; i < padding_len; i++) { + output[data_len + i] = (unsigned char) padding_len; + } +} + +static int get_pkcs_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + size_t *data_len) +{ + size_t i, pad_idx; + unsigned char padding_len; + + if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + padding_len = input[input_len - 1]; + *data_len = input_len - padding_len; + + mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padding_len, input_len); + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(padding_len, 0)); + + /* The number of bytes checked must be independent of padding_len, + * so pick input_len, which is usually 8 or 16 (one block) */ + pad_idx = input_len - padding_len; + for (i = 0; i < input_len; i++) { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t in_padding = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, pad_idx); + mbedtls_ct_condition_t different = mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i], padding_len); + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, different)); + } + + return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS) +/* + * One and zeros padding: fill with 80 00 ... 00 + */ +static void add_one_and_zeros_padding(unsigned char *output, + size_t output_len, size_t data_len) +{ + size_t padding_len = output_len - data_len; + unsigned char i = 0; + + output[data_len] = 0x80; + for (i = 1; i < padding_len; i++) { + output[data_len + i] = 0x00; + } +} + +static int get_one_and_zeros_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + size_t *data_len) +{ + if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_ct_condition_t in_padding = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE; + + *data_len = 0; + + for (ptrdiff_t i = (ptrdiff_t) (input_len) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t is_nonzero = mbedtls_ct_bool(input[i]); + + mbedtls_ct_condition_t hit_first_nonzero = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(is_nonzero, in_padding); + + *data_len = mbedtls_ct_size_if(hit_first_nonzero, i, *data_len); + + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_if(hit_first_nonzero, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i], 0x80), bad); + + in_padding = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, mbedtls_ct_bool_not(is_nonzero)); + } + + return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN) +/* + * Zeros and len padding: fill with 00 ... 00 ll, where ll is padding length + */ +static void add_zeros_and_len_padding(unsigned char *output, + size_t output_len, size_t data_len) +{ + size_t padding_len = output_len - data_len; + unsigned char i = 0; + + for (i = 1; i < padding_len; i++) { + output[data_len + i - 1] = 0x00; + } + output[output_len - 1] = (unsigned char) padding_len; +} + +static int get_zeros_and_len_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + size_t *data_len) +{ + size_t i, pad_idx; + unsigned char padding_len; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad; + + if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + padding_len = input[input_len - 1]; + *data_len = input_len - padding_len; + + /* Avoid logical || since it results in a branch */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padding_len, input_len); + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(padding_len, 0)); + + /* The number of bytes checked must be independent of padding_len */ + pad_idx = input_len - padding_len; + for (i = 0; i < input_len - 1; i++) { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t is_padding = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, pad_idx); + mbedtls_ct_condition_t nonzero_pad_byte; + nonzero_pad_byte = mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(is_padding, mbedtls_ct_bool(input[i])); + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, nonzero_pad_byte); + } + + return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS) +/* + * Zero padding: fill with 00 ... 00 + */ +static void add_zeros_padding(unsigned char *output, + size_t output_len, size_t data_len) +{ + memset(output + data_len, 0, output_len - data_len); +} + +static int get_zeros_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + size_t *data_len) +{ + size_t i; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t done = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE, prev_done; + + if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + *data_len = 0; + for (i = input_len; i > 0; i--) { + prev_done = done; + done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(done, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i-1], 0)); + *data_len = mbedtls_ct_size_if(mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(done, prev_done), i, *data_len); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS */ + +/* + * No padding: don't pad :) + * + * There is no add_padding function (check for NULL in mbedtls_cipher_finish) + * but a trivial get_padding function + */ +static int get_no_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + size_t *data_len) +{ + if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + *data_len = input_len; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ + +int mbedtls_cipher_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen) +{ + if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + + *olen = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) + /* CBC mode requires padding so we make sure a call to + * mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode has been done successfully. */ + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + if (ctx->get_padding == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } +#endif + + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + return 0; + } + + if ((MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) || + (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type))) { + return 0; + } + + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + if (ctx->unprocessed_len != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED; + } + + return 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + int ret = 0; + + if (MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT == ctx->operation) { + /* check for 'no padding' mode */ + if (NULL == ctx->add_padding) { + if (0 != ctx->unprocessed_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED; + } + + return 0; + } + + ctx->add_padding(ctx->unprocessed_data, mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size(ctx), + ctx->unprocessed_len); + } else if (mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(ctx) != ctx->unprocessed_len) { + /* + * For decrypt operations, expect a full block, + * or an empty block if no padding + */ + if (NULL == ctx->add_padding && 0 == ctx->unprocessed_len) { + return 0; + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED; + } + + /* cipher block */ + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ctx->operation, + mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( + ctx), + ctx->iv, + ctx->unprocessed_data, + output))) { + return ret; + } + + /* Set output size for decryption */ + if (MBEDTLS_DECRYPT == ctx->operation) { + return ctx->get_padding(output, mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(ctx), + olen); + } + + /* Set output size for encryption */ + *olen = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(ctx); + return 0; + } +#else + ((void) output); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) +int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode) +{ + if (NULL == ctx->cipher_info || + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC != ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { + /* While PSA Crypto knows about CBC padding + * schemes, we currently don't make them + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + if (mode != MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + + switch (mode) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) + case MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7: + ctx->add_padding = add_pkcs_padding; + ctx->get_padding = get_pkcs_padding; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS) + case MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS: + ctx->add_padding = add_one_and_zeros_padding; + ctx->get_padding = get_one_and_zeros_padding; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN) + case MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN: + ctx->add_padding = add_zeros_and_len_padding; + ctx->get_padding = get_zeros_and_len_padding; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS) + case MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS: + ctx->add_padding = add_zeros_padding; + ctx->get_padding = get_zeros_padding; + break; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE: + ctx->add_padding = NULL; + ctx->get_padding = get_no_padding; + break; + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ + if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT != ctx->operation) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + size_t output_length; + /* The code here doesn't yet support alternative implementations + * that can delay up to a block of output. */ + return mbedtls_gcm_finish((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + NULL, 0, &output_length, + tag, tag_len); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) { + /* Don't allow truncated MAC for Poly1305 */ + if (tag_len != 16U) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( + (mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, tag); + } +#endif + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ + unsigned char check_tag[16]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (MBEDTLS_DECRYPT != ctx->operation) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { + /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart + * operations, we currently don't make it + * accessible through the cipher layer. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + + /* Status to return on a non-authenticated algorithm. */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + size_t output_length; + /* The code here doesn't yet support alternative implementations + * that can delay up to a block of output. */ + + if (tag_len > sizeof(check_tag)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish( + (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, + NULL, 0, &output_length, + check_tag, tag_len))) { + return ret; + } + + /* Check the tag in "constant-time" */ + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, tag_len) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) { + /* Don't allow truncated MAC for Poly1305 */ + if (tag_len != sizeof(check_tag)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_finish( + (mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, check_tag); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Check the tag in "constant-time" */ + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, tag_len) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(check_tag, tag_len); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +/* + * Packet-oriented wrapper for non-AEAD modes + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_crypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t finish_olen; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { + /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that + * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will + * still be in its default state of 0, which is + * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call + * below will gracefully fail. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + psa_status_t status; + psa_cipher_operation_t cipher_op = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t part_len; + + if (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) { + status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(&cipher_op, + cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg); + } else if (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT) { + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(&cipher_op, + cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg); + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* In the following, we can immediately return on an error, + * because the PSA Crypto API guarantees that cipher operations + * are terminated by unsuccessful calls to psa_cipher_update(), + * and by any call to psa_cipher_finish(). */ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) != MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB) { + status = psa_cipher_set_iv(&cipher_op, iv, iv_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + } + + status = psa_cipher_update(&cipher_op, + input, ilen, + output, ilen, olen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_cipher_finish(&cipher_op, + output + *olen, ilen - *olen, + &part_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + *olen += part_len; + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(ctx, iv, iv_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_reset(ctx)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, input, ilen, + output, olen)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish(ctx, output + *olen, + &finish_olen)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + *olen += finish_olen; + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) +/* + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function used by + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). + */ +static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { + /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that + * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will + * still be in its default state of 0, which is + * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call + * below will gracefully fail. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + psa_status_t status; + + /* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag + * at the end of the encrypted message. */ + if (output == NULL || tag != output + ilen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + status = psa_aead_encrypt(cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg, + iv, iv_len, + ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, + output, ilen + tag_len, olen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + *olen -= tag_len; + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + *olen = ilen; + return mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(ctx->cipher_ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, + ilen, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, output, tag_len, tag); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + *olen = ilen; + return mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, + iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, input, output, + tag, tag_len); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) { + /* ChachaPoly has fixed length nonce and MAC (tag) */ + if ((iv_len != mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(ctx->cipher_info)) || + (tag_len != 16U)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + *olen = ilen; + return mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag(ctx->cipher_ctx, + ilen, iv, ad, ad_len, input, output, tag); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} + +/* + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function used by + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(). + */ +static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) { + /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that + * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will + * still be in its default state of 0, which is + * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call + * below will gracefully fail. */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa = + (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx; + + psa_status_t status; + + /* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag + * at the end of the encrypted message. */ + if (input == NULL || tag != input + ilen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + status = psa_aead_decrypt(cipher_psa->slot, + cipher_psa->alg, + iv, iv_len, + ad, ad_len, + input, ilen + tag_len, + output, ilen, olen); + if (status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + } else if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *olen = ilen; + ret = mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, + iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + tag, tag_len, input, output); + + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + } + + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *olen = ilen; + ret = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, + iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, output, tag, tag_len); + + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + } + + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* ChachaPoly has fixed length nonce and MAC (tag) */ + if ((iv_len != mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(ctx->cipher_info)) || + (tag_len != 16U)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + *olen = ilen; + ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen, + iv, ad, ad_len, tag, input, output); + + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + } + + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +/* + * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD/NIST_KW: public function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + if ( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + ctx->psa_enabled == 0 && +#endif + (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode))) { + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = + (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) ? + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; + + /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, + * so these length should be 0 as documented. */ + if (iv_len != 0 || tag_len != 0 || ad_len != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + (void) iv; + (void) ad; + + return mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap(ctx->cipher_ctx, mode, input, ilen, + output, olen, output_len); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) + /* AEAD case: check length before passing on to shared function */ + if (output_len < ilen + tag_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + int ret = mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen, output, olen, + output + ilen, tag_len); + *olen += tag_len; + return ret; +#else + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ +} + +/* + * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD/NIST_KW: public function. + */ +int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + size_t *olen, size_t tag_len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + if ( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + ctx->psa_enabled == 0 && +#endif + (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) || + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode))) { + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode = + (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) ? + MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP; + + /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP, + * so these length should be 0 as documented. */ + if (iv_len != 0 || tag_len != 0 || ad_len != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + (void) iv; + (void) ad; + + return mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(ctx->cipher_ctx, mode, input, ilen, + output, olen, output_len); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) + /* AEAD case: check length before passing on to shared function */ + if (ilen < tag_len || output_len < ilen - tag_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, + input, ilen - tag_len, output, olen, + input + ilen - tag_len, tag_len); +#else + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD || MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ diff --git a/library/cipher_wrap.c b/library/cipher_wrap.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d2fee22e2bc --- /dev/null +++ b/library/cipher_wrap.c @@ -0,0 +1,2482 @@ +/** + * \file cipher_wrap.c + * + * \brief Generic cipher wrapper for Mbed TLS + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + +#include "cipher_wrap.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) +#include "mbedtls/aria.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#include +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +enum mbedtls_cipher_base_index { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHA20_BASE, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHAPOLY_BASE, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE3, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_NULL_BASE, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_XTS_AES, +#endif + /* Prevent compile failure due to empty enum */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_PREVENT_EMPTY_ENUM +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)) +/* shared by all GCM ciphers */ +static void *gcm_ctx_alloc(void) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_gcm_context)); + + if (ctx != NULL) { + mbedtls_gcm_init((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx); + } + + return ctx; +} + +static void gcm_ctx_free(void *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_gcm_free(ctx); + mbedtls_free(ctx); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)) +/* shared by all CCM ciphers */ +static void *ccm_ctx_alloc(void) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ccm_context)); + + if (ctx != NULL) { + mbedtls_ccm_init((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx); + } + + return ctx; +} + +static void ccm_ctx_free(void *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_ccm_free(ctx); + mbedtls_free(ctx); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + +static int aes_crypt_ecb_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, operation, input, output); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static int aes_crypt_cbc_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, size_t length, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, input, + output); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static int aes_crypt_cfb128_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv_off, iv, + input, output); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +static int aes_crypt_ofb_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, length, iv_off, + iv, input, output); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static int aes_crypt_ctr_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, length, nc_off, nonce_counter, + stream_block, input, output); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +static int aes_crypt_xts_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, + const unsigned char data_unit[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = ctx; + int mode; + + switch (operation) { + case MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT: + mode = MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DECRYPT: + mode = MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT; + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(xts_ctx, mode, length, + data_unit, input, output); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +static int aes_setkey_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen); +} +#endif + +static int aes_setkey_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + return mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen); +} + +static void *aes_ctx_alloc(void) +{ + mbedtls_aes_context *aes = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_aes_context)); + + if (aes == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + mbedtls_aes_init(aes); + + return aes; +} + +static void aes_ctx_free(void *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_aes_free((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx); + mbedtls_free(ctx); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t aes_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + aes_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + aes_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + aes_crypt_cfb128_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + aes_crypt_ofb_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + aes_crypt_ctr_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + aes_setkey_enc_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + aes_setkey_dec_wrap, +#endif + aes_ctx_alloc, + aes_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ecb_info = { + "AES-128-ECB", + 16, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES +}; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ecb_info = { + "AES-192-ECB", + 16, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ecb_info = { + "AES-256-ECB", + 16, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_cbc_info = { + "AES-128-CBC", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES +}; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_cbc_info = { + "AES-192-CBC", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_cbc_info = { + "AES-256-CBC", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES +}; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_cfb128_info = { + "AES-128-CFB128", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES +}; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_cfb128_info = { + "AES-192-CFB128", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_cfb128_info = { + "AES-256-CFB128", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES +}; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ofb_info = { + "AES-128-OFB", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES +}; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ofb_info = { + "AES-192-OFB", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ofb_info = { + "AES-256-OFB", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES +}; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ctr_info = { + "AES-128-CTR", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES +}; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ctr_info = { + "AES-192-CTR", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ctr_info = { + "AES-256-CTR", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES +}; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) +static int xts_aes_setkey_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = ctx; + return mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc(xts_ctx, key, key_bitlen); +} + +static int xts_aes_setkey_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = ctx; + return mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec(xts_ctx, key, key_bitlen); +} + +static void *xts_aes_ctx_alloc(void) +{ + mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(*xts_ctx)); + + if (xts_ctx != NULL) { + mbedtls_aes_xts_init(xts_ctx); + } + + return xts_ctx; +} + +static void xts_aes_ctx_free(void *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = ctx; + + if (xts_ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_aes_xts_free(xts_ctx); + mbedtls_free(xts_ctx); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t xts_aes_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + aes_crypt_xts_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + xts_aes_setkey_enc_wrap, + xts_aes_setkey_dec_wrap, + xts_aes_ctx_alloc, + xts_aes_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_xts_info = { + "AES-128-XTS", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_XTS_AES +}; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_xts_info = { + "AES-256-XTS", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 512 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_XTS_AES +}; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) +static int gcm_aes_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + return mbedtls_gcm_setkey((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + key, key_bitlen); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C && MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_aes_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + gcm_aes_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + gcm_aes_setkey_wrap, +#endif + gcm_ctx_alloc, + gcm_ctx_free, +#else + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_gcm_info = { + "AES-128-GCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES +}; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_gcm_info = { + "AES-192-GCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_gcm_info = { + "AES-256-GCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES +}; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) +static int ccm_aes_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + return mbedtls_ccm_setkey((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + key, key_bitlen); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C && MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_aes_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + ccm_aes_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + ccm_aes_setkey_wrap, +#endif + ccm_ctx_alloc, + ccm_ctx_free, +#else + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, +#endif +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ccm_info = { + "AES-128-CCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES +}; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ccm_info = { + "AES-192-CCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ccm_info = { + "AES-256-CCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES +}; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES +}; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES +}; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */ + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + +static int camellia_crypt_ecb_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb((mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, operation, input, + output); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static int camellia_crypt_cbc_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc((mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, + input, output); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static int camellia_crypt_cfb128_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128((mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, operation, length, + iv_off, iv, input, output); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static int camellia_crypt_ctr_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr((mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, length, nc_off, + nonce_counter, stream_block, input, output); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +static int camellia_setkey_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec((mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen); +} +#endif + +static int camellia_setkey_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + return mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc((mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen); +} + +static void *camellia_ctx_alloc(void) +{ + mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx; + ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_camellia_context)); + + if (ctx == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + mbedtls_camellia_init(ctx); + + return ctx; +} + +static void camellia_ctx_free(void *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_camellia_free((mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx); + mbedtls_free(ctx); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t camellia_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, + camellia_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + camellia_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + camellia_crypt_cfb128_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + camellia_crypt_ctr_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + camellia_setkey_enc_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + camellia_setkey_dec_wrap, +#endif + camellia_ctx_alloc, + camellia_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ecb_info = { + "CAMELLIA-128-ECB", + 16, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ecb_info = { + "CAMELLIA-192-ECB", + 16, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ecb_info = { + "CAMELLIA-256-ECB", + 16, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_cbc_info = { + "CAMELLIA-128-CBC", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_cbc_info = { + "CAMELLIA-192-CBC", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_cbc_info = { + "CAMELLIA-256-CBC", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_cfb128_info = { + "CAMELLIA-128-CFB128", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_cfb128_info = { + "CAMELLIA-192-CFB128", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_cfb128_info = { + "CAMELLIA-256-CFB128", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ctr_info = { + "CAMELLIA-128-CTR", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ctr_info = { + "CAMELLIA-192-CTR", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ctr_info = { + "CAMELLIA-256-CTR", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +static int gcm_camellia_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + return mbedtls_gcm_setkey((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, + key, key_bitlen); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_camellia_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + gcm_camellia_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + gcm_camellia_setkey_wrap, +#endif + gcm_ctx_alloc, + gcm_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_gcm_info = { + "CAMELLIA-128-GCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_gcm_info = { + "CAMELLIA-192-GCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_gcm_info = { + "CAMELLIA-256-GCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +static int ccm_camellia_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + return mbedtls_ccm_setkey((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, + key, key_bitlen); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_camellia_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + ccm_camellia_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + ccm_camellia_setkey_wrap, +#endif + ccm_ctx_alloc, + ccm_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ccm_info = { + "CAMELLIA-128-CCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ccm_info = { + "CAMELLIA-192-CCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ccm_info = { + "CAMELLIA-256-CCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + +static int aria_crypt_ecb_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) +{ + (void) operation; + return mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb((mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, input, + output); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static int aria_crypt_cbc_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) +{ + return mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc((mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, + input, output); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static int aria_crypt_cfb128_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) +{ + return mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128((mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, operation, length, + iv_off, iv, input, output); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static int aria_crypt_ctr_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) +{ + return mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr((mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, length, nc_off, + nonce_counter, stream_block, input, output); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) +static int aria_setkey_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + return mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec((mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen); +} +#endif + +static int aria_setkey_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + return mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc((mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen); +} + +static void *aria_ctx_alloc(void) +{ + mbedtls_aria_context *ctx; + ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_aria_context)); + + if (ctx == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + mbedtls_aria_init(ctx); + + return ctx; +} + +static void aria_ctx_free(void *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_aria_free((mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx); + mbedtls_free(ctx); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t aria_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, + aria_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + aria_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + aria_crypt_cfb128_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + aria_crypt_ctr_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + aria_setkey_enc_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + aria_setkey_dec_wrap, +#endif + aria_ctx_alloc, + aria_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ecb_info = { + "ARIA-128-ECB", + 16, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ecb_info = { + "ARIA-192-ECB", + 16, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ecb_info = { + "ARIA-256-ECB", + 16, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_cbc_info = { + "ARIA-128-CBC", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_cbc_info = { + "ARIA-192-CBC", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_cbc_info = { + "ARIA-256-CBC", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_cfb128_info = { + "ARIA-128-CFB128", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CFB128, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_cfb128_info = { + "ARIA-192-CFB128", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CFB128, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_cfb128_info = { + "ARIA-256-CFB128", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CFB128, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ctr_info = { + "ARIA-128-CTR", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CTR, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ctr_info = { + "ARIA-192-CTR", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CTR, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ctr_info = { + "ARIA-256-CTR", + 16, + 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CTR, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +static int gcm_aria_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + return mbedtls_gcm_setkey((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, + key, key_bitlen); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_aria_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + gcm_aria_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + gcm_aria_setkey_wrap, +#endif + gcm_ctx_alloc, + gcm_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_gcm_info = { + "ARIA-128-GCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_gcm_info = { + "ARIA-192-GCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_gcm_info = { + "ARIA-256-GCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +static int ccm_aria_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + return mbedtls_ccm_setkey((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, + key, key_bitlen); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_aria_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + ccm_aria_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + ccm_aria_setkey_wrap, +#endif + ccm_ctx_alloc, + ccm_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ccm_info = { + "ARIA-128-CCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ccm_info = { + "ARIA-192-CCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ccm_info = { + "ARIA-256-CCM", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info = { + "ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG", + 16, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + +static int des_crypt_ecb_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) +{ + ((void) operation); + return mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb((mbedtls_des_context *) ctx, input, output); +} + +static int des3_crypt_ecb_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) +{ + ((void) operation); + return mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb((mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, input, output); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static int des_crypt_cbc_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, size_t length, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) +{ + return mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc((mbedtls_des_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, input, + output); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static int des3_crypt_cbc_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, size_t length, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) +{ + return mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc((mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, input, + output); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +static int des_setkey_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des_setkey_dec((mbedtls_des_context *) ctx, key); +} + +static int des_setkey_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des_setkey_enc((mbedtls_des_context *) ctx, key); +} + +static int des3_set2key_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec((mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, key); +} + +static int des3_set2key_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc((mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, key); +} + +static int des3_set3key_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec((mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, key); +} + +static int des3_set3key_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc((mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, key); +} + +static void *des_ctx_alloc(void) +{ + mbedtls_des_context *des = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_des_context)); + + if (des == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + mbedtls_des_init(des); + + return des; +} + +static void des_ctx_free(void *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_des_free((mbedtls_des_context *) ctx); + mbedtls_free(ctx); +} + +static void *des3_ctx_alloc(void) +{ + mbedtls_des3_context *des3; + des3 = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_des3_context)); + + if (des3 == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + mbedtls_des3_init(des3); + + return des3; +} + +static void des3_ctx_free(void *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_des3_free((mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx); + mbedtls_free(ctx); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES, + des_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + des_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + des_setkey_enc_wrap, + des_setkey_dec_wrap, + des_ctx_alloc, + des_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ecb_info = { + "DES-ECB", + 8, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_cbc_info = { + "DES-CBC", + 8, + 8 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_ede_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES, + des3_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + des3_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + des3_set2key_enc_wrap, + des3_set2key_dec_wrap, + des3_ctx_alloc, + des3_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede_ecb_info = { + "DES-EDE-ECB", + 8, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede_cbc_info = { + "DES-EDE-CBC", + 8, + 8 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_ede3_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES, + des3_crypt_ecb_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + des3_crypt_cbc_wrap, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + des3_set3key_enc_wrap, + des3_set3key_dec_wrap, + des3_ctx_alloc, + des3_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede3_ecb_info = { + "DES-EDE3-ECB", + 8, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE3 +}; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede3_cbc_info = { + "DES-EDE3-CBC", + 8, + 8 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE3 +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + +static int chacha20_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + if (key_bitlen != 256U) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_chacha20_setkey((mbedtls_chacha20_context *) ctx, key)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int chacha20_stream_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update(ctx, length, input, output); + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ret; +} + +static void *chacha20_ctx_alloc(void) +{ + mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx; + ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_chacha20_context)); + + if (ctx == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + mbedtls_chacha20_init(ctx); + + return ctx; +} + +static void chacha20_ctx_free(void *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_chacha20_free((mbedtls_chacha20_context *) ctx); + mbedtls_free(ctx); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t chacha20_base_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + chacha20_stream_wrap, +#endif + chacha20_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + chacha20_setkey_wrap, +#endif + chacha20_ctx_alloc, + chacha20_ctx_free +}; +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t chacha20_info = { + "CHACHA20", + 1, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHA20_BASE +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + +static int chachapoly_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + if (key_bitlen != 256U) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey((mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx, key)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} + +static void *chachapoly_ctx_alloc(void) +{ + mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx; + ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_chachapoly_context)); + + if (ctx == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + mbedtls_chachapoly_init(ctx); + + return ctx; +} + +static void chachapoly_ctx_free(void *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_chachapoly_free((mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx); + mbedtls_free(ctx); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t chachapoly_base_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + chachapoly_setkey_wrap, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + chachapoly_setkey_wrap, +#endif + chachapoly_ctx_alloc, + chachapoly_ctx_free +}; +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t chachapoly_info = { + "CHACHA20-POLY1305", + 1, + 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHAPOLY_BASE +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +static int null_crypt_stream(void *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + ((void) ctx); + memmove(output, input, length); + return 0; +} + +static int null_setkey(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + ((void) ctx); + ((void) key); + ((void) key_bitlen); + + return 0; +} + +static void *null_ctx_alloc(void) +{ + return (void *) 1; +} + +static void null_ctx_free(void *ctx) +{ + ((void) ctx); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t null_base_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NULL, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + null_crypt_stream, +#endif + null_setkey, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + null_setkey, +#endif + null_ctx_alloc, + null_ctx_free +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t null_cipher_info = { + "NULL", + 1, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_NULL_BASE +}; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) +static void *kw_ctx_alloc(void) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_nist_kw_context)); + + if (ctx != NULL) { + mbedtls_nist_kw_init((mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx); + } + + return ctx; +} + +static void kw_ctx_free(void *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_nist_kw_free(ctx); + mbedtls_free(ctx); +} + +static int kw_aes_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + return mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey((mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, key_bitlen, 1); +} + +static int kw_aes_setkey_unwrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen) +{ + return mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey((mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, key_bitlen, 0); +} + +static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t kw_aes_info = { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + NULL, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + NULL, +#endif + kw_aes_setkey_wrap, + kw_aes_setkey_unwrap, + kw_ctx_alloc, + kw_ctx_free, +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_nist_kw_info = { + "AES-128-KW", + 16, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES +}; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_nist_kw_info = { + "AES-192-KW", + 16, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_nist_kw_info = { + "AES-256-KW", + 16, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES +}; +#endif + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_nist_kwp_info = { + "AES-128-KWP", + 16, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES +}; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_nist_kwp_info = { + "AES-192-KWP", + 16, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES +}; + +static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_nist_kwp_info = { + "AES-256-KWP", + 16, + 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT, + 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT, + MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, + 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES +}; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ + +const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, &aes_128_ecb_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, &aes_192_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, &aes_256_ecb_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, &aes_128_cbc_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, &aes_192_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, &aes_256_cbc_info }, +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128, &aes_128_cfb128_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128, &aes_192_cfb128_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128, &aes_256_cfb128_info }, +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, &aes_128_ofb_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, &aes_192_ofb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, &aes_256_ofb_info }, +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR, &aes_128_ctr_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR, &aes_192_ctr_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR, &aes_256_ctr_info }, +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS, &aes_128_xts_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, &aes_256_xts_info }, +#endif +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, &aes_128_gcm_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM, &aes_192_gcm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, &aes_256_gcm_info }, +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, &aes_128_ccm_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, &aes_192_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, &aes_256_ccm_info }, +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aes_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aes_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aes_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, &camellia_128_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB, &camellia_192_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB, &camellia_256_ecb_info }, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, &camellia_128_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC, &camellia_192_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, &camellia_256_cbc_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128, &camellia_128_cfb128_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128, &camellia_192_cfb128_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128, &camellia_256_cfb128_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR, &camellia_128_ctr_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR, &camellia_192_ctr_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR, &camellia_256_ctr_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, &camellia_128_gcm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM, &camellia_192_gcm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, &camellia_256_gcm_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, &camellia_128_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, &camellia_192_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, &camellia_256_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &camellia_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &camellia_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &camellia_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB, &aria_128_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB, &aria_192_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB, &aria_256_ecb_info }, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, &aria_128_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC, &aria_192_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, &aria_256_cbc_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CFB128, &aria_128_cfb128_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CFB128, &aria_192_cfb128_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CFB128, &aria_256_cfb128_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CTR, &aria_128_ctr_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CTR, &aria_192_ctr_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CTR, &aria_256_ctr_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, &aria_128_gcm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM, &aria_192_gcm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, &aria_256_gcm_info }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, &aria_128_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, &aria_192_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, &aria_256_ccm_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aria_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aria_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aria_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB, &des_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB, &des_ede_ecb_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, &des_ede3_ecb_info }, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, &des_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, &des_ede_cbc_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, &des_ede3_cbc_info }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, &chacha20_info }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, &chachapoly_info }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, &aes_128_nist_kw_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, &aes_192_nist_kw_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, &aes_256_nist_kw_info }, +#endif + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, &aes_128_nist_kwp_info }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, &aes_192_nist_kwp_info }, + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, &aes_256_nist_kwp_info }, +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, &null_cipher_info }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ + + { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, NULL } +}; + +#define NUM_CIPHERS (sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions) / \ + sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions[0])) +int mbedtls_cipher_supported[NUM_CIPHERS]; + +const mbedtls_cipher_base_t *mbedtls_cipher_base_lookup_table[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES] = &aes_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA] = &aria_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA] = &camellia_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES] = &ccm_aes_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA] = &ccm_aria_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA] = &ccm_camellia_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHA20_BASE] = &chacha20_base_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHAPOLY_BASE] = &chachapoly_base_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE3] = &des_ede3_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE] = &des_ede_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES] = &des_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES] = &gcm_aes_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA] = &gcm_aria_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA] = &gcm_camellia_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES] = &kw_aes_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_NULL_BASE] = &null_base_info, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_XTS_AES] = &xts_aes_info +#endif +}; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ diff --git a/library/cipher_wrap.h b/library/cipher_wrap.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f22915120dd --- /dev/null +++ b/library/cipher_wrap.h @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +/** + * \file cipher_wrap.h + * + * \brief Cipher wrappers. + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Support for GCM either through Mbed TLS SW implementation or PSA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) +#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_SOME_AEAD_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA +#endif + +/** + * Base cipher information. The non-mode specific functions and values. + */ +struct mbedtls_cipher_base_t { + /** Base Cipher type (e.g. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES) */ + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher; + + /** Encrypt using ECB */ + int (*ecb_func)(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + /** Encrypt using CBC */ + int (*cbc_func)(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, size_t length, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + /** Encrypt using CFB (Full length) */ + int (*cfb_func)(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, size_t length, size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + /** Encrypt using OFB (Full length) */ + int (*ofb_func)(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *iv_off, + unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + /** Encrypt using CTR */ + int (*ctr_func)(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off, + unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + /** Encrypt or decrypt using XTS. */ + int (*xts_func)(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, size_t length, + const unsigned char data_unit[16], + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM) + /** Encrypt using STREAM */ + int (*stream_func)(void *ctx, size_t length, + const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output); +#endif + + /** Set key for encryption purposes */ + int (*setkey_enc_func)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + /** Set key for decryption purposes */ + int (*setkey_dec_func)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int key_bitlen); +#endif + + /** Allocate a new context */ + void * (*ctx_alloc_func)(void); + + /** Free the given context */ + void (*ctx_free_func)(void *ctx); + +}; + +typedef struct { + mbedtls_cipher_type_t type; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info; +} mbedtls_cipher_definition_t; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_UNSET = 0, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED, /* Used for PSA-based cipher contexts which */ + /* use raw key material internally imported */ + /* as a volatile key, and which hence need */ + /* to destroy that key when the context is */ + /* freed. */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_NOT_OWNED, /* Used for PSA-based cipher contexts */ + /* which use a key provided by the */ + /* user, and which hence will not be */ + /* destroyed when the context is freed. */ +} mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership; + +typedef struct { + psa_algorithm_t alg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t slot; + mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership slot_state; +} mbedtls_cipher_context_psa; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +extern const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[]; + +extern int mbedtls_cipher_supported[]; + +extern const mbedtls_cipher_base_t *mbedtls_cipher_base_lookup_table[]; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H */ diff --git a/library/cmac.c b/library/cmac.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..eda10d0b3dd --- /dev/null +++ b/library/cmac.c @@ -0,0 +1,1067 @@ +/** + * \file cmac.c + * + * \brief NIST SP800-38B compliant CMAC implementation for AES and 3DES + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * - NIST SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The + * CMAC Mode for Authentication + * http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38b.pdf + * + * - RFC 4493 - The AES-CMAC Algorithm + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4493 + * + * - RFC 4615 - The Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher-based Message + * Authentication Code-Pseudo-Random Function-128 (AES-CMAC-PRF-128) + * Algorithm for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4615 + * + * Additional test vectors: ISO/IEC 9797-1 + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * Multiplication by u in the Galois field of GF(2^n) + * + * As explained in NIST SP 800-38B, this can be computed: + * + * If MSB(p) = 0, then p = (p << 1) + * If MSB(p) = 1, then p = (p << 1) ^ R_n + * with R_64 = 0x1B and R_128 = 0x87 + * + * Input and output MUST NOT point to the same buffer + * Block size must be 8 bytes or 16 bytes - the block sizes for DES and AES. + */ +static int cmac_multiply_by_u(unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t blocksize) +{ + const unsigned char R_128 = 0x87; + unsigned char R_n; + uint32_t overflow = 0x00; + int i; + + if (blocksize == MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + R_n = R_128; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + else if (blocksize == MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE) { + const unsigned char R_64 = 0x1B; + R_n = R_64; + } +#endif + else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + for (i = (int) blocksize - 4; i >= 0; i -= 4) { + uint32_t i32 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(&input[i], 0); + uint32_t new_overflow = i32 >> 31; + i32 = (i32 << 1) | overflow; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(i32, &output[i], 0); + overflow = new_overflow; + } + + R_n = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_bool(input[0] >> 7), R_n); + output[blocksize - 1] ^= R_n; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Generate subkeys + * + * - as specified by RFC 4493, section 2.3 Subkey Generation Algorithm + */ +static int cmac_generate_subkeys(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char *K1, unsigned char *K2) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char L[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t olen, block_size; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(L, sizeof(L)); + + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(ctx->cipher_info); + + /* Calculate Ek(0) */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, L, block_size, L, &olen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Generate K1 and K2 + */ + if ((ret = cmac_multiply_by_u(K1, L, block_size)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = cmac_multiply_by_u(K2, K1, block_size)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(L, sizeof(L)); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) + +/* + * Create padded last block from (partial) last block. + * + * We can't use the padding option from the cipher layer, as it only works for + * CBC and we use ECB mode, and anyway we need to XOR K1 or K2 in addition. + */ +static void cmac_pad(unsigned char padded_block[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE], + size_t padded_block_len, + const unsigned char *last_block, + size_t last_block_len) +{ + size_t j; + + for (j = 0; j < padded_block_len; j++) { + if (j < last_block_len) { + padded_block[j] = last_block[j]; + } else if (j == last_block_len) { + padded_block[j] = 0x80; + } else { + padded_block[j] = 0x00; + } + } +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keybits) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_type_t type; + mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx; + int retval; + + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || key == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((retval = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(ctx, key, (int) keybits, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) { + return retval; + } + + type = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_type(ctx->cipher_info); + + switch (type) { + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB: + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB: + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Allocated and initialise in the cipher context memory for the CMAC + * context */ + cmac_ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_cmac_context_t)); + if (cmac_ctx == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + ctx->cmac_ctx = cmac_ctx; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cmac_ctx->state, sizeof(cmac_ctx->state)); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen) +{ + mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx; + unsigned char *state; + int ret = 0; + size_t n, j, olen, block_size; + + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || input == NULL || + ctx->cmac_ctx == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + cmac_ctx = ctx->cmac_ctx; + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(ctx->cipher_info); + state = ctx->cmac_ctx->state; + + /* Without the MBEDTLS_ASSUME below, gcc -O3 will generate a warning of the form + * error: writing 16 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=] */ + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(block_size <= MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE); + + /* Is there data still to process from the last call, that's greater in + * size than a block? */ + if (cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len > 0 && + ilen > block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len) { + memcpy(&cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block[cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len], + input, + block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len); + + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(state, cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, state, block_size); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, state, block_size, state, + &olen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + input += block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len; + ilen -= block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len; + cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + } + + /* n is the number of blocks including any final partial block */ + n = (ilen + block_size - 1) / block_size; + + /* Iterate across the input data in block sized chunks, excluding any + * final partial or complete block */ + for (j = 1; j < n; j++) { + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(state, input, state, block_size); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, state, block_size, state, + &olen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ilen -= block_size; + input += block_size; + } + + /* If there is data left over that wasn't aligned to a block */ + if (ilen > 0) { + memcpy(&cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block[cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len], + input, + ilen); + cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len += ilen; + } + +exit: + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + unsigned char *output) +{ + mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx; + unsigned char *state, *last_block; + unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char M_last[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen, block_size; + + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || ctx->cmac_ctx == NULL || + output == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + cmac_ctx = ctx->cmac_ctx; + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(ctx->cipher_info); + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(block_size <= MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE); // silence GCC warning + state = cmac_ctx->state; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(K1, sizeof(K1)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(K2, sizeof(K2)); + cmac_generate_subkeys(ctx, K1, K2); + + last_block = cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block; + + /* Calculate last block */ + if (cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len < block_size) { + cmac_pad(M_last, block_size, last_block, cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len); + mbedtls_xor(M_last, M_last, K2, block_size); + } else { + /* Last block is complete block */ + mbedtls_xor(M_last, last_block, K1, block_size); + } + + + mbedtls_xor(state, M_last, state, block_size); + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, state, block_size, state, + &olen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + memcpy(output, state, block_size); + +exit: + /* Wipe the generated keys on the stack, and any other transients to avoid + * side channel leakage */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(K1, sizeof(K1)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(K2, sizeof(K2)); + + cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, + sizeof(cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block)); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(state, MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx; + + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || ctx->cmac_ctx == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + cmac_ctx = ctx->cmac_ctx; + + /* Reset the internal state */ + cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, + sizeof(cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cmac_ctx->state, + sizeof(cmac_ctx->state)); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_cipher_cmac(const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (cipher_info == NULL || key == NULL || input == NULL || output == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_cipher_init(&ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts(&ctx, key, keylen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(&ctx, input, ilen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(&ctx, output); + +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx); + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* + * Implementation of AES-CMAC-PRF-128 defined in RFC 4615 + */ +int mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128(const unsigned char *key, size_t key_length, + const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, + unsigned char output[16]) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + unsigned char zero_key[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char int_key[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + if (key == NULL || input == NULL || output == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB); + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + /* Failing at this point must be due to a build issue */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto exit; + } + + if (key_length == MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) { + /* Use key as is */ + memcpy(int_key, key, MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } else { + memset(zero_key, 0, MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(cipher_info, zero_key, 128, key, + key_length, int_key); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(cipher_info, int_key, 128, input, in_len, + output); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(int_key, sizeof(int_key)); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * CMAC test data for SP800-38B + * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/AES_CMAC.pdf + * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/TDES_CMAC.pdf + * + * AES-CMAC-PRF-128 test data from RFC 4615 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4615#page-4 + */ + +#define NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY 4 +#define NB_PRF_TESTS 3 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +/* All CMAC test inputs are truncated from the same 64 byte buffer. */ +static const unsigned char test_message[] = { + /* PT */ + 0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96, + 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a, + 0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c, + 0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0x8e, 0x51, + 0x30, 0xc8, 0x1c, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x5c, 0xe4, 0x11, + 0xe5, 0xfb, 0xc1, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x0a, 0x52, 0xef, + 0xf6, 0x9f, 0x24, 0x45, 0xdf, 0x4f, 0x9b, 0x17, + 0xad, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0x6c, 0x37, 0x10 +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* Truncation point of message for AES CMAC tests */ +static const unsigned int aes_message_lengths[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY] = { + /* Mlen */ + 0, + 16, + 20, + 64 +}; + +/* CMAC-AES128 Test Data */ +static const unsigned char aes_128_key[16] = { + 0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6, + 0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c +}; +static const unsigned char aes_128_subkeys[2][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* K1 */ + 0xfb, 0xee, 0xd6, 0x18, 0x35, 0x71, 0x33, 0x66, + 0x7c, 0x85, 0xe0, 0x8f, 0x72, 0x36, 0xa8, 0xde + }, + { + /* K2 */ + 0xf7, 0xdd, 0xac, 0x30, 0x6a, 0xe2, 0x66, 0xcc, + 0xf9, 0x0b, 0xc1, 0x1e, 0xe4, 0x6d, 0x51, 0x3b + } +}; +static const unsigned char aes_128_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = +{ + { + /* Example #1 */ + 0xbb, 0x1d, 0x69, 0x29, 0xe9, 0x59, 0x37, 0x28, + 0x7f, 0xa3, 0x7d, 0x12, 0x9b, 0x75, 0x67, 0x46 + }, + { + /* Example #2 */ + 0x07, 0x0a, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x6b, 0x4d, 0x41, 0x44, + 0xf7, 0x9b, 0xdd, 0x9d, 0xd0, 0x4a, 0x28, 0x7c + }, + { + /* Example #3 */ + 0x7d, 0x85, 0x44, 0x9e, 0xa6, 0xea, 0x19, 0xc8, + 0x23, 0xa7, 0xbf, 0x78, 0x83, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0xde + }, + { + /* Example #4 */ + 0x51, 0xf0, 0xbe, 0xbf, 0x7e, 0x3b, 0x9d, 0x92, + 0xfc, 0x49, 0x74, 0x17, 0x79, 0x36, 0x3c, 0xfe + } +}; + +/* CMAC-AES192 Test Data */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static const unsigned char aes_192_key[24] = { + 0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x0e, 0x64, 0x52, + 0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5, + 0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b +}; +static const unsigned char aes_192_subkeys[2][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* K1 */ + 0x44, 0x8a, 0x5b, 0x1c, 0x93, 0x51, 0x4b, 0x27, + 0x3e, 0xe6, 0x43, 0x9d, 0xd4, 0xda, 0xa2, 0x96 + }, + { + /* K2 */ + 0x89, 0x14, 0xb6, 0x39, 0x26, 0xa2, 0x96, 0x4e, + 0x7d, 0xcc, 0x87, 0x3b, 0xa9, 0xb5, 0x45, 0x2c + } +}; +static const unsigned char aes_192_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = +{ + { + /* Example #1 */ + 0xd1, 0x7d, 0xdf, 0x46, 0xad, 0xaa, 0xcd, 0xe5, + 0x31, 0xca, 0xc4, 0x83, 0xde, 0x7a, 0x93, 0x67 + }, + { + /* Example #2 */ + 0x9e, 0x99, 0xa7, 0xbf, 0x31, 0xe7, 0x10, 0x90, + 0x06, 0x62, 0xf6, 0x5e, 0x61, 0x7c, 0x51, 0x84 + }, + { + /* Example #3 */ + 0x3d, 0x75, 0xc1, 0x94, 0xed, 0x96, 0x07, 0x04, + 0x44, 0xa9, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0xc7, 0x40, 0xec, 0xf8 + }, + { + /* Example #4 */ + 0xa1, 0xd5, 0xdf, 0x0e, 0xed, 0x79, 0x0f, 0x79, + 0x4d, 0x77, 0x58, 0x96, 0x59, 0xf3, 0x9a, 0x11 + } +}; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ + +/* CMAC-AES256 Test Data */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) +static const unsigned char aes_256_key[32] = { + 0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe, + 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81, + 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd7, + 0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4 +}; +static const unsigned char aes_256_subkeys[2][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = { + { + /* K1 */ + 0xca, 0xd1, 0xed, 0x03, 0x29, 0x9e, 0xed, 0xac, + 0x2e, 0x9a, 0x99, 0x80, 0x86, 0x21, 0x50, 0x2f + }, + { + /* K2 */ + 0x95, 0xa3, 0xda, 0x06, 0x53, 0x3d, 0xdb, 0x58, + 0x5d, 0x35, 0x33, 0x01, 0x0c, 0x42, 0xa0, 0xd9 + } +}; +static const unsigned char aes_256_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = +{ + { + /* Example #1 */ + 0x02, 0x89, 0x62, 0xf6, 0x1b, 0x7b, 0xf8, 0x9e, + 0xfc, 0x6b, 0x55, 0x1f, 0x46, 0x67, 0xd9, 0x83 + }, + { + /* Example #2 */ + 0x28, 0xa7, 0x02, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x2e, 0x8f, 0x82, + 0xbd, 0x4b, 0xf2, 0x8d, 0x8c, 0x37, 0xc3, 0x5c + }, + { + /* Example #3 */ + 0x15, 0x67, 0x27, 0xdc, 0x08, 0x78, 0x94, 0x4a, + 0x02, 0x3c, 0x1f, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0xad, 0x6d, 0x93 + }, + { + /* Example #4 */ + 0xe1, 0x99, 0x21, 0x90, 0x54, 0x9f, 0x6e, 0xd5, + 0x69, 0x6a, 0x2c, 0x05, 0x6c, 0x31, 0x54, 0x10 + } +}; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +/* Truncation point of message for 3DES CMAC tests */ +static const unsigned int des3_message_lengths[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY] = { + 0, + 16, + 20, + 32 +}; + +/* CMAC-TDES (Generation) - 2 Key Test Data */ +static const unsigned char des3_2key_key[24] = { + /* Key1 */ + 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, + /* Key2 */ + 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xEF, 0x01, + /* Key3 */ + 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef +}; +static const unsigned char des3_2key_subkeys[2][8] = { + { + /* K1 */ + 0x0d, 0xd2, 0xcb, 0x7a, 0x3d, 0x88, 0x88, 0xd9 + }, + { + /* K2 */ + 0x1b, 0xa5, 0x96, 0xf4, 0x7b, 0x11, 0x11, 0xb2 + } +}; +static const unsigned char des3_2key_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE] + = { + { + /* Sample #1 */ + 0x79, 0xce, 0x52, 0xa7, 0xf7, 0x86, 0xa9, 0x60 + }, + { + /* Sample #2 */ + 0xcc, 0x18, 0xa0, 0xb7, 0x9a, 0xf2, 0x41, 0x3b + }, + { + /* Sample #3 */ + 0xc0, 0x6d, 0x37, 0x7e, 0xcd, 0x10, 0x19, 0x69 + }, + { + /* Sample #4 */ + 0x9c, 0xd3, 0x35, 0x80, 0xf9, 0xb6, 0x4d, 0xfb + } + }; + +/* CMAC-TDES (Generation) - 3 Key Test Data */ +static const unsigned char des3_3key_key[24] = { + /* Key1 */ + 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xaa, 0xcd, 0xef, + /* Key2 */ + 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, 0x01, + /* Key3 */ + 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, 0x01, 0x23 +}; +static const unsigned char des3_3key_subkeys[2][8] = { + { + /* K1 */ + 0x9d, 0x74, 0xe7, 0x39, 0x33, 0x17, 0x96, 0xc0 + }, + { + /* K2 */ + 0x3a, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x72, 0x66, 0x2f, 0x2d, 0x9b + } +}; +static const unsigned char des3_3key_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE] + = { + { + /* Sample #1 */ + 0x7d, 0xb0, 0xd3, 0x7d, 0xf9, 0x36, 0xc5, 0x50 + }, + { + /* Sample #2 */ + 0x30, 0x23, 0x9c, 0xf1, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0x66, 0x09 + }, + { + /* Sample #3 */ + 0x6c, 0x9f, 0x3e, 0xe4, 0x92, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0xe2 + }, + { + /* Sample #4 */ + 0x99, 0x42, 0x9b, 0xd0, 0xbF, 0x79, 0x04, 0xe5 + } + }; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* AES AES-CMAC-PRF-128 Test Data */ +static const unsigned char PRFK[] = { + /* Key */ + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0xed, 0xcb +}; + +/* Sizes in bytes */ +static const size_t PRFKlen[NB_PRF_TESTS] = { + 18, + 16, + 10 +}; + +/* Message */ +static const unsigned char PRFM[] = { + 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, + 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, + 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13 +}; + +static const unsigned char PRFT[NB_PRF_TESTS][16] = { + { + 0x84, 0xa3, 0x48, 0xa4, 0xa4, 0x5d, 0x23, 0x5b, + 0xab, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x0d, 0x2b, 0x4d, 0xa0, 0x9a + }, + { + 0x98, 0x0a, 0xe8, 0x7b, 0x5f, 0x4c, 0x9c, 0x52, + 0x14, 0xf5, 0xb6, 0xa8, 0x45, 0x5e, 0x4c, 0x2d + }, + { + 0x29, 0x0d, 0x9e, 0x11, 0x2e, 0xdb, 0x09, 0xee, + 0x14, 0x1f, 0xcf, 0x64, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0x2f, 0x3d + } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +static int cmac_test_subkeys(int verbose, + const char *testname, + const unsigned char *key, + int keybits, + const unsigned char *subkeys, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, + int block_size, + int num_tests) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_type); + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + /* Failing at this point must be due to a build issue */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + for (i = 0; i < num_tests; i++) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" %s CMAC subkey #%d: ", testname, i + 1); + } + + mbedtls_cipher_init(&ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("test execution failed\n"); + } + + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&ctx, key, keybits, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) { + /* When CMAC is implemented by an alternative implementation, or + * the underlying primitive itself is implemented alternatively, + * AES-192 may be unavailable. This should not cause the selftest + * function to fail. */ + if ((ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) && + cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + } + goto next_test; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("test execution failed\n"); + } + + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = cmac_generate_subkeys(&ctx, K1, K2); + if (ret != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((ret = memcmp(K1, subkeys, block_size)) != 0 || + (ret = memcmp(K2, &subkeys[block_size], block_size)) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + goto cleanup; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + +next_test: + mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx); + } + + ret = 0; + goto exit; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx); + +exit: + return ret; +} + +static int cmac_test_wth_cipher(int verbose, + const char *testname, + const unsigned char *key, + int keybits, + const unsigned char *messages, + const unsigned int message_lengths[4], + const unsigned char *expected_result, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, + int block_size, + int num_tests) +{ + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_type); + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + /* Failing at this point must be due to a build issue */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto exit; + } + + for (i = 0; i < num_tests; i++) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" %s CMAC #%d: ", testname, i + 1); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(cipher_info, key, keybits, messages, + message_lengths[i], output)) != 0) { + /* When CMAC is implemented by an alternative implementation, or + * the underlying primitive itself is implemented alternatively, + * AES-192 and/or 3DES may be unavailable. This should not cause + * the selftest function to fail. */ + if ((ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) && + (cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB || + cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB)) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + } + continue; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = memcmp(output, &expected_result[i * block_size], block_size)) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + ret = 0; + +exit: + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +static int test_aes128_cmac_prf(int verbose) +{ + int i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + for (i = 0; i < NB_PRF_TESTS; i++) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES CMAC 128 PRF #%d: ", i); + ret = mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128(PRFK, PRFKlen[i], PRFM, 20, output); + if (ret != 0 || + memcmp(output, PRFT[i], MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != 0) { + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + return ret; + } else if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +int mbedtls_cmac_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + /* AES-128 */ + if ((ret = cmac_test_subkeys(verbose, + "AES 128", + aes_128_key, + 128, + (const unsigned char *) aes_128_subkeys, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher(verbose, + "AES 128", + aes_128_key, + 128, + test_message, + aes_message_lengths, + (const unsigned char *) aes_128_expected_result, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* AES-192 */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + if ((ret = cmac_test_subkeys(verbose, + "AES 192", + aes_192_key, + 192, + (const unsigned char *) aes_192_subkeys, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher(verbose, + "AES 192", + aes_192_key, + 192, + test_message, + aes_message_lengths, + (const unsigned char *) aes_192_expected_result, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ + + /* AES-256 */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + if ((ret = cmac_test_subkeys(verbose, + "AES 256", + aes_256_key, + 256, + (const unsigned char *) aes_256_subkeys, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher(verbose, + "AES 256", + aes_256_key, + 256, + test_message, + aes_message_lengths, + (const unsigned char *) aes_256_expected_result, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, + MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + /* 3DES 2 key */ + if ((ret = cmac_test_subkeys(verbose, + "3DES 2 key", + des3_2key_key, + 192, + (const unsigned char *) des3_2key_subkeys, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, + MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher(verbose, + "3DES 2 key", + des3_2key_key, + 192, + test_message, + des3_message_lengths, + (const unsigned char *) des3_2key_expected_result, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, + MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* 3DES 3 key */ + if ((ret = cmac_test_subkeys(verbose, + "3DES 3 key", + des3_3key_key, + 192, + (const unsigned char *) des3_3key_subkeys, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, + MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher(verbose, + "3DES 3 key", + des3_3key_key, + 192, + test_message, + des3_message_lengths, + (const unsigned char *) des3_3key_expected_result, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, + MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE, + NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + if ((ret = test_aes128_cmac_prf(verbose)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ diff --git a/library/common.h b/library/common.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3936ffdfe1e --- /dev/null +++ b/library/common.h @@ -0,0 +1,435 @@ +/** + * \file common.h + * + * \brief Utility macros for internal use in the library + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H +#define MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" +#include "alignment.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(__ARM_NEON) +#include +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +#include +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS +#endif + +/** Helper to define a function as static except when building invasive tests. + * + * If a function is only used inside its own source file and should be + * declared `static` to allow the compiler to optimize for code size, + * but that function has unit tests, define it with + * ``` + * MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_foo(...) { ... } + * ``` + * and declare it in a header in the `library/` directory with + * ``` + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + * int mbedtls_foo(...); + * #endif + * ``` + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +#else +#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE static +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +extern void (*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail)(const char *test, int line, const char *file); +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(TEST) \ + do { \ + if ((!(TEST)) && ((*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail) != NULL)) \ + { \ + (*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail)( #TEST, __LINE__, __FILE__); \ + } \ + } while (0) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(TEST) +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) */ + +/** \def ARRAY_LENGTH + * Return the number of elements of a static or stack array. + * + * \param array A value of array (not pointer) type. + * + * \return The number of elements of the array. + */ +/* A correct implementation of ARRAY_LENGTH, but which silently gives + * a nonsensical result if called with a pointer rather than an array. */ +#define ARRAY_LENGTH_UNSAFE(array) \ + (sizeof(array) / sizeof(*(array))) + +#if defined(__GNUC__) +/* Test if arg and &(arg)[0] have the same type. This is true if arg is + * an array but not if it's a pointer. */ +#define IS_ARRAY_NOT_POINTER(arg) \ + (!__builtin_types_compatible_p(__typeof__(arg), \ + __typeof__(&(arg)[0]))) +/* A compile-time constant with the value 0. If `const_expr` is not a + * compile-time constant with a nonzero value, cause a compile-time error. */ +#define STATIC_ASSERT_EXPR(const_expr) \ + (0 && sizeof(struct { unsigned int STATIC_ASSERT : 1 - 2 * !(const_expr); })) + +/* Return the scalar value `value` (possibly promoted). This is a compile-time + * constant if `value` is. `condition` must be a compile-time constant. + * If `condition` is false, arrange to cause a compile-time error. */ +#define STATIC_ASSERT_THEN_RETURN(condition, value) \ + (STATIC_ASSERT_EXPR(condition) ? 0 : (value)) + +#define ARRAY_LENGTH(array) \ + (STATIC_ASSERT_THEN_RETURN(IS_ARRAY_NOT_POINTER(array), \ + ARRAY_LENGTH_UNSAFE(array))) + +#else +/* If we aren't sure the compiler supports our non-standard tricks, + * fall back to the unsafe implementation. */ +#define ARRAY_LENGTH(array) ARRAY_LENGTH_UNSAFE(array) +#endif +/** Allow library to access its structs' private members. + * + * Although structs defined in header files are publicly available, + * their members are private and should not be accessed by the user. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS + +/** + * \brief Securely zeroize a buffer then free it. + * + * Similar to making consecutive calls to + * \c mbedtls_platform_zeroize() and \c mbedtls_free(), but has + * code size savings, and potential for optimisation in the future. + * + * Guaranteed to be a no-op if \p buf is \c NULL and \p len is 0. + * + * \param buf Buffer to be zeroized then freed. + * \param len Length of the buffer in bytes + */ +void mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(void *buf, size_t len); + +/** Return an offset into a buffer. + * + * This is just the addition of an offset to a pointer, except that this + * function also accepts an offset of 0 into a buffer whose pointer is null. + * (`p + n` has undefined behavior when `p` is null, even when `n == 0`. + * A null pointer is a valid buffer pointer when the size is 0, for example + * as the result of `malloc(0)` on some platforms.) + * + * \param p Pointer to a buffer of at least n bytes. + * This may be \p NULL if \p n is zero. + * \param n An offset in bytes. + * \return Pointer to offset \p n in the buffer \p p. + * Note that this is only a valid pointer if the size of the + * buffer is at least \p n + 1. + */ +static inline unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset( + unsigned char *p, size_t n) +{ + return p == NULL ? NULL : p + n; +} + +/** Return an offset into a read-only buffer. + * + * Similar to mbedtls_buffer_offset(), but for const pointers. + * + * \param p Pointer to a buffer of at least n bytes. + * This may be \p NULL if \p n is zero. + * \param n An offset in bytes. + * \return Pointer to offset \p n in the buffer \p p. + * Note that this is only a valid pointer if the size of the + * buffer is at least \p n + 1. + */ +static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset_const( + const unsigned char *p, size_t n) +{ + return p == NULL ? NULL : p + n; +} + +/* Always inline mbedtls_xor() for similar reasons as mbedtls_xor_no_simd(). */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +/** + * Perform a fast block XOR operation, such that + * r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i] where 0 <= i < n + * + * \param r Pointer to result (buffer of at least \p n bytes). \p r + * may be equal to either \p a or \p b, but behaviour when + * it overlaps in other ways is undefined. + * \param a Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) + * \param b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) + * \param n Number of bytes to process. + * + * \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor() or + * mbedtls_xor_no_simd() (these are functionally equivalent). + * If the result is used immediately after the xor operation in non-SIMD code (e.g, in + * AES-CBC), there may be additional latency to transfer the data from SIMD to scalar + * registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd() may be faster. In other cases where + * the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor() may be faster. + * For targets without SIMD support, they will behave the same. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, + const unsigned char *a, + const unsigned char *b, + size_t n) +{ + size_t i = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS) && \ + (!(defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION < 70300)) + /* Old GCC versions generate a warning here, so disable the NEON path for these compilers */ + for (; (i + 16) <= n; i += 16) { + uint8x16_t v1 = vld1q_u8(a + i); + uint8x16_t v2 = vld1q_u8(b + i); + uint8x16_t x = veorq_u8(v1, v2); + vst1q_u8(r + i, x); + } +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + /* This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case + * where n is a constant multiple of 16. + * For other compilers (e.g. recent gcc and clang) it makes no difference if n is a compile-time + * constant, and is a very small perf regression if n is not a compile-time constant. */ + if (n % 16 == 0) { + return; + } +#endif +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) + /* This codepath probably only makes sense on architectures with 64-bit registers */ + for (; (i + 8) <= n; i += 8) { + uint64_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(b + i); + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(r + i, x); + } +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + if (n % 8 == 0) { + return; + } +#endif +#else + for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) { + uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(b + i); + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(r + i, x); + } +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + if (n % 4 == 0) { + return; + } +#endif +#endif +#endif + for (; i < n; i++) { + r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i]; + } +} + +/* Always inline mbedtls_xor_no_simd() as we see significant perf regressions when it does not get + * inlined (e.g., observed about 3x perf difference in gcm_mult_largetable with gcc 7 - 12) */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +/** + * Perform a fast block XOR operation, such that + * r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i] where 0 <= i < n + * + * In some situations, this can perform better than mbedtls_xor() (e.g., it's about 5% + * better in AES-CBC). + * + * \param r Pointer to result (buffer of at least \p n bytes). \p r + * may be equal to either \p a or \p b, but behaviour when + * it overlaps in other ways is undefined. + * \param a Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) + * \param b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) + * \param n Number of bytes to process. + * + * \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor() or + * mbedtls_xor_no_simd() (these are functionally equivalent). + * If the result is used immediately after the xor operation in non-SIMD code (e.g, in + * AES-CBC), there may be additional latency to transfer the data from SIMD to scalar + * registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd() may be faster. In other cases where + * the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor() may be faster. + * For targets without SIMD support, they will behave the same. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_xor_no_simd(unsigned char *r, + const unsigned char *a, + const unsigned char *b, + size_t n) +{ + size_t i = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) + /* This codepath probably only makes sense on architectures with 64-bit registers */ + for (; (i + 8) <= n; i += 8) { + uint64_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(b + i); + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(r + i, x); + } +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + /* This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case + * where n is a constant multiple of 8. + * For other compilers (e.g. recent gcc and clang) it makes no difference if n is a compile-time + * constant, and is a very small perf regression if n is not a compile-time constant. */ + if (n % 8 == 0) { + return; + } +#endif +#else + for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) { + uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(b + i); + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(r + i, x); + } +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + if (n % 4 == 0) { + return; + } +#endif +#endif +#endif + for (; i < n; i++) { + r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i]; + } +} + +/* Fix MSVC C99 compatible issue + * MSVC support __func__ from visual studio 2015( 1900 ) + * Use MSVC predefine macro to avoid name check fail. + */ +#if (defined(_MSC_VER) && (_MSC_VER <= 1900)) +#define /*no-check-names*/ __func__ __FUNCTION__ +#endif + +/* Define `asm` for compilers which don't define it. */ +/* *INDENT-OFF* */ +#ifndef asm +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#define asm __asm +#else +#define asm __asm__ +#endif +#endif +/* *INDENT-ON* */ + +/* + * Define the constraint used for read-only pointer operands to aarch64 asm. + * + * This is normally the usual "r", but for aarch64_32 (aka ILP32, + * as found in watchos), "p" is required to avoid warnings from clang. + * + * Note that clang does not recognise '+p' or '=p', and armclang + * does not recognise 'p' at all. Therefore, to update a pointer from + * aarch64 assembly, it is necessary to use something like: + * + * uintptr_t uptr = (uintptr_t) ptr; + * asm( "ldr x4, [%x0], #8" ... : "+r" (uptr) : : ) + * ptr = (void*) uptr; + * + * Note that the "x" in "%x0" is neccessary; writing "%0" will cause warnings. + */ +#if defined(__aarch64__) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) +#if UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffful +/* ILP32: Specify the pointer operand slightly differently, as per #7787. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASM_AARCH64_PTR_CONSTRAINT "p" +#elif UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffffffffffful +/* Normal case (64-bit pointers): use "r" as the constraint for pointer operands to asm */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASM_AARCH64_PTR_CONSTRAINT "r" +#else +#error "Unrecognised pointer size for aarch64" +#endif +#endif + +/* Always provide a static assert macro, so it can be used unconditionally. + * It will expand to nothing on some systems. + * Can be used outside functions (but don't add a trailing ';' in that case: + * the semicolon is included here to avoid triggering -Wextra-semi when + * MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT() expands to nothing). + * Can't use the C11-style `defined(static_assert)` on FreeBSD, since it + * defines static_assert even with -std=c99, but then complains about it. + */ +#if defined(static_assert) && !defined(__FreeBSD__) +#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(expr, msg) static_assert(expr, msg); +#else +#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(expr, msg) +#endif + +#if defined(__has_builtin) +#define MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(x) __has_builtin(x) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(x) 0 +#endif + +/* Define compiler branch hints */ +#if MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(__builtin_expect) +#define MBEDTLS_LIKELY(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 1) +#define MBEDTLS_UNLIKELY(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 0) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_LIKELY(x) x +#define MBEDTLS_UNLIKELY(x) x +#endif + +/* MBEDTLS_ASSUME may be used to provide additional information to the compiler + * which can result in smaller code-size. */ +#if MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(__builtin_assume) +/* clang provides __builtin_assume */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASSUME(x) __builtin_assume(x) +#elif MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(__builtin_unreachable) +/* gcc and IAR can use __builtin_unreachable */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASSUME(x) do { if (!(x)) __builtin_unreachable(); } while (0) +#elif defined(_MSC_VER) +/* Supported by MSVC since VS 2005 */ +#define MBEDTLS_ASSUME(x) __assume(x) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_ASSUME(x) do { } while (0) +#endif + +/* For gcc -Os, override with -O2 for a given function. + * + * This will not affect behaviour for other optimisation settings, e.g. -O0. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && defined(__OPTIMIZE_SIZE__) +#define MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE __attribute__((optimize("-O2"))) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE +#endif + +/* Suppress compiler warnings for unused functions and variables. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) && defined(__has_attribute) +# if __has_attribute(unused) +# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED __attribute__((unused)) +# endif +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) && defined(__GNUC__) +# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED __attribute__((unused)) +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) && defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) && defined(__VER__) +/* IAR does support __attribute__((unused)), but only if the -e flag (extended language support) + * is given; the pragma always works. + * Unfortunately the pragma affects the rest of the file where it is used, but this is harmless. + * Check for version 5.2 or later - this pragma may be supported by earlier versions, but I wasn't + * able to find documentation). + */ +# if (__VER__ >= 5020000) +# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED _Pragma("diag_suppress=Pe177") +# endif +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) && defined(_MSC_VER) +# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED __pragma(warning(suppress:4189)) +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) +# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/library/constant_time.c b/library/constant_time.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d212ddfd810 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/constant_time.c @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +/** + * Constant-time functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * The following functions are implemented without using comparison operators, as those + * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms. + */ + +#include +#include + +#include "common.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ASM) +/* + * Define an object with the value zero, such that the compiler cannot prove that it + * has the value zero (because it is volatile, it "may be modified in ways unknown to + * the implementation"). + */ +volatile mbedtls_ct_uint_t mbedtls_ct_zero = 0; +#endif + +/* + * Define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_VOLATILE_ACCESS where assembly is present to + * perform fast unaligned access to volatile data. + * + * This is needed because mbedtls_get_unaligned_uintXX etc don't support volatile + * memory accesses. + * + * Some of these definitions could be moved into alignment.h but for now they are + * only used here. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) && \ + ((defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) && (UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffful)) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM)) +/* We check pointer sizes to avoid issues with them not matching register size requirements */ +#define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_VOLATILE_ACCESS + +static inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32(volatile const unsigned char *p) +{ + /* This is UB, even where it's safe: + * return *((volatile uint32_t*)p); + * so instead the same thing is expressed in assembly below. + */ + uint32_t r; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) + asm volatile ("ldr %0, [%1]" : "=r" (r) : "r" (p) :); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM) + asm volatile ("ldr %w0, [%1]" : "=r" (r) : MBEDTLS_ASM_AARCH64_PTR_CONSTRAINT(p) :); +#else +#error "No assembly defined for mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32" +#endif + return r; +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) && + (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM)) */ + +int mbedtls_ct_memcmp(const void *a, + const void *b, + size_t n) +{ + size_t i = 0; + /* + * `A` and `B` are cast to volatile to ensure that the compiler + * generates code that always fully reads both buffers. + * Otherwise it could generate a test to exit early if `diff` has all + * bits set early in the loop. + */ + volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a; + volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b; + uint32_t diff = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_VOLATILE_ACCESS) + for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) { + uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32(A + i); + uint32_t y = mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32(B + i); + diff |= x ^ y; + } +#endif + + for (; i < n; i++) { + /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff. + * This avoids IAR compiler warning: + * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */ + unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i]; + diff |= x ^ y; + } + + +#if (INT_MAX < INT32_MAX) + /* We don't support int smaller than 32-bits, but if someone tried to build + * with this configuration, there is a risk that, for differing data, the + * only bits set in diff are in the top 16-bits, and would be lost by a + * simple cast from uint32 to int. + * This would have significant security implications, so protect against it. */ +#error "mbedtls_ct_memcmp() requires minimum 32-bit ints" +#else + /* The bit-twiddling ensures that when we cast uint32_t to int, we are casting + * a value that is in the range 0..INT_MAX - a value larger than this would + * result in implementation defined behaviour. + * + * This ensures that the value returned by the function is non-zero iff + * diff is non-zero. + */ + return (int) ((diff & 0xffff) | (diff >> 16)); +#endif +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + +int mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial(const void *a, + const void *b, + size_t n, + size_t skip_head, + size_t skip_tail) +{ + unsigned int diff = 0; + + volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a; + volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b; + + size_t valid_end = n - skip_tail; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) { + unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i]; + unsigned int d = x ^ y; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t valid = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, skip_head), + mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(i, valid_end)); + diff |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(valid, d); + } + + /* Since we go byte-by-byte, the only bits set will be in the bottom 8 bits, so the + * cast from uint to int is safe. */ + return (int) diff; +} + +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +void mbedtls_ct_memmove_left(void *start, size_t total, size_t offset) +{ + volatile unsigned char *buf = start; + for (size_t i = 0; i < total; i++) { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t no_op = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(total - offset, i); + /* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last + * `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and + * zero out the last byte. */ + for (size_t n = 0; n < total - 1; n++) { + unsigned char current = buf[n]; + unsigned char next = buf[n+1]; + buf[n] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(no_op, current, next); + } + buf[total-1] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(no_op, buf[total-1]); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src1, + const unsigned char *src2, + size_t len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64) + const uint64_t mask = (uint64_t) condition; + const uint64_t not_mask = (uint64_t) ~mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(condition); +#else + const uint32_t mask = (uint32_t) condition; + const uint32_t not_mask = (uint32_t) ~mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(condition); +#endif + + /* If src2 is NULL, setup src2 so that we read from the destination address. + * + * This means that if src2 == NULL && condition is false, the result will be a + * no-op because we read from dest and write the same data back into dest. + */ + if (src2 == NULL) { + src2 = dest; + } + + /* dest[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dest[i] */ + size_t i = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64) + for (; (i + 8) <= len; i += 8) { + uint64_t a = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(src1 + i) & mask; + uint64_t b = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(src2 + i) & not_mask; + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(dest + i, a | b); + } +#else + for (; (i + 4) <= len; i += 4) { + uint32_t a = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(src1 + i) & mask; + uint32_t b = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(src2 + i) & not_mask; + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(dest + i, a | b); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS */ + for (; i < len; i++) { + dest[i] = (src1[i] & mask) | (src2[i] & not_mask); + } +} + +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset(unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src, + size_t offset, + size_t offset_min, + size_t offset_max, + size_t len) +{ + size_t offsetval; + + for (offsetval = offset_min; offsetval <= offset_max; offsetval++) { + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(offsetval, offset), dest, src + offsetval, NULL, + len); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +void mbedtls_ct_zeroize_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, void *buf, size_t len) +{ + uint32_t mask = (uint32_t) ~condition; + uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *) buf; + size_t i = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) + for (; (i + 4) <= len; i += 4) { + mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((void *) (p + i), + mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((void *) (p + i)) & mask); + } +#endif + for (; i < len; i++) { + p[i] = p[i] & mask; + } +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) */ diff --git a/library/constant_time_impl.h b/library/constant_time_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2a4574ba68f --- /dev/null +++ b/library/constant_time_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,556 @@ +/** + * Constant-time functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_IMPL_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_IMPL_H + +#include + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +/* + * To improve readability of constant_time_internal.h, the static inline + * definitions are here, and constant_time_internal.h has only the declarations. + * + * This results in duplicate declarations of the form: + * static inline void f(); // from constant_time_internal.h + * static inline void f() { ... } // from constant_time_impl.h + * when constant_time_internal.h is included. + * + * This appears to behave as if the declaration-without-definition was not present + * (except for warnings if gcc -Wredundant-decls or similar is used). + * + * Disable -Wredundant-decls so that gcc does not warn about this. This is re-enabled + * at the bottom of this file. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (__GNUC__ > 4) + #pragma GCC diagnostic push + #pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wredundant-decls" +#endif + +/* Disable asm under Memsan because it confuses Memsan and generates false errors. + * + * We also disable under Valgrind by default, because it's more useful + * for Valgrind to test the plain C implementation. MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_ASM //no-check-names + * may be set to permit building asm under Valgrind. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND) && !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_ASM)) //no-check-names +#define MBEDTLS_CT_NO_ASM +#elif defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_NO_ASM +#endif +#endif + +/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && defined(__GNUC__) && (!defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || \ + __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CT_NO_ASM) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_ASM +#if (defined(__arm__) || defined(__thumb__) || defined(__thumb2__)) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM +#elif defined(__aarch64__) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM +#elif defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_X86_64_ASM +#elif defined(__i386__) +#define MBEDTLS_CT_X86_ASM +#endif +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE (sizeof(mbedtls_ct_uint_t) * 8) + + +/* ============================================================================ + * Core const-time primitives + */ + +/* Ensure that the compiler cannot know the value of x (i.e., cannot optimise + * based on its value) after this function is called. + * + * If we are not using assembly, this will be fairly inefficient, so its use + * should be minimised. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ASM) +extern volatile mbedtls_ct_uint_t mbedtls_ct_zero; +#endif + +/** + * \brief Ensure that a value cannot be known at compile time. + * + * \param x The value to hide from the compiler. + * \return The same value that was passed in, such that the compiler + * cannot prove its value (even for calls of the form + * x = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(1), x will be unknown). + * + * \note This is mainly used in constructing mbedtls_ct_condition_t + * values and performing operations over them, to ensure that + * there is no way for the compiler to ever know anything about + * the value of an mbedtls_ct_condition_t. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_uint_t mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ASM) + asm volatile ("" : [x] "+r" (x) :); + return x; +#else + return x ^ mbedtls_ct_zero; +#endif +} + +/* + * Selecting unified syntax is needed for gcc, and harmless on clang. + * + * This is needed because on Thumb 1, condition flags are always set, so + * e.g. "negs" is supported but "neg" is not (on Thumb 2, both exist). + * + * Under Thumb 1 unified syntax, only the "negs" form is accepted, and + * under divided syntax, only the "neg" form is accepted. clang only + * supports unified syntax. + * + * On Thumb 2 and Arm, both compilers are happy with the "s" suffix, + * although we don't actually care about setting the flags. + * + * For old versions of gcc (see #8516 for details), restore divided + * syntax afterwards - otherwise old versions of gcc seem to apply + * unified syntax globally, which breaks other asm code. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__) && \ + (__GNUC__ < 11) && !defined(__ARM_ARCH_2__) +#define RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX ".syntax divided \n\t" +#else +#define RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX +#endif + +/* Convert a number into a condition in constant time. */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x) +{ + /* + * Define mask-generation code that, as far as possible, will not use branches or conditional instructions. + * + * For some platforms / type sizes, we define assembly to assure this. + * + * Otherwise, we define a plain C fallback which (in May 2023) does not get optimised into + * conditional instructions or branches by trunk clang, gcc, or MSVC v19. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + mbedtls_ct_uint_t s; + asm volatile ("neg %x[s], %x[x] \n\t" + "orr %x[x], %x[s], %x[x] \n\t" + "asr %x[x], %x[x], 63 \n\t" + : + [s] "=&r" (s), + [x] "+&r" (x) + : + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + uint32_t s; + asm volatile (".syntax unified \n\t" + "negs %[s], %[x] \n\t" + "orrs %[x], %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "asrs %[x], %[x], #31 \n\t" + RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX + : + [s] "=&l" (s), + [x] "+&l" (x) + : + : + "cc" /* clobbers flag bits */ + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + uint64_t s; + asm volatile ("mov %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "neg %[s] \n\t" + "or %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "sar $63, %[s] \n\t" + : + [s] "=&a" (s) + : + [x] "D" (x) + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) s; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + uint32_t s; + asm volatile ("mov %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "neg %[s] \n\t" + "or %[s], %[x] \n\t" + "sar $31, %[x] \n\t" + : + [s] "=&c" (s), + [x] "+&a" (x) + : + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#else + const mbedtls_ct_uint_t xo = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(x); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) + /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is + * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ +#pragma warning( push ) +#pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) +#endif + // y is negative (i.e., top bit set) iff x is non-zero + mbedtls_ct_int_t y = (-xo) | -(xo >> 1); + + // extract only the sign bit of y so that y == 1 (if x is non-zero) or 0 (if x is zero) + y = (((mbedtls_ct_uint_t) y) >> (MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE - 1)); + + // -y has all bits set (if x is non-zero), or all bits clear (if x is zero) + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (-y); +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma warning( pop ) +#endif +#endif +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_uint_t mbedtls_ct_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t if1, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t if0) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + asm volatile ("and %x[if1], %x[if1], %x[condition] \n\t" + "mvn %x[condition], %x[condition] \n\t" + "and %x[condition], %x[condition], %x[if0] \n\t" + "orr %x[condition], %x[if1], %x[condition]" + : + [condition] "+&r" (condition), + [if1] "+&r" (if1) + : + [if0] "r" (if0) + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) condition; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + asm volatile (".syntax unified \n\t" + "ands %[if1], %[if1], %[condition] \n\t" + "mvns %[condition], %[condition] \n\t" + "ands %[condition], %[condition], %[if0] \n\t" + "orrs %[condition], %[if1], %[condition] \n\t" + RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX + : + [condition] "+&l" (condition), + [if1] "+&l" (if1) + : + [if0] "l" (if0) + : + "cc" + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) condition; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + asm volatile ("and %[condition], %[if1] \n\t" + "not %[condition] \n\t" + "and %[condition], %[if0] \n\t" + "or %[if1], %[if0] \n\t" + : + [condition] "+&D" (condition), + [if1] "+&S" (if1), + [if0] "+&a" (if0) + : + : + ); + return if0; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + asm volatile ("and %[condition], %[if1] \n\t" + "not %[condition] \n\t" + "and %[if0], %[condition] \n\t" + "or %[condition], %[if1] \n\t" + : + [condition] "+&c" (condition), + [if1] "+&a" (if1) + : + [if0] "b" (if0) + : + ); + return if1; +#else + mbedtls_ct_condition_t not_cond = + (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (~mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(condition)); + return (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) ((condition & if1) | (not_cond & if0)); +#endif +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + uint64_t s1; + asm volatile ("eor %x[s1], %x[y], %x[x] \n\t" + "sub %x[x], %x[x], %x[y] \n\t" + "bic %x[x], %x[x], %x[s1] \n\t" + "and %x[s1], %x[s1], %x[y] \n\t" + "orr %x[s1], %x[x], %x[s1] \n\t" + "asr %x[x], %x[s1], 63" + : + [s1] "=&r" (s1), + [x] "+&r" (x) + : + [y] "r" (y) + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + uint32_t s1; + asm volatile ( + ".syntax unified \n\t" +#if defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__) + "movs %[s1], %[x] \n\t" + "eors %[s1], %[s1], %[y] \n\t" +#else + "eors %[s1], %[x], %[y] \n\t" +#endif + "subs %[x], %[x], %[y] \n\t" + "bics %[x], %[x], %[s1] \n\t" + "ands %[y], %[s1], %[y] \n\t" + "orrs %[x], %[x], %[y] \n\t" + "asrs %[x], %[x], #31 \n\t" + RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX + : + [s1] "=&l" (s1), + [x] "+&l" (x), + [y] "+&l" (y) + : + : + "cc" + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)) + uint64_t s; + asm volatile ("mov %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "xor %[y], %[s] \n\t" + "sub %[y], %[x] \n\t" + "and %[s], %[y] \n\t" + "not %[s] \n\t" + "and %[s], %[x] \n\t" + "or %[y], %[x] \n\t" + "sar $63, %[x] \n\t" + : + [s] "=&a" (s), + [x] "+&D" (x), + [y] "+&S" (y) + : + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) + uint32_t s; + asm volatile ("mov %[x], %[s] \n\t" + "xor %[y], %[s] \n\t" + "sub %[y], %[x] \n\t" + "and %[s], %[y] \n\t" + "not %[s] \n\t" + "and %[s], %[x] \n\t" + "or %[y], %[x] \n\t" + "sar $31, %[x] \n\t" + : + [s] "=&b" (s), + [x] "+&a" (x), + [y] "+&c" (y) + : + : + ); + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x; +#else + /* Ensure that the compiler cannot optimise the following operations over x and y, + * even if it knows the value of x and y. + */ + const mbedtls_ct_uint_t xo = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(x); + const mbedtls_ct_uint_t yo = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(y); + /* + * Check if the most significant bits (MSB) of the operands are different. + * cond is true iff the MSBs differ. + */ + mbedtls_ct_condition_t cond = mbedtls_ct_bool((xo ^ yo) >> (MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE - 1)); + + /* + * If the MSB are the same then the difference x-y will be negative (and + * have its MSB set to 1 during conversion to unsigned) if and only if x> (MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE - 1); + + // Convert to a condition (i.e., all bits set iff non-zero) + return mbedtls_ct_bool(ret); +#endif +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ + /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */ + const mbedtls_ct_uint_t diff = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(x) ^ mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(y); + + /* all ones if x != y, 0 otherwise */ + return mbedtls_ct_bool(diff); +} + +static inline unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(unsigned char low, + unsigned char high, + unsigned char c, + unsigned char t) +{ + const unsigned char co = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(c); + const unsigned char to = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(t); + + /* low_mask is: 0 if low <= c, 0x...ff if low > c */ + unsigned low_mask = ((unsigned) co - low) >> 8; + /* high_mask is: 0 if c <= high, 0x...ff if c > high */ + unsigned high_mask = ((unsigned) high - co) >> 8; + + return (unsigned char) (~(low_mask | high_mask)) & to; +} + +/* ============================================================================ + * Everything below here is trivial wrapper functions + */ + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + size_t if1, + size_t if0) +{ + return (size_t) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0); +} + +static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + unsigned if1, + unsigned if0) +{ + return (unsigned) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if0) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, + (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_mpi_uint if1, + mbedtls_mpi_uint if0) +{ + return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, + (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, + (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0); +} + +#endif + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, size_t if1) +{ + return (size_t) (condition & if1); +} + +static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, unsigned if1) +{ + return (unsigned) (condition & if1); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (condition & if1); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_mpi_uint if1) +{ + return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (condition & if1); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1, int if0) +{ + /* Coverting int -> uint -> int here is safe, because we require if1 and if0 to be + * in the range -32767..0, and we require 32-bit int and uint types. + * + * This means that (0 <= -if0 < INT_MAX), so negating if0 is safe, and similarly for + * converting back to int. + */ + return -((int) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) (-if1), + (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) (-if0))); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1) +{ + return -((int) (condition & (-if1))); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ + return ~mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(x, y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ + return mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(y, x); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ + return ~mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(x, y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_le(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y) +{ + return ~mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(x, y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (x ^ y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (x & y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_or(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (x | y); +} + +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_not(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x) +{ + return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (~x); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (__GNUC__ > 4) +/* Restore warnings for -Wredundant-decls on gcc */ + #pragma GCC diagnostic pop +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/library/constant_time_internal.h b/library/constant_time_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..61a5c6d4e95 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/constant_time_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,579 @@ +/** + * Constant-time functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H + +#include +#include + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +/* The constant-time interface provides various operations that are likely + * to result in constant-time code that does not branch or use conditional + * instructions for secret data (for secret pointers, this also applies to + * the data pointed to). + * + * It has three main parts: + * + * - boolean operations + * These are all named mbedtls_ct__. + * They operate over and return mbedtls_ct_condition_t. + * All arguments are considered secret. + * example: bool x = y | z => x = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(y, z) + * example: bool x = y == z => x = mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(y, z) + * + * - conditional data selection + * These are all named mbedtls_ct__if and mbedtls_ct__if_else_0 + * All arguments are considered secret. + * example: size_t a = x ? b : c => a = mbedtls_ct_size_if(x, b, c) + * example: unsigned a = x ? b : 0 => a = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(x, b) + * + * - block memory operations + * Only some arguments are considered secret, as documented for each + * function. + * example: if (x) memcpy(...) => mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(x, ...) + * + * mbedtls_ct_condition_t must be treated as opaque and only created and + * manipulated via the functions in this header. The compiler should never + * be able to prove anything about its value at compile-time. + * + * mbedtls_ct_uint_t is an unsigned integer type over which constant time + * operations may be performed via the functions in this header. It is as big + * as the larger of size_t and mbedtls_mpi_uint, i.e. it is safe to cast + * to/from "unsigned int", "size_t", and "mbedtls_mpi_uint" (and any other + * not-larger integer types). + * + * For Arm (32-bit, 64-bit and Thumb), x86 and x86-64, assembly implementations + * are used to ensure that the generated code is constant time. For other + * architectures, it uses a plain C fallback designed to yield constant-time code + * (this has been observed to be constant-time on latest gcc, clang and MSVC + * as of May 2023). + * + * For readability, the static inline definitions are separated out into + * constant_time_impl.h. + */ + +#if (SIZE_MAX > 0xffffffffffffffffULL) +/* Pointer size > 64-bit */ +typedef size_t mbedtls_ct_condition_t; +typedef size_t mbedtls_ct_uint_t; +typedef ptrdiff_t mbedtls_ct_int_t; +#define MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE ((mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(SIZE_MAX)) +#elif (SIZE_MAX > 0xffffffff) || defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) +/* 32-bit < pointer size <= 64-bit, or 64-bit MPI */ +typedef uint64_t mbedtls_ct_condition_t; +typedef uint64_t mbedtls_ct_uint_t; +typedef int64_t mbedtls_ct_int_t; +#define MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64 +#define MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE ((mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(UINT64_MAX)) +#else +/* Pointer size <= 32-bit, and no 64-bit MPIs */ +typedef uint32_t mbedtls_ct_condition_t; +typedef uint32_t mbedtls_ct_uint_t; +typedef int32_t mbedtls_ct_int_t; +#define MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32 +#define MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE ((mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(UINT32_MAX)) +#endif +#define MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE ((mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(0)) + +/* ============================================================================ + * Boolean operations + */ + +/** Convert a number into a mbedtls_ct_condition_t. + * + * \param x Number to convert. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x != 0, or MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if \p x == 0 + * + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x); + +/** Boolean "not equal" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x != \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x != \p y, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); + +/** Boolean "equals" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x == \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x == \p y, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); + +/** Boolean "less than" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x < \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x < \p y, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); + +/** Boolean "greater than" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x > \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x > \p y, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); + +/** Boolean "greater or equal" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x >= \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x >= \p y, + * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); + +/** Boolean "less than or equal" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x <= \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x <= \p y, + * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_le(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, + mbedtls_ct_uint_t y); + +/** Boolean not-equals operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x != \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \note This is more efficient than mbedtls_ct_uint_ne if both arguments are + * mbedtls_ct_condition_t. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x != \p y, + * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y); + +/** Boolean "and" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x && \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x && \p y, + * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y); + +/** Boolean "or" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * \p x || \p y + * + * \param x The first value to analyze. + * \param y The second value to analyze. + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x || \p y, + * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_or(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t y); + +/** Boolean "not" operation. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * ! \p x + * + * \param x The value to invert + * + * \return MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if \p x, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_not(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x); + + +/* ============================================================================ + * Data selection operations + */ + +/** Choose between two size_t values. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : if0. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0. + */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + size_t if1, + size_t if0); + +/** Choose between two unsigned values. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : if0. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0. + */ +static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + unsigned if1, + unsigned if0); + +/** Choose between two mbedtls_ct_condition_t values. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : if0. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if0); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +/** Choose between two mbedtls_mpi_uint values. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : if0. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0. + */ +static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint if1, \ + mbedtls_mpi_uint if0); + +#endif + +/** Choose between an unsigned value and 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_uint_if(condition, if1, 0) but + * results in smaller code size. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0. + */ +static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, unsigned if1); + +/** Choose between an mbedtls_ct_condition_t and 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_bool_if(condition, if1, 0) but + * results in smaller code size. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0. + */ +static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1); + +/** Choose between a size_t value and 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_size_if(condition, if1, 0) but + * results in smaller code size. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0. + */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, size_t if1); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +/** Choose between an mbedtls_mpi_uint value and 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(condition, if1, 0) but + * results in smaller code size. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0. + */ +static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + mbedtls_mpi_uint if1); + +#endif + +/** Constant-flow char selection + * + * \param low Secret. Bottom of range + * \param high Secret. Top of range + * \param c Secret. Value to compare to range + * \param t Secret. Value to return, if in range + * + * \return \p t if \p low <= \p c <= \p high, 0 otherwise. + */ +static inline unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(unsigned char low, + unsigned char high, + unsigned char c, + unsigned char t); + +/** Choose between two error values. The values must be in the range [-32767..0]. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : if0. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1, int if0); + +/** Choose between an error value and 0. The error value must be in the range [-32767..0]. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * condition ? if1 : 0. + * + * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_error_if(condition, if1, 0) but + * results in smaller code size. + * + * \param condition Condition to test. + * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE. + * + * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1); + +/* ============================================================================ + * Block memory operations + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +/** Conditionally set a block of memory to zero. + * + * Regardless of the condition, every byte will be read once and written to + * once. + * + * \param condition Secret. Condition to test. + * \param buf Secret. Pointer to the start of the buffer. + * \param len Number of bytes to set to zero. + * + * \warning Unlike mbedtls_platform_zeroize, this does not have the same guarantees + * about not being optimised away if the memory is never read again. + */ +void mbedtls_ct_zeroize_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, void *buf, size_t len); + +/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset); + * memset(start + (total - offset), 0, offset); + * + * Timing independence comes at the expense of performance. + * + * \param start Secret. Pointer to the start of the buffer. + * \param total Total size of the buffer. + * \param offset Secret. Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes. + */ +void mbedtls_ct_memmove_left(void *start, + size_t total, + size_t offset); + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) */ + +/** Conditional memcpy. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * if (condition) { + * memcpy(dest, src1, len); + * } else { + * if (src2 != NULL) + * memcpy(dest, src2, len); + * } + * + * It will always read len bytes from src1. + * If src2 != NULL, it will always read len bytes from src2. + * If src2 == NULL, it will instead read len bytes from dest (as if src2 == dest). + * + * \param condition The condition + * \param dest Secret. Destination pointer. + * \param src1 Secret. Pointer to copy from (if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE). + * This may be equal to \p dest, but may not overlap in other ways. + * \param src2 Secret (contents only - may branch to determine if this parameter is NULL). + * Pointer to copy from (if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE and \p src2 is not NULL). May be NULL. + * This may be equal to \p dest, but may not overlap it in other ways. It may overlap with \p src1. + * \param len Number of bytes to copy. + */ +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, + unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src1, + const unsigned char *src2, + size_t len + ); + +/** Copy data from a secret position. + * + * Functionally equivalent to: + * + * memcpy(dst, src + offset, len) + * + * This function copies \p len bytes from \p src + \p offset to + * \p dst, with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not depend on + * \p offset, but only on \p offset_min, \p offset_max and \p len. + * + * \note This function reads from \p dest, but the value that + * is read does not influence the result and this + * function's behavior is well-defined regardless of the + * contents of the buffers. This may result in false + * positives from static or dynamic analyzers, especially + * if \p dest is not initialized. + * + * \param dest Secret. The destination buffer. This must point to a writable + * buffer of at least \p len bytes. + * \param src Secret. The base of the source buffer. This must point to a + * readable buffer of at least \p offset_max + \p len + * bytes. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest + * \param offset Secret. The offset in the source buffer from which to copy. + * This must be no less than \p offset_min and no greater + * than \p offset_max. + * \param offset_min The minimal value of \p offset. + * \param offset_max The maximal value of \p offset. + * \param len The number of bytes to copy. + */ +void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset(unsigned char *dest, + const unsigned char *src, + size_t offset, + size_t offset_min, + size_t offset_max, + size_t len); + +/* Documented in include/mbedtls/constant_time.h. a and b are secret. + + int mbedtls_ct_memcmp(const void *a, + const void *b, + size_t n); + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + +/** Constant-time buffer comparison without branches. + * + * Similar to mbedtls_ct_memcmp, except that the result only depends on part of + * the input data - differences in the head or tail are ignored. Functionally equivalent to: + * + * memcmp(a + skip_head, b + skip_head, size - skip_head - skip_tail) + * + * Time taken depends on \p n, but not on \p skip_head or \p skip_tail . + * + * Behaviour is undefined if ( \p skip_head + \p skip_tail) > \p n. + * + * \param a Secret. Pointer to the first buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL. + * \param b Secret. Pointer to the second buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL. + * \param n The number of bytes to examine (total size of the buffers). + * \param skip_head Secret. The number of bytes to treat as non-significant at the start of the buffer. + * These bytes will still be read. + * \param skip_tail Secret. The number of bytes to treat as non-significant at the end of the buffer. + * These bytes will still be read. + * + * \return Zero if the contents of the two buffers are the same, otherwise non-zero. + */ +int mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial(const void *a, + const void *b, + size_t n, + size_t skip_head, + size_t skip_tail); + +#endif + +/* Include the implementation of static inline functions above. */ +#include "constant_time_impl.h" + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/library/ctr.h b/library/ctr.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..aa48fb9e707 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ctr.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/** + * \file ctr.h + * + * \brief This file contains common functionality for counter algorithms. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CTR_H +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_H + +#include "common.h" + +/** + * \brief Increment a big-endian 16-byte value. + * This is quite performance-sensitive for AES-CTR and CTR-DRBG. + * + * \param n A 16-byte value to be incremented. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(uint8_t n[16]) +{ + // The 32-bit version seems to perform about the same as a 64-bit version + // on 64-bit architectures, so no need to define a 64-bit version. + for (int i = 3;; i--) { + uint32_t x = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(n, i << 2); + x += 1; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(x, n, i << 2); + if (x != 0 || i == 0) { + break; + } + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_H */ diff --git a/library/ctr_drbg.c b/library/ctr_drbg.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..66d9d28c589 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ctr_drbg.c @@ -0,0 +1,1016 @@ +/* + * CTR_DRBG implementation based on AES-256 (NIST SP 800-90) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * The NIST SP 800-90 DRBGs are described in the following publication. + * + * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-90r.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + +#include "ctr.h" +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#endif + +/* Using error translation functions from PSA to MbedTLS */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +static psa_status_t ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context *psa_ctx, + unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attr, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES); + status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, key, key_len, &psa_ctx->key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(&psa_ctx->operation, psa_ctx->key_id, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + return status; +} + +static void ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context *psa_ctx) +{ + psa_cipher_abort(&psa_ctx->operation); + psa_destroy_key(psa_ctx->key_id); + + psa_ctx->operation = psa_cipher_operation_init(); + psa_ctx->key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +} +#endif + +/* + * CTR_DRBG context initialization + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->aes_ctx); +#else + ctx->psa_ctx.key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + ctx->psa_ctx.operation = psa_cipher_operation_init(); +#endif + /* Indicate that the entropy nonce length is not set explicitly. + * See mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). */ + ctx->reseed_counter = -1; + + ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; +} + +/* + * This function resets CTR_DRBG context to the state immediately + * after initial call of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(). + */ +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* The mutex is initialized iff f_entropy is set. */ + if (ctx->f_entropy != NULL) { + mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx->aes_ctx); +#else + ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&ctx->psa_ctx); +#endif + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context)); + ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; + ctx->reseed_counter = -1; +} + +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int resistance) +{ + ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance; +} + +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + size_t len) +{ + ctx->entropy_len = len; +} + +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + size_t len) +{ + /* If mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() has already been called, it's + * too late. Return the error code that's closest to making sense. */ + if (ctx->f_entropy != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + } + + if (len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; + } + + /* This shouldn't be an issue because + * MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT < INT_MAX in any sensible + * configuration, but make sure anyway. */ + if (len > INT_MAX) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; + } + + /* For backward compatibility with Mbed TLS <= 2.19, store the + * entropy nonce length in a field that already exists, but isn't + * used until after the initial seeding. */ + /* Due to the capping of len above, the value fits in an int. */ + ctx->reseed_counter = (int) len; + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int interval) +{ + ctx->reseed_interval = interval; +} + +static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output, + const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len) +{ + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16]; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE]; + unsigned char chain[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; + unsigned char *p, *iv; + int ret = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; +#else + psa_status_t status; + size_t tmp_len; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context psa_ctx; + + psa_ctx.key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_ctx.operation = psa_cipher_operation_init(); +#endif + + int i, j; + size_t buf_len, use_len; + + if (data_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; + } + + memset(buf, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT + + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16); + + /* + * Construct IV (16 bytes) and S in buffer + * IV = Counter (in 32-bits) padded to 16 with zeroes + * S = Length input string (in 32-bits) || Length of output (in 32-bits) || + * data || 0x80 + * (Total is padded to a multiple of 16-bytes with zeroes) + */ + p = buf + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(data_len, p, 0); + p += 4 + 3; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; + memcpy(p, data, data_len); + p[data_len] = 0x80; + + buf_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 8 + data_len + 1; + + for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; i++) { + key[i] = i; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + mbedtls_aes_init(&aes_ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes_ctx, key, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } +#else + status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&psa_ctx, key, sizeof(key)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif + + /* + * Reduce data to MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN bytes of data + */ + for (j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) { + p = buf; + memset(chain, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE); + use_len = buf_len; + + while (use_len > 0) { + mbedtls_xor(chain, chain, p, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE); + p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; + use_len -= (use_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) ? + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : use_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + chain, chain)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } +#else + status = psa_cipher_update(&psa_ctx.operation, chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, + chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif + } + + memcpy(tmp + j, chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE); + + /* + * Update IV + */ + buf[3]++; + } + + /* + * Do final encryption with reduced data + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes_ctx, tmp, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } +#else + ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&psa_ctx); + + status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&psa_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif + iv = tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; + p = output; + + for (j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + iv, iv)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } +#else + status = psa_cipher_update(&psa_ctx.operation, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, + iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif + memcpy(p, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE); + p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; + } +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + mbedtls_aes_free(&aes_ctx); +#else + ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&psa_ctx); +#endif + /* + * tidy up the stack + */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key, sizeof(key)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(chain, sizeof(chain)); + if (0 != ret) { + /* + * wipe partial seed from memory + */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(output, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN); + } + + return ret; +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Update (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.2) + * ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, provided_data) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Update(provided_data, Key, V) + * with inputs and outputs + * ctx->aes_ctx = Key + * ctx->counter = V + */ +static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]) +{ + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + unsigned char *p = tmp; + int j; + int ret = 0; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + psa_status_t status; + size_t tmp_len; +#endif + + memset(tmp, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN); + + for (j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) { + /* + * Increase counter + */ + mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(ctx->counter); + + /* + * Crypt counter block + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + ctx->counter, p)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } +#else + status = psa_cipher_update(&ctx->psa_ctx.operation, ctx->counter, sizeof(ctx->counter), + p, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif + + p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; + } + + mbedtls_xor(tmp, tmp, data, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN); + + /* + * Update key and counter + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->aes_ctx, tmp, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } +#else + ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&ctx->psa_ctx); + + status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&ctx->psa_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif + memcpy(ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + return ret; +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2) + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(ctx, additional, add_len) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string, + * security_strength) -> initial_working_state + * with inputs + * ctx->counter = all-bits-0 + * ctx->aes_ctx = context from all-bits-0 key + * additional[:add_len] = entropy_input || nonce || personalization_string + * and with outputs + * ctx = initial_working_state + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len) +{ + unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (add_len == 0) { + return 0; + } + + if ((ret = block_cipher_df(add_input, additional, add_len)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, add_input)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(add_input, sizeof(add_input)); + return ret; +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Reseed with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.4.2) + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, len, nonce_len) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional_input) + * -> new_working_state + * with inputs + * ctx contains working_state + * additional[:len] = additional_input + * and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy + * for (ctx->entropy_len + nonce_len) bytes + * and with output + * ctx contains new_working_state + */ +static int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t len, + size_t nonce_len) +{ + unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; + size_t seedlen = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ctx->entropy_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; + } + if (nonce_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; + } + if (len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len - nonce_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; + } + + memset(seed, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT); + + /* Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy to seed state. */ + if (0 != ctx->f_entropy(ctx->p_entropy, seed, ctx->entropy_len)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + } + seedlen += ctx->entropy_len; + + /* Gather entropy for a nonce if requested. */ + if (nonce_len != 0) { + if (0 != ctx->f_entropy(ctx->p_entropy, seed + seedlen, nonce_len)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + } + seedlen += nonce_len; + } + + /* Add additional data if provided. */ + if (additional != NULL && len != 0) { + memcpy(seed + seedlen, additional, len); + seedlen += len; + } + + /* Reduce to 384 bits. */ + if ((ret = block_cipher_df(seed, seed, seedlen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Update state. */ + if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, seed)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ctx->reseed_counter = 1; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seed, sizeof(seed)); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t len) +{ + return mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal(ctx, additional, len, 0); +} + +/* Return a "good" nonce length for CTR_DRBG. The chosen nonce length + * is sufficient to achieve the maximum security strength given the key + * size and entropy length. If there is enough entropy in the initial + * call to the entropy function to serve as both the entropy input and + * the nonce, don't make a second call to get a nonce. */ +static size_t good_nonce_len(size_t entropy_len) +{ + if (entropy_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 3 / 2) { + return 0; + } else { + return (entropy_len + 1) / 2; + } +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2) + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(ctx, f_entropy, p_entropy, custom, len) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string, + * security_strength) -> initial_working_state + * with inputs + * custom[:len] = nonce || personalization_string + * where entropy_input comes from f_entropy for ctx->entropy_len bytes + * and with outputs + * ctx = initial_working_state + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_entropy, + const unsigned char *custom, + size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE]; + size_t nonce_len; + + memset(key, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE); + + /* The mutex is initialized iff f_entropy is set. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex); +#endif + + ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy; + ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy; + + if (ctx->entropy_len == 0) { + ctx->entropy_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; + } + /* ctx->reseed_counter contains the desired amount of entropy to + * grab for a nonce (see mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()). + * If it's -1, indicating that the entropy nonce length was not set + * explicitly, use a sufficiently large nonce for security. */ + nonce_len = (ctx->reseed_counter >= 0 ? + (size_t) ctx->reseed_counter : + good_nonce_len(ctx->entropy_len)); + + /* Initialize with an empty key. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->aes_ctx, key, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#else + psa_status_t status; + + status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&ctx->psa_ctx, key, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + return status; + } +#endif + + /* Do the initial seeding. */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal(ctx, custom, len, + nonce_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +/* CTR_DRBG_Generate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.5.2) + * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(ctx, output, output_len, additional, add_len) + * implements + * CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional[:add_len]) + * -> working_state_after_reseed + * if required, then + * CTR_DRBG_Generate(working_state_after_reseed, + * requested_number_of_bits, additional_input) + * -> status, returned_bits, new_working_state + * with inputs + * ctx contains working_state + * requested_number_of_bits = 8 * output_len + * additional[:add_len] = additional_input + * and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy + * and with outputs + * status = SUCCESS (this function does the reseed internally) + * returned_bits = output[:output_len] + * ctx contains new_working_state + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_len, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng; + unsigned char *p = output; + struct { + unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; + } locals; + size_t use_len; + + if (output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG; + } + + if (add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; + } + + memset(locals.add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN); + + if (ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval || + ctx->prediction_resistance) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, add_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + add_len = 0; + } + + if (add_len > 0) { + if ((ret = block_cipher_df(locals.add_input, additional, add_len)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, locals.add_input)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + while (output_len > 0) { + /* + * Increase counter (treat it as a 128-bit big-endian integer). + */ + mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(ctx->counter); + + /* + * Crypt counter block + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, + ctx->counter, locals.tmp)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } +#else + psa_status_t status; + size_t tmp_len; + + status = psa_cipher_update(&ctx->psa_ctx.operation, ctx->counter, sizeof(ctx->counter), + locals.tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + goto exit; + } +#endif + + use_len = (output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) + ? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : output_len; + /* + * Copy random block to destination + */ + memcpy(p, locals.tmp, use_len); + p += use_len; + output_len -= use_len; + } + + if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, locals.add_input)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ctx->reseed_counter++; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&locals, sizeof(locals)); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, + size_t output_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(ctx, output, output_len, NULL, 0); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } +#endif + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const char *path) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + FILE *f; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT]; + + if ((f = fopen(path, "wb")) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(ctx, buf, + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (fwrite(buf, 1, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT, f) != + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } else { + ret = 0; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + + fclose(f); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, + const char *path) +{ + int ret = 0; + FILE *f = NULL; + size_t n; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT]; + unsigned char c; + + if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + + n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f); + if (fread(&c, 1, 1, f) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; + goto exit; + } + if (n == 0 || ferror(f)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + fclose(f); + f = NULL; + + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(ctx, buf, n); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (f != NULL) { + fclose(f); + } + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + return mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file(ctx, path); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* The CTR_DRBG NIST test vectors used here are available at + * https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/documents/drbg/drbgtestvectors.zip + * + * The parameters used to derive the test data are: + * + * [AES-128 use df] + * [PredictionResistance = True/False] + * [EntropyInputLen = 128] + * [NonceLen = 64] + * [PersonalizationStringLen = 128] + * [AdditionalInputLen = 0] + * [ReturnedBitsLen = 512] + * + * [AES-256 use df] + * [PredictionResistance = True/False] + * [EntropyInputLen = 256] + * [NonceLen = 128] + * [PersonalizationStringLen = 256] + * [AdditionalInputLen = 0] + * [ReturnedBitsLen = 512] + * + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) +static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[] = +{ 0x04, 0xd9, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xdc, 0xe8, 0x6e, 0xbb, + 0xf1, 0x08, 0x77, 0x2b, 0x9e, 0x08, 0xca, 0x92, + 0x65, 0x16, 0xda, 0x99, 0xa2, 0x59, 0xf3, 0xe8, + 0x38, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0x51, 0x70, 0x7b, 0x20, + 0xec, 0x53, 0xd0, 0x66, 0xc3, 0x0f, 0xe3, 0xb0, + 0xe0, 0x86, 0xa6, 0xaa, 0x5f, 0x72, 0x2f, 0xad, + 0xf7, 0xef, 0x06, 0xb8, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0xe8 }; + +static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[] = +{ 0x07, 0x0d, 0x59, 0x63, 0x98, 0x73, 0xa5, 0x45, + 0x27, 0x38, 0x22, 0x7b, 0x76, 0x85, 0xd1, 0xa9, + 0x74, 0x18, 0x1f, 0x3c, 0x22, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x20, + 0x4a, 0x47, 0xc2, 0xf3, 0x85, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x6f, + 0x00, 0x2e, 0x71, 0xda, 0xed, 0x16, 0x9b, 0x5c }; + +static const unsigned char pers_pr[] = +{ 0xbf, 0xa4, 0x9a, 0x8f, 0x7b, 0xd8, 0xb1, 0x7a, + 0x9d, 0xfa, 0x45, 0xed, 0x21, 0x52, 0xb3, 0xad }; + +static const unsigned char pers_nopr[] = +{ 0x4e, 0x61, 0x79, 0xd4, 0xc2, 0x72, 0xa1, 0x4c, + 0xf1, 0x3d, 0xf6, 0x5e, 0xa3, 0xa6, 0xe5, 0x0f }; + +static const unsigned char result_pr[] = +{ 0xc9, 0x0a, 0xaf, 0x85, 0x89, 0x71, 0x44, 0x66, + 0x4f, 0x25, 0x0b, 0x2b, 0xde, 0xd8, 0xfa, 0xff, + 0x52, 0x5a, 0x1b, 0x32, 0x5e, 0x41, 0x7a, 0x10, + 0x1f, 0xef, 0x1e, 0x62, 0x23, 0xe9, 0x20, 0x30, + 0xc9, 0x0d, 0xad, 0x69, 0xb4, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0xf4, + 0x87, 0x42, 0xd5, 0xae, 0x5e, 0x5e, 0x43, 0xcc, + 0xd9, 0xfd, 0x0b, 0x93, 0x4a, 0xe3, 0xd4, 0x06, + 0x37, 0x36, 0x0f, 0x3f, 0x72, 0x82, 0x0c, 0xcf }; + +static const unsigned char result_nopr[] = +{ 0x31, 0xc9, 0x91, 0x09, 0xf8, 0xc5, 0x10, 0x13, + 0x3c, 0xd3, 0x96, 0xf9, 0xbc, 0x2c, 0x12, 0xc0, + 0x7c, 0xc1, 0x61, 0x5f, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x99, 0xaf, + 0xd7, 0xf2, 0x36, 0xfd, 0x40, 0x1a, 0x8b, 0xf2, + 0x33, 0x38, 0xee, 0x1d, 0x03, 0x5f, 0x83, 0xb7, + 0xa2, 0x53, 0xdc, 0xee, 0x18, 0xfc, 0xa7, 0xf2, + 0xee, 0x96, 0xc6, 0xc2, 0xcd, 0x0c, 0xff, 0x02, + 0x76, 0x70, 0x69, 0xaa, 0x69, 0xd1, 0x3b, 0xe8 }; +#else /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ + +static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[] = +{ 0xca, 0x58, 0xfd, 0xf2, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xcb, 0x49, + 0xd4, 0xe0, 0x5b, 0xe2, 0x39, 0x50, 0xd9, 0x8a, + 0x6a, 0xb3, 0xc5, 0x2f, 0xdf, 0x74, 0xd5, 0x85, + 0x8f, 0xd1, 0xba, 0x64, 0x54, 0x7b, 0xdb, 0x1e, + 0xc5, 0xea, 0x24, 0xc0, 0xfa, 0x0c, 0x90, 0x15, + 0x09, 0x20, 0x92, 0x42, 0x32, 0x36, 0x45, 0x45, + 0x7d, 0x20, 0x76, 0x6b, 0xcf, 0xa2, 0x15, 0xc8, + 0x2f, 0x9f, 0xbc, 0x88, 0x3f, 0x80, 0xd1, 0x2c, + 0xb7, 0x16, 0xd1, 0x80, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0xb3, + 0x88, 0x1b, 0x21, 0x45, 0xef, 0xa1, 0x7f, 0xce, + 0xc8, 0x92, 0x35, 0x55, 0x2a, 0xd9, 0x1d, 0x8e, + 0x12, 0x38, 0xac, 0x01, 0x4e, 0x38, 0x18, 0x76, + 0x9c, 0xf2, 0xb6, 0xd4, 0x13, 0xb6, 0x2c, 0x77, + 0xc0, 0xe7, 0xe6, 0x0c, 0x47, 0x44, 0x95, 0xbe }; + +static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[] = +{ 0x4c, 0xfb, 0x21, 0x86, 0x73, 0x34, 0x6d, 0x9d, + 0x50, 0xc9, 0x22, 0xe4, 0x9b, 0x0d, 0xfc, 0xd0, + 0x90, 0xad, 0xf0, 0x4f, 0x5c, 0x3b, 0xa4, 0x73, + 0x27, 0xdf, 0xcd, 0x6f, 0xa6, 0x3a, 0x78, 0x5c, + 0x01, 0x69, 0x62, 0xa7, 0xfd, 0x27, 0x87, 0xa2, + 0x4b, 0xf6, 0xbe, 0x47, 0xef, 0x37, 0x83, 0xf1, + 0xb7, 0xec, 0x46, 0x07, 0x23, 0x63, 0x83, 0x4a, + 0x1b, 0x01, 0x33, 0xf2, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x91, 0xdb, + 0x4f, 0x11, 0xa6, 0x86, 0x51, 0xf2, 0x3e, 0x3a, + 0x8b, 0x1f, 0xdc, 0x03, 0xb1, 0x92, 0xc7, 0xe7 }; + +static const unsigned char pers_pr[] = +{ 0x5a, 0x70, 0x95, 0xe9, 0x81, 0x40, 0x52, 0x33, + 0x91, 0x53, 0x7e, 0x75, 0xd6, 0x19, 0x9d, 0x1e, + 0xad, 0x0d, 0xc6, 0xa7, 0xde, 0x6c, 0x1f, 0xe0, + 0xea, 0x18, 0x33, 0xa8, 0x7e, 0x06, 0x20, 0xe9 }; + +static const unsigned char pers_nopr[] = +{ 0x88, 0xee, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xe8, 0x3b, 0xf3, 0x29, + 0x4b, 0xda, 0xcd, 0x60, 0x99, 0xeb, 0xe4, 0xbf, + 0x55, 0xec, 0xd9, 0x11, 0x3f, 0x71, 0xe5, 0xeb, + 0xcb, 0x45, 0x75, 0xf3, 0xd6, 0xa6, 0x8a, 0x6b }; + +static const unsigned char result_pr[] = +{ 0xce, 0x2f, 0xdb, 0xb6, 0xd9, 0xb7, 0x39, 0x85, + 0x04, 0xc5, 0xc0, 0x42, 0xc2, 0x31, 0xc6, 0x1d, + 0x9b, 0x5a, 0x59, 0xf8, 0x7e, 0x0d, 0xcc, 0x62, + 0x7b, 0x65, 0x11, 0x55, 0x10, 0xeb, 0x9e, 0x3d, + 0xa4, 0xfb, 0x1c, 0x6a, 0x18, 0xc0, 0x74, 0xdb, + 0xdd, 0xe7, 0x02, 0x23, 0x63, 0x21, 0xd0, 0x39, + 0xf9, 0xa7, 0xc4, 0x52, 0x84, 0x3b, 0x49, 0x40, + 0x72, 0x2b, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0x9c, 0xdb, 0xc3, 0x43 }; + +static const unsigned char result_nopr[] = +{ 0xa5, 0x51, 0x80, 0xa1, 0x90, 0xbe, 0xf3, 0xad, + 0xaf, 0x28, 0xf6, 0xb7, 0x95, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0xf3, + 0xd6, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0xb2, 0x7d, 0xd0, 0x46, 0x7b, + 0x0c, 0x75, 0xf5, 0xfa, 0x93, 0x1e, 0x97, 0x14, + 0x75, 0xb2, 0x7c, 0xae, 0x03, 0xa2, 0x96, 0x54, + 0xe2, 0xf4, 0x09, 0x66, 0xea, 0x33, 0x64, 0x30, + 0x40, 0xd1, 0x40, 0x0f, 0xe6, 0x77, 0x87, 0x3a, + 0xf8, 0x09, 0x7c, 0x1f, 0xe9, 0xf0, 0x02, 0x98 }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ + +static size_t test_offset; +static int ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy(void *data, unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + const unsigned char *p = data; + memcpy(buf, p + test_offset, len); + test_offset += len; + return 0; +} + +#define CHK(c) if ((c) != 0) \ + { \ + if (verbose != 0) \ + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); \ + return 1; \ + } + +#define SELF_TEST_OUTPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH 64 + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test(int verbose) +{ + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[sizeof(result_pr)]; + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&ctx); + + /* + * Based on a NIST CTR_DRBG test vector (PR = True) + */ + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" CTR_DRBG (PR = TRUE) : "); + } + + test_offset = 0; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE / 2); + CHK(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(&ctx, + ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy, + (void *) entropy_source_pr, + pers_pr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE)); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON); + CHK(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, SELF_TEST_OUTPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH)); + CHK(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, sizeof(result_pr))); + CHK(memcmp(buf, result_pr, sizeof(result_pr))); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(&ctx); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + + /* + * Based on a NIST CTR_DRBG test vector (PR = FALSE) + */ + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" CTR_DRBG (PR = FALSE): "); + } + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&ctx); + + test_offset = 0; + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE); + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE / 2); + CHK(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(&ctx, + ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy, + (void *) entropy_source_nopr, + pers_nopr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE)); + CHK(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(&ctx, NULL, 0)); + CHK(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, SELF_TEST_OUTPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH)); + CHK(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, sizeof(result_nopr))); + CHK(memcmp(buf, result_nopr, sizeof(result_nopr))); + + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(&ctx); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/library/debug.c b/library/debug.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c36ed3c5c21 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/debug.c @@ -0,0 +1,465 @@ +/* + * Debugging routines + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +/* DEBUG_BUF_SIZE must be at least 2 */ +#define DEBUG_BUF_SIZE 512 + +static int debug_threshold = 0; + +void mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(int threshold) +{ + debug_threshold = threshold; +} + +/* + * All calls to f_dbg must be made via this function + */ +static inline void debug_send_line(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *str) +{ + /* + * If in a threaded environment, we need a thread identifier. + * Since there is no portable way to get one, use the address of the ssl + * context instead, as it shouldn't be shared between threads. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + char idstr[20 + DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; /* 0x + 16 nibbles + ': ' */ + mbedtls_snprintf(idstr, sizeof(idstr), "%p: %s", (void *) ssl, str); + ssl->conf->f_dbg(ssl->conf->p_dbg, level, file, line, idstr); +#else + ssl->conf->f_dbg(ssl->conf->p_dbg, level, file, line, str); +#endif +} + +MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6) +void mbedtls_debug_print_msg(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *format, ...) +{ + va_list argp; + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(DEBUG_BUF_SIZE >= 2, "DEBUG_BUF_SIZE too small"); + + if (NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold) { + return; + } + + va_start(argp, format); + ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf(str, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, format, argp); + va_end(argp); + + if (ret < 0) { + ret = 0; + } else { + if (ret >= DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1) { + ret = DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 2; + } + } + str[ret] = '\n'; + str[ret + 1] = '\0'; + + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); +} + +void mbedtls_debug_print_ret(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, int ret) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + + if (NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold) { + return; + } + + /* + * With non-blocking I/O and examples that just retry immediately, + * the logs would be quickly flooded with WANT_READ, so ignore that. + * Don't ignore WANT_WRITE however, since it is usually rare. + */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s() returned %d (-0x%04x)\n", + text, ret, (unsigned int) -ret); + + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); +} + +void mbedtls_debug_print_buf(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, const char *text, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + char txt[17]; + size_t i, idx = 0; + + if (NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "dumping '%s' (%u bytes)\n", + text, (unsigned int) len); + + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); + + memset(txt, 0, sizeof(txt)); + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (i >= 4096) { + break; + } + + if (i % 16 == 0) { + if (i > 0) { + mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " %s\n", txt); + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); + + idx = 0; + memset(txt, 0, sizeof(txt)); + } + + idx += mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "%04x: ", + (unsigned int) i); + + } + + idx += mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " %02x", + (unsigned int) buf[i]); + txt[i % 16] = (buf[i] > 31 && buf[i] < 127) ? buf[i] : '.'; + } + + if (len > 0) { + for (/* i = i */; i % 16 != 0; i++) { + idx += mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " "); + } + + mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " %s\n", txt); + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) +void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + + if (NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s(X)", text); + mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(ssl, level, file, line, str, &X->X); + + mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s(Y)", text); + mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(ssl, level, file, line, str, &X->Y); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +static void mbedtls_debug_print_ec_coord(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, const char *text, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + size_t i, idx = 0; + + mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "value of '%s' (%u bits) is:\n", + text, (unsigned int) len * 8); + + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (i >= 4096) { + break; + } + + if (i % 16 == 0) { + if (i > 0) { + mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "\n"); + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); + + idx = 0; + } + } + + idx += mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " %02x", + (unsigned int) buf[i]); + } + + if (len > 0) { + for (/* i = i */; i % 16 != 0; i++) { + idx += mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " "); + } + + mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "\n"); + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); + } +} + +void mbedtls_debug_print_psa_ec(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + const uint8_t *coord_start; + size_t coord_len; + + if (NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + level > debug_threshold) { + return; + } + + /* For the description of pk->pk_raw content please refer to the description + * psa_export_public_key() function. */ + coord_len = (pk->pub_raw_len - 1)/2; + + /* X coordinate */ + coord_start = pk->pub_raw + 1; + mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s(X)", text); + mbedtls_debug_print_ec_coord(ssl, level, file, line, str, coord_start, coord_len); + + /* Y coordinate */ + coord_start = coord_start + coord_len; + mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s(Y)", text); + mbedtls_debug_print_ec_coord(ssl, level, file, line, str, coord_start, coord_len); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + size_t bitlen; + size_t idx = 0; + + if (NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + NULL == X || + level > debug_threshold) { + return; + } + + bitlen = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(X); + + mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "value of '%s' (%u bits) is:\n", + text, (unsigned) bitlen); + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); + + if (bitlen == 0) { + str[0] = ' '; str[1] = '0'; str[2] = '0'; + idx = 3; + } else { + int n; + for (n = (int) ((bitlen - 1) / 8); n >= 0; n--) { + size_t limb_offset = n / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); + size_t offset_in_limb = n % sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); + unsigned char octet = + (X->p[limb_offset] >> (offset_in_limb * 8)) & 0xff; + mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " %02x", octet); + idx += 3; + /* Wrap lines after 16 octets that each take 3 columns */ + if (idx >= 3 * 16) { + mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "\n"); + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); + idx = 0; + } + } + } + + if (idx != 0) { + mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "\n"); + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +static void debug_print_pk(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t i; + mbedtls_pk_debug_item items[MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS]; + char name[16]; + + memset(items, 0, sizeof(items)); + + if (mbedtls_pk_debug(pk, items) != 0) { + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, + "invalid PK context\n"); + return; + } + + for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS; i++) { + if (items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_NONE) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s%s", text, items[i].name); + name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0'; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if (items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI) { + mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(ssl, level, file, line, name, items[i].value); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) + if (items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP) { + mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(ssl, level, file, line, name, items[i].value); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + if (items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_PSA_EC) { + mbedtls_debug_print_psa_ec(ssl, level, file, line, name, items[i].value); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + { debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, + "should not happen\n"); } + } +} + +static void debug_print_line_by_line(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, const char *text) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + const char *start, *cur; + + start = text; + for (cur = text; *cur != '\0'; cur++) { + if (*cur == '\n') { + size_t len = (size_t) (cur - start) + 1; + if (len > DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1) { + len = DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1; + } + + memcpy(str, start, len); + str[len] = '\0'; + + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); + + start = cur + 1; + } + } +} + +void mbedtls_debug_print_crt(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) +{ + char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; + int i = 0; + + if (NULL == ssl || + NULL == ssl->conf || + NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg || + NULL == crt || + level > debug_threshold) { + return; + } + + while (crt != NULL) { + char buf[1024]; + + mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s #%d:\n", text, ++i); + debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_info(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, "", crt); + debug_print_line_by_line(ssl, level, file, line, buf); + + debug_print_pk(ssl, level, file, line, "crt->", &crt->pk); + + crt = crt->next; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +static void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh_internal(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, + int line, + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, + mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx = ecdh; +#else + const mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx = &ecdh->ctx.mbed_ecdh; +#endif + + switch (attr) { + case MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q: + mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(ssl, level, file, line, "ECDH: Q", + &ctx->Q); + break; + case MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP: + mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(ssl, level, file, line, "ECDH: Qp", + &ctx->Qp); + break; + case MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z: + mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(ssl, level, file, line, "ECDH: z", + &ctx->z); + break; + default: + break; + } +} + +void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, + mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh_internal(ssl, level, file, line, ecdh, attr); +#else + switch (ecdh->var) { + default: + mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh_internal(ssl, level, file, line, ecdh, + attr); + } +#endif +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED && + MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ diff --git a/library/debug_internal.h b/library/debug_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4523b4633a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/debug_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +/** + * \file debug_internal.h + * + * \brief Internal part of the public "debug.h". + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" + +/** + * \brief Print a message to the debug output. This function is always used + * through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG() macro, which supplies the ssl + * context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the message has occurred in + * \param line line number the message has occurred at + * \param format format specifier, in printf format + * \param ... variables used by the format specifier + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_msg(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *format, ...) MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6); + +/** + * \brief Print the return value of a function to the debug output. This + * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text the name of the function that returned the error + * \param ret the return code value + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_ret(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, int ret); + +/** + * \brief Output a buffer of size len bytes to the debug output. This function + * is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the buffer being dumped. Normally the + * variable or buffer name + * \param buf the buffer to be outputted + * \param len length of the buffer + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_buf(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, const char *text, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +/** + * \brief Print a MPI variable to the debug output. This function is always + * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI() macro, which supplies the + * ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the MPI being output. Normally the + * variable name + * \param X the MPI variable + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) +/** + * \brief Print an ECP point to the debug output. This function is always + * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP() macro, which supplies the + * ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the ECP point being output. Normally the + * variable name + * \param X the ECP point + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +/** + * \brief Print a X.509 certificate structure to the debug output. This + * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the certificate being output + * \param crt X.509 certificate structure + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_crt(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt); +#endif + +/* Note: the MBEDTLS_ECDH_C guard here is mandatory because this debug function + only works for the built-in implementation. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z, +} mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr; + +/** + * \brief Print a field of the ECDH structure in the SSL context to the debug + * output. This function is always used through the + * MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH() macro, which supplies the ssl context, file + * and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param ecdh the ECDH context + * \param attr the identifier of the attribute being output + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, + mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED && + MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/library/des.c b/library/des.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f0032b3b569 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/des.c @@ -0,0 +1,1042 @@ +/* + * FIPS-46-3 compliant Triple-DES implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * DES, on which TDES is based, was originally designed by Horst Feistel + * at IBM in 1974, and was adopted as a standard by NIST (formerly NBS). + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips46-3/fips46-3.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT) + +/* + * Expanded DES S-boxes + */ +static const uint32_t SB1[64] = +{ + 0x01010400, 0x00000000, 0x00010000, 0x01010404, + 0x01010004, 0x00010404, 0x00000004, 0x00010000, + 0x00000400, 0x01010400, 0x01010404, 0x00000400, + 0x01000404, 0x01010004, 0x01000000, 0x00000004, + 0x00000404, 0x01000400, 0x01000400, 0x00010400, + 0x00010400, 0x01010000, 0x01010000, 0x01000404, + 0x00010004, 0x01000004, 0x01000004, 0x00010004, + 0x00000000, 0x00000404, 0x00010404, 0x01000000, + 0x00010000, 0x01010404, 0x00000004, 0x01010000, + 0x01010400, 0x01000000, 0x01000000, 0x00000400, + 0x01010004, 0x00010000, 0x00010400, 0x01000004, + 0x00000400, 0x00000004, 0x01000404, 0x00010404, + 0x01010404, 0x00010004, 0x01010000, 0x01000404, + 0x01000004, 0x00000404, 0x00010404, 0x01010400, + 0x00000404, 0x01000400, 0x01000400, 0x00000000, + 0x00010004, 0x00010400, 0x00000000, 0x01010004 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB2[64] = +{ + 0x80108020, 0x80008000, 0x00008000, 0x00108020, + 0x00100000, 0x00000020, 0x80100020, 0x80008020, + 0x80000020, 0x80108020, 0x80108000, 0x80000000, + 0x80008000, 0x00100000, 0x00000020, 0x80100020, + 0x00108000, 0x00100020, 0x80008020, 0x00000000, + 0x80000000, 0x00008000, 0x00108020, 0x80100000, + 0x00100020, 0x80000020, 0x00000000, 0x00108000, + 0x00008020, 0x80108000, 0x80100000, 0x00008020, + 0x00000000, 0x00108020, 0x80100020, 0x00100000, + 0x80008020, 0x80100000, 0x80108000, 0x00008000, + 0x80100000, 0x80008000, 0x00000020, 0x80108020, + 0x00108020, 0x00000020, 0x00008000, 0x80000000, + 0x00008020, 0x80108000, 0x00100000, 0x80000020, + 0x00100020, 0x80008020, 0x80000020, 0x00100020, + 0x00108000, 0x00000000, 0x80008000, 0x00008020, + 0x80000000, 0x80100020, 0x80108020, 0x00108000 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB3[64] = +{ + 0x00000208, 0x08020200, 0x00000000, 0x08020008, + 0x08000200, 0x00000000, 0x00020208, 0x08000200, + 0x00020008, 0x08000008, 0x08000008, 0x00020000, + 0x08020208, 0x00020008, 0x08020000, 0x00000208, + 0x08000000, 0x00000008, 0x08020200, 0x00000200, + 0x00020200, 0x08020000, 0x08020008, 0x00020208, + 0x08000208, 0x00020200, 0x00020000, 0x08000208, + 0x00000008, 0x08020208, 0x00000200, 0x08000000, + 0x08020200, 0x08000000, 0x00020008, 0x00000208, + 0x00020000, 0x08020200, 0x08000200, 0x00000000, + 0x00000200, 0x00020008, 0x08020208, 0x08000200, + 0x08000008, 0x00000200, 0x00000000, 0x08020008, + 0x08000208, 0x00020000, 0x08000000, 0x08020208, + 0x00000008, 0x00020208, 0x00020200, 0x08000008, + 0x08020000, 0x08000208, 0x00000208, 0x08020000, + 0x00020208, 0x00000008, 0x08020008, 0x00020200 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB4[64] = +{ + 0x00802001, 0x00002081, 0x00002081, 0x00000080, + 0x00802080, 0x00800081, 0x00800001, 0x00002001, + 0x00000000, 0x00802000, 0x00802000, 0x00802081, + 0x00000081, 0x00000000, 0x00800080, 0x00800001, + 0x00000001, 0x00002000, 0x00800000, 0x00802001, + 0x00000080, 0x00800000, 0x00002001, 0x00002080, + 0x00800081, 0x00000001, 0x00002080, 0x00800080, + 0x00002000, 0x00802080, 0x00802081, 0x00000081, + 0x00800080, 0x00800001, 0x00802000, 0x00802081, + 0x00000081, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00802000, + 0x00002080, 0x00800080, 0x00800081, 0x00000001, + 0x00802001, 0x00002081, 0x00002081, 0x00000080, + 0x00802081, 0x00000081, 0x00000001, 0x00002000, + 0x00800001, 0x00002001, 0x00802080, 0x00800081, + 0x00002001, 0x00002080, 0x00800000, 0x00802001, + 0x00000080, 0x00800000, 0x00002000, 0x00802080 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB5[64] = +{ + 0x00000100, 0x02080100, 0x02080000, 0x42000100, + 0x00080000, 0x00000100, 0x40000000, 0x02080000, + 0x40080100, 0x00080000, 0x02000100, 0x40080100, + 0x42000100, 0x42080000, 0x00080100, 0x40000000, + 0x02000000, 0x40080000, 0x40080000, 0x00000000, + 0x40000100, 0x42080100, 0x42080100, 0x02000100, + 0x42080000, 0x40000100, 0x00000000, 0x42000000, + 0x02080100, 0x02000000, 0x42000000, 0x00080100, + 0x00080000, 0x42000100, 0x00000100, 0x02000000, + 0x40000000, 0x02080000, 0x42000100, 0x40080100, + 0x02000100, 0x40000000, 0x42080000, 0x02080100, + 0x40080100, 0x00000100, 0x02000000, 0x42080000, + 0x42080100, 0x00080100, 0x42000000, 0x42080100, + 0x02080000, 0x00000000, 0x40080000, 0x42000000, + 0x00080100, 0x02000100, 0x40000100, 0x00080000, + 0x00000000, 0x40080000, 0x02080100, 0x40000100 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB6[64] = +{ + 0x20000010, 0x20400000, 0x00004000, 0x20404010, + 0x20400000, 0x00000010, 0x20404010, 0x00400000, + 0x20004000, 0x00404010, 0x00400000, 0x20000010, + 0x00400010, 0x20004000, 0x20000000, 0x00004010, + 0x00000000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010, 0x00004000, + 0x00404000, 0x20004010, 0x00000010, 0x20400010, + 0x20400010, 0x00000000, 0x00404010, 0x20404000, + 0x00004010, 0x00404000, 0x20404000, 0x20000000, + 0x20004000, 0x00000010, 0x20400010, 0x00404000, + 0x20404010, 0x00400000, 0x00004010, 0x20000010, + 0x00400000, 0x20004000, 0x20000000, 0x00004010, + 0x20000010, 0x20404010, 0x00404000, 0x20400000, + 0x00404010, 0x20404000, 0x00000000, 0x20400010, + 0x00000010, 0x00004000, 0x20400000, 0x00404010, + 0x00004000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010, 0x00000000, + 0x20404000, 0x20000000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB7[64] = +{ + 0x00200000, 0x04200002, 0x04000802, 0x00000000, + 0x00000800, 0x04000802, 0x00200802, 0x04200800, + 0x04200802, 0x00200000, 0x00000000, 0x04000002, + 0x00000002, 0x04000000, 0x04200002, 0x00000802, + 0x04000800, 0x00200802, 0x00200002, 0x04000800, + 0x04000002, 0x04200000, 0x04200800, 0x00200002, + 0x04200000, 0x00000800, 0x00000802, 0x04200802, + 0x00200800, 0x00000002, 0x04000000, 0x00200800, + 0x04000000, 0x00200800, 0x00200000, 0x04000802, + 0x04000802, 0x04200002, 0x04200002, 0x00000002, + 0x00200002, 0x04000000, 0x04000800, 0x00200000, + 0x04200800, 0x00000802, 0x00200802, 0x04200800, + 0x00000802, 0x04000002, 0x04200802, 0x04200000, + 0x00200800, 0x00000000, 0x00000002, 0x04200802, + 0x00000000, 0x00200802, 0x04200000, 0x00000800, + 0x04000002, 0x04000800, 0x00000800, 0x00200002 +}; + +static const uint32_t SB8[64] = +{ + 0x10001040, 0x00001000, 0x00040000, 0x10041040, + 0x10000000, 0x10001040, 0x00000040, 0x10000000, + 0x00040040, 0x10040000, 0x10041040, 0x00041000, + 0x10041000, 0x00041040, 0x00001000, 0x00000040, + 0x10040000, 0x10000040, 0x10001000, 0x00001040, + 0x00041000, 0x00040040, 0x10040040, 0x10041000, + 0x00001040, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x10040040, + 0x10000040, 0x10001000, 0x00041040, 0x00040000, + 0x00041040, 0x00040000, 0x10041000, 0x00001000, + 0x00000040, 0x10040040, 0x00001000, 0x00041040, + 0x10001000, 0x00000040, 0x10000040, 0x10040000, + 0x10040040, 0x10000000, 0x00040000, 0x10001040, + 0x00000000, 0x10041040, 0x00040040, 0x10000040, + 0x10040000, 0x10001000, 0x10001040, 0x00000000, + 0x10041040, 0x00041000, 0x00041000, 0x00001040, + 0x00001040, 0x00040040, 0x10000000, 0x10041000 +}; + +/* + * PC1: left and right halves bit-swap + */ +static const uint32_t LHs[16] = +{ + 0x00000000, 0x00000001, 0x00000100, 0x00000101, + 0x00010000, 0x00010001, 0x00010100, 0x00010101, + 0x01000000, 0x01000001, 0x01000100, 0x01000101, + 0x01010000, 0x01010001, 0x01010100, 0x01010101 +}; + +static const uint32_t RHs[16] = +{ + 0x00000000, 0x01000000, 0x00010000, 0x01010000, + 0x00000100, 0x01000100, 0x00010100, 0x01010100, + 0x00000001, 0x01000001, 0x00010001, 0x01010001, + 0x00000101, 0x01000101, 0x00010101, 0x01010101, +}; + +/* + * Initial Permutation macro + */ +#define DES_IP(X, Y) \ + do \ + { \ + T = (((X) >> 4) ^ (Y)) & 0x0F0F0F0F; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 4); \ + T = (((X) >> 16) ^ (Y)) & 0x0000FFFF; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 16); \ + T = (((Y) >> 2) ^ (X)) & 0x33333333; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 2); \ + T = (((Y) >> 8) ^ (X)) & 0x00FF00FF; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 8); \ + (Y) = (((Y) << 1) | ((Y) >> 31)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + T = ((X) ^ (Y)) & 0xAAAAAAAA; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= T; \ + (X) = (((X) << 1) | ((X) >> 31)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + } while (0) + +/* + * Final Permutation macro + */ +#define DES_FP(X, Y) \ + do \ + { \ + (X) = (((X) << 31) | ((X) >> 1)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + T = ((X) ^ (Y)) & 0xAAAAAAAA; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= T; \ + (Y) = (((Y) << 31) | ((Y) >> 1)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \ + T = (((Y) >> 8) ^ (X)) & 0x00FF00FF; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 8); \ + T = (((Y) >> 2) ^ (X)) & 0x33333333; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 2); \ + T = (((X) >> 16) ^ (Y)) & 0x0000FFFF; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 16); \ + T = (((X) >> 4) ^ (Y)) & 0x0F0F0F0F; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 4); \ + } while (0) + +/* + * DES round macro + */ +#define DES_ROUND(X, Y) \ + do \ + { \ + T = *SK++ ^ (X); \ + (Y) ^= SB8[(T) & 0x3F] ^ \ + SB6[(T >> 8) & 0x3F] ^ \ + SB4[(T >> 16) & 0x3F] ^ \ + SB2[(T >> 24) & 0x3F]; \ + \ + T = *SK++ ^ (((X) << 28) | ((X) >> 4)); \ + (Y) ^= SB7[(T) & 0x3F] ^ \ + SB5[(T >> 8) & 0x3F] ^ \ + SB3[(T >> 16) & 0x3F] ^ \ + SB1[(T >> 24) & 0x3F]; \ + } while (0) + +#define SWAP(a, b) \ + do \ + { \ + uint32_t t = (a); (a) = (b); (b) = t; t = 0; \ + } while (0) + +void mbedtls_des_init(mbedtls_des_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_des_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_des_free(mbedtls_des_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_des_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_des3_init(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_des3_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_des3_free(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_des3_context)); +} + +static const unsigned char odd_parity_table[128] = { 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, + 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32, + 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, + 47, 49, 50, 52, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 64, 67, 69, + 70, 73, 74, 76, 79, 81, + 82, 84, 87, 88, 91, 93, 94, 97, 98, 100, 103, + 104, 107, 109, 110, 112, + 115, 117, 118, 121, 122, 124, 127, 128, 131, + 133, 134, 137, 138, 140, + 143, 145, 146, 148, 151, 152, 155, 157, 158, + 161, 162, 164, 167, 168, + 171, 173, 174, 176, 179, 181, 182, 185, 186, + 188, 191, 193, 194, 196, + 199, 200, 203, 205, 206, 208, 211, 213, 214, + 217, 218, 220, 223, 224, + 227, 229, 230, 233, 234, 236, 239, 241, 242, + 244, 247, 248, 251, 253, + 254 }; + +void mbedtls_des_key_set_parity(unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE]) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE; i++) { + key[i] = odd_parity_table[key[i] / 2]; + } +} + +/* + * Check the given key's parity, returns 1 on failure, 0 on SUCCESS + */ +int mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity(const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE]) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE; i++) { + if (key[i] != odd_parity_table[key[i] / 2]) { + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Table of weak and semi-weak keys + * + * Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weak_key + * + * Weak: + * Alternating ones + zeros (0x0101010101010101) + * Alternating 'F' + 'E' (0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFE) + * '0xE0E0E0E0F1F1F1F1' + * '0x1F1F1F1F0E0E0E0E' + * + * Semi-weak: + * 0x011F011F010E010E and 0x1F011F010E010E01 + * 0x01E001E001F101F1 and 0xE001E001F101F101 + * 0x01FE01FE01FE01FE and 0xFE01FE01FE01FE01 + * 0x1FE01FE00EF10EF1 and 0xE01FE01FF10EF10E + * 0x1FFE1FFE0EFE0EFE and 0xFE1FFE1FFE0EFE0E + * 0xE0FEE0FEF1FEF1FE and 0xFEE0FEE0FEF1FEF1 + * + */ + +#define WEAK_KEY_COUNT 16 + +static const unsigned char weak_key_table[WEAK_KEY_COUNT][MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] = +{ + { 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01 }, + { 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE }, + { 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E }, + { 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xF1, 0xF1, 0xF1, 0xF1 }, + + { 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x0E }, + { 0x1F, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01 }, + { 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01, 0xF1 }, + { 0xE0, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01 }, + { 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE }, + { 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01 }, + { 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xF1 }, + { 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x0E }, + { 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE }, + { 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE, 0x0E }, + { 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE }, + { 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1 } +}; + +int mbedtls_des_key_check_weak(const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE]) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < WEAK_KEY_COUNT; i++) { + if (memcmp(weak_key_table[i], key, MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE) == 0) { + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT) +void mbedtls_des_setkey(uint32_t SK[32], const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE]) +{ + int i; + uint32_t X, Y, T; + + X = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, 0); + Y = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, 4); + + /* + * Permuted Choice 1 + */ + T = ((Y >> 4) ^ X) & 0x0F0F0F0F; X ^= T; Y ^= (T << 4); + T = ((Y) ^ X) & 0x10101010; X ^= T; Y ^= (T); + + X = (LHs[(X) & 0xF] << 3) | (LHs[(X >> 8) & 0xF] << 2) + | (LHs[(X >> 16) & 0xF] << 1) | (LHs[(X >> 24) & 0xF]) + | (LHs[(X >> 5) & 0xF] << 7) | (LHs[(X >> 13) & 0xF] << 6) + | (LHs[(X >> 21) & 0xF] << 5) | (LHs[(X >> 29) & 0xF] << 4); + + Y = (RHs[(Y >> 1) & 0xF] << 3) | (RHs[(Y >> 9) & 0xF] << 2) + | (RHs[(Y >> 17) & 0xF] << 1) | (RHs[(Y >> 25) & 0xF]) + | (RHs[(Y >> 4) & 0xF] << 7) | (RHs[(Y >> 12) & 0xF] << 6) + | (RHs[(Y >> 20) & 0xF] << 5) | (RHs[(Y >> 28) & 0xF] << 4); + + X &= 0x0FFFFFFF; + Y &= 0x0FFFFFFF; + + /* + * calculate subkeys + */ + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + if (i < 2 || i == 8 || i == 15) { + X = ((X << 1) | (X >> 27)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; + Y = ((Y << 1) | (Y >> 27)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; + } else { + X = ((X << 2) | (X >> 26)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; + Y = ((Y << 2) | (Y >> 26)) & 0x0FFFFFFF; + } + + *SK++ = ((X << 4) & 0x24000000) | ((X << 28) & 0x10000000) + | ((X << 14) & 0x08000000) | ((X << 18) & 0x02080000) + | ((X << 6) & 0x01000000) | ((X << 9) & 0x00200000) + | ((X >> 1) & 0x00100000) | ((X << 10) & 0x00040000) + | ((X << 2) & 0x00020000) | ((X >> 10) & 0x00010000) + | ((Y >> 13) & 0x00002000) | ((Y >> 4) & 0x00001000) + | ((Y << 6) & 0x00000800) | ((Y >> 1) & 0x00000400) + | ((Y >> 14) & 0x00000200) | ((Y) & 0x00000100) + | ((Y >> 5) & 0x00000020) | ((Y >> 10) & 0x00000010) + | ((Y >> 3) & 0x00000008) | ((Y >> 18) & 0x00000004) + | ((Y >> 26) & 0x00000002) | ((Y >> 24) & 0x00000001); + + *SK++ = ((X << 15) & 0x20000000) | ((X << 17) & 0x10000000) + | ((X << 10) & 0x08000000) | ((X << 22) & 0x04000000) + | ((X >> 2) & 0x02000000) | ((X << 1) & 0x01000000) + | ((X << 16) & 0x00200000) | ((X << 11) & 0x00100000) + | ((X << 3) & 0x00080000) | ((X >> 6) & 0x00040000) + | ((X << 15) & 0x00020000) | ((X >> 4) & 0x00010000) + | ((Y >> 2) & 0x00002000) | ((Y << 8) & 0x00001000) + | ((Y >> 14) & 0x00000808) | ((Y >> 9) & 0x00000400) + | ((Y) & 0x00000200) | ((Y << 7) & 0x00000100) + | ((Y >> 7) & 0x00000020) | ((Y >> 3) & 0x00000011) + | ((Y << 2) & 0x00000004) | ((Y >> 21) & 0x00000002); + } +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT */ + +/* + * DES key schedule (56-bit, encryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des_setkey_enc(mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE]) +{ + mbedtls_des_setkey(ctx->sk, key); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * DES key schedule (56-bit, decryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des_setkey_dec(mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE]) +{ + int i; + + mbedtls_des_setkey(ctx->sk, key); + + for (i = 0; i < 16; i += 2) { + SWAP(ctx->sk[i], ctx->sk[30 - i]); + SWAP(ctx->sk[i + 1], ctx->sk[31 - i]); + } + + return 0; +} + +static void des3_set2key(uint32_t esk[96], + uint32_t dsk[96], + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE*2]) +{ + int i; + + mbedtls_des_setkey(esk, key); + mbedtls_des_setkey(dsk + 32, key + 8); + + for (i = 0; i < 32; i += 2) { + dsk[i] = esk[30 - i]; + dsk[i + 1] = esk[31 - i]; + + esk[i + 32] = dsk[62 - i]; + esk[i + 33] = dsk[63 - i]; + + esk[i + 64] = esk[i]; + esk[i + 65] = esk[i + 1]; + + dsk[i + 64] = dsk[i]; + dsk[i + 65] = dsk[i + 1]; + } +} + +/* + * Triple-DES key schedule (112-bit, encryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2]) +{ + uint32_t sk[96]; + + des3_set2key(ctx->sk, sk, key); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sk, sizeof(sk)); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Triple-DES key schedule (112-bit, decryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2]) +{ + uint32_t sk[96]; + + des3_set2key(sk, ctx->sk, key); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sk, sizeof(sk)); + + return 0; +} + +static void des3_set3key(uint32_t esk[96], + uint32_t dsk[96], + const unsigned char key[24]) +{ + int i; + + mbedtls_des_setkey(esk, key); + mbedtls_des_setkey(dsk + 32, key + 8); + mbedtls_des_setkey(esk + 64, key + 16); + + for (i = 0; i < 32; i += 2) { + dsk[i] = esk[94 - i]; + dsk[i + 1] = esk[95 - i]; + + esk[i + 32] = dsk[62 - i]; + esk[i + 33] = dsk[63 - i]; + + dsk[i + 64] = esk[30 - i]; + dsk[i + 65] = esk[31 - i]; + } +} + +/* + * Triple-DES key schedule (168-bit, encryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3]) +{ + uint32_t sk[96]; + + des3_set3key(ctx->sk, sk, key); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sk, sizeof(sk)); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Triple-DES key schedule (168-bit, decryption) + */ +int mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3]) +{ + uint32_t sk[96]; + + des3_set3key(sk, ctx->sk, key); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sk, sizeof(sk)); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * DES-ECB block encryption/decryption + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) +int mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_des_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[8], + unsigned char output[8]) +{ + int i; + uint32_t X, Y, T, *SK; + + SK = ctx->sk; + + X = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 0); + Y = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 4); + + DES_IP(X, Y); + + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + DES_ROUND(Y, X); + DES_ROUND(X, Y); + } + + DES_FP(Y, X); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(Y, output, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(X, output, 4); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * DES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[8], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char temp[8]; + + if (length % 8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; + } + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT) { + while (length > 0) { + mbedtls_xor(output, input, iv, 8); + + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb(ctx, output, output); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + memcpy(iv, output, 8); + + input += 8; + output += 8; + length -= 8; + } + } else { /* MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT */ + while (length > 0) { + memcpy(temp, input, 8); + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb(ctx, input, output); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_xor(output, output, iv, 8); + + memcpy(iv, temp, 8); + + input += 8; + output += 8; + length -= 8; + } + } + ret = 0; + +exit: + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +/* + * 3DES-ECB block encryption/decryption + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) +int mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + const unsigned char input[8], + unsigned char output[8]) +{ + int i; + uint32_t X, Y, T, *SK; + + SK = ctx->sk; + + X = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 0); + Y = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 4); + + DES_IP(X, Y); + + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + DES_ROUND(Y, X); + DES_ROUND(X, Y); + } + + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + DES_ROUND(X, Y); + DES_ROUND(Y, X); + } + + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + DES_ROUND(Y, X); + DES_ROUND(X, Y); + } + + DES_FP(Y, X); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(Y, output, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(X, output, 4); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * 3DES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption + */ +int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[8], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char temp[8]; + + if (length % 8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; + } + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT) { + while (length > 0) { + mbedtls_xor(output, input, iv, 8); + + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb(ctx, output, output); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + memcpy(iv, output, 8); + + input += 8; + output += 8; + length -= 8; + } + } else { /* MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT */ + while (length > 0) { + memcpy(temp, input, 8); + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb(ctx, input, output); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_xor(output, output, iv, 8); + + memcpy(iv, temp, 8); + + input += 8; + output += 8; + length -= 8; + } + } + ret = 0; + +exit: + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * DES and 3DES test vectors from: + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/des/tripledes-vectors.zip + */ +static const unsigned char des3_test_keys[24] = +{ + 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, + 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0x01, + 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0x01, 0x23 +}; + +static const unsigned char des3_test_buf[8] = +{ + 0x4E, 0x6F, 0x77, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74 +}; + +static const unsigned char des3_test_ecb_dec[3][8] = +{ + { 0x37, 0x2B, 0x98, 0xBF, 0x52, 0x65, 0xB0, 0x59 }, + { 0xC2, 0x10, 0x19, 0x9C, 0x38, 0x5A, 0x65, 0xA1 }, + { 0xA2, 0x70, 0x56, 0x68, 0x69, 0xE5, 0x15, 0x1D } +}; + +static const unsigned char des3_test_ecb_enc[3][8] = +{ + { 0x1C, 0xD5, 0x97, 0xEA, 0x84, 0x26, 0x73, 0xFB }, + { 0xB3, 0x92, 0x4D, 0xF3, 0xC5, 0xB5, 0x42, 0x93 }, + { 0xDA, 0x37, 0x64, 0x41, 0xBA, 0x6F, 0x62, 0x6F } +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +static const unsigned char des3_test_iv[8] = +{ + 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x90, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, +}; + +static const unsigned char des3_test_cbc_dec[3][8] = +{ + { 0x58, 0xD9, 0x48, 0xEF, 0x85, 0x14, 0x65, 0x9A }, + { 0x5F, 0xC8, 0x78, 0xD4, 0xD7, 0x92, 0xD9, 0x54 }, + { 0x25, 0xF9, 0x75, 0x85, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x48, 0xBF } +}; + +static const unsigned char des3_test_cbc_enc[3][8] = +{ + { 0x91, 0x1C, 0x6D, 0xCF, 0x48, 0xA7, 0xC3, 0x4D }, + { 0x60, 0x1A, 0x76, 0x8F, 0xA1, 0xF9, 0x66, 0xF1 }, + { 0xA1, 0x50, 0x0F, 0x99, 0xB2, 0xCD, 0x64, 0x76 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_des_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int i, j, u, v, ret = 0; + mbedtls_des_context ctx; + mbedtls_des3_context ctx3; + unsigned char buf[8]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + unsigned char prv[8]; + unsigned char iv[8]; +#endif + + mbedtls_des_init(&ctx); + mbedtls_des3_init(&ctx3); + /* + * ECB mode + */ + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + v = i & 1; + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" DES%c-ECB-%3d (%s): ", + (u == 0) ? ' ' : '3', 56 + u * 56, + (v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } + + memcpy(buf, des3_test_buf, 8); + + switch (i) { + case 0: + ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_dec(&ctx, des3_test_keys); + break; + + case 1: + ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_enc(&ctx, des3_test_keys); + break; + + case 2: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec(&ctx3, des3_test_keys); + break; + + case 3: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc(&ctx3, des3_test_keys); + break; + + case 4: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec(&ctx3, des3_test_keys); + break; + + case 5: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc(&ctx3, des3_test_keys); + break; + + default: + return 1; + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + for (j = 0; j < 100; j++) { + if (u == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb(&ctx, buf, buf); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb(&ctx3, buf, buf); + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + if ((v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT && + memcmp(buf, des3_test_ecb_dec[u], 8) != 0) || + (v != MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT && + memcmp(buf, des3_test_ecb_enc[u], 8) != 0)) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + /* + * CBC mode + */ + for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { + u = i >> 1; + v = i & 1; + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" DES%c-CBC-%3d (%s): ", + (u == 0) ? ' ' : '3', 56 + u * 56, + (v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc"); + } + + memcpy(iv, des3_test_iv, 8); + memcpy(prv, des3_test_iv, 8); + memcpy(buf, des3_test_buf, 8); + + switch (i) { + case 0: + ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_dec(&ctx, des3_test_keys); + break; + + case 1: + ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_enc(&ctx, des3_test_keys); + break; + + case 2: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec(&ctx3, des3_test_keys); + break; + + case 3: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc(&ctx3, des3_test_keys); + break; + + case 4: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec(&ctx3, des3_test_keys); + break; + + case 5: + ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc(&ctx3, des3_test_keys); + break; + + default: + return 1; + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT) { + for (j = 0; j < 100; j++) { + if (u == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc(&ctx, v, 8, iv, buf, buf); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc(&ctx3, v, 8, iv, buf, buf); + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + } else { + for (j = 0; j < 100; j++) { + unsigned char tmp[8]; + + if (u == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc(&ctx, v, 8, iv, buf, buf); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc(&ctx3, v, 8, iv, buf, buf); + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + memcpy(tmp, prv, 8); + memcpy(prv, buf, 8); + memcpy(buf, tmp, 8); + } + + memcpy(buf, prv, 8); + } + + if ((v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT && + memcmp(buf, des3_test_cbc_dec[u], 8) != 0) || + (v != MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT && + memcmp(buf, des3_test_cbc_enc[u], 8) != 0)) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_des_free(&ctx); + mbedtls_des3_free(&ctx3); + + if (ret != 0) { + ret = 1; + } + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ diff --git a/library/dhm.c b/library/dhm.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..bcc07f54419 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/dhm.c @@ -0,0 +1,712 @@ +/* + * Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation + * of the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle algorithm: + * + * [1] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 12 + * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + +#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) + +/* + * helper to validate the mbedtls_mpi size and import it + */ +static int dhm_read_bignum(mbedtls_mpi *X, + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret, n; + + if (end - *p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0); + (*p) += 2; + + if ((size_t) (end - *p) < (size_t) n) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(X, *p, n)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED, ret); + } + + (*p) += n; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Verify sanity of parameter with regards to P + * + * Parameter should be: 2 <= public_param <= P - 2 + * + * This means that we need to return an error if + * public_param < 2 or public_param > P-2 + * + * For more information on the attack, see: + * http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/psandqs.pdf + * http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2005-2643 + */ +static int dhm_check_range(const mbedtls_mpi *param, const mbedtls_mpi *P) +{ + mbedtls_mpi U; + int ret = 0; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&U); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&U, P, 2)); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(param, 2) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(param, &U) > 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&U); + return ret; +} + +void mbedtls_dhm_init(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_dhm_context)); +} + +size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->P); +} + +size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_len(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->P); +} + +int mbedtls_dhm_get_value(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + mbedtls_dhm_parameter param, + mbedtls_mpi *dest) +{ + const mbedtls_mpi *src = NULL; + switch (param) { + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_P: + src = &ctx->P; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_G: + src = &ctx->G; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_X: + src = &ctx->X; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GX: + src = &ctx->GX; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GY: + src = &ctx->GY; + break; + case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_K: + src = &ctx->K; + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_mpi_copy(dest, src); +} + +/* + * Parse the ServerKeyExchange parameters + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_read_params(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = dhm_read_bignum(&ctx->P, p, end)) != 0 || + (ret = dhm_read_bignum(&ctx->G, p, end)) != 0 || + (ret = dhm_read_bignum(&ctx->GY, p, end)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = dhm_check_range(&ctx->GY, &ctx->P)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Pick a random R in the range [2, M-2] for blinding or key generation. + */ +static int dhm_random_below(mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *M, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_random(R, 3, M, f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(R, R, 1)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +static int dhm_make_common(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (x_size < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((unsigned) x_size < mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->P)) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng)); + } else { + /* Generate X as large as possible ( <= P - 2 ) */ + ret = dhm_random_below(&ctx->X, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng); + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED; + } + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + /* + * Calculate GX = G^X mod P + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->GX, &ctx->G, &ctx->X, + &ctx->P, &ctx->RP)); + + if ((ret = dhm_check_range(&ctx->GX, &ctx->P)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_make_params(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret; + size_t n1, n2, n3; + unsigned char *p; + + ret = dhm_make_common(ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Export P, G, GX. RFC 5246 §4.4 states that "leading zero octets are + * not required". We omit leading zeros for compactness. + */ +#define DHM_MPI_EXPORT(X, n) \ + do { \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary((X), \ + p + 2, \ + (n))); \ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \ + p += (n); \ + } while (0) + + n1 = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->P); + n2 = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->G); + n3 = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->GX); + + p = output; + DHM_MPI_EXPORT(&ctx->P, n1); + DHM_MPI_EXPORT(&ctx->G, n2); + DHM_MPI_EXPORT(&ctx->GX, n3); + + *olen = (size_t) (p - output); + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0 && ret > -128) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED, ret); + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * Set prime modulus and generator + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_set_group(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *G) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->P, P)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->G, G)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED, ret); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Import the peer's public value G^Y + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_read_public(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ilen < 1 || ilen > mbedtls_dhm_get_len(ctx)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->GY, input, ilen)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Create own private value X and export G^X + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_make_public(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size, + unsigned char *output, size_t olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret; + + if (olen < 1 || olen > mbedtls_dhm_get_len(ctx)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = dhm_make_common(ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng); + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED; + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->GX, output, olen)); + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0 && ret > -128) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret); + } + return ret; +} + + +/* + * Use the blinding method and optimisation suggested in section 10 of: + * KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, + * DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer + * Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113. + */ +static int dhm_update_blinding(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_mpi R; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&R); + + /* + * Don't use any blinding the first time a particular X is used, + * but remember it to use blinding next time. + */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&ctx->X, &ctx->pX) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->pX, &ctx->X)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&ctx->Vi, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&ctx->Vf, 1)); + + return 0; + } + + /* + * Ok, we need blinding. Can we re-use existing values? + * If yes, just update them by squaring them. + */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Vi, 1) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P)); + + return 0; + } + + /* + * We need to generate blinding values from scratch + */ + + /* Vi = random( 2, P-2 ) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(dhm_random_below(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng)); + + /* Vf = Vi^-X mod P + * First compute Vi^-1 = R * (R Vi)^-1, (avoiding leaks from inv_mod), + * then elevate to the Xth power. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(dhm_random_below(&R, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vi, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->X, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP)); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&R); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Derive and export the shared secret (G^Y)^X mod P + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi GYb; + + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (output_size < mbedtls_dhm_get_len(ctx)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((ret = dhm_check_range(&ctx->GY, &ctx->P)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&GYb); + + /* Blind peer's value */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(dhm_update_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&GYb, &ctx->GY, &ctx->Vi)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&GYb, &GYb, &ctx->P)); + + /* Do modular exponentiation */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->K, &GYb, &ctx->X, + &ctx->P, &ctx->RP)); + + /* Unblind secret value */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->Vf)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->P)); + + /* Output the secret without any leading zero byte. This is mandatory + * for TLS per RFC 5246 §8.1.2. */ + *olen = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->K); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->K, output, *olen)); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&GYb); + + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED, ret); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a DHM key + */ +void mbedtls_dhm_free(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->pX); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vf); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vi); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RP); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->K); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->GY); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->GX); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->X); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->G); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->P); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_dhm_context)); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +/* + * Parse DHM parameters + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm(mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin, + size_t dhminlen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_context pem; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_init(&pem); + + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if (dhminlen == 0 || dhmin[dhminlen - 1] != '\0') { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, + "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----", + "-----END DH PARAMETERS-----", + dhmin, NULL, 0, &dhminlen); + } + + if (ret == 0) { + /* + * Was PEM encoded + */ + dhminlen = pem.buflen; + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) { + goto exit; + } + + p = (ret == 0) ? pem.buf : (unsigned char *) dhmin; +#else + p = (unsigned char *) dhmin; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + end = p + dhminlen; + + /* + * DHParams ::= SEQUENCE { + * prime INTEGER, -- P + * generator INTEGER, -- g + * privateValueLength INTEGER OPTIONAL + * } + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + goto exit; + } + + end = p + len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end, &dhm->P)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end, &dhm->G)) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + goto exit; + } + + if (p != end) { + /* This might be the optional privateValueLength. + * If so, we can cleanly discard it */ + mbedtls_mpi rec; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&rec); + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end, &rec); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&rec); + if (ret != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + goto exit; + } + if (p != end) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto exit; + } + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_dhm_free(dhm); + } + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load all data from a file into a given buffer. + * + * The file is expected to contain either PEM or DER encoded data. + * A terminating null byte is always appended. It is included in the announced + * length only if the data looks like it is PEM encoded. + */ +static int load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n) +{ + FILE *f; + long size; + + if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + /* The data loaded here is public, so don't bother disabling buffering. */ + + fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); + if ((size = ftell(f)) == -1) { + fclose(f); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET); + + *n = (size_t) size; + + if (*n + 1 == 0 || + (*buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, *n + 1)) == NULL) { + fclose(f); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + if (fread(*buf, 1, *n, f) != *n) { + fclose(f); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(*buf, *n + 1); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + + fclose(f); + + (*buf)[*n] = '\0'; + + if (strstr((const char *) *buf, "-----BEGIN ") != NULL) { + ++*n; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Load and parse DHM parameters + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile(mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + if ((ret = load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm(dhm, buf, n); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +static const char mbedtls_test_dhm_params[] = + "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n" + "MIGHAoGBAJ419DBEOgmQTzo5qXl5fQcN9TN455wkOL7052HzxxRVMyhYmwQcgJvh\r\n" + "1sa18fyfR9OiVEMYglOpkqVoGLN7qd5aQNNi5W7/C+VBdHTBJcGZJyyP5B3qcz32\r\n" + "9mLJKudlVudV0Qxk5qUJaPZ/xupz0NyoVpviuiBOI1gNi8ovSXWzAgEC\r\n" + "-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n"; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ +static const char mbedtls_test_dhm_params[] = { + 0x30, 0x81, 0x87, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0x9e, 0x35, 0xf4, 0x30, 0x44, + 0x3a, 0x09, 0x90, 0x4f, 0x3a, 0x39, 0xa9, 0x79, 0x79, 0x7d, 0x07, 0x0d, + 0xf5, 0x33, 0x78, 0xe7, 0x9c, 0x24, 0x38, 0xbe, 0xf4, 0xe7, 0x61, 0xf3, + 0xc7, 0x14, 0x55, 0x33, 0x28, 0x58, 0x9b, 0x04, 0x1c, 0x80, 0x9b, 0xe1, + 0xd6, 0xc6, 0xb5, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x9f, 0x47, 0xd3, 0xa2, 0x54, 0x43, 0x18, + 0x82, 0x53, 0xa9, 0x92, 0xa5, 0x68, 0x18, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0xa9, 0xde, 0x5a, + 0x40, 0xd3, 0x62, 0xe5, 0x6e, 0xff, 0x0b, 0xe5, 0x41, 0x74, 0x74, 0xc1, + 0x25, 0xc1, 0x99, 0x27, 0x2c, 0x8f, 0xe4, 0x1d, 0xea, 0x73, 0x3d, 0xf6, + 0xf6, 0x62, 0xc9, 0x2a, 0xe7, 0x65, 0x56, 0xe7, 0x55, 0xd1, 0x0c, 0x64, + 0xe6, 0xa5, 0x09, 0x68, 0xf6, 0x7f, 0xc6, 0xea, 0x73, 0xd0, 0xdc, 0xa8, + 0x56, 0x9b, 0xe2, 0xba, 0x20, 0x4e, 0x23, 0x58, 0x0d, 0x8b, 0xca, 0x2f, + 0x49, 0x75, 0xb3, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02 +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +static const size_t mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len = sizeof(mbedtls_test_dhm_params); + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_dhm_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_dhm_context dhm; + + mbedtls_dhm_init(&dhm); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" DHM parameter load: "); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm(&dhm, + (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_dhm_params, + mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len)) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n\n"); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_dhm_free(&dhm); + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ diff --git a/library/ecdh.c b/library/ecdh.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b276c6adadf --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ecdh.c @@ -0,0 +1,694 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * SEC1 https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf + * RFC 4492 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) +typedef mbedtls_ecdh_context mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed; +#endif + +static mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id( + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return ctx->grp.id; +#else + return ctx->grp_id; +#endif +} + +int mbedtls_ecdh_can_do(mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid) +{ + /* At this time, all groups support ECDH. */ + (void) gid; + return 1; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) +/* + * Generate public key (restartable version) + * + * Note: this internal function relies on its caller preserving the value of + * the output parameter 'd' across continuation calls. This would not be + * acceptable for a public function but is OK here as we control call sites. + */ +static int ecdh_gen_public_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + int restarting = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + restarting = (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL); +#endif + /* If multiplication is in progress, we already generated a privkey */ + if (!restarting) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(grp, d, f_rng, p_rng)); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(grp, Q, d, &grp->G, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Generate public key + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + return ecdh_gen_public_restartable(grp, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) +/* + * Compute shared secret (SEC1 3.3.1) + */ +static int ecdh_compute_shared_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *z, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point P; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&P); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(grp, &P, d, Q, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx)); + + if (mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(&P)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(z, &P.X)); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&P); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Compute shared secret (SEC1 3.3.1) + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + return ecdh_compute_shared_restartable(grp, z, Q, d, + f_rng, p_rng, NULL); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */ + +static void ecdh_init_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&ctx->grp); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->d); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Q); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Qp); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->z); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_init(&ctx->rs); +#endif +} + +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecdh_get_grp_id(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp).id; +#else + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp_id); +#endif +} + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_init(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + ecdh_init_internal(ctx); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Vi); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Vf); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->_d); +#else + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ecdh_context)); + + ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_NONE; +#endif + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + ctx->restart_enabled = 0; +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_setup_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, grp_id); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Setup context + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_setup(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return ecdh_setup_internal(ctx, grp_id); +#else + switch (grp_id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED; + ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST; + ctx->grp_id = grp_id; + return mbedtls_everest_setup(&ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, grp_id); +#endif + default: + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0; + ctx->grp_id = grp_id; + ecdh_init_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh); + return ecdh_setup_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, grp_id); + } +#endif +} + +static void ecdh_free_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&ctx->grp); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->d); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Q); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Qp); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->z); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_free(&ctx->rs); +#endif +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Enable restartable operations for context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->restart_enabled = 1; +} +#endif + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdh_free(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Vi); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Vf); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->_d); + ecdh_free_internal(ctx); +#else + switch (ctx->var) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + mbedtls_everest_free(&ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh); + break; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + ecdh_free_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh); + break; + default: + break; + } + + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_NONE; + ctx->grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_make_params_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + size_t *olen, int point_format, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, + unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng, + int restart_enabled) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t grp_len, pt_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL; +#endif + + if (ctx->grp.pbits == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (restart_enabled) { + rs_ctx = &ctx->rs; + } +#else + (void) restart_enabled; +#endif + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if ((ret = ecdh_gen_public_restartable(&ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(&ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, + f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group(&ctx->grp, &grp_len, buf, + blen)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + buf += grp_len; + blen -= grp_len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, point_format, + &pt_len, buf, blen)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + *olen = grp_len + pt_len; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; + * ECPoint public; + * } ServerECDHParams; + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int restart_enabled = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; +#else + (void) restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return ecdh_make_params_internal(ctx, olen, ctx->point_format, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, restart_enabled); +#else + switch (ctx->var) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return mbedtls_everest_make_params(&ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen, + buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return ecdh_make_params_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen, + ctx->point_format, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, + restart_enabled); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_read_params_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + const unsigned char **buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + return mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Qp, buf, + (size_t) (end - *buf)); +} + +/* + * Read the ServerKeyExchange parameters (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; + * ECPoint public; + * } ServerECDHParams; + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_read_params(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const unsigned char **buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(&grp_id, buf, (size_t) (end - *buf))) + != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(ctx, grp_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return ecdh_read_params_internal(ctx, buf, end); +#else + switch (ctx->var) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return mbedtls_everest_read_params(&ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, + buf, end); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return ecdh_read_params_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, + buf, end); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_get_params_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + mbedtls_ecdh_side side) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* If it's not our key, just import the public part as Qp */ + if (side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS) { + return mbedtls_ecp_copy(&ctx->Qp, &key->Q); + } + + /* Our key: import public (as Q) and private parts */ + if (side != MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy(&ctx->Q, &key->Q)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->d, &key->d)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Get parameters from a keypair + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + mbedtls_ecdh_side side) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + if (side != MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS && side != MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id(ctx) == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + /* This is the first call to get_params(). Set up the context + * for use with the group. */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(ctx, key->grp.id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } else { + /* This is not the first call to get_params(). Check that the + * current key's group is the same as the context's, which was set + * from the first key's group. */ + if (mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id(ctx) != key->grp.id) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return ecdh_get_params_internal(ctx, key, side); +#else + switch (ctx->var) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + { + mbedtls_everest_ecdh_side s = side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ? + MBEDTLS_EVEREST_ECDH_OURS : + MBEDTLS_EVEREST_ECDH_THEIRS; + return mbedtls_everest_get_params(&ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, + key, s); + } +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return ecdh_get_params_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, + key, side); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_make_public_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + size_t *olen, int point_format, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, + unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng, + int restart_enabled) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL; +#endif + + if (ctx->grp.pbits == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (restart_enabled) { + rs_ctx = &ctx->rs; + } +#else + (void) restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if ((ret = ecdh_gen_public_restartable(&ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(&ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, + f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + return mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, point_format, olen, + buf, blen); +} + +/* + * Setup and export the client public value + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int restart_enabled = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return ecdh_make_public_internal(ctx, olen, ctx->point_format, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, restart_enabled); +#else + switch (ctx->var) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return mbedtls_everest_make_public(&ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen, + buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return ecdh_make_public_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen, + ctx->point_format, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, + restart_enabled); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_read_public_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Qp, &p, + blen)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((size_t) (p - buf) != blen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse and import the client's public value + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return ecdh_read_public_internal(ctx, buf, blen); +#else + switch (ctx->var) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return mbedtls_everest_read_public(&ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, + buf, blen); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return ecdh_read_public_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, + buf, blen); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} + +static int ecdh_calc_secret_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx, + size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, + size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, + unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng, + int restart_enabled) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL; +#endif + + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->grp.pbits == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (restart_enabled) { + rs_ctx = &ctx->rs; + } +#else + (void) restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if ((ret = ecdh_compute_shared_restartable(&ctx->grp, &ctx->z, &ctx->Qp, + &ctx->d, f_rng, p_rng, + rs_ctx)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared(&ctx->grp, &ctx->z, &ctx->Qp, + &ctx->d, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + if (mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->z) > blen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + *olen = ctx->grp.pbits / 8 + ((ctx->grp.pbits % 8) != 0); + + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&ctx->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { + return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(&ctx->z, buf, *olen); + } + + return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->z, buf, *olen); +} + +/* + * Derive and export the shared secret + */ +int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int restart_enabled = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + return ecdh_calc_secret_internal(ctx, olen, buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng, + restart_enabled); +#else + switch (ctx->var) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST: + return mbedtls_everest_calc_secret(&ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen, + buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng); +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0: + return ecdh_calc_secret_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen, buf, + blen, f_rng, p_rng, + restart_enabled); + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ diff --git a/library/ecdsa.c b/library/ecdsa.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2f7a996a7e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ecdsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,867 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curve DSA + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * SEC1 https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + +/* + * Sub-context for ecdsa_verify() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver { + mbedtls_mpi u1, u2; /* intermediate values */ + enum { /* what to do next? */ + ecdsa_ver_init = 0, /* getting started */ + ecdsa_ver_muladd, /* muladd step */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init verify restart sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_ver_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->u1); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->u2); + ctx->state = ecdsa_ver_init; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a verify restart sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_ver_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->u1); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->u2); + + ecdsa_restart_ver_init(ctx); +} + +/* + * Sub-context for ecdsa_sign() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig { + int sign_tries; + int key_tries; + mbedtls_mpi k; /* per-signature random */ + mbedtls_mpi r; /* r value */ + enum { /* what to do next? */ + ecdsa_sig_init = 0, /* getting started */ + ecdsa_sig_mul, /* doing ecp_mul() */ + ecdsa_sig_modn, /* mod N computations */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init verify sign sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_sig_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx) +{ + ctx->sign_tries = 0; + ctx->key_tries = 0; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->k); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->r); + ctx->state = ecdsa_sig_init; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a sign restart sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_sig_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->k); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->r); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +/* + * Sub-context for ecdsa_sign_det() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det { + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx; /* DRBG state */ + enum { /* what to do next? */ + ecdsa_det_init = 0, /* getting started */ + ecdsa_det_sign, /* make signature */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init verify sign_det sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_det_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(&ctx->rng_ctx); + ctx->state = ecdsa_det_init; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a sign_det restart sub-context + */ +static void ecdsa_restart_det_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&ctx->rng_ctx); + + ecdsa_restart_det_init(ctx); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +#define ECDSA_RS_ECP (rs_ctx == NULL ? NULL : &rs_ctx->ecp) + +/* Utility macro for checking and updating ops budget */ +#define ECDSA_BUDGET(ops) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_budget(grp, ECDSA_RS_ECP, ops)); + +/* Call this when entering a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER(SUB) do { \ + /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ \ + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ecp.depth++ == 0) \ + rs_ctx->ecp.ops_done = 0; \ + \ + /* set up our own sub-context if needed */ \ + if (mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && \ + rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB == NULL) \ + { \ + rs_ctx->SUB = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(*rs_ctx->SUB)); \ + if (rs_ctx->SUB == NULL) \ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; \ + \ + ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_init(rs_ctx->SUB); \ + } \ +} while (0) + +/* Call this when leaving a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE(SUB) do { \ + /* clear our sub-context when not in progress (done or error) */ \ + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB != NULL && \ + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) \ + { \ + ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_free(rs_ctx->SUB); \ + mbedtls_free(rs_ctx->SUB); \ + rs_ctx->SUB = NULL; \ + } \ + \ + if (rs_ctx != NULL) \ + rs_ctx->ecp.depth--; \ +} while (0) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#define ECDSA_RS_ECP NULL + +#define ECDSA_BUDGET(ops) /* no-op; for compatibility */ + +#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER(SUB) (void) rs_ctx +#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE(SUB) (void) rs_ctx + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) +/* + * Derive a suitable integer for group grp from a buffer of length len + * SEC1 4.1.3 step 5 aka SEC1 4.1.4 step 3 + */ +static int derive_mpi(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *x, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n_size = (grp->nbits + 7) / 8; + size_t use_size = blen > n_size ? n_size : blen; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(x, buf, use_size)); + if (use_size * 8 > grp->nbits) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(x, use_size * 8 - grp->nbits)); + } + + /* While at it, reduce modulo N */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(x, &grp->N) >= 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(x, x, &grp->N)); + } + +cleanup: + return ret; +} +#endif /* ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC || !ECDSA_SIGN_ALT || !ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ + +int mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid) +{ + switch (gid) { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: return 0; +#endif +#ifdef MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: return 0; +#endif + default: return 1; + } +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) +/* + * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3) + * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message) + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret, key_tries, sign_tries; + int *p_sign_tries = &sign_tries, *p_key_tries = &key_tries; + mbedtls_ecp_point R; + mbedtls_mpi k, e, t; + mbedtls_mpi *pk = &k, *pr = r; + + /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */ + if (!mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(grp->id) || grp->N.p == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Make sure d is in range 1..n-1 */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(d, 1) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(d, &grp->N) >= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&R); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&k); mbedtls_mpi_init(&e); mbedtls_mpi_init(&t); + + ECDSA_RS_ENTER(sig); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL) { + /* redirect to our context */ + p_sign_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->sign_tries; + p_key_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->key_tries; + pk = &rs_ctx->sig->k; + pr = &rs_ctx->sig->r; + + /* jump to current step */ + if (rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_mul) { + goto mul; + } + if (rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_modn) { + goto modn; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + *p_sign_tries = 0; + do { + if ((*p_sign_tries)++ > 10) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Steps 1-3: generate a suitable ephemeral keypair + * and set r = xR mod n + */ + *p_key_tries = 0; + do { + if ((*p_key_tries)++ > 10) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(grp, pk, f_rng, p_rng)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL) { + rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_mul; + } + +mul: +#endif + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(grp, &R, pk, &grp->G, + f_rng_blind, + p_rng_blind, + ECDSA_RS_ECP)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(pr, &R.X, &grp->N)); + } while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(pr, 0) == 0); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL) { + rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_modn; + } + +modn: +#endif + /* + * Accounting for everything up to the end of the loop + * (step 6, but checking now avoids saving e and t) + */ + ECDSA_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 4); + + /* + * Step 5: derive MPI from hashed message + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(derive_mpi(grp, &e, buf, blen)); + + /* + * Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step, + * avoiding a potential timing leak. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(grp, &t, f_rng_blind, + p_rng_blind)); + + /* + * Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(s, pr, d)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&e, &e, s)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&e, &e, &t)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(pk, pk, &t)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(pk, pk, &grp->N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(s, pk, &grp->N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(s, s, &e)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(s, s, &grp->N)); + } while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(s, 0) == 0); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(r, pr)); + } +#endif + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&R); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&k); mbedtls_mpi_free(&e); mbedtls_mpi_free(&t); + + ECDSA_RS_LEAVE(sig); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */ + return mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +/* + * Deterministic signature wrapper + * + * note: The f_rng_blind parameter must not be NULL. + * + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng_blind, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng = &rng_ctx; + unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t grp_len = (grp->nbits + 7) / 8; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_mpi h; + + if ((md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&h); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(&rng_ctx); + + ECDSA_RS_ENTER(det); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL) { + /* redirect to our context */ + p_rng = &rs_ctx->det->rng_ctx; + + /* jump to current step */ + if (rs_ctx->det->state == ecdsa_det_sign) { + goto sign; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + /* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(d, data, grp_len)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(derive_mpi(grp, &h, buf, blen)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&h, data + grp_len, grp_len)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf(p_rng, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL) { + rs_ctx->det->state = ecdsa_det_sign; + } + +sign: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) + (void) f_rng_blind; + (void) p_rng_blind; + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng); +#else + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, + f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ + +cleanup: + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&rng_ctx); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&h); + + ECDSA_RS_LEAVE(det); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Deterministic signature wrapper + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, + mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng_blind) +{ + return mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, + f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, NULL); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) +/* + * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message (SEC1 4.1.4) + * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 2 (hash message) + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *r, + const mbedtls_mpi *s, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2; + mbedtls_ecp_point R; + mbedtls_mpi *pu1 = &u1, *pu2 = &u2; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&R); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&e); mbedtls_mpi_init(&s_inv); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&u1); mbedtls_mpi_init(&u2); + + /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */ + if (!mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(grp->id) || grp->N.p == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ECDSA_RS_ENTER(ver); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL) { + /* redirect to our context */ + pu1 = &rs_ctx->ver->u1; + pu2 = &rs_ctx->ver->u2; + + /* jump to current step */ + if (rs_ctx->ver->state == ecdsa_ver_muladd) { + goto muladd; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + /* + * Step 1: make sure r and s are in range 1..n-1 + */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(r, 1) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(r, &grp->N) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(s, 1) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(s, &grp->N) >= 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Step 3: derive MPI from hashed message + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(derive_mpi(grp, &e, buf, blen)); + + /* + * Step 4: u1 = e / s mod n, u2 = r / s mod n + */ + ECDSA_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK + MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 2); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&s_inv, s, &grp->N)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(pu1, &e, &s_inv)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(pu1, pu1, &grp->N)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(pu2, r, &s_inv)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(pu2, pu2, &grp->N)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL) { + rs_ctx->ver->state = ecdsa_ver_muladd; + } + +muladd: +#endif + /* + * Step 5: R = u1 G + u2 Q + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable(grp, + &R, pu1, &grp->G, pu2, Q, ECDSA_RS_ECP)); + + if (mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(&R)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Step 6: convert xR to an integer (no-op) + * Step 7: reduce xR mod n (gives v) + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&R.X, &R.X, &grp->N)); + + /* + * Step 8: check if v (that is, R.X) is equal to r + */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&R.X, r) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&R); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&e); mbedtls_mpi_free(&s_inv); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&u1); mbedtls_mpi_free(&u2); + + ECDSA_RS_LEAVE(ver); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *r, + const mbedtls_mpi *s) +{ + return mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(grp, buf, blen, Q, r, s, NULL); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ + +/* + * Convert a signature (given by context) to ASN.1 + */ +static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1(const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *slen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN] = { 0 }; + unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf); + size_t len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&p, buf, s)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&p, buf, r)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + if (len > sig_size) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(sig, p, len); + *slen = len; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Compute and write signature + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&s); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, + hash, hlen, md_alg, f_rng, + p_rng, rs_ctx)); +#else + (void) md_alg; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) + (void) rs_ctx; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, + hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng)); +#else + /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d, + hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, + p_rng, rs_ctx)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_signature_to_asn1(&r, &s, sig, sig_size, slen)); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&s); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Compute and write signature + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( + ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, sig_size, slen, + f_rng, p_rng, NULL); +} + +/* + * Read and check signature + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen) +{ + return mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( + ctx, hash, hlen, sig, slen, NULL); +} + +/* + * Restartable read and check signature + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen, + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) sig; + const unsigned char *end = sig + slen; + size_t len; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&s); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (p + len != end) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end, &r)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end, &s)) != 0) { + ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) + (void) rs_ctx; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(&ctx->grp, hash, hlen, + &ctx->Q, &r, &s)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(&ctx->grp, hash, hlen, + &ctx->Q, &r, &s, rs_ctx)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ + + /* At this point we know that the buffer starts with a valid signature. + * Return 0 if the buffer just contains the signature, and a specific + * error code if the valid signature is followed by more data. */ + if (p != end) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&s); + + return ret; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) +/* + * Generate key pair + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = 0; + ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, gid); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(&ctx->grp, &ctx->d, + &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng); +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */ + +/* + * Set context from an mbedtls_ecp_keypair + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(&ctx->grp, &key->grp)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->d, &key->d)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy(&ctx->Q, &key->Q)) != 0) { + mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ctx); + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ctx); +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ctx); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_restart_init(&ctx->ecp); + + ctx->ver = NULL; + ctx->sig = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + ctx->det = NULL; +#endif +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_restart_free(&ctx->ecp); + + ecdsa_restart_ver_free(ctx->ver); + mbedtls_free(ctx->ver); + ctx->ver = NULL; + + ecdsa_restart_sig_free(ctx->sig); + mbedtls_free(ctx->sig); + ctx->sig = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + ecdsa_restart_det_free(ctx->det); + mbedtls_free(ctx->det); + ctx->det = NULL; +#endif +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ diff --git a/library/ecjpake.c b/library/ecjpake.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..cdf5d7ea46e --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ecjpake.c @@ -0,0 +1,1216 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curve J-PAKE + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * References in the code are to the Thread v1.0 Specification, + * available to members of the Thread Group http://threadgroup.org/ + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + +/* + * Convert a mbedtls_ecjpake_role to identifier string + */ +static const char * const ecjpake_id[] = { + "client", + "server" +}; + +#define ID_MINE (ecjpake_id[ctx->role]) +#define ID_PEER (ecjpake_id[1 - ctx->role]) + +/** + * Helper to Compute a hash from md_type + */ +static int mbedtls_ecjpake_compute_hash(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output) +{ + return mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type), + input, ilen, output); +} + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ecjpake_init(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&ctx->grp); + ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Xm1); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Xm2); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Xp1); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Xp2); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Xp); + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->xm1); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->xm2); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->s); +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ecjpake_free(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + ctx->md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&ctx->grp); + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Xm1); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Xm2); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Xp1); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Xp2); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Xp); + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->xm1); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->xm2); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->s); +} + +/* + * Setup context + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + mbedtls_ecjpake_role role, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve, + const unsigned char *secret, + size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (role != MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT && role != MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->role = role; + + if ((mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + ctx->md_type = hash; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, curve)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->s, secret, len)); + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ecjpake_free(ctx); + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + int point_format) +{ + switch (point_format) { + case MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED: + case MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED: + ctx->point_format = point_format; + return 0; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +/* + * Check if context is ready for use + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_check(const mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx->md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || + ctx->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || + ctx->s.p == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Write a point plus its length to a buffer + */ +static int ecjpake_write_len_point(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* Need at least 4 for length plus 1 for point */ + if (end < *p || end - *p < 5) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(grp, P, pf, + &len, *p + 4, (size_t) (end - (*p + 4))); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(len, *p, 0); + + *p += 4 + len; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Size of the temporary buffer for ecjpake_hash: + * 3 EC points plus their length, plus ID and its length (4 + 6 bytes) + */ +#define ECJPAKE_HASH_BUF_LEN (3 * (4 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN) + 4 + 6) + +/* + * Compute hash for ZKP (7.4.2.2.2.1) + */ +static int ecjpake_hash(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *V, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + mbedtls_mpi *h) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[ECJPAKE_HASH_BUF_LEN]; + unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + sizeof(buf); + const size_t id_len = strlen(id); + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + + /* Write things to temporary buffer */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_write_len_point(&p, end, grp, pf, G)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_write_len_point(&p, end, grp, pf, V)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_write_len_point(&p, end, grp, pf, X)); + + if (end - p < 4) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(id_len, p, 0); + p += 4; + + if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < id_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(p, id, id_len); + p += id_len; + + /* Compute hash */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecjpake_compute_hash(md_type, + buf, (size_t) (p - buf), hash)); + + /* Turn it into an integer mod n */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(h, hash, + mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_type))); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(h, h, &grp->N)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Parse a ECShnorrZKP (7.4.2.2.2) and verify it (7.4.2.3.3) + */ +static int ecjpake_zkp_read(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + const unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point V, VV; + mbedtls_mpi r, h; + size_t r_len; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&V); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&VV); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&h); + + /* + * struct { + * ECPoint V; + * opaque r<1..2^8-1>; + * } ECSchnorrZKP; + */ + if (end < *p) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(grp, &V, p, (size_t) (end - *p))); + + if (end < *p || (size_t) (end - *p) < 1) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + r_len = *(*p)++; + + if (end < *p || (size_t) (end - *p) < r_len || r_len == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&r, *p, r_len)); + *p += r_len; + + /* + * Verification + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_hash(md_type, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_muladd((mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, + &VV, &h, X, &r, G)); + + if (mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp(&VV, &V) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&V); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&VV); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&h); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Generate ZKP (7.4.2.3.2) and write it as ECSchnorrZKP (7.4.2.2.2) + */ +static int ecjpake_zkp_write(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + const mbedtls_mpi *x, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point V; + mbedtls_mpi v; + mbedtls_mpi h; /* later recycled to hold r */ + size_t len; + + if (end < *p) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&V); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&v); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&h); + + /* Compute signature */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base((mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, + G, &v, &V, f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_hash(md_type, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&h, &h, x)); /* x*h */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&h, &v, &h)); /* v - x*h */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&h, &h, &grp->N)); /* r */ + + /* Write it out */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(grp, &V, + pf, &len, *p, (size_t) (end - *p))); + *p += len; + + len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&h); /* actually r */ + if (end < *p || (size_t) (end - *p) < 1 + len || len > 255) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + + *(*p)++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&h, *p, len)); /* r */ + *p += len; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&V); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&v); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&h); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Parse a ECJPAKEKeyKP (7.4.2.2.1) and check proof + * Output: verified public key X + */ +static int ecjpake_kkp_read(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + const unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (end < *p) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * struct { + * ECPoint X; + * ECSchnorrZKP zkp; + * } ECJPAKEKeyKP; + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(grp, X, p, (size_t) (end - *p))); + if (mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(X)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_read(md_type, grp, pf, G, X, id, p, end)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Generate an ECJPAKEKeyKP + * Output: the serialized structure, plus private/public key pair + */ +static int ecjpake_kkp_write(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_mpi *x, + mbedtls_ecp_point *X, + const char *id, + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if (end < *p) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* Generate key (7.4.2.3.1) and write it out */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base((mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, G, x, X, + f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(grp, X, + pf, &len, *p, (size_t) (end - *p))); + *p += len; + + /* Generate and write proof */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_write(md_type, grp, pf, G, x, X, id, + p, end, f_rng, p_rng)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Read a ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList (7.4.2.3) and check proofs + * Outputs: verified peer public keys Xa, Xb + */ +static int ecjpake_kkpp_read(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Xa, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Xb, + const char *id, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + + /* + * struct { + * ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp_pair_list[2]; + * } ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList; + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(md_type, grp, pf, G, Xa, id, &p, end)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(md_type, grp, pf, G, Xb, id, &p, end)); + + if (p != end) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Generate a ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList + * Outputs: the serialized structure, plus two private/public key pairs + */ +static int ecjpake_kkpp_write(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const int pf, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_mpi *xm1, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Xa, + mbedtls_mpi *xm2, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Xb, + const char *id, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_write(md_type, grp, pf, G, xm1, Xa, id, + &p, end, f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_write(md_type, grp, pf, G, xm2, Xb, id, + &p, end, f_rng, p_rng)); + + *olen = (size_t) (p - buf); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Read and process the first round message + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + return ecjpake_kkpp_read(ctx->md_type, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, + &ctx->grp.G, + &ctx->Xp1, &ctx->Xp2, ID_PEER, + buf, len); +} + +/* + * Generate and write the first round message + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + return ecjpake_kkpp_write(ctx->md_type, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format, + &ctx->grp.G, + &ctx->xm1, &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->Xm2, + ID_MINE, buf, len, olen, f_rng, p_rng); +} + +/* + * Compute the sum of three points R = A + B + C + */ +static int ecjpake_ecp_add3(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *A, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *B, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *C) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi one; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&one); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&one, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_muladd(grp, R, &one, A, &one, B)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_muladd(grp, R, &one, R, &one, C)); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&one); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Read and process second round message (C: 7.4.2.5, S: 7.4.2.6) + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point G; /* C: GB, S: GA */ + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&G); + + /* + * Server: GA = X3 + X4 + X1 (7.4.2.6.1) + * Client: GB = X1 + X2 + X3 (7.4.2.5.1) + * Unified: G = Xm1 + Xm2 + Xp1 + * We need that before parsing in order to check Xp as we read it + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_ecp_add3(&ctx->grp, &G, + &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->Xm2, &ctx->Xp1)); + + /* + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; // only client reading server msg + * ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp; + * } Client/ServerECJPAKEParams; + */ + if (ctx->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group(&grp, &p, len)); + if (grp.id != ctx->grp.id) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(ctx->md_type, &ctx->grp, + ctx->point_format, + &G, &ctx->Xp, ID_PEER, &p, end)); + + if (p != end) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&G); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Compute R = +/- X * S mod N, taking care not to leak S + */ +static int ecjpake_mul_secret(mbedtls_mpi *R, int sign, + const mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *S, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi b; /* Blinding value, then s + N * blinding */ + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&b); + + /* b = s + rnd-128-bit * N */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&b, 16, f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&b, &b, N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&b, &b, S)); + + /* R = sign * X * b mod N */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(R, X, &b)); + R->s *= sign; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(R, R, N)); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&b); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Generate and write the second round message (S: 7.4.2.5, C: 7.4.2.6) + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point G; /* C: GA, S: GB */ + mbedtls_ecp_point Xm; /* C: Xc, S: Xs */ + mbedtls_mpi xm; /* C: xc, S: xs */ + unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + size_t ec_len; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&G); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Xm); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&xm); + + /* + * First generate private/public key pair (S: 7.4.2.5.1, C: 7.4.2.6.1) + * + * Client: GA = X1 + X3 + X4 | xs = x2 * s | Xc = xc * GA + * Server: GB = X3 + X1 + X2 | xs = x4 * s | Xs = xs * GB + * Unified: G = Xm1 + Xp1 + Xp2 | xm = xm2 * s | Xm = xm * G + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_ecp_add3(&ctx->grp, &G, + &ctx->Xp1, &ctx->Xp2, &ctx->Xm1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_mul_secret(&xm, 1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->s, + &ctx->grp.N, f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &Xm, &xm, &G, f_rng, p_rng)); + + /* + * Now write things out + * + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; // only server writing its message + * ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp; + * } Client/ServerECJPAKEParams; + */ + if (ctx->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER) { + if (end < p) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group(&ctx->grp, &ec_len, + p, (size_t) (end - p))); + p += ec_len; + } + + if (end < p) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(&ctx->grp, &Xm, + ctx->point_format, &ec_len, p, (size_t) (end - p))); + p += ec_len; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_write(ctx->md_type, &ctx->grp, + ctx->point_format, + &G, &xm, &Xm, ID_MINE, + &p, end, f_rng, p_rng)); + + *olen = (size_t) (p - buf); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&G); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&Xm); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&xm); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Derive PMS (7.4.2.7 / 7.4.2.8) + */ +static int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_k(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + mbedtls_ecp_point *K, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi m_xm2_s, one; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&m_xm2_s); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&one); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&one, 1)); + + /* + * Client: K = ( Xs - X4 * x2 * s ) * x2 + * Server: K = ( Xc - X2 * x4 * s ) * x4 + * Unified: K = ( Xp - Xp2 * xm2 * s ) * xm2 + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_mul_secret(&m_xm2_s, -1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->s, + &ctx->grp.N, f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_muladd(&ctx->grp, K, + &one, &ctx->Xp, + &m_xm2_s, &ctx->Xp2)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, K, &ctx->xm2, K, + f_rng, p_rng)); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&m_xm2_s); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&one); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point K; + unsigned char kx[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; + size_t x_bytes; + + *olen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(ctx->md_type); + if (len < *olen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&K); + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_k(ctx, &K, f_rng, p_rng); + if (ret) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* PMS = SHA-256( K.X ) */ + x_bytes = (ctx->grp.pbits + 7) / 8; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&K.X, kx, x_bytes)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecjpake_compute_hash(ctx->md_type, + kx, x_bytes, buf)); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&K); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point K; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&K); + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_k(ctx, &K, f_rng, p_rng); + if (ret) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ctx->grp, &K, ctx->point_format, + olen, buf, len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&K); + + return ret; +} + +#undef ID_MINE +#undef ID_PEER + +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test(int verbose) +{ + (void) verbose; + return 0; +} +#else + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_password[] = { + 0x74, 0x68, 0x72, 0x65, 0x61, 0x64, 0x6a, 0x70, 0x61, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x74, + 0x65, 0x73, 0x74 +}; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x1[] = { + 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, + 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18, + 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x21 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x2[] = { + 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, + 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, + 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x81 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x3[] = { + 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, + 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, + 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x81 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x4[] = { + 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0xc8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, 0xcc, + 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, 0xd7, 0xd8, + 0xd9, 0xda, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xdf, 0xe1 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_cli_one[] = { + 0x41, 0x04, 0xac, 0xcf, 0x01, 0x06, 0xef, 0x85, 0x8f, 0xa2, 0xd9, 0x19, + 0x33, 0x13, 0x46, 0x80, 0x5a, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x8b, 0xba, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0x44, + 0xe5, 0xc7, 0x89, 0x28, 0x79, 0x14, 0x61, 0x87, 0xdd, 0x26, 0x66, 0xad, + 0xa7, 0x81, 0xbb, 0x7f, 0x11, 0x13, 0x72, 0x25, 0x1a, 0x89, 0x10, 0x62, + 0x1f, 0x63, 0x4d, 0xf1, 0x28, 0xac, 0x48, 0xe3, 0x81, 0xfd, 0x6e, 0xf9, + 0x06, 0x07, 0x31, 0xf6, 0x94, 0xa4, 0x41, 0x04, 0x1d, 0xd0, 0xbd, 0x5d, + 0x45, 0x66, 0xc9, 0xbe, 0xd9, 0xce, 0x7d, 0xe7, 0x01, 0xb5, 0xe8, 0x2e, + 0x08, 0xe8, 0x4b, 0x73, 0x04, 0x66, 0x01, 0x8a, 0xb9, 0x03, 0xc7, 0x9e, + 0xb9, 0x82, 0x17, 0x22, 0x36, 0xc0, 0xc1, 0x72, 0x8a, 0xe4, 0xbf, 0x73, + 0x61, 0x0d, 0x34, 0xde, 0x44, 0x24, 0x6e, 0xf3, 0xd9, 0xc0, 0x5a, 0x22, + 0x36, 0xfb, 0x66, 0xa6, 0x58, 0x3d, 0x74, 0x49, 0x30, 0x8b, 0xab, 0xce, + 0x20, 0x72, 0xfe, 0x16, 0x66, 0x29, 0x92, 0xe9, 0x23, 0x5c, 0x25, 0x00, + 0x2f, 0x11, 0xb1, 0x50, 0x87, 0xb8, 0x27, 0x38, 0xe0, 0x3c, 0x94, 0x5b, + 0xf7, 0xa2, 0x99, 0x5d, 0xda, 0x1e, 0x98, 0x34, 0x58, 0x41, 0x04, 0x7e, + 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa4, 0x48, 0x70, 0x37, 0xa9, 0xe0, 0xdb, 0xd7, 0x92, 0x62, + 0xb2, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x77, 0x99, 0x30, 0xfc, 0x18, 0x40, 0x9a, 0xc5, + 0x36, 0x1c, 0x5f, 0xe6, 0x69, 0xd7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x47, 0x79, 0x0a, 0xeb, + 0x4c, 0xe7, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x75, 0xab, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x7f, 0xd1, 0xc3, 0x35, + 0x93, 0x9a, 0xa8, 0x63, 0xba, 0x37, 0xec, 0x91, 0xb7, 0xe3, 0x2b, 0xb0, + 0x13, 0xbb, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x04, 0xa4, 0x95, 0x58, 0xd3, 0x2e, 0xd1, 0xeb, + 0xfc, 0x18, 0x16, 0xaf, 0x4f, 0xf0, 0x9b, 0x55, 0xfc, 0xb4, 0xca, 0x47, + 0xb2, 0xa0, 0x2d, 0x1e, 0x7c, 0xaf, 0x11, 0x79, 0xea, 0x3f, 0xe1, 0x39, + 0x5b, 0x22, 0xb8, 0x61, 0x96, 0x40, 0x16, 0xfa, 0xba, 0xf7, 0x2c, 0x97, + 0x56, 0x95, 0xd9, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0x19, 0x7f, 0xe9, 0xf0, 0x40, + 0x63, 0x4e, 0xd5, 0x97, 0x64, 0x93, 0x77, 0x87, 0xbe, 0x20, 0xbc, 0x4d, + 0xee, 0xbb, 0xf9, 0xb8, 0xd6, 0x0a, 0x33, 0x5f, 0x04, 0x6c, 0xa3, 0xaa, + 0x94, 0x1e, 0x45, 0x86, 0x4c, 0x7c, 0xad, 0xef, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0x3d, + 0x8b, 0x01, 0x0e, 0x44, 0x3e, 0xf0 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_srv_one[] = { + 0x41, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa4, 0x48, 0x70, 0x37, 0xa9, 0xe0, 0xdb, + 0xd7, 0x92, 0x62, 0xb2, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x77, 0x99, 0x30, 0xfc, 0x18, + 0x40, 0x9a, 0xc5, 0x36, 0x1c, 0x5f, 0xe6, 0x69, 0xd7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x47, + 0x79, 0x0a, 0xeb, 0x4c, 0xe7, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x75, 0xab, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x7f, + 0xd1, 0xc3, 0x35, 0x93, 0x9a, 0xa8, 0x63, 0xba, 0x37, 0xec, 0x91, 0xb7, + 0xe3, 0x2b, 0xb0, 0x13, 0xbb, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x04, 0x09, 0xf8, 0x5b, 0x3d, + 0x20, 0xeb, 0xd7, 0x88, 0x5c, 0xe4, 0x64, 0xc0, 0x8d, 0x05, 0x6d, 0x64, + 0x28, 0xfe, 0x4d, 0xd9, 0x28, 0x7a, 0xa3, 0x65, 0xf1, 0x31, 0xf4, 0x36, + 0x0f, 0xf3, 0x86, 0xd8, 0x46, 0x89, 0x8b, 0xc4, 0xb4, 0x15, 0x83, 0xc2, + 0xa5, 0x19, 0x7f, 0x65, 0xd7, 0x87, 0x42, 0x74, 0x6c, 0x12, 0xa5, 0xec, + 0x0a, 0x4f, 0xfe, 0x2f, 0x27, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x0a, 0x1d, 0x8f, 0xb5, 0x16, + 0x20, 0x93, 0x4d, 0x74, 0xeb, 0x43, 0xe5, 0x4d, 0xf4, 0x24, 0xfd, 0x96, + 0x30, 0x6c, 0x01, 0x17, 0xbf, 0x13, 0x1a, 0xfa, 0xbf, 0x90, 0xa9, 0xd3, + 0x3d, 0x11, 0x98, 0xd9, 0x05, 0x19, 0x37, 0x35, 0x14, 0x41, 0x04, 0x19, + 0x0a, 0x07, 0x70, 0x0f, 0xfa, 0x4b, 0xe6, 0xae, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xee, 0x0f, + 0x06, 0xae, 0xb5, 0x44, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xdd, 0xaa, 0xbe, 0xdf, 0x70, 0xf8, + 0x62, 0x33, 0x21, 0x33, 0x2c, 0x54, 0xf3, 0x55, 0xf0, 0xfb, 0xfe, 0xc7, + 0x83, 0xed, 0x35, 0x9e, 0x5d, 0x0b, 0xf7, 0x37, 0x7a, 0x0f, 0xc4, 0xea, + 0x7a, 0xce, 0x47, 0x3c, 0x9c, 0x11, 0x2b, 0x41, 0xcc, 0xd4, 0x1a, 0xc5, + 0x6a, 0x56, 0x12, 0x41, 0x04, 0x36, 0x0a, 0x1c, 0xea, 0x33, 0xfc, 0xe6, + 0x41, 0x15, 0x64, 0x58, 0xe0, 0xa4, 0xea, 0xc2, 0x19, 0xe9, 0x68, 0x31, + 0xe6, 0xae, 0xbc, 0x88, 0xb3, 0xf3, 0x75, 0x2f, 0x93, 0xa0, 0x28, 0x1d, + 0x1b, 0xf1, 0xfb, 0x10, 0x60, 0x51, 0xdb, 0x96, 0x94, 0xa8, 0xd6, 0xe8, + 0x62, 0xa5, 0xef, 0x13, 0x24, 0xa3, 0xd9, 0xe2, 0x78, 0x94, 0xf1, 0xee, + 0x4f, 0x7c, 0x59, 0x19, 0x99, 0x65, 0xa8, 0xdd, 0x4a, 0x20, 0x91, 0x84, + 0x7d, 0x2d, 0x22, 0xdf, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0x5f, 0xaa, 0x2a, 0x3f, 0xb3, 0x3f, + 0xd2, 0xd1, 0xe0, 0x55, 0xa0, 0x7a, 0x7c, 0x61, 0xec, 0xfb, 0x8d, 0x80, + 0xec, 0x00, 0xc2, 0xc9, 0xeb, 0x12 +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_srv_two[] = { + 0x03, 0x00, 0x17, 0x41, 0x04, 0x0f, 0xb2, 0x2b, 0x1d, 0x5d, 0x11, 0x23, + 0xe0, 0xef, 0x9f, 0xeb, 0x9d, 0x8a, 0x2e, 0x59, 0x0a, 0x1f, 0x4d, 0x7c, + 0xed, 0x2c, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x58, 0x6e, 0x8f, 0x2a, 0x16, 0xd4, 0xeb, 0x2f, + 0xda, 0x43, 0x28, 0xa2, 0x0b, 0x07, 0xd8, 0xfd, 0x66, 0x76, 0x54, 0xca, + 0x18, 0xc5, 0x4e, 0x32, 0xa3, 0x33, 0xa0, 0x84, 0x54, 0x51, 0xe9, 0x26, + 0xee, 0x88, 0x04, 0xfd, 0x7a, 0xf0, 0xaa, 0xa7, 0xa6, 0x41, 0x04, 0x55, + 0x16, 0xea, 0x3e, 0x54, 0xa0, 0xd5, 0xd8, 0xb2, 0xce, 0x78, 0x6b, 0x38, + 0xd3, 0x83, 0x37, 0x00, 0x29, 0xa5, 0xdb, 0xe4, 0x45, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0xd6, + 0x01, 0xb4, 0x08, 0xa2, 0x4a, 0xe6, 0x46, 0x5c, 0x8a, 0xc9, 0x05, 0xb9, + 0xeb, 0x03, 0xb5, 0xd3, 0x69, 0x1c, 0x13, 0x9e, 0xf8, 0x3f, 0x1c, 0xd4, + 0x20, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x9c, 0xd4, 0xec, 0x39, 0x22, 0x18, 0xa5, 0x9e, 0xd2, + 0x43, 0xd3, 0xc8, 0x20, 0xff, 0x72, 0x4a, 0x9a, 0x70, 0xb8, 0x8c, 0xb8, + 0x6f, 0x20, 0xb4, 0x34, 0xc6, 0x86, 0x5a, 0xa1, 0xcd, 0x79, 0x06, 0xdd, + 0x7c, 0x9b, 0xce, 0x35, 0x25, 0xf5, 0x08, 0x27, 0x6f, 0x26, 0x83, 0x6c +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_cli_two[] = { + 0x41, 0x04, 0x69, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xe8, 0x5e, 0x90, 0xce, 0x3f, 0x12, 0x46, + 0x74, 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x07, 0xe9, 0x39, 0xe8, 0x1d, 0x1d, 0xc1, 0xc5, 0xcb, + 0x98, 0x8b, 0x58, 0xc3, 0x10, 0xc9, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0x52, 0x4d, 0x93, 0x72, + 0x0b, 0x45, 0x54, 0x1c, 0x83, 0xee, 0x88, 0x41, 0x19, 0x1d, 0xa7, 0xce, + 0xd8, 0x6e, 0x33, 0x12, 0xd4, 0x36, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xd6, 0x3e, 0x74, 0x98, + 0x9a, 0xba, 0x4a, 0xff, 0xd1, 0xee, 0x41, 0x04, 0x07, 0x7e, 0x8c, 0x31, + 0xe2, 0x0e, 0x6b, 0xed, 0xb7, 0x60, 0xc1, 0x35, 0x93, 0xe6, 0x9f, 0x15, + 0xbe, 0x85, 0xc2, 0x7d, 0x68, 0xcd, 0x09, 0xcc, 0xb8, 0xc4, 0x18, 0x36, + 0x08, 0x91, 0x7c, 0x5c, 0x3d, 0x40, 0x9f, 0xac, 0x39, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xe8, + 0x2f, 0x72, 0x92, 0xd3, 0x6f, 0x0d, 0x23, 0xe0, 0x55, 0x91, 0x3f, 0x45, + 0xa5, 0x2b, 0x85, 0xdd, 0x8a, 0x20, 0x52, 0xe9, 0xe1, 0x29, 0xbb, 0x4d, + 0x20, 0x0f, 0x01, 0x1f, 0x19, 0x48, 0x35, 0x35, 0xa6, 0xe8, 0x9a, 0x58, + 0x0c, 0x9b, 0x00, 0x03, 0xba, 0xf2, 0x14, 0x62, 0xec, 0xe9, 0x1a, 0x82, + 0xcc, 0x38, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xae, 0x60, 0xd9, 0xc5, 0x4c +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_shared_key[] = { + 0x04, 0x01, 0xab, 0xe9, 0xf2, 0xc7, 0x3a, 0x99, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x1f, 0x80, + 0xfb, 0x9d, 0xdb, 0x7e, 0x00, 0x12, 0xa8, 0x9c, 0x2f, 0x39, 0x27, 0x79, + 0xf9, 0x64, 0x40, 0x14, 0x75, 0xea, 0xc1, 0x31, 0x28, 0x43, 0x8f, 0xe1, + 0x12, 0x41, 0xd6, 0xc1, 0xe5, 0x5f, 0x7b, 0x80, 0x88, 0x94, 0xc9, 0xc0, + 0x27, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x41, 0xf5, 0xcb, 0xa1, 0xfe, 0x6c, 0xc7, 0xe6, 0x12, + 0x17, 0xc3, 0xde, 0x27, 0xb4, +}; + +static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_pms[] = { + 0xf3, 0xd4, 0x7f, 0x59, 0x98, 0x44, 0xdb, 0x92, 0xa5, 0x69, 0xbb, 0xe7, + 0x98, 0x1e, 0x39, 0xd9, 0x31, 0xfd, 0x74, 0x3b, 0xf2, 0x2e, 0x98, 0xf9, + 0xb4, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x19, 0xd3, 0xc4, 0xf3, 0x51 +}; + +/* + * PRNG for test - !!!INSECURE NEVER USE IN PRODUCTION!!! + * + * This is the linear congruential generator from numerical recipes, + * except we only use the low byte as the output. See + * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_congruential_generator#Parameters_in_common_use + */ +static int self_test_rng(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len) +{ + static uint32_t state = 42; + + (void) ctx; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) { + state = state * 1664525u + 1013904223u; + out[i] = (unsigned char) state; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Load my private keys and generate the corresponding public keys */ +static int ecjpake_test_load(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *xm1, size_t len1, + const unsigned char *xm2, size_t len2) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->xm1, xm1, len1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->xm2, xm2, len2)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->xm1, + &ctx->grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm2, &ctx->xm2, + &ctx->grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ + +/* For tests we don't need a secure RNG; + * use the LGC from Numerical Recipes for simplicity */ +static int ecjpake_lgc(void *p, unsigned char *out, size_t len) +{ + static uint32_t x = 42; + (void) p; + + while (len > 0) { + size_t use_len = len > 4 ? 4 : len; + x = 1664525 * x + 1013904223; + memcpy(out, &x, use_len); + out += use_len; + len -= use_len; + } + + return 0; +} + +#define TEST_ASSERT(x) \ + do { \ + if (x) \ + ret = 0; \ + else \ + { \ + ret = 1; \ + goto cleanup; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecjpake_context cli; + mbedtls_ecjpake_context srv; + unsigned char buf[512], pms[32]; + size_t len, pmslen; + + mbedtls_ecjpake_init(&cli); + mbedtls_ecjpake_init(&srv); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" ECJPAKE test #0 (setup): "); + } + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(&cli, MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + ecjpake_test_password, + sizeof(ecjpake_test_password)) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(&srv, MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + ecjpake_test_password, + sizeof(ecjpake_test_password)) == 0); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" ECJPAKE test #1 (random handshake): "); + } + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&cli, + buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&srv, buf, len) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&srv, + buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&cli, buf, len) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(&srv, + buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&cli, buf, len) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&cli, + pms, sizeof(pms), &pmslen, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(&cli, + buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&srv, buf, len) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&srv, + buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(len == pmslen); + TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, pms, len) == 0); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + /* 'reference handshake' tests can only be run against implementations + * for which we have 100% control over how the random ephemeral keys + * are generated. This is only the case for the internal Mbed TLS + * implementation, so these tests are skipped in case the internal + * implementation is swapped out for an alternative one. */ + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" ECJPAKE test #2 (reference handshake): "); + } + + /* Simulate generation of round one */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_test_load(&cli, + ecjpake_test_x1, sizeof(ecjpake_test_x1), + ecjpake_test_x2, sizeof(ecjpake_test_x2))); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_test_load(&srv, + ecjpake_test_x3, sizeof(ecjpake_test_x3), + ecjpake_test_x4, sizeof(ecjpake_test_x4))); + + /* Read round one */ + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&srv, + ecjpake_test_cli_one, + sizeof(ecjpake_test_cli_one)) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&cli, + ecjpake_test_srv_one, + sizeof(ecjpake_test_srv_one)) == 0); + + /* Skip generation of round two, read round two */ + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&cli, + ecjpake_test_srv_two, + sizeof(ecjpake_test_srv_two)) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&srv, + ecjpake_test_cli_two, + sizeof(ecjpake_test_cli_two)) == 0); + + /* Server derives PMS */ + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&srv, + buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(len == sizeof(ecjpake_test_pms)); + TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, ecjpake_test_pms, len) == 0); + + /* Server derives K as unsigned binary data */ + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(&srv, + buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(len == sizeof(ecjpake_test_shared_key)); + TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, ecjpake_test_shared_key, len) == 0); + + memset(buf, 0, len); /* Avoid interferences with next step */ + + /* Client derives PMS */ + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&cli, + buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(len == sizeof(ecjpake_test_pms)); + TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, ecjpake_test_pms, len) == 0); + + /* Client derives K as unsigned binary data */ + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(&cli, + buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(len == sizeof(ecjpake_test_shared_key)); + TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, ecjpake_test_shared_key, len) == 0); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecjpake_free(&cli); + mbedtls_ecjpake_free(&srv); + + if (ret != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + ret = 1; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return ret; +} + +#undef TEST_ASSERT + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C */ diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..427059bb532 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ecp.c @@ -0,0 +1,3703 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curves over GF(p): generic functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * SEC1 https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf + * GECC = Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography - Hankerson, Menezes, Vanstone + * FIPS 186-3 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-3/fips_186-3.pdf + * RFC 4492 for the related TLS structures and constants + * - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4492 + * RFC 7748 for the Curve448 and Curve25519 curve definitions + * - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7748 + * + * [Curve25519] https://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf + * + * [2] CORON, Jean-S'ebastien. Resistance against differential power analysis + * for elliptic curve cryptosystems. In : Cryptographic Hardware and + * Embedded Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999. p. 292-302. + * + * + * [3] HEDABOU, Mustapha, PINEL, Pierre, et B'EN'ETEAU, Lucien. A comb method to + * render ECC resistant against Side Channel Attacks. IACR Cryptology + * ePrint Archive, 2004, vol. 2004, p. 342. + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +/** + * \brief Function level alternative implementation. + * + * The MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT macro enables alternative implementations to + * replace certain functions in this module. The alternative implementations are + * typically hardware accelerators and need to activate the hardware before the + * computation starts and deactivate it after it finishes. The + * mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() and mbedtls_internal_ecp_free() functions serve + * this purpose. + * + * To preserve the correct functionality the following conditions must hold: + * + * - The alternative implementation must be activated by + * mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() before any of the replaceable functions is + * called. + * - mbedtls_internal_ecp_free() must \b only be called when the alternative + * implementation is activated. + * - mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() must \b not be called when the alternative + * implementation is activated. + * - Public functions must not return while the alternative implementation is + * activated. + * - Replaceable functions are guarded by \c MBEDTLS_ECP_XXX_ALT macros and + * before calling them an \code if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) ) + * \endcode ensures that the alternative implementation supports the current + * group. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include "bn_mul.h" +#include "ecp_invasive.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "ecp_internal_alt.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * Counts of point addition and doubling, and field multiplications. + * Used to test resistance of point multiplication to simple timing attacks. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +static unsigned long add_count, dbl_count; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +static unsigned long mul_count; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Maximum number of "basic operations" to be done in a row. + * + * Default value 0 means that ECC operations will not yield. + * Note that regardless of the value of ecp_max_ops, always at + * least one step is performed before yielding. + * + * Setting ecp_max_ops=1 can be suitable for testing purposes + * as it will interrupt computation at all possible points. + */ +static unsigned ecp_max_ops = 0; + +/* + * Set ecp_max_ops + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(unsigned max_ops) +{ + ecp_max_ops = max_ops; +} + +/* + * Check if restart is enabled + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled(void) +{ + return ecp_max_ops != 0; +} + +/* + * Restart sub-context for ecp_mul_comb() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul { + mbedtls_ecp_point R; /* current intermediate result */ + size_t i; /* current index in various loops, 0 outside */ + mbedtls_ecp_point *T; /* table for precomputed points */ + unsigned char T_size; /* number of points in table T */ + enum { /* what were we doing last time we returned? */ + ecp_rsm_init = 0, /* nothing so far, dummy initial state */ + ecp_rsm_pre_dbl, /* precompute 2^n multiples */ + ecp_rsm_pre_norm_dbl, /* normalize precomputed 2^n multiples */ + ecp_rsm_pre_add, /* precompute remaining points by adding */ + ecp_rsm_pre_norm_add, /* normalize all precomputed points */ + ecp_rsm_comb_core, /* ecp_mul_comb_core() */ + ecp_rsm_final_norm, /* do the final normalization */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init restart_mul sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_rsm_init(mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->R); + ctx->i = 0; + ctx->T = NULL; + ctx->T_size = 0; + ctx->state = ecp_rsm_init; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart_mul sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_rsm_free(mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx) +{ + unsigned char i; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->R); + + if (ctx->T != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < ctx->T_size; i++) { + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(ctx->T + i); + } + mbedtls_free(ctx->T); + } + + ecp_restart_rsm_init(ctx); +} + +/* + * Restart context for ecp_muladd() + */ +struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd { + mbedtls_ecp_point mP; /* mP value */ + mbedtls_ecp_point R; /* R intermediate result */ + enum { /* what should we do next? */ + ecp_rsma_mul1 = 0, /* first multiplication */ + ecp_rsma_mul2, /* second multiplication */ + ecp_rsma_add, /* addition */ + ecp_rsma_norm, /* normalization */ + } state; +}; + +/* + * Init restart_muladd sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_ma_init(mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->mP); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->R); + ctx->state = ecp_rsma_mul1; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart_muladd sub-context + */ +static void ecp_restart_ma_free(mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->mP); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->R); + + ecp_restart_ma_init(ctx); +} + +/* + * Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_restart_init(mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx) +{ + ctx->ops_done = 0; + ctx->depth = 0; + ctx->rsm = NULL; + ctx->ma = NULL; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_restart_free(mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + ecp_restart_rsm_free(ctx->rsm); + mbedtls_free(ctx->rsm); + + ecp_restart_ma_free(ctx->ma); + mbedtls_free(ctx->ma); + + mbedtls_ecp_restart_init(ctx); +} + +/* + * Check if we can do the next step + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, + unsigned ops) +{ + if (rs_ctx != NULL && ecp_max_ops != 0) { + /* scale depending on curve size: the chosen reference is 256-bit, + * and multiplication is quadratic. Round to the closest integer. */ + if (grp->pbits >= 512) { + ops *= 4; + } else if (grp->pbits >= 384) { + ops *= 2; + } + + /* Avoid infinite loops: always allow first step. + * Because of that, however, it's not generally true + * that ops_done <= ecp_max_ops, so the check + * ops_done > ecp_max_ops below is mandatory. */ + if ((rs_ctx->ops_done != 0) && + (rs_ctx->ops_done > ecp_max_ops || + ops > ecp_max_ops - rs_ctx->ops_done)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS; + } + + /* update running count */ + rs_ctx->ops_done += ops; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Call this when entering a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECP_RS_ENTER(SUB) do { \ + /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ \ + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->depth++ == 0) \ + rs_ctx->ops_done = 0; \ + \ + /* set up our own sub-context if needed */ \ + if (mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && \ + rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB == NULL) \ + { \ + rs_ctx->SUB = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(*rs_ctx->SUB)); \ + if (rs_ctx->SUB == NULL) \ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; \ + \ + ecp_restart_## SUB ##_init(rs_ctx->SUB); \ + } \ +} while (0) + +/* Call this when leaving a function that needs its own sub-context */ +#define ECP_RS_LEAVE(SUB) do { \ + /* clear our sub-context when not in progress (done or error) */ \ + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB != NULL && \ + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) \ + { \ + ecp_restart_## SUB ##_free(rs_ctx->SUB); \ + mbedtls_free(rs_ctx->SUB); \ + rs_ctx->SUB = NULL; \ + } \ + \ + if (rs_ctx != NULL) \ + rs_ctx->depth--; \ +} while (0) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#define ECP_RS_ENTER(sub) (void) rs_ctx; +#define ECP_RS_LEAVE(sub) (void) rs_ctx; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +static void mpi_init_many(mbedtls_mpi *arr, size_t size) +{ + while (size--) { + mbedtls_mpi_init(arr++); + } +} + +static void mpi_free_many(mbedtls_mpi *arr, size_t size) +{ + while (size--) { + mbedtls_mpi_free(arr++); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +/* + * List of supported curves: + * - internal ID + * - TLS NamedCurve ID (RFC 4492 sec. 5.1.1, RFC 7071 sec. 2, RFC 8446 sec. 4.2.7) + * - size in bits + * - readable name + * + * Curves are listed in order: largest curves first, and for a given size, + * fastest curves first. + * + * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c and ssl_tls.c when adding a new curve! + */ +static const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info ecp_supported_curves[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, 25, 521, "secp521r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, 28, 512, "brainpoolP512r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, 24, 384, "secp384r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, 27, 384, "brainpoolP384r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, 23, 256, "secp256r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, 22, 256, "secp256k1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, 26, 256, "brainpoolP256r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, 21, 224, "secp224r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, 20, 224, "secp224k1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, 19, 192, "secp192r1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, 18, 192, "secp192k1" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, 29, 256, "x25519" }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, 30, 448, "x448" }, +#endif + { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, 0, 0, NULL }, +}; + +#define ECP_NB_CURVES sizeof(ecp_supported_curves) / \ + sizeof(ecp_supported_curves[0]) + +static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_supported_grp_id[ECP_NB_CURVES]; + +/* + * List of supported curves and associated info + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(void) +{ + return ecp_supported_curves; +} + +/* + * List of supported curves, group ID only + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list(void) +{ + static int init_done = 0; + + if (!init_done) { + size_t i = 0; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + for (curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++) { + ecp_supported_grp_id[i++] = curve_info->grp_id; + } + ecp_supported_grp_id[i] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + + init_done = 1; + } + + return ecp_supported_grp_id; +} + +/* + * Get the curve info for the internal identifier + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + for (curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++) { + if (curve_info->grp_id == grp_id) { + return curve_info; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Get the curve info from the TLS identifier + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + for (curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++) { + if (curve_info->tls_id == tls_id) { + return curve_info; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Get the curve info from the name + */ +const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name(const char *name) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + + if (name == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + for (curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(); + curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + curve_info++) { + if (strcmp(curve_info->name, name) == 0) { + return curve_info; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Get the type of a curve + */ +mbedtls_ecp_curve_type mbedtls_ecp_get_type(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +{ + if (grp->G.X.p == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_NONE; + } + + if (grp->G.Y.p == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS; + } +} + +/* + * Initialize (the components of) a point + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_point_init(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_init(&pt->X); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&pt->Y); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&pt->Z); +} + +/* + * Initialize (the components of) a group + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_group_init(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +{ + grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&grp->P); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&grp->A); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&grp->B); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&grp->G); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&grp->N); + grp->pbits = 0; + grp->nbits = 0; + grp->h = 0; + grp->modp = NULL; + grp->t_pre = NULL; + grp->t_post = NULL; + grp->t_data = NULL; + grp->T = NULL; + grp->T_size = 0; +} + +/* + * Initialize (the components of) a key pair + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&key->grp); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&key->d); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&key->Q); +} + +/* + * Unallocate (the components of) a point + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_point_free(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) +{ + if (pt == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&(pt->X)); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&(pt->Y)); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&(pt->Z)); +} + +/* + * Check that the comb table (grp->T) is static initialized. + */ +static int ecp_group_is_static_comb_table(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +{ +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 + return grp->T != NULL && grp->T_size == 0; +#else + (void) grp; + return 0; +#endif +} + +/* + * Unallocate (the components of) a group + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_group_free(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +{ + size_t i; + + if (grp == NULL) { + return; + } + + if (grp->h != 1) { + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->A); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->B); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&grp->G); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->N); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->P); +#endif + } + + if (!ecp_group_is_static_comb_table(grp) && grp->T != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < grp->T_size; i++) { + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&grp->T[i]); + } + mbedtls_free(grp->T); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(grp, sizeof(mbedtls_ecp_group)); +} + +/* + * Unallocate (the components of) a key pair + */ +void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key) +{ + if (key == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&key->grp); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&key->d); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&key->Q); +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of a point + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_copy(mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&P->X, &Q->X)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&P->Y, &Q->Y)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&P->Z, &Q->Z)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Copy the contents of a group object + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(mbedtls_ecp_group *dst, const mbedtls_ecp_group *src) +{ + return mbedtls_ecp_group_load(dst, src->id); +} + +/* + * Set point to zero + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_set_zero(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->X, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->Y, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->Z, 0)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Tell if a point is zero + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) +{ + return mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&pt->Z, 0) == 0; +} + +/* + * Compare two points lazily + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp(const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) +{ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&P->X, &Q->X) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&P->Y, &Q->Y) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&P->Z, &Q->Z) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +} + +/* + * Import a non-zero point from ASCII strings + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string(mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int radix, + const char *x, const char *y) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&P->X, radix, x)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&P->Y, radix, y)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&P->Z, 1)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Export a point into unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.3 and RFC7748) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t plen; + if (format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED && + format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + plen = mbedtls_mpi_size(&grp->P); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + (void) format; /* Montgomery curves always use the same point format */ + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { + *olen = plen; + if (buflen < *olen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(&P->X, buf, plen)); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { + /* + * Common case: P == 0 + */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&P->Z, 0) == 0) { + if (buflen < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + buf[0] = 0x00; + *olen = 1; + + return 0; + } + + if (format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED) { + *olen = 2 * plen + 1; + + if (buflen < *olen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + buf[0] = 0x04; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&P->X, buf + 1, plen)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&P->Y, buf + 1 + plen, plen)); + } else if (format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { + *olen = plen + 1; + + if (buflen < *olen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + buf[0] = 0x02 + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&P->Y, 0); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&P->X, buf + 1, plen)); + } + } +#endif + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +static int mbedtls_ecp_sw_derive_y(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi *Y, + int parity_bit); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Import a point from unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.4 and RFC7748) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t ilen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t plen; + if (ilen < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + plen = mbedtls_mpi_size(&grp->P); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { + if (plen != ilen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le(&pt->X, buf, plen)); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&pt->Y); + + if (grp->id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) { + /* Set most significant bit to 0 as prescribed in RFC7748 §5 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&pt->X, plen * 8 - 1, 0)); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->Z, 1)); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { + if (buf[0] == 0x00) { + if (ilen == 1) { + return mbedtls_ecp_set_zero(pt); + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + + if (ilen < 1 + plen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&pt->X, buf + 1, plen)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->Z, 1)); + + if (buf[0] == 0x04) { + /* format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED */ + if (ilen != 1 + plen * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&pt->Y, buf + 1 + plen, plen); + } else if (buf[0] == 0x02 || buf[0] == 0x03) { + /* format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED */ + if (ilen != 1 + plen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_ecp_sw_derive_y(grp, &pt->X, &pt->Y, + (buf[0] & 1)); + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } +#endif + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Import a point from a TLS ECPoint record (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * opaque point <1..2^8-1>; + * } ECPoint; + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t buf_len) +{ + unsigned char data_len; + const unsigned char *buf_start; + /* + * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least one for data) + */ + if (buf_len < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + data_len = *(*buf)++; + if (data_len < 1 || data_len > buf_len - 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * Save buffer start for read_binary and update buf + */ + buf_start = *buf; + *buf += data_len; + + return mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(grp, pt, buf_start, data_len); +} + +/* + * Export a point as a TLS ECPoint record (RFC 4492) + * struct { + * opaque point <1..2^8-1>; + * } ECPoint; + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + if (format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED && + format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * buffer length must be at least one, for our length byte + */ + if (blen < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(grp, pt, format, + olen, buf + 1, blen - 1)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* + * write length to the first byte and update total length + */ + buf[0] = (unsigned char) *olen; + ++*olen; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Set a group from an ECParameters record (RFC 4492) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(&grp_id, buf, len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return mbedtls_ecp_group_load(grp, grp_id); +} + +/* + * Read a group id from an ECParameters record (RFC 4492) and convert it to + * mbedtls_ecp_group_id. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp, + const unsigned char **buf, size_t len) +{ + uint16_t tls_id; + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + /* + * We expect at least three bytes (see below) + */ + if (len < 3) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled + */ + if (*(*buf)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value + */ + tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*buf, 0); + *buf += 2; + + if ((curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + *grp = curve_info->grp_id; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Write the ECParameters record corresponding to a group (RFC 4492) + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t blen) +{ + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info; + if ((curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(grp->id)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * We are going to write 3 bytes (see below) + */ + *olen = 3; + if (blen < *olen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* + * First byte is curve_type, always named_curve + */ + *buf++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE; + + /* + * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(curve_info->tls_id, buf, 0); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Wrapper around fast quasi-modp functions, with fall-back to mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi. + * See the documentation of struct mbedtls_ecp_group. + * + * This function is in the critial loop for mbedtls_ecp_mul, so pay attention to perf. + */ +static int ecp_modp(mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (grp->modp == NULL) { + return mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(N, N, &grp->P); + } + + /* N->s < 0 is a much faster test, which fails only if N is 0 */ + if ((N->s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 0) != 0) || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(N) > 2 * grp->pbits) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(grp->modp(N)); + + /* N->s < 0 is a much faster test, which fails only if N is 0 */ + while (N->s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 0) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(N, N, &grp->P)); + } + + while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(N, &grp->P) >= 0) { + /* we known P, N and the result are positive */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(N, N, &grp->P)); + } + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Fast mod-p functions expect their argument to be in the 0..p^2 range. + * + * In order to guarantee that, we need to ensure that operands of + * mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi are in the 0..p range. So, after each operation we will + * bring the result back to this range. + * + * The following macros are shortcuts for doing that. + */ + +/* + * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, general case, to use after mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#define INC_MUL_COUNT mul_count++; +#else +#define INC_MUL_COUNT +#endif + +#define MOD_MUL(N) \ + do \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_modp(&(N), grp)); \ + INC_MUL_COUNT \ + } while (0) + +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(X, A, B)); + MOD_MUL(*X); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi + * N->s < 0 is a very fast test, which fails only if N is 0 + */ +#define MOD_SUB(N) \ + do { \ + while ((N)->s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int((N), 0) != 0) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi((N), (N), &grp->P)); \ + } while (0) + +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(X, A, B)); + MOD_SUB(X); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi and mbedtls_mpi_mul_int. + * We known P, N and the result are positive, so sub_abs is correct, and + * a bit faster. + */ +#define MOD_ADD(N) \ + while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi((N), &grp->P) >= 0) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs((N), (N), &grp->P)) + +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + const mbedtls_mpi *B) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(X, A, B)); + MOD_ADD(X); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_uint c) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(X, A, c)); + MOD_ADD(X); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + const mbedtls_mpi *A, + mbedtls_mpi_uint c) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(X, A, c)); + MOD_SUB(X); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +#define MPI_ECP_SUB_INT(X, A, c) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int_mod(grp, X, A, c)) + +MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED +static inline int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *X, + size_t count) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(X, count)); + MOD_ADD(X); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Macro wrappers around ECP modular arithmetic + * + * Currently, these wrappers are defined via the bignum module. + */ + +#define MPI_ECP_ADD(X, A, B) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, X, A, B)) + +#define MPI_ECP_SUB(X, A, B) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, X, A, B)) + +#define MPI_ECP_MUL(X, A, B) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, X, A, B)) + +#define MPI_ECP_SQR(X, A) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, X, A, A)) + +#define MPI_ECP_MUL_INT(X, A, c) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int_mod(grp, X, A, c)) + +#define MPI_ECP_INV(dst, src) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod((dst), (src), &grp->P)) + +#define MPI_ECP_MOV(X, A) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, A)) + +#define MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(X, count) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(grp, X, count)) + +#define MPI_ECP_LSET(X, c) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, c)) + +#define MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(X, c) \ + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, c) + +#define MPI_ECP_CMP(X, Y) \ + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(X, Y) + +/* Needs f_rng, p_rng to be defined. */ +#define MPI_ECP_RAND(X) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_random((X), 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng)) + +/* Conditional negation + * Needs grp and a temporary MPI tmp to be defined. */ +#define MPI_ECP_COND_NEG(X, cond) \ + do \ + { \ + unsigned char nonzero = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int((X), 0) != 0; \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&tmp, &grp->P, (X))); \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign((X), &tmp, \ + nonzero & cond)); \ + } while (0) + +#define MPI_ECP_NEG(X) MPI_ECP_COND_NEG((X), 1) + +#define MPI_ECP_VALID(X) \ + ((X)->p != NULL) + +#define MPI_ECP_COND_ASSIGN(X, Y, cond) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign((X), (Y), (cond))) + +#define MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(X, Y, cond) \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap((X), (Y), (cond))) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + +/* + * Computes the right-hand side of the Short Weierstrass equation + * RHS = X^3 + A X + B + */ +static int ecp_sw_rhs(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *rhs, + const mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + int ret; + + /* Compute X^3 + A X + B as X (X^2 + A) + B */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(rhs, X); + + /* Special case for A = -3 */ + if (mbedtls_ecp_group_a_is_minus_3(grp)) { + MPI_ECP_SUB_INT(rhs, rhs, 3); + } else { + MPI_ECP_ADD(rhs, rhs, &grp->A); + } + + MPI_ECP_MUL(rhs, rhs, X); + MPI_ECP_ADD(rhs, rhs, &grp->B); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Derive Y from X and a parity bit + */ +static int mbedtls_ecp_sw_derive_y(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *X, + mbedtls_mpi *Y, + int parity_bit) +{ + /* w = y^2 = x^3 + ax + b + * y = sqrt(w) = w^((p+1)/4) mod p (for prime p where p = 3 mod 4) + * + * Note: this method for extracting square root does not validate that w + * was indeed a square so this function will return garbage in Y if X + * does not correspond to a point on the curve. + */ + + /* Check prerequisite p = 3 mod 4 */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&grp->P, 0) != 1 || + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&grp->P, 1) != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + int ret; + mbedtls_mpi exp; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&exp); + + /* use Y to store intermediate result, actually w above */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_sw_rhs(grp, Y, X)); + + /* w = y^2 */ /* Y contains y^2 intermediate result */ + /* exp = ((p+1)/4) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&exp, &grp->P, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&exp, 2)); + /* sqrt(w) = w^((p+1)/4) mod p (for prime p where p = 3 mod 4) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(Y, Y /*y^2*/, &exp, &grp->P, NULL)); + + /* check parity bit match or else invert Y */ + /* This quick inversion implementation is valid because Y != 0 for all + * Short Weierstrass curves supported by mbedtls, as each supported curve + * has an order that is a large prime, so each supported curve does not + * have any point of order 2, and a point with Y == 0 would be of order 2 */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(Y, 0) != parity_bit) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(Y, &grp->P, Y)); + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&exp); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +/* + * For curves in short Weierstrass form, we do all the internal operations in + * Jacobian coordinates. + * + * For multiplication, we'll use a comb method with countermeasures against + * SPA, hence timing attacks. + */ + +/* + * Normalize jacobian coordinates so that Z == 0 || Z == 1 (GECC 3.2.1) + * Cost: 1N := 1I + 3M + 1S + */ +static int ecp_normalize_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) +{ + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&pt->Z, 0) == 0) { + return 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) + if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) { + return mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac(grp, pt); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi T; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + MPI_ECP_INV(&T, &pt->Z); /* T <- 1 / Z */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Y, &pt->Y, &T); /* Y' <- Y*T = Y / Z */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&T, &T); /* T <- T^2 = 1 / Z^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->X, &pt->X, &T); /* X <- X * T = X / Z^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Y, &pt->Y, &T); /* Y'' <- Y' * T = Y / Z^3 */ + + MPI_ECP_LSET(&pt->Z, 1); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + + return ret; +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Normalize jacobian coordinates of an array of (pointers to) points, + * using Montgomery's trick to perform only one inversion mod P. + * (See for example Cohen's "A Course in Computational Algebraic Number + * Theory", Algorithm 10.3.4.) + * + * Warning: fails (returning an error) if one of the points is zero! + * This should never happen, see choice of w in ecp_mul_comb(). + * + * Cost: 1N(t) := 1I + (6t - 3)M + 1S + */ +static int ecp_normalize_jac_many(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *T[], size_t T_size) +{ + if (T_size < 2) { + return ecp_normalize_jac(grp, *T); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) + if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) { + return mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac_many(grp, T, T_size); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi *c, t; + + if ((c = mbedtls_calloc(T_size, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi))) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&t); + + mpi_init_many(c, T_size); + /* + * c[i] = Z_0 * ... * Z_i, i = 0,..,n := T_size-1 + */ + MPI_ECP_MOV(&c[0], &T[0]->Z); + for (i = 1; i < T_size; i++) { + MPI_ECP_MUL(&c[i], &c[i-1], &T[i]->Z); + } + + /* + * c[n] = 1 / (Z_0 * ... * Z_n) mod P + */ + MPI_ECP_INV(&c[T_size-1], &c[T_size-1]); + + for (i = T_size - 1;; i--) { + /* At the start of iteration i (note that i decrements), we have + * - c[j] = Z_0 * .... * Z_j for j < i, + * - c[j] = 1 / (Z_0 * .... * Z_j) for j == i, + * + * This is maintained via + * - c[i-1] <- c[i] * Z_i + * + * We also derive 1/Z_i = c[i] * c[i-1] for i>0 and use that + * to do the actual normalization. For i==0, we already have + * c[0] = 1 / Z_0. + */ + + if (i > 0) { + /* Compute 1/Z_i and establish invariant for the next iteration. */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&t, &c[i], &c[i-1]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&c[i-1], &c[i], &T[i]->Z); + } else { + MPI_ECP_MOV(&t, &c[0]); + } + + /* Now t holds 1 / Z_i; normalize as in ecp_normalize_jac() */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &t); + MPI_ECP_SQR(&t, &t); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[i]->X, &T[i]->X, &t); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &t); + + /* + * Post-precessing: reclaim some memory by shrinking coordinates + * - not storing Z (always 1) + * - shrinking other coordinates, but still keeping the same number of + * limbs as P, as otherwise it will too likely be regrown too fast. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shrink(&T[i]->X, grp->P.n)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shrink(&T[i]->Y, grp->P.n)); + + MPI_ECP_LSET(&T[i]->Z, 1); + + if (i == 0) { + break; + } + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&t); + mpi_free_many(c, T_size); + mbedtls_free(c); + + return ret; +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Conditional point inversion: Q -> -Q = (Q.X, -Q.Y, Q.Z) without leak. + * "inv" must be 0 (don't invert) or 1 (invert) or the result will be invalid + */ +static int ecp_safe_invert_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + unsigned char inv) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi tmp; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&tmp); + + MPI_ECP_COND_NEG(&Q->Y, inv); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&tmp); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Point doubling R = 2 P, Jacobian coordinates + * + * Based on http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian.html#doubling-dbl-1998-cmo-2 . + * + * We follow the variable naming fairly closely. The formula variations that trade a MUL for a SQR + * (plus a few ADDs) aren't useful as our bignum implementation doesn't distinguish squaring. + * + * Standard optimizations are applied when curve parameter A is one of { 0, -3 }. + * + * Cost: 1D := 3M + 4S (A == 0) + * 4M + 4S (A == -3) + * 3M + 6S + 1a otherwise + */ +static int ecp_double_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + dbl_count++; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) + if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) { + return mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac(grp, R, P); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Special case for A = -3 */ + if (mbedtls_ecp_group_a_is_minus_3(grp)) { + /* tmp[0] <- M = 3(X + Z^2)(X - Z^2) */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[1], &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_ADD(&tmp[2], &P->X, &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[3], &P->X, &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[2], &tmp[3]); + MPI_ECP_MUL_INT(&tmp[0], &tmp[1], 3); + } else { + /* tmp[0] <- M = 3.X^2 + A.Z^4 */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[1], &P->X); + MPI_ECP_MUL_INT(&tmp[0], &tmp[1], 3); + + /* Optimize away for "koblitz" curves with A = 0 */ + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&grp->A, 0) != 0) { + /* M += A.Z^4 */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[1], &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[2], &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[2], &grp->A); + MPI_ECP_ADD(&tmp[0], &tmp[0], &tmp[1]); + } + } + + /* tmp[1] <- S = 4.X.Y^2 */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[2], &P->Y); + MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[2], 1); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &P->X, &tmp[2]); + MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[1], 1); + + /* tmp[3] <- U = 8.Y^4 */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[3], &tmp[2]); + MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[3], 1); + + /* tmp[2] <- T = M^2 - 2.S */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[2], &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], &tmp[1]); + + /* tmp[1] <- S = M(S - T) - U */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &tmp[2]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &tmp[3]); + + /* tmp[3] <- U = 2.Y.Z */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[3], &P->Y, &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[3], 1); + + /* Store results */ + MPI_ECP_MOV(&R->X, &tmp[2]); + MPI_ECP_MOV(&R->Y, &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_MOV(&R->Z, &tmp[3]); + +cleanup: + + return ret; +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Addition: R = P + Q, mixed affine-Jacobian coordinates (GECC 3.22) + * + * The coordinates of Q must be normalized (= affine), + * but those of P don't need to. R is not normalized. + * + * P,Q,R may alias, but only at the level of EC points: they must be either + * equal as pointers, or disjoint (including the coordinate data buffers). + * Fine-grained aliasing at the level of coordinates is not supported. + * + * Special cases: (1) P or Q is zero, (2) R is zero, (3) P == Q. + * None of these cases can happen as intermediate step in ecp_mul_comb(): + * - at each step, P, Q and R are multiples of the base point, the factor + * being less than its order, so none of them is zero; + * - Q is an odd multiple of the base point, P an even multiple, + * due to the choice of precomputed points in the modified comb method. + * So branches for these cases do not leak secret information. + * + * Cost: 1A := 8M + 3S + */ +static int ecp_add_mixed(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + add_count++; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) + if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) { + return mbedtls_internal_ecp_add_mixed(grp, R, P, Q); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* NOTE: Aliasing between input and output is allowed, so one has to make + * sure that at the point X,Y,Z are written, {P,Q}->{X,Y,Z} are no + * longer read from. */ + mbedtls_mpi * const X = &R->X; + mbedtls_mpi * const Y = &R->Y; + mbedtls_mpi * const Z = &R->Z; + + if (!MPI_ECP_VALID(&Q->Z)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * Trivial cases: P == 0 or Q == 0 (case 1) + */ + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&P->Z, 0) == 0) { + return mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, Q); + } + + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&Q->Z, 0) == 0) { + return mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, P); + } + + /* + * Make sure Q coordinates are normalized + */ + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&Q->Z, 1) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[0], &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[0], &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[0], &tmp[0], &Q->X); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &Q->Y); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[0], &tmp[0], &P->X); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &P->Y); + + /* Special cases (2) and (3) */ + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&tmp[0], 0) == 0) { + if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&tmp[1], 0) == 0) { + ret = ecp_double_jac(grp, R, P, tmp); + goto cleanup; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_ecp_set_zero(R); + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* {P,Q}->Z no longer used, so OK to write to Z even if there's aliasing. */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(Z, &P->Z, &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[2], &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[3], &tmp[2], &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], &P->X); + + MPI_ECP_MOV(&tmp[0], &tmp[2]); + MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[0], 1); + + /* {P,Q}->X no longer used, so OK to write to X even if there's aliasing. */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(X, &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(X, X, &tmp[0]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(X, X, &tmp[3]); + MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], X); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], &tmp[1]); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[3], &tmp[3], &P->Y); + /* {P,Q}->Y no longer used, so OK to write to Y even if there's aliasing. */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(Y, &tmp[2], &tmp[3]); + +cleanup: + + return ret; +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Randomize jacobian coordinates: + * (X, Y, Z) -> (l^2 X, l^3 Y, l Z) for random l + * This is sort of the reverse operation of ecp_normalize_jac(). + * + * This countermeasure was first suggested in [2]. + */ +static int ecp_randomize_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) + if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) { + return mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_jac(grp, pt, f_rng, p_rng); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi l; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&l); + + /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ + MPI_ECP_RAND(&l); + + /* Z' = l * Z */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Z, &pt->Z, &l); + + /* Y' = l * Y */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Y, &pt->Y, &l); + + /* X' = l^2 * X */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&l, &l); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->X, &pt->X, &l); + + /* Y'' = l^2 * Y' = l^3 * Y */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Y, &pt->Y, &l); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&l); + + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + } + return ret; +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Check and define parameters used by the comb method (see below for details) + */ +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE < 2 || MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE > 7 +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE out of bounds" +#endif + +/* d = ceil( n / w ) */ +#define COMB_MAX_D (MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 1) / 2 + +/* number of precomputed points */ +#define COMB_MAX_PRE (1 << (MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE - 1)) + +/* + * Compute the representation of m that will be used with our comb method. + * + * The basic comb method is described in GECC 3.44 for example. We use a + * modified version that provides resistance to SPA by avoiding zero + * digits in the representation as in [3]. We modify the method further by + * requiring that all K_i be odd, which has the small cost that our + * representation uses one more K_i, due to carries, but saves on the size of + * the precomputed table. + * + * Summary of the comb method and its modifications: + * + * - The goal is to compute m*P for some w*d-bit integer m. + * + * - The basic comb method splits m into the w-bit integers + * x[0] .. x[d-1] where x[i] consists of the bits in m whose + * index has residue i modulo d, and computes m * P as + * S[x[0]] + 2 * S[x[1]] + .. + 2^(d-1) S[x[d-1]], where + * S[i_{w-1} .. i_0] := i_{w-1} 2^{(w-1)d} P + ... + i_1 2^d P + i_0 P. + * + * - If it happens that, say, x[i+1]=0 (=> S[x[i+1]]=0), one can replace the sum by + * .. + 2^{i-1} S[x[i-1]] - 2^i S[x[i]] + 2^{i+1} S[x[i]] + 2^{i+2} S[x[i+2]] .., + * thereby successively converting it into a form where all summands + * are nonzero, at the cost of negative summands. This is the basic idea of [3]. + * + * - More generally, even if x[i+1] != 0, we can first transform the sum as + * .. - 2^i S[x[i]] + 2^{i+1} ( S[x[i]] + S[x[i+1]] ) + 2^{i+2} S[x[i+2]] .., + * and then replace S[x[i]] + S[x[i+1]] = S[x[i] ^ x[i+1]] + 2 S[x[i] & x[i+1]]. + * Performing and iterating this procedure for those x[i] that are even + * (keeping track of carry), we can transform the original sum into one of the form + * S[x'[0]] +- 2 S[x'[1]] +- .. +- 2^{d-1} S[x'[d-1]] + 2^d S[x'[d]] + * with all x'[i] odd. It is therefore only necessary to know S at odd indices, + * which is why we are only computing half of it in the first place in + * ecp_precompute_comb and accessing it with index abs(i) / 2 in ecp_select_comb. + * + * - For the sake of compactness, only the seven low-order bits of x[i] + * are used to represent its absolute value (K_i in the paper), and the msb + * of x[i] encodes the sign (s_i in the paper): it is set if and only if + * if s_i == -1; + * + * Calling conventions: + * - x is an array of size d + 1 + * - w is the size, ie number of teeth, of the comb, and must be between + * 2 and 7 (in practice, between 2 and MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) + * - m is the MPI, expected to be odd and such that bitlength(m) <= w * d + * (the result will be incorrect if these assumptions are not satisfied) + */ +static void ecp_comb_recode_core(unsigned char x[], size_t d, + unsigned char w, const mbedtls_mpi *m) +{ + size_t i, j; + unsigned char c, cc, adjust; + + memset(x, 0, d+1); + + /* First get the classical comb values (except for x_d = 0) */ + for (i = 0; i < d; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < w; j++) { + x[i] |= mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(m, i + d * j) << j; + } + } + + /* Now make sure x_1 .. x_d are odd */ + c = 0; + for (i = 1; i <= d; i++) { + /* Add carry and update it */ + cc = x[i] & c; + x[i] = x[i] ^ c; + c = cc; + + /* Adjust if needed, avoiding branches */ + adjust = 1 - (x[i] & 0x01); + c |= x[i] & (x[i-1] * adjust); + x[i] = x[i] ^ (x[i-1] * adjust); + x[i-1] |= adjust << 7; + } +} + +/* + * Precompute points for the adapted comb method + * + * Assumption: T must be able to hold 2^{w - 1} elements. + * + * Operation: If i = i_{w-1} ... i_1 is the binary representation of i, + * sets T[i] = i_{w-1} 2^{(w-1)d} P + ... + i_1 2^d P + P. + * + * Cost: d(w-1) D + (2^{w-1} - 1) A + 1 N(w-1) + 1 N(2^{w-1} - 1) + * + * Note: Even comb values (those where P would be omitted from the + * sum defining T[i] above) are not needed in our adaption + * the comb method. See ecp_comb_recode_core(). + * + * This function currently works in four steps: + * (1) [dbl] Computation of intermediate T[i] for 2-power values of i + * (2) [norm_dbl] Normalization of coordinates of these T[i] + * (3) [add] Computation of all T[i] + * (4) [norm_add] Normalization of all T[i] + * + * Step 1 can be interrupted but not the others; together with the final + * coordinate normalization they are the largest steps done at once, depending + * on the window size. Here are operation counts for P-256: + * + * step (2) (3) (4) + * w = 5 142 165 208 + * w = 4 136 77 160 + * w = 3 130 33 136 + * w = 2 124 11 124 + * + * So if ECC operations are blocking for too long even with a low max_ops + * value, it's useful to set MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE to a lower value in order + * to minimize maximum blocking time. + */ +static int ecp_precompute_comb(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point T[], const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + unsigned char w, size_t d, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char i; + size_t j = 0; + const unsigned char T_size = 1U << (w - 1); + mbedtls_ecp_point *cur, *TT[COMB_MAX_PRE - 1] = { NULL }; + + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]; + + mpi_init_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) { + if (rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_dbl) { + goto dbl; + } + if (rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_norm_dbl) { + goto norm_dbl; + } + if (rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_add) { + goto add; + } + if (rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_norm_add) { + goto norm_add; + } + } +#else + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) { + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_dbl; + + /* initial state for the loop */ + rs_ctx->rsm->i = 0; + } + +dbl: +#endif + /* + * Set T[0] = P and + * T[2^{l-1}] = 2^{dl} P for l = 1 .. w-1 (this is not the final value) + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(&T[0], P)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm->i != 0) { + j = rs_ctx->rsm->i; + } else +#endif + j = 0; + + for (; j < d * (w - 1); j++) { + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL); + + i = 1U << (j / d); + cur = T + i; + + if (j % d == 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(cur, T + (i >> 1))); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_jac(grp, cur, cur, tmp)); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) { + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_norm_dbl; + } + +norm_dbl: +#endif + /* + * Normalize current elements in T to allow them to be used in + * ecp_add_mixed() below, which requires one normalized input. + * + * As T has holes, use an auxiliary array of pointers to elements in T. + * + */ + j = 0; + for (i = 1; i < T_size; i <<= 1) { + TT[j++] = T + i; + } + + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 6 * j - 2); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_normalize_jac_many(grp, TT, j)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) { + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_add; + } + +add: +#endif + /* + * Compute the remaining ones using the minimal number of additions + * Be careful to update T[2^l] only after using it! + */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET((T_size - 1) * MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD); + + for (i = 1; i < T_size; i <<= 1) { + j = i; + while (j--) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, &T[i + j], &T[j], &T[i], tmp)); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) { + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_norm_add; + } + +norm_add: +#endif + /* + * Normalize final elements in T. Even though there are no holes now, we + * still need the auxiliary array for homogeneity with the previous + * call. Also, skip T[0] which is already normalised, being a copy of P. + */ + for (j = 0; j + 1 < T_size; j++) { + TT[j] = T + j + 1; + } + + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 6 * j - 2); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_normalize_jac_many(grp, TT, j)); + + /* Free Z coordinate (=1 after normalization) to save RAM. + * This makes T[i] invalid as mbedtls_ecp_points, but this is OK + * since from this point onwards, they are only accessed indirectly + * via the getter function ecp_select_comb() which does set the + * target's Z coordinate to 1. */ + for (i = 0; i < T_size; i++) { + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T[i].Z); + } + +cleanup: + + mpi_free_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + if (rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_dbl) { + rs_ctx->rsm->i = j; + } + } +#endif + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Select precomputed point: R = sign(i) * T[ abs(i) / 2 ] + * + * See ecp_comb_recode_core() for background + */ +static int ecp_select_comb(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point T[], unsigned char T_size, + unsigned char i) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char ii, j; + + /* Ignore the "sign" bit and scale down */ + ii = (i & 0x7Fu) >> 1; + + /* Read the whole table to thwart cache-based timing attacks */ + for (j = 0; j < T_size; j++) { + MPI_ECP_COND_ASSIGN(&R->X, &T[j].X, j == ii); + MPI_ECP_COND_ASSIGN(&R->Y, &T[j].Y, j == ii); + } + + /* Safely invert result if i is "negative" */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_safe_invert_jac(grp, R, i >> 7)); + + MPI_ECP_LSET(&R->Z, 1); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Core multiplication algorithm for the (modified) comb method. + * This part is actually common with the basic comb method (GECC 3.44) + * + * Cost: d A + d D + 1 R + */ +static int ecp_mul_comb_core(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_ecp_point T[], unsigned char T_size, + const unsigned char x[], size_t d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point Txi; + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]; + size_t i; + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Txi); + mpi_init_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && + rs_ctx->rsm->state != ecp_rsm_comb_core) { + rs_ctx->rsm->i = 0; + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_comb_core; + } + + /* new 'if' instead of nested for the sake of the 'else' branch */ + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm->i != 0) { + /* restore current index (R already pointing to rs_ctx->rsm->R) */ + i = rs_ctx->rsm->i; + } else +#endif + { + /* Start with a non-zero point and randomize its coordinates */ + i = d; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_select_comb(grp, R, T, T_size, x[i])); + if (f_rng != 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_jac(grp, R, f_rng, p_rng)); + } + } + + while (i != 0) { + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL + MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD); + --i; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_jac(grp, R, R, tmp)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_select_comb(grp, &Txi, T, T_size, x[i])); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, R, R, &Txi, tmp)); + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&Txi); + mpi_free_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + rs_ctx->rsm->i = i; + /* no need to save R, already pointing to rs_ctx->rsm->R */ + } +#endif + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Recode the scalar to get constant-time comb multiplication + * + * As the actual scalar recoding needs an odd scalar as a starting point, + * this wrapper ensures that by replacing m by N - m if necessary, and + * informs the caller that the result of multiplication will be negated. + * + * This works because we only support large prime order for Short Weierstrass + * curves, so N is always odd hence either m or N - m is. + * + * See ecp_comb_recode_core() for background. + */ +static int ecp_comb_recode_scalar(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, + unsigned char k[COMB_MAX_D + 1], + size_t d, + unsigned char w, + unsigned char *parity_trick) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi M, mm; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&M); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&mm); + + /* N is always odd (see above), just make extra sure */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&grp->N, 0) != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* do we need the parity trick? */ + *parity_trick = (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(m, 0) == 0); + + /* execute parity fix in constant time */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&M, m)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&mm, &grp->N, m)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(&M, &mm, *parity_trick)); + + /* actual scalar recoding */ + ecp_comb_recode_core(k, d, w, &M); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&mm); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&M); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Perform comb multiplication (for short Weierstrass curves) + * once the auxiliary table has been pre-computed. + * + * Scalar recoding may use a parity trick that makes us compute -m * P, + * if that is the case we'll need to recover m * P at the end. + */ +static int ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *T, + unsigned char T_size, + unsigned char w, + size_t d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char parity_trick; + unsigned char k[COMB_MAX_D + 1]; + mbedtls_ecp_point *RR = R; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) { + RR = &rs_ctx->rsm->R; + + if (rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_final_norm) { + goto final_norm; + } + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_comb_recode_scalar(grp, m, k, d, w, + &parity_trick)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_mul_comb_core(grp, RR, T, T_size, k, d, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_safe_invert_jac(grp, RR, parity_trick)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) { + rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_final_norm; + } + +final_norm: + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV); +#endif + /* + * Knowledge of the jacobian coordinates may leak the last few bits of the + * scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow, + * inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value + * of its input via side-channels [2]. + * + * [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191 + * [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 + * + * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them. + */ + if (f_rng != 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_jac(grp, RR, f_rng, p_rng)); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_normalize_jac(grp, RR)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, RR)); + } +#endif + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Pick window size based on curve size and whether we optimize for base point + */ +static unsigned char ecp_pick_window_size(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + unsigned char p_eq_g) +{ + unsigned char w; + + /* + * Minimize the number of multiplications, that is minimize + * 10 * d * w + 18 * 2^(w-1) + 11 * d + 7 * w, with d = ceil( nbits / w ) + * (see costs of the various parts, with 1S = 1M) + */ + w = grp->nbits >= 384 ? 5 : 4; + + /* + * If P == G, pre-compute a bit more, since this may be re-used later. + * Just adding one avoids upping the cost of the first mul too much, + * and the memory cost too. + */ + if (p_eq_g) { + w++; + } + + /* + * If static comb table may not be used (!p_eq_g) or static comb table does + * not exists, make sure w is within bounds. + * (The last test is useful only for very small curves in the test suite.) + * + * The user reduces MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE does not changes the size of + * static comb table, because the size of static comb table is fixed when + * it is generated. + */ +#if (MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE < 6) + if ((!p_eq_g || !ecp_group_is_static_comb_table(grp)) && w > MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) { + w = MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE; + } +#endif + if (w >= grp->nbits) { + w = 2; + } + + return w; +} + +/* + * Multiplication using the comb method - for curves in short Weierstrass form + * + * This function is mainly responsible for administrative work: + * - managing the restart context if enabled + * - managing the table of precomputed points (passed between the below two + * functions): allocation, computation, ownership transfer, freeing. + * + * It delegates the actual arithmetic work to: + * ecp_precompute_comb() and ecp_mul_comb_with_precomp() + * + * See comments on ecp_comb_recode_core() regarding the computation strategy. + */ +static int ecp_mul_comb(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char w, p_eq_g, i; + size_t d; + unsigned char T_size = 0, T_ok = 0; + mbedtls_ecp_point *T = NULL; + + ECP_RS_ENTER(rsm); + + /* Is P the base point ? */ +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 + p_eq_g = (MPI_ECP_CMP(&P->Y, &grp->G.Y) == 0 && + MPI_ECP_CMP(&P->X, &grp->G.X) == 0); +#else + p_eq_g = 0; +#endif + + /* Pick window size and deduce related sizes */ + w = ecp_pick_window_size(grp, p_eq_g); + T_size = 1U << (w - 1); + d = (grp->nbits + w - 1) / w; + + /* Pre-computed table: do we have it already for the base point? */ + if (p_eq_g && grp->T != NULL) { + /* second pointer to the same table, will be deleted on exit */ + T = grp->T; + T_ok = 1; + } else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* Pre-computed table: do we have one in progress? complete? */ + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm->T != NULL) { + /* transfer ownership of T from rsm to local function */ + T = rs_ctx->rsm->T; + rs_ctx->rsm->T = NULL; + rs_ctx->rsm->T_size = 0; + + /* This effectively jumps to the call to mul_comb_after_precomp() */ + T_ok = rs_ctx->rsm->state >= ecp_rsm_comb_core; + } else +#endif + /* Allocate table if we didn't have any */ + { + T = mbedtls_calloc(T_size, sizeof(mbedtls_ecp_point)); + if (T == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + for (i = 0; i < T_size; i++) { + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&T[i]); + } + + T_ok = 0; + } + + /* Compute table (or finish computing it) if not done already */ + if (!T_ok) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_precompute_comb(grp, T, P, w, d, rs_ctx)); + + if (p_eq_g) { + /* almost transfer ownership of T to the group, but keep a copy of + * the pointer to use for calling the next function more easily */ + grp->T = T; + grp->T_size = T_size; + } + } + + /* Actual comb multiplication using precomputed points */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp(grp, R, m, + T, T_size, w, d, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx)); + +cleanup: + + /* does T belong to the group? */ + if (T == grp->T) { + T = NULL; + } + + /* does T belong to the restart context? */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && T != NULL) { + /* transfer ownership of T from local function to rsm */ + rs_ctx->rsm->T_size = T_size; + rs_ctx->rsm->T = T; + T = NULL; + } +#endif + + /* did T belong to us? then let's destroy it! */ + if (T != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < T_size; i++) { + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&T[i]); + } + mbedtls_free(T); + } + + /* prevent caller from using invalid value */ + int should_free_R = (ret != 0); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* don't free R while in progress in case R == P */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + should_free_R = 0; + } +#endif + if (should_free_R) { + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(R); + } + + ECP_RS_LEAVE(rsm); + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +/* + * For Montgomery curves, we do all the internal arithmetic in projective + * coordinates. Import/export of points uses only the x coordinates, which is + * internally represented as X / Z. + * + * For scalar multiplication, we'll use a Montgomery ladder. + */ + +/* + * Normalize Montgomery x/z coordinates: X = X/Z, Z = 1 + * Cost: 1M + 1I + */ +static int ecp_normalize_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) + if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) { + return mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_mxz(grp, P); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MPI_ECP_INV(&P->Z, &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&P->X, &P->X, &P->Z); + MPI_ECP_LSET(&P->Z, 1); + +cleanup: + return ret; +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Randomize projective x/z coordinates: + * (X, Z) -> (l X, l Z) for random l + * This is sort of the reverse operation of ecp_normalize_mxz(). + * + * This countermeasure was first suggested in [2]. + * Cost: 2M + */ +static int ecp_randomize_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) + if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) { + return mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_mxz(grp, P, f_rng, p_rng); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi l; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&l); + + /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */ + MPI_ECP_RAND(&l); + + MPI_ECP_MUL(&P->X, &P->X, &l); + MPI_ECP_MUL(&P->Z, &P->Z, &l); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&l); + + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + } + return ret; +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Double-and-add: R = 2P, S = P + Q, with d = X(P - Q), + * for Montgomery curves in x/z coordinates. + * + * http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-code/montgom/xz/ladder/mladd-1987-m.op3 + * with + * d = X1 + * P = (X2, Z2) + * Q = (X3, Z3) + * R = (X4, Z4) + * S = (X5, Z5) + * and eliminating temporary variables tO, ..., t4. + * + * Cost: 5M + 4S + */ +static int ecp_double_add_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, mbedtls_ecp_point *S, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *d, + mbedtls_mpi T[4]) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) + if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) { + return mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_add_mxz(grp, R, S, P, Q, d); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MPI_ECP_ADD(&T[0], &P->X, &P->Z); /* Pp := PX + PZ */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(&T[1], &P->X, &P->Z); /* Pm := PX - PZ */ + MPI_ECP_ADD(&T[2], &Q->X, &Q->Z); /* Qp := QX + XZ */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(&T[3], &Q->X, &Q->Z); /* Qm := QX - QZ */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[3], &T[3], &T[0]); /* Qm * Pp */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[2], &T[2], &T[1]); /* Qp * Pm */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&T[0], &T[0]); /* Pp^2 */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&T[1], &T[1]); /* Pm^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&R->X, &T[0], &T[1]); /* Pp^2 * Pm^2 */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(&T[0], &T[0], &T[1]); /* Pp^2 - Pm^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&R->Z, &grp->A, &T[0]); /* A * (Pp^2 - Pm^2) */ + MPI_ECP_ADD(&R->Z, &T[1], &R->Z); /* [ A * (Pp^2-Pm^2) ] + Pm^2 */ + MPI_ECP_ADD(&S->X, &T[3], &T[2]); /* Qm*Pp + Qp*Pm */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&S->X, &S->X); /* (Qm*Pp + Qp*Pm)^2 */ + MPI_ECP_SUB(&S->Z, &T[3], &T[2]); /* Qm*Pp - Qp*Pm */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&S->Z, &S->Z); /* (Qm*Pp - Qp*Pm)^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&S->Z, d, &S->Z); /* d * ( Qm*Pp - Qp*Pm )^2 */ + MPI_ECP_MUL(&R->Z, &T[0], &R->Z); /* [A*(Pp^2-Pm^2)+Pm^2]*(Pp^2-Pm^2) */ + +cleanup: + + return ret; +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) */ +} + +/* + * Multiplication with Montgomery ladder in x/z coordinates, + * for curves in Montgomery form + */ +static int ecp_mul_mxz(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + unsigned char b; + mbedtls_ecp_point RP; + mbedtls_mpi PX; + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]; + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&RP); mbedtls_mpi_init(&PX); + + mpi_init_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Save PX and read from P before writing to R, in case P == R */ + MPI_ECP_MOV(&PX, &P->X); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(&RP, P)); + + /* Set R to zero in modified x/z coordinates */ + MPI_ECP_LSET(&R->X, 1); + MPI_ECP_LSET(&R->Z, 0); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&R->Y); + + /* RP.X might be slightly larger than P, so reduce it */ + MOD_ADD(&RP.X); + + /* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_mxz(grp, &RP, f_rng, p_rng)); + + /* Loop invariant: R = result so far, RP = R + P */ + i = grp->nbits + 1; /* one past the (zero-based) required msb for private keys */ + while (i-- > 0) { + b = mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(m, i); + /* + * if (b) R = 2R + P else R = 2R, + * which is: + * if (b) double_add( RP, R, RP, R ) + * else double_add( R, RP, R, RP ) + * but using safe conditional swaps to avoid leaks + */ + MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(&R->X, &RP.X, b); + MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(&R->Z, &RP.Z, b); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_add_mxz(grp, R, &RP, R, &RP, &PX, tmp)); + MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(&R->X, &RP.X, b); + MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(&R->Z, &RP.Z, b); + } + + /* + * Knowledge of the projective coordinates may leak the last few bits of the + * scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow, + * inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value + * of its input via side-channels [2]. + * + * [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191 + * [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 + * + * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_mxz(grp, R, f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_normalize_mxz(grp, R)); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&RP); mbedtls_mpi_free(&PX); + + mpi_free_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Restartable multiplication R = m * P + * + * This internal function can be called without an RNG in case where we know + * the inputs are not sensitive. + */ +static int ecp_mul_restartable_internal(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + char is_grp_capable = 0; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->depth++ == 0) { + rs_ctx->ops_done = 0; + } +#else + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if ((is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp))) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_internal_ecp_init(grp)); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + + int restarting = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + restarting = (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL); +#endif + /* skip argument check when restarting */ + if (!restarting) { + /* check_privkey is free */ + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK); + + /* Common sanity checks */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(grp, m)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(grp, P)); + } + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_mul_mxz(grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng)); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_mul_comb(grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx)); + } +#endif + +cleanup: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if (is_grp_capable) { + mbedtls_internal_ecp_free(grp); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL) { + rs_ctx->depth--; + } +#endif + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Restartable multiplication R = m * P + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ecp_mul_restartable_internal(grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx); +} + +/* + * Multiplication R = m * P + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_mul(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + return mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, NULL); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +/* + * Check that an affine point is valid as a public key, + * short weierstrass curves (SEC1 3.2.3.1) + */ +static int ecp_check_pubkey_sw(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi YY, RHS; + + /* pt coordinates must be normalized for our checks */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&pt->X, 0) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&pt->Y, 0) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pt->X, &grp->P) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pt->Y, &grp->P) >= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&YY); mbedtls_mpi_init(&RHS); + + /* + * YY = Y^2 + * RHS = X^3 + A X + B + */ + MPI_ECP_SQR(&YY, &pt->Y); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_sw_rhs(grp, &RHS, &pt->X)); + + if (MPI_ECP_CMP(&YY, &RHS) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&YY); mbedtls_mpi_free(&RHS); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +/* + * R = m * P with shortcuts for m == 0, m == 1 and m == -1 + * NOT constant-time - ONLY for short Weierstrass! + */ +static int mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi tmp; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&tmp); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(m, 0) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(grp, P)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_set_zero(R)); + } else if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(m, 1) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(grp, P)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, P)); + } else if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(m, -1) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(grp, P)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, P)); + MPI_ECP_NEG(&R->Y); + } else { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_mul_restartable_internal(grp, R, m, P, + NULL, NULL, rs_ctx)); + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&tmp); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Restartable linear combination + * NOT constant-time + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point mP; + mbedtls_ecp_point *pmP = &mP; + mbedtls_ecp_point *pR = R; + mbedtls_mpi tmp[4]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + char is_grp_capable = 0; +#endif + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) != MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&mP); + mpi_init_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + + ECP_RS_ENTER(ma); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL) { + /* redirect intermediate results to restart context */ + pmP = &rs_ctx->ma->mP; + pR = &rs_ctx->ma->R; + + /* jump to next operation */ + if (rs_ctx->ma->state == ecp_rsma_mul2) { + goto mul2; + } + if (rs_ctx->ma->state == ecp_rsma_add) { + goto add; + } + if (rs_ctx->ma->state == ecp_rsma_norm) { + goto norm; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts(grp, pmP, m, P, rs_ctx)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL) { + rs_ctx->ma->state = ecp_rsma_mul2; + } + +mul2: +#endif + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts(grp, pR, n, Q, rs_ctx)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if ((is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp))) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_internal_ecp_init(grp)); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL) { + rs_ctx->ma->state = ecp_rsma_add; + } + +add: +#endif + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, pR, pmP, pR, tmp)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL) { + rs_ctx->ma->state = ecp_rsma_norm; + } + +norm: +#endif + MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_normalize_jac(grp, pR)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, pR)); + } +#endif + +cleanup: + + mpi_free_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + if (is_grp_capable) { + mbedtls_internal_ecp_free(grp); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&mP); + + ECP_RS_LEAVE(ma); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Linear combination + * NOT constant-time + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_muladd(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) +{ + return mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable(grp, R, m, P, n, Q, NULL); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) } +#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ + ECP_MPI_INIT(x, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) +/* + * Constants for the two points other than 0, 1, -1 (mod p) in + * https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate + * See ecp_check_pubkey_x25519(). + */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint x25519_bad_point_1[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xe0, 0xeb, 0x7a, 0x7c, 0x3b, 0x41, 0xb8, 0xae), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x56, 0xe3, 0xfa, 0xf1, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x6a), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xda, 0x09, 0x8d, 0xeb, 0x9c, 0x32, 0xb1, 0xfd), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x62, 0x05, 0x16, 0x5f, 0x49, 0xb8, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint x25519_bad_point_2[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5f, 0x9c, 0x95, 0xbc, 0xa3, 0x50, 0x8c, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xb1, 0xd0, 0xb1, 0x55, 0x9c, 0x83, 0xef, 0x5b), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x44, 0x5c, 0xc4, 0x58, 0x1c, 0x8e, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xd8, 0x22, 0x4e, 0xdd, 0xd0, 0x9f, 0x11, 0x57), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi ecp_x25519_bad_point_1 = ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY( + x25519_bad_point_1); +static const mbedtls_mpi ecp_x25519_bad_point_2 = ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY( + x25519_bad_point_2); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Check that the input point is not one of the low-order points. + * This is recommended by the "May the Fourth" paper: + * https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/806.pdf + * Those points are never sent by an honest peer. + */ +static int ecp_check_bad_points_mx(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_mpi XmP; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&XmP); + + /* Reduce X mod P so that we only need to check values less than P. + * We know X < 2^256 so we can proceed by subtraction. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&XmP, X)); + while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&XmP, P) >= 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&XmP, &XmP, P)); + } + + /* Check against the known bad values that are less than P. For Curve448 + * these are 0, 1 and -1. For Curve25519 we check the values less than P + * from the following list: https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&XmP, 1) <= 0) { /* takes care of 0 and 1 */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) { + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&XmP, &ecp_x25519_bad_point_1) == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&XmP, &ecp_x25519_bad_point_2) == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + } +#else + (void) grp_id; +#endif + + /* Final check: check if XmP + 1 is P (final because it changes XmP!) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&XmP, &XmP, 1)); + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&XmP, P) == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&XmP); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Check validity of a public key for Montgomery curves with x-only schemes + */ +static int ecp_check_pubkey_mx(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) +{ + /* [Curve25519 p. 5] Just check X is the correct number of bytes */ + /* Allow any public value, if it's too big then we'll just reduce it mod p + * (RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 3). */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_size(&pt->X) > (grp->nbits + 7) / 8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + } + + /* Implicit in all standards (as they don't consider negative numbers): + * X must be non-negative. This is normally ensured by the way it's + * encoded for transmission, but let's be extra sure. */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&pt->X, 0) < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + } + + return ecp_check_bad_points_mx(&pt->X, &grp->P, grp->id); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Check that a point is valid as a public key + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt) +{ + /* Must use affine coordinates */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&pt->Z, 1) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { + return ecp_check_pubkey_mx(grp, pt); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { + return ecp_check_pubkey_sw(grp, pt); + } +#endif + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +} + +/* + * Check that an mbedtls_mpi is valid as a private key + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi *d) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { + /* see RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 5 */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(d, 0) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(d, 1) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(d) - 1 != grp->nbits) { /* mbedtls_mpi_bitlen is one-based! */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + } + + /* see [Curve25519] page 5 */ + if (grp->nbits == 254 && mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(d, 2) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + } + + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { + /* see SEC1 3.2 */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(d, 1) < 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(d, &grp->N) >= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + } else { + return 0; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx(size_t high_bit, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + size_t n_random_bytes = high_bit / 8 + 1; + + /* [Curve25519] page 5 */ + /* Generate a (high_bit+1)-bit random number by generating just enough + * random bytes, then shifting out extra bits from the top (necessary + * when (high_bit+1) is not a multiple of 8). */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(d, n_random_bytes, + f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(d, 8 * n_random_bytes - high_bit - 1)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(d, high_bit, 1)); + + /* Make sure the last two bits are unset for Curve448, three bits for + Curve25519 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(d, 0, 0)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(d, 1, 0)); + if (high_bit == 254) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(d, 2, 0)); + } + +cleanup: + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) +static int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_sw( + const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_mpi_random(d, 1, N, f_rng, p_rng); + switch (ret) { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED; + default: + return ret; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Generate a private key + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { + return mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx(grp->nbits, d, f_rng, p_rng); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { + return mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_sw(&grp->N, d, f_rng, p_rng); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * Generate a keypair with configurable base point + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *G, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(grp, d, f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(grp, Q, d, G, f_rng, p_rng)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Generate key pair, wrapper for conventional base point + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + return mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base(grp, &grp->G, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng); +} + +/* + * Generate a keypair, prettier wrapper + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&key->grp, grp_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(&key->grp, &key->d, &key->Q, f_rng, p_rng); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +int mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + /* Group not set yet */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&key->grp, grp_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } else if (key->grp.id != grp_id) { + /* Group mismatch */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_ecp_copy(&key->Q, Q); +} + + +#define ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE 32 +#define ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE 56 +/* + * Read a private key. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&key->grp, grp_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { + /* + * Mask the key as mandated by RFC7748 for Curve25519 and Curve448. + */ + if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) { + if (buflen != ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le(&key->d, buf, buflen)); + + /* Set the three least significant bits to 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, 0, 0)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, 1, 0)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, 2, 0)); + + /* Set the most significant bit to 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, + ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 1, 0) + ); + + /* Set the second most significant bit to 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, + ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 2, 1) + ); + } else if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448) { + if (buflen != ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le(&key->d, buf, buflen)); + + /* Set the two least significant bits to 0 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, 0, 0)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, 1, 0)); + + /* Set the most significant bit to 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, + ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 1, 1) + ); + } + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&key->d, buf, buflen)); + } +#endif + + if (ret == 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(&key->grp, &key->d)); + } + +cleanup: + + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_free(&key->d); + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Write a private key. + */ +#if !defined MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED +int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { + if (key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) { + if (buflen < ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + } else if (key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448) { + if (buflen < ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(&key->d, buf, buflen)); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&key->d, buf, buflen)); + } + +#endif +cleanup: + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +int mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + size_t len = (key->grp.nbits + 7) / 8; + if (len > buflen) { + /* For robustness, ensure *olen <= buflen even on error. */ + *olen = 0; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + *olen = len; + + /* Private key not set */ + if (key->d.n == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) { + return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(&key->d, buf, len); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) { + return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&key->d, buf, len); + } +#endif + + /* Private key set but no recognized curve type? This shouldn't happen. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +} + +/* + * Write a public key. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + return mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&key->grp, &key->Q, + format, olen, buf, buflen); +} + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * Check a public-private key pair + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + if (pub->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || + pub->grp.id != prv->grp.id || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->Q.X, &prv->Q.X) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->Q.Y, &prv->Q.Y) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->Q.Z, &prv->Q.Z)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Q); + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp); + + /* mbedtls_ecp_mul() needs a non-const group... */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(&grp, &prv->grp); + + /* Also checks d is valid */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&grp, &Q, &prv->d, &prv->grp.G, f_rng, p_rng)); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&Q.X, &prv->Q.X) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&Q.Y, &prv->Q.Y) || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&Q.Z, &prv->Q.Z)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&Q); + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + return mbedtls_ecp_mul(&key->grp, &key->Q, &key->d, &key->grp.G, + f_rng, p_rng); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id( + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key) +{ + return key->grp.id; +} + +/* + * Export generic key-pair parameters. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_export(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (grp != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(grp, &key->grp)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (d != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(d, &key->d)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (Q != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy(Q, &key->Q)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +/* + * PRNG for test - !!!INSECURE NEVER USE IN PRODUCTION!!! + * + * This is the linear congruential generator from numerical recipes, + * except we only use the low byte as the output. See + * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_congruential_generator#Parameters_in_common_use + */ +static int self_test_rng(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len) +{ + static uint32_t state = 42; + + (void) ctx; + + for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) { + state = state * 1664525u + 1013904223u; + out[i] = (unsigned char) state; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Adjust the exponent to be a valid private point for the specified curve. + * This is sometimes necessary because we use a single set of exponents + * for all curves but the validity of values depends on the curve. */ +static int self_test_adjust_exponent(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_mpi *m) +{ + int ret = 0; + switch (grp->id) { + /* If Curve25519 is available, then that's what we use for the + * Montgomery test, so we don't need the adjustment code. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + /* Move highest bit from 254 to N-1. Setting bit N-1 is + * necessary to enforce the highest-bit-set constraint. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(m, 254, 0)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(m, grp->nbits, 1)); + /* Copy second-highest bit from 253 to N-2. This is not + * necessary but improves the test variety a bit. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(m, grp->nbits - 1, + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(m, 253))); + break; +#endif +#endif /* ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) */ + default: + /* Non-Montgomery curves and Curve25519 need no adjustment. */ + (void) grp; + (void) m; + goto cleanup; + } +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* Calculate R = m.P for each m in exponents. Check that the number of + * basic operations doesn't depend on the value of m. */ +static int self_test_point(int verbose, + mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + mbedtls_mpi *m, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const char *const *exponents, + size_t n_exponents) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t i = 0; + unsigned long add_c_prev, dbl_c_prev, mul_c_prev; + add_count = 0; + dbl_count = 0; + mul_count = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(m, 16, exponents[0])); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(self_test_adjust_exponent(grp, m)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(grp, R, m, P, self_test_rng, NULL)); + + for (i = 1; i < n_exponents; i++) { + add_c_prev = add_count; + dbl_c_prev = dbl_count; + mul_c_prev = mul_count; + add_count = 0; + dbl_count = 0; + mul_count = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(m, 16, exponents[i])); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(self_test_adjust_exponent(grp, m)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(grp, R, m, P, self_test_rng, NULL)); + + if (add_count != add_c_prev || + dbl_count != dbl_c_prev || + mul_count != mul_c_prev) { + ret = 1; + break; + } + } + +cleanup: + if (verbose != 0) { + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed (%u)\n", (unsigned int) i); + } else { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_self_test(int verbose) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_point R, P; + mbedtls_mpi m; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + /* Exponents especially adapted for secp192k1, which has the lowest + * order n of all supported curves (secp192r1 is in a slightly larger + * field but the order of its base point is slightly smaller). */ + const char *sw_exponents[] = + { + "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", /* one */ + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE26F2FC170F69466A74DEFD8C", /* n - 1 */ + "5EA6F389A38B8BC81E767753B15AA5569E1782E30ABE7D25", /* random */ + "400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", /* one and zeros */ + "7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", /* all ones */ + "555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555", /* 101010... */ + }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + const char *m_exponents[] = + { + /* Valid private values for Curve25519. In a build with Curve448 + * but not Curve25519, they will be adjusted in + * self_test_adjust_exponent(). */ + "4000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", + "5C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C30", + "5715ECCE24583F7A7023C24164390586842E816D7280A49EF6DF4EAE6B280BF8", + "41A2B017516F6D254E1F002BCCBADD54BE30F8CEC737A0E912B4963B6BA74460", + "5555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555550", + "7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF8", + }; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&R); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&P); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&m); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + /* Use secp192r1 if available, or any available curve */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1)); +#else + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()->grp_id)); +#endif + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" ECP SW test #1 (constant op_count, base point G): "); + } + /* Do a dummy multiplication first to trigger precomputation */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&m, 2)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&grp, &P, &m, &grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL)); + ret = self_test_point(verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, + sw_exponents, + sizeof(sw_exponents) / sizeof(sw_exponents[0])); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" ECP SW test #2 (constant op_count, other point): "); + } + /* We computed P = 2G last time, use it */ + ret = self_test_point(verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &P, + sw_exponents, + sizeof(sw_exponents) / sizeof(sw_exponents[0])); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&R); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" ECP Montgomery test (constant op_count): "); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519)); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448)); +#else +#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED is defined, but no curve is supported for self-test" +#endif + ret = self_test_point(verbose, + &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G, + m_exponents, + sizeof(m_exponents) / sizeof(m_exponents[0])); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +cleanup: + + if (ret < 0 && verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", (unsigned int) ret); + } + + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&R); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&m); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return ret; +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + (void) verbose; + return 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ diff --git a/library/ecp_curves.c b/library/ecp_curves.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c3cd33f47a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ecp_curves.c @@ -0,0 +1,5460 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curves over GF(p): curve-specific data and functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include "bn_mul.h" +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "ecp_invasive.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + +#define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) } + +#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ + ECP_MPI_INIT(x, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) + +#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(x, y) { \ + ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(NULL, 0) } +#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(x, y) { \ + ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(mpi_one, 1) } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */ +#define ECP_LOAD_GROUP +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_one[] = { 1 }; +#endif + +/* + * Note: the constants are in little-endian order + * to be directly usable in MPIs + */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp192r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xB9, 0x46, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0xB8, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x30, 0x24, 0x72, 0xAB, 0xE9, 0xA7, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x80, 0x9C, 0xE5, 0x19, 0x05, 0x21, 0x64), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x28, 0xD2, 0xB4, 0xB1, 0xC9, 0x6B, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xF8, 0xDE, 0x99, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x9E, 0xE3, 0x60, 0x59, 0xD1, 0xC4, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBD, 0x22, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x2A, 0xCF, 0x33, 0xF0, 0xBE, 0xD1, 0xED), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x71, 0x4B, 0xA8, 0xED, 0x7E, 0xC9, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x2A, 0xF6, 0xDF, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x35, 0xF7, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0x1E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x67, 0xC2, 0x1D, 0x32, 0x8F, 0x10, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x2D, 0x17, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xD8, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x45, 0x10, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x3E, 0x52, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xF1, 0x04, 0x5D, 0xEE, 0xD4, 0x56, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x27, 0x61, 0xAA, 0x81, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x37, 0xD7, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x14), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x35, 0x52, 0xC6, 0x31, 0xB7, 0x27, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xD4, 0x15, 0x98, 0x0F, 0xE7, 0xF3, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x31, 0x70, 0x35, 0x09, 0xA0, 0x2B, 0xC2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x75, 0xA7, 0x4C, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5B, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x17, 0x48, 0x8D, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x86, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xCF, 0xFE, 0x6B, 0xB0, 0xA5, 0x06, 0xAB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0x6D, 0x7B, 0x47, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xFC, 0x51, 0x12, 0x62, 0x66, 0x0B, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x40, 0x93, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x58, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x0B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x36, 0x9D, 0xA3, 0xD7, 0x3B, 0xAD, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x3B, 0x05, 0x9A, 0xA8, 0xAA, 0x69, 0xB2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xD9, 0xD1, 0x4D, 0x4A, 0x6E, 0x96, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x66, 0x32, 0x39, 0xC6, 0x57, 0x7D, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xA0, 0x36, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x00, 0x62), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xEF, 0x59, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xD9, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xB0, 0xE9, 0x41, 0xA4, 0x87, 0x76, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xD4, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0xFA, 0x16, 0x56, 0xDC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x62, 0xD2, 0xB1, 0x34, 0xB2, 0xF1, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xED, 0x55, 0xC5, 0x47, 0xB5, 0x07, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xF6, 0x2F, 0x94, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x54, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xA6, 0xD4, 0x8C, 0xA9, 0xCE, 0x4D, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x4B, 0x46, 0xCC, 0xB2, 0x55, 0xC8, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xAE, 0x31, 0xED, 0x89, 0x65, 0x59, 0x55), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x0A, 0xD1, 0x1A, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0xEA, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xFC, 0x0C, 0x1A, 0xFB, 0xA0, 0xC8, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xFD, 0x53, 0x6F, 0x6D, 0xBF, 0xBA, 0xAF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xB0, 0x7D, 0x83, 0x96, 0xE3, 0xCB, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x6E, 0x55, 0x2C, 0x20, 0x53, 0x2F, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x66, 0x00, 0x17, 0x08, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x12, 0x97, 0x3A, 0xC7, 0x57, 0x45, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x25, 0x99, 0x00, 0xF6, 0x97, 0xB4, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x74, 0xE6, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xCC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xF4, 0x76, 0xD5, 0x5F, 0x2A, 0xFD, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x80, 0x7E, 0x3E, 0xE5, 0xE8, 0xD6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xAD, 0x1E, 0x70, 0x79, 0x3E, 0x3D, 0x83), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x15, 0xBB, 0xB3, 0x42, 0x6A, 0xA1, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x58, 0xCB, 0x43, 0x25, 0x00, 0x14, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x4E, 0x93, 0x11, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x54, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x52, 0xA2, 0xB4, 0x57, 0x32, 0xB9, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x43, 0xA1, 0xB1, 0xFB, 0x01, 0xE1, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x11, 0xB8, 0xC2, 0x03, 0xE5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x2B, 0x71, 0x26, 0x4E, 0x7C, 0xC5, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xF5, 0xD3, 0xA8, 0xE4, 0x95, 0x48, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xAE, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9F, 0x6A, 0x22, 0xAD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xCC, 0xA3, 0x4D, 0xA0, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xF8, 0x5E, 0xA6, 0x58, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x8A, 0x3D, 0x17, 0xFF, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xCD, 0xA8, 0xDD, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x5C, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xFE, 0x17, 0xE2, 0xCF, 0xEA, 0x63, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x51, 0xC9, 0x16, 0xDE, 0xB4, 0xB2, 0xDD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBE, 0x12, 0xD7, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x50, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x87, 0xC5, 0x8A, 0x76, 0x57, 0x07, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x1F, 0xC6, 0x1B, 0x66, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0x8A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xA4, 0x85, 0x13, 0x8F, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x0D, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0x1B, 0xD1, 0xD6, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x7A, 0xD0, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x66), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xFE, 0xA5, 0x9C, 0x34, 0x30, 0x49, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x26, 0x06, 0xE3, 0x01, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x2B, 0x66, 0xFC, 0x95, 0x5F, 0x35, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xCF, 0x54, 0x63, 0x99, 0x57, 0x05, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x6F, 0x00, 0x5F, 0x65, 0x08, 0x47, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x6D, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xBC, 0x45), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x0A, 0x35, 0x9E, 0x33, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x17, 0x0C, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x7A, 0x49, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x44, 0x06, 0x8F, 0x0B, 0x70, 0x2F, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x4B, 0xCB, 0xF9, 0x8E, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x3F, 0xCE, 0x17, 0xD2, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x0D, 0xD2, 0x6C, 0x82, 0x37, 0xE5, 0xFC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x3C, 0xF4, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x8A, 0x95, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x96, 0xF1, 0x0A, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x74, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xA1, 0xAA, 0xBA, 0x86, 0x77, 0x4F, 0xA2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x7F, 0xEF, 0x60, 0x50, 0x80, 0xD7, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x2F, 0xBE, 0x91, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xAE, 0x85, 0x98, 0xFE, 0x05, 0x7F, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBE, 0xFD, 0x11, 0x31, 0x3D, 0x14, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x75, 0xE8, 0x30, 0x01, 0xCB, 0x9B, 0x1C), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192r1_T_0_X, secp192r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_1_X, secp192r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_2_X, secp192r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_3_X, secp192r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_4_X, secp192r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_5_X, secp192r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_6_X, secp192r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_7_X, secp192r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_8_X, secp192r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_9_X, secp192r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_10_X, secp192r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_11_X, secp192r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_12_X, secp192r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_13_X, secp192r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_14_X, secp192r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_15_X, secp192r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp192r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp224r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xFF, 0x55, 0x23, 0x43, 0x39, 0x0B, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xD8, 0xBF, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0xB0, 0x44, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0x32, 0x41, 0xF5, 0xAB, 0xB3, 0x04, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x85, 0x0A, 0x05, 0xB4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x2A, 0x5C, 0x5C, 0x45, 0x29, 0xDD, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xF0, 0xB8, 0xE0, 0xA2, 0x16, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xF9, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0xD3, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xFD, 0x99, 0x26, 0x19, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x0E, 0x4C, 0x48, 0x7C, 0xA2, 0x17, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x57, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x16, 0x5C, 0x8F, 0xAA, 0xED, 0x0F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xC5, 0x43, 0x34, 0x93, 0x05, 0x2A, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCA, 0xC6, 0x14, 0xC2, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x43, 0x6C, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x5A, 0x98, 0x1E, 0xC8, 0xA5, 0x42, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x49, 0x56, 0x78, 0xF8, 0xEF, 0xED, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0xBB, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x4C, 0x54, 0x5F, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x0C, 0x33, 0xCC, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x79, 0xCB, 0x2E, 0x08, 0xFF, 0xD8, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x1F, 0xD4, 0xD7, 0x57, 0xE9, 0x39, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xD6, 0x3B, 0x0A, 0x1C, 0x87, 0xB7, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x30, 0xD8, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x79, 0x74, 0x9A, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x67, 0xC1, 0x91, 0xE7, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xDF, 0x38, 0x82, 0x19, 0x2C, 0x4C, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x2E, 0x39, 0xC5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x36, 0x78, 0x4E, 0xAE, 0x5B, 0x02, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0xF8, 0xF4, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x35, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0x2C, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xA5, 0x1F, 0xAE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x1C, 0x4B, 0xDF, 0x5B, 0xF2, 0x51, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0x0E, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x24, 0x09, 0x62, 0xAF, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xE1, 0x80, 0x55, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x82, 0xFE, 0xAD, 0xC3, 0xE5, 0xCF, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xA2, 0x62, 0x17, 0x76, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xB8, 0xE5, 0xAC, 0xB7, 0x66, 0x38, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xFD, 0x86, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xD3, 0x0C, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x66, 0xB0, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x8D, 0x90, 0x10, 0xB7, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x47, 0x9B, 0xE6, 0x55, 0x8A, 0xE4, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x78, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x97, 0xED, 0xDE, 0xFF, 0xB3, 0xDF, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xB9, 0x83, 0xB7, 0xEB, 0xBE, 0x40, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xD3, 0xD3, 0xCD, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x79, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x83, 0x1B, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x54, 0xD3, 0x31, 0x56, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x36, 0xE5, 0xE0, 0x89, 0x96, 0x8E, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xEF, 0x0A, 0xED, 0xD0, 0x11, 0x4A, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x00, 0x57, 0x27, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xCA, 0x3D, 0xF7, 0x64, 0x9B, 0x6E, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xE3, 0x70, 0x6B, 0x41, 0xD7, 0xED, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x44, 0x44, 0x80, 0xCE, 0x13, 0x37, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x73, 0x80, 0x79, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x4D, 0x70, 0x7D, 0x31, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x35, 0x88, 0x47, 0xC4, 0x24, 0x78, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xF0, 0xCD, 0x91, 0x81, 0xB3, 0xDE, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xCE, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x9C, 0x2D, 0xE8, 0xD2, 0x00, 0x8F, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x5E, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0x6E, 0x58, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x81, 0x21, 0xCE, 0x43, 0xF4, 0x24, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0xBC, 0xF0, 0xF4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x10, 0xC2, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x8F, 0x8A, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x67, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x38, 0x2B, 0x35, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0xA9, 0xFA, 0x77, 0x5C, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x33, 0x19, 0x2B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x3E, 0x96, 0x22, 0x53, 0xE1, 0xE9, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x13, 0xBC, 0xA1, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x01, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x00, 0xC9, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x73, 0xA5, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0xC1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x95, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x32, 0x30, 0x2B, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x42, 0x09, 0x05, 0x61, 0x2A, 0x7E, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x84, 0xA2, 0x05, 0x88, 0x64, 0x65, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x2D, 0x90, 0xB3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xE7, 0x2E, 0x85, 0x55, 0x80, 0x7C, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xC1, 0xAC, 0x78, 0xB4, 0xAF, 0xFB, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xC3, 0x28, 0x8E, 0x79, 0x18, 0x1F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x5F, 0xA8, 0x6C, 0x46, 0x83, 0x43, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xA9, 0x93, 0x11, 0xB6, 0x07, 0x57, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x03, 0x89, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x8C, 0x62, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x2C, 0x13, 0x59, 0xCC, 0xFA, 0x84, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xB9, 0x48, 0xBC, 0x57, 0xC7, 0xB3, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0x2E, 0x3A, 0x28, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x0A, 0x43, 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x25, 0xAB, 0xC1, 0xEE, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xDB, 0x45, 0x1D, 0x4A, 0x80, 0x75, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x2D, 0x9A, 0x05, 0xF4, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x10, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x95, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x15, 0x86, 0xC3, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xDC, 0x27, 0xD1, 0x56, 0xA1, 0x14, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x0B, 0xD6, 0x77, 0x4E, 0x44, 0xA2, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x42, 0x71, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x86, 0xB2, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0x2F, 0x7B, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xEF, 0xCB, 0xDB, 0xBC, 0x9E, 0x3B, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x03, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x5B, 0xF5, 0x8D, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x95, 0x79, 0xD6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x32, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x9B, 0x4F, 0x07, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x3E, 0xFB, 0x06, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0x40, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x1F, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x61, 0xFD, 0x8B, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x8B, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x34, 0xB3, 0xB4, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0xB0, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x58, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x77, 0xBB, 0x13, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x34, 0xCC, 0x89, 0x21, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x33, 0xDD, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x81, 0xEF, 0xA4, 0xF2, 0x10, 0x0B, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xF7, 0x6E, 0x72, 0x4A, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x23, 0x0A, 0x53, 0x03, 0x16, 0x62, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x76, 0xFD, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x14, 0xA1, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xD7, 0xB0, 0x6C, 0xA0, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xC0, 0xB0, 0xC6, 0x63, 0x24, 0xCD, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x38, 0x2C, 0xB1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xCD, 0x7D, 0x20, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x97, 0x9F, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x45, 0xF7, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x99, 0xF3, 0xD2, 0x20, 0x02, 0xEB, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x18, 0x5B, 0x7B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x91, 0x60, 0xEA, 0xFD, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xD3, 0xB5, 0xD6, 0x90, 0x17, 0x0E, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xF4, 0x28, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x58, 0xDC, 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x20, 0x01, 0xFB, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x7F, 0x06, 0xDA, 0x11, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x41, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x33, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xFF, 0x27, 0xCA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224r1_T_0_X, secp224r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_1_X, secp224r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_2_X, secp224r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_3_X, secp224r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_4_X, secp224r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_5_X, secp224r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_6_X, secp224r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_7_X, secp224r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_8_X, secp224r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_9_X, secp224r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_10_X, secp224r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_11_X, secp224r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_12_X, secp224r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_13_X, secp224r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_14_X, secp224r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_15_X, secp224r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp224r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp256r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x60, 0xD2, 0x27, 0x3E, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xB0, 0x53, 0xCC, 0xB0, 0x06, 0x1D, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x86, 0x98, 0x76, 0x55, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x93, 0x3A, 0xAA, 0xD8, 0x35, 0xC6, 0x5A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x25, 0x63, 0xFC, 0xC2, 0xCA, 0xB9, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x9E, 0x17, 0xA7, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE6, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xC8, 0xBA, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x4B, 0xD2, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xC6, 0x23, 0x3A, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x3A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x23, 0xCC, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x29, 0x87, 0x0F, 0xFA, 0x3C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x69, 0xF2, 0x40, 0x0B, 0xA3, 0x98, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xA8, 0x48, 0x02, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0x12, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xAF, 0x09, 0x83, 0x80, 0xAA, 0x58, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x12, 0xBE, 0x70, 0x94, 0x76, 0xE3, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x7D, 0xEF, 0x86, 0xFF, 0xE3, 0x37, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x86, 0x8B, 0x08, 0x27, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x54, 0x4C, 0x25, 0x4F, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xFD, 0xF0, 0x6D, 0x37, 0x03, 0x69, 0xD6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xD5, 0xDA, 0xAD, 0x92, 0x49, 0xF0, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x73, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xAF, 0xA7, 0xD1, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x41, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x78, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0xE2, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x6A, 0x5D, 0x52, 0x35, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0x96, 0xF4, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x20, 0x49, 0x54, 0xEA, 0xB3, 0x82, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0xDB, 0xEA, 0x02, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x1C, 0x62), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x9E, 0x4C, 0xDC, 0x39, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0x57, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x5D, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x7F, 0x2D, 0x52, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x64, 0xFA, 0xB4, 0xFE, 0xA4, 0xC4, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x37, 0xB9, 0xC0, 0xAA, 0x59, 0xC6, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x58, 0xD9, 0xED, 0x58, 0x99, 0x65, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x7D, 0x26, 0x8C, 0x4A, 0xF9, 0x05, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x73, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xD0, 0x55, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x0A, 0xF5, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x81, 0x2D, 0x20, 0xEB, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xC1, 0x28, 0x52, 0xAB, 0xE3, 0xD1, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x34, 0x79, 0x45, 0x57, 0xA5, 0x12, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xCF, 0xB8, 0x7E, 0xF7, 0x92, 0x96, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x01, 0x8C, 0x0D, 0x23, 0xF2, 0xE3, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x2E, 0xE3, 0x84, 0x52, 0x7A, 0x34, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xA1, 0xB0, 0x15, 0x90, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x3C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x98, 0xE7, 0xFA, 0xA5, 0x7D, 0x8B, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x35, 0xD2, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x1B, 0x9F, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x69, 0x08, 0x9A, 0x72, 0xF0, 0xA9, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0xD3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xF6, 0xE8, 0xF8, 0x87, 0xF7, 0xFC, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xBE, 0x7F, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x2B, 0xD7, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x32, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x6D, 0x42, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x9A, 0xE3, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xBB, 0x84, 0xED), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x95, 0x29, 0x73, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3E, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x30, 0x54, 0x35, 0x8E, 0x0A, 0xDD, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0x97, 0x61, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x33, 0x3C, 0x58, 0x55, 0x34, 0x23, 0xA3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x5D, 0x16, 0x5F, 0x7B, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x8A, 0xC1, 0x51, 0xCC, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x0D, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x53, 0x23, 0x1D, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x66, 0x52, 0x84, 0xE1, 0x95), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x9B, 0x83, 0x0A, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xFF, 0x42, 0x41, 0x6E, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xA1, 0x4F, 0x1F, 0x89, 0x82, 0xAA, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xB8, 0x0F, 0x6B, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0xD6, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0xB3, 0xBB, 0x51, 0x69, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x4F, 0x0F, 0x8D, 0xBD, 0x26, 0x0F, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xCB, 0xEC, 0x6B, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x3D, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x5D, 0x1E, 0x10, 0xD5, 0x44, 0xE2, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x9E, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0x6E, 0x4C, 0xAD, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x58, 0xC0, 0xFB, 0x34, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x9C, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x07, 0x41, 0xBD, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x6E, 0x10, 0xEC, 0x0E, 0xEC, 0xBB, 0xD6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xCF, 0xEF, 0x3F, 0x83, 0x1A, 0x88, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x29, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0xE0, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x46, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCD, 0x7E, 0xB3, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x21, 0xD0, 0xD4, 0xA3, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0xCA, 0xA8, 0xB3, 0xBF, 0x29, 0x99, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xF2, 0x05, 0xC1, 0xCF, 0x5D, 0x91, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x01, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x82, 0xDF, 0x5F, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x06, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xE3, 0x38, 0xA4, 0xC4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xD2, 0x3A, 0xE8, 0x03, 0xC5, 0x6D, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x35, 0xD0, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x1E, 0xD2, 0xCB, 0xAC, 0x88, 0x27, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xE0, 0x31, 0xDD, 0x99, 0x86), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x32, 0x96, 0x41, 0x58, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x5A, 0x2A, 0xB8, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x78, 0x2C, 0xC7, 0x08, 0x99, 0x19, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xE9, 0x84, 0x54, 0xE6, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x38, 0x30, 0xDB, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x0A, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x5C, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0xD5, 0x46, 0x0B, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x0B, 0x60, 0x4B, 0x37, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x24, 0xF3, 0x3D, 0x79, 0x7F, 0x6C, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7F, 0xE5, 0x1C, 0x4F, 0x60, 0x24, 0xF7, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x89, 0x49, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xA7, 0x2E, 0x8D, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0x39, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x89, 0xB5, 0x9A, 0xB8, 0x8D, 0x42, 0x9C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0x45, 0xE6, 0x4B, 0x3F, 0x4F, 0x1E, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x59, 0x22, 0xCC, 0x72, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x93, 0x1A, 0x27, 0x1E, 0x34, 0xC5, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x58, 0x5C, 0x15, 0x2E, 0xC6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x7F, 0xBA, 0x58, 0x5A, 0x84, 0x6F, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xA6, 0x36, 0x7E, 0xDC, 0xF7, 0xE1, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x4D, 0xAA, 0xEE, 0x57, 0x76, 0x3A, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x7E, 0x26, 0x18, 0x22, 0x23, 0x9F, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x4C, 0x64, 0xC7, 0x55, 0x02, 0x3F, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x02, 0x90, 0xBB, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0x30, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x6F, 0x64, 0xF4, 0x16, 0x69, 0x48, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x44, 0x9C, 0x95, 0x0C, 0x7D, 0x67, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x91, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0xD0, 0xD7, 0xE7, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xF9, 0x48, 0x62, 0x6F, 0xA8, 0x93, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x3A, 0x99, 0x02, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0x3D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xD3, 0x00, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x0C, 0x9F, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xB2, 0xAA, 0xFD, 0x88, 0x15, 0xDF, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0x35, 0x27, 0x31, 0x44, 0xCD, 0xC0, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xA5, 0x71, 0x94, 0x84, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xCB, 0xD0, 0x93, 0xE9, 0x88, 0xDA, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xC6, 0x39, 0x16, 0x5D, 0xA3, 0x1E, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x07, 0x37, 0x26, 0x36, 0x2A, 0xFE, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xBC, 0xF3, 0xD0, 0xDE, 0x50, 0xFC, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x2E, 0x06, 0x10, 0x15, 0x4D, 0xFA, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x65, 0x69, 0x5B, 0x66, 0xA2, 0x75, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x16, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB0, 0x30, 0x25, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xFB, 0x86, 0x42, 0x80, 0xC1, 0xC4, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x1D, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x01, 0x5F, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x37, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x1F, 0xA1, 0xF0, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x10, 0x5B, 0xCE, 0xC4, 0x9B, 0x6F, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x11, 0x11, 0x24, 0x4F, 0x4C, 0x79, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x3A, 0x72, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x72, 0x58, 0x43), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256r1_T_0_X, secp256r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_1_X, secp256r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_2_X, secp256r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_3_X, secp256r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_4_X, secp256r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_5_X, secp256r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_6_X, secp256r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_7_X, secp256r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_8_X, secp256r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_9_X, secp256r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_10_X, secp256r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_11_X, secp256r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_12_X, secp256r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_13_X, secp256r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_14_X, secp256r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_15_X, secp256r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp256r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp384r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x2A, 0xEC, 0xD3, 0xED, 0xC8, 0x85, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x8A, 0x8D, 0x39, 0x56, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x87, 0x13, 0x50, 0x8F, 0x08, 0x14, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x41, 0x81, 0xFE, 0x6E, 0x9C, 0x1D, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x2D, 0xF8, 0xE3, 0x6B, 0x05, 0x8E, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0xE2, 0xA7, 0x2F, 0x31, 0xB3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x29, 0xC5, 0xCC, 0x6A, 0x19, 0xEC, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xA7, 0xB0, 0x48, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x2D, 0x37, 0xF4, 0x81, 0x4D, 0x63, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x92, 0x00, 0x2C, 0x78, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xB7, 0x06, 0xF7, 0xB6, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xBC, 0x2C, 0xCF, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x53, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x75, 0x7B, 0xA3, 0xAB, 0xC3, 0x2C, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x9D, 0x78, 0x41, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x84, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x56, 0xE8, 0x52, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0xA8, 0xBD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xF2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0xB6, 0x89, 0x1B, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x0F, 0xCE, 0x1C, 0x7C, 0xF6, 0x50, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xEB, 0x90, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0xC7, 0xD4, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x49, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x01, 0x99, 0x60, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x80, 0x9B, 0x9B, 0x6A, 0xB0, 0x07, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xA2, 0xEE, 0x59, 0xBE, 0x95, 0xBC, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x9D, 0x56, 0xAE, 0x59, 0xFB, 0x1F, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xAC, 0x91, 0x80, 0x87, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x08, 0xA7, 0x08, 0x94, 0x32, 0xFC, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x29, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF4, 0xE5, 0x6E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x21, 0xB9, 0x50, 0x24, 0xF8, 0x9C, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x04, 0x01, 0xC2, 0xFB, 0x77, 0x3E, 0xDE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x38, 0xEE, 0xE3, 0xC7, 0x9D, 0xEC, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x43, 0xFA, 0x92, 0x5E, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xCA, 0x43, 0xF8, 0x3B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xE7, 0xEB, 0x17, 0x45, 0x86, 0xC2, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x69, 0x57, 0x32, 0xE0, 0x9C, 0xD1, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x10, 0xB8, 0x4D, 0xB8, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xE3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0xB2, 0x79, 0x39, 0x27, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x71, 0xE4, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xBD, 0x19, 0x40, 0xFA, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xF8, 0x1E, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x50, 0x8D, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x18, 0x7C, 0x41, 0xFA, 0x7C, 0x1B, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x59, 0x24, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xB7, 0xD3, 0xAD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x63, 0x54, 0x45, 0x6F, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xB2, 0x19, 0xA3, 0x86, 0x1D, 0x42, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x02, 0x87, 0x18, 0x92, 0x52, 0x1A, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x37, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x74, 0x61, 0xBA, 0x18, 0xAF, 0x40, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x52, 0x0F, 0x07, 0xB0, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x39, 0x13, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x15, 0x99, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x00, 0xCB, 0xC6, 0xB1, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xFA, 0x60, 0xB8, 0x24, 0xE4, 0x7D, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x75, 0xB3, 0x70, 0xB2, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCD, 0x33, 0x62, 0x7A, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x30, 0xDC, 0x0F, 0x9F, 0xBB, 0xB8, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xD5, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x81, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xAA, 0x2F, 0xD6, 0xF2, 0x73, 0xDF, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x7B, 0x74, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0x5B, 0x95, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x04, 0xEB, 0x15, 0xC8, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x50, 0x20, 0x28, 0xD1, 0x01, 0xAF, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x4F, 0x31, 0x81, 0x2F, 0x94, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x63, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x37, 0x63, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x46, 0xAD, 0xCE, 0x7B, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x47, 0x2D, 0x66, 0xA7, 0xE9, 0x33, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xF9, 0x93, 0x94, 0xA8, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x4A, 0xAC, 0x51, 0x08, 0x72, 0x2F, 0x1A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0xAD, 0xA0, 0xF9, 0x81, 0xE1, 0x78, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x9A, 0x63, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x31, 0x7B, 0x7A, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0x7D, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x96, 0x12, 0x4B, 0x19, 0x09, 0xE0, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x8A, 0x57, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x7E, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x9D, 0x69, 0xDC, 0xB3, 0xDA, 0xD8, 0x08), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x49, 0x03, 0x03, 0x33, 0x6F, 0x28, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xDB, 0xA7, 0x05, 0x8C, 0xF3, 0x4D, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x92, 0xB1, 0xA8, 0xEC, 0x0D, 0x64, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0x4B, 0x88, 0x1B, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x9C, 0x51, 0x69, 0xCE, 0x71, 0x73, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x5A, 0x14, 0x23, 0x1A, 0x46, 0x63, 0x5F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x44, 0x18, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x49, 0xDD, 0x64, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x32, 0x7C, 0x09, 0xD0, 0x3F, 0xD6, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE0, 0x4F, 0x65, 0x0C, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xFA, 0xFB, 0x4A, 0xB4, 0x79, 0x5A, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x5D, 0x1B, 0x2B, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0x9A, 0x74), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xAC, 0x56, 0xF7, 0x5F, 0x51, 0x68, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xE0, 0x1D, 0xBC, 0x13, 0x4E, 0xAC, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xF5, 0xC5, 0xE6, 0xD2, 0x88, 0xBA, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x23, 0x58, 0x67, 0xFA, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x80, 0x4B, 0xD8, 0xC4, 0xDF, 0x15, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x0E, 0x58, 0xE6, 0x2C, 0x59, 0xC2, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x26, 0x27, 0x99, 0x16, 0x2B, 0x22, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xF3, 0x8F, 0xC3, 0x2A, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x2E, 0x83, 0x3D, 0xFE, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x57, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0xC1, 0x49, 0x38, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x42, 0x8B, 0x33, 0x89, 0x1F, 0xEA, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x1D, 0x13, 0xD7, 0x50, 0xBB, 0x3E, 0xEB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x9A, 0x52, 0xD2, 0x54, 0x7C, 0x97, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x33, 0x6E, 0xED, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x50, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x35, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x40, 0x15, 0x83, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x2B, 0xA4, 0xAB, 0x03, 0x91, 0xEA, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x47, 0x39, 0xEF, 0x05, 0x59, 0xD0, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x24, 0x0D, 0x76, 0x11, 0x53, 0x08, 0xAF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x2F, 0xDD, 0xBD, 0x50, 0x48, 0xB1, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x1C, 0x84, 0x55, 0x78, 0x14, 0xEB, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x5E, 0x3E, 0xA6, 0xAF, 0xF6, 0xC7, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x11, 0xE2, 0x65, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x95, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x83, 0xD8, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0x22, 0x06, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x7F, 0x25, 0x2A, 0xAA, 0x28, 0x46, 0x97), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xDB, 0x15, 0x56, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xC0, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xDB, 0x0E, 0x08, 0xC9, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x62, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x7C, 0x13, 0xD5, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x21, 0xA0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x38, 0x81, 0x21, 0x23, 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x51, 0x05, 0xD0, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA9, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xC3, 0x27, 0xBF, 0xC6, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x65, 0x45, 0xDF, 0xB9, 0x46, 0x17, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x38, 0x3F, 0xB2, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0xCA, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xD7, 0x48, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x99, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x05, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE6, 0x5E, 0x82, 0x6D, 0xE5, 0x7E, 0xD5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x61, 0xFA, 0x7D, 0x01, 0xDB, 0xB6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xC6, 0x58, 0x39, 0xF4, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x5A, 0x7A, 0x80, 0x08, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x3F, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0x68, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xF5, 0xD5, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xD8, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xAD, 0x92, 0xC5, 0x57, 0x6C, 0xDA, 0x91), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x67, 0x17, 0xC0, 0x40, 0x78, 0x8C, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xAA, 0xDA, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xDB, 0x42, 0x3E, 0x72, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xF9, 0x41, 0x17, 0x43, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xDD, 0xCC, 0x43, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x05, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x4B, 0xCF, 0x48, 0x8F, 0x41, 0x90, 0xE5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x0C, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0x22, 0x04, 0xBC, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x63, 0x79, 0x2F, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x8A, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x67, 0x3F, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x14, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x33, 0xF4, 0x6B, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x44, 0x71, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x88, 0x3F, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x2B, 0x85, 0x05, 0xC5, 0x44, 0x53, 0x15), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD1, 0x1C, 0x73, 0xE3, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x33, 0xA1, 0xD3, 0x69, 0x1C, 0x9D, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x5A, 0xBA, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0x1B, 0x94, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x74, 0x90, 0x5C, 0x57, 0xB0, 0x3A, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x2F, 0x93, 0x20, 0x24, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x78, 0x9D, 0x71, 0x67, 0x5D, 0x49, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xC8, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0x8F, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x7F, 0x79, 0x6C, 0x5F, 0xB7, 0xBC, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xE1, 0x83, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xBB, 0xEE, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x41, 0x71, 0xB9, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0xEE, 0xBB, 0x1D, 0x89, 0x50, 0x88, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x1C, 0x55, 0x74, 0xEB, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x38, 0x92, 0x06, 0x19, 0xD0, 0xB3, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x99, 0x26, 0xA3, 0x5F, 0xE2, 0xC1, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xC3, 0xB6, 0x26, 0x24, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xB7, 0x64, 0x4B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x4E, 0x95, 0xAD, 0x07, 0xFE, 0xB6, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x15, 0xE7, 0x2D, 0x19, 0xA9, 0x08, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0x0A, 0x3F, 0x6B, 0xFF, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xE4, 0x74, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x1D, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xB0, 0x71, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x96, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0xB8, 0x19, 0x90, 0x80, 0xB5, 0xEE, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x21, 0x20, 0xA6, 0x17, 0x48, 0x03, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x1D, 0xBB, 0x6D, 0x94, 0x20, 0x34, 0xF1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x82, 0x67, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x4E, 0xBE, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xDA, 0x77, 0xF8, 0x23, 0x55, 0x2B, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x02, 0xDE, 0x25, 0x35, 0x2D, 0x74, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x0C, 0xB8, 0x0B, 0x39, 0xBA, 0xAD, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x4D, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0xE4, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xB0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x68, 0xCE, 0xC2, 0x55, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x20, 0x93, 0x32, 0x90, 0xD6, 0xAE, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x78, 0xAB, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xEB, 0x73, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x97, 0xC3, 0x83, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xF1, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x25, 0x25, 0x66, 0x08, 0x26, 0xFA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xFB, 0x44, 0x5D, 0x82, 0xEC, 0x3B, 0xAC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x90, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x04, 0x99, 0xD0, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0xF2, 0x22, 0xA0, 0xEB, 0xFD, 0x45, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA4, 0x81, 0x32, 0xFC, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x4F, 0xF0, 0x10, 0xB3, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x74, 0x13, 0x14, 0x9E, 0x90, 0xD7, 0xE6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x4F, 0xA8, 0xD1, 0x06, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0x68, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x53, 0x75, 0xED, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0xC2, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x87, 0x6B, 0x9F, 0x05, 0xE2, 0x22, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x1A, 0xA8, 0xB7, 0x03, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xD0, 0x69, 0x88, 0xA8, 0x39, 0x9E, 0x3A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xEF, 0x68, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x08, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x06, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x0D, 0xB7, 0x34, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xF4, 0xDD, 0x1A, 0xA0, 0x4A, 0xE4, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x63, 0x4F, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xBB, 0xD6, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xEE, 0x8D, 0xDF, 0x3F, 0x73, 0xB7, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x06, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xD9, 0x53), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xF5, 0x13, 0xDF, 0x13, 0x19, 0x97, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xF9, 0xB3, 0x33, 0x66, 0x82, 0x21, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xFC, 0x39, 0x16, 0x23, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x48, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x64, 0x95, 0x1C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xAC, 0x15, 0x57, 0xD9, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x5F, 0xB8, 0x3D, 0x48, 0x91, 0x24, 0xCC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xF2, 0xC8, 0x54, 0xD1, 0x32, 0xBD, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x3B, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF4, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xC3, 0xBB, 0x6C, 0x66, 0xAC, 0x25, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x25, 0x10, 0xB2, 0xE1, 0x41, 0xDE, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xE8, 0x30, 0xB8, 0x37, 0xBC, 0x2A, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x57, 0x01, 0x4A, 0x1E, 0x78, 0x9F, 0x85), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x19, 0xCD, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x51, 0x4F, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x4B, 0x3D, 0x24, 0xA4, 0x16, 0x59, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xEB, 0xD3, 0x59, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x7C, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xB9, 0xB4, 0xA5, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0x29, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x16, 0x05, 0x75, 0x02, 0xB3, 0x06, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x7C, 0x9F, 0x79, 0x91, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x98, 0x7C, 0x84, 0xE1, 0xFF, 0x30, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xE2, 0xC2, 0x5F, 0x55, 0x40, 0xBD, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x65, 0x87, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x30, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x15, 0xD1, 0x24, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x99, 0xD9, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0xB1, 0xAF, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x80, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0x74, 0xB9, 0xF3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xE6, 0x0F, 0x37, 0xC1, 0x10, 0x99, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xAD, 0x9D, 0x5D, 0x80, 0x01, 0xA6, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x20, 0x38, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x60, 0xCB, 0xCE, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0xA7, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xCF, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xBF, 0xE5, 0x74, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xDD, 0x59, 0x02, 0x5D, 0xC6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC9, 0xF8, 0xF5, 0xB6, 0x13, 0x4D, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x93, 0xB3, 0xA2, 0x79, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xF6, 0xCF, 0xF7, 0xE6, 0x29, 0x9C, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x50, 0x65, 0x80, 0xBC, 0x59, 0x0A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xF0, 0x24, 0x35, 0xA2, 0x46, 0xF0, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x26, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x61, 0x56, 0x62, 0x67), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x37, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xF7, 0xCE, 0x35, 0xFC, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x34, 0x96, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x76, 0x9D, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x3B, 0x0F, 0xEA, 0xA8, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x3F, 0x5D, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0xD4, 0x9E, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x2E, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0x6E, 0xAB, 0xAF, 0xDC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xB2, 0x7B, 0x0C, 0x9A, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x51, 0x90, 0x92, 0x79, 0x32, 0x19, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x89, 0xF9, 0xD0, 0xCF, 0x2C, 0xA5, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x50, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x50, 0x41, 0x9D, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x7D, 0x2B, 0x9E, 0x9D, 0x95, 0xA8, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x87, 0x88, 0x97, 0x5F, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2, 0xAD, 0xD9, 0xC9, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x83, 0x07, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x26, 0xC7, 0x13, 0x35, 0x0D, 0xB0, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x60, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0x4B, 0x93, 0x18, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0x31, 0x4C, 0xE4, 0x61, 0xAE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x4D, 0x1E, 0x51, 0x59, 0x6E, 0x91, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x54, 0x4D, 0x51, 0xED, 0x36, 0xCC, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xA8, 0x56, 0xC7, 0x78, 0x27, 0x33, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB7, 0x95, 0xC9, 0x8B, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xE9, 0x13, 0x96, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0xF9, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x46, 0xB0, 0x5E, 0xC3, 0x94, 0x03, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x5B, 0x29, 0x30, 0x41, 0x1A, 0x9E, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xCA, 0x83, 0x31, 0x5B, 0xA7, 0xCB, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x41, 0x50, 0x44, 0x4D, 0x64, 0x31, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x84, 0xC2, 0x5D, 0x97, 0xA5, 0x3C, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x0F, 0xA5, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x47, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x58, 0x02, 0x2D, 0x40, 0xB1, 0x0B, 0xBA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x33, 0x8C, 0x67, 0xCE, 0x23, 0x43, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x53, 0x47, 0x72, 0x44, 0x1F, 0x5B, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xC1, 0xD9, 0xA4, 0x50, 0x88, 0x63, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xF2, 0x75, 0x69, 0x73, 0x00, 0xC4, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x90, 0x1D, 0xDF, 0x1A, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xB1, 0x89, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x70, 0x62, 0xEF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x8A, 0x55, 0x50, 0x7B, 0xEF, 0x8A, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x1B, 0x23, 0x48, 0x23, 0x63, 0x91, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x04, 0x54, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x9B, 0xC7, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x38, 0xC3, 0x84, 0xFB, 0xFF, 0x9F, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x2A, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x68, 0x8A, 0x5C, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x93, 0x53, 0x85, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xAF, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x88, 0x95, 0x4C, 0x0B, 0xD0, 0x06, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xAF, 0x8D, 0x49, 0xA2, 0xC8, 0xB4, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x76, 0x53, 0x09, 0x88, 0x43, 0x87, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xA4, 0x77, 0x3F, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xB4, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x9E, 0x86, 0x64, 0xCC, 0x91, 0xC1, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x17, 0x56, 0xCB, 0xC3, 0x7D, 0x5B, 0xB1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x74, 0x9F, 0xB5, 0x91, 0x21, 0xB1, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xED, 0xE1, 0x11, 0xEF, 0x45, 0xAF, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x31, 0xBE, 0xB2, 0xBC, 0x72, 0x65, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x4B, 0x8C, 0x77, 0xCE, 0x1E, 0x42, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xC9, 0xAA, 0xB9, 0xD9, 0x86, 0x99, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x23, 0x80, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x35, 0x0B, 0x6D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xD8, 0xA2, 0x0A, 0x39, 0x32, 0x1D, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xF1, 0x12, 0x9A, 0x4A, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xF1, 0x7C, 0xAA, 0x70, 0x8E, 0xBC, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x01, 0x47, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0x8B, 0xA5, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x08, 0x21, 0xF4, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0xF5, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x76, 0xA5, 0x95, 0xC4, 0x0F, 0x88, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x42, 0x2A, 0x52, 0xCD, 0x75, 0x51, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x36, 0xE5, 0x04, 0x2B, 0x44, 0xC6, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xEE, 0x16, 0x13, 0x07, 0x83, 0xB5, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x59, 0xC6, 0xA2, 0x19, 0x05, 0xD3, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x8B, 0xA8, 0x16, 0x09, 0xB7, 0xEA, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xEE, 0x14, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0xEF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x7C, 0xCA, 0x71, 0x3E, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x31, 0x0E, 0x3F, 0xE5, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x3E, 0x95, 0x37, 0x58, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x1F, 0x02, 0x03, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xEE, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x5B, 0x1A, 0xFC, 0x38, 0xCD, 0xE8, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x57, 0x42, 0x85, 0xC6, 0x21, 0x68, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xA2, 0x4A, 0x66, 0xB1, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x9D, 0x5E, 0x99, 0xB2, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x03, 0x40, 0xCA, 0xB2, 0xB3, 0x30, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x78, 0x48, 0x27, 0x34, 0x1E, 0xE2, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x72, 0x5B, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0x6D, 0xE3, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAB, 0x46, 0xCB, 0xEA, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x08, 0xAD, 0x4E, 0x51, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5C, 0x7D, 0x4C, 0xD6, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x76, 0x26, 0xE0, 0x8B, 0x10, 0xD9, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xA7, 0x23, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x42, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xE5, 0xA4, 0xEC, 0x77, 0x21, 0x34, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x14, 0x65, 0xEA, 0x4A, 0x85, 0xC3, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xD8, 0x40, 0x27, 0x73, 0x15, 0x7E, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xBB, 0x53, 0x7E, 0x0F, 0x40, 0xC8, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x37, 0x19, 0x73, 0xEF, 0x5A, 0x5E, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x73, 0x2B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xAC, 0x97, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xB2, 0xC3, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0xE7, 0xD2, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x08, 0xD6, 0xDD, 0xAC, 0x21, 0xD6, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x26, 0xBE, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x38, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x6C, 0x31, 0xA7, 0x49, 0x50, 0x3A, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x99, 0xC6, 0xF5, 0xD2, 0xC2, 0x30, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0x8B, 0x97, 0xE9, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0D, 0xFC, 0x15, 0x54, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x83, 0x1C, 0xA4, 0xCD, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0xF2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x48, 0xE4, 0xAA, 0x69, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x7A, 0x27, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x96, 0x1A, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0xE7, 0x30, 0xA5, 0xCF, 0x13, 0x46, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xD8, 0xAF, 0x74, 0x23, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x3D, 0x44, 0x14, 0x1B, 0x97, 0x83, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x47, 0xD7, 0x5F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x38, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x73, 0x64, 0x36, 0xFD, 0x7B, 0xC1, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x5D, 0x32, 0xD2, 0x47, 0x94, 0x89, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xE9, 0x30, 0xAC, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x65, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x1B, 0xF7, 0x61, 0x49, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xFF, 0x32, 0x43, 0x80, 0xDA, 0xA6, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x01, 0x95, 0x35, 0xCE, 0x21), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x06, 0x46, 0x0D, 0x51, 0xE2, 0xD8, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x57, 0x1D, 0x6F, 0x79, 0xA0, 0xCD, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0xFB, 0x36, 0xCA, 0xAD, 0xF5, 0x9E, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x7A, 0x1D, 0x9E, 0x1D, 0x95, 0x48, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x26, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x15, 0x2C, 0xC2, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x42, 0x72, 0xAA, 0x11, 0xDC, 0xC9, 0xB6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x6C, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x62, 0x3C, 0xAB, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x6A, 0x44, 0xD8, 0x60, 0xC0, 0xA8, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x76, 0x58, 0x12, 0x57, 0x3C, 0x89, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x4F, 0x83, 0xCE, 0xCB, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x84, 0x04, 0xB0, 0xAD, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xA4, 0xC3, 0x41, 0x44, 0x4E, 0x65, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x16, 0xA9, 0x1C, 0xE7, 0x65, 0x20, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x53, 0x32, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xA6, 0xBD, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xF0, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x26, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xE3, 0x54, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xD3, 0x17, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xAE, 0xED, 0xFB, 0xCD, 0xE7, 0x1E, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x16, 0x1C, 0x34, 0x40, 0x00, 0x1F, 0xB6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x32, 0x00, 0xC2, 0xD4, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xE0, 0x99, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0x4A, 0x16, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x73, 0x18, 0x1B, 0xD4, 0x94, 0x29, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xA4, 0x2D, 0xB1, 0x9D, 0x74, 0x32, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xF4, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x37, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xFF, 0xDA, 0xE2, 0x35, 0xA3, 0xB6, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x49, 0x99, 0x65, 0xC5, 0xED, 0x16, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x42, 0x9A, 0xF3, 0xA7, 0x4E, 0x6F, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x0A, 0x7E, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x07, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x7A, 0x31, 0x69, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x15, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xE0, 0x72, 0xA4, 0x3F, 0xB9, 0xF8, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x75, 0x32, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0x37, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xC0, 0x0D, 0xCF, 0x25, 0x41, 0xA4, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xFC, 0xB2, 0x48, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x83, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xBE, 0x0B, 0x58, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x9A, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xF3, 0x81, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x74, 0x4F, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x43, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x16, 0x8B, 0xA3, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x18, 0x81, 0x7B, 0x8D, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x77), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xC4, 0x3F, 0x2C, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0x99, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0xAD, 0x5A, 0x56, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x48, 0xC8, 0xE8, 0xBA, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xA1, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x5A, 0xCD, 0x99, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x95, 0xAD, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x6B, 0xD1, 0x34, 0x99, 0x53, 0x63, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x5D, 0x2B, 0xAB, 0x01, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x85, 0xD0, 0xD5, 0x49, 0x83, 0x4D, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xC6, 0x91, 0x30, 0x3B, 0x00, 0xAF, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xAE, 0x61, 0x07, 0xE1, 0xB6, 0xE2, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x43, 0x41, 0xFE, 0x9B, 0xB6, 0xF0, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x97, 0xAE, 0xAD, 0x89, 0x88, 0x9E, 0x41), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp384r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp384r1_T_0_X, secp384r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_1_X, secp384r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_2_X, secp384r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_3_X, secp384r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_4_X, secp384r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_5_X, secp384r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_6_X, secp384r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_7_X, secp384r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_8_X, secp384r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_9_X, secp384r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_10_X, secp384r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_11_X, secp384r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_12_X, secp384r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_13_X, secp384r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_14_X, secp384r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_15_X, secp384r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_16_X, secp384r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_17_X, secp384r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_18_X, secp384r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_19_X, secp384r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_20_X, secp384r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_21_X, secp384r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_22_X, secp384r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_23_X, secp384r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_24_X, secp384r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_25_X, secp384r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_26_X, secp384r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_27_X, secp384r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_28_X, secp384r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_29_X, secp384r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_30_X, secp384r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_31_X, secp384r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp384r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp521r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xFF, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x3F, 0x50, 0x6B, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0x45, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x34, 0x2C, 0x3D, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x73, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xBF, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0xBD, 0xC0, 0x52, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x93, 0x7E, 0xEC, 0x51, 0x39, 0x19, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x09, 0xF1, 0x8E, 0x91, 0x89, 0xB4, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x15, 0xB3, 0x99, 0x5B, 0x72, 0xDA, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x40, 0x85, 0xB6, 0xA0, 0x21, 0x9A, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x9A, 0x1C, 0x8E, 0x61, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x51, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xC6, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x18, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x64, 0x38, 0x91, 0x1E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x47, 0x9C, 0x89, 0xB8, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0xA5, 0x09, 0xF7, 0x48, 0x01, 0xCC, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x96, 0x2F, 0xBF, 0x83, 0x87, 0x86, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xFF, 0x01), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xB1, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x27, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x4B, 0x44, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x5C, 0x5F, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x85, 0x28, 0x78, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x34, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x57, 0x0F, 0x73, 0x78, 0x7A, 0xE3, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD8, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xDA, 0x04, 0xAD, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x8A, 0x09, 0xF3, 0x58, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x03, 0xCB, 0x50, 0x1A, 0x7F, 0x56, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xA6, 0x78, 0x38, 0x85, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xD5, 0xD2, 0x22, 0xC4, 0x00, 0x3B, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x93, 0x0E, 0x7B, 0x85, 0x51, 0xC3, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x54, 0x49, 0x02, 0x81, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x3A, 0x92, 0xE7, 0x72, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x5F, 0x28, 0x9E, 0x91, 0x27, 0x88, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x28, 0x31, 0xB3, 0x84, 0xCA, 0x12, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xF9, 0xAC, 0x22, 0x10, 0x0A, 0x64, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xC6, 0x33, 0x1F, 0x69, 0x19, 0x18, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x48, 0xB8, 0xC7, 0x37, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xCC, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xEE, 0x03, 0xC2, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x29, 0xC2, 0xE4, 0x6E, 0x24, 0x20, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0x7B, 0xF9, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x7B, 0x3C, 0xE1, 0x19, 0xA1, 0x23, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x53, 0xC0, 0x07, 0x13, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFE, 0x36, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x5E, 0x59, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x55, 0x89, 0x84, 0xBC, 0xEF, 0xA2, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x1A, 0x08, 0x67, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x22, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x26, 0xDF, 0x81, 0x3C, 0x5F, 0x1C, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x4D, 0xD0, 0x0A, 0x48, 0x06, 0xF4, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x18, 0x39, 0xF7, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x77, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x8F, 0x44, 0x13, 0xCB, 0x78, 0x11, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xE2, 0x49, 0xEA, 0x43, 0x79, 0x08, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xD1, 0xD8, 0x73, 0x2C, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0xF4, 0x46, 0xAB, 0x20, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x0B, 0xB9, 0x71, 0x1A, 0x27, 0xB7, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xA2, 0x2C, 0xD1, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xA3, 0x10, 0x1F, 0x90, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xFB, 0x20, 0xF4, 0xC0, 0x70, 0xC0, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xA7, 0x99, 0xF0, 0xA5, 0xD3, 0x09, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0xE8, 0x14, 0x39, 0xBE, 0xCB, 0x60, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xD6, 0x14, 0xA9, 0xC9, 0x20, 0xC3, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA8, 0x5B, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x96, 0xBC, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x04, 0x45, 0xBE, 0xCE, 0x75, 0x95, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x49, 0x35, 0x09, 0x8D, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x36, 0xF2, 0xA6, 0x2D, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xFC, 0x3D, 0xA8, 0xFB, 0x3C, 0xD2, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x09, 0x18, 0x42, 0xF0, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xC1, 0xCE, 0x9E, 0x6A, 0x49, 0x60, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xB1, 0x00, 0xF7, 0xA1, 0x7A, 0x31, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xC3, 0x86, 0xCD, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x47, 0x8D, 0xAA, 0xA6, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x97, 0xF0, 0xBC, 0x2D, 0xDC, 0x9D, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x86, 0xB0, 0x74, 0xB2, 0xF4, 0xF6, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x43, 0x5C, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xC3, 0xE2, 0x6E, 0x25, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x5E, 0x08, 0xB3, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x5F, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xB7, 0xD1, 0xF4, 0xDC, 0x19, 0xE9, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xE4, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x3E, 0xED, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x67, 0x92, 0x84, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x03, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x95, 0xEF, 0x8F, 0xB2, 0x82, 0x6B, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFA, 0xB9, 0x55, 0x23, 0xFE, 0x09, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x79, 0x85, 0x4B, 0x0E, 0xD4, 0x35, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x27, 0x45, 0x81, 0xE0, 0x88, 0x52, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x63, 0xA2, 0x4B, 0xBC, 0x5D, 0xB1, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x8C, 0x83, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0xD3, 0x42, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x03, 0x3A, 0x31, 0xBA, 0xE9, 0x3A, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x10, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0x00, 0xFE, 0x32, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0xDA, 0xF8, 0x6F, 0x4D, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x79, 0x7D, 0x09, 0xE5, 0xD3, 0x03, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xC3, 0xBE, 0xDF, 0x07, 0x65, 0x49, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x57, 0x33, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x4F, 0x04, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xFE, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x85, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xBA, 0xAA, 0x06, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x83, 0x01, 0xA9, 0xF6, 0x51, 0xE7, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xA6, 0x15, 0x8E, 0xAB, 0x1F, 0x10, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x08, 0x27, 0x1A, 0xA1, 0x21, 0xAD, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x09, 0x90, 0x6E, 0x50, 0x90, 0x9A, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0xF5, 0xA2, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x7D, 0xE3, 0xDC, 0x21, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xBF, 0x07, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x51, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x5C, 0x34, 0x02, 0x62, 0x9B, 0x08, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0x6A, 0xEC, 0x75, 0xF6, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x3C, 0x60, 0xB1, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x37, 0x84, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0xF2, 0x9A, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x9A, 0x9A, 0x15, 0x36, 0xE0, 0x2B, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x38, 0x9C, 0x50, 0x3D, 0x1E, 0x37, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x79, 0xF0, 0x92, 0xF2, 0x8B, 0x18, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x1E, 0x80, 0x82, 0x4B, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x6B, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xF9, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0x4A, 0x82, 0xCF, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x8C, 0xC8, 0x9B, 0x72, 0x9E, 0xF7, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xCE, 0xE9, 0x77, 0x0A, 0x19, 0x59, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xA1, 0x41, 0x6A, 0x72, 0x4B, 0xB4, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x35, 0x43, 0xE2, 0x8C, 0xBE, 0x0D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xEB, 0xAD, 0xF3, 0xA9, 0xA6, 0x68, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x2F, 0xE2, 0x48, 0x0C, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x1E, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xD2, 0xC1, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x64, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0xF6, 0xF6, 0x6E, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x3D, 0x30, 0x78, 0x10, 0x18, 0x41, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x1D, 0x1C, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x83, 0xD1, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x03, 0x0B, 0xF5, 0x2F, 0x6C, 0x04, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x3E, 0xD5, 0xFC, 0x31, 0x5B, 0x3A, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x82, 0x2F, 0xFB, 0xFE, 0xF8, 0x76, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x26, 0xDA, 0x9C, 0x36, 0xF5, 0x93, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xE7, 0x6E, 0xD2, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x09, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x03, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x48, 0x24, 0xA2, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x79, 0x0C, 0x8E, 0x6B, 0x95, 0xF3, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x87, 0x03, 0x39, 0xCF, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xF0, 0xF7, 0xC1, 0x07, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xE8, 0x02, 0x89, 0x65, 0xC4, 0x72, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x88, 0xEA, 0x96, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x5D, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x75, 0x60, 0xA8, 0xBD, 0x74, 0xDF, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xE5, 0x71, 0x50, 0x67, 0xD0, 0xD2, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xFC, 0xE5, 0xC7, 0x77, 0xB0, 0x7F, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x86, 0x69, 0xCD, 0x0D, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x17, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xA8, 0x76, 0xAC, 0x80, 0xA9, 0x72, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x78, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x4D, 0xAF, 0xF9, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x97, 0x8E, 0x74, 0xC4, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD8, 0xF6, 0xF3, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0x52, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x57, 0xF4, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0x43, 0xED, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x46, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x18, 0xE8, 0x58, 0xB9, 0x76, 0x2C, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x54, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xC7, 0xBC, 0x31, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xF8, 0x89, 0xEE, 0x70, 0xB5, 0xB0, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x22, 0x26, 0x9A, 0x53, 0xB9, 0x38, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xA7, 0x19, 0x8C, 0x74, 0x7E, 0x88, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xDA, 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDA, 0xA5, 0xBE, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x5C, 0xF7, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x72, 0xFB, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xE2, 0x23, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xB7, 0xE0, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x36, 0xBC, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xBB, 0xA1, 0xF7, 0x0B, 0x9E, 0xBF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x28, 0xE1, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xFC, 0xFC, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xFE, 0x19, 0x0A, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0x69, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xCD, 0x12, 0xF5, 0xBE, 0xD3, 0x04, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xA8, 0x0D, 0x81, 0x59, 0xC4, 0x79, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xF3, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x65, 0xC3, 0x31, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xB5, 0x4F, 0x4D, 0x91, 0xD4, 0xE2, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x09, 0x41, 0x79, 0x1D, 0x4D, 0x0D, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x31, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xA0, 0xF2, 0x6E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x5B, 0x4D, 0x4F, 0xAF, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x99, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x68, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x04, 0xE1, 0xB5, 0x9D, 0x00, 0xBC, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x95, 0x92, 0x8D, 0x72, 0xD3, 0x37, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x4B, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xE8, 0xA4, 0x26, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x45, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0xCB, 0x9F, 0xBA, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x7E, 0x1B, 0x64, 0xF4, 0xE8, 0xA5, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x20, 0xA9, 0xCA, 0xF3, 0x89, 0xE5, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xED, 0xFC, 0xAB, 0xD9, 0x0A, 0xB9, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x6F, 0x46, 0x7C, 0xCD, 0x78, 0xFF, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xAB, 0x71, 0x5A, 0x94, 0xAB, 0x20, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x2E, 0xEE, 0x87, 0x57, 0x1F, 0xAD, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x4C, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x7E, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x86, 0xBA, 0x53, 0x37, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x26, 0xB2, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x91, 0xE3, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xC9, 0x54, 0x84, 0x08, 0x3D, 0x0B, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA8, 0x77, 0x2F, 0x64, 0x45, 0x99, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x96, 0x16, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0x96, 0x28, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x2B, 0x8D, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x4F, 0x55, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xE6, 0x48, 0xBD, 0x99, 0x3D, 0x12, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x84, 0x59, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xB6, 0x66, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x78, 0x41, 0x92, 0xDF, 0xF4, 0x3F, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x86, 0x6F, 0x4F, 0xBF, 0x67, 0xDF, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x2B, 0x1E, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xB9, 0x6A, 0x89, 0xD8, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x9A, 0x32, 0x23, 0xA0, 0x02, 0x91, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x7F, 0x6A, 0x15, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x8B, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x57, 0x82, 0x58, 0xA9, 0x56, 0xB5, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x50, 0x92, 0x60, 0xCC, 0x81, 0x24, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x3D, 0xAD, 0xDA, 0xD9, 0x51, 0x3E, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xFE, 0x8F, 0xB0, 0x0B, 0xDE, 0x2E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xD2, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0xAC, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xE8, 0x72, 0x0B, 0xAC, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x5B, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0xE3, 0x3C, 0x7C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x04, 0xA7, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x93, 0xC0, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x32, 0xC5, 0xF0, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x42, 0x07, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0xF1, 0x72, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9C, 0x88, 0xD2, 0x62, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x89, 0x58, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xCC, 0x4C, 0x97, 0x30, 0x66, 0x34, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0xC9, 0x5E, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x4D, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x9B, 0x9C, 0xAC, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xE4, 0x4B, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xDA, 0xE8, 0x61, 0x9F, 0xC8, 0x49, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x85, 0xF6, 0x8D, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xC5, 0xCD, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xC6, 0x0E, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x22, 0x9F, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x56, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x57, 0x32, 0xEC, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x9A, 0xC6, 0x4C, 0x09, 0xC4, 0x52, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x1E, 0x6F, 0xF4, 0x7D, 0x27, 0xDD, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x11, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x79, 0x83, 0xAD, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x4E, 0x92, 0x1F, 0x19, 0x7D, 0x65, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xFF, 0x78, 0x15, 0x45, 0x63, 0x32, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x91, 0xD0, 0x78, 0x58, 0xDA, 0x50, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0xDE, 0x40, 0xF6, 0x41, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0xE1, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0x35, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xD4, 0xBA, 0x7B, 0xCC, 0x1B, 0x3A, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x74, 0x47, 0x14, 0xC3, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xF0, 0x8B, 0x06, 0x15, 0x8E, 0x0E, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0xD2, 0xEB, 0x97, 0x50, 0x7D, 0x31, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x93, 0x4C, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x79, 0x44, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xA2, 0xA0, 0x0B, 0xC8, 0x3A, 0x8A, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x50, 0x92, 0x9E, 0x24, 0x1F, 0xCB, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x16, 0xC9, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0x5A, 0xAF, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xE4, 0xA8, 0x50, 0xF6, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x57, 0x97, 0x42, 0x78, 0x92, 0x49, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xEB, 0x62, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0x32, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x0C, 0x36, 0x6E, 0x8F, 0xE8, 0xE8, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xD3, 0x7C, 0xC7, 0x8D, 0x3F, 0x5C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x73, 0x10, 0x79, 0xB8, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xF9, 0xEF, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x5C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xF3, 0xF4, 0x49, 0x5B, 0x73, 0xAA, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xF2, 0xEA, 0x0F, 0x00, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xB8, 0x66, 0xED, 0xC4, 0x2B, 0x4C, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x2F, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x37, 0xD2, 0x7F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xA7, 0x81, 0x38, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x37, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x3B, 0x6C, 0x9F, 0x5B, 0xD9, 0x8B, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x08, 0xD8, 0xD2, 0x7E, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x71, 0xE6, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xB0, 0xE7, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x81, 0x23, 0xEC, 0x2D, 0x42, 0x45, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x5B, 0x44, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x03, 0x67, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x27, 0xAE, 0x80, 0x5A, 0x33, 0xBE, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xB6, 0x64, 0x1A, 0xDF, 0xD3, 0x85, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x8C, 0x22, 0xBA, 0xD0, 0xBD, 0xCC, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x3C, 0x01, 0x3A, 0xFF, 0x9D, 0xC7, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xC7, 0x64, 0xB4, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x9F, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x34, 0x0A, 0x41, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xF2, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xD4, 0xE4, 0xF0, 0x97, 0x45, 0x6D, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x6D, 0xFE, 0xA0, 0xC4, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x40, 0xBB, 0x65, 0xD4, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xA8, 0x87, 0x35, 0x20, 0x3A, 0x89, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFD, 0x4F, 0xAB, 0x2D, 0xD1, 0xD0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xE8, 0x00, 0xFC, 0x69, 0x52, 0xF8, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x9A, 0x99, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x9C, 0x3F, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x08, 0x98, 0xD9, 0xCA, 0x73, 0xD5, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xD7, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x04, 0xB0, 0x54, 0x09, 0xF4, 0x72, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xEE, 0x28, 0xCC, 0xE8, 0x50, 0x78, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x91, 0x03, 0x76, 0xDB, 0x68, 0x24, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xE0, 0x56, 0xB2, 0x5D, 0x12, 0xD3, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x42, 0x59, 0x8B, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xB5, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xCC, 0xE5, 0x31, 0x53, 0x7A, 0x46, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x8D, 0x59, 0xB5, 0x1B, 0x0F, 0xF4, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x2F, 0xD1, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0x04, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0xBA, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x7E, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x08, 0x51, 0x56, 0xA6, 0x76, 0x67, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x17, 0x63, 0xFE, 0x56, 0xD0, 0xD9, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xF6, 0xC3, 0x14, 0x47, 0xC5, 0xA7, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x4C, 0x80, 0xF6, 0xA2, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xB3, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x2F, 0xE1, 0x3E, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x6B, 0x7B, 0x90, 0xDF, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x82, 0xEF, 0x62, 0xA1, 0x4C, 0x53, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x99, 0x76, 0x01, 0xBA, 0x8D, 0x0F, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xF4, 0x58, 0x73, 0x56, 0xFE, 0xDD, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xCE, 0xF9, 0xE8, 0xA1, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x5F, 0xDC, 0x6A, 0x3D, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xF4, 0x51, 0xB8, 0xB8, 0xC1, 0xD7, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x7D, 0x58, 0xD1, 0xD4, 0x1B, 0x4D, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x95, 0xDF, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x47, 0x3C, 0xC3, 0xB2, 0x01, 0x53, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x17, 0x43, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xBA, 0x0F, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x41, 0x54, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x39, 0x26, 0x70, 0x53, 0x32, 0x18, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x46, 0x07, 0x97, 0x3A, 0x57, 0xE0, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x92, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xDF, 0x25, 0x80, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x6F, 0x9A, 0x03, 0x05, 0x4B, 0xD1, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x01, 0x72, 0x30, 0x90, 0x17, 0x51, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xFB, 0x41, 0x65, 0x5C, 0xB4, 0x2D, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xCD, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xCC, 0xBB, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xCE, 0x08, 0x0A, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xA2, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA8, 0x21, 0x7F, 0x7A, 0x5B, 0x9B, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x44, 0x0A, 0x7F, 0x85, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xDE, 0x7C, 0x19, 0x5C, 0x65, 0x26, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x29, 0x4A, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x00, 0x40, 0x87, 0xEB, 0xA9, 0x58, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x51, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x56, 0x35, 0x51, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xAC, 0x08, 0x94, 0x71, 0xDA, 0xEC, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x4D, 0xC5, 0x7B, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x8D, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x05, 0xF1, 0x3E, 0x9E, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0x62, 0x94, 0xAD, 0x49, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0x8F, 0xFD, 0x33, 0x44, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7F, 0x42, 0xBE, 0xF7, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x29, 0x39, 0x13, 0x08, 0x8D, 0x91, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x79, 0xF9, 0x2F, 0xA9, 0x0A, 0xCF, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x87, 0x7A, 0xA3, 0x19, 0xAB, 0x55, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x0B, 0x01, 0xC5, 0x56, 0x19, 0x9D, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xDE, 0x82, 0x3B, 0xEA, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x6B, 0xC7, 0xF3, 0x0F, 0x82, 0x87, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x2E, 0x23, 0xF2, 0x39, 0x9D, 0x49, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0xDE, 0xAF, 0x7A, 0xEE, 0xB0, 0xDA, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x4E, 0x2A, 0x50, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0xC0, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x63, 0xD8, 0x89, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x4E, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x85, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x95, 0x5C, 0x96, 0x5D, 0xAA, 0x59, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xDB, 0xD2, 0x68, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x94, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x02, 0xBF, 0x77, 0x9F, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xDC, 0xC0, 0xCF, 0x81, 0x1E, 0xC4, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xCC, 0x37, 0x86, 0xDC, 0xE2, 0x64, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x59, 0x20, 0x9D, 0x98, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x0C, 0x9D, 0xF8, 0x20, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xA0, 0xF4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0x9C, 0x9E, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x25, 0xA2, 0xB0, 0x54, 0xCD, 0x2E, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD9, 0x42, 0xB0, 0x80, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xFE, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x40, 0xFF, 0x27, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x9D, 0xA6, 0x88, 0x3A, 0x8B, 0x6F, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x39, 0xEE, 0x1F, 0x3F, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xD7, 0x9E, 0xFF, 0xD2, 0x35, 0x67, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x4F, 0x15, 0x5D, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0x53, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xF7, 0x24, 0x98, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0x11, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x2E, 0x25, 0xE1, 0x94, 0xC5, 0xA3, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x82, 0x6E, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x43, 0x25, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x65, 0xB4, 0x49, 0x73, 0x18, 0x35, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x5B, 0xBC, 0x62, 0x86, 0x4C, 0xC1, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xF2, 0x95, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x59, 0x62, 0xB0, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0xB4, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x55, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x69, 0xBA, 0x63, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0x69, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x34, 0x7D, 0x68, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x06, 0xCA, 0x55, 0x44, 0x36, 0x2B, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xD4, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x69, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x44, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x40, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x4F, 0xFA, 0x75, 0xE3, 0xFB, 0x97, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x1C, 0x48, 0xB0, 0x26, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x7B, 0x32, 0xFA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0x84, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x21, 0x03, 0x1D, 0x0D, 0x22, 0x55, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xF9, 0x42, 0x03, 0x9C, 0xC2, 0xCB, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xA1, 0x96, 0xD9, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x6F, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x40, 0x57, 0xEB, 0x40, 0x2D, 0xC0, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x4F, 0x2F, 0x23, 0xA8, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x29, 0x85, 0x21, 0xA5, 0x50, 0x62, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x7D, 0x92, 0xCF, 0x87, 0x0C, 0x22, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x0E, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x96, 0x37, 0x2C, 0x88, 0x35, 0x30, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xB4, 0x69, 0xFF, 0xEB, 0xC6, 0x94, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x55, 0x60, 0xAD, 0xAA, 0x58, 0x14, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xFF, 0xF2, 0xB2, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0xD9, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xAE, 0x54, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x31, 0xF3, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x92, 0x83, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x42, 0x83, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xD2, 0xC8, 0xB7, 0x76, 0x45, 0x7F, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x11, 0xA4, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x01, 0xBC, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x27, 0x73, 0x8D, 0x02, 0x91, 0x27, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x62, 0xF6, 0xDD, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x5B, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xCA, 0xA2, 0x44, 0x2C, 0xF0, 0x28, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xF1, 0x7A, 0xA2, 0x42, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x83, 0x3E, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0xF7, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xED, 0x78, 0xCB, 0x76, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x01, 0x1E, 0x43, 0x27, 0x47, 0x6E, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x4F, 0x54, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x35, 0x40, 0x69, 0x7F, 0x74, 0x9D, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x06, 0x6F, 0x67, 0x68, 0x2B, 0x4D, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x65, 0x41, 0xFC, 0x7C, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x79, 0x37, 0xAF, 0xFD, 0xD2, 0xDA, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xA8, 0x69, 0x56, 0x62, 0xA4, 0xE4, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x71, 0x73, 0x21, 0x8A, 0x17, 0x81, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x55, 0x8F, 0x7B, 0xB8, 0xAF, 0xF7, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xD1, 0xBD, 0xBE, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0x60, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xA6, 0x57, 0x8C, 0xAE, 0x5C, 0x19, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x43, 0xE4, 0xD9, 0xD8, 0x7B, 0xE7, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xB9, 0xE4, 0x85, 0x7C, 0x2E, 0xFC, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x2A, 0x6D, 0x56, 0xBE, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x0C, 0x25, 0x9B, 0xAE, 0x86, 0x37, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x22, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0x99, 0x66, 0xB7, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xF7, 0x90, 0xF0, 0x1B, 0x09, 0x27, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x64, 0x49, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xA0, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xA9, 0x07, 0x54, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xFF, 0xE2, 0x00, 0x07, 0x21, 0x88, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x53, 0x05, 0x6C, 0x42, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xF7, 0x39, 0x5C, 0x82, 0x36, 0xE8, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x83, 0xA8, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x43, 0x07, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xAF, 0x2B, 0x79, 0xED, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x20, 0x91, 0x7A, 0xC4, 0x07, 0xEF, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x10, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x0E, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x81, 0x87, 0x41, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x55, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x53, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xB6, 0xEB, 0x6C, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x77, 0x73, 0x9D, 0xFC, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x40, 0xE3, 0x6D, 0x1C, 0x16, 0x71, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xF4, 0x1B, 0xFF, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0xA5, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x0E, 0x0B, 0x11, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x93, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xC5, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x24, 0x19, 0xF2, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xB3, 0xAF, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x4F, 0x5E, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x18, 0x8E, 0x33, 0x68, 0x6C, 0xE8, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x8B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x19, 0x7F, 0x90, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x68, 0xE2, 0x7D, 0xD4, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xC1, 0x67, 0xB3, 0x72, 0xCB, 0xBF, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x1D, 0x14, 0x58, 0x0A, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x7A, 0x65, 0x98, 0xB3, 0x07, 0x4B, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x87, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA2, 0x01, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xC9, 0xC8, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x87, 0xA5, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xA0, 0xAB, 0x24, 0x1E, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xBC, 0x02, 0x35, 0x70, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x59, 0xA0, 0x50, 0x04, 0x80, 0x52, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x56, 0x6E, 0x42, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x91, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0xA5, 0xDE, 0x14, 0x24, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xCB, 0x74, 0x28, 0xE6, 0xA7, 0xE7, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x73, 0xA8, 0x8F, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0x63, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x1B, 0x77, 0xC7, 0xC1, 0x38, 0xF9, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x3C, 0xCF, 0xA8, 0x7A, 0xD7, 0xF3, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x5F, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xAD, 0xE9, 0x1A, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x5E, 0xD5, 0x81, 0x95, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x88, 0x75, 0x29, 0x1F, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA9, 0x5A, 0x4D, 0x63, 0x95, 0xF9, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xCD, 0x04, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x91, 0xDE, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xD4, 0xFD, 0x25, 0x11, 0x99, 0x6E, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x83, 0x01, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x3A, 0xDC, 0x74, 0xC2, 0xD7, 0xCF, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xBD, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x07, 0x03, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xBE, 0xE9, 0x2E, 0x58, 0x84, 0x66, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x20, 0x78, 0x37, 0x79, 0x0B, 0xA6, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xF2, 0xAC, 0x65, 0xC8, 0xC9, 0x2F, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x93, 0xE5, 0x0D, 0x0C, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xAD, 0x5C, 0x19, 0x12, 0x61, 0x0E, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x4F, 0x0B, 0x1F, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2E, 0x30, 0x61, 0xDB, 0x08, 0x68, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x78, 0xAF, 0xB3, 0x08, 0xC1, 0x69, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x5F, 0x5D, 0xC1, 0x57, 0x6F, 0xD8, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0xD3, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xE5, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x7B, 0x47, 0xE8, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x62, 0xC8, 0x7E, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x2B, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x84, 0xFD, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6F, 0x12, 0x6E, 0x4D, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x08, 0xA1, 0x82, 0x9C, 0x62, 0x74, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x58, 0x22, 0x05, 0x1D, 0x15, 0x35, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5C, 0x05, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x6B, 0x2F, 0x79, 0x09, 0x73, 0x67, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA0, 0x80, 0xD8, 0xE8, 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x48, 0x7B, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x53, 0xA9, 0xED, 0x61, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x49, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9B, 0x4E, 0x89, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x12, 0xEB, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xCB, 0xC1, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xDC, 0x95, 0x16, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x70, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x33, 0xB1, 0xD6, 0x78, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xCE, 0x88, 0xC3, 0xFD, 0x7A, 0x6B, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x1E, 0x50, 0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB1, 0x25, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xE7, 0xD7, 0xD5, 0xBD, 0x7A, 0x12, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xAA, 0xA2, 0x80, 0x5D, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x39, 0x79, 0x64, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3C, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xC7, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xAC, 0xAB, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x83, 0xF0, 0x3D, 0xBC, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x92, 0x4A, 0x38, 0x42, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x0B, 0x4F, 0xEE, 0x9E, 0x92, 0xA5, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xDD, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x6B, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xFC, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x8A, 0xE5, 0x4C, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x06, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x7E, 0xF8, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xC8, 0x01, 0x51, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x52, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x89, 0x66, 0x2B, 0x1F, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x0F, 0x95, 0x07, 0x2B, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xBB, 0x91, 0x1F, 0xA3, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x6E, 0x54, 0x28, 0x7B, 0x9C, 0x79, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x45, 0xFF, 0xA6, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x83, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xDE, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x37, 0x82, 0xCB, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x94, 0x3F, 0x26, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x97, 0x28, 0x20, 0xCD, 0xC1, 0xF3, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x7D, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0x8C, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xD1, 0x42, 0xE6, 0x39, 0x33, 0x6D, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xC0, 0xFC, 0xD2, 0x14, 0x5D, 0x3E, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x4A, 0x3E, 0x40, 0x16, 0x93, 0x15, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x24, 0xC1, 0x27, 0x27, 0xE5, 0x4B, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x50, 0xD8, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0x46, 0x22, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x0E, 0x60, 0xA1, 0xB3, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xB1, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x47, 0x5A, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0xAC, 0x11, 0x35, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0xF4, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x97, 0xFA, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x39, 0x13, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x7B, 0x34, 0x12, 0x75, 0x8E, 0x9B, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x9E, 0xCD, 0x29, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0x8D, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xAC, 0xE9, 0x25, 0x27, 0xBB, 0x78, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x7A, 0xA8, 0xD3, 0xE3, 0x66, 0xE5, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x76, 0x81, 0x50, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x71, 0x08, 0xB8, 0x52, 0x7C, 0xAF, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x59, 0x24, 0xDD, 0xFB, 0x2F, 0xD0, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xCD, 0x56, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x91, 0xE6, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x64, 0x20, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xE4, 0xEF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x97, 0xF6, 0x22, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF4, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xA5, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x6C, 0xAE, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x55, 0x55, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x67, 0x84, 0x47, 0x7C, 0x83, 0x5C, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x10, 0x4D, 0xDD, 0x30, 0x60, 0xB0, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xA7, 0x36, 0x76, 0x24, 0x32, 0x9F, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x42, 0x81, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x2E, 0x13, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x94, 0x91, 0xFF, 0x99, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x83, 0xA1, 0x76, 0xAF, 0x37, 0x5C, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xA8, 0x04, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xA9, 0x79, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xFB, 0x83, 0x28, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0xB0, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x02, 0x46, 0x7F, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xED, 0x48, 0xC2, 0x96, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x1C, 0x7E, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x2E, 0x18, 0x71, 0x2D, 0x7B, 0xD7, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x46, 0x9D, 0xDE, 0xAA, 0x78, 0x8E, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xD7, 0x69, 0x2E, 0xE1, 0xD9, 0x48, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xFF, 0x9E, 0x09, 0x22, 0x22, 0xE6, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x14, 0x28, 0x13, 0x1B, 0x62, 0x12, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x7F, 0x67, 0x03, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF3, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xC3, 0x0F, 0xFB, 0x25, 0x48, 0x3E, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x98, 0x36, 0xB3, 0xD3, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x81, 0x54, 0x22, 0xA4, 0xCC, 0xC1, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xBA, 0xFC, 0xA9, 0xDF, 0x68, 0x86, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x92, 0x0E, 0xC3, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xE8, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp521r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp521r1_T_0_X, secp521r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_1_X, secp521r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_2_X, secp521r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_3_X, secp521r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_4_X, secp521r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_5_X, secp521r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_6_X, secp521r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_7_X, secp521r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_8_X, secp521r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_9_X, secp521r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_10_X, secp521r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_11_X, secp521r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_12_X, secp521r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_13_X, secp521r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_14_X, secp521r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_15_X, secp521r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_16_X, secp521r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_17_X, secp521r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_18_X, secp521r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_19_X, secp521r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_20_X, secp521r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_21_X, secp521r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_22_X, secp521r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_23_X, secp521r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_24_X, secp521r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_25_X, secp521r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_26_X, secp521r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_27_X, secp521r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_28_X, secp521r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_29_X, secp521r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_30_X, secp521r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_31_X, secp521r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp521r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x03, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFD, 0xDE, 0x74, 0x6A, 0x46, 0x69, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xFC, 0xF2, 0x26, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x77, 0x3D, 0x0D, 0x85, 0x48, 0xA8, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x1D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x01, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x86, 0xF6, 0xAF, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x88, 0x2E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x90, 0xB6, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x36, 0x4C, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x11, 0x14, 0xA6, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0x15, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0xB0, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0xBA, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xC1, 0x9C, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x19, 0xAC, 0x5A, 0xC9, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x86, 0x89, 0x27, 0x8D, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xE0, 0x6F, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xD3, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0x87, 0xC9, 0x9D, 0xC0, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x11, 0x7E, 0xD6, 0xF7, 0x33, 0xFC, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x37, 0x3E, 0xC0, 0x7F, 0x62, 0xE7, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x3B, 0x69, 0x9D, 0x44, 0xBC, 0x82, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x84, 0xB3, 0x5F, 0x2B, 0xA5, 0x9E, 0x2C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x4C, 0x04, 0xB4, 0xF4, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xAD, 0x4B, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0xEB, 0xC4, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xB1, 0xC5, 0x59, 0xE3, 0xD5, 0x16, 0x2A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x2A, 0xCC, 0xAC, 0xD0, 0xEE, 0x50, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x83, 0xE0, 0x5B, 0x14, 0x44, 0x52, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x15, 0x2D, 0x78, 0xF6, 0x51, 0x32, 0xCF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x36, 0x9B, 0xDD, 0xF8, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xB1, 0x6A, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2B, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x87, 0x7A, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x8F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x45, 0xE5, 0x81, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x37, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x29, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x64, 0x23, 0x6B, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x1D, 0x41, 0xE1, 0x9B, 0x61, 0x7B, 0xD9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x59, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x6E, 0x4A, 0x48, 0x84, 0x90, 0xAC, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xB8, 0xF5, 0xF3, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0xA1, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x32, 0x81, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x5A, 0x4E, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xA8, 0x90, 0xBE, 0x0F, 0xEC, 0xC0, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x30, 0xD7, 0x08, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x3A, 0xA5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x76, 0xB3, 0x64, 0x74, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x75, 0xD4, 0xDB, 0x98, 0xD7, 0x39, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xEB, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xD4, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xBE, 0xF9, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xBA, 0xF3, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x85, 0x59, 0xF3, 0x60, 0x41, 0x02, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x1C, 0x4A, 0xA4, 0xC7, 0xED, 0x66, 0xBC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x46, 0x52, 0x18, 0x87, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x75, 0xAC, 0x4D, 0x75, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x2F, 0xAC, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x93, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x4D, 0xC9, 0x18, 0xE9, 0x00, 0xEB, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x69, 0x72, 0x07, 0x5A, 0x59, 0xA8, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x65, 0x83, 0x20, 0x10, 0xF9, 0x69, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x9F, 0xBF, 0x46, 0x0C, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xCF, 0xF0, 0xDC, 0xDF, 0x2D, 0xE6, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xF0, 0x72, 0x3A, 0x7A, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xAA, 0x57, 0x13, 0x37, 0xA7, 0x2C, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xAC, 0xA2, 0x23, 0xF9, 0x84, 0x60, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xEB, 0x51, 0x70, 0x64, 0x78, 0xCA, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xCC, 0x30, 0x62, 0x93, 0x46, 0x13, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x26, 0xCC, 0x6C, 0x3D, 0x5C, 0xDA, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xAA, 0xB8, 0x03, 0xA4, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x96), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x9D, 0xE6, 0xCC, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xC3, 0x8A, 0xAE, 0x6F, 0x40, 0x05, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x8F, 0x4A, 0x4D, 0x35, 0xD3, 0x50, 0x9D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0x03, 0xB4, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x40, 0xD2, 0x9F, 0xCA, 0xD0, 0x53, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x84, 0x00, 0x6F, 0xC8, 0xAD, 0xED, 0x8D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xD3, 0x57, 0xD7, 0xC3, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xBA, 0x47, 0x1D, 0x3D, 0xEF, 0x98, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xC0, 0x6C, 0x7F, 0x12, 0xEE, 0x9F, 0x67), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x02, 0xDA, 0x79, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x27, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x79, 0xC7, 0x71, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xE5, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x37, 0x06, 0xBA, 0xB5, 0xD5, 0x18, 0x4C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6C, 0xF2, 0x63, 0x27, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xBC, 0x71, 0xDF, 0x75, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x70, 0x9B, 0xDC, 0xE7, 0x18, 0x71, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x5B, 0x9F, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xE0, 0xBB, 0xFC, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x9C, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x03, 0x68, 0x83, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x4C, 0xDD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x49, 0x23, 0xA8, 0xCB, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x75, 0xB6, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xFD, 0x30, 0x01, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0xF9, 0xE8), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0x29, 0x42, 0xC9, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xD7, 0xA0, 0xE6, 0x6B, 0x86, 0x61, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0xE9, 0xD3, 0x37, 0xD8, 0xE7, 0x35, 0xA9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC8, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xCB, 0xB1, 0xB5, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xD7, 0x46, 0x7D, 0xAF, 0xE2, 0xDC, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x46, 0xE7, 0xD8, 0x76, 0x31, 0x90, 0x76), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xD3, 0xF4, 0x74, 0xE1, 0x67, 0xD8, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xC8, 0xAF, 0x5F, 0xF4, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x4E, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x43, 0xB3, 0x16, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAE, 0xD1, 0xDD, 0x31, 0x14, 0xD3, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x14, 0x06, 0x13, 0x12, 0x1C, 0x81, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xF9, 0x0C, 0x91, 0xF7, 0x67, 0x59, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x91, 0xE2, 0xF4, 0x9D, 0xEB, 0x88, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x82, 0x30, 0x9C, 0xAE, 0x18, 0x4D, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x79, 0xCF, 0x17, 0xA5, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192k1_T_0_X, secp192k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_1_X, secp192k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_2_X, secp192k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_3_X, secp192k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_4_X, secp192k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_5_X, secp192k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_6_X, secp192k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_7_X, secp192k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_8_X, secp192k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_9_X, secp192k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_10_X, secp192k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_11_X, secp192k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_12_X, secp192k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_13_X, secp192k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_14_X, secp192k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_15_X, secp192k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp192k1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE5, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x05, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xB1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x61, 0xEC, 0xD2, 0xE8, 0xDC, 0x01, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x6C, 0x22, 0x22, 0x40, 0x89, 0xAE, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x92, 0xE1, 0x87, 0x56, 0x35, 0xAF, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xAF, 0x08, 0x35, 0x27, 0xEA, 0x04, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x53, 0xFD, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xD0, 0x9F, 0x8D, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x54, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xDB, 0x0F, 0x61, 0x54, 0x26, 0xD1, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x21, 0xF7, 0x1B, 0xB5, 0x1D, 0xF6, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x05, 0xDA, 0x8F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x26, 0x73, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0x29, 0x62, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x95, 0x17, 0x8B, 0xC3, 0x9B, 0xAC, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xDB, 0x77, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0x13, 0x04, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0xFC, 0x22, 0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x65, 0xF1, 0x5A, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x79, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x01, 0x37, 0xAC, 0x9A, 0x5B, 0x51, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x75, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x4A, 0xAD, 0xFE, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x82, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x5E, 0xF0, 0x40, 0xC3, 0xA6, 0xE2, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x9A, 0x6F, 0xCF, 0x11, 0x26, 0x66, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x73, 0xA8, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x12, 0x36, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xB3, 0x0A, 0x58, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x79, 0x00, 0x55, 0x04, 0x34, 0x90, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x54, 0x1C, 0xC2, 0x45, 0x0C, 0x1B, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x19, 0xAB, 0xA8, 0xFC, 0x73, 0xDC, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0xFB, 0x93, 0xCE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x75, 0xD0, 0x66, 0x95, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xEA, 0x29, 0x16, 0x6A, 0x38, 0xDF, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA2, 0x36, 0x2F, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0x5E, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x89, 0x59, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0x77, 0x9D, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x93, 0x43, 0x47, 0xC6, 0x5C, 0xF9, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x00, 0x79, 0x42, 0x64, 0xB8, 0x25, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x54, 0xB4, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x0C, 0x42, 0x90, 0x83, 0x0B, 0x31, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x2E, 0xAE, 0xC8, 0xC7, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xBC, 0xAD, 0x41, 0xE7, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x97, 0x52, 0x83, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x13, 0x7A, 0xBD, 0xAE, 0x94, 0x60, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x9B, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x6E, 0x68, 0xB2, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x49, 0xBE, 0x51, 0xFE, 0x66, 0x15, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x37, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x9B, 0xEE, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x1B, 0xBD, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0xA9, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x25, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x13, 0xB1, 0x38, 0xFB, 0x9D, 0x78, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xE7, 0x1B, 0xFA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xB3, 0xB7, 0x44, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x00, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x82, 0x44, 0x3E, 0x18, 0x1A, 0x58, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xE4, 0xEE, 0xC1, 0xBF, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x32, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x9A, 0x42, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x26, 0x54, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x85, 0x74, 0xA0, 0x79, 0xA8, 0xEE, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x36, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x28, 0x4D, 0x55, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x27, 0x82, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0xFC, 0x73, 0x77, 0xAF, 0x5C, 0xAC, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xED, 0xE5, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x1C, 0xF1, 0x80, 0x73, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE2, 0xDE, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x3E, 0x6B, 0xFE, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x28, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xB2, 0x14, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x11, 0x7D, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC4, 0xD6, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x57, 0x4D, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x55, 0x1B, 0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xF7, 0x17, 0xBC, 0x45, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xB0, 0xEF, 0x61, 0xE3, 0x20, 0x7C, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x85, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xC2, 0x9B, 0x5E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x2E, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x3E, 0x4B, 0xD3, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x2B, 0x9D, 0xD5, 0x27, 0xFA, 0xCA, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0xB3, 0x6A, 0xE0, 0x79, 0x14, 0x28, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0xF5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x44, 0x56, 0xCD, 0xFC, 0x9F, 0x09, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x8C, 0x59, 0xA4, 0x64, 0x2A, 0x3A, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x86, 0x4E, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x8B, 0x11, 0x38, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x17, 0x16, 0x12, 0x17, 0xDC, 0x00, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x76, 0x24, 0x6C, 0x97, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x71, 0xE3, 0xB0, 0xBB, 0x4E, 0x50, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0x48, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x5F, 0x28, 0xF6, 0x01, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x95, 0xFE, 0xD0, 0xAD, 0x15, 0xD4, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0xFD, 0x80, 0xF7, 0x9F, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xBC, 0x1B, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xE6, 0xDF, 0x14, 0x29, 0xF4, 0xD4, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x12, 0xDD, 0xEC, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x59, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x92, 0x3E, 0x35, 0x08, 0xE9, 0xCF, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x35, 0x29, 0x97, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xDB, 0xD6, 0x6A, 0xC5, 0x43, 0xA4, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x33, 0x50, 0x61, 0x70, 0xA1, 0xE9, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x15, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x8C, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0xA1, 0x9A, 0x9D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0x4A, 0xCD, 0x9B, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x4D, 0x5A, 0xB8, 0xE2, 0x6D, 0xA6, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x3F, 0xB6, 0x17, 0xE3, 0x2C, 0x6F, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xA4, 0x59, 0x51, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x6E, 0xEB, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xC9, 0x1F, 0xB7, 0x4D, 0x98, 0xC7, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x20, 0x95, 0xBB, 0x20, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xF2, 0x73, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xEF, 0xFB, 0x30, 0xFA, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x4C, 0x24, 0xB4, 0x5B, 0xC9, 0x4C, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xDD, 0x5E, 0x84, 0x95, 0x4D, 0x26, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xFA, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0x7A, 0xDC, 0xA7, 0x53, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x9F, 0x81, 0x84, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0xFE, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x89, 0x1B, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x89, 0x71, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xE9, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xAD, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xE0, 0x23, 0x02, 0x86, 0x0F, 0x77, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x93, 0x6D, 0xE9, 0xF9, 0x3C, 0xBE, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xE7, 0x24, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x3C, 0x5B, 0x4B, 0x1B, 0x25, 0x37, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xE8, 0x38, 0x1B, 0xA1, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x19, 0xFD, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x01, 0x6B, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x69, 0x37, 0x4F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xE2, 0xBF, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x95, 0x9C, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x7B, 0xFC, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x25, 0x5E, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x55, 0x09, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x6A, 0xC9, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xCC, 0x3B, 0xD9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x08, 0x65, 0x5E, 0xCB, 0xAB, 0x48, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x79, 0x8B, 0xC0, 0x11, 0xC0, 0x69, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xE8, 0x8C, 0x4C, 0xC5, 0x28, 0xE4, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x1F, 0x34, 0x5C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224k1_T_0_X, secp224k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_1_X, secp224k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_2_X, secp224k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_3_X, secp224k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_4_X, secp224k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_5_X, secp224k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_6_X, secp224k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_7_X, secp224k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_8_X, secp224k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_9_X, secp224k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_10_X, secp224k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_11_X, secp224k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_12_X, secp224k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_13_X, secp224k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_14_X, secp224k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_15_X, secp224k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp224k1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xFC, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x07, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x41, 0x36, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xAF, 0xE6, 0xDC, 0xAE, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xEE, 0xD7, 0x1E, 0x67, 0x86, 0x32, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x73, 0xB1, 0xA9, 0xD5, 0xCC, 0x27, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x01, 0x71, 0xFE, 0x92, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x28, 0x63, 0x6D, 0x72, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xC0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE1, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x3E, 0x2C, 0x75, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xB7, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0x3C, 0xDF, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x5D, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x5E, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xC3, 0x05, 0xD6, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x24, 0xFC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xCF, 0x7B, 0xDC, 0xCD, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xE5, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x47, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x46, 0xA8, 0x61, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xE4, 0x55, 0xD5, 0xC2, 0xBF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x59, 0x24, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x45, 0x12, 0xDE, 0xBA, 0x4F, 0xEF, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x08, 0xBF, 0xC1, 0x66, 0xAA, 0x0A, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xFE, 0x30, 0x55, 0x31, 0x86, 0xA7, 0xB4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xBF, 0x18, 0x81, 0x67, 0x27, 0x42, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x05, 0x83, 0xA4, 0xDD, 0x57, 0xD3, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x63, 0xAB, 0xE4, 0x90, 0x70, 0xD0, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x5D, 0xFD, 0xA0, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x1C, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x80, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x09, 0xBC, 0x57, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x9F, 0x6E, 0x88, 0x54, 0x6E, 0x51, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x5F, 0x85, 0xFB, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x4A, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x19, 0xF5, 0x55, 0xC9, 0x07, 0xD8, 0xCE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xB4, 0xC3, 0xD9, 0x5C, 0xA0, 0xD4, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x30, 0xAF, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x66, 0x7B, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xBF, 0xF0, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0x71, 0xA4, 0x9E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x88, 0x28, 0xF1, 0xBE, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xF3, 0x1A, 0x0E, 0xB9, 0x01, 0x66, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xA7, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x05, 0xD0, 0xAA, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x39, 0x1E, 0x47, 0xE5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0xC0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xB9, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0x33, 0x8A, 0x7D, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x93, 0xA5, 0x53, 0x55, 0x16, 0xB4, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x5F, 0xEA, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x52, 0x71, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xF0, 0x24, 0xB8, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0xA0, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x00, 0x27, 0xB2, 0xDF, 0x73, 0xA2, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x2E, 0x4D, 0x7C, 0xDE, 0x7A, 0x23, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x65, 0x60, 0xC7, 0x97, 0x1E, 0xA4, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x13, 0x5B, 0x77, 0x59, 0xCB, 0x36, 0xE1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0x9E, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x2A, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x5F, 0x64, 0x9F, 0x1A, 0x19, 0xE6, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x7B, 0x39, 0xD2, 0xDB, 0x85, 0x84, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xC7, 0x0D, 0x58, 0x6E, 0x3F, 0x52, 0x15), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x68, 0x19, 0x0B, 0x68, 0xC9, 0x1E, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x4E, 0x21, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x55, 0xCC, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xF9, 0x25, 0x45, 0x54, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xB3, 0xF7, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA4, 0x04, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x1E, 0x88, 0xC4, 0xAA, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xAC, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x71, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xA2, 0xF1, 0x15, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x6C, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x5B, 0x05, 0xBC, 0xB7, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x72), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x80, 0xF8, 0x5C, 0x20, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x48, 0x2E, 0x68, 0x82, 0x7F, 0xEB, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x3B, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x32, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x6E, 0xA6, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x62, 0x78, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x4D, 0x3E, 0x86, 0x58, 0xC3, 0xEB, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x89, 0x33, 0x18, 0x21, 0x1D, 0x9B, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x9D, 0xFF, 0xC3, 0x79, 0xC1, 0x88, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xD4, 0x48, 0x53, 0xE8, 0xAD, 0x21, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x7B, 0xDE, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x17, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xF3, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xC8, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xAE, 0x4C, 0xB0, 0x16, 0xA4, 0x93, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x8B, 0x6B, 0xDC, 0xD7, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0x7E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0xD2, 0x59, 0x05, 0xA2, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x56, 0x09, 0x32, 0xF1, 0xE8, 0xE3, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xCA, 0xE5, 0x2E, 0xF0, 0xFB, 0x18, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x85, 0xA9, 0x23, 0x15, 0x31, 0x1F, 0x0E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xE5, 0xB1, 0x86, 0xB9, 0x6E, 0x8D, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x77, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0x3F, 0x89, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x25, 0xB0, 0xC7, 0x41, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x11, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0x11, 0x62, 0xD4, 0x2D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x7D, 0x34, 0xB3, 0x20, 0x7F, 0x37, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xD4, 0x45, 0xE8, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0xC5, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x32, 0x3B, 0x25, 0x7E, 0x79, 0xAF, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xE4, 0x54, 0x71, 0xBE, 0x35, 0x4E, 0xD0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x94, 0xDD, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC2, 0xDD, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x49, 0xE9, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0x08, 0x49, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xB6, 0x03, 0x88, 0x6F, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xD3, 0x1C, 0xF3, 0xA5, 0xEB, 0x79, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xF9, 0x43, 0x88, 0x89, 0x0D, 0x06, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x2D, 0xF5, 0x98, 0x32, 0xF6, 0xB1, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x73, 0x8F, 0x2B, 0x50, 0x27, 0x0A, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xE3, 0xBD, 0x16, 0x05, 0xC8, 0x93, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xE3, 0x3D, 0xDE, 0x5F, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xA3, 0x9C, 0x22, 0x3C, 0x33, 0x36, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x69, 0x45, 0x78, 0x14, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xF8, 0xD4, 0xBF, 0xB8, 0xC0, 0xA1, 0x25), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x88, 0xE1, 0x91, 0x03, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x11, 0xA1, 0xEF, 0x14, 0x0D, 0xC4, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xD4, 0x0D, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x33, 0x5C, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x45, 0x2A, 0x1A, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x04, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xB5, 0xA7, 0x80, 0xE9, 0x93, 0x97, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xB9, 0x7C, 0xA0, 0xC9, 0x57, 0x26, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0xEF, 0x56, 0xDA, 0x66, 0xF6, 0x1B, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x89, 0x6B, 0x91, 0xE0, 0xA9, 0x65, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x98, 0x96, 0x9B, 0x06, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x19, 0x37, 0x94, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xBE, 0x6B, 0x1A, 0x05, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xCD, 0x5D, 0x35, 0xB4, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x64), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xEF, 0x96, 0xDB, 0xF2, 0x61, 0x63, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x04, 0x88, 0xC9, 0x9F, 0x1B, 0x94, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x30, 0x79, 0x7E, 0x24, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xB8, 0x90, 0xB7, 0x94, 0x25, 0xBB, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x79, 0xEA, 0xAD, 0xC0, 0x6D, 0x18, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xA4, 0x58, 0x2A, 0x8D, 0x95, 0xB3, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x12, 0x0D, 0x79, 0xE2, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x6F, 0xBE, 0x97, 0x4D, 0xA4, 0x20, 0x07), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x31, 0x71, 0xC6, 0xA6, 0x91, 0xEB, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x9B, 0xA8, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0x77, 0xE1, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x06, 0xD3, 0x3D, 0x94, 0x30, 0xEF, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xDF, 0xCA, 0xFA, 0xF5, 0x28, 0xF8, 0xC9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xE1, 0x32, 0xFD, 0x3E, 0x81, 0xF8, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xF2, 0x4B, 0x1D, 0x19, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xB1, 0x8A, 0x22, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x6B, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x21, 0xEF, 0x30, 0xEC, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x89), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x84, 0x4A, 0x46, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x3C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x18, 0x3A, 0xF4, 0xCC, 0xF5, 0xB2, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xF4, 0xBD, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x89, 0x7F, 0x8A, 0xB1, 0x52, 0x3A, 0xAB), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256k1_T_0_X, secp256k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_1_X, secp256k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_2_X, secp256k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_3_X, secp256k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_4_X, secp256k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_5_X, secp256k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_6_X, secp256k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_7_X, secp256k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_8_X, secp256k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_9_X, secp256k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_10_X, secp256k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_11_X, secp256k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_12_X, secp256k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_13_X, secp256k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_14_X, secp256k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_15_X, secp256k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp256k1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP256r1 (RFC 5639 3.4) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x53, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0x1D, 0x48, 0x13, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x20, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x23, 0xF6, 0x3B, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3, 0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26, 0xC1, 0x55, 0x80, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xFF, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x30, 0x75, 0xF6, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x30, 0x2C, 0xFC, 0x75, 0x09, 0x5A, 0x7D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x07, 0x8C, 0xFF, 0x18, 0xDC, 0xCC, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE1, 0xF7, 0x5C, 0x29, 0x16, 0x84, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xBB, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9, 0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x56, 0x48, 0x97, 0x82, 0x0E, 0x1E, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xA6, 0x61, 0xB5, 0xA3, 0x7A, 0x39, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xA2, 0xED, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xE3, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0xC9, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x3F, 0x93, 0x7A, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x12, 0x53, 0x61, 0x3E, 0x76, 0x08, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x8C, 0x74, 0xF4, 0x08, 0xC3, 0x76, 0x80), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xDD, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xED, 0xEE, 0xC4, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xD9, 0xBE, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x20, 0x12, 0xCA, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x72, 0x71, 0x90, 0x7A, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x51, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0xBC, 0xB0, 0xB6, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x58, 0xD7, 0x0A, 0x84, 0x05, 0xA3, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x8E, 0x95, 0x61, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0xDF, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x92, 0x12, 0x0F, 0x5E, 0x87, 0x70, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x3A, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xF7, 0x45, 0xD3, 0x06, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x28, 0x65, 0xE1, 0xC5, 0x6C, 0x57, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x01, 0x81, 0x9E, 0x38, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xA5, 0x91, 0x2B, 0xDF, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xEE, 0xB6, 0x25, 0xD6, 0x98, 0xDE, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xA1, 0x55, 0x63, 0x39, 0xEB, 0xB5, 0x47), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xD6, 0xB8, 0xE3, 0x13, 0xED, 0x7F, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xE8, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xB8, 0xCD, 0x19, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x82, 0x83, 0x7A, 0x7B, 0x46, 0x56, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x60, 0x46, 0x15, 0x5A, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x61, 0x50, 0xC6, 0xFF, 0x10, 0x7D, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x51, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0x7D, 0x78, 0x26, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0x15, 0x9A, 0xF7, 0x01, 0xC1, 0xBB, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x0F, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xBD, 0x4A, 0x9E, 0x87), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xF8, 0xD1, 0x77, 0xD2, 0x49, 0xB3, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x86, 0xFB, 0x9E, 0x1F, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xCD, 0x86, 0x61, 0x2F, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xF6, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x37, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x77, 0xAA, 0x97, 0x9C, 0x0B, 0x04, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xA6, 0x60, 0x81, 0xCE, 0x25, 0x13, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x00, 0xF3, 0xBB, 0x82, 0x99, 0x95, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x5A, 0xCE, 0x90, 0x71, 0x38, 0x2F, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x1A, 0xC0, 0x84, 0x27, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x37, 0x52, 0x16, 0x13, 0x0E, 0xCE, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xBF, 0x5A, 0xDB, 0xDB, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xB7, 0x5E, 0xF9, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x5C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xAB, 0x5C, 0x8D, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC5, 0xF8, 0xF7, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x0B, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x4C, 0xA7, 0x45, 0x20, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x5D, 0xEF, 0xDE, 0xEE, 0x39, 0x44, 0x19), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x2F, 0x6D, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x58, 0x60, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xC9, 0x62, 0xCB, 0x38, 0x3C, 0x55, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xA5, 0x09, 0x10, 0x88, 0xDB, 0xE3, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x4B, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x1D, 0xB4, 0x10, 0x76, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x70, 0x5A, 0x07, 0xF5, 0x1A, 0x74, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xE9, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xC0, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x6D, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0x9B, 0xE9, 0x6D, 0x0E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x00, 0x32, 0x41, 0x57, 0x84, 0x89, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xC7, 0x14, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0xFF, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x67, 0x9E, 0xFB, 0xB6, 0xB8, 0x96, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x4A, 0xE3, 0x97, 0x4B, 0x58, 0xDE, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x1E, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x7F, 0xD5, 0xD4, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x08, 0x7A, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x89, 0xC7, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xF9, 0x11, 0x1B, 0xF5, 0x3C, 0x6D, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x50, 0xE5, 0x69, 0x1D, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x0C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x2F, 0xF8, 0x3F, 0xEC, 0x55, 0x99, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x90, 0x43, 0x81, 0x31, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x18, 0x44, 0x50, 0x5D, 0x76, 0xCB, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xC5, 0x5B, 0x9A, 0x03, 0xE6, 0x17, 0x39), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x89, 0xFC, 0x55, 0x94, 0x91, 0x6A, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x46, 0x35, 0xF2, 0x3A, 0x42, 0x08, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xD2, 0x76, 0x49, 0x42, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xEA, 0xA0, 0x52, 0xF1, 0x6A, 0x30, 0x57), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xB2, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x8A, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x94, 0xB5, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xC3, 0xD7, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x49, 0x1C, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x23, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x5C, 0x53), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x65, 0x5C, 0x85, 0x94, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x37, 0xC7, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0xAE, 0x6C, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xD8, 0x11, 0x54, 0x98, 0x44, 0xE3, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x4D, 0xA6, 0x4B, 0x28, 0xF2, 0x57, 0x9E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xD0, 0xEB, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x30, 0xD3, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0xA7, 0x73, 0x6E, 0xB6, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x47, 0xF6, 0xED, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x71, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xB5, 0x49, 0x61, 0x5E, 0x45, 0xF6, 0x4A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x0E, 0xB3, 0x84, 0x3A, 0x63, 0x72, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x53, 0x5C, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0x2E, 0xAB, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x0F, 0x8F, 0x87, 0x50, 0x28, 0xB4, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x98, 0x4A, 0x98, 0x31, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x51), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xC9, 0xE2, 0xFD, 0x5D, 0x1F, 0xE8, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x90, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xBA, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x5A, 0xB3, 0x4E, 0xFB, 0xE0, 0x57, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x0B, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x9D, 0x8E, 0x02), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x41, 0x8F, 0x31, 0xFA, 0x5A, 0xF6, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xE9, 0xE3, 0xF6, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x4E, 0xCD, 0xA2, 0x22, 0x14, 0xD4, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xED, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0F, 0x53, 0x10, 0x17), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x06, 0x24, 0x2C, 0x4E, 0xD1, 0x1E, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0x9F, 0xAB, 0xF0, 0x37, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x5E, 0x12, 0xCE, 0x83, 0x1B, 0x2A, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x65, 0xCF, 0xE8, 0x5C, 0xA5, 0xA2, 0x70), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x86, 0x76, 0x3A, 0x94, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xDA, 0xC9, 0xA6, 0x29, 0x93, 0x15, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x61, 0x6A, 0x7D, 0xC7, 0xA9, 0xF3, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x03, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x15, 0xCE, 0x50, 0x72), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xD0, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x4F, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x4B, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x71, 0x58, 0x7E, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x93, 0x95, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x8F, 0xC7, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0x7A, 0x86, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xAF, 0x68, 0x3A, 0x23, 0xC1, 0x2E, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x50, 0x11, 0x67, 0x39, 0xB9, 0xAF, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x86, 0xAA, 0x1E, 0x88, 0x21, 0x29, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x28, 0xA4, 0x9D, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x9A, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBA, 0x04, 0x67, 0xB7, 0x01, 0x40, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xA3, 0xCA, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x97, 0xA8, 0xB6, 0x3C, 0xEE, 0x90, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xED, 0xC4, 0xF7, 0xC3, 0x95, 0xEC, 0x85), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x84, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xD5, 0x64, 0xBB, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x9B, 0xE2, 0x28, 0x50, 0xC2, 0x72, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xF2, 0x74, 0xD1, 0x26, 0xBF, 0x32, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0x72, 0xDB, 0x6D, 0x30, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x50, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x48, 0xC1, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x28, 0xBB, 0x11, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x22, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0x5C, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x44, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xE8, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xBB, 0xC1, 0x81, 0x7F), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP256r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP256r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP384r1 (RFC 5639 3.6) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xEC, 0x07, 0x31, 0x13, 0x00, 0x47, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x1A, 0x1D, 0x90, 0x29, 0xA7, 0xD3, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x11, 0xB7, 0x7F, 0x19, 0xDA, 0xB1, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xD4, 0x3A, 0x50, 0x4A, 0x81, 0xA5, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xF9, 0x91, 0xBA, 0xEF, 0x65, 0x91, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x4F, 0x8E, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xAF, 0x05, 0xCE, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x72, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x15, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0xC6, 0x82, 0xC3, 0x7B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x96, 0x86, 0xB7, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0xC9, 0xDB, 0x95, 0x02, 0x39, 0xB4, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x62, 0xEB, 0x3E, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x88, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xD2, 0xDC, 0x07, 0xE1, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x44, 0xF0, 0x16, 0x54, 0xB5, 0x39, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x65, 0x04, 0xE9, 0x02, 0x32, 0x88, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xC3, 0x7F, 0x6B, 0xAF, 0xB6, 0x3A, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x25, 0x04, 0xAC, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x16, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0xD8, 0x8A, 0x54, 0x41, 0xD6, 0x6B, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x3B, 0xF1, 0x22, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x4B, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x33, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x52, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0x52, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x6E, 0x17, 0x9B, 0xD5, 0x2A, 0x4A, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xDA, 0x6B, 0xE5, 0x03, 0x07, 0x1D, 0x2E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0x98, 0xE3, 0xA4, 0xF6, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x7D, 0xFE, 0x51, 0x40, 0x3B, 0x47, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x88, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xE2, 0x8F, 0xCB, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xE2, 0x88, 0x2D, 0x4E, 0x50, 0xEB, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x54, 0x94, 0x5E, 0xF4, 0x7F, 0x3A, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x07, 0x1C, 0xE1, 0xBD, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x92, 0x28, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x04, 0xB1, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x82, 0x44, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0D, 0x55, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xE3, 0xFF, 0x89, 0x46, 0xDE, 0x4E, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x67, 0x1A, 0x81, 0xEE, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x54, 0xE2, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0xDA, 0x2C, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x9A, 0x90, 0xAA, 0x6E, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x5F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x40, 0xAC, 0xED, 0x7D, 0x37, 0x87, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xF8, 0xB1, 0x80, 0x4C, 0x8C, 0x04, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x98, 0x2C, 0xAD, 0x30, 0x69, 0x35, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x2E, 0x00, 0x2F, 0x44, 0x8C, 0xF0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x58, 0x07, 0xD7, 0xCD, 0x60, 0xA1, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xFB, 0x7B, 0x03, 0x05, 0x5E, 0x79, 0x73), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x17, 0xCE, 0x38, 0x4B, 0x5E, 0x5B, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x0E, 0x0A, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x7C, 0x62, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xF0, 0x98, 0x71, 0x7F, 0x17, 0x26, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xD3, 0xFA, 0x3C, 0xF0, 0x70, 0x07, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x47, 0x5C, 0x09, 0x43, 0xB7, 0x65, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xFA, 0xF3, 0xEC, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x78, 0x22, 0x2B, 0x58, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x30, 0xCE, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0xB0, 0x4F, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x95, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x23, 0xC2, 0x65, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xCF, 0x03, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x80, 0x44, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xD5, 0xED, 0xEA, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x5B, 0x16, 0x10, 0x25, 0xAC, 0x2A, 0x17), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0x8C, 0x6B, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xBB, 0x1C, 0xD3, 0x5A, 0xEE, 0xD9, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x5D, 0x30, 0x5E, 0xF7, 0xB2, 0x41, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xCE, 0x0F, 0x1A, 0xC6, 0x41, 0x64, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x18, 0xE1, 0xE3, 0x82, 0x15, 0x66, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xE2, 0x24, 0x04, 0x72, 0x39, 0xA0, 0x7C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x51, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x88, 0x62, 0xE1, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xD2, 0x65, 0x14, 0xE9, 0x4C, 0x82, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xE1, 0xAC, 0x87, 0xAE, 0x31, 0x1A, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x4F, 0x96, 0x1E, 0x85, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x86, 0xBB, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x08, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x53, 0x03, 0x09, 0x80, 0x91, 0xEF, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xD7, 0xAF, 0x6F, 0x69, 0x7B, 0x88, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x30, 0xA2, 0x47, 0xB5, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xD2, 0xC0, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x3C, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x8C, 0xB3, 0x4C, 0xBA, 0x8B, 0x6D, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0xC7, 0xA1, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x4F, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x4A, 0x97, 0xC8, 0x03, 0x6F, 0x01, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x18, 0x12, 0xA9, 0x39, 0xD5, 0x22, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xA7, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x78, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xB3, 0xD0, 0x7F, 0xDF, 0xD0, 0x30, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x25, 0x73, 0x96, 0xEC, 0xA8, 0x1D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xD1, 0x65, 0x66, 0xDC, 0xD9, 0xCF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x37, 0xAD, 0xE2, 0xBE, 0x2D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x79, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x07, 0x66, 0xB1, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x53, 0x62, 0x65, 0x92, 0x09, 0x4C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xAF, 0xC3, 0x03, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x2D, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xCA, 0x41, 0xD9, 0xA2, 0x69, 0x9B, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xB2, 0xA6, 0x8D, 0xE1, 0xAA, 0x61, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xBA, 0x4D, 0x12, 0xB6, 0xBE, 0xF3, 0x7E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xD9, 0x92, 0x22, 0x07, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xA1, 0x7C, 0x91, 0xDB, 0x32, 0xF7, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x49, 0x4B, 0x6D, 0xFB, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xFB, 0x4E, 0x4C, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x81, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0x00, 0xB7, 0xD9, 0xCC, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x36, 0x8B, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x1F, 0x60, 0x03, 0xBB, 0xD7, 0x60, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xDD, 0x71, 0x95, 0xE9, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0x5F, 0x68, 0x81, 0xC5, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0x98, 0x42, 0x28, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x29, 0x8E, 0x11, 0x49, 0xB4, 0xD7, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x3E, 0xD2, 0x30, 0xA1, 0xBA, 0xCA, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x37, 0x64, 0x44, 0x2F, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x42, 0xBC, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x1A, 0x5F, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x04, 0xAB, 0x04, 0xE0, 0x24, 0xAD, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x45, 0x17, 0x67, 0x1F, 0x3E, 0x53, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x0F, 0xB3, 0x1B, 0x57, 0x54, 0xC2, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xD3, 0xF8, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x9B, 0xFA, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x90, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x49, 0x38, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xCF, 0xC6, 0xDD, 0xF0, 0xFF, 0x8C, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x69, 0x9D, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x33, 0xE9, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x19, 0x82, 0x3D, 0xAC, 0x1C, 0x40, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC7, 0x02, 0x46, 0x14, 0x77, 0x00, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x05, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x3A, 0x66, 0x5C, 0x39), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xE6, 0x17, 0xDE, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xC6, 0x42, 0x5E, 0xE7, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x21, 0x68, 0x5A, 0x26, 0xFB, 0xD7, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x00, 0x5C, 0xBA, 0x8A, 0x34, 0xEC, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x9C, 0x3C, 0xAF, 0x53, 0xE8, 0x65, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xEF, 0x28, 0xDC, 0x67, 0x05, 0xC8, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x78, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x49, 0xA0, 0xBC, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x3E, 0x2D, 0xA0, 0xCF, 0xD4, 0x7A, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x93, 0xFE, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x6E, 0x99, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xAD, 0x04, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xAF, 0x5E, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x7A, 0xED, 0xA6, 0x9E, 0x18, 0x09, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x05, 0x94, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xB8, 0x85, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xB7, 0x37, 0xC2, 0x50, 0x75, 0x15, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0xB2, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x3E, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x81, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x73, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xF1, 0xD1, 0x61, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x8F, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xDB, 0x4A, 0xFF, 0x14, 0xA7, 0x48, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x73, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xCC, 0xF1, 0x57, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xED, 0x73, 0x27, 0x70, 0x82, 0xB6, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xBA, 0xAC, 0x3A, 0xCF, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xD6, 0xB1, 0x8F, 0x0E, 0x08, 0x2C, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x2F, 0x0E, 0xA1, 0xF3, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xF5, 0x7C, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x0A, 0xF6, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xEE, 0x17, 0x47, 0x34, 0x15, 0xA3, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xBE, 0x88, 0x48, 0xE7, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xAD, 0xDC, 0x65, 0x61, 0x37, 0x0F, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x67, 0xAD, 0xA2, 0x3A, 0x1C, 0x91, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x07, 0x0C, 0x3A, 0x41, 0x6E, 0x13, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0xBD, 0x7E, 0xED, 0xAA, 0x14, 0xDD, 0x61), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xDC, 0x20, 0x01, 0x72, 0x11, 0x48, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x62, 0x3D, 0xF0, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xC2, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x52, 0xA3, 0x4A, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x46, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xF8, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xC7, 0x8F, 0xA9, 0x26, 0x42, 0x32, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xA6, 0xA0, 0x8D, 0x4B, 0x9A, 0x19, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xAB, 0x6D, 0x1E, 0xFB, 0xEE, 0x60, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x56, 0x3C, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0x10, 0x79, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xBC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0x71, 0xEF, 0x02, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x36, 0xC4, 0xD0, 0x88, 0x9B, 0x32, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xD4, 0x5D, 0x17, 0x39, 0xE6, 0x22, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x26, 0x01, 0xCE, 0xBE, 0x4A, 0x9C, 0x27), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x6D, 0x11, 0xCA, 0x6C, 0x5A, 0x93, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x96, 0x26, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0xE4, 0x30, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xC1, 0x4C, 0xC6, 0x30, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xB3, 0xE8, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xEB, 0x63, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x1D, 0xCA, 0xFC, 0x50, 0x36, 0x4B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x0E, 0x23, 0x5B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x88, 0xB6, 0xD7, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x23, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x66, 0xE2, 0xBB, 0x29, 0xA6, 0x4F, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x68, 0x6E, 0xA0, 0x14, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x73, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0xAB, 0x5B, 0xF6, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x00, 0x95, 0xE9, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x0D, 0x4F, 0x81, 0xD0, 0xF2, 0x3F, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x1D, 0xCD, 0x78, 0x39, 0xC4, 0x6B, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x45, 0xC7, 0xB8, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x5D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x8C, 0x6E, 0xA3, 0x24, 0xB2, 0xDB, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x2D, 0xD9, 0xF1, 0xC7, 0x9B, 0x8A, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0xB9, 0x40, 0x37, 0x91, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0x23, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x9D, 0x5A, 0x20, 0x10, 0xA9, 0x84, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x30, 0x89, 0x20, 0x13, 0xE9, 0xB2, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x6E, 0x52, 0xEB, 0x03, 0x18, 0x1F, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x9E, 0x1C, 0x35, 0x87, 0x92, 0x69, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0xC9, 0x88, 0xAF, 0xC6, 0x6C, 0x83, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xD5, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x34, 0x99, 0xB6, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0xAD, 0x45, 0x9B, 0x4B, 0x41, 0x4D, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x5D, 0xAB, 0x7F, 0x35, 0x34, 0xE9, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0xBE, 0x78, 0x34, 0x44, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xDE, 0xE3, 0xC4, 0xEE, 0x0B, 0xF9, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x86, 0x16, 0x48, 0x32, 0xB8, 0x74, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xEE, 0x7C, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0x81, 0xE3, 0x55), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x6A, 0xFA, 0x84, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0xD5, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8A, 0xD5, 0x1B, 0x2E, 0x1A, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0C, 0x61, 0xE2, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0xE6, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x62, 0xC1, 0x87, 0x53, 0x1B, 0x92, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x90, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x6A, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x2E, 0xB5, 0x3B, 0x44, 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x78), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x5D, 0x02, 0x58, 0xB5, 0xBE, 0x45, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xEF, 0x8E, 0x90, 0x4D, 0x2A, 0x32, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x99, 0x75, 0x5C, 0x0A, 0x33, 0x8F, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x6C, 0x95, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xE4, 0x4C, 0x91, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x25, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x29, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x34, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x15, 0xE5, 0x13, 0x7E, 0x64, 0x8B, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xBC, 0x0D, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x37, 0x9E, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x82, 0x20, 0xF7, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x77, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x29, 0xA2, 0xDB, 0x7A, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xC6, 0x50, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x9F, 0xD5, 0xE8, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x03, 0x55, 0x10, 0xDB, 0xA6, 0x8B, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x78, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x43, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x35, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x47, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x95, 0x2F, 0xEA, 0xBC, 0xB4, 0x18, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x48, 0xAE, 0x89, 0xF5, 0x65, 0x3D, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0x20, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x50, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xE6, 0x5C, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0x7D, 0xDF, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x07, 0x3E, 0xCE, 0x9F, 0x18, 0xB6, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0xF8, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xFA, 0x42, 0x1D, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x6C, 0x1D, 0x03, 0xC9, 0x0E, 0x2B, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x18, 0x52, 0xA5, 0xB4, 0x63, 0xE1, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0xD9, 0xC4, 0xFD, 0x16, 0x60, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x7D, 0xDE, 0xDF, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xB0, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x4E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x85, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xF0, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x9B, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xC2, 0x39, 0x5D, 0xF3, 0x2C, 0xD9, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x1C, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x2F, 0x54, 0x87, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x72, 0xC7, 0xB5, 0x50, 0xA3, 0x84, 0x77), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xD1, 0xAF, 0xA9, 0xB4, 0x8B, 0x5D, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xF6, 0x52, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x52, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x05, 0x42, 0x77, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x08, 0x90, 0x72, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x15, 0xF8, 0xF1, 0x16, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x87, 0xAC, 0x8F, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x83, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xE1, 0xE6, 0x2D, 0x0E, 0x11, 0xA1, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x32, 0xE6, 0xE3, 0x83, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x56, 0xE5, 0xCD, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x67, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xED, 0xC9, 0x65, 0x6D, 0x87, 0xE1, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x8E, 0xFD, 0x9A, 0x53, 0x0E, 0xFA, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0x23, 0x84, 0xFA, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xFE, 0x49, 0x81, 0xD1, 0x3E, 0xF4, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x72, 0xE0, 0xEF, 0x0D, 0xB8, 0x3E, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCE, 0x60, 0x72, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xCC, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x07, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x3A, 0x35, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x1F, 0xCA, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xEA, 0x88, 0x55, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x05, 0x7F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x6D, 0xF1, 0x97, 0xA6, 0x69, 0x39, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x41, 0x99, 0xFF, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x2F, 0x95, 0x80, 0x12, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xBF, 0x51, 0xAA, 0xAE, 0x2D, 0xDA, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x1C, 0xB3, 0x52, 0x36, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xC1, 0x1F, 0x3A, 0xD3, 0x3E, 0x5C, 0x1A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x2B, 0xC8, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0x98, 0x41, 0x66, 0xB0, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x1D, 0xC0, 0x42, 0xCD, 0xF8, 0xC3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x41, 0x91, 0x7D, 0xCC, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xAE, 0x76, 0xED, 0x56, 0x18, 0xC5, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x6A, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x7F, 0x65, 0x10, 0x1F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xEC, 0x3C, 0x05, 0x05, 0xCA, 0xF6, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0xCD, 0x02, 0x51, 0x12, 0x16, 0x3C, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x43, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x59, 0x90, 0x41, 0xDB, 0xE4, 0xF5, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x0E, 0x18, 0x2A, 0x5A, 0x83, 0x7C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x37, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xF1, 0x2F, 0x63, 0x79), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xC0, 0xFA, 0x6F, 0x1F, 0x67, 0xCF, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x34, 0x45, 0xBB, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x67, 0x1D, 0x64, 0x8F, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x39, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0xAD, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x93, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0x28, 0xFA, 0x39, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xF9, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x26, 0x7A, 0x88, 0x89), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xD5, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x11, 0xDE, 0xEB, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x46, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x74, 0x34, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xBD, 0xD3, 0xF5, 0x14, 0xEE, 0xFE, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x4C, 0xA3, 0x71, 0x43, 0x65, 0xF8, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x6C, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x90, 0x25, 0xD8, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x34, 0x84, 0x96, 0xA1, 0x43, 0x03, 0x4D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x3B, 0x3B, 0x2F, 0xCA, 0x59, 0xF2, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x48, 0x24, 0x74, 0xD8, 0x72, 0x90, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x42, 0x74, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x52, 0x19, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x9E, 0x41, 0x63, 0x68, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x6B, 0x38, 0x52, 0xA8, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x30, 0x25, 0x93, 0xA1, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x2F, 0x4B, 0x64, 0x79, 0x50, 0xFF, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x36, 0xED, 0x57, 0x39, 0x3B, 0xE7, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x85, 0xEA, 0x35, 0xD6, 0xC0, 0xA0, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x89, 0x3A, 0xCC, 0x22, 0x1C, 0x46, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x7A, 0xB0, 0xA1, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x62, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xB8, 0x8A, 0x6C, 0x18, 0x85, 0x0D, 0x88), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xB6, 0x50, 0xE9, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0xE8, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x5B, 0x5C, 0xD1, 0x4B, 0x11, 0x9A, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x25, 0x56, 0x74, 0x51, 0x9C, 0xEC, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x7F, 0xB6, 0x8A, 0xCB, 0x3A, 0x10, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x33, 0x07, 0x01, 0xE9, 0x49, 0x59, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xA5, 0x2E, 0xF2, 0xBA, 0x32, 0x63, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x06, 0x0B, 0xA5, 0x44, 0x27, 0x7F, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x74, 0xAC, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x4F, 0x13, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xB1, 0xBF, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA5, 0x1C, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x64, 0x68, 0x7B, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x77, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x39, 0xF9, 0x4E, 0x84, 0x9C, 0xF6, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xCF, 0x6D, 0xE2, 0xA1, 0x2D, 0xF9, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xC4, 0x90, 0x57, 0x31, 0x01, 0x05, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x1E, 0xBB, 0xBF, 0x98, 0xA4, 0x7C, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xE3, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0xCD, 0x39, 0x9A, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x34, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x89, 0x98, 0xB5, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0x20, 0x3D, 0x3A, 0x04, 0x8F, 0x5A, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x49, 0x09, 0x9C, 0x0F, 0x59), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x66, 0xD2, 0x38, 0x2A, 0x62, 0x81, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xC8, 0x20, 0x5E, 0x28, 0xA3, 0x81, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x31, 0xA4, 0xF1, 0xEA, 0x7D, 0x87, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x2C, 0x99, 0x09, 0x6F, 0x63, 0xEB, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x76, 0xDA, 0x1A, 0x06, 0xBE, 0xDE, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x09, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x39, 0x30, 0x2D, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x9B, 0xC1, 0x5A, 0x17, 0xC3, 0x8C, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x8D, 0x94, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xAB, 0x60, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFD, 0x1E, 0x0F, 0x43, 0xAE, 0x9D, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0xF2, 0xF3, 0x20, 0x1B, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x5B, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x90, 0x3B, 0xE3, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x78, 0x72, 0xBD, 0x65, 0x09, 0x0B, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x37, 0x2A, 0x6C, 0x16, 0x4F, 0x64, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xCE, 0xA3, 0x90, 0xB4, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x38, 0x55, 0x63, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x6E, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xB4, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x22, 0x45, 0x89, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x7C, 0x8C, 0xA6, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x06, 0x42, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0xE3, 0xC6, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0x5D, 0x47, 0x31, 0x7C, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x85, 0xEE, 0x46, 0x7E, 0x13, 0x04, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x3C, 0x8B, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x74, 0xF5, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x88, 0x8E, 0x07, 0x29, 0x08, 0x03, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x9B, 0x89, 0xEB, 0x08, 0xE8, 0x43, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x07, 0x67, 0xFD, 0xD9, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xEB, 0x21, 0x8D, 0x98, 0x43, 0x74, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xCC, 0x14, 0xD8, 0x08, 0xBB, 0xA6, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x98, 0xF2, 0x6A, 0x18, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x38, 0x91, 0xA0, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x04, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xAF, 0xE8, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0x13, 0x70, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x93, 0x87, 0x98, 0x4A, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x2E, 0x69, 0x9C, 0xA2, 0x2D, 0x03, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xFE, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x2A, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xB1, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0x41, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xD8, 0x9A, 0x21, 0xF3, 0xFE, 0xCB, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x78, 0x04, 0x60, 0xB7, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1E, 0x66, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x51, 0xBD, 0x8B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x16, 0x36, 0xEF, 0x61, 0x2D, 0xEE, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x5F, 0x88, 0xA0, 0x13, 0x12, 0xF7, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0x4A, 0x4A, 0x07, 0x01, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x06, 0x4F, 0xD7, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x8B, 0x4D, 0x48, 0xE0, 0x98, 0xFB, 0x6A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0xBA, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x0D, 0x52, 0xAC, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xD0, 0xE0, 0x36, 0xE6, 0x07, 0x3A, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x80, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x49, 0x22, 0x4B, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xC7, 0xAB, 0x1C, 0x89, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x2A, 0xFC, 0xB3, 0x6D, 0x45, 0x96, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xE4, 0xDB, 0x52, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xB4, 0x19), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xCC, 0xC8, 0x7F, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x87, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x21, 0x3C, 0x69, 0x7D, 0x38, 0x57, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x4C, 0x18, 0x3C, 0x53, 0xA5, 0x48, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xC3, 0x64, 0x45, 0xDB, 0xC4, 0x6D, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xCC, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0x17, 0xB8, 0x34, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x69, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x28, 0x4A, 0x3D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xE8, 0x9E, 0x39, 0xEA, 0x8D, 0x38, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x9C, 0xBB, 0xCD, 0x80, 0x1A, 0xEE, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA0, 0x45, 0xBF, 0xD9, 0x22, 0x11, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x7C, 0x5C, 0xD9, 0xC0, 0x9F, 0x69, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x8A, 0xA6, 0x79, 0x4E, 0x35, 0xB9, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x8B, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0xA1, 0xB8, 0x28, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x2F, 0xEF, 0xBB, 0xA9, 0x72, 0x7F, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x34, 0xB7, 0x12, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0xC3, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0x42, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x71, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x01, 0x59, 0xA7, 0x56, 0x03, 0x91, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x91, 0x99, 0x33, 0x30, 0x3E, 0xEF, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xC9, 0x5A, 0x9A, 0x54, 0x66, 0xF1, 0x70), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x2C, 0xB7, 0x6E, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x35, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x0D, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x2D, 0x99, 0x63, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x31, 0xAF, 0x2D, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xC0, 0xDF, 0x80, 0x54, 0xC4, 0xAC, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x6B, 0xA0, 0x84, 0x96, 0xF7, 0x31, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0xE2, 0x7C, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x45, 0x75, 0x6A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xEE, 0x58, 0x31, 0xE8, 0x68, 0xD6, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x2E, 0x48, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x9F, 0xD4, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xA9, 0x5C, 0xE7, 0x64, 0x43, 0x5D, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x58, 0x9F, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x68, 0xFF, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x88, 0x2D, 0xBA, 0x12, 0xBF, 0x8D, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xDF, 0x6F, 0xB3, 0x75, 0xA4, 0x55, 0x73), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x17, 0x92, 0x39, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x37, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x43, 0x71, 0xA7, 0xCA, 0x17, 0x1B, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xB9, 0xB0, 0x78, 0xEF, 0xA0, 0xDA, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x84, 0xF2, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x65, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x45, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x6A, 0x8C, 0x2B, 0x77, 0x96, 0x36, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x7A, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x97, 0x63, 0x02, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x03, 0x8F, 0xB9, 0xEE, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0xEE, 0x8B, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDB, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x7B, 0x81, 0xC9, 0x70, 0x8D, 0x62, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xDA, 0x46, 0xF8, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0xBE, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x9C, 0x7A, 0x97, 0x62, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x03, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0x46, 0x27, 0x9E, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x08, 0x1C, 0xD5, 0x25, 0xAF, 0xE9, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x7C, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x9A, 0x7A, 0x99, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x4E, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xCE, 0x85, 0x5F, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x57, 0x69, 0x90, 0x76, 0xF3, 0x53, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP384r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP384r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP512r1 (RFC 5639 3.7) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x58, 0x56, 0x60, 0xAA, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x81, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x80, 0xA3, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xA1, 0xCD, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x68, 0xC6, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77, 0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B, 0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D, 0x8D, 0xDD, 0xCB, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x4C, 0x23, 0xAC, 0x45, 0x71, 0x32, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x8B, 0x31, 0xA3, 0x30, 0x78), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0xF7, 0x16, 0x80, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x09, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xE5, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xB7, 0x50, 0x40, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x3E, 0x08, 0xDC, 0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7, 0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F, 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A, 0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D, 0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8, 0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x00, 0xA9, 0x9C, 0x82, 0x96, 0x87, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xDA, 0x5D, 0x08, 0x81, 0xD3, 0xB1, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x10, 0xAC, 0x7F, 0x19, 0x61, 0x86, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x26, 0xA9, 0x4C, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x9D, 0x88, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x96, 0xA7, 0x56, 0xD1, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xF5, 0x0E, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x40, 0xEF, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0xD6, 0x32, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xED, 0x56, 0x14, 0x57, 0x1A, 0x8D, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xED, 0x4D, 0x3A, 0xFA, 0x71, 0x75, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xC5, 0x76, 0x1C, 0x14, 0xBE, 0xB5, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x5A, 0xCB, 0xE7, 0x36, 0x1D, 0x52, 0x1C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x8D, 0x7A, 0xEB, 0xA3, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xA3, 0x41, 0xF8, 0xAC, 0x9E, 0xAB, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xE3, 0x65, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0xFE, 0x09, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x3F, 0xC5, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x5D, 0x63, 0x28, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xD3, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x95, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x82, 0xD4, 0x77, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xBB, 0x92, 0x32, 0x00, 0xF4, 0x66, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x58, 0x31, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x36, 0xA9, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA5, 0x2D, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x44, 0xAB, 0xCE, 0x71, 0xFF, 0x0C, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x24, 0x58, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x21, 0x32, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0xA6, 0x28, 0xF8, 0x7A, 0x97, 0xAE, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xE7, 0x08, 0xFA, 0x47, 0xC9, 0x55, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xAC, 0x2E, 0x84, 0xA4, 0xF5, 0x52, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x58, 0x05, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0x71, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x92, 0xC1, 0x92, 0xEC, 0x6B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x48, 0x2D, 0x79, 0x5E, 0x58, 0xE5, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x85, 0x26, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x6E, 0xD4, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x68, 0x26, 0x87, 0x38, 0xA2, 0xD2, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x17, 0x60, 0xCE, 0x75, 0xF8, 0xA5, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x51, 0xDB, 0xA9, 0xAE, 0x87, 0xF1, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x49, 0x92, 0x3B, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF5, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0xD5, 0x52, 0x52, 0x8C, 0xCE, 0xFD, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x18, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xF6, 0xAE, 0x08, 0x41), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x2B, 0xD8, 0x54, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x57, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x9E, 0x03, 0x03, 0x3C, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x29, 0x00, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x33, 0x99, 0x0E, 0x00, 0x5D, 0xFE, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2D, 0xF2, 0x59, 0x32, 0xCF, 0x03, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xC9, 0x72, 0xAE, 0x0C, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x5A, 0x27, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xBE, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0x1E, 0x88), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x83, 0xC2, 0x46, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xDC, 0xCE, 0x15, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xDB, 0x5E, 0x94, 0x31, 0x0B, 0xB2, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xB9, 0xE3, 0xE3, 0x11, 0x71, 0x41, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xE3, 0x01, 0xB7, 0x7D, 0xBC, 0x65, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x07, 0x65, 0x87, 0xA7, 0xE8, 0x48, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x48, 0x8F, 0xD4, 0x30, 0x8E, 0xB4, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xE0, 0x73, 0xBE, 0x1E, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x0E, 0x5E, 0x87, 0xC5, 0xAB, 0x0E, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xF9, 0x5F, 0x80, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x15, 0x21, 0x54, 0x92, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x8A, 0x47, 0x74, 0xDC, 0x42, 0xB1, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xF7, 0x30, 0xFD, 0xC1, 0x9B, 0x0C, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x6C, 0xCC, 0xDF, 0xC5, 0xE3, 0xA9, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x67, 0x59, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x51, 0x54, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x37, 0xFB, 0x6E, 0xB0, 0x78, 0x63, 0x8E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xEF, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xF1, 0x46, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xFF, 0x10, 0xE4, 0xE2, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x2E, 0x22, 0x89, 0xE5, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x0C, 0x29, 0xA8, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0xCA, 0x87, 0x2A, 0x6F, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xDC, 0x9B, 0x9F, 0x65, 0xD4, 0xAD, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xC3, 0x08, 0x0F, 0xCF, 0x67, 0xE9, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x5C, 0xD7, 0xFF, 0x41, 0x9C, 0xCB, 0x26), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x25, 0x05, 0x12, 0xAD, 0x73, 0x63, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x99, 0x07, 0x86, 0x57, 0xE7, 0x94, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xBF, 0x18, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x09, 0xF2, 0x2F, 0x0C, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x3A, 0x04, 0xEA, 0x89, 0x6C, 0x91, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x21, 0x04, 0xE3, 0xB9, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x71, 0x4B, 0x7B, 0xC2, 0x89, 0xCD, 0xA2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xB9, 0xA8, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x41, 0x6C, 0xBB, 0x5A, 0xCA, 0x1F, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xD7, 0xE2, 0x6C, 0x6B, 0xA7, 0x48, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x19, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0xC1, 0x7E, 0x4F, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xF7, 0x19, 0x3C, 0x06, 0x74, 0x2C, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x23, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x09, 0xB0, 0x80, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x74, 0x34, 0x08, 0x44, 0x7E, 0xA3, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xCC, 0x8D, 0x12, 0x6E, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x71, 0x02, 0x93, 0xC2, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x89, 0x40, 0xE2, 0x1F, 0xE7, 0x5E, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x8E, 0xAE, 0x89, 0x01, 0xD4, 0x0C, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x70, 0x24, 0xF2, 0xE4, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0xC7, 0x1D, 0xD6, 0x4A, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x1D, 0x7E, 0x4A, 0x2C, 0xCA, 0xEC, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x06, 0x7F, 0xA8, 0x99, 0xE4, 0xD3, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x1D, 0x5A, 0xDF, 0x5E, 0x58, 0x36, 0x49), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xB9, 0x32, 0x69, 0x1F, 0x72, 0x2A, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x73, 0xE2, 0x03, 0x39, 0x35, 0xAA, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x5E, 0x5D, 0x48, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x30, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x7F, 0x60, 0x19, 0xAF, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xD9, 0x19, 0xE4, 0x1B, 0x56, 0x15, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xD7, 0x33, 0x59, 0x1F, 0x43, 0x59, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0xCA, 0xA4, 0x7F, 0x63, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x40, 0xC0, 0xF6, 0x19, 0x89, 0x43, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x92, 0xEA, 0x07, 0x65, 0x79, 0x86, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x75, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x0A, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x9E, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x1F, 0x0C, 0xF9, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x8C, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x21, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x4D, 0xD8, 0x18, 0xC4, 0xF6, 0x36, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xC9, 0xAC, 0x5C, 0xFA, 0x69, 0xA4, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x8C, 0x94, 0x1C, 0x7B, 0x71, 0x36, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xBD, 0x46, 0xCE, 0xB7, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD6, 0x96, 0x4B, 0xA6, 0x47, 0xEB, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0xF1, 0x5F, 0x15, 0xDE, 0x99, 0x6F, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0x04, 0xB8, 0xE6, 0xC0, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xD3, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x00, 0xE4, 0x05, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xF3, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x1A, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x32, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x33, 0x09, 0xB6, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xEF, 0xFC, 0x61, 0x10, 0x42, 0x31, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF1, 0xF4, 0x33, 0xCF, 0x28, 0x90, 0x9C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x88, 0x87, 0x7B, 0xEB, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xB8, 0xDA, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0x3D, 0xA6, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xF0, 0x62, 0x82, 0x53, 0x32, 0x55, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x4A, 0x19, 0x11, 0x9C, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xB3, 0x27, 0xE9, 0x75, 0x90, 0x05, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x1C, 0x90, 0x48, 0x77, 0x01, 0x85, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xD6, 0x9B, 0x84, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xC5, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x7A, 0xCB, 0xB3, 0x11, 0x46, 0xD7, 0x99), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x23, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x75, 0xA1, 0x95, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x34, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x03, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x80, 0x9D, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x44, 0xE1, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x5D, 0xBD, 0xA8, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x25, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x99, 0x1F, 0x53, 0xF1, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x7C, 0xE5, 0xC5, 0x51, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0xB0, 0x1A, 0x9C, 0x16, 0xB0, 0x32, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xE3, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x7B, 0x33), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xDD, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xAB, 0x01, 0xD3, 0x87, 0x74, 0x25, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xA3, 0xE3, 0x76, 0x43, 0x87, 0x12, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x66, 0xEB, 0x98, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x78, 0xC8, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x75, 0xCA, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x19, 0xE7, 0x07, 0x36, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xC9, 0xA8, 0x5F, 0x91, 0xBF, 0x47, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x96, 0x58, 0x96, 0x18, 0xB6, 0xFA, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x2D, 0xA9, 0x9B, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x0C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x0B, 0x2D, 0x56, 0x4A, 0xD3, 0x93, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x15, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x12, 0x86, 0x0E, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xC1, 0xCB, 0xE4, 0xC3, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x53, 0x10, 0xCA, 0xA3, 0xAC, 0x83, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x01, 0x22, 0x96, 0x10, 0xAD, 0x69, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x46, 0x4E, 0xD8, 0xEA, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x2F, 0x7F, 0x62, 0x62, 0x80, 0xD0, 0x14), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x63, 0x09, 0xBD, 0x6A, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xD4, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x05, 0xB7, 0xF7, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x4D, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x4A, 0x15, 0x27, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x15, 0xAA, 0x37, 0x27, 0x34, 0x18, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x20, 0x2C, 0x84, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xBA, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x09, 0xD6, 0x04, 0xA2, 0x60, 0x84, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x04, 0x94, 0x08, 0xD4, 0xED, 0x47, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x35, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x80, 0xD6, 0xF1, 0x30, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x14, 0xA6, 0x85, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xD8, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x49, 0x2A, 0x1E, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x2D, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x87, 0x56, 0x91, 0x03, 0x77, 0x4D, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x52, 0xD4, 0xAA, 0xF7, 0xFA, 0xB0, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x5D, 0x11, 0x39, 0xB1, 0xE7, 0x76, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x13, 0xBC, 0x37, 0x5D, 0x74, 0xCD, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x48, 0x14, 0x23, 0x30, 0xF8, 0x46, 0x37), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x27, 0xB0, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0x74, 0xB4, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0x64, 0x36, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x2B, 0x78, 0x40, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x7B, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x68, 0x3A, 0xB6, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0xDB, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x33, 0xD7, 0x34, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x45, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xCE, 0xA8, 0xC9, 0x01, 0xFB, 0x0E, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xF9, 0x51, 0x4C, 0x12, 0x9F, 0x60, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x85, 0xBD, 0x30, 0x37, 0x84, 0x39, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x33, 0xAF, 0x2E, 0xB8, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x0C, 0x09, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x24, 0x89, 0x81, 0x12, 0xFF, 0xBB, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x37, 0x1A, 0x66, 0xEE, 0xED, 0xB6, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xBD, 0x04, 0x20, 0x5D, 0xFB, 0xBF, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xF8, 0x34, 0xA3, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDE, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x18, 0x73, 0xF1, 0x32, 0x25, 0x58, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xC1, 0x14, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x40, 0x0F, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0x9D, 0x9C, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x56, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xBA, 0x87, 0xF9, 0x15, 0x0C, 0x66, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x1F, 0xC1, 0x28, 0xB0, 0x47, 0x0D, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xCA, 0x27, 0xEE, 0x4B, 0x23, 0x2B, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0xB5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0x17, 0x5D, 0xC3, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x02, 0x08, 0xEE, 0x20, 0x9D, 0xEA, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x14, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xFA, 0xF8, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0xDC, 0x14, 0x8C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xBD, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x18, 0x98, 0xDC, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x63, 0x02, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x5B, 0x5A, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xB1, 0xD7, 0x4B, 0x15, 0x39, 0x61, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x32, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0x70, 0x1B, 0xCE, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x83, 0x52, 0x9B, 0x6D, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x55, 0x56, 0x19, 0x34, 0xA4, 0xEA, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xA9, 0x55, 0x80, 0xE3, 0x15, 0x36, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x1D, 0x17, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0xD6, 0xF0, 0xCC, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x53, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x5A, 0xDC, 0x46, 0xBD, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x2F, 0x11, 0x60, 0x15, 0x51, 0x4A, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xE3, 0x93, 0x38, 0xD5, 0x83, 0xAA, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xA6, 0xCC, 0xB1, 0xFD, 0xBB, 0x1A, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x54, 0xC8, 0x54, 0x6F, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x4A, 0xDA, 0x28, 0x92, 0x97, 0x9D, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x4B, 0xDB, 0xC7, 0x52, 0xC5, 0x66, 0x34), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x7E, 0x92, 0x53, 0x30, 0x93, 0xFD, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x16, 0x6A, 0xB1, 0x91, 0x0A, 0xB4, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x9D, 0x40, 0x3F, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x01, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x0E, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x4C, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x8D, 0x29, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x23, 0x21, 0x11, 0xAB, 0x77, 0x81, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xAF, 0x11, 0xFA, 0xBA, 0x40, 0x63, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x6F, 0x8D, 0x80, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xF5, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0x08, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x2B, 0x30, 0x02, 0x45, 0x71, 0x08, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x3A, 0xCA, 0x50, 0xF6, 0xC2, 0x19, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0x73, 0x95, 0x1D, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x60, 0x59, 0x48, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0xD6, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xB9, 0x6C, 0x89, 0xAB, 0x99, 0xA8, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x4E, 0x06, 0x19, 0xEC, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x95, 0x04, 0xCF, 0xD5, 0x94, 0xB3, 0x02), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x35, 0x93, 0x7C, 0xB3, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x45, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x81, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xE8, 0x24, 0xDF, 0xEC, 0x2F, 0x7D, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0x6A, 0x9B, 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xE3, 0x27, 0x82, 0xDE, 0xDD, 0xCA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x57, 0x56, 0x46, 0x05, 0x06, 0x01, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x35, 0xA7, 0x47, 0xE2, 0x6B, 0x2C, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xEC, 0x1F, 0x11, 0x75, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xC1, 0xE9, 0x0E, 0xE9, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xCF, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0xE8, 0xED, 0x0A, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x73, 0xCA, 0x0C, 0x46, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x44, 0x63, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x43, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xF8, 0xC1, 0x8C, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x4B, 0xF0, 0x69, 0x25, 0xBD, 0x71, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x82, 0xE7, 0xC1, 0xC1, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x5A, 0x6E, 0x5E, 0x97, 0x6A, 0x35, 0x8D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x18, 0x6C, 0x7E, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x57, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0xD0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x08, 0xAE, 0x46, 0x34, 0xEA, 0x7A, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1C, 0x56, 0xA9, 0x18, 0x37, 0xD4, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x63, 0xE9, 0x0A, 0xB6, 0x38, 0x3C, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x4F, 0xA4, 0x6E, 0x85, 0x31, 0x23, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0xAD, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB1, 0x4B, 0x1C, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x56, 0x4A, 0x38, 0xB3, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0x2C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xC7, 0x19, 0xDE, 0x21, 0xED, 0x89, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0xEB, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x0E, 0x13, 0x1E, 0x86, 0x57, 0xC3, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x4B, 0x30, 0x46, 0x52, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xD5, 0x44, 0x31, 0x96, 0x3B, 0x26, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x68, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x78, 0x39, 0xE8, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x78, 0xB7, 0xDD, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xB6, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x3C, 0xB3, 0x26, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x8C, 0xA5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x24, 0xE5, 0x73, 0xEE, 0x9A, 0x02, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x6A, 0x65, 0x60, 0xF3, 0x62, 0xE3, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x07, 0x84, 0xE6, 0x3B, 0x46, 0x65, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0xB0, 0xE1, 0x04, 0x82, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x13, 0xBF, 0x3D, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xA2, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x26, 0x76, 0x74, 0xAB, 0x0B, 0x29, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x03, 0x34, 0x7C, 0x38, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x72, 0xF9, 0x3B, 0x3C, 0xA4, 0xBC, 0x7C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xCE, 0x18, 0x80, 0xB8, 0x24, 0x45, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x09, 0x03, 0xB8, 0x06, 0x64, 0xF7, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x26, 0xB1, 0x10, 0x6D, 0x71, 0x12, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x12, 0xC6, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x6A, 0xC3, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xD3, 0x0A, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x6B, 0x04, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x87, 0x5B, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x3C, 0xC0, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0xF5, 0xF9, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x89, 0xBB, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x69, 0x72, 0x8B, 0xAE, 0x32, 0x13, 0x11), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x16, 0x07, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0xCF, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x50, 0x21, 0xE9, 0xDE, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0x83, 0x30, 0x0B, 0x65, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xBA, 0x6C, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x0D, 0x7B, 0x9E, 0x08, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x91, 0xB2, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xCE, 0x67, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x93, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xD7, 0x1F, 0x2F, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x7F, 0x9D, 0x40, 0xF8, 0x78, 0x7A, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x22, 0x95, 0xE8, 0xEF, 0x31, 0x57, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x88, 0x53, 0xFE, 0xAF, 0x7C, 0x47, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xCE, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xE8, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x16, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x6E, 0x8A, 0x73, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x07, 0x97, 0x21, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x5F, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0x81, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xE7, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x8F, 0x75, 0x09, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x53, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x4F, 0x70, 0x97, 0xC7, 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x3C, 0x6A, 0xB4, 0x10, 0xA9, 0xC8, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xC5, 0xD6, 0x69, 0x16, 0xB8, 0xAC, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xEB, 0x48, 0x54, 0x5D, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x48, 0x9B, 0xD7, 0x72, 0x69, 0xA4, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x0D, 0x36, 0x9A, 0x66, 0x0B, 0xEC, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xC6, 0xD4, 0xB6, 0x60, 0xE5, 0xC3, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x29, 0x42, 0xE0, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x7C, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x10, 0xBA, 0x55, 0xBC, 0x3B, 0x38, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x66, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x73, 0x03, 0x1B, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xA4, 0x66, 0x12, 0x96, 0x7B, 0x02, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xB5, 0xDE, 0x6D, 0x98, 0xD1, 0xD5, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xF5, 0x44, 0xB8, 0x8E, 0xF6, 0x8C, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x15, 0x2B, 0x72, 0xBC, 0x49, 0xE5, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x44, 0xD7, 0xDF, 0x8F, 0xEB, 0x8D, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x64, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xE4, 0x70, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x14, 0xBB, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xB9, 0x65, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x8E, 0x88, 0xF5, 0xF1, 0xC1, 0x89, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x30, 0x53, 0xE6, 0xFB, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xE4, 0xFF, 0xBA, 0x31, 0x79, 0xAB, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x09, 0xF7, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xAE, 0xC2, 0x44, 0xDC, 0x17, 0x78, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xD4, 0x17, 0x43, 0x19, 0x74, 0x9E, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x64, 0x3B, 0x73, 0xA2, 0x99, 0x27, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x74, 0x36, 0x5F, 0xD3, 0x14, 0xB1, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x07, 0xAB, 0xFD, 0x9B, 0x03, 0xC5, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xBE, 0xB0, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x0C, 0x73, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xE7, 0x7B, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x34, 0xFD, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x25, 0x3D, 0xC7, 0x36, 0x83, 0x53, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x7C, 0xCF, 0x63, 0x55, 0x12, 0x11, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x34, 0x4D, 0x27, 0x92, 0xAC, 0x18, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x42, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x2E, 0xFF, 0x13, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x65, 0x57, 0x0D, 0xBC, 0x0A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x7B, 0x6E, 0xC6, 0x2A, 0x21, 0x74, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xA7, 0x53, 0x4D, 0x29, 0x36, 0xEF, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xD6, 0x41, 0xC7, 0x99, 0xAD, 0x50, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xAC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0x86, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xBB, 0xE6, 0x25, 0x28, 0xAA, 0xEB, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x04, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0x08, 0x8A, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x2B, 0x5B, 0xE2, 0x8D, 0x76, 0xEA, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x33, 0xD2, 0x21, 0x4D, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x8E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x06, 0x8B, 0x2B, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0xB1, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xF5, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x03, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x55, 0xB6, 0x1A, 0x9F, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x54, 0x32, 0xBE, 0x06, 0x43, 0xB5, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x20, 0x89, 0xBE, 0xD4, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x26, 0x95, 0x10, 0xCE, 0xB4, 0x88, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xA6, 0x27, 0xAC, 0x32, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0x9C, 0x7B, 0xBE, 0xA1, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xCD, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xDF, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xA7, 0x11, 0x06, 0xCC, 0x0E, 0x31, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0xE4, 0xF4, 0xAD, 0x7B, 0x5F, 0xF1, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x54, 0xBE, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x03, 0x47, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x53, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xB0, 0x8A, 0x68, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x16, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x5B, 0x0E, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x32, 0xE3, 0x43, 0x64, 0x75, 0xFB, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x18, 0x55, 0x8A, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x97, 0x15, 0x1E, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x9C, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xAD, 0x13, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x96, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0x5E, 0xDA, 0xD5, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x81, 0xE9, 0x65, 0x66, 0x76, 0x47, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x35, 0x87, 0x06, 0x73, 0xCF, 0x34, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x81, 0x15, 0x42, 0xA2, 0x79, 0x5B, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xA2, 0x7D, 0x09, 0x14, 0x64, 0xC6, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0xED, 0xF1, 0xD6, 0xE9, 0x24), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xD5, 0xBB, 0x25, 0xA3, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xF2, 0x68, 0x67, 0x39, 0x8F, 0x73, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x76, 0x28, 0x89, 0xAD, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x90, 0xCC, 0x57, 0x58, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xD7, 0x43, 0xD2, 0xCE, 0x5E, 0xA0, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0xA4, 0x9E, 0x96, 0x26, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x61, 0x1D, 0xF3, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x60, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xED, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x60, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x30, 0x17, 0x8A, 0x91, 0x88, 0x0A, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x7D, 0x18, 0xA4, 0xAC, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x65, 0x39, 0x9A, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x16, 0x4B, 0x68, 0xBA, 0x59, 0x13, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFD, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x56, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xE6, 0xF7, 0xB4, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x7C, 0x03, 0x00, 0x26, 0x9F, 0xD8, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x1D, 0x6E, 0x00, 0xB9, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x93), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x63, 0xDA, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0x47, 0xF0, 0xAE, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x4C, 0xF7, 0x50, 0x0C, 0x48, 0x06, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x2B, 0x32, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x7E, 0x61, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x02, 0x27, 0xFE, 0x75, 0x86, 0xDF, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x22, 0x32, 0x1B, 0xFE, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x27, 0xF7, 0x78, 0x6F, 0xD7, 0xFD, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x78, 0xCC, 0xEA, 0xC0, 0x50, 0x24, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x2B, 0x4F, 0x7F, 0x58, 0xE6, 0xC2, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x43, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x3C, 0x80, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x6D, 0x4B, 0x12, 0x00, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x15, 0xBD, 0xD0, 0x9B, 0xCA, 0xAA, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xCE, 0x9C, 0xE3, 0x8B, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xDA, 0x4B, 0x03, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x43, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAF, 0x00, 0x2B, 0x32, 0xF0, 0x22, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xD9, 0x99, 0x99, 0xBE, 0x43, 0x99, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x71, 0x41, 0xF4, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xDD, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x4C, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x1F, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x43, 0x48, 0x76, 0x8A, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x1A, 0x55, 0xA8, 0xA3, 0xD4, 0x57, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xA6, 0x84, 0x39, 0xC9, 0x13, 0xBB, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xFA, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDE, 0x83, 0xDD, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xC9, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x91, 0x68, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x9F, 0x85, 0x6D, 0xF7, 0x54, 0x36, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0xA3, 0xE5, 0xD4, 0x46, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x3E, 0xDC, 0x84, 0x7C, 0x7B, 0x24, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xED, 0x7F, 0x86, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x57, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x06, 0xFE, 0x52, 0x12, 0x79, 0x69, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xD1, 0x44, 0x5F, 0x21, 0x3A, 0xC3, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xD9, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0x75, 0xAB, 0x17, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x81, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xBE, 0x8E, 0xA5, 0xAA, 0xBC, 0x1E, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xC7, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xB1, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xCE, 0x40, 0xD1, 0xFB, 0xDF, 0x94, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xB8, 0x5E, 0xBF, 0x45, 0xA8, 0x2D, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x1B, 0xA9, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0xA2, 0xD3, 0x74, 0xA1, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0x78, 0xDB, 0xAE, 0x3A, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x32, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x68, 0x6A, 0x43, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xBC, 0x39, 0x36, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0xBB, 0x11), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x07, 0xA2, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0x4D, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x1D, 0x67, 0xE6, 0xF1, 0x46, 0xEB, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x41, 0x23, 0x95, 0xE7, 0xE0, 0x10, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x68, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x5F, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xB9, 0x2B, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0x4F, 0xD8, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x09, 0xF5, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xF6, 0x91, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x15, 0x42, 0x6B, 0x6D, 0xB5, 0xF3, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x56, 0x9D, 0xC5, 0xFF, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x38, 0xE6, 0x23, 0x63, 0x48, 0x3C, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x68, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x3B, 0xE9, 0x3B, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x08, 0x54, 0x49, 0xD1, 0x46, 0x45, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x70, 0x52, 0x6E, 0x79, 0xC4, 0x5E, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xDF, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x32, 0x81, 0xDA, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x5B, 0xB5, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x12, 0x8D, 0xC3, 0x36, 0x36, 0xB2, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x2F, 0x22, 0x38, 0x5B, 0x18, 0x4C, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x11, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0x56, 0x18, 0x61, 0x66, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xFB, 0x72, 0x08, 0x84, 0x38, 0x51, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x86, 0xA8, 0xB9, 0x31, 0x99, 0x29, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xFB, 0xC3, 0x42, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0x6F, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x09, 0xBE, 0x75, 0xB0, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x7D, 0xFF, 0xF4, 0x99, 0xFC, 0x13, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x1B, 0x84, 0x81, 0x42, 0x22, 0xC6, 0x3D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xE0, 0x37, 0xA4, 0xA0, 0x2F, 0x38, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x40, 0x2F, 0x39, 0x3C, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x3B, 0x8A, 0x51, 0xAE, 0x40, 0x49, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x20, 0x9F, 0xDD, 0xA9, 0xD0, 0x77, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x1D, 0x64, 0xDA, 0xA0, 0x53, 0xC7, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x7B, 0x66, 0x55, 0x94, 0xD1, 0x51, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xA9, 0xB5, 0x5B, 0x38, 0x35, 0x40, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x79, 0x43, 0x61), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x47, 0x45, 0x69, 0x80, 0x72, 0x72, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x11, 0x99, 0x59, 0xDB, 0x48, 0x80, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x6E, 0x3D, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x15, 0xF4, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xBB, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x35, 0x8D, 0x28, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x1A, 0x3B, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0xD3, 0xAA, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x1C, 0x1A, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xD9, 0x7B, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x69, 0xAC, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x31, 0x14, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x8A, 0xE6, 0xDE, 0x58, 0xB9, 0xC4, 0x7A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x83, 0x52, 0xFE, 0xF9, 0x7B, 0xE9, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xA2, 0x55, 0x46, 0x15, 0x49, 0xC1, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xBC, 0x5C, 0x91, 0xBD, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xFD, 0xB1, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0x74, 0xEE, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0x8B, 0x17, 0x73, 0x1B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x67, 0x06, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x0F, 0x80, 0x24, 0xE2, 0x27, 0x5F, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x1C, 0xCE, 0xD0, 0x67, 0xCA, 0xD4, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0x33, 0x66, 0xF9, 0x05, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xE5, 0x6B, 0x79, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x42, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x14, 0x52, 0xE3, 0x53, 0xB4, 0x50, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x84, 0x6C, 0xCF, 0xDA, 0xB2, 0x20, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xD6, 0x1A, 0xE5, 0xE2, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x61, 0xFE, 0xBB, 0x21, 0x82, 0xD1, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0xF0, 0x9C, 0x8B, 0x1A, 0x42, 0x30, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xD6, 0x49, 0x81, 0x92, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x90), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x91, 0x93, 0x6A, 0xA6, 0x22, 0xE9, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xDC, 0xC3, 0x69, 0x11, 0x95, 0x7D, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xA3, 0x9D, 0x87, 0x5E, 0x64, 0x41, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x87, 0x5A, 0x15, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x8D, 0x50, 0xCC, 0xCF, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x65, 0xCD, 0x31, 0x30, 0xF1, 0x68, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x5C, 0x66, 0x67, 0x92, 0x30, 0x57, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x9B, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x20, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x0D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xC0, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xDE, 0x62, 0xAB, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x1C, 0x0F, 0x16, 0x93, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x1F, 0x16, 0x50, 0x56, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x06, 0xBC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xFE, 0x21, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x55, 0xE1, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xA8, 0xD0, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB5, 0xB2, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xE7, 0x4B, 0xF3, 0x11, 0x0C, 0xC9, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x3A, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xFA, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x77, 0xEE, 0x81, 0x5E, 0x96, 0xEA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0xF4, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0xB2, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xD4, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x63, 0x47, 0x25, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x3D, 0xFF, 0xA4, 0x02, 0xC3, 0x95, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x10, 0x78, 0xD1, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xBE, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xF9, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0xFC, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xC4, 0x01, 0xD6, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x78, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x13, 0xA4, 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xB0, 0xC9, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0xA2, 0x1E, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x22, 0x9B, 0xEA, 0xE8, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x46, 0xDF, 0x43, 0xB9, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x32, 0xF1, 0x4E, 0x95, 0x41, 0xAE, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x93, 0x26, 0xFC, 0xD3, 0x90, 0xDC, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x05, 0x45, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x82, 0x63, 0x4E, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x69, 0x52, 0x49, 0xE9, 0xED, 0x57, 0x34), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x64, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xEA, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xE9, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xE7, 0xF9, 0xA9, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x0C, 0xC1, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x07, 0xB6, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x68, 0xFA, 0x35, 0xE4, 0x9E, 0xAE, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x2D, 0x1A, 0x13, 0x8E, 0x02, 0xE2, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x38, 0x28, 0x86, 0x46, 0x7B, 0x3A, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x4C, 0x64, 0x59, 0x0A, 0xF9, 0x02, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x4F, 0x23, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xD5, 0xEF, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP512r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP512r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) +/* + * Create an MPI from embedded constants + * (assumes len is an exact multiple of sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) + */ +static inline void ecp_mpi_load(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t len) +{ + X->s = 1; + X->n = (unsigned short) (len / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) p; +} + +/* + * Set an MPI to static value 1 + */ +static inline void ecp_mpi_set1(mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + X->s = 1; + X->n = 1; + X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mpi_one; /* X->p will not be modified so the cast is safe */ +} + +/* + * Make group available from embedded constants + */ +static int ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t plen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *a, size_t alen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *b, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gx, size_t gxlen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gy, size_t gylen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *n, size_t nlen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *T) +{ + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->P, p, plen); + if (a != NULL) { + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->A, a, alen); + } + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->B, b, blen); + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->N, n, nlen); + + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->G.X, gx, gxlen); + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->G.Y, gy, gylen); + ecp_mpi_set1(&grp->G.Z); + + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P); + grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->N); + + grp->h = 1; + + grp->T = (mbedtls_ecp_point *) T; + /* + * Set T_size to 0 to prevent T free by mbedtls_ecp_group_free. + */ + grp->T_size = 0; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) +/* Forward declarations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p192(mbedtls_mpi *); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p224(mbedtls_mpi *); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p256(mbedtls_mpi *); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p384(mbedtls_mpi *); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p521(mbedtls_mpi *); +#endif + +#define NIST_MODP(P) grp->modp = ecp_mod_ ## P; +#else +#define NIST_MODP(P) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ + +/* Additional forward declarations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p255(mbedtls_mpi *); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p448(mbedtls_mpi *); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *); +#endif + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) +#define LOAD_GROUP_A(G) ecp_group_load(grp, \ + G ## _p, sizeof(G ## _p), \ + G ## _a, sizeof(G ## _a), \ + G ## _b, sizeof(G ## _b), \ + G ## _gx, sizeof(G ## _gx), \ + G ## _gy, sizeof(G ## _gy), \ + G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n), \ + G ## _T \ + ) + +#define LOAD_GROUP(G) ecp_group_load(grp, \ + G ## _p, sizeof(G ## _p), \ + NULL, 0, \ + G ## _b, sizeof(G ## _b), \ + G ## _gx, sizeof(G ## _gx), \ + G ## _gy, sizeof(G ## _gy), \ + G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n), \ + G ## _T \ + ) +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve25519() */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve25519_a24 = 0x01DB42; +static const unsigned char curve25519_part_of_n[] = { + 0x14, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0xDE, 0xA2, 0xF7, 0x9C, 0xD6, + 0x58, 0x12, 0x63, 0x1A, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0xD3, 0xED, +}; + +/* + * Specialized function for creating the Curve25519 group + */ +static int ecp_use_curve25519(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->A, curve25519_a24)); + + /* P = 2^255 - 19 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->P, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&grp->P, 255)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&grp->P, &grp->P, 19)); + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P); + + /* N = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&grp->N, + curve25519_part_of_n, sizeof(curve25519_part_of_n))); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&grp->N, 252, 1)); + + /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. + * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.X, 9)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.Z, 1)); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->G.Y); + + /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ + grp->nbits = 254; + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve448() */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve448_a24 = 0x98AA; +static const unsigned char curve448_part_of_n[] = { + 0x83, 0x35, 0xDC, 0x16, 0x3B, 0xB1, 0x24, + 0xB6, 0x51, 0x29, 0xC9, 0x6F, 0xDE, 0x93, + 0x3D, 0x8D, 0x72, 0x3A, 0x70, 0xAA, 0xDC, + 0x87, 0x3D, 0x6D, 0x54, 0xA7, 0xBB, 0x0D, +}; + +/* + * Specialized function for creating the Curve448 group + */ +static int ecp_use_curve448(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +{ + mbedtls_mpi Ns; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&Ns); + + /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->A, curve448_a24)); + + /* P = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->P, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&grp->P, 224)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&grp->P, &grp->P, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&grp->P, 224)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&grp->P, &grp->P, 1)); + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P); + + /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. + * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.X, 5)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.Z, 1)); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->G.Y); + + /* N = 2^446 - 13818066809895115352007386748515426880336692474882178609894547503885 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&grp->N, 446, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&Ns, + curve448_part_of_n, sizeof(curve448_part_of_n))); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&grp->N, &grp->N, &Ns)); + + /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ + grp->nbits = 447; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&Ns); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Set a group using well-known domain parameters + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(grp); + + grp->id = id; + + switch (id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: + NIST_MODP(p192); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp192r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: + NIST_MODP(p224); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp224r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: + NIST_MODP(p256); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp256r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: + NIST_MODP(p384); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp384r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: + NIST_MODP(p521); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp521r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p192k1; + return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp192k1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p224k1; + return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp224k1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p256k1; + return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp256k1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: + return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP256r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: + return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP384r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: + return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP512r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p255; + return ecp_use_curve25519(grp); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p448; + return ecp_use_curve448(grp); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + + default: + grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) +/* + * Fast reduction modulo the primes used by the NIST curves. + * + * These functions are critical for speed, but not needed for correct + * operations. So, we make the choice to heavily rely on the internals of our + * bignum library, which creates a tight coupling between these functions and + * our MPI implementation. However, the coupling between the ECP module and + * MPI remains loose, since these functions can be deactivated at will. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Compared to the way things are presented in FIPS 186-3 D.2, + * we proceed in columns, from right (least significant chunk) to left, + * adding chunks to N in place, and keeping a carry for the next chunk. + * This avoids moving things around in memory, and uselessly adding zeros, + * compared to the more straightforward, line-oriented approach. + * + * For this prime we need to handle data in chunks of 64 bits. + * Since this is always a multiple of our basic mbedtls_mpi_uint, we can + * use a mbedtls_mpi_uint * to designate such a chunk, and small loops to handle it. + */ + +/* Add 64-bit chunks (dst += src) and update carry */ +static inline void add64(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry) +{ + unsigned char i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + for (i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); i++, dst++, src++) { + *dst += c; c = (*dst < c); + *dst += *src; c += (*dst < *src); + } + *carry += c; +} + +/* Add carry to a 64-bit chunk and update carry */ +static inline void carry64(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry) +{ + unsigned char i; + for (i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); i++, dst++) { + *dst += *carry; + *carry = (*dst < *carry); + } +} + +#define WIDTH 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) +#define A(i) N->p + (i) * WIDTH +#define ADD(i) add64(p, A(i), &c) +#define NEXT p += WIDTH; carry64(p, &c) +#define LAST p += WIDTH; *p = c; while (++p < end) *p = 0 + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.1) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p192(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, *end; + + /* Make sure we have enough blocks so that A(5) is legal */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, 6 * WIDTH)); + + p = N->p; + end = p + N->n; + + ADD(3); ADD(5); NEXT; // A0 += A3 + A5 + ADD(3); ADD(4); ADD(5); NEXT; // A1 += A3 + A4 + A5 + ADD(4); ADD(5); LAST; // A2 += A4 + A5 + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +#undef WIDTH +#undef A +#undef ADD +#undef NEXT +#undef LAST +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +/* + * The reader is advised to first understand ecp_mod_p192() since the same + * general structure is used here, but with additional complications: + * (1) chunks of 32 bits, and (2) subtractions. + */ + +/* + * For these primes, we need to handle data in chunks of 32 bits. + * This makes it more complicated if we use 64 bits limbs in MPI, + * which prevents us from using a uniform access method as for p192. + * + * So, we define a mini abstraction layer to access 32 bit chunks, + * load them in 'cur' for work, and store them back from 'cur' when done. + * + * While at it, also define the size of N in terms of 32-bit chunks. + */ +#define LOAD32 cur = A(i); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) /* 32 bit */ + +#define MAX32 N->n +#define A(j) N->p[j] +#define STORE32 N->p[i] = cur; + +#else /* 64-bit */ + +#define MAX32 N->n * 2 +#define A(j) (j) % 2 ? (uint32_t) (N->p[(j)/2] >> 32) : \ + (uint32_t) (N->p[(j)/2]) +#define STORE32 \ + if (i % 2) { \ + N->p[i/2] &= 0x00000000FFFFFFFF; \ + N->p[i/2] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur) << 32; \ + } else { \ + N->p[i/2] &= 0xFFFFFFFF00000000; \ + N->p[i/2] |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur; \ + } + +#endif /* sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) */ + +/* + * Helpers for addition and subtraction of chunks, with signed carry. + */ +static inline void add32(uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry) +{ + *dst += src; + *carry += (*dst < src); +} + +static inline void sub32(uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry) +{ + *carry -= (*dst < src); + *dst -= src; +} + +#define ADD(j) add32(&cur, A(j), &c); +#define SUB(j) sub32(&cur, A(j), &c); + +/* + * Helpers for the main 'loop' + */ +#define INIT(b) \ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; \ + signed char c = 0, cc; \ + uint32_t cur; \ + size_t i = 0, bits = (b); \ + /* N is the size of the product of two b-bit numbers, plus one */ \ + /* limb for fix_negative */ \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, (b) * 2 / biL + 1)); \ + LOAD32; + +#define NEXT \ + STORE32; i++; LOAD32; \ + cc = c; c = 0; \ + if (cc < 0) \ + sub32(&cur, -cc, &c); \ + else \ + add32(&cur, cc, &c); \ + +#define LAST \ + STORE32; i++; \ + cur = c > 0 ? c : 0; STORE32; \ + cur = 0; while (++i < MAX32) { STORE32; } \ + if (c < 0) mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative(N, c, bits); + +/* + * If the result is negative, we get it in the form + * c * 2^bits + N, with c negative and N positive shorter than 'bits' + */ +static void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative(mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits) +{ + size_t i; + + /* Set N := 2^bits - 1 - N. We know that 0 <= N < 2^bits, so + * set the absolute value to 0xfff...fff - N. There is no carry + * since we're subtracting from all-bits-one. */ + for (i = 0; i <= bits / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); i++) { + N->p[i] = ~(mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0 - N->p[i]; + } + /* Add 1, taking care of the carry. */ + i = 0; + do { + ++N->p[i]; + } while (N->p[i++] == 0 && i <= bits / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + /* Invert the sign. + * Now N = N0 - 2^bits where N0 is the initial value of N. */ + N->s = -1; + + /* Add |c| * 2^bits to the absolute value. Since c and N are + * negative, this adds c * 2^bits. */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint msw = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) -c; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + if (bits == 224) { + msw <<= 32; + } +#endif + N->p[bits / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)] += msw; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.2) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p224(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + INIT(224); + + SUB(7); SUB(11); NEXT; // A0 += -A7 - A11 + SUB(8); SUB(12); NEXT; // A1 += -A8 - A12 + SUB(9); SUB(13); NEXT; // A2 += -A9 - A13 + SUB(10); ADD(7); ADD(11); NEXT; // A3 += -A10 + A7 + A11 + SUB(11); ADD(8); ADD(12); NEXT; // A4 += -A11 + A8 + A12 + SUB(12); ADD(9); ADD(13); NEXT; // A5 += -A12 + A9 + A13 + SUB(13); ADD(10); LAST; // A6 += -A13 + A10 + +cleanup: + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.3) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p256(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + INIT(256); + + ADD(8); ADD(9); + SUB(11); SUB(12); SUB(13); SUB(14); NEXT; // A0 + + ADD(9); ADD(10); + SUB(12); SUB(13); SUB(14); SUB(15); NEXT; // A1 + + ADD(10); ADD(11); + SUB(13); SUB(14); SUB(15); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD(11); ADD(11); ADD(12); ADD(12); ADD(13); + SUB(15); SUB(8); SUB(9); NEXT; // A3 + + ADD(12); ADD(12); ADD(13); ADD(13); ADD(14); + SUB(9); SUB(10); NEXT; // A4 + + ADD(13); ADD(13); ADD(14); ADD(14); ADD(15); + SUB(10); SUB(11); NEXT; // A5 + + ADD(14); ADD(14); ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(14); ADD(13); + SUB(8); SUB(9); NEXT; // A6 + + ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(8); + SUB(10); SUB(11); SUB(12); SUB(13); LAST; // A7 + +cleanup: + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p384 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.4) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p384(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + INIT(384); + + ADD(12); ADD(21); ADD(20); + SUB(23); NEXT; // A0 + + ADD(13); ADD(22); ADD(23); + SUB(12); SUB(20); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD(14); ADD(23); + SUB(13); SUB(21); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD(15); ADD(12); ADD(20); ADD(21); + SUB(14); SUB(22); SUB(23); NEXT; // A3 + + ADD(21); ADD(21); ADD(16); ADD(13); ADD(12); ADD(20); ADD(22); + SUB(15); SUB(23); SUB(23); NEXT; // A4 + + ADD(22); ADD(22); ADD(17); ADD(14); ADD(13); ADD(21); ADD(23); + SUB(16); NEXT; // A5 + + ADD(23); ADD(23); ADD(18); ADD(15); ADD(14); ADD(22); + SUB(17); NEXT; // A6 + + ADD(19); ADD(16); ADD(15); ADD(23); + SUB(18); NEXT; // A7 + + ADD(20); ADD(17); ADD(16); + SUB(19); NEXT; // A8 + + ADD(21); ADD(18); ADD(17); + SUB(20); NEXT; // A9 + + ADD(22); ADD(19); ADD(18); + SUB(21); NEXT; // A10 + + ADD(23); ADD(20); ADD(19); + SUB(22); LAST; // A11 + +cleanup: + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#undef A +#undef LOAD32 +#undef STORE32 +#undef MAX32 +#undef INIT +#undef NEXT +#undef LAST + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Here we have an actual Mersenne prime, so things are more straightforward. + * However, chunks are aligned on a 'weird' boundary (521 bits). + */ + +/* Size of p521 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P521_WIDTH (521 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1) + +/* Bits to keep in the most significant mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P521_MASK 0x01FF + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5) + * Write N as A1 + 2^521 A0, return A0 + A1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p521(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P521_WIDTH + 1]; + /* Worst case for the size of M is when mbedtls_mpi_uint is 16 bits: + * we need to hold bits 513 to 1056, which is 34 limbs, that is + * P521_WIDTH + 1. Otherwise P521_WIDTH is enough. */ + + if (N->n < P521_WIDTH) { + return 0; + } + + /* M = A1 */ + M.s = 1; + M.n = N->n - (P521_WIDTH - 1); + if (M.n > P521_WIDTH + 1) { + M.n = P521_WIDTH + 1; + } + M.p = Mp; + memcpy(Mp, N->p + P521_WIDTH - 1, M.n * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&M, 521 % (8 * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)))); + + /* N = A0 */ + N->p[P521_WIDTH - 1] &= P521_MASK; + for (i = P521_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++) { + N->p[i] = 0; + } + + /* N = A0 + A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(N, N, &M)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +#undef P521_WIDTH +#undef P521_MASK +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + +/* Size of p255 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P255_WIDTH (255 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p255 = 2^255 - 19 + * Write N as A0 + 2^256 A1, return A0 + 38 * A1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p255(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P255_WIDTH]; + + /* Helper references for top part of N */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint * const NT_p = N->p + P255_WIDTH; + const size_t NT_n = N->n - P255_WIDTH; + if (N->n <= P255_WIDTH) { + return 0; + } + if (NT_n > P255_WIDTH) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Split N as N + 2^256 M */ + memcpy(Mp, NT_p, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * NT_n); + memset(NT_p, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * NT_n); + + /* N = A0 + 38 * A1 */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(N->p, P255_WIDTH + 1, + Mp, NT_n, + 38); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + +/* Size of p448 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P448_WIDTH (448 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) + +/* Number of limbs fully occupied by 2^224 (max), and limbs used by it (min) */ +#define DIV_ROUND_UP(X, Y) (((X) + (Y) -1) / (Y)) +#define P224_SIZE (224 / 8) +#define P224_WIDTH_MIN (P224_SIZE / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) +#define P224_WIDTH_MAX DIV_ROUND_UP(P224_SIZE, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) +#define P224_UNUSED_BITS ((P224_WIDTH_MAX * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * 8) - 224) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p448 = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 + * Write N as A0 + 2^448 A1 and A1 as B0 + 2^224 B1, and return + * A0 + A1 + B1 + (B0 + B1) * 2^224. This is different to the reference + * implementation of Curve448, which uses its own special 56-bit limbs rather + * than a generic bignum library. We could squeeze some extra speed out on + * 32-bit machines by splitting N up into 32-bit limbs and doing the + * arithmetic using the limbs directly as we do for the NIST primes above, + * but for 64-bit targets it should use half the number of operations if we do + * the reduction with 224-bit limbs, since mpi_add_mpi will then use 64-bit adds. + */ +static int ecp_mod_p448(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M, Q; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P448_WIDTH + 1], Qp[P448_WIDTH]; + + if (N->n <= P448_WIDTH) { + return 0; + } + + /* M = A1 */ + M.s = 1; + M.n = N->n - (P448_WIDTH); + if (M.n > P448_WIDTH) { + /* Shouldn't be called with N larger than 2^896! */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + M.p = Mp; + memset(Mp, 0, sizeof(Mp)); + memcpy(Mp, N->p + P448_WIDTH, M.n * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + + /* N = A0 */ + for (i = P448_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++) { + N->p[i] = 0; + } + + /* N += A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(N, N, &M)); + + /* Q = B1, N += B1 */ + Q = M; + Q.p = Qp; + memcpy(Qp, Mp, sizeof(Qp)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&Q, 224)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(N, N, &Q)); + + /* M = (B0 + B1) * 2^224, N += M */ + if (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) > 4) { + Mp[P224_WIDTH_MIN] &= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint)-1) >> (P224_UNUSED_BITS); + } + for (i = P224_WIDTH_MAX; i < M.n; ++i) { + Mp[i] = 0; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&M, &M, &Q)); + M.n = P448_WIDTH + 1; /* Make room for shifted carry bit from the addition */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&M, 224)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(N, N, &M)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo P = 2^s - R, + * with R about 33 bits, used by the Koblitz curves. + * + * Write N as A0 + 2^224 A1, return A0 + R * A1. + * Actually do two passes, since R is big. + */ +#define P_KOBLITZ_MAX (256 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) // Max limbs in P +#define P_KOBLITZ_R (8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) // Limbs in R +static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p_limbs, + size_t adjust, size_t shift, mbedtls_mpi_uint mask) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_mpi M, R; + mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P_KOBLITZ_MAX + P_KOBLITZ_R + 1]; + + if (N->n < p_limbs) { + return 0; + } + + /* Init R */ + R.s = 1; + R.p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) Rp; /* R.p will not be modified so the cast is safe */ + R.n = P_KOBLITZ_R; + + /* Common setup for M */ + M.s = 1; + M.p = Mp; + + /* M = A1 */ + M.n = (unsigned short) (N->n - (p_limbs - adjust)); + if (M.n > p_limbs + adjust) { + M.n = (unsigned short) (p_limbs + adjust); + } + memset(Mp, 0, sizeof(Mp)); + memcpy(Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + if (shift != 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&M, shift)); + } + M.n += R.n; /* Make room for multiplication by R */ + + /* N = A0 */ + if (mask != 0) { + N->p[p_limbs - 1] &= mask; + } + for (i = p_limbs; i < N->n; i++) { + N->p[i] = 0; + } + + /* N = A0 + R * A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&M, &M, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(N, N, &M)); + + /* Second pass */ + + /* M = A1 */ + M.n = (unsigned short) (N->n - (p_limbs - adjust)); + if (M.n > p_limbs + adjust) { + M.n = (unsigned short) (p_limbs + adjust); + } + memset(Mp, 0, sizeof(Mp)); + memcpy(Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + if (shift != 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&M, shift)); + } + M.n += R.n; /* Make room for multiplication by R */ + + /* N = A0 */ + if (mask != 0) { + N->p[p_limbs - 1] &= mask; + } + for (i = p_limbs; i < N->n; i++) { + N->p[i] = 0; + } + + /* N = A0 + R * A1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&M, &M, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(N, N, &M)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192k1 = 2^192 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x01000011C9 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00) + }; + + return ecp_mod_koblitz(N, Rp, 192 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), 0, 0, + 0); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224k1 = 2^224 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^11 + 2^9 + 2^7 + 2^4 + 2 + 1 = 0x0100001A93 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00) + }; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) + return ecp_mod_koblitz(N, Rp, 4, 1, 32, 0xFFFFFFFF); +#else + return ecp_mod_koblitz(N, Rp, 224 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), 0, 0, + 0); +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256k1 = 2^256 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^9 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^4 + 1 = 0x01000003D1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00) + }; + return ecp_mod_koblitz(N, Rp, 256 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), 0, 0, + 0); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +mbedtls_ecp_variant mbedtls_ecp_get_variant(void) +{ + return MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_STRUCT; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */ diff --git a/library/ecp_curves_new.c b/library/ecp_curves_new.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..035b23a1b41 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ecp_curves_new.c @@ -0,0 +1,6036 @@ +/* + * Elliptic curves over GF(p): curve-specific data and functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) + +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include "bn_mul.h" +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "ecp_invasive.h" + +#include + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + +#define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) } + +#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ + ECP_MPI_INIT(x, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) + +#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(x, y) { \ + ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(NULL, 0) } +#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(x, y) { \ + ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(mpi_one, 1) } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +/* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */ +#define ECP_LOAD_GROUP +static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_one[] = { 1 }; +#endif + +/* + * Note: the constants are in little-endian order + * to be directly usable in MPIs + */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp192r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xB9, 0x46, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0xB8, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x30, 0x24, 0x72, 0xAB, 0xE9, 0xA7, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x80, 0x9C, 0xE5, 0x19, 0x05, 0x21, 0x64), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x28, 0xD2, 0xB4, 0xB1, 0xC9, 0x6B, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xF8, 0xDE, 0x99, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x9E, 0xE3, 0x60, 0x59, 0xD1, 0xC4, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBD, 0x22, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x2A, 0xCF, 0x33, 0xF0, 0xBE, 0xD1, 0xED), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x71, 0x4B, 0xA8, 0xED, 0x7E, 0xC9, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x2A, 0xF6, 0xDF, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x35, 0xF7, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0x1E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x67, 0xC2, 0x1D, 0x32, 0x8F, 0x10, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x2D, 0x17, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xD8, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x45, 0x10, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x3E, 0x52, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xF1, 0x04, 0x5D, 0xEE, 0xD4, 0x56, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x27, 0x61, 0xAA, 0x81, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x37, 0xD7, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x14), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x35, 0x52, 0xC6, 0x31, 0xB7, 0x27, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xD4, 0x15, 0x98, 0x0F, 0xE7, 0xF3, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x31, 0x70, 0x35, 0x09, 0xA0, 0x2B, 0xC2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x75, 0xA7, 0x4C, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5B, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x17, 0x48, 0x8D, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x86, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xCF, 0xFE, 0x6B, 0xB0, 0xA5, 0x06, 0xAB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0x6D, 0x7B, 0x47, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xFC, 0x51, 0x12, 0x62, 0x66, 0x0B, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x40, 0x93, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x58, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x0B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x36, 0x9D, 0xA3, 0xD7, 0x3B, 0xAD, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x3B, 0x05, 0x9A, 0xA8, 0xAA, 0x69, 0xB2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xD9, 0xD1, 0x4D, 0x4A, 0x6E, 0x96, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x66, 0x32, 0x39, 0xC6, 0x57, 0x7D, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xA0, 0x36, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x00, 0x62), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xEF, 0x59, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xD9, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xB0, 0xE9, 0x41, 0xA4, 0x87, 0x76, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xD4, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0xFA, 0x16, 0x56, 0xDC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x62, 0xD2, 0xB1, 0x34, 0xB2, 0xF1, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xED, 0x55, 0xC5, 0x47, 0xB5, 0x07, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xF6, 0x2F, 0x94, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x54, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xA6, 0xD4, 0x8C, 0xA9, 0xCE, 0x4D, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x4B, 0x46, 0xCC, 0xB2, 0x55, 0xC8, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xAE, 0x31, 0xED, 0x89, 0x65, 0x59, 0x55), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x0A, 0xD1, 0x1A, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0xEA, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xFC, 0x0C, 0x1A, 0xFB, 0xA0, 0xC8, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xFD, 0x53, 0x6F, 0x6D, 0xBF, 0xBA, 0xAF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xB0, 0x7D, 0x83, 0x96, 0xE3, 0xCB, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x6E, 0x55, 0x2C, 0x20, 0x53, 0x2F, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x66, 0x00, 0x17, 0x08, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x12, 0x97, 0x3A, 0xC7, 0x57, 0x45, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x25, 0x99, 0x00, 0xF6, 0x97, 0xB4, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x74, 0xE6, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xCC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xF4, 0x76, 0xD5, 0x5F, 0x2A, 0xFD, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x80, 0x7E, 0x3E, 0xE5, 0xE8, 0xD6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xAD, 0x1E, 0x70, 0x79, 0x3E, 0x3D, 0x83), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x15, 0xBB, 0xB3, 0x42, 0x6A, 0xA1, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x58, 0xCB, 0x43, 0x25, 0x00, 0x14, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x4E, 0x93, 0x11, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x54, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x52, 0xA2, 0xB4, 0x57, 0x32, 0xB9, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x43, 0xA1, 0xB1, 0xFB, 0x01, 0xE1, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x11, 0xB8, 0xC2, 0x03, 0xE5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x2B, 0x71, 0x26, 0x4E, 0x7C, 0xC5, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xF5, 0xD3, 0xA8, 0xE4, 0x95, 0x48, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xAE, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9F, 0x6A, 0x22, 0xAD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xCC, 0xA3, 0x4D, 0xA0, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xF8, 0x5E, 0xA6, 0x58, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x8A, 0x3D, 0x17, 0xFF, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xCD, 0xA8, 0xDD, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x5C, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xFE, 0x17, 0xE2, 0xCF, 0xEA, 0x63, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x51, 0xC9, 0x16, 0xDE, 0xB4, 0xB2, 0xDD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBE, 0x12, 0xD7, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x50, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x87, 0xC5, 0x8A, 0x76, 0x57, 0x07, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x1F, 0xC6, 0x1B, 0x66, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0x8A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xA4, 0x85, 0x13, 0x8F, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x0D, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0x1B, 0xD1, 0xD6, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x7A, 0xD0, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x66), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xFE, 0xA5, 0x9C, 0x34, 0x30, 0x49, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x26, 0x06, 0xE3, 0x01, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x2B, 0x66, 0xFC, 0x95, 0x5F, 0x35, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xCF, 0x54, 0x63, 0x99, 0x57, 0x05, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x6F, 0x00, 0x5F, 0x65, 0x08, 0x47, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x6D, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xBC, 0x45), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x0A, 0x35, 0x9E, 0x33, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x17, 0x0C, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x7A, 0x49, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x44, 0x06, 0x8F, 0x0B, 0x70, 0x2F, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x4B, 0xCB, 0xF9, 0x8E, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x3F, 0xCE, 0x17, 0xD2, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x0D, 0xD2, 0x6C, 0x82, 0x37, 0xE5, 0xFC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x3C, 0xF4, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x8A, 0x95, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x96, 0xF1, 0x0A, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x74, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xA1, 0xAA, 0xBA, 0x86, 0x77, 0x4F, 0xA2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x7F, 0xEF, 0x60, 0x50, 0x80, 0xD7, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x2F, 0xBE, 0x91, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xAE, 0x85, 0x98, 0xFE, 0x05, 0x7F, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBE, 0xFD, 0x11, 0x31, 0x3D, 0x14, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x75, 0xE8, 0x30, 0x01, 0xCB, 0x9B, 0x1C), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192r1_T_0_X, secp192r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_1_X, secp192r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_2_X, secp192r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_3_X, secp192r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_4_X, secp192r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_5_X, secp192r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_6_X, secp192r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_7_X, secp192r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_8_X, secp192r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_9_X, secp192r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_10_X, secp192r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_11_X, secp192r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_12_X, secp192r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_13_X, secp192r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_14_X, secp192r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_15_X, secp192r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp192r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp224r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xFF, 0x55, 0x23, 0x43, 0x39, 0x0B, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xD8, 0xBF, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0xB0, 0x44, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0x32, 0x41, 0xF5, 0xAB, 0xB3, 0x04, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x85, 0x0A, 0x05, 0xB4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x2A, 0x5C, 0x5C, 0x45, 0x29, 0xDD, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xF0, 0xB8, 0xE0, 0xA2, 0x16, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xF9, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0xD3, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xFD, 0x99, 0x26, 0x19, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x0E, 0x4C, 0x48, 0x7C, 0xA2, 0x17, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x57, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x16, 0x5C, 0x8F, 0xAA, 0xED, 0x0F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xC5, 0x43, 0x34, 0x93, 0x05, 0x2A, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCA, 0xC6, 0x14, 0xC2, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x43, 0x6C, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x5A, 0x98, 0x1E, 0xC8, 0xA5, 0x42, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x49, 0x56, 0x78, 0xF8, 0xEF, 0xED, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0xBB, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x4C, 0x54, 0x5F, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x0C, 0x33, 0xCC, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x79, 0xCB, 0x2E, 0x08, 0xFF, 0xD8, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x1F, 0xD4, 0xD7, 0x57, 0xE9, 0x39, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xD6, 0x3B, 0x0A, 0x1C, 0x87, 0xB7, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x30, 0xD8, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x79, 0x74, 0x9A, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x67, 0xC1, 0x91, 0xE7, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xDF, 0x38, 0x82, 0x19, 0x2C, 0x4C, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x2E, 0x39, 0xC5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x36, 0x78, 0x4E, 0xAE, 0x5B, 0x02, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0xF8, 0xF4, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x35, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0x2C, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xA5, 0x1F, 0xAE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x1C, 0x4B, 0xDF, 0x5B, 0xF2, 0x51, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0x0E, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x24, 0x09, 0x62, 0xAF, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xE1, 0x80, 0x55, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x82, 0xFE, 0xAD, 0xC3, 0xE5, 0xCF, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xA2, 0x62, 0x17, 0x76, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xB8, 0xE5, 0xAC, 0xB7, 0x66, 0x38, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xFD, 0x86, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xD3, 0x0C, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x66, 0xB0, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x8D, 0x90, 0x10, 0xB7, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x47, 0x9B, 0xE6, 0x55, 0x8A, 0xE4, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x78, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x97, 0xED, 0xDE, 0xFF, 0xB3, 0xDF, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xB9, 0x83, 0xB7, 0xEB, 0xBE, 0x40, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xD3, 0xD3, 0xCD, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x79, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x83, 0x1B, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x54, 0xD3, 0x31, 0x56, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x36, 0xE5, 0xE0, 0x89, 0x96, 0x8E, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xEF, 0x0A, 0xED, 0xD0, 0x11, 0x4A, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x00, 0x57, 0x27, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xCA, 0x3D, 0xF7, 0x64, 0x9B, 0x6E, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xE3, 0x70, 0x6B, 0x41, 0xD7, 0xED, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x44, 0x44, 0x80, 0xCE, 0x13, 0x37, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x73, 0x80, 0x79, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x4D, 0x70, 0x7D, 0x31, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x35, 0x88, 0x47, 0xC4, 0x24, 0x78, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xF0, 0xCD, 0x91, 0x81, 0xB3, 0xDE, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xCE, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x9C, 0x2D, 0xE8, 0xD2, 0x00, 0x8F, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x5E, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0x6E, 0x58, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x81, 0x21, 0xCE, 0x43, 0xF4, 0x24, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0xBC, 0xF0, 0xF4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x10, 0xC2, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x8F, 0x8A, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x67, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x38, 0x2B, 0x35, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0xA9, 0xFA, 0x77, 0x5C, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x33, 0x19, 0x2B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x3E, 0x96, 0x22, 0x53, 0xE1, 0xE9, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x13, 0xBC, 0xA1, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x01, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x00, 0xC9, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x73, 0xA5, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0xC1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x95, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x32, 0x30, 0x2B, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x42, 0x09, 0x05, 0x61, 0x2A, 0x7E, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x84, 0xA2, 0x05, 0x88, 0x64, 0x65, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x2D, 0x90, 0xB3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xE7, 0x2E, 0x85, 0x55, 0x80, 0x7C, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xC1, 0xAC, 0x78, 0xB4, 0xAF, 0xFB, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xC3, 0x28, 0x8E, 0x79, 0x18, 0x1F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x5F, 0xA8, 0x6C, 0x46, 0x83, 0x43, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xA9, 0x93, 0x11, 0xB6, 0x07, 0x57, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x03, 0x89, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x8C, 0x62, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x2C, 0x13, 0x59, 0xCC, 0xFA, 0x84, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xB9, 0x48, 0xBC, 0x57, 0xC7, 0xB3, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0x2E, 0x3A, 0x28, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x0A, 0x43, 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x25, 0xAB, 0xC1, 0xEE, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xDB, 0x45, 0x1D, 0x4A, 0x80, 0x75, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x2D, 0x9A, 0x05, 0xF4, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x10, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x95, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x15, 0x86, 0xC3, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xDC, 0x27, 0xD1, 0x56, 0xA1, 0x14, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x0B, 0xD6, 0x77, 0x4E, 0x44, 0xA2, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x42, 0x71, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x86, 0xB2, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0x2F, 0x7B, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xEF, 0xCB, 0xDB, 0xBC, 0x9E, 0x3B, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x03, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x5B, 0xF5, 0x8D, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x95, 0x79, 0xD6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x32, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x9B, 0x4F, 0x07, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x3E, 0xFB, 0x06, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0x40, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x1F, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x61, 0xFD, 0x8B, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x8B, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x34, 0xB3, 0xB4, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0xB0, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x58, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x77, 0xBB, 0x13, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x34, 0xCC, 0x89, 0x21, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x33, 0xDD, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x81, 0xEF, 0xA4, 0xF2, 0x10, 0x0B, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xF7, 0x6E, 0x72, 0x4A, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x23, 0x0A, 0x53, 0x03, 0x16, 0x62, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x76, 0xFD, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x14, 0xA1, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xD7, 0xB0, 0x6C, 0xA0, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xC0, 0xB0, 0xC6, 0x63, 0x24, 0xCD, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x38, 0x2C, 0xB1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xCD, 0x7D, 0x20, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x97, 0x9F, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x45, 0xF7, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x99, 0xF3, 0xD2, 0x20, 0x02, 0xEB, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x18, 0x5B, 0x7B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x91, 0x60, 0xEA, 0xFD, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xD3, 0xB5, 0xD6, 0x90, 0x17, 0x0E, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xF4, 0x28, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x58, 0xDC, 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x20, 0x01, 0xFB, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x7F, 0x06, 0xDA, 0x11, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x41, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x33, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xFF, 0x27, 0xCA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224r1_T_0_X, secp224r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_1_X, secp224r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_2_X, secp224r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_3_X, secp224r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_4_X, secp224r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_5_X, secp224r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_6_X, secp224r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_7_X, secp224r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_8_X, secp224r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_9_X, secp224r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_10_X, secp224r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_11_X, secp224r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_12_X, secp224r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_13_X, secp224r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_14_X, secp224r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_15_X, secp224r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp224r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp256r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x60, 0xD2, 0x27, 0x3E, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xB0, 0x53, 0xCC, 0xB0, 0x06, 0x1D, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x86, 0x98, 0x76, 0x55, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x93, 0x3A, 0xAA, 0xD8, 0x35, 0xC6, 0x5A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x25, 0x63, 0xFC, 0xC2, 0xCA, 0xB9, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x9E, 0x17, 0xA7, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE6, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xC8, 0xBA, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x4B, 0xD2, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xC6, 0x23, 0x3A, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x3A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x23, 0xCC, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x29, 0x87, 0x0F, 0xFA, 0x3C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x69, 0xF2, 0x40, 0x0B, 0xA3, 0x98, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xA8, 0x48, 0x02, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0x12, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xAF, 0x09, 0x83, 0x80, 0xAA, 0x58, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x12, 0xBE, 0x70, 0x94, 0x76, 0xE3, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x7D, 0xEF, 0x86, 0xFF, 0xE3, 0x37, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x86, 0x8B, 0x08, 0x27, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x54, 0x4C, 0x25, 0x4F, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xFD, 0xF0, 0x6D, 0x37, 0x03, 0x69, 0xD6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xD5, 0xDA, 0xAD, 0x92, 0x49, 0xF0, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x73, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xAF, 0xA7, 0xD1, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x41, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x78, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0xE2, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x6A, 0x5D, 0x52, 0x35, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0x96, 0xF4, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x20, 0x49, 0x54, 0xEA, 0xB3, 0x82, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0xDB, 0xEA, 0x02, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x1C, 0x62), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x9E, 0x4C, 0xDC, 0x39, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0x57, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x5D, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x7F, 0x2D, 0x52, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x64, 0xFA, 0xB4, 0xFE, 0xA4, 0xC4, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x37, 0xB9, 0xC0, 0xAA, 0x59, 0xC6, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x58, 0xD9, 0xED, 0x58, 0x99, 0x65, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x7D, 0x26, 0x8C, 0x4A, 0xF9, 0x05, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x73, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xD0, 0x55, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x0A, 0xF5, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x81, 0x2D, 0x20, 0xEB, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xC1, 0x28, 0x52, 0xAB, 0xE3, 0xD1, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x34, 0x79, 0x45, 0x57, 0xA5, 0x12, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xCF, 0xB8, 0x7E, 0xF7, 0x92, 0x96, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x01, 0x8C, 0x0D, 0x23, 0xF2, 0xE3, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x2E, 0xE3, 0x84, 0x52, 0x7A, 0x34, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xA1, 0xB0, 0x15, 0x90, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x3C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x98, 0xE7, 0xFA, 0xA5, 0x7D, 0x8B, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x35, 0xD2, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x1B, 0x9F, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x69, 0x08, 0x9A, 0x72, 0xF0, 0xA9, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0xD3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xF6, 0xE8, 0xF8, 0x87, 0xF7, 0xFC, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xBE, 0x7F, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x2B, 0xD7, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x32, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x6D, 0x42, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x9A, 0xE3, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xBB, 0x84, 0xED), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x95, 0x29, 0x73, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3E, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x30, 0x54, 0x35, 0x8E, 0x0A, 0xDD, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0x97, 0x61, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x33, 0x3C, 0x58, 0x55, 0x34, 0x23, 0xA3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x5D, 0x16, 0x5F, 0x7B, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x8A, 0xC1, 0x51, 0xCC, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x0D, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x53, 0x23, 0x1D, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x66, 0x52, 0x84, 0xE1, 0x95), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x9B, 0x83, 0x0A, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xFF, 0x42, 0x41, 0x6E, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xA1, 0x4F, 0x1F, 0x89, 0x82, 0xAA, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xB8, 0x0F, 0x6B, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0xD6, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0xB3, 0xBB, 0x51, 0x69, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x4F, 0x0F, 0x8D, 0xBD, 0x26, 0x0F, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xCB, 0xEC, 0x6B, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x3D, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x5D, 0x1E, 0x10, 0xD5, 0x44, 0xE2, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x9E, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0x6E, 0x4C, 0xAD, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x58, 0xC0, 0xFB, 0x34, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x9C, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x07, 0x41, 0xBD, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x6E, 0x10, 0xEC, 0x0E, 0xEC, 0xBB, 0xD6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xCF, 0xEF, 0x3F, 0x83, 0x1A, 0x88, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x29, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0xE0, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x46, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCD, 0x7E, 0xB3, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x21, 0xD0, 0xD4, 0xA3, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0xCA, 0xA8, 0xB3, 0xBF, 0x29, 0x99, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xF2, 0x05, 0xC1, 0xCF, 0x5D, 0x91, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x01, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x82, 0xDF, 0x5F, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x06, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xE3, 0x38, 0xA4, 0xC4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xD2, 0x3A, 0xE8, 0x03, 0xC5, 0x6D, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x35, 0xD0, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x1E, 0xD2, 0xCB, 0xAC, 0x88, 0x27, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xE0, 0x31, 0xDD, 0x99, 0x86), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x32, 0x96, 0x41, 0x58, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x5A, 0x2A, 0xB8, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x78, 0x2C, 0xC7, 0x08, 0x99, 0x19, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xE9, 0x84, 0x54, 0xE6, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x38, 0x30, 0xDB, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x0A, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x5C, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0xD5, 0x46, 0x0B, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x0B, 0x60, 0x4B, 0x37, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x24, 0xF3, 0x3D, 0x79, 0x7F, 0x6C, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7F, 0xE5, 0x1C, 0x4F, 0x60, 0x24, 0xF7, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x89, 0x49, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xA7, 0x2E, 0x8D, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0x39, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x89, 0xB5, 0x9A, 0xB8, 0x8D, 0x42, 0x9C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0x45, 0xE6, 0x4B, 0x3F, 0x4F, 0x1E, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x59, 0x22, 0xCC, 0x72, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x93, 0x1A, 0x27, 0x1E, 0x34, 0xC5, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x58, 0x5C, 0x15, 0x2E, 0xC6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x7F, 0xBA, 0x58, 0x5A, 0x84, 0x6F, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xA6, 0x36, 0x7E, 0xDC, 0xF7, 0xE1, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x4D, 0xAA, 0xEE, 0x57, 0x76, 0x3A, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x7E, 0x26, 0x18, 0x22, 0x23, 0x9F, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x4C, 0x64, 0xC7, 0x55, 0x02, 0x3F, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x02, 0x90, 0xBB, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0x30, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x6F, 0x64, 0xF4, 0x16, 0x69, 0x48, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x44, 0x9C, 0x95, 0x0C, 0x7D, 0x67, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x91, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0xD0, 0xD7, 0xE7, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xF9, 0x48, 0x62, 0x6F, 0xA8, 0x93, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x3A, 0x99, 0x02, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0x3D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xD3, 0x00, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x0C, 0x9F, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xB2, 0xAA, 0xFD, 0x88, 0x15, 0xDF, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0x35, 0x27, 0x31, 0x44, 0xCD, 0xC0, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xA5, 0x71, 0x94, 0x84, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xCB, 0xD0, 0x93, 0xE9, 0x88, 0xDA, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xC6, 0x39, 0x16, 0x5D, 0xA3, 0x1E, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x07, 0x37, 0x26, 0x36, 0x2A, 0xFE, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xBC, 0xF3, 0xD0, 0xDE, 0x50, 0xFC, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x2E, 0x06, 0x10, 0x15, 0x4D, 0xFA, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x65, 0x69, 0x5B, 0x66, 0xA2, 0x75, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x16, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB0, 0x30, 0x25, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xFB, 0x86, 0x42, 0x80, 0xC1, 0xC4, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x1D, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x01, 0x5F, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x37, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x1F, 0xA1, 0xF0, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x10, 0x5B, 0xCE, 0xC4, 0x9B, 0x6F, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x11, 0x11, 0x24, 0x4F, 0x4C, 0x79, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x3A, 0x72, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x72, 0x58, 0x43), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256r1_T_0_X, secp256r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_1_X, secp256r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_2_X, secp256r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_3_X, secp256r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_4_X, secp256r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_5_X, secp256r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_6_X, secp256r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_7_X, secp256r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_8_X, secp256r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_9_X, secp256r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_10_X, secp256r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_11_X, secp256r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_12_X, secp256r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_13_X, secp256r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_14_X, secp256r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_15_X, secp256r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp256r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp384r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x2A, 0xEC, 0xD3, 0xED, 0xC8, 0x85, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x8A, 0x8D, 0x39, 0x56, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x87, 0x13, 0x50, 0x8F, 0x08, 0x14, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x41, 0x81, 0xFE, 0x6E, 0x9C, 0x1D, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x2D, 0xF8, 0xE3, 0x6B, 0x05, 0x8E, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0xE2, 0xA7, 0x2F, 0x31, 0xB3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x29, 0xC5, 0xCC, 0x6A, 0x19, 0xEC, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xA7, 0xB0, 0x48, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x2D, 0x37, 0xF4, 0x81, 0x4D, 0x63, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x92, 0x00, 0x2C, 0x78, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xB7, 0x06, 0xF7, 0xB6, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xBC, 0x2C, 0xCF, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x53, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x75, 0x7B, 0xA3, 0xAB, 0xC3, 0x2C, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x9D, 0x78, 0x41, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x84, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x56, 0xE8, 0x52, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0xA8, 0xBD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xF2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0xB6, 0x89, 0x1B, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x0F, 0xCE, 0x1C, 0x7C, 0xF6, 0x50, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xEB, 0x90, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0xC7, 0xD4, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x49, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x01, 0x99, 0x60, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x80, 0x9B, 0x9B, 0x6A, 0xB0, 0x07, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xA2, 0xEE, 0x59, 0xBE, 0x95, 0xBC, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x9D, 0x56, 0xAE, 0x59, 0xFB, 0x1F, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xAC, 0x91, 0x80, 0x87, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x08, 0xA7, 0x08, 0x94, 0x32, 0xFC, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x29, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF4, 0xE5, 0x6E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x21, 0xB9, 0x50, 0x24, 0xF8, 0x9C, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x04, 0x01, 0xC2, 0xFB, 0x77, 0x3E, 0xDE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x38, 0xEE, 0xE3, 0xC7, 0x9D, 0xEC, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x43, 0xFA, 0x92, 0x5E, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xCA, 0x43, 0xF8, 0x3B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xE7, 0xEB, 0x17, 0x45, 0x86, 0xC2, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x69, 0x57, 0x32, 0xE0, 0x9C, 0xD1, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x10, 0xB8, 0x4D, 0xB8, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xE3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0xB2, 0x79, 0x39, 0x27, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x71, 0xE4, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xBD, 0x19, 0x40, 0xFA, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xF8, 0x1E, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x50, 0x8D, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x18, 0x7C, 0x41, 0xFA, 0x7C, 0x1B, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x59, 0x24, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xB7, 0xD3, 0xAD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x63, 0x54, 0x45, 0x6F, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xB2, 0x19, 0xA3, 0x86, 0x1D, 0x42, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x02, 0x87, 0x18, 0x92, 0x52, 0x1A, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x37, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x74, 0x61, 0xBA, 0x18, 0xAF, 0x40, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x52, 0x0F, 0x07, 0xB0, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x39, 0x13, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x15, 0x99, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x00, 0xCB, 0xC6, 0xB1, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xFA, 0x60, 0xB8, 0x24, 0xE4, 0x7D, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x75, 0xB3, 0x70, 0xB2, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCD, 0x33, 0x62, 0x7A, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x30, 0xDC, 0x0F, 0x9F, 0xBB, 0xB8, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xD5, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x81, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xAA, 0x2F, 0xD6, 0xF2, 0x73, 0xDF, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x7B, 0x74, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0x5B, 0x95, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x04, 0xEB, 0x15, 0xC8, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x50, 0x20, 0x28, 0xD1, 0x01, 0xAF, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x4F, 0x31, 0x81, 0x2F, 0x94, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x63, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x37, 0x63, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x46, 0xAD, 0xCE, 0x7B, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x47, 0x2D, 0x66, 0xA7, 0xE9, 0x33, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xF9, 0x93, 0x94, 0xA8, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x4A, 0xAC, 0x51, 0x08, 0x72, 0x2F, 0x1A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0xAD, 0xA0, 0xF9, 0x81, 0xE1, 0x78, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x9A, 0x63, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x31, 0x7B, 0x7A, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0x7D, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x96, 0x12, 0x4B, 0x19, 0x09, 0xE0, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x8A, 0x57, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x7E, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x9D, 0x69, 0xDC, 0xB3, 0xDA, 0xD8, 0x08), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x49, 0x03, 0x03, 0x33, 0x6F, 0x28, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xDB, 0xA7, 0x05, 0x8C, 0xF3, 0x4D, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x92, 0xB1, 0xA8, 0xEC, 0x0D, 0x64, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0x4B, 0x88, 0x1B, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x9C, 0x51, 0x69, 0xCE, 0x71, 0x73, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x5A, 0x14, 0x23, 0x1A, 0x46, 0x63, 0x5F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x44, 0x18, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x49, 0xDD, 0x64, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x32, 0x7C, 0x09, 0xD0, 0x3F, 0xD6, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE0, 0x4F, 0x65, 0x0C, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xFA, 0xFB, 0x4A, 0xB4, 0x79, 0x5A, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x5D, 0x1B, 0x2B, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0x9A, 0x74), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xAC, 0x56, 0xF7, 0x5F, 0x51, 0x68, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xE0, 0x1D, 0xBC, 0x13, 0x4E, 0xAC, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xF5, 0xC5, 0xE6, 0xD2, 0x88, 0xBA, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x23, 0x58, 0x67, 0xFA, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x80, 0x4B, 0xD8, 0xC4, 0xDF, 0x15, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x0E, 0x58, 0xE6, 0x2C, 0x59, 0xC2, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x26, 0x27, 0x99, 0x16, 0x2B, 0x22, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xF3, 0x8F, 0xC3, 0x2A, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x2E, 0x83, 0x3D, 0xFE, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x57, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0xC1, 0x49, 0x38, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x42, 0x8B, 0x33, 0x89, 0x1F, 0xEA, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x1D, 0x13, 0xD7, 0x50, 0xBB, 0x3E, 0xEB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x9A, 0x52, 0xD2, 0x54, 0x7C, 0x97, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x33, 0x6E, 0xED, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x50, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x35, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x40, 0x15, 0x83, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x2B, 0xA4, 0xAB, 0x03, 0x91, 0xEA, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x47, 0x39, 0xEF, 0x05, 0x59, 0xD0, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x24, 0x0D, 0x76, 0x11, 0x53, 0x08, 0xAF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x2F, 0xDD, 0xBD, 0x50, 0x48, 0xB1, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x1C, 0x84, 0x55, 0x78, 0x14, 0xEB, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x5E, 0x3E, 0xA6, 0xAF, 0xF6, 0xC7, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x11, 0xE2, 0x65, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x95, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x83, 0xD8, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0x22, 0x06, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x7F, 0x25, 0x2A, 0xAA, 0x28, 0x46, 0x97), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xDB, 0x15, 0x56, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xC0, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xDB, 0x0E, 0x08, 0xC9, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x62, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x7C, 0x13, 0xD5, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x21, 0xA0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x38, 0x81, 0x21, 0x23, 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x51, 0x05, 0xD0, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA9, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xC3, 0x27, 0xBF, 0xC6, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x65, 0x45, 0xDF, 0xB9, 0x46, 0x17, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x38, 0x3F, 0xB2, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0xCA, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xD7, 0x48, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x99, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x05, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE6, 0x5E, 0x82, 0x6D, 0xE5, 0x7E, 0xD5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x61, 0xFA, 0x7D, 0x01, 0xDB, 0xB6, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xC6, 0x58, 0x39, 0xF4, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x5A, 0x7A, 0x80, 0x08, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x3F, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0x68, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xF5, 0xD5, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xD8, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xAD, 0x92, 0xC5, 0x57, 0x6C, 0xDA, 0x91), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x67, 0x17, 0xC0, 0x40, 0x78, 0x8C, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xAA, 0xDA, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xDB, 0x42, 0x3E, 0x72, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xF9, 0x41, 0x17, 0x43, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xDD, 0xCC, 0x43, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x05, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x4B, 0xCF, 0x48, 0x8F, 0x41, 0x90, 0xE5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x0C, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0x22, 0x04, 0xBC, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x63, 0x79, 0x2F, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x8A, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x67, 0x3F, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x14, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x33, 0xF4, 0x6B, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x44, 0x71, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x88, 0x3F, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x2B, 0x85, 0x05, 0xC5, 0x44, 0x53, 0x15), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD1, 0x1C, 0x73, 0xE3, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x33, 0xA1, 0xD3, 0x69, 0x1C, 0x9D, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x5A, 0xBA, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0x1B, 0x94, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x74, 0x90, 0x5C, 0x57, 0xB0, 0x3A, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x2F, 0x93, 0x20, 0x24, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x78, 0x9D, 0x71, 0x67, 0x5D, 0x49, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xC8, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0x8F, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x7F, 0x79, 0x6C, 0x5F, 0xB7, 0xBC, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xE1, 0x83, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xBB, 0xEE, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x41, 0x71, 0xB9, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0xEE, 0xBB, 0x1D, 0x89, 0x50, 0x88, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x1C, 0x55, 0x74, 0xEB, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x38, 0x92, 0x06, 0x19, 0xD0, 0xB3, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x99, 0x26, 0xA3, 0x5F, 0xE2, 0xC1, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xC3, 0xB6, 0x26, 0x24, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xB7, 0x64, 0x4B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x4E, 0x95, 0xAD, 0x07, 0xFE, 0xB6, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x15, 0xE7, 0x2D, 0x19, 0xA9, 0x08, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0x0A, 0x3F, 0x6B, 0xFF, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xE4, 0x74, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x1D, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xB0, 0x71, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x96, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0xB8, 0x19, 0x90, 0x80, 0xB5, 0xEE, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x21, 0x20, 0xA6, 0x17, 0x48, 0x03, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x1D, 0xBB, 0x6D, 0x94, 0x20, 0x34, 0xF1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x82, 0x67, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x4E, 0xBE, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xDA, 0x77, 0xF8, 0x23, 0x55, 0x2B, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x02, 0xDE, 0x25, 0x35, 0x2D, 0x74, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x0C, 0xB8, 0x0B, 0x39, 0xBA, 0xAD, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x4D, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0xE4, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xB0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x68, 0xCE, 0xC2, 0x55, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x20, 0x93, 0x32, 0x90, 0xD6, 0xAE, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x78, 0xAB, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xEB, 0x73, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x97, 0xC3, 0x83, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xF1, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x25, 0x25, 0x66, 0x08, 0x26, 0xFA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xFB, 0x44, 0x5D, 0x82, 0xEC, 0x3B, 0xAC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x90, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x04, 0x99, 0xD0, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0xF2, 0x22, 0xA0, 0xEB, 0xFD, 0x45, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA4, 0x81, 0x32, 0xFC, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x4F, 0xF0, 0x10, 0xB3, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x74, 0x13, 0x14, 0x9E, 0x90, 0xD7, 0xE6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x4F, 0xA8, 0xD1, 0x06, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0x68, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x53, 0x75, 0xED, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0xC2, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x87, 0x6B, 0x9F, 0x05, 0xE2, 0x22, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x1A, 0xA8, 0xB7, 0x03, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xD0, 0x69, 0x88, 0xA8, 0x39, 0x9E, 0x3A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xEF, 0x68, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x08, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x06, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x0D, 0xB7, 0x34, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xF4, 0xDD, 0x1A, 0xA0, 0x4A, 0xE4, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x63, 0x4F, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xBB, 0xD6, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xEE, 0x8D, 0xDF, 0x3F, 0x73, 0xB7, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x06, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xD9, 0x53), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xF5, 0x13, 0xDF, 0x13, 0x19, 0x97, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xF9, 0xB3, 0x33, 0x66, 0x82, 0x21, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xFC, 0x39, 0x16, 0x23, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x48, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x64, 0x95, 0x1C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xAC, 0x15, 0x57, 0xD9, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x5F, 0xB8, 0x3D, 0x48, 0x91, 0x24, 0xCC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xF2, 0xC8, 0x54, 0xD1, 0x32, 0xBD, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x3B, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF4, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xC3, 0xBB, 0x6C, 0x66, 0xAC, 0x25, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x25, 0x10, 0xB2, 0xE1, 0x41, 0xDE, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xE8, 0x30, 0xB8, 0x37, 0xBC, 0x2A, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x57, 0x01, 0x4A, 0x1E, 0x78, 0x9F, 0x85), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x19, 0xCD, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x51, 0x4F, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x4B, 0x3D, 0x24, 0xA4, 0x16, 0x59, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xEB, 0xD3, 0x59, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x7C, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xB9, 0xB4, 0xA5, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0x29, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x16, 0x05, 0x75, 0x02, 0xB3, 0x06, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x7C, 0x9F, 0x79, 0x91, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x98, 0x7C, 0x84, 0xE1, 0xFF, 0x30, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xE2, 0xC2, 0x5F, 0x55, 0x40, 0xBD, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x65, 0x87, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x30, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x15, 0xD1, 0x24, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x99, 0xD9, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0xB1, 0xAF, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x80, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0x74, 0xB9, 0xF3), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xE6, 0x0F, 0x37, 0xC1, 0x10, 0x99, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xAD, 0x9D, 0x5D, 0x80, 0x01, 0xA6, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x20, 0x38, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x60, 0xCB, 0xCE, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0xA7, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xCF, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xBF, 0xE5, 0x74, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xDD, 0x59, 0x02, 0x5D, 0xC6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC9, 0xF8, 0xF5, 0xB6, 0x13, 0x4D, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x93, 0xB3, 0xA2, 0x79, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xF6, 0xCF, 0xF7, 0xE6, 0x29, 0x9C, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x50, 0x65, 0x80, 0xBC, 0x59, 0x0A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xF0, 0x24, 0x35, 0xA2, 0x46, 0xF0, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x26, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x61, 0x56, 0x62, 0x67), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x37, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xF7, 0xCE, 0x35, 0xFC, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x34, 0x96, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x76, 0x9D, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x3B, 0x0F, 0xEA, 0xA8, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x3F, 0x5D, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0xD4, 0x9E, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x2E, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0x6E, 0xAB, 0xAF, 0xDC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xB2, 0x7B, 0x0C, 0x9A, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x51, 0x90, 0x92, 0x79, 0x32, 0x19, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x89, 0xF9, 0xD0, 0xCF, 0x2C, 0xA5, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x50, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x50, 0x41, 0x9D, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x7D, 0x2B, 0x9E, 0x9D, 0x95, 0xA8, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x87, 0x88, 0x97, 0x5F, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2, 0xAD, 0xD9, 0xC9, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x83, 0x07, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x26, 0xC7, 0x13, 0x35, 0x0D, 0xB0, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x60, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0x4B, 0x93, 0x18, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0x31, 0x4C, 0xE4, 0x61, 0xAE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x4D, 0x1E, 0x51, 0x59, 0x6E, 0x91, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x54, 0x4D, 0x51, 0xED, 0x36, 0xCC, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xA8, 0x56, 0xC7, 0x78, 0x27, 0x33, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB7, 0x95, 0xC9, 0x8B, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xE9, 0x13, 0x96, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0xF9, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x46, 0xB0, 0x5E, 0xC3, 0x94, 0x03, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x5B, 0x29, 0x30, 0x41, 0x1A, 0x9E, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xCA, 0x83, 0x31, 0x5B, 0xA7, 0xCB, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x41, 0x50, 0x44, 0x4D, 0x64, 0x31, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x84, 0xC2, 0x5D, 0x97, 0xA5, 0x3C, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x0F, 0xA5, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x47, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x58, 0x02, 0x2D, 0x40, 0xB1, 0x0B, 0xBA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x33, 0x8C, 0x67, 0xCE, 0x23, 0x43, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x53, 0x47, 0x72, 0x44, 0x1F, 0x5B, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xC1, 0xD9, 0xA4, 0x50, 0x88, 0x63, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xF2, 0x75, 0x69, 0x73, 0x00, 0xC4, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x90, 0x1D, 0xDF, 0x1A, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xB1, 0x89, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x70, 0x62, 0xEF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x8A, 0x55, 0x50, 0x7B, 0xEF, 0x8A, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x1B, 0x23, 0x48, 0x23, 0x63, 0x91, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x04, 0x54, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x9B, 0xC7, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x38, 0xC3, 0x84, 0xFB, 0xFF, 0x9F, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x2A, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x68, 0x8A, 0x5C, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x93, 0x53, 0x85, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xAF, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x88, 0x95, 0x4C, 0x0B, 0xD0, 0x06, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xAF, 0x8D, 0x49, 0xA2, 0xC8, 0xB4, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x76, 0x53, 0x09, 0x88, 0x43, 0x87, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xA4, 0x77, 0x3F, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xB4, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x9E, 0x86, 0x64, 0xCC, 0x91, 0xC1, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x17, 0x56, 0xCB, 0xC3, 0x7D, 0x5B, 0xB1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x74, 0x9F, 0xB5, 0x91, 0x21, 0xB1, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xED, 0xE1, 0x11, 0xEF, 0x45, 0xAF, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x31, 0xBE, 0xB2, 0xBC, 0x72, 0x65, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x4B, 0x8C, 0x77, 0xCE, 0x1E, 0x42, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xC9, 0xAA, 0xB9, 0xD9, 0x86, 0x99, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x23, 0x80, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x35, 0x0B, 0x6D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xD8, 0xA2, 0x0A, 0x39, 0x32, 0x1D, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xF1, 0x12, 0x9A, 0x4A, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xF1, 0x7C, 0xAA, 0x70, 0x8E, 0xBC, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x01, 0x47, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0x8B, 0xA5, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x08, 0x21, 0xF4, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0xF5, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x76, 0xA5, 0x95, 0xC4, 0x0F, 0x88, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x42, 0x2A, 0x52, 0xCD, 0x75, 0x51, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x36, 0xE5, 0x04, 0x2B, 0x44, 0xC6, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xEE, 0x16, 0x13, 0x07, 0x83, 0xB5, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x59, 0xC6, 0xA2, 0x19, 0x05, 0xD3, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x8B, 0xA8, 0x16, 0x09, 0xB7, 0xEA, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xEE, 0x14, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0xEF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x7C, 0xCA, 0x71, 0x3E, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x31, 0x0E, 0x3F, 0xE5, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x3E, 0x95, 0x37, 0x58, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x1F, 0x02, 0x03, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xEE, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x5B, 0x1A, 0xFC, 0x38, 0xCD, 0xE8, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x57, 0x42, 0x85, 0xC6, 0x21, 0x68, 0x71), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xA2, 0x4A, 0x66, 0xB1, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x9D, 0x5E, 0x99, 0xB2, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x03, 0x40, 0xCA, 0xB2, 0xB3, 0x30, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x78, 0x48, 0x27, 0x34, 0x1E, 0xE2, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x72, 0x5B, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0x6D, 0xE3, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAB, 0x46, 0xCB, 0xEA, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x08, 0xAD, 0x4E, 0x51, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5C, 0x7D, 0x4C, 0xD6, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x76, 0x26, 0xE0, 0x8B, 0x10, 0xD9, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xA7, 0x23, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x42, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xE5, 0xA4, 0xEC, 0x77, 0x21, 0x34, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x14, 0x65, 0xEA, 0x4A, 0x85, 0xC3, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xD8, 0x40, 0x27, 0x73, 0x15, 0x7E, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xBB, 0x53, 0x7E, 0x0F, 0x40, 0xC8, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x37, 0x19, 0x73, 0xEF, 0x5A, 0x5E, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x73, 0x2B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xAC, 0x97, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xB2, 0xC3, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0xE7, 0xD2, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x08, 0xD6, 0xDD, 0xAC, 0x21, 0xD6, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x26, 0xBE, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x38, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x6C, 0x31, 0xA7, 0x49, 0x50, 0x3A, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x99, 0xC6, 0xF5, 0xD2, 0xC2, 0x30, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0x8B, 0x97, 0xE9, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0D, 0xFC, 0x15, 0x54, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x83, 0x1C, 0xA4, 0xCD, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0xF2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x48, 0xE4, 0xAA, 0x69, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x7A, 0x27, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x96, 0x1A, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0xE7, 0x30, 0xA5, 0xCF, 0x13, 0x46, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xD8, 0xAF, 0x74, 0x23, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x3D, 0x44, 0x14, 0x1B, 0x97, 0x83, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x47, 0xD7, 0x5F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x38, 0xF7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x73, 0x64, 0x36, 0xFD, 0x7B, 0xC1, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x5D, 0x32, 0xD2, 0x47, 0x94, 0x89, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xE9, 0x30, 0xAC, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x65, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x1B, 0xF7, 0x61, 0x49, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xFF, 0x32, 0x43, 0x80, 0xDA, 0xA6, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x01, 0x95, 0x35, 0xCE, 0x21), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x06, 0x46, 0x0D, 0x51, 0xE2, 0xD8, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x57, 0x1D, 0x6F, 0x79, 0xA0, 0xCD, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0xFB, 0x36, 0xCA, 0xAD, 0xF5, 0x9E, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x7A, 0x1D, 0x9E, 0x1D, 0x95, 0x48, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x26, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x15, 0x2C, 0xC2, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x42, 0x72, 0xAA, 0x11, 0xDC, 0xC9, 0xB6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x6C, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x62, 0x3C, 0xAB, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x6A, 0x44, 0xD8, 0x60, 0xC0, 0xA8, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x76, 0x58, 0x12, 0x57, 0x3C, 0x89, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x4F, 0x83, 0xCE, 0xCB, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x84, 0x04, 0xB0, 0xAD, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xA4, 0xC3, 0x41, 0x44, 0x4E, 0x65, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x16, 0xA9, 0x1C, 0xE7, 0x65, 0x20, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x53, 0x32, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xA6, 0xBD, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xF0, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x26, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xE3, 0x54, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xD3, 0x17, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xAE, 0xED, 0xFB, 0xCD, 0xE7, 0x1E, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x16, 0x1C, 0x34, 0x40, 0x00, 0x1F, 0xB6), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x32, 0x00, 0xC2, 0xD4, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xE0, 0x99, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0x4A, 0x16, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x73, 0x18, 0x1B, 0xD4, 0x94, 0x29, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xA4, 0x2D, 0xB1, 0x9D, 0x74, 0x32, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xF4, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x37, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xFF, 0xDA, 0xE2, 0x35, 0xA3, 0xB6, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x49, 0x99, 0x65, 0xC5, 0xED, 0x16, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x42, 0x9A, 0xF3, 0xA7, 0x4E, 0x6F, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x0A, 0x7E, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x07, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x7A, 0x31, 0x69, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x15, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xE0, 0x72, 0xA4, 0x3F, 0xB9, 0xF8, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x75, 0x32, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0x37, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xC0, 0x0D, 0xCF, 0x25, 0x41, 0xA4, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xFC, 0xB2, 0x48, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x83, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xBE, 0x0B, 0x58, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x9A, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xF3, 0x81, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x74, 0x4F, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x43, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x16, 0x8B, 0xA3, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x18, 0x81, 0x7B, 0x8D, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x77), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xC4, 0x3F, 0x2C, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0x99, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0xAD, 0x5A, 0x56, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x48, 0xC8, 0xE8, 0xBA, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xA1, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x5A, 0xCD, 0x99, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x95, 0xAD, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x6B, 0xD1, 0x34, 0x99, 0x53, 0x63, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x5D, 0x2B, 0xAB, 0x01, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x85, 0xD0, 0xD5, 0x49, 0x83, 0x4D, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xC6, 0x91, 0x30, 0x3B, 0x00, 0xAF, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xAE, 0x61, 0x07, 0xE1, 0xB6, 0xE2, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x43, 0x41, 0xFE, 0x9B, 0xB6, 0xF0, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x97, 0xAE, 0xAD, 0x89, 0x88, 0x9E, 0x41), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp384r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp384r1_T_0_X, secp384r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_1_X, secp384r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_2_X, secp384r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_3_X, secp384r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_4_X, secp384r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_5_X, secp384r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_6_X, secp384r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_7_X, secp384r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_8_X, secp384r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_9_X, secp384r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_10_X, secp384r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_11_X, secp384r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_12_X, secp384r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_13_X, secp384r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_14_X, secp384r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_15_X, secp384r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_16_X, secp384r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_17_X, secp384r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_18_X, secp384r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_19_X, secp384r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_20_X, secp384r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_21_X, secp384r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_22_X, secp384r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_23_X, secp384r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_24_X, secp384r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_25_X, secp384r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_26_X, secp384r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_27_X, secp384r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_28_X, secp384r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_29_X, secp384r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_30_X, secp384r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_31_X, secp384r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp384r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for secp521r1 + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xFF, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x3F, 0x50, 0x6B, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0x45, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x34, 0x2C, 0x3D, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x73, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xBF, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0xBD, 0xC0, 0x52, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x93, 0x7E, 0xEC, 0x51, 0x39, 0x19, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x09, 0xF1, 0x8E, 0x91, 0x89, 0xB4, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x15, 0xB3, 0x99, 0x5B, 0x72, 0xDA, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x40, 0x85, 0xB6, 0xA0, 0x21, 0x9A, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x9A, 0x1C, 0x8E, 0x61, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x51, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xC6, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x18, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x64, 0x38, 0x91, 0x1E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x47, 0x9C, 0x89, 0xB8, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0xA5, 0x09, 0xF7, 0x48, 0x01, 0xCC, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x96, 0x2F, 0xBF, 0x83, 0x87, 0x86, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xFF, 0x01), +}; +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xB1, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x27, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x4B, 0x44, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x5C, 0x5F, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x85, 0x28, 0x78, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x34, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x57, 0x0F, 0x73, 0x78, 0x7A, 0xE3, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD8, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xDA, 0x04, 0xAD, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x8A, 0x09, 0xF3, 0x58, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x03, 0xCB, 0x50, 0x1A, 0x7F, 0x56, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xA6, 0x78, 0x38, 0x85, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xD5, 0xD2, 0x22, 0xC4, 0x00, 0x3B, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x93, 0x0E, 0x7B, 0x85, 0x51, 0xC3, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x54, 0x49, 0x02, 0x81, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x3A, 0x92, 0xE7, 0x72, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x5F, 0x28, 0x9E, 0x91, 0x27, 0x88, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x28, 0x31, 0xB3, 0x84, 0xCA, 0x12, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xF9, 0xAC, 0x22, 0x10, 0x0A, 0x64, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xC6, 0x33, 0x1F, 0x69, 0x19, 0x18, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x48, 0xB8, 0xC7, 0x37, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xCC, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xEE, 0x03, 0xC2, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x29, 0xC2, 0xE4, 0x6E, 0x24, 0x20, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0x7B, 0xF9, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x7B, 0x3C, 0xE1, 0x19, 0xA1, 0x23, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x53, 0xC0, 0x07, 0x13, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFE, 0x36, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x5E, 0x59, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x55, 0x89, 0x84, 0xBC, 0xEF, 0xA2, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x1A, 0x08, 0x67, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x22, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x26, 0xDF, 0x81, 0x3C, 0x5F, 0x1C, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x4D, 0xD0, 0x0A, 0x48, 0x06, 0xF4, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x18, 0x39, 0xF7, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x77, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x8F, 0x44, 0x13, 0xCB, 0x78, 0x11, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xE2, 0x49, 0xEA, 0x43, 0x79, 0x08, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xD1, 0xD8, 0x73, 0x2C, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0xF4, 0x46, 0xAB, 0x20, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x0B, 0xB9, 0x71, 0x1A, 0x27, 0xB7, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xA2, 0x2C, 0xD1, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xA3, 0x10, 0x1F, 0x90, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xFB, 0x20, 0xF4, 0xC0, 0x70, 0xC0, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xA7, 0x99, 0xF0, 0xA5, 0xD3, 0x09, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0xE8, 0x14, 0x39, 0xBE, 0xCB, 0x60, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xD6, 0x14, 0xA9, 0xC9, 0x20, 0xC3, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA8, 0x5B, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x96, 0xBC, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x04, 0x45, 0xBE, 0xCE, 0x75, 0x95, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x49, 0x35, 0x09, 0x8D, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x36, 0xF2, 0xA6, 0x2D, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xFC, 0x3D, 0xA8, 0xFB, 0x3C, 0xD2, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x09, 0x18, 0x42, 0xF0, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xC1, 0xCE, 0x9E, 0x6A, 0x49, 0x60, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xB1, 0x00, 0xF7, 0xA1, 0x7A, 0x31, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xC3, 0x86, 0xCD, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x47, 0x8D, 0xAA, 0xA6, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x97, 0xF0, 0xBC, 0x2D, 0xDC, 0x9D, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x86, 0xB0, 0x74, 0xB2, 0xF4, 0xF6, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x43, 0x5C, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xC3, 0xE2, 0x6E, 0x25, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x5E, 0x08, 0xB3, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x5F, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xB7, 0xD1, 0xF4, 0xDC, 0x19, 0xE9, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xE4, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x3E, 0xED, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x67, 0x92, 0x84, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x03, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x95, 0xEF, 0x8F, 0xB2, 0x82, 0x6B, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFA, 0xB9, 0x55, 0x23, 0xFE, 0x09, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x79, 0x85, 0x4B, 0x0E, 0xD4, 0x35, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x27, 0x45, 0x81, 0xE0, 0x88, 0x52, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x63, 0xA2, 0x4B, 0xBC, 0x5D, 0xB1, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x8C, 0x83, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0xD3, 0x42, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x03, 0x3A, 0x31, 0xBA, 0xE9, 0x3A, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x10, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0x00, 0xFE, 0x32, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0xDA, 0xF8, 0x6F, 0x4D, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x79, 0x7D, 0x09, 0xE5, 0xD3, 0x03, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xC3, 0xBE, 0xDF, 0x07, 0x65, 0x49, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x57, 0x33, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x4F, 0x04, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xFE, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x85, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xBA, 0xAA, 0x06, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x83, 0x01, 0xA9, 0xF6, 0x51, 0xE7, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xA6, 0x15, 0x8E, 0xAB, 0x1F, 0x10, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x08, 0x27, 0x1A, 0xA1, 0x21, 0xAD, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x09, 0x90, 0x6E, 0x50, 0x90, 0x9A, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0xF5, 0xA2, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x7D, 0xE3, 0xDC, 0x21, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xBF, 0x07, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x51, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x5C, 0x34, 0x02, 0x62, 0x9B, 0x08, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0x6A, 0xEC, 0x75, 0xF6, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x3C, 0x60, 0xB1, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x37, 0x84, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0xF2, 0x9A, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x9A, 0x9A, 0x15, 0x36, 0xE0, 0x2B, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x38, 0x9C, 0x50, 0x3D, 0x1E, 0x37, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x79, 0xF0, 0x92, 0xF2, 0x8B, 0x18, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x1E, 0x80, 0x82, 0x4B, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x6B, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xF9, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0x4A, 0x82, 0xCF, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x8C, 0xC8, 0x9B, 0x72, 0x9E, 0xF7, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xCE, 0xE9, 0x77, 0x0A, 0x19, 0x59, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xA1, 0x41, 0x6A, 0x72, 0x4B, 0xB4, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x35, 0x43, 0xE2, 0x8C, 0xBE, 0x0D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xEB, 0xAD, 0xF3, 0xA9, 0xA6, 0x68, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x2F, 0xE2, 0x48, 0x0C, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x1E, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xD2, 0xC1, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x64, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0xF6, 0xF6, 0x6E, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x3D, 0x30, 0x78, 0x10, 0x18, 0x41, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x1D, 0x1C, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x83, 0xD1, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x03, 0x0B, 0xF5, 0x2F, 0x6C, 0x04, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x3E, 0xD5, 0xFC, 0x31, 0x5B, 0x3A, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x82, 0x2F, 0xFB, 0xFE, 0xF8, 0x76, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x26, 0xDA, 0x9C, 0x36, 0xF5, 0x93, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xE7, 0x6E, 0xD2, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x09, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x03, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x48, 0x24, 0xA2, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x79, 0x0C, 0x8E, 0x6B, 0x95, 0xF3, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x87, 0x03, 0x39, 0xCF, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xF0, 0xF7, 0xC1, 0x07, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xE8, 0x02, 0x89, 0x65, 0xC4, 0x72, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x88, 0xEA, 0x96, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x5D, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x75, 0x60, 0xA8, 0xBD, 0x74, 0xDF, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xE5, 0x71, 0x50, 0x67, 0xD0, 0xD2, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xFC, 0xE5, 0xC7, 0x77, 0xB0, 0x7F, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x86, 0x69, 0xCD, 0x0D, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x17, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xA8, 0x76, 0xAC, 0x80, 0xA9, 0x72, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x78, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x4D, 0xAF, 0xF9, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x97, 0x8E, 0x74, 0xC4, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD8, 0xF6, 0xF3, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0x52, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x57, 0xF4, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0x43, 0xED, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x46, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x18, 0xE8, 0x58, 0xB9, 0x76, 0x2C, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x54, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xC7, 0xBC, 0x31, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xF8, 0x89, 0xEE, 0x70, 0xB5, 0xB0, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x22, 0x26, 0x9A, 0x53, 0xB9, 0x38, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xA7, 0x19, 0x8C, 0x74, 0x7E, 0x88, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xDA, 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDA, 0xA5, 0xBE, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x5C, 0xF7, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x72, 0xFB, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xE2, 0x23, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xB7, 0xE0, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x36, 0xBC, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xBB, 0xA1, 0xF7, 0x0B, 0x9E, 0xBF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x28, 0xE1, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xFC, 0xFC, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xFE, 0x19, 0x0A, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0x69, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xCD, 0x12, 0xF5, 0xBE, 0xD3, 0x04, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xA8, 0x0D, 0x81, 0x59, 0xC4, 0x79, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xF3, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x65, 0xC3, 0x31, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xB5, 0x4F, 0x4D, 0x91, 0xD4, 0xE2, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x09, 0x41, 0x79, 0x1D, 0x4D, 0x0D, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x31, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xA0, 0xF2, 0x6E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x5B, 0x4D, 0x4F, 0xAF, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x99, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x68, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x04, 0xE1, 0xB5, 0x9D, 0x00, 0xBC, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x95, 0x92, 0x8D, 0x72, 0xD3, 0x37, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x4B, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xE8, 0xA4, 0x26, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x45, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0xCB, 0x9F, 0xBA, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x7E, 0x1B, 0x64, 0xF4, 0xE8, 0xA5, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x20, 0xA9, 0xCA, 0xF3, 0x89, 0xE5, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xED, 0xFC, 0xAB, 0xD9, 0x0A, 0xB9, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x6F, 0x46, 0x7C, 0xCD, 0x78, 0xFF, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xAB, 0x71, 0x5A, 0x94, 0xAB, 0x20, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x2E, 0xEE, 0x87, 0x57, 0x1F, 0xAD, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x4C, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x7E, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x86, 0xBA, 0x53, 0x37, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x26, 0xB2, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x91, 0xE3, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xC9, 0x54, 0x84, 0x08, 0x3D, 0x0B, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA8, 0x77, 0x2F, 0x64, 0x45, 0x99, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x96, 0x16, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0x96, 0x28, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x2B, 0x8D, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x4F, 0x55, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xE6, 0x48, 0xBD, 0x99, 0x3D, 0x12, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x84, 0x59, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xB6, 0x66, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x78, 0x41, 0x92, 0xDF, 0xF4, 0x3F, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x86, 0x6F, 0x4F, 0xBF, 0x67, 0xDF, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x2B, 0x1E, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xB9, 0x6A, 0x89, 0xD8, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x9A, 0x32, 0x23, 0xA0, 0x02, 0x91, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x7F, 0x6A, 0x15, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x8B, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x57, 0x82, 0x58, 0xA9, 0x56, 0xB5, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x50, 0x92, 0x60, 0xCC, 0x81, 0x24, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x3D, 0xAD, 0xDA, 0xD9, 0x51, 0x3E, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xFE, 0x8F, 0xB0, 0x0B, 0xDE, 0x2E, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xD2, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0xAC, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xE8, 0x72, 0x0B, 0xAC, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x5B, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0xE3, 0x3C, 0x7C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x04, 0xA7, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x93, 0xC0, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x32, 0xC5, 0xF0, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x42, 0x07, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0xF1, 0x72, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9C, 0x88, 0xD2, 0x62, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x89, 0x58, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xCC, 0x4C, 0x97, 0x30, 0x66, 0x34, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0xC9, 0x5E, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x4D, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x9B, 0x9C, 0xAC, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xE4, 0x4B, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xDA, 0xE8, 0x61, 0x9F, 0xC8, 0x49, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x85, 0xF6, 0x8D, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xC5, 0xCD, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xC6, 0x0E, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x22, 0x9F, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x56, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x57, 0x32, 0xEC, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x9A, 0xC6, 0x4C, 0x09, 0xC4, 0x52, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x1E, 0x6F, 0xF4, 0x7D, 0x27, 0xDD, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x11, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x79, 0x83, 0xAD, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x4E, 0x92, 0x1F, 0x19, 0x7D, 0x65, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xFF, 0x78, 0x15, 0x45, 0x63, 0x32, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x91, 0xD0, 0x78, 0x58, 0xDA, 0x50, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0xDE, 0x40, 0xF6, 0x41, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0xE1, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0x35, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xD4, 0xBA, 0x7B, 0xCC, 0x1B, 0x3A, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x74, 0x47, 0x14, 0xC3, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xF0, 0x8B, 0x06, 0x15, 0x8E, 0x0E, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0xD2, 0xEB, 0x97, 0x50, 0x7D, 0x31, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x93, 0x4C, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x79, 0x44, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xA2, 0xA0, 0x0B, 0xC8, 0x3A, 0x8A, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x50, 0x92, 0x9E, 0x24, 0x1F, 0xCB, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x16, 0xC9, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0x5A, 0xAF, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xE4, 0xA8, 0x50, 0xF6, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x57, 0x97, 0x42, 0x78, 0x92, 0x49, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xEB, 0x62, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0x32, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x0C, 0x36, 0x6E, 0x8F, 0xE8, 0xE8, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xD3, 0x7C, 0xC7, 0x8D, 0x3F, 0x5C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x73, 0x10, 0x79, 0xB8, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xF9, 0xEF, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x5C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xF3, 0xF4, 0x49, 0x5B, 0x73, 0xAA, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xF2, 0xEA, 0x0F, 0x00, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xB8, 0x66, 0xED, 0xC4, 0x2B, 0x4C, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x2F, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x37, 0xD2, 0x7F, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xA7, 0x81, 0x38, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x37, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x3B, 0x6C, 0x9F, 0x5B, 0xD9, 0x8B, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x08, 0xD8, 0xD2, 0x7E, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x71, 0xE6, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xB0, 0xE7, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x81, 0x23, 0xEC, 0x2D, 0x42, 0x45, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x5B, 0x44, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x03, 0x67, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x27, 0xAE, 0x80, 0x5A, 0x33, 0xBE, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xB6, 0x64, 0x1A, 0xDF, 0xD3, 0x85, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x8C, 0x22, 0xBA, 0xD0, 0xBD, 0xCC, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x3C, 0x01, 0x3A, 0xFF, 0x9D, 0xC7, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xC7, 0x64, 0xB4, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x9F, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x34, 0x0A, 0x41, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xF2, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xD4, 0xE4, 0xF0, 0x97, 0x45, 0x6D, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x6D, 0xFE, 0xA0, 0xC4, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x40, 0xBB, 0x65, 0xD4, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xA8, 0x87, 0x35, 0x20, 0x3A, 0x89, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFD, 0x4F, 0xAB, 0x2D, 0xD1, 0xD0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xE8, 0x00, 0xFC, 0x69, 0x52, 0xF8, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x9A, 0x99, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x9C, 0x3F, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x08, 0x98, 0xD9, 0xCA, 0x73, 0xD5, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xD7, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x04, 0xB0, 0x54, 0x09, 0xF4, 0x72, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xEE, 0x28, 0xCC, 0xE8, 0x50, 0x78, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x91, 0x03, 0x76, 0xDB, 0x68, 0x24, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xE0, 0x56, 0xB2, 0x5D, 0x12, 0xD3, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x42, 0x59, 0x8B, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xB5, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xCC, 0xE5, 0x31, 0x53, 0x7A, 0x46, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x8D, 0x59, 0xB5, 0x1B, 0x0F, 0xF4, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x2F, 0xD1, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0x04, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0xBA, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x7E, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x08, 0x51, 0x56, 0xA6, 0x76, 0x67, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x17, 0x63, 0xFE, 0x56, 0xD0, 0xD9, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xF6, 0xC3, 0x14, 0x47, 0xC5, 0xA7, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x4C, 0x80, 0xF6, 0xA2, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xB3, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x2F, 0xE1, 0x3E, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x6B, 0x7B, 0x90, 0xDF, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x82, 0xEF, 0x62, 0xA1, 0x4C, 0x53, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x99, 0x76, 0x01, 0xBA, 0x8D, 0x0F, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xF4, 0x58, 0x73, 0x56, 0xFE, 0xDD, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xCE, 0xF9, 0xE8, 0xA1, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x5F, 0xDC, 0x6A, 0x3D, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xF4, 0x51, 0xB8, 0xB8, 0xC1, 0xD7, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x7D, 0x58, 0xD1, 0xD4, 0x1B, 0x4D, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x95, 0xDF, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x47, 0x3C, 0xC3, 0xB2, 0x01, 0x53, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x17, 0x43, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xBA, 0x0F, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x41, 0x54, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x39, 0x26, 0x70, 0x53, 0x32, 0x18, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x46, 0x07, 0x97, 0x3A, 0x57, 0xE0, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x92, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xDF, 0x25, 0x80, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x6F, 0x9A, 0x03, 0x05, 0x4B, 0xD1, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x01, 0x72, 0x30, 0x90, 0x17, 0x51, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xFB, 0x41, 0x65, 0x5C, 0xB4, 0x2D, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xCD, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xCC, 0xBB, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xCE, 0x08, 0x0A, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xA2, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA8, 0x21, 0x7F, 0x7A, 0x5B, 0x9B, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x44, 0x0A, 0x7F, 0x85, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xDE, 0x7C, 0x19, 0x5C, 0x65, 0x26, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x29, 0x4A, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x00, 0x40, 0x87, 0xEB, 0xA9, 0x58, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x51, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x56, 0x35, 0x51, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xAC, 0x08, 0x94, 0x71, 0xDA, 0xEC, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x4D, 0xC5, 0x7B, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x8D, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x05, 0xF1, 0x3E, 0x9E, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x8F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0x62, 0x94, 0xAD, 0x49, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0x8F, 0xFD, 0x33, 0x44, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7F, 0x42, 0xBE, 0xF7, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x29, 0x39, 0x13, 0x08, 0x8D, 0x91, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x79, 0xF9, 0x2F, 0xA9, 0x0A, 0xCF, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x87, 0x7A, 0xA3, 0x19, 0xAB, 0x55, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x0B, 0x01, 0xC5, 0x56, 0x19, 0x9D, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xDE, 0x82, 0x3B, 0xEA, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x6B, 0xC7, 0xF3, 0x0F, 0x82, 0x87, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x2E, 0x23, 0xF2, 0x39, 0x9D, 0x49, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0xDE, 0xAF, 0x7A, 0xEE, 0xB0, 0xDA, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x4E, 0x2A, 0x50, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0xC0, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x63, 0xD8, 0x89, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x4E, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x85, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x95, 0x5C, 0x96, 0x5D, 0xAA, 0x59, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xDB, 0xD2, 0x68, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x94, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x02, 0xBF, 0x77, 0x9F, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xDC, 0xC0, 0xCF, 0x81, 0x1E, 0xC4, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xCC, 0x37, 0x86, 0xDC, 0xE2, 0x64, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x59, 0x20, 0x9D, 0x98, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x0C, 0x9D, 0xF8, 0x20, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xA0, 0xF4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0x9C, 0x9E, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x25, 0xA2, 0xB0, 0x54, 0xCD, 0x2E, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD9, 0x42, 0xB0, 0x80, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xFE, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x40, 0xFF, 0x27, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x9D, 0xA6, 0x88, 0x3A, 0x8B, 0x6F, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x39, 0xEE, 0x1F, 0x3F, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xD7, 0x9E, 0xFF, 0xD2, 0x35, 0x67, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x4F, 0x15, 0x5D, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0x53, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xF7, 0x24, 0x98, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0x11, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x2E, 0x25, 0xE1, 0x94, 0xC5, 0xA3, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x82, 0x6E, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x43, 0x25, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x65, 0xB4, 0x49, 0x73, 0x18, 0x35, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x5B, 0xBC, 0x62, 0x86, 0x4C, 0xC1, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xF2, 0x95, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x59, 0x62, 0xB0, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0xB4, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x55, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x69, 0xBA, 0x63, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0x69, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x34, 0x7D, 0x68, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x06, 0xCA, 0x55, 0x44, 0x36, 0x2B, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xD4, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x69, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x44, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x40, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x4F, 0xFA, 0x75, 0xE3, 0xFB, 0x97, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x1C, 0x48, 0xB0, 0x26, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x7B, 0x32, 0xFA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0x84, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x21, 0x03, 0x1D, 0x0D, 0x22, 0x55, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xF9, 0x42, 0x03, 0x9C, 0xC2, 0xCB, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xA1, 0x96, 0xD9, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x6F, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x40, 0x57, 0xEB, 0x40, 0x2D, 0xC0, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x4F, 0x2F, 0x23, 0xA8, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x29, 0x85, 0x21, 0xA5, 0x50, 0x62, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x7D, 0x92, 0xCF, 0x87, 0x0C, 0x22, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x0E, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x96, 0x37, 0x2C, 0x88, 0x35, 0x30, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xB4, 0x69, 0xFF, 0xEB, 0xC6, 0x94, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x55, 0x60, 0xAD, 0xAA, 0x58, 0x14, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xFF, 0xF2, 0xB2, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0xD9, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xAE, 0x54, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x31, 0xF3, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x92, 0x83, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x42, 0x83, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xD2, 0xC8, 0xB7, 0x76, 0x45, 0x7F, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x11, 0xA4, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x01, 0xBC, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x27, 0x73, 0x8D, 0x02, 0x91, 0x27, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x62, 0xF6, 0xDD, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x5B, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xCA, 0xA2, 0x44, 0x2C, 0xF0, 0x28, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xF1, 0x7A, 0xA2, 0x42, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x83, 0x3E, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0xF7, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xED, 0x78, 0xCB, 0x76, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x01, 0x1E, 0x43, 0x27, 0x47, 0x6E, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x4F, 0x54, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x35, 0x40, 0x69, 0x7F, 0x74, 0x9D, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x06, 0x6F, 0x67, 0x68, 0x2B, 0x4D, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x65, 0x41, 0xFC, 0x7C, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x79, 0x37, 0xAF, 0xFD, 0xD2, 0xDA, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xA8, 0x69, 0x56, 0x62, 0xA4, 0xE4, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x71, 0x73, 0x21, 0x8A, 0x17, 0x81, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x55, 0x8F, 0x7B, 0xB8, 0xAF, 0xF7, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xD1, 0xBD, 0xBE, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0x60, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xA6, 0x57, 0x8C, 0xAE, 0x5C, 0x19, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x43, 0xE4, 0xD9, 0xD8, 0x7B, 0xE7, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xB9, 0xE4, 0x85, 0x7C, 0x2E, 0xFC, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x2A, 0x6D, 0x56, 0xBE, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x0C, 0x25, 0x9B, 0xAE, 0x86, 0x37, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x22, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0x99, 0x66, 0xB7, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xF7, 0x90, 0xF0, 0x1B, 0x09, 0x27, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x64, 0x49, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xA0, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xA9, 0x07, 0x54, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xFF, 0xE2, 0x00, 0x07, 0x21, 0x88, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x53, 0x05, 0x6C, 0x42, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xF7, 0x39, 0x5C, 0x82, 0x36, 0xE8, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x83, 0xA8, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x43, 0x07, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xAF, 0x2B, 0x79, 0xED, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x20, 0x91, 0x7A, 0xC4, 0x07, 0xEF, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x10, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x0E, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x81, 0x87, 0x41, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x55, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x53, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xB6, 0xEB, 0x6C, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x77, 0x73, 0x9D, 0xFC, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x40, 0xE3, 0x6D, 0x1C, 0x16, 0x71, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xF4, 0x1B, 0xFF, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0xA5, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x0E, 0x0B, 0x11, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x93, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xC5, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x24, 0x19, 0xF2, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xB3, 0xAF, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x4F, 0x5E, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x18, 0x8E, 0x33, 0x68, 0x6C, 0xE8, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x8B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x19, 0x7F, 0x90, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x68, 0xE2, 0x7D, 0xD4, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xC1, 0x67, 0xB3, 0x72, 0xCB, 0xBF, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x1D, 0x14, 0x58, 0x0A, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x7A, 0x65, 0x98, 0xB3, 0x07, 0x4B, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x87, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA2, 0x01, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xC9, 0xC8, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x87, 0xA5, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xA0, 0xAB, 0x24, 0x1E, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xBC, 0x02, 0x35, 0x70, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x59, 0xA0, 0x50, 0x04, 0x80, 0x52, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x56, 0x6E, 0x42, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x91, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0xA5, 0xDE, 0x14, 0x24, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xCB, 0x74, 0x28, 0xE6, 0xA7, 0xE7, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x73, 0xA8, 0x8F, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0x63, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x1B, 0x77, 0xC7, 0xC1, 0x38, 0xF9, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x3C, 0xCF, 0xA8, 0x7A, 0xD7, 0xF3, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x5F, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xAD, 0xE9, 0x1A, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x5E, 0xD5, 0x81, 0x95, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x88, 0x75, 0x29, 0x1F, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA9, 0x5A, 0x4D, 0x63, 0x95, 0xF9, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xCD, 0x04, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x91, 0xDE, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xD4, 0xFD, 0x25, 0x11, 0x99, 0x6E, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x83, 0x01, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x3A, 0xDC, 0x74, 0xC2, 0xD7, 0xCF, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xBD, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x07, 0x03, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xBE, 0xE9, 0x2E, 0x58, 0x84, 0x66, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x20, 0x78, 0x37, 0x79, 0x0B, 0xA6, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xF2, 0xAC, 0x65, 0xC8, 0xC9, 0x2F, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x93, 0xE5, 0x0D, 0x0C, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xAD, 0x5C, 0x19, 0x12, 0x61, 0x0E, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x4F, 0x0B, 0x1F, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2E, 0x30, 0x61, 0xDB, 0x08, 0x68, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x78, 0xAF, 0xB3, 0x08, 0xC1, 0x69, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x5F, 0x5D, 0xC1, 0x57, 0x6F, 0xD8, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0xD3, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xE5, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x7B, 0x47, 0xE8, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x62, 0xC8, 0x7E, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x2B, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x84, 0xFD, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6F, 0x12, 0x6E, 0x4D, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x08, 0xA1, 0x82, 0x9C, 0x62, 0x74, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x58, 0x22, 0x05, 0x1D, 0x15, 0x35, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5C, 0x05, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x6B, 0x2F, 0x79, 0x09, 0x73, 0x67, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA0, 0x80, 0xD8, 0xE8, 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x48, 0x7B, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x53, 0xA9, 0xED, 0x61, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x49, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9B, 0x4E, 0x89, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x12, 0xEB, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xCB, 0xC1, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xDC, 0x95, 0x16, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x70, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x33, 0xB1, 0xD6, 0x78, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xCE, 0x88, 0xC3, 0xFD, 0x7A, 0x6B, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x1E, 0x50, 0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB1, 0x25, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xE7, 0xD7, 0xD5, 0xBD, 0x7A, 0x12, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xAA, 0xA2, 0x80, 0x5D, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x39, 0x79, 0x64, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3C, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xC7, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xAC, 0xAB, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x83, 0xF0, 0x3D, 0xBC, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x92, 0x4A, 0x38, 0x42, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x0B, 0x4F, 0xEE, 0x9E, 0x92, 0xA5, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xDD, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x6B, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xFC, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x8A, 0xE5, 0x4C, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x06, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x7E, 0xF8, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xC8, 0x01, 0x51, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x52, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x89, 0x66, 0x2B, 0x1F, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x0F, 0x95, 0x07, 0x2B, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xBB, 0x91, 0x1F, 0xA3, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x6E, 0x54, 0x28, 0x7B, 0x9C, 0x79, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x45, 0xFF, 0xA6, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x83, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xDE, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x37, 0x82, 0xCB, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x94, 0x3F, 0x26, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x97, 0x28, 0x20, 0xCD, 0xC1, 0xF3, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x7D, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0x8C, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xD1, 0x42, 0xE6, 0x39, 0x33, 0x6D, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xC0, 0xFC, 0xD2, 0x14, 0x5D, 0x3E, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x4A, 0x3E, 0x40, 0x16, 0x93, 0x15, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x24, 0xC1, 0x27, 0x27, 0xE5, 0x4B, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x50, 0xD8, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0x46, 0x22, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x0E, 0x60, 0xA1, 0xB3, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xB1, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x47, 0x5A, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0xAC, 0x11, 0x35, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0xF4, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x97, 0xFA, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x39, 0x13, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x7B, 0x34, 0x12, 0x75, 0x8E, 0x9B, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x9E, 0xCD, 0x29, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0x8D, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xAC, 0xE9, 0x25, 0x27, 0xBB, 0x78, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x7A, 0xA8, 0xD3, 0xE3, 0x66, 0xE5, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x76, 0x81, 0x50, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x71, 0x08, 0xB8, 0x52, 0x7C, 0xAF, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x59, 0x24, 0xDD, 0xFB, 0x2F, 0xD0, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xCD, 0x56, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x91, 0xE6, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x64, 0x20, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xE4, 0xEF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x97, 0xF6, 0x22, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF4, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xA5, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x6C, 0xAE, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x55, 0x55, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x67, 0x84, 0x47, 0x7C, 0x83, 0x5C, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x10, 0x4D, 0xDD, 0x30, 0x60, 0xB0, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xA7, 0x36, 0x76, 0x24, 0x32, 0x9F, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x42, 0x81, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x2E, 0x13, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x94, 0x91, 0xFF, 0x99, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x83, 0xA1, 0x76, 0xAF, 0x37, 0x5C, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xA8, 0x04, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xA9, 0x79, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xFB, 0x83, 0x28, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0xB0, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x02, 0x46, 0x7F, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xED, 0x48, 0xC2, 0x96, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x1C, 0x7E, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x2E, 0x18, 0x71, 0x2D, 0x7B, 0xD7, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x46, 0x9D, 0xDE, 0xAA, 0x78, 0x8E, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xD7, 0x69, 0x2E, 0xE1, 0xD9, 0x48, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xFF, 0x9E, 0x09, 0x22, 0x22, 0xE6, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x14, 0x28, 0x13, 0x1B, 0x62, 0x12, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x7F, 0x67, 0x03, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF3, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xC3, 0x0F, 0xFB, 0x25, 0x48, 0x3E, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x98, 0x36, 0xB3, 0xD3, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x81, 0x54, 0x22, 0xA4, 0xCC, 0xC1, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xBA, 0xFC, 0xA9, 0xDF, 0x68, 0x86, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x92, 0x0E, 0xC3, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xE8, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp521r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp521r1_T_0_X, secp521r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_1_X, secp521r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_2_X, secp521r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_3_X, secp521r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_4_X, secp521r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_5_X, secp521r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_6_X, secp521r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_7_X, secp521r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_8_X, secp521r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_9_X, secp521r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_10_X, secp521r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_11_X, secp521r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_12_X, secp521r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_13_X, secp521r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_14_X, secp521r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_15_X, secp521r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_16_X, secp521r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_17_X, secp521r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_18_X, secp521r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_19_X, secp521r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_20_X, secp521r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_21_X, secp521r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_22_X, secp521r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_23_X, secp521r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_24_X, secp521r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_25_X, secp521r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_26_X, secp521r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_27_X, secp521r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_28_X, secp521r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_29_X, secp521r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_30_X, secp521r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_31_X, secp521r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp521r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x03, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFD, 0xDE, 0x74, 0x6A, 0x46, 0x69, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xFC, 0xF2, 0x26, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x77, 0x3D, 0x0D, 0x85, 0x48, 0xA8, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x1D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x01, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x86, 0xF6, 0xAF, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x88, 0x2E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x90, 0xB6, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x36, 0x4C, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x11, 0x14, 0xA6, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0x15, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0xB0, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0xBA, 0xD7), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xC1, 0x9C, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x19, 0xAC, 0x5A, 0xC9, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x86, 0x89, 0x27, 0x8D, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xE0, 0x6F, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xD3, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0x87, 0xC9, 0x9D, 0xC0, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x11, 0x7E, 0xD6, 0xF7, 0x33, 0xFC, 0xE4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x37, 0x3E, 0xC0, 0x7F, 0x62, 0xE7, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x3B, 0x69, 0x9D, 0x44, 0xBC, 0x82, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x84, 0xB3, 0x5F, 0x2B, 0xA5, 0x9E, 0x2C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x4C, 0x04, 0xB4, 0xF4, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xAD, 0x4B, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0xEB, 0xC4, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xB1, 0xC5, 0x59, 0xE3, 0xD5, 0x16, 0x2A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x2A, 0xCC, 0xAC, 0xD0, 0xEE, 0x50, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x83, 0xE0, 0x5B, 0x14, 0x44, 0x52, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x15, 0x2D, 0x78, 0xF6, 0x51, 0x32, 0xCF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x36, 0x9B, 0xDD, 0xF8, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xB1, 0x6A, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2B, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x87, 0x7A, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x8F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x45, 0xE5, 0x81, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x37, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x29, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x64, 0x23, 0x6B, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x1D, 0x41, 0xE1, 0x9B, 0x61, 0x7B, 0xD9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x59, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x6E, 0x4A, 0x48, 0x84, 0x90, 0xAC, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xB8, 0xF5, 0xF3, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0xA1, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x32, 0x81, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x5A, 0x4E, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xA8, 0x90, 0xBE, 0x0F, 0xEC, 0xC0, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x30, 0xD7, 0x08, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x3A, 0xA5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x76, 0xB3, 0x64, 0x74, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x75, 0xD4, 0xDB, 0x98, 0xD7, 0x39, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xEB, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xD4, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xBE, 0xF9, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xBA, 0xF3, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x85, 0x59, 0xF3, 0x60, 0x41, 0x02, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x1C, 0x4A, 0xA4, 0xC7, 0xED, 0x66, 0xBC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x46, 0x52, 0x18, 0x87, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x75, 0xAC, 0x4D, 0x75, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x2F, 0xAC, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x93, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x4D, 0xC9, 0x18, 0xE9, 0x00, 0xEB, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x69, 0x72, 0x07, 0x5A, 0x59, 0xA8, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x65, 0x83, 0x20, 0x10, 0xF9, 0x69, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x9F, 0xBF, 0x46, 0x0C, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xCF, 0xF0, 0xDC, 0xDF, 0x2D, 0xE6, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xF0, 0x72, 0x3A, 0x7A, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xAA, 0x57, 0x13, 0x37, 0xA7, 0x2C, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xAC, 0xA2, 0x23, 0xF9, 0x84, 0x60, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xEB, 0x51, 0x70, 0x64, 0x78, 0xCA, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xCC, 0x30, 0x62, 0x93, 0x46, 0x13, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x26, 0xCC, 0x6C, 0x3D, 0x5C, 0xDA, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xAA, 0xB8, 0x03, 0xA4, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x96), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x9D, 0xE6, 0xCC, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xC3, 0x8A, 0xAE, 0x6F, 0x40, 0x05, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x8F, 0x4A, 0x4D, 0x35, 0xD3, 0x50, 0x9D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0x03, 0xB4, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x40, 0xD2, 0x9F, 0xCA, 0xD0, 0x53, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x84, 0x00, 0x6F, 0xC8, 0xAD, 0xED, 0x8D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xD3, 0x57, 0xD7, 0xC3, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xBA, 0x47, 0x1D, 0x3D, 0xEF, 0x98, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xC0, 0x6C, 0x7F, 0x12, 0xEE, 0x9F, 0x67), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x02, 0xDA, 0x79, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x27, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x79, 0xC7, 0x71, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xE5, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x37, 0x06, 0xBA, 0xB5, 0xD5, 0x18, 0x4C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6C, 0xF2, 0x63, 0x27, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xBC, 0x71, 0xDF, 0x75, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x70, 0x9B, 0xDC, 0xE7, 0x18, 0x71, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x5B, 0x9F, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xE0, 0xBB, 0xFC, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x9C, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x03, 0x68, 0x83, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x4C, 0xDD), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x49, 0x23, 0xA8, 0xCB, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x75, 0xB6, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xFD, 0x30, 0x01, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0xF9, 0xE8), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0x29, 0x42, 0xC9, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xD7, 0xA0, 0xE6, 0x6B, 0x86, 0x61, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0xE9, 0xD3, 0x37, 0xD8, 0xE7, 0x35, 0xA9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC8, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xCB, 0xB1, 0xB5, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xD7, 0x46, 0x7D, 0xAF, 0xE2, 0xDC, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x46, 0xE7, 0xD8, 0x76, 0x31, 0x90, 0x76), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xD3, 0xF4, 0x74, 0xE1, 0x67, 0xD8, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xC8, 0xAF, 0x5F, 0xF4, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x4E, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x43, 0xB3, 0x16, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAE, 0xD1, 0xDD, 0x31, 0x14, 0xD3, 0xF0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x14, 0x06, 0x13, 0x12, 0x1C, 0x81, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xF9, 0x0C, 0x91, 0xF7, 0x67, 0x59, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x91, 0xE2, 0xF4, 0x9D, 0xEB, 0x88, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x82, 0x30, 0x9C, 0xAE, 0x18, 0x4D, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x79, 0xCF, 0x17, 0xA5, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192k1_T_0_X, secp192k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_1_X, secp192k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_2_X, secp192k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_3_X, secp192k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_4_X, secp192k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_5_X, secp192k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_6_X, secp192k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_7_X, secp192k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_8_X, secp192k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_9_X, secp192k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_10_X, secp192k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_11_X, secp192k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_12_X, secp192k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_13_X, secp192k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_14_X, secp192k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_15_X, secp192k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp192k1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE5, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x05, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xB1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x61, 0xEC, 0xD2, 0xE8, 0xDC, 0x01, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x6C, 0x22, 0x22, 0x40, 0x89, 0xAE, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x92, 0xE1, 0x87, 0x56, 0x35, 0xAF, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xAF, 0x08, 0x35, 0x27, 0xEA, 0x04, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x53, 0xFD, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xD0, 0x9F, 0x8D, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x54, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xDB, 0x0F, 0x61, 0x54, 0x26, 0xD1, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x21, 0xF7, 0x1B, 0xB5, 0x1D, 0xF6, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x05, 0xDA, 0x8F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x26, 0x73, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0x29, 0x62, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x95, 0x17, 0x8B, 0xC3, 0x9B, 0xAC, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xDB, 0x77, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0x13, 0x04, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0xFC, 0x22, 0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x65, 0xF1, 0x5A, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x79, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x01, 0x37, 0xAC, 0x9A, 0x5B, 0x51, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x75, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x4A, 0xAD, 0xFE, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x82, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x5E, 0xF0, 0x40, 0xC3, 0xA6, 0xE2, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x9A, 0x6F, 0xCF, 0x11, 0x26, 0x66, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x73, 0xA8, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x12, 0x36, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xB3, 0x0A, 0x58, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x79, 0x00, 0x55, 0x04, 0x34, 0x90, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x54, 0x1C, 0xC2, 0x45, 0x0C, 0x1B, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x19, 0xAB, 0xA8, 0xFC, 0x73, 0xDC, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0xFB, 0x93, 0xCE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x75, 0xD0, 0x66, 0x95, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xEA, 0x29, 0x16, 0x6A, 0x38, 0xDF, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA2, 0x36, 0x2F, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0x5E, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x89, 0x59, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0x77, 0x9D, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x93, 0x43, 0x47, 0xC6, 0x5C, 0xF9, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x00, 0x79, 0x42, 0x64, 0xB8, 0x25, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x54, 0xB4, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x0C, 0x42, 0x90, 0x83, 0x0B, 0x31, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x2E, 0xAE, 0xC8, 0xC7, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xBC, 0xAD, 0x41, 0xE7, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x97, 0x52, 0x83, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x13, 0x7A, 0xBD, 0xAE, 0x94, 0x60, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x9B, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x6E, 0x68, 0xB2, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x49, 0xBE, 0x51, 0xFE, 0x66, 0x15, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x37, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x9B, 0xEE, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x1B, 0xBD, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0xA9, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x25, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x13, 0xB1, 0x38, 0xFB, 0x9D, 0x78, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xE7, 0x1B, 0xFA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xB3, 0xB7, 0x44, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x00, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x82, 0x44, 0x3E, 0x18, 0x1A, 0x58, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xE4, 0xEE, 0xC1, 0xBF, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x32, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x9A, 0x42, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x26, 0x54, 0x21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x85, 0x74, 0xA0, 0x79, 0xA8, 0xEE, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x36, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x28, 0x4D, 0x55, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x27, 0x82, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0xFC, 0x73, 0x77, 0xAF, 0x5C, 0xAC, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xED, 0xE5, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x1C, 0xF1, 0x80, 0x73, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE2, 0xDE, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x3E, 0x6B, 0xFE, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x28, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xB2, 0x14, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x11, 0x7D, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC4, 0xD6, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x57, 0x4D, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x55, 0x1B, 0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xF7, 0x17, 0xBC, 0x45, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xB0, 0xEF, 0x61, 0xE3, 0x20, 0x7C, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x85, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xC2, 0x9B, 0x5E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x2E, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x3E, 0x4B, 0xD3, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x2B, 0x9D, 0xD5, 0x27, 0xFA, 0xCA, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0xB3, 0x6A, 0xE0, 0x79, 0x14, 0x28, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0xF5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x44, 0x56, 0xCD, 0xFC, 0x9F, 0x09, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x8C, 0x59, 0xA4, 0x64, 0x2A, 0x3A, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x86, 0x4E, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x8B, 0x11, 0x38, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x17, 0x16, 0x12, 0x17, 0xDC, 0x00, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x76, 0x24, 0x6C, 0x97, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x71, 0xE3, 0xB0, 0xBB, 0x4E, 0x50, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0x48, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x5F, 0x28, 0xF6, 0x01, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x95, 0xFE, 0xD0, 0xAD, 0x15, 0xD4, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0xFD, 0x80, 0xF7, 0x9F, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xBC, 0x1B, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xE6, 0xDF, 0x14, 0x29, 0xF4, 0xD4, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x12, 0xDD, 0xEC, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x59, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x92, 0x3E, 0x35, 0x08, 0xE9, 0xCF, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x35, 0x29, 0x97, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xDB, 0xD6, 0x6A, 0xC5, 0x43, 0xA4, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x33, 0x50, 0x61, 0x70, 0xA1, 0xE9, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x15, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x8C, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0xA1, 0x9A, 0x9D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0x4A, 0xCD, 0x9B, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x4D, 0x5A, 0xB8, 0xE2, 0x6D, 0xA6, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x3F, 0xB6, 0x17, 0xE3, 0x2C, 0x6F, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xA4, 0x59, 0x51, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x6E, 0xEB, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xC9, 0x1F, 0xB7, 0x4D, 0x98, 0xC7, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x20, 0x95, 0xBB, 0x20, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xF2, 0x73, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xEF, 0xFB, 0x30, 0xFA, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x4C, 0x24, 0xB4, 0x5B, 0xC9, 0x4C, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xDD, 0x5E, 0x84, 0x95, 0x4D, 0x26, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xFA, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0x7A, 0xDC, 0xA7, 0x53, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x9F, 0x81, 0x84, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0xFE, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x89, 0x1B, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x89, 0x71, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xE9, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xAD, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xE0, 0x23, 0x02, 0x86, 0x0F, 0x77, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x93, 0x6D, 0xE9, 0xF9, 0x3C, 0xBE, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xE7, 0x24, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x3C, 0x5B, 0x4B, 0x1B, 0x25, 0x37, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xE8, 0x38, 0x1B, 0xA1, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x19, 0xFD, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x01, 0x6B, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x69, 0x37, 0x4F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xE2, 0xBF, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x95, 0x9C, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x7B, 0xFC, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x25, 0x5E, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x55, 0x09, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x6A, 0xC9, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xCC, 0x3B, 0xD9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x08, 0x65, 0x5E, 0xCB, 0xAB, 0x48, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x79, 0x8B, 0xC0, 0x11, 0xC0, 0x69, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xE8, 0x8C, 0x4C, 0xC5, 0x28, 0xE4, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x1F, 0x34, 0x5C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224k1_T_0_X, secp224k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_1_X, secp224k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_2_X, secp224k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_3_X, secp224k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_4_X, secp224k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_5_X, secp224k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_6_X, secp224k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_7_X, secp224k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_8_X, secp224k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_9_X, secp224k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_10_X, secp224k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_11_X, secp224k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_12_X, secp224k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_13_X, secp224k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_14_X, secp224k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_15_X, secp224k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp224k1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xFC, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x07, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x41, 0x36, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xAF, 0xE6, 0xDC, 0xAE, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xEE, 0xD7, 0x1E, 0x67, 0x86, 0x32, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x73, 0xB1, 0xA9, 0xD5, 0xCC, 0x27, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x01, 0x71, 0xFE, 0x92, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x28, 0x63, 0x6D, 0x72, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xC0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE1, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x3E, 0x2C, 0x75, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xB7, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0x3C, 0xDF, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x5D, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x5E, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xC3, 0x05, 0xD6, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x24, 0xFC), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xCF, 0x7B, 0xDC, 0xCD, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xE5, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x47, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x46, 0xA8, 0x61, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xE4, 0x55, 0xD5, 0xC2, 0xBF), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x59, 0x24, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x45, 0x12, 0xDE, 0xBA, 0x4F, 0xEF, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x08, 0xBF, 0xC1, 0x66, 0xAA, 0x0A, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xFE, 0x30, 0x55, 0x31, 0x86, 0xA7, 0xB4), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xBF, 0x18, 0x81, 0x67, 0x27, 0x42, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x05, 0x83, 0xA4, 0xDD, 0x57, 0xD3, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x63, 0xAB, 0xE4, 0x90, 0x70, 0xD0, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x5D, 0xFD, 0xA0, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x1C, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x80, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x09, 0xBC, 0x57, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x9F, 0x6E, 0x88, 0x54, 0x6E, 0x51, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x5F, 0x85, 0xFB, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x4A, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x19, 0xF5, 0x55, 0xC9, 0x07, 0xD8, 0xCE), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xB4, 0xC3, 0xD9, 0x5C, 0xA0, 0xD4, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x30, 0xAF, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x66, 0x7B, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xBF, 0xF0, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0x71, 0xA4, 0x9E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x88, 0x28, 0xF1, 0xBE, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xF3, 0x1A, 0x0E, 0xB9, 0x01, 0x66, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xA7, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x05, 0xD0, 0xAA, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x39, 0x1E, 0x47, 0xE5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0xC0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xB9, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0x33, 0x8A, 0x7D, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x93, 0xA5, 0x53, 0x55, 0x16, 0xB4, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x5F, 0xEA, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x52, 0x71, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xF0, 0x24, 0xB8, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0xA0, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x00, 0x27, 0xB2, 0xDF, 0x73, 0xA2, 0xE0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x2E, 0x4D, 0x7C, 0xDE, 0x7A, 0x23, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x65, 0x60, 0xC7, 0x97, 0x1E, 0xA4, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x13, 0x5B, 0x77, 0x59, 0xCB, 0x36, 0xE1), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0x9E, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x2A, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x5F, 0x64, 0x9F, 0x1A, 0x19, 0xE6, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x7B, 0x39, 0xD2, 0xDB, 0x85, 0x84, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xC7, 0x0D, 0x58, 0x6E, 0x3F, 0x52, 0x15), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x68, 0x19, 0x0B, 0x68, 0xC9, 0x1E, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x4E, 0x21, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x55, 0xCC, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xF9, 0x25, 0x45, 0x54, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xB3, 0xF7, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA4, 0x04, 0x05), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x1E, 0x88, 0xC4, 0xAA, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xAC, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x71, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xA2, 0xF1, 0x15, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x6C, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x5B, 0x05, 0xBC, 0xB7, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x72), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x80, 0xF8, 0x5C, 0x20, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x48, 0x2E, 0x68, 0x82, 0x7F, 0xEB, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x3B, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x32, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x6E, 0xA6, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x62, 0x78, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x4D, 0x3E, 0x86, 0x58, 0xC3, 0xEB, 0xBA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x89, 0x33, 0x18, 0x21, 0x1D, 0x9B, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x9D, 0xFF, 0xC3, 0x79, 0xC1, 0x88, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xD4, 0x48, 0x53, 0xE8, 0xAD, 0x21, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x7B, 0xDE, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x17, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xF3, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xC8, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xAE, 0x4C, 0xB0, 0x16, 0xA4, 0x93, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x8B, 0x6B, 0xDC, 0xD7, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0x7E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0xD2, 0x59, 0x05, 0xA2, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x56, 0x09, 0x32, 0xF1, 0xE8, 0xE3, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xCA, 0xE5, 0x2E, 0xF0, 0xFB, 0x18, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x85, 0xA9, 0x23, 0x15, 0x31, 0x1F, 0x0E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xE5, 0xB1, 0x86, 0xB9, 0x6E, 0x8D, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x77, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0x3F, 0x89, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x25, 0xB0, 0xC7, 0x41, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x11, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0x11, 0x62, 0xD4, 0x2D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x7D, 0x34, 0xB3, 0x20, 0x7F, 0x37, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xD4, 0x45, 0xE8, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0xC5, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x32, 0x3B, 0x25, 0x7E, 0x79, 0xAF, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xE4, 0x54, 0x71, 0xBE, 0x35, 0x4E, 0xD0), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x94, 0xDD, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC2, 0xDD, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x49, 0xE9, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0x08, 0x49, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xB6, 0x03, 0x88, 0x6F, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x67), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xD3, 0x1C, 0xF3, 0xA5, 0xEB, 0x79, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xF9, 0x43, 0x88, 0x89, 0x0D, 0x06, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x2D, 0xF5, 0x98, 0x32, 0xF6, 0xB1, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x73, 0x8F, 0x2B, 0x50, 0x27, 0x0A, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xE3, 0xBD, 0x16, 0x05, 0xC8, 0x93, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xE3, 0x3D, 0xDE, 0x5F, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xA3, 0x9C, 0x22, 0x3C, 0x33, 0x36, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x69, 0x45, 0x78, 0x14, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xF8, 0xD4, 0xBF, 0xB8, 0xC0, 0xA1, 0x25), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x88, 0xE1, 0x91, 0x03, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x11, 0xA1, 0xEF, 0x14, 0x0D, 0xC4, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xD4, 0x0D, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x33, 0x5C, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x45, 0x2A, 0x1A, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x04, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xB5, 0xA7, 0x80, 0xE9, 0x93, 0x97, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xB9, 0x7C, 0xA0, 0xC9, 0x57, 0x26, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0xEF, 0x56, 0xDA, 0x66, 0xF6, 0x1B, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x89, 0x6B, 0x91, 0xE0, 0xA9, 0x65, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x98, 0x96, 0x9B, 0x06, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x19, 0x37, 0x94, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xBE, 0x6B, 0x1A, 0x05, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xCD, 0x5D, 0x35, 0xB4, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x64), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xEF, 0x96, 0xDB, 0xF2, 0x61, 0x63, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x04, 0x88, 0xC9, 0x9F, 0x1B, 0x94, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x30, 0x79, 0x7E, 0x24, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xB8, 0x90, 0xB7, 0x94, 0x25, 0xBB, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x79, 0xEA, 0xAD, 0xC0, 0x6D, 0x18, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xA4, 0x58, 0x2A, 0x8D, 0x95, 0xB3, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x12, 0x0D, 0x79, 0xE2, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x6F, 0xBE, 0x97, 0x4D, 0xA4, 0x20, 0x07), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x31, 0x71, 0xC6, 0xA6, 0x91, 0xEB, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x9B, 0xA8, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0x77, 0xE1, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x06, 0xD3, 0x3D, 0x94, 0x30, 0xEF, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xDF, 0xCA, 0xFA, 0xF5, 0x28, 0xF8, 0xC9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xE1, 0x32, 0xFD, 0x3E, 0x81, 0xF8, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xF2, 0x4B, 0x1D, 0x19, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xB1, 0x8A, 0x22, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x6B, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x21, 0xEF, 0x30, 0xEC, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x89), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x84, 0x4A, 0x46, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x3C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x18, 0x3A, 0xF4, 0xCC, 0xF5, 0xB2, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xF4, 0xBD, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x89, 0x7F, 0x8A, 0xB1, 0x52, 0x3A, 0xAB), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256k1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256k1_T_0_X, secp256k1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_1_X, secp256k1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_2_X, secp256k1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_3_X, secp256k1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_4_X, secp256k1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_5_X, secp256k1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_6_X, secp256k1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_7_X, secp256k1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_8_X, secp256k1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_9_X, secp256k1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_10_X, secp256k1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_11_X, secp256k1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_12_X, secp256k1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_13_X, secp256k1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_14_X, secp256k1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_15_X, secp256k1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define secp256k1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP256r1 (RFC 5639 3.4) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x53, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0x1D, 0x48, 0x13, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x20, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x23, 0xF6, 0x3B, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3, 0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26, 0xC1, 0x55, 0x80, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xFF, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x30, 0x75, 0xF6, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x30, 0x2C, 0xFC, 0x75, 0x09, 0x5A, 0x7D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x07, 0x8C, 0xFF, 0x18, 0xDC, 0xCC, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE1, 0xF7, 0x5C, 0x29, 0x16, 0x84, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xBB, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9, 0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x56, 0x48, 0x97, 0x82, 0x0E, 0x1E, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xA6, 0x61, 0xB5, 0xA3, 0x7A, 0x39, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xA2, 0xED, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xE3, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0xC9, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x3F, 0x93, 0x7A, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x12, 0x53, 0x61, 0x3E, 0x76, 0x08, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x8C, 0x74, 0xF4, 0x08, 0xC3, 0x76, 0x80), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xDD, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xED, 0xEE, 0xC4, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xD9, 0xBE, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x20, 0x12, 0xCA, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x72, 0x71, 0x90, 0x7A, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x23), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x51, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0xBC, 0xB0, 0xB6, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x58, 0xD7, 0x0A, 0x84, 0x05, 0xA3, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x8E, 0x95, 0x61, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0xDF, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x92, 0x12, 0x0F, 0x5E, 0x87, 0x70, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x3A, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xF7, 0x45, 0xD3, 0x06, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x28, 0x65, 0xE1, 0xC5, 0x6C, 0x57, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x01, 0x81, 0x9E, 0x38, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xA5, 0x91, 0x2B, 0xDF, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xEE, 0xB6, 0x25, 0xD6, 0x98, 0xDE, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xA1, 0x55, 0x63, 0x39, 0xEB, 0xB5, 0x47), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xD6, 0xB8, 0xE3, 0x13, 0xED, 0x7F, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xE8, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xB8, 0xCD, 0x19, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x82, 0x83, 0x7A, 0x7B, 0x46, 0x56, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x60, 0x46, 0x15, 0x5A, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x61, 0x50, 0xC6, 0xFF, 0x10, 0x7D, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x51, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0x7D, 0x78, 0x26, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0x15, 0x9A, 0xF7, 0x01, 0xC1, 0xBB, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x0F, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xBD, 0x4A, 0x9E, 0x87), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xF8, 0xD1, 0x77, 0xD2, 0x49, 0xB3, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x86, 0xFB, 0x9E, 0x1F, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xCD, 0x86, 0x61, 0x2F, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xF6, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x37, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x77, 0xAA, 0x97, 0x9C, 0x0B, 0x04, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xA6, 0x60, 0x81, 0xCE, 0x25, 0x13, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x00, 0xF3, 0xBB, 0x82, 0x99, 0x95, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x5A, 0xCE, 0x90, 0x71, 0x38, 0x2F, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x1A, 0xC0, 0x84, 0x27, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x37, 0x52, 0x16, 0x13, 0x0E, 0xCE, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xBF, 0x5A, 0xDB, 0xDB, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xB7, 0x5E, 0xF9, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x5C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xAB, 0x5C, 0x8D, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC5, 0xF8, 0xF7, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x0B, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x4C, 0xA7, 0x45, 0x20, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x5D, 0xEF, 0xDE, 0xEE, 0x39, 0x44, 0x19), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x2F, 0x6D, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x58, 0x60, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xC9, 0x62, 0xCB, 0x38, 0x3C, 0x55, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xA5, 0x09, 0x10, 0x88, 0xDB, 0xE3, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x4B, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x1D, 0xB4, 0x10, 0x76, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x70, 0x5A, 0x07, 0xF5, 0x1A, 0x74, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xE9, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xC0, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x6D, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0x9B, 0xE9, 0x6D, 0x0E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x00, 0x32, 0x41, 0x57, 0x84, 0x89, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xC7, 0x14, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0xFF, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x67, 0x9E, 0xFB, 0xB6, 0xB8, 0x96, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x4A, 0xE3, 0x97, 0x4B, 0x58, 0xDE, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x1E, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x7F, 0xD5, 0xD4, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x08, 0x7A, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x89, 0xC7, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xF9, 0x11, 0x1B, 0xF5, 0x3C, 0x6D, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x50, 0xE5, 0x69, 0x1D, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x0C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x2F, 0xF8, 0x3F, 0xEC, 0x55, 0x99, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x90, 0x43, 0x81, 0x31, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x18, 0x44, 0x50, 0x5D, 0x76, 0xCB, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xC5, 0x5B, 0x9A, 0x03, 0xE6, 0x17, 0x39), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x89, 0xFC, 0x55, 0x94, 0x91, 0x6A, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x46, 0x35, 0xF2, 0x3A, 0x42, 0x08, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xD2, 0x76, 0x49, 0x42, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xEA, 0xA0, 0x52, 0xF1, 0x6A, 0x30, 0x57), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xB2, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x8A, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x94, 0xB5, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xC3, 0xD7, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x49, 0x1C, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x23, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x5C, 0x53), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x65, 0x5C, 0x85, 0x94, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x37, 0xC7, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0xAE, 0x6C, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xD8, 0x11, 0x54, 0x98, 0x44, 0xE3, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x4D, 0xA6, 0x4B, 0x28, 0xF2, 0x57, 0x9E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xD0, 0xEB, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x30, 0xD3, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0xA7, 0x73, 0x6E, 0xB6, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x47, 0xF6, 0xED, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x71, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xB5, 0x49, 0x61, 0x5E, 0x45, 0xF6, 0x4A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x0E, 0xB3, 0x84, 0x3A, 0x63, 0x72, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x53, 0x5C, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0x2E, 0xAB, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x0F, 0x8F, 0x87, 0x50, 0x28, 0xB4, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x98, 0x4A, 0x98, 0x31, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x51), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xC9, 0xE2, 0xFD, 0x5D, 0x1F, 0xE8, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x90, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xBA, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x5A, 0xB3, 0x4E, 0xFB, 0xE0, 0x57, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x0B, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x9D, 0x8E, 0x02), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x41, 0x8F, 0x31, 0xFA, 0x5A, 0xF6, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xE9, 0xE3, 0xF6, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x4E, 0xCD, 0xA2, 0x22, 0x14, 0xD4, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xED, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0F, 0x53, 0x10, 0x17), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x06, 0x24, 0x2C, 0x4E, 0xD1, 0x1E, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0x9F, 0xAB, 0xF0, 0x37, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x5E, 0x12, 0xCE, 0x83, 0x1B, 0x2A, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x65, 0xCF, 0xE8, 0x5C, 0xA5, 0xA2, 0x70), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x86, 0x76, 0x3A, 0x94, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xDA, 0xC9, 0xA6, 0x29, 0x93, 0x15, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x61, 0x6A, 0x7D, 0xC7, 0xA9, 0xF3, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x03, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x15, 0xCE, 0x50, 0x72), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xD0, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x4F, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x4B, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x71, 0x58, 0x7E, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x93, 0x95, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x8F, 0xC7, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0x7A, 0x86, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xAF, 0x68, 0x3A, 0x23, 0xC1, 0x2E, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x50, 0x11, 0x67, 0x39, 0xB9, 0xAF, 0x48), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x86, 0xAA, 0x1E, 0x88, 0x21, 0x29, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x28, 0xA4, 0x9D, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x9A, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBA, 0x04, 0x67, 0xB7, 0x01, 0x40, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xA3, 0xCA, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x97, 0xA8, 0xB6, 0x3C, 0xEE, 0x90, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xED, 0xC4, 0xF7, 0xC3, 0x95, 0xEC, 0x85), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x84, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xD5, 0x64, 0xBB, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x9B, 0xE2, 0x28, 0x50, 0xC2, 0x72, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xF2, 0x74, 0xD1, 0x26, 0xBF, 0x32, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0x72, 0xDB, 0x6D, 0x30, 0x98), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x50, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x48, 0xC1, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x28, 0xBB, 0x11, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x22, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0x5C, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x44, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xE8, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xBB, 0xC1, 0x81, 0x7F), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP256r1_T[16] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP256r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP384r1 (RFC 5639 3.6) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xEC, 0x07, 0x31, 0x13, 0x00, 0x47, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x1A, 0x1D, 0x90, 0x29, 0xA7, 0xD3, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x11, 0xB7, 0x7F, 0x19, 0xDA, 0xB1, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xD4, 0x3A, 0x50, 0x4A, 0x81, 0xA5, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xF9, 0x91, 0xBA, 0xEF, 0x65, 0x91, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x4F, 0x8E, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xAF, 0x05, 0xCE, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x72, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x15, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0xC6, 0x82, 0xC3, 0x7B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x96, 0x86, 0xB7, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0xC9, 0xDB, 0x95, 0x02, 0x39, 0xB4, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x62, 0xEB, 0x3E, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x88, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xD2, 0xDC, 0x07, 0xE1, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x44, 0xF0, 0x16, 0x54, 0xB5, 0x39, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x65, 0x04, 0xE9, 0x02, 0x32, 0x88, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xC3, 0x7F, 0x6B, 0xAF, 0xB6, 0x3A, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x25, 0x04, 0xAC, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x16, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0xD8, 0x8A, 0x54, 0x41, 0xD6, 0x6B, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x3B, 0xF1, 0x22, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x4B, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x33, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x52, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0x52, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x6E, 0x17, 0x9B, 0xD5, 0x2A, 0x4A, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xDA, 0x6B, 0xE5, 0x03, 0x07, 0x1D, 0x2E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0x98, 0xE3, 0xA4, 0xF6, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x7D, 0xFE, 0x51, 0x40, 0x3B, 0x47, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x88, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xE2, 0x8F, 0xCB, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xE2, 0x88, 0x2D, 0x4E, 0x50, 0xEB, 0x9A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x54, 0x94, 0x5E, 0xF4, 0x7F, 0x3A, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x07, 0x1C, 0xE1, 0xBD, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x92, 0x28, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x04, 0xB1, 0x4D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x82, 0x44, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0D, 0x55, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xE3, 0xFF, 0x89, 0x46, 0xDE, 0x4E, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x67, 0x1A, 0x81, 0xEE, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x54, 0xE2, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0xDA, 0x2C, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x9A, 0x90, 0xAA, 0x6E, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x5F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x40, 0xAC, 0xED, 0x7D, 0x37, 0x87, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xF8, 0xB1, 0x80, 0x4C, 0x8C, 0x04, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x98, 0x2C, 0xAD, 0x30, 0x69, 0x35, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x2E, 0x00, 0x2F, 0x44, 0x8C, 0xF0, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x58, 0x07, 0xD7, 0xCD, 0x60, 0xA1, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xFB, 0x7B, 0x03, 0x05, 0x5E, 0x79, 0x73), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x17, 0xCE, 0x38, 0x4B, 0x5E, 0x5B, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x0E, 0x0A, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x7C, 0x62, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xF0, 0x98, 0x71, 0x7F, 0x17, 0x26, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xD3, 0xFA, 0x3C, 0xF0, 0x70, 0x07, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x47, 0x5C, 0x09, 0x43, 0xB7, 0x65, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xFA, 0xF3, 0xEC, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x78, 0x22, 0x2B, 0x58, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x30, 0xCE, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0xB0, 0x4F, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x95, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x23, 0xC2, 0x65, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xCF, 0x03, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x80, 0x44, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xD5, 0xED, 0xEA, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x5B, 0x16, 0x10, 0x25, 0xAC, 0x2A, 0x17), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0x8C, 0x6B, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xBB, 0x1C, 0xD3, 0x5A, 0xEE, 0xD9, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x5D, 0x30, 0x5E, 0xF7, 0xB2, 0x41, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xCE, 0x0F, 0x1A, 0xC6, 0x41, 0x64, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x18, 0xE1, 0xE3, 0x82, 0x15, 0x66, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xE2, 0x24, 0x04, 0x72, 0x39, 0xA0, 0x7C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x51, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x88, 0x62, 0xE1, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xD2, 0x65, 0x14, 0xE9, 0x4C, 0x82, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xE1, 0xAC, 0x87, 0xAE, 0x31, 0x1A, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x4F, 0x96, 0x1E, 0x85, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x86, 0xBB, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x08, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x53, 0x03, 0x09, 0x80, 0x91, 0xEF, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xD7, 0xAF, 0x6F, 0x69, 0x7B, 0x88, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x30, 0xA2, 0x47, 0xB5, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xD2, 0xC0, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x3C, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x8C, 0xB3, 0x4C, 0xBA, 0x8B, 0x6D, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0xC7, 0xA1, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x4F, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x4A, 0x97, 0xC8, 0x03, 0x6F, 0x01, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x18, 0x12, 0xA9, 0x39, 0xD5, 0x22, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xA7, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x78, 0x38), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xB3, 0xD0, 0x7F, 0xDF, 0xD0, 0x30, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x25, 0x73, 0x96, 0xEC, 0xA8, 0x1D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xD1, 0x65, 0x66, 0xDC, 0xD9, 0xCF, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x37, 0xAD, 0xE2, 0xBE, 0x2D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x79, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x07, 0x66, 0xB1, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x53, 0x62, 0x65, 0x92, 0x09, 0x4C, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xAF, 0xC3, 0x03, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x2D, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xCA, 0x41, 0xD9, 0xA2, 0x69, 0x9B, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xB2, 0xA6, 0x8D, 0xE1, 0xAA, 0x61, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xBA, 0x4D, 0x12, 0xB6, 0xBE, 0xF3, 0x7E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xD9, 0x92, 0x22, 0x07, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xA1, 0x7C, 0x91, 0xDB, 0x32, 0xF7, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x49, 0x4B, 0x6D, 0xFB, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xFB, 0x4E, 0x4C, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x81, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0x00, 0xB7, 0xD9, 0xCC, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x36, 0x8B, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x1F, 0x60, 0x03, 0xBB, 0xD7, 0x60, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xDD, 0x71, 0x95, 0xE9, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0x5F, 0x68, 0x81, 0xC5, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0x98, 0x42, 0x28, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x29, 0x8E, 0x11, 0x49, 0xB4, 0xD7, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x3E, 0xD2, 0x30, 0xA1, 0xBA, 0xCA, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x37, 0x64, 0x44, 0x2F, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x42, 0xBC, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x1A, 0x5F, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x04, 0xAB, 0x04, 0xE0, 0x24, 0xAD, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x45, 0x17, 0x67, 0x1F, 0x3E, 0x53, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x0F, 0xB3, 0x1B, 0x57, 0x54, 0xC2, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xD3, 0xF8, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x9B, 0xFA, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x90, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x49, 0x38, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xCF, 0xC6, 0xDD, 0xF0, 0xFF, 0x8C, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x69, 0x9D, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x33, 0xE9, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x19, 0x82, 0x3D, 0xAC, 0x1C, 0x40, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC7, 0x02, 0x46, 0x14, 0x77, 0x00, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x05, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x3A, 0x66, 0x5C, 0x39), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xE6, 0x17, 0xDE, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xC6, 0x42, 0x5E, 0xE7, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x21, 0x68, 0x5A, 0x26, 0xFB, 0xD7, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x00, 0x5C, 0xBA, 0x8A, 0x34, 0xEC, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x9C, 0x3C, 0xAF, 0x53, 0xE8, 0x65, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xEF, 0x28, 0xDC, 0x67, 0x05, 0xC8, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x78, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x49, 0xA0, 0xBC, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x3E, 0x2D, 0xA0, 0xCF, 0xD4, 0x7A, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x93, 0xFE, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x6E, 0x99, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xAD, 0x04, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xAF, 0x5E, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x7A, 0xED, 0xA6, 0x9E, 0x18, 0x09, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x05, 0x94, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xB8, 0x85, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xB7, 0x37, 0xC2, 0x50, 0x75, 0x15, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0xB2, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x3E, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x81, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x73, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xF1, 0xD1, 0x61, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x8F, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xDB, 0x4A, 0xFF, 0x14, 0xA7, 0x48, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x73, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xCC, 0xF1, 0x57, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xED, 0x73, 0x27, 0x70, 0x82, 0xB6, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xBA, 0xAC, 0x3A, 0xCF, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xD6, 0xB1, 0x8F, 0x0E, 0x08, 0x2C, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x2F, 0x0E, 0xA1, 0xF3, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xF5, 0x7C, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x0A, 0xF6, 0x28), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xEE, 0x17, 0x47, 0x34, 0x15, 0xA3, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xBE, 0x88, 0x48, 0xE7, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xDE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xAD, 0xDC, 0x65, 0x61, 0x37, 0x0F, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x67, 0xAD, 0xA2, 0x3A, 0x1C, 0x91, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x07, 0x0C, 0x3A, 0x41, 0x6E, 0x13, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0xBD, 0x7E, 0xED, 0xAA, 0x14, 0xDD, 0x61), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xDC, 0x20, 0x01, 0x72, 0x11, 0x48, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x62, 0x3D, 0xF0, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xC2, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x52, 0xA3, 0x4A, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x46, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xF8, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xC7, 0x8F, 0xA9, 0x26, 0x42, 0x32, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xA6, 0xA0, 0x8D, 0x4B, 0x9A, 0x19, 0x03), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xAB, 0x6D, 0x1E, 0xFB, 0xEE, 0x60, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x56, 0x3C, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0x10, 0x79, 0x1C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xBC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0x71, 0xEF, 0x02, 0xF9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x36, 0xC4, 0xD0, 0x88, 0x9B, 0x32, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xD4, 0x5D, 0x17, 0x39, 0xE6, 0x22, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x26, 0x01, 0xCE, 0xBE, 0x4A, 0x9C, 0x27), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x6D, 0x11, 0xCA, 0x6C, 0x5A, 0x93, 0x0C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x96, 0x26, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0xE4, 0x30, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xC1, 0x4C, 0xC6, 0x30, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x04), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xB3, 0xE8, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xEB, 0x63, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x1D, 0xCA, 0xFC, 0x50, 0x36, 0x4B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x0E, 0x23, 0x5B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x88, 0xB6, 0xD7, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x23, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x66, 0xE2, 0xBB, 0x29, 0xA6, 0x4F, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x68, 0x6E, 0xA0, 0x14, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x73, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0xAB, 0x5B, 0xF6, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x00, 0x95, 0xE9, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x0D, 0x4F, 0x81, 0xD0, 0xF2, 0x3F, 0x00), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x1D, 0xCD, 0x78, 0x39, 0xC4, 0x6B, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x45, 0xC7, 0xB8, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x5D, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x8C, 0x6E, 0xA3, 0x24, 0xB2, 0xDB, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x2D, 0xD9, 0xF1, 0xC7, 0x9B, 0x8A, 0xAF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0xB9, 0x40, 0x37, 0x91, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0x23, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0x2F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x9D, 0x5A, 0x20, 0x10, 0xA9, 0x84, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x30, 0x89, 0x20, 0x13, 0xE9, 0xB2, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x6E, 0x52, 0xEB, 0x03, 0x18, 0x1F, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x9E, 0x1C, 0x35, 0x87, 0x92, 0x69, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0xC9, 0x88, 0xAF, 0xC6, 0x6C, 0x83, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xD5, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x34, 0x99, 0xB6, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0xAD, 0x45, 0x9B, 0x4B, 0x41, 0x4D, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x5D, 0xAB, 0x7F, 0x35, 0x34, 0xE9, 0x29), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0xBE, 0x78, 0x34, 0x44, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xDE, 0xE3, 0xC4, 0xEE, 0x0B, 0xF9, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x86, 0x16, 0x48, 0x32, 0xB8, 0x74, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xEE, 0x7C, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0x81, 0xE3, 0x55), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x6A, 0xFA, 0x84, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0xD5, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8A, 0xD5, 0x1B, 0x2E, 0x1A, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0C, 0x61, 0xE2, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0xE6, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x62, 0xC1, 0x87, 0x53, 0x1B, 0x92, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x90, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x6A, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x2E, 0xB5, 0x3B, 0x44, 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x78), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x5D, 0x02, 0x58, 0xB5, 0xBE, 0x45, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xEF, 0x8E, 0x90, 0x4D, 0x2A, 0x32, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x99, 0x75, 0x5C, 0x0A, 0x33, 0x8F, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x6C, 0x95, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xDA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xE4, 0x4C, 0x91, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x25, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x29, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x34, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x15, 0xE5, 0x13, 0x7E, 0x64, 0x8B, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xBC, 0x0D, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x37, 0x9E, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x82, 0x20, 0xF7, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x77, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x29, 0xA2, 0xDB, 0x7A, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xC6, 0x50, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x9F, 0xD5, 0xE8, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x30), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x03, 0x55, 0x10, 0xDB, 0xA6, 0x8B, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x78, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x43, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x35, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x47, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x95, 0x2F, 0xEA, 0xBC, 0xB4, 0x18, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x48, 0xAE, 0x89, 0xF5, 0x65, 0x3D, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0x20, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x50, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xE6, 0x5C, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0x7D, 0xDF, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x07, 0x3E, 0xCE, 0x9F, 0x18, 0xB6, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0xF8, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xFA, 0x42, 0x1D, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x6C, 0x1D, 0x03, 0xC9, 0x0E, 0x2B, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x18, 0x52, 0xA5, 0xB4, 0x63, 0xE1, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0xD9, 0xC4, 0xFD, 0x16, 0x60, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x7D, 0xDE, 0xDF, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xB0, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x4E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x85, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xF0, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x9B, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xC2, 0x39, 0x5D, 0xF3, 0x2C, 0xD9, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x1C, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x2F, 0x54, 0x87, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x72, 0xC7, 0xB5, 0x50, 0xA3, 0x84, 0x77), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xD1, 0xAF, 0xA9, 0xB4, 0x8B, 0x5D, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xF6, 0x52, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x52, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x05, 0x42, 0x77, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x08, 0x90, 0x72, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x15, 0xF8, 0xF1, 0x16, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x87, 0xAC, 0x8F, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x83, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xE1, 0xE6, 0x2D, 0x0E, 0x11, 0xA1, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x32, 0xE6, 0xE3, 0x83, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x56, 0xE5, 0xCD, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x67, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xED, 0xC9, 0x65, 0x6D, 0x87, 0xE1, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x8E, 0xFD, 0x9A, 0x53, 0x0E, 0xFA, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0x23, 0x84, 0xFA, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xFE, 0x49, 0x81, 0xD1, 0x3E, 0xF4, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x72, 0xE0, 0xEF, 0x0D, 0xB8, 0x3E, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCE, 0x60, 0x72, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xCC, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x07, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x3A, 0x35, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x1F, 0xCA, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xEA, 0x88, 0x55, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x05, 0x7F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x6D, 0xF1, 0x97, 0xA6, 0x69, 0x39, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x41, 0x99, 0xFF, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x2F, 0x95, 0x80, 0x12, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xBF, 0x51, 0xAA, 0xAE, 0x2D, 0xDA, 0xCF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x1C, 0xB3, 0x52, 0x36, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xC1, 0x1F, 0x3A, 0xD3, 0x3E, 0x5C, 0x1A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x2B, 0xC8, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0x98, 0x41, 0x66, 0xB0, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x1D, 0xC0, 0x42, 0xCD, 0xF8, 0xC3, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x41, 0x91, 0x7D, 0xCC, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xAE, 0x76, 0xED, 0x56, 0x18, 0xC5, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x6A, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x7F, 0x65, 0x10, 0x1F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xEC, 0x3C, 0x05, 0x05, 0xCA, 0xF6, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0xCD, 0x02, 0x51, 0x12, 0x16, 0x3C, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x43, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x59, 0x90, 0x41, 0xDB, 0xE4, 0xF5, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x0E, 0x18, 0x2A, 0x5A, 0x83, 0x7C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x37, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xF1, 0x2F, 0x63, 0x79), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xC0, 0xFA, 0x6F, 0x1F, 0x67, 0xCF, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x34, 0x45, 0xBB, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x67, 0x1D, 0x64, 0x8F, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x39, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0xAD, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x93, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0x28, 0xFA, 0x39, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xF9, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x26, 0x7A, 0x88, 0x89), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xD5, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x11, 0xDE, 0xEB, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x46, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x74, 0x34, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xBD, 0xD3, 0xF5, 0x14, 0xEE, 0xFE, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x4C, 0xA3, 0x71, 0x43, 0x65, 0xF8, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x6C, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x90, 0x25, 0xD8, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x34, 0x84, 0x96, 0xA1, 0x43, 0x03, 0x4D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x3B, 0x3B, 0x2F, 0xCA, 0x59, 0xF2, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x48, 0x24, 0x74, 0xD8, 0x72, 0x90, 0xA3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x42, 0x74, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x52, 0x19, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x9E, 0x41, 0x63, 0x68, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x6B, 0x38, 0x52, 0xA8, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x30, 0x25, 0x93, 0xA1, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x68), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x2F, 0x4B, 0x64, 0x79, 0x50, 0xFF, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x36, 0xED, 0x57, 0x39, 0x3B, 0xE7, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x85, 0xEA, 0x35, 0xD6, 0xC0, 0xA0, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x89, 0x3A, 0xCC, 0x22, 0x1C, 0x46, 0x02), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x7A, 0xB0, 0xA1, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x62, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xB8, 0x8A, 0x6C, 0x18, 0x85, 0x0D, 0x88), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xB6, 0x50, 0xE9, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0xE8, 0x07), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x5B, 0x5C, 0xD1, 0x4B, 0x11, 0x9A, 0xD8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x25, 0x56, 0x74, 0x51, 0x9C, 0xEC, 0x9C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x7F, 0xB6, 0x8A, 0xCB, 0x3A, 0x10, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x33, 0x07, 0x01, 0xE9, 0x49, 0x59, 0xE6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xA5, 0x2E, 0xF2, 0xBA, 0x32, 0x63, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x06, 0x0B, 0xA5, 0x44, 0x27, 0x7F, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x74, 0xAC, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x4F, 0x13, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xB1, 0xBF, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA5, 0x1C, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x64, 0x68, 0x7B, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x77, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x39, 0xF9, 0x4E, 0x84, 0x9C, 0xF6, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xCF, 0x6D, 0xE2, 0xA1, 0x2D, 0xF9, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xC4, 0x90, 0x57, 0x31, 0x01, 0x05, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x1E, 0xBB, 0xBF, 0x98, 0xA4, 0x7C, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xE3, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0xCD, 0x39, 0x9A, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x34, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x89, 0x98, 0xB5, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0x20, 0x3D, 0x3A, 0x04, 0x8F, 0x5A, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x49, 0x09, 0x9C, 0x0F, 0x59), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x66, 0xD2, 0x38, 0x2A, 0x62, 0x81, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xC8, 0x20, 0x5E, 0x28, 0xA3, 0x81, 0xA7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x31, 0xA4, 0xF1, 0xEA, 0x7D, 0x87, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x2C, 0x99, 0x09, 0x6F, 0x63, 0xEB, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x76, 0xDA, 0x1A, 0x06, 0xBE, 0xDE, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x09, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x39, 0x30, 0x2D, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x9B, 0xC1, 0x5A, 0x17, 0xC3, 0x8C, 0x31), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x8D, 0x94, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xAB, 0x60, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFD, 0x1E, 0x0F, 0x43, 0xAE, 0x9D, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0xF2, 0xF3, 0x20, 0x1B, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x5B, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x90, 0x3B, 0xE3, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x78, 0x72, 0xBD, 0x65, 0x09, 0x0B, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x37, 0x2A, 0x6C, 0x16, 0x4F, 0x64, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xCE, 0xA3, 0x90, 0xB4, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x38, 0x55, 0x63, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x6E, 0x18), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xB4, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x22, 0x45, 0x89, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x7C, 0x8C, 0xA6, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x06, 0x42, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0xE3, 0xC6, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0x5D, 0x47, 0x31, 0x7C, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x85, 0xEE, 0x46, 0x7E, 0x13, 0x04, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x3C, 0x8B, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x74, 0xF5, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x88, 0x8E, 0x07, 0x29, 0x08, 0x03, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x9B, 0x89, 0xEB, 0x08, 0xE8, 0x43, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x07, 0x67, 0xFD, 0xD9, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xEB, 0x21, 0x8D, 0x98, 0x43, 0x74, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xCC, 0x14, 0xD8, 0x08, 0xBB, 0xA6, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x98, 0xF2, 0x6A, 0x18, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x38, 0x91, 0xA0, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x04, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xAF, 0xE8, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0x13, 0x70, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x93, 0x87, 0x98, 0x4A, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x2E, 0x69, 0x9C, 0xA2, 0x2D, 0x03, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xFE, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x2A, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xB1, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0x41, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xD8, 0x9A, 0x21, 0xF3, 0xFE, 0xCB, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x78, 0x04, 0x60, 0xB7, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1E, 0x66, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x51, 0xBD, 0x8B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x16, 0x36, 0xEF, 0x61, 0x2D, 0xEE, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x5F, 0x88, 0xA0, 0x13, 0x12, 0xF7, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0x4A, 0x4A, 0x07, 0x01, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x06, 0x4F, 0xD7, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x8B, 0x4D, 0x48, 0xE0, 0x98, 0xFB, 0x6A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0xBA, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x0D, 0x52, 0xAC, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xD0, 0xE0, 0x36, 0xE6, 0x07, 0x3A, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x80, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x49, 0x22, 0x4B, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xC7, 0xAB, 0x1C, 0x89, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x2A, 0xFC, 0xB3, 0x6D, 0x45, 0x96, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xE4, 0xDB, 0x52, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xB4, 0x19), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xCC, 0xC8, 0x7F, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x87, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x21, 0x3C, 0x69, 0x7D, 0x38, 0x57, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x4C, 0x18, 0x3C, 0x53, 0xA5, 0x48, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xC3, 0x64, 0x45, 0xDB, 0xC4, 0x6D, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xCC, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0x17, 0xB8, 0x34, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x69, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x28, 0x4A, 0x3D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xE8, 0x9E, 0x39, 0xEA, 0x8D, 0x38, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x9C, 0xBB, 0xCD, 0x80, 0x1A, 0xEE, 0xB7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA0, 0x45, 0xBF, 0xD9, 0x22, 0x11, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x7C, 0x5C, 0xD9, 0xC0, 0x9F, 0x69, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x8A, 0xA6, 0x79, 0x4E, 0x35, 0xB9, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x8B, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0xA1, 0xB8, 0x28, 0x10), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x2F, 0xEF, 0xBB, 0xA9, 0x72, 0x7F, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x34, 0xB7, 0x12, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0xC3, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0x42, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x71, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x01, 0x59, 0xA7, 0x56, 0x03, 0x91, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x91, 0x99, 0x33, 0x30, 0x3E, 0xEF, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xC9, 0x5A, 0x9A, 0x54, 0x66, 0xF1, 0x70), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x2C, 0xB7, 0x6E, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x35, 0x30), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x0D, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x2D, 0x99, 0x63, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x31, 0xAF, 0x2D, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xC0, 0xDF, 0x80, 0x54, 0xC4, 0xAC, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x6B, 0xA0, 0x84, 0x96, 0xF7, 0x31, 0xC8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0xE2, 0x7C, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x45, 0x75, 0x6A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xEE, 0x58, 0x31, 0xE8, 0x68, 0xD6, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x2E, 0x48, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x9F, 0xD4, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xA9, 0x5C, 0xE7, 0x64, 0x43, 0x5D, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x58, 0x9F, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x68, 0xFF, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x88, 0x2D, 0xBA, 0x12, 0xBF, 0x8D, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xDF, 0x6F, 0xB3, 0x75, 0xA4, 0x55, 0x73), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x17, 0x92, 0x39, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x37, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x43, 0x71, 0xA7, 0xCA, 0x17, 0x1B, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xB9, 0xB0, 0x78, 0xEF, 0xA0, 0xDA, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x84, 0xF2, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x65, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x45, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x6A, 0x8C, 0x2B, 0x77, 0x96, 0x36, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x7A, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x97, 0x63, 0x02, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x03, 0x8F, 0xB9, 0xEE, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0xEE, 0x8B, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDB, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x7B, 0x81, 0xC9, 0x70, 0x8D, 0x62, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xDA, 0x46, 0xF8, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0xBE, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x9C, 0x7A, 0x97, 0x62, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0x0F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x03, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0x46, 0x27, 0x9E, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x08, 0x1C, 0xD5, 0x25, 0xAF, 0xE9, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x7C, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x9A, 0x7A, 0x99, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x4E, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xCE, 0x85, 0x5F, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x57, 0x69, 0x90, 0x76, 0xF3, 0x53, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP384r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP384r1_T NULL +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Domain parameters for brainpoolP512r1 (RFC 5639 3.7) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x58, 0x56, 0x60, 0xAA, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x81, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x80, 0xA3, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xA1, 0xCD, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x68, 0xC6, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_a[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77, 0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B, 0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D, 0x8D, 0xDD, 0xCB, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x4C, 0x23, 0xAC, 0x45, 0x71, 0x32, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x8B, 0x31, 0xA3, 0x30, 0x78), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_b[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0xF7, 0x16, 0x80, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x09, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xE5, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xB7, 0x50, 0x40, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x3E, 0x08, 0xDC, 0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7, 0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F, 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A, 0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D, 0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8, 0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gx[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gy[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x00, 0xA9, 0x9C, 0x82, 0x96, 0x87, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xDA, 0x5D, 0x08, 0x81, 0xD3, 0xB1, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x10, 0xAC, 0x7F, 0x19, 0x61, 0x86, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x26, 0xA9, 0x4C, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA), +}; + +#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1 +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x9D, 0x88, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x96, 0xA7, 0x56, 0xD1, 0x37), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xF5, 0x0E, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x40, 0xEF, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0xD6, 0x32, 0x33), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xED, 0x56, 0x14, 0x57, 0x1A, 0x8D, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xED, 0x4D, 0x3A, 0xFA, 0x71, 0x75, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xC5, 0x76, 0x1C, 0x14, 0xBE, 0xB5, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x5A, 0xCB, 0xE7, 0x36, 0x1D, 0x52, 0x1C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x8D, 0x7A, 0xEB, 0xA3, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xA3, 0x41, 0xF8, 0xAC, 0x9E, 0xAB, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xE3, 0x65, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0xFE, 0x09, 0x2B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x3F, 0xC5, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x5D, 0x63, 0x28, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xD3, 0x91), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x95, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x82, 0xD4, 0x77, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xBB, 0x92, 0x32, 0x00, 0xF4, 0x66, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x58, 0x31, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x22), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x36, 0xA9, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA5, 0x2D, 0x78), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x44, 0xAB, 0xCE, 0x71, 0xFF, 0x0C, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x24, 0x58, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x21, 0x32, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0xA6, 0x28, 0xF8, 0x7A, 0x97, 0xAE, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xE7, 0x08, 0xFA, 0x47, 0xC9, 0x55, 0x09), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xAC, 0x2E, 0x84, 0xA4, 0xF5, 0x52, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x58, 0x05, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0x71, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x92, 0xC1, 0x92, 0xEC, 0x6B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x48, 0x2D, 0x79, 0x5E, 0x58, 0xE5, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x85, 0x26, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x6E, 0xD4, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x68, 0x26, 0x87, 0x38, 0xA2, 0xD2, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x17, 0x60, 0xCE, 0x75, 0xF8, 0xA5, 0x6F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x51, 0xDB, 0xA9, 0xAE, 0x87, 0xF1, 0x15), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x49, 0x92, 0x3B, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF5, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0xD5, 0x52, 0x52, 0x8C, 0xCE, 0xFD, 0xFA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x18, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xF6, 0xAE, 0x08, 0x41), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x2B, 0xD8, 0x54, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x57, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x9E, 0x03, 0x03, 0x3C, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x29, 0x00, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x33, 0x99, 0x0E, 0x00, 0x5D, 0xFE, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2D, 0xF2, 0x59, 0x32, 0xCF, 0x03, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xC9, 0x72, 0xAE, 0x0C, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x5A, 0x27, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xBE, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0x1E, 0x88), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x83, 0xC2, 0x46, 0xF6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xDC, 0xCE, 0x15, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xDB, 0x5E, 0x94, 0x31, 0x0B, 0xB2, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xB9, 0xE3, 0xE3, 0x11, 0x71, 0x41, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xE3, 0x01, 0xB7, 0x7D, 0xBC, 0x65, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x07, 0x65, 0x87, 0xA7, 0xE8, 0x48, 0xE3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x48, 0x8F, 0xD4, 0x30, 0x8E, 0xB4, 0x6C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xE0, 0x73, 0xBE, 0x1E, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x36), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x0E, 0x5E, 0x87, 0xC5, 0xAB, 0x0E, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xF9, 0x5F, 0x80, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x15, 0x21, 0x54, 0x92, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x8A, 0x47, 0x74, 0xDC, 0x42, 0xB1, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xF7, 0x30, 0xFD, 0xC1, 0x9B, 0x0C, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x6C, 0xCC, 0xDF, 0xC5, 0xE3, 0xA9, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x67, 0x59, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x51, 0x54, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x37, 0xFB, 0x6E, 0xB0, 0x78, 0x63, 0x8E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xEF, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xF1, 0x46, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xFF, 0x10, 0xE4, 0xE2, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x2E, 0x22, 0x89, 0xE5, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x0C, 0x29, 0xA8, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0xCA, 0x87, 0x2A, 0x6F, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xDC, 0x9B, 0x9F, 0x65, 0xD4, 0xAD, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xC3, 0x08, 0x0F, 0xCF, 0x67, 0xE9, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x5C, 0xD7, 0xFF, 0x41, 0x9C, 0xCB, 0x26), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x25, 0x05, 0x12, 0xAD, 0x73, 0x63, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x99, 0x07, 0x86, 0x57, 0xE7, 0x94, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xBF, 0x18, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x6A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x09, 0xF2, 0x2F, 0x0C, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x3A, 0x04, 0xEA, 0x89, 0x6C, 0x91, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x21, 0x04, 0xE3, 0xB9, 0x40), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x71, 0x4B, 0x7B, 0xC2, 0x89, 0xCD, 0xA2), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xB9, 0xA8, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x41, 0x6C, 0xBB, 0x5A, 0xCA, 0x1F, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xD7, 0xE2, 0x6C, 0x6B, 0xA7, 0x48, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x19, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0xC1, 0x7E, 0x4F, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xF7, 0x19, 0x3C, 0x06, 0x74, 0x2C, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x23, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x09, 0xB0, 0x80, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x74, 0x34, 0x08, 0x44, 0x7E, 0xA3, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xCC, 0x8D, 0x12, 0x6E, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x71, 0x02, 0x93, 0xC2, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x89, 0x40, 0xE2, 0x1F, 0xE7, 0x5E, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x8E, 0xAE, 0x89, 0x01, 0xD4, 0x0C, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x70, 0x24, 0xF2, 0xE4, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0xC7, 0x1D, 0xD6, 0x4A, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x1D, 0x7E, 0x4A, 0x2C, 0xCA, 0xEC, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x06, 0x7F, 0xA8, 0x99, 0xE4, 0xD3, 0x4E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x1D, 0x5A, 0xDF, 0x5E, 0x58, 0x36, 0x49), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xB9, 0x32, 0x69, 0x1F, 0x72, 0x2A, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x73, 0xE2, 0x03, 0x39, 0x35, 0xAA, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x5E, 0x5D, 0x48, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x30, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x7F, 0x60, 0x19, 0xAF, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xD9, 0x19, 0xE4, 0x1B, 0x56, 0x15, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xD7, 0x33, 0x59, 0x1F, 0x43, 0x59, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0xCA, 0xA4, 0x7F, 0x63, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x40, 0xC0, 0xF6, 0x19, 0x89, 0x43, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x92, 0xEA, 0x07, 0x65, 0x79, 0x86, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x75, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x0A, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x9E, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x1F, 0x0C, 0xF9, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x8C, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x21, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x4D, 0xD8, 0x18, 0xC4, 0xF6, 0x36, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xC9, 0xAC, 0x5C, 0xFA, 0x69, 0xA4, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x8C, 0x94, 0x1C, 0x7B, 0x71, 0x36, 0x58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xBD, 0x46, 0xCE, 0xB7, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x5E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD6, 0x96, 0x4B, 0xA6, 0x47, 0xEB, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0xF1, 0x5F, 0x15, 0xDE, 0x99, 0x6F, 0x66), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0x04, 0xB8, 0xE6, 0xC0, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xD3, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x00, 0xE4, 0x05, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xF3, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x1A, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x32, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x33, 0x09, 0xB6, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xEF, 0xFC, 0x61, 0x10, 0x42, 0x31, 0x94), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF1, 0xF4, 0x33, 0xCF, 0x28, 0x90, 0x9C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x88, 0x87, 0x7B, 0xEB, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xB8, 0xDA, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0x3D, 0xA6, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xF0, 0x62, 0x82, 0x53, 0x32, 0x55, 0x03), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x4A, 0x19, 0x11, 0x9C, 0x10), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xB3, 0x27, 0xE9, 0x75, 0x90, 0x05, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x1C, 0x90, 0x48, 0x77, 0x01, 0x85, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xD6, 0x9B, 0x84, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xC5, 0x28), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x7A, 0xCB, 0xB3, 0x11, 0x46, 0xD7, 0x99), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x23, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x75, 0xA1, 0x95, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x34, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x03, 0xBE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x80, 0x9D, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x44, 0xE1, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x5D, 0xBD, 0xA8, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x25, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x99, 0x1F, 0x53, 0xF1, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x7C, 0xE5, 0xC5, 0x51, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0xB0, 0x1A, 0x9C, 0x16, 0xB0, 0x32, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xE3, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x7B, 0x33), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xDD, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x65), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xAB, 0x01, 0xD3, 0x87, 0x74, 0x25, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xA3, 0xE3, 0x76, 0x43, 0x87, 0x12, 0xBD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x66, 0xEB, 0x98, 0x54), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x78, 0xC8, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x75, 0xCA, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x19, 0xE7, 0x07, 0x36, 0xB5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xC9, 0xA8, 0x5F, 0x91, 0xBF, 0x47, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x96, 0x58, 0x96, 0x18, 0xB6, 0xFA, 0x01), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x2D, 0xA9, 0x9B, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x0C, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x0B, 0x2D, 0x56, 0x4A, 0xD3, 0x93, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x15, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x12, 0x86, 0x0E, 0xB2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xC1, 0xCB, 0xE4, 0xC3, 0xD7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x53, 0x10, 0xCA, 0xA3, 0xAC, 0x83, 0x26), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x01, 0x22, 0x96, 0x10, 0xAD, 0x69, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x46, 0x4E, 0xD8, 0xEA, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xF3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x2F, 0x7F, 0x62, 0x62, 0x80, 0xD0, 0x14), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x63, 0x09, 0xBD, 0x6A, 0x83), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xD4, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x05, 0xB7, 0xF7, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x4D, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x4A, 0x15, 0x27, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x15, 0xAA, 0x37, 0x27, 0x34, 0x18, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x20, 0x2C, 0x84, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xBA, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x09, 0xD6, 0x04, 0xA2, 0x60, 0x84, 0x72), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x04, 0x94, 0x08, 0xD4, 0xED, 0x47, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x35, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x80, 0xD6, 0xF1, 0x30, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x14, 0xA6, 0x85, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xD8, 0x61), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x49, 0x2A, 0x1E, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x2D, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x87, 0x56, 0x91, 0x03, 0x77, 0x4D, 0x55), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x52, 0xD4, 0xAA, 0xF7, 0xFA, 0xB0, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x5D, 0x11, 0x39, 0xB1, 0xE7, 0x76, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x13, 0xBC, 0x37, 0x5D, 0x74, 0xCD, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x48, 0x14, 0x23, 0x30, 0xF8, 0x46, 0x37), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x27, 0xB0, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0x74, 0xB4, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0x64, 0x36, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x2B, 0x78, 0x40, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x7B, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x68, 0x3A, 0xB6, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0xDB, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x33, 0xD7, 0x34, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x45, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xCE, 0xA8, 0xC9, 0x01, 0xFB, 0x0E, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xF9, 0x51, 0x4C, 0x12, 0x9F, 0x60, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x85, 0xBD, 0x30, 0x37, 0x84, 0x39, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x33, 0xAF, 0x2E, 0xB8, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x0C, 0x09, 0x4A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x24, 0x89, 0x81, 0x12, 0xFF, 0xBB, 0x6E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x37, 0x1A, 0x66, 0xEE, 0xED, 0xB6, 0x9B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xBD, 0x04, 0x20, 0x5D, 0xFB, 0xBF, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xF8, 0x34, 0xA3, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDE, 0x92), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x18, 0x73, 0xF1, 0x32, 0x25, 0x58, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xC1, 0x14, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x40, 0x0F, 0x12), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0x9D, 0x9C, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x56, 0x19), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xBA, 0x87, 0xF9, 0x15, 0x0C, 0x66, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x1F, 0xC1, 0x28, 0xB0, 0x47, 0x0D, 0xF5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xCA, 0x27, 0xEE, 0x4B, 0x23, 0x2B, 0x89), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0xB5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0x17, 0x5D, 0xC3, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x02, 0x08, 0xEE, 0x20, 0x9D, 0xEA, 0x64), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x14, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xFA, 0xF8, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0xDC, 0x14, 0x8C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xBD, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x18, 0x98, 0xDC, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x63, 0x02, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x5B, 0x5A, 0xC6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xB1, 0xD7, 0x4B, 0x15, 0x39, 0x61, 0x5D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x32, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0x70, 0x1B, 0xCE, 0x51), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x83, 0x52, 0x9B, 0x6D, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x55, 0x56, 0x19, 0x34, 0xA4, 0xEA, 0xFC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xA9, 0x55, 0x80, 0xE3, 0x15, 0x36, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x1D, 0x17, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x16), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0xD6, 0xF0, 0xCC, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x53, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x5A, 0xDC, 0x46, 0xBD, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x2F, 0x11, 0x60, 0x15, 0x51, 0x4A, 0xEA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xE3, 0x93, 0x38, 0xD5, 0x83, 0xAA, 0x0D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xA6, 0xCC, 0xB1, 0xFD, 0xBB, 0x1A, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x54, 0xC8, 0x54, 0x6F, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x59), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x4A, 0xDA, 0x28, 0x92, 0x97, 0x9D, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x4B, 0xDB, 0xC7, 0x52, 0xC5, 0x66, 0x34), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x7E, 0x92, 0x53, 0x30, 0x93, 0xFD, 0xFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x16, 0x6A, 0xB1, 0x91, 0x0A, 0xB4, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x9D, 0x40, 0x3F, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x01, 0x46), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x0E, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x4C, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x8D, 0x29, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x23, 0x21, 0x11, 0xAB, 0x77, 0x81, 0x62), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xAF, 0x11, 0xFA, 0xBA, 0x40, 0x63, 0xE7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x6F, 0x8D, 0x80, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xF5, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0x08, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x2B, 0x30, 0x02, 0x45, 0x71, 0x08, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x3A, 0xCA, 0x50, 0xF6, 0xC2, 0x19, 0x8C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0x73, 0x95, 0x1D, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x60, 0x59, 0x48, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0xD6, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xB9, 0x6C, 0x89, 0xAB, 0x99, 0xA8, 0xF8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x4E, 0x06, 0x19, 0xEC, 0x99), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x95, 0x04, 0xCF, 0xD5, 0x94, 0xB3, 0x02), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x35, 0x93, 0x7C, 0xB3, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x45, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x81, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xE8, 0x24, 0xDF, 0xEC, 0x2F, 0x7D, 0xB9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0x6A, 0x9B, 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xE3, 0x27, 0x82, 0xDE, 0xDD, 0xCA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x57, 0x56, 0x46, 0x05, 0x06, 0x01, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x35, 0xA7, 0x47, 0xE2, 0x6B, 0x2C, 0x4F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xEC, 0x1F, 0x11, 0x75, 0x2B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xC1, 0xE9, 0x0E, 0xE9, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xCF, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0xE8, 0xED, 0x0A, 0x49), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x73, 0xCA, 0x0C, 0x46, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x44, 0x63, 0x6D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x43, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xF8, 0xC1, 0x8C, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x4B, 0xF0, 0x69, 0x25, 0xBD, 0x71, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x82, 0xE7, 0xC1, 0xC1, 0xEE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x5A, 0x6E, 0x5E, 0x97, 0x6A, 0x35, 0x8D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x18, 0x6C, 0x7E, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x57, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0xD0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x32), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x08, 0xAE, 0x46, 0x34, 0xEA, 0x7A, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1C, 0x56, 0xA9, 0x18, 0x37, 0xD4, 0x9E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x63, 0xE9, 0x0A, 0xB6, 0x38, 0x3C, 0xC1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x4F, 0xA4, 0x6E, 0x85, 0x31, 0x23, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0xAD, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB1, 0x4B, 0x1C, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x56, 0x4A, 0x38, 0xB3, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0x2C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xC7, 0x19, 0xDE, 0x21, 0xED, 0x89, 0xD0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0xEB, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x0E, 0x13, 0x1E, 0x86, 0x57, 0xC3, 0x3B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x4B, 0x30, 0x46, 0x52, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xD5, 0x44, 0x31, 0x96, 0x3B, 0x26, 0x27), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x68, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x78, 0x39, 0xE8, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x78, 0xB7, 0xDD, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xB6, 0x3D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x3C, 0xB3, 0x26, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x8C, 0xA5), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x24, 0xE5, 0x73, 0xEE, 0x9A, 0x02, 0xA9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x6A, 0x65, 0x60, 0xF3, 0x62, 0xE3, 0xE9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x07, 0x84, 0xE6, 0x3B, 0x46, 0x65, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0xB0, 0xE1, 0x04, 0x82, 0x9D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x13, 0xBF, 0x3D, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xA2, 0x74), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x26, 0x76, 0x74, 0xAB, 0x0B, 0x29, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x03, 0x34, 0x7C, 0x38, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x72, 0xF9, 0x3B, 0x3C, 0xA4, 0xBC, 0x7C), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xCE, 0x18, 0x80, 0xB8, 0x24, 0x45, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x09, 0x03, 0xB8, 0x06, 0x64, 0xF7, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x26, 0xB1, 0x10, 0x6D, 0x71, 0x12, 0x2E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x12, 0xC6, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x6A, 0xC3, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xD3, 0x0A, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x6B, 0x04, 0x5C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x87, 0x5B, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x3C, 0xC0, 0xC5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0xF5, 0xF9, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x89, 0xBB, 0x7E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x69, 0x72, 0x8B, 0xAE, 0x32, 0x13, 0x11), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x16, 0x07, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0xCF, 0xE8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x50, 0x21, 0xE9, 0xDE, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0x83, 0x30, 0x0B, 0x65, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xBA, 0x6C, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x0D, 0x7B, 0x9E, 0x08, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x91, 0xB2, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xCE, 0x67, 0xED), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x93, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xD7, 0x1F, 0x2F, 0x17), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x7F, 0x9D, 0x40, 0xF8, 0x78, 0x7A, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x22, 0x95, 0xE8, 0xEF, 0x31, 0x57, 0x35), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x88, 0x53, 0xFE, 0xAF, 0x7C, 0x47, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xCE, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xE8, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x16, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x6E, 0x8A, 0x73, 0x97), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x07, 0x97, 0x21, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x5F, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0x81, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xE7, 0x9F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x8F, 0x75, 0x09, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x53, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x4F, 0x70, 0x97, 0xC7, 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x3F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x3C, 0x6A, 0xB4, 0x10, 0xA9, 0xC8, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xC5, 0xD6, 0x69, 0x16, 0xB8, 0xAC, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xEB, 0x48, 0x54, 0x5D, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x48, 0x9B, 0xD7, 0x72, 0x69, 0xA4, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x0D, 0x36, 0x9A, 0x66, 0x0B, 0xEC, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xC6, 0xD4, 0xB6, 0x60, 0xE5, 0xC3, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x29, 0x42, 0xE0, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x7C, 0x3E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x10, 0xBA, 0x55, 0xBC, 0x3B, 0x38, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x66, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x73, 0x03, 0x1B, 0x69), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xA4, 0x66, 0x12, 0x96, 0x7B, 0x02, 0x4C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xB5, 0xDE, 0x6D, 0x98, 0xD1, 0xD5, 0xA8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xF5, 0x44, 0xB8, 0x8E, 0xF6, 0x8C, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x15, 0x2B, 0x72, 0xBC, 0x49, 0xE5, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x44, 0xD7, 0xDF, 0x8F, 0xEB, 0x8D, 0x80), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x64, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xE4, 0x70, 0x1D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x14, 0xBB, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xB9, 0x65, 0x5D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x8E, 0x88, 0xF5, 0xF1, 0xC1, 0x89, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x30, 0x53, 0xE6, 0xFB, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xB4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xE4, 0xFF, 0xBA, 0x31, 0x79, 0xAB, 0xC2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x09, 0xF7, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x90), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xAE, 0xC2, 0x44, 0xDC, 0x17, 0x78, 0x47), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xD4, 0x17, 0x43, 0x19, 0x74, 0x9E, 0x23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x64, 0x3B, 0x73, 0xA2, 0x99, 0x27, 0x76), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x74, 0x36, 0x5F, 0xD3, 0x14, 0xB1, 0x31), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x07, 0xAB, 0xFD, 0x9B, 0x03, 0xC5, 0xD5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xBE, 0xB0, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x0C, 0x73, 0x73), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xE7, 0x7B, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x34, 0xFD, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x25, 0x3D, 0xC7, 0x36, 0x83, 0x53, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x7C, 0xCF, 0x63, 0x55, 0x12, 0x11, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x34, 0x4D, 0x27, 0x92, 0xAC, 0x18, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x42, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x2E, 0xFF, 0x13, 0x16), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x65, 0x57, 0x0D, 0xBC, 0x0A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x7B, 0x6E, 0xC6, 0x2A, 0x21, 0x74, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xA7, 0x53, 0x4D, 0x29, 0x36, 0xEF, 0xE5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xD6, 0x41, 0xC7, 0x99, 0xAD, 0x50, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xAC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0x86, 0xF1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xBB, 0xE6, 0x25, 0x28, 0xAA, 0xEB, 0x1E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x04, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0x08, 0x8A, 0xCC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x2B, 0x5B, 0xE2, 0x8D, 0x76, 0xEA, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x33, 0xD2, 0x21, 0x4D, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x8E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x06, 0x8B, 0x2B, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0xB1, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xF5, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x03, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x55, 0xB6, 0x1A, 0x9F, 0x6B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x54, 0x32, 0xBE, 0x06, 0x43, 0xB5, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x20, 0x89, 0xBE, 0xD4, 0x1B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x26, 0x95, 0x10, 0xCE, 0xB4, 0x88, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xA6, 0x27, 0xAC, 0x32, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0x9C, 0x7B, 0xBE, 0xA1, 0x63), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xCD, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xDF, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xA7, 0x11, 0x06, 0xCC, 0x0E, 0x31, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0xE4, 0xF4, 0xAD, 0x7B, 0x5F, 0xF1, 0xEF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x54, 0xBE, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x03, 0x47, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x53, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xB0, 0x8A, 0x68, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x16, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x5B, 0x0E, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x32, 0xE3, 0x43, 0x64, 0x75, 0xFB, 0xFB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x18, 0x55, 0x8A, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x54), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x97, 0x15, 0x1E, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x9C, 0xA5), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xAD, 0x13, 0xAD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x96, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0x5E, 0xDA, 0xD5, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x81, 0xE9, 0x65, 0x66, 0x76, 0x47, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x35, 0x87, 0x06, 0x73, 0xCF, 0x34, 0xD2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x81, 0x15, 0x42, 0xA2, 0x79, 0x5B, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xA2, 0x7D, 0x09, 0x14, 0x64, 0xC6, 0xAE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0xED, 0xF1, 0xD6, 0xE9, 0x24), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xD5, 0xBB, 0x25, 0xA3, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x88), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xF2, 0x68, 0x67, 0x39, 0x8F, 0x73, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x76, 0x28, 0x89, 0xAD, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xDF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x90, 0xCC, 0x57, 0x58, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xD7, 0x43, 0xD2, 0xCE, 0x5E, 0xA0, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0xA4, 0x9E, 0x96, 0x26, 0x86), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x61, 0x1D, 0xF3, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x60, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xED, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x60, 0x20), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x30, 0x17, 0x8A, 0x91, 0x88, 0x0A, 0xA4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x7D, 0x18, 0xA4, 0xAC, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x5F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x65, 0x39, 0x9A, 0xDC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x16, 0x4B, 0x68, 0xBA, 0x59, 0x13, 0x2F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFD, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x56, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0x5E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xE6, 0xF7, 0xB4, 0x01), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x7C, 0x03, 0x00, 0x26, 0x9F, 0xD8, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x1D, 0x6E, 0x00, 0xB9, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x93), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x63, 0xDA, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0x47, 0xF0, 0xAE, 0xF2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x4C, 0xF7, 0x50, 0x0C, 0x48, 0x06, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x2B, 0x32, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x7E, 0x61, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x02, 0x27, 0xFE, 0x75, 0x86, 0xDF, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x22, 0x32, 0x1B, 0xFE, 0x24), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x27, 0xF7, 0x78, 0x6F, 0xD7, 0xFD, 0xE4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x78, 0xCC, 0xEA, 0xC0, 0x50, 0x24, 0x44), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x2B, 0x4F, 0x7F, 0x58, 0xE6, 0xC2, 0x70), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x43, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x3C, 0x80, 0xB8), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x6D, 0x4B, 0x12, 0x00, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0xA6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x15, 0xBD, 0xD0, 0x9B, 0xCA, 0xAA, 0x81), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xCE, 0x9C, 0xE3, 0x8B, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xDA, 0x4B, 0x03, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x43, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAF, 0x00, 0x2B, 0x32, 0xF0, 0x22, 0x68), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xD9, 0x99, 0x99, 0xBE, 0x43, 0x99, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x71, 0x41, 0xF4, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xDD, 0x36), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x4C, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x1F, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x43, 0x48, 0x76, 0x8A, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x87), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x1A, 0x55, 0xA8, 0xA3, 0xD4, 0x57, 0x75), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xA6, 0x84, 0x39, 0xC9, 0x13, 0xBB, 0x60), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xFA, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDE, 0x83, 0xDD, 0xC9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xC9, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x91, 0x68, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x9F, 0x85, 0x6D, 0xF7, 0x54, 0x36, 0x82), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0xA3, 0xE5, 0xD4, 0x46, 0xDB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x3E, 0xDC, 0x84, 0x7C, 0x7B, 0x24, 0x34), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xED, 0x7F, 0x86, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x57, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x06, 0xFE, 0x52, 0x12, 0x79, 0x69, 0x56), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xD1, 0x44, 0x5F, 0x21, 0x3A, 0xC3, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xD9, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0x75, 0xAB, 0x17, 0xAC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x81, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xBE, 0x8E, 0xA5, 0xAA, 0xBC, 0x1E, 0x3E), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xC7, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xB1, 0x52), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xCE, 0x40, 0xD1, 0xFB, 0xDF, 0x94, 0xF7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xB8, 0x5E, 0xBF, 0x45, 0xA8, 0x2D, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x1B, 0xA9, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x79), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0xA2, 0xD3, 0x74, 0xA1, 0x3C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0x78, 0xDB, 0xAE, 0x3A, 0x14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x32, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x68, 0x6A, 0x43, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xBC, 0x39, 0x36, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0xBB, 0x11), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x07, 0xA2, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0x4D, 0x0F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x1D, 0x67, 0xE6, 0xF1, 0x46, 0xEB, 0x71), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x41, 0x23, 0x95, 0xE7, 0xE0, 0x10, 0xDD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x68, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x5F, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xB9, 0x2B, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0x4F, 0xD8, 0x1A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x09, 0xF5, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xF6, 0x91, 0x57), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x15, 0x42, 0x6B, 0x6D, 0xB5, 0xF3, 0xB6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x56, 0x9D, 0xC5, 0xFF, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x9B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x38, 0xE6, 0x23, 0x63, 0x48, 0x3C, 0xCA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x68, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x3B, 0xE9, 0x3B, 0x82), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x08, 0x54, 0x49, 0xD1, 0x46, 0x45, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x70, 0x52, 0x6E, 0x79, 0xC4, 0x5E, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xDF, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x32, 0x81, 0xDA, 0xD3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x5B, 0xB5, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x12, 0x8D, 0xC3, 0x36, 0x36, 0xB2, 0x2A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x2F, 0x22, 0x38, 0x5B, 0x18, 0x4C, 0x35), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x11, 0x05), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0x56, 0x18, 0x61, 0x66, 0x12), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xFB, 0x72, 0x08, 0x84, 0x38, 0x51, 0xB0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x86, 0xA8, 0xB9, 0x31, 0x99, 0x29, 0xC3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xFB, 0xC3, 0x42, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0x6F, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x09, 0xBE, 0x75, 0xB0, 0x22), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x7D, 0xFF, 0xF4, 0x99, 0xFC, 0x13, 0xAB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x1B, 0x84, 0x81, 0x42, 0x22, 0xC6, 0x3D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xE0, 0x37, 0xA4, 0xA0, 0x2F, 0x38, 0x7F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x40, 0x2F, 0x39, 0x3C, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x3B, 0x8A, 0x51, 0xAE, 0x40, 0x49, 0x7A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x20, 0x9F, 0xDD, 0xA9, 0xD0, 0x77, 0xC7), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x1D, 0x64, 0xDA, 0xA0, 0x53, 0xC7, 0x7D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x7B, 0x66, 0x55, 0x94, 0xD1, 0x51, 0x44), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xA9, 0xB5, 0x5B, 0x38, 0x35, 0x40, 0xC0), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x79, 0x43, 0x61), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x47, 0x45, 0x69, 0x80, 0x72, 0x72, 0x42), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x11, 0x99, 0x59, 0xDB, 0x48, 0x80, 0x39), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x6E, 0x3D, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x15, 0xF4, 0xBF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xBB, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x35, 0x8D, 0x28, 0x20), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x1A, 0x3B, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0xD3, 0xAA, 0x2D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x1C, 0x1A, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xD9, 0x7B, 0x41), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x69, 0xAC, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x31, 0x14, 0xA1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x8A, 0xE6, 0xDE, 0x58, 0xB9, 0xC4, 0x7A), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x83, 0x52, 0xFE, 0xF9, 0x7B, 0xE9, 0x1F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xA2, 0x55, 0x46, 0x15, 0x49, 0xC1, 0x3A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xBC, 0x5C, 0x91, 0xBD, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xF4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xFD, 0xB1, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0x74, 0xEE, 0x53), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0x8B, 0x17, 0x73, 0x1B, 0x96), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x67, 0x06, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xCD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x0F, 0x80, 0x24, 0xE2, 0x27, 0x5F, 0x8B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x1C, 0xCE, 0xD0, 0x67, 0xCA, 0xD4, 0x0B), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0x33, 0x66, 0xF9, 0x05, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xE5, 0x6B, 0x79, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x42, 0xAA), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x14, 0x52, 0xE3, 0x53, 0xB4, 0x50, 0xD4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x84, 0x6C, 0xCF, 0xDA, 0xB2, 0x20, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xD6, 0x1A, 0xE5, 0xE2, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x61, 0xFE, 0xBB, 0x21, 0x82, 0xD1, 0xFE), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0xF0, 0x9C, 0x8B, 0x1A, 0x42, 0x30, 0x06), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xD6, 0x49, 0x81, 0x92, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x90), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x91, 0x93, 0x6A, 0xA6, 0x22, 0xE9, 0xD6), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xDC, 0xC3, 0x69, 0x11, 0x95, 0x7D, 0xEC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xA3, 0x9D, 0x87, 0x5E, 0x64, 0x41, 0xA2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x87, 0x5A, 0x15, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x8D), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x8D, 0x50, 0xCC, 0xCF, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0x0B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x65, 0xCD, 0x31, 0x30, 0xF1, 0x68, 0x13), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x5C, 0x66, 0x67, 0x92, 0x30, 0x57, 0x95), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x9B, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x20, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x0D), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xC0, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xDE, 0x62, 0xAB, 0xB3), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x1C, 0x0F, 0x16, 0x93, 0x45), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x1F, 0x16, 0x50, 0x56, 0x98), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x06, 0xBC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x7B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xFE, 0x21, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x55, 0xE1, 0xFD), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xA8, 0xD0, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB5, 0xB2, 0x84), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xE7, 0x4B, 0xF3, 0x11, 0x0C, 0xC9, 0x5B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x3A, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xFA, 0x18), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x77, 0xEE, 0x81, 0x5E, 0x96, 0xEA, 0x4B), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0xF4, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0xB2, 0x43), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xD4, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x63, 0x47, 0x25, 0x8A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x3D, 0xFF, 0xA4, 0x02, 0xC3, 0x95, 0x11), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x10, 0x78, 0xD1, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xBE, 0x0E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xF9, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0xFC, 0xBC), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xC4, 0x01, 0xD6, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x78, 0xE2), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x13, 0xA4, 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x6F), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xB0, 0xC9, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0xA2, 0x1E, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x22, 0x9B, 0xEA, 0xE8, 0xBB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x46, 0xDF, 0x43, 0xB9, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x0A), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x32, 0xF1, 0x4E, 0x95, 0x41, 0xAE, 0x8E), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x93, 0x26, 0xFC, 0xD3, 0x90, 0xDC, 0xEB), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x05, 0x45, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x93), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x82, 0x63, 0x4E, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x08), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x69, 0x52, 0x49, 0xE9, 0xED, 0x57, 0x34), +}; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x64, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xEA, 0x25), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xE9, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xE7, 0xF9, 0xA9, 0x2C), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x0C, 0xC1, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x07, 0xB6, 0xB1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x68, 0xFA, 0x35, 0xE4, 0x9E, 0xAE, 0xD9), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x2D, 0x1A, 0x13, 0x8E, 0x02, 0xE2, 0x63), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x38, 0x28, 0x86, 0x46, 0x7B, 0x3A, 0xE1), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x4C, 0x64, 0x59, 0x0A, 0xF9, 0x02, 0xC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x4F, 0x23, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xD5, 0xEF, 0x42), +}; +static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP512r1_T[32] = { + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y), + ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y), +}; +#else +#define brainpoolP512r1_T NULL +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +/* + * Create an MPI from embedded constants + * (assumes len is an exact multiple of sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) and + * len < 1048576) + */ +static inline void ecp_mpi_load(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t len) +{ + X->s = 1; + X->n = (unsigned short) (len / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) p; +} +#endif + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) +/* + * Set an MPI to static value 1 + */ +static inline void ecp_mpi_set1(mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + X->s = 1; + X->n = 1; + X->p = mpi_one; +} + +/* + * Make group available from embedded constants + */ +static int ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t plen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *a, size_t alen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *b, size_t blen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gx, size_t gxlen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gy, size_t gylen, + const mbedtls_mpi_uint *n, size_t nlen, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *T) +{ + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->P, p, plen); + if (a != NULL) { + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->A, a, alen); + } + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->B, b, blen); + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->N, n, nlen); + + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->G.X, gx, gxlen); + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->G.Y, gy, gylen); + ecp_mpi_set1(&grp->G.Z); + + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P); + grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->N); + + grp->h = 1; + + grp->T = (mbedtls_ecp_point *) T; + /* + * Set T_size to 0 to prevent T free by mbedtls_ecp_group_free. + */ + grp->T_size = 0; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) +/* Forward declarations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p192(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *Np, size_t Nn); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p224(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p256(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p384(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p521(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *N_p, size_t N_n); +#endif + +#define NIST_MODP(P) grp->modp = ecp_mod_ ## P; +#else +#define NIST_MODP(P) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ + +/* Additional forward declarations */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p255(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p448(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *, size_t); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) +static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *); +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); +#endif + +#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) +#define LOAD_GROUP_A(G) ecp_group_load(grp, \ + G ## _p, sizeof(G ## _p), \ + G ## _a, sizeof(G ## _a), \ + G ## _b, sizeof(G ## _b), \ + G ## _gx, sizeof(G ## _gx), \ + G ## _gy, sizeof(G ## _gy), \ + G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n), \ + G ## _T \ + ) + +#define LOAD_GROUP(G) ecp_group_load(grp, \ + G ## _p, sizeof(G ## _p), \ + NULL, 0, \ + G ## _b, sizeof(G ## _b), \ + G ## _gx, sizeof(G ## _gx), \ + G ## _gy, sizeof(G ## _gy), \ + G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n), \ + G ## _T \ + ) +#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) +/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve25519() */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve25519_a24 = 0x01DB42; + +/* P = 2^255 - 19 */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint curve25519_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0X7F) +}; + +/* N = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint curve25519_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XED, 0XD3, 0XF5, 0X5C, 0X1A, 0X63, 0X12, 0X58), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XD6, 0X9C, 0XF7, 0XA2, 0XDE, 0XF9, 0XDE, 0X14), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10) +}; + +/* + * Specialized function for creating the Curve25519 group + */ +static int ecp_use_curve25519(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->A, curve25519_a24)); + + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->P, curve25519_p, sizeof(curve25519_p)); + + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P); + + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->N, curve25519_n, sizeof(curve25519_n)); + + /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. + * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.X, 9)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.Z, 1)); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->G.Y); + + /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ + grp->nbits = 254; + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) +/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve448() */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve448_a24 = 0x98AA; + +/* P = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint curve448_p[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFE, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00) +}; + +/* N = 2^446 - 13818066809895115352007386748515426880336692474882178609894547503885 */ +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint curve448_n[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XF3, 0X44, 0X58, 0XAB, 0X92, 0XC2, 0X78, 0X23), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X55, 0X8F, 0XC5, 0X8D, 0X72, 0XC2, 0X6C, 0X21), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X90, 0X36, 0XD6, 0XAE, 0X49, 0XDB, 0X4E, 0XC4), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XE9, 0X23, 0XCA, 0X7C, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0X3F), + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00) +}; + +/* + * Specialized function for creating the Curve448 group + */ +static int ecp_use_curve448(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->A, curve448_a24)); + + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->P, curve448_p, sizeof(curve448_p)); + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P); + + /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates. + * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.X, 5)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.Z, 1)); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->G.Y); + + ecp_mpi_load(&grp->N, curve448_n, sizeof(curve448_n)); + + /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */ + grp->nbits = 447; + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Set a group using well-known domain parameters + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp); + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(grp); + + grp->id = id; + + switch (id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: + NIST_MODP(p192); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp192r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: + NIST_MODP(p224); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp224r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: + NIST_MODP(p256); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp256r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: + NIST_MODP(p384); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp384r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: + NIST_MODP(p521); + return LOAD_GROUP(secp521r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p192k1; + return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp192k1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p224k1; + return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp224k1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p256k1; + return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp256k1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: + return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP256r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: + return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP384r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: + return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP512r1); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p255; + return ecp_use_curve25519(grp); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + grp->modp = ecp_mod_p448; + return ecp_use_curve448(grp); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + + default: + grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) +/* + * Fast reduction modulo the primes used by the NIST curves. + * + * These functions are critical for speed, but not needed for correct + * operations. So, we make the choice to heavily rely on the internals of our + * bignum library, which creates a tight coupling between these functions and + * our MPI implementation. However, the coupling between the ECP module and + * MPI remains loose, since these functions can be deactivated at will. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Compared to the way things are presented in FIPS 186-3 D.2, + * we proceed in columns, from right (least significant chunk) to left, + * adding chunks to N in place, and keeping a carry for the next chunk. + * This avoids moving things around in memory, and uselessly adding zeros, + * compared to the more straightforward, line-oriented approach. + * + * For this prime we need to handle data in chunks of 64 bits. + * Since this is always a multiple of our basic mbedtls_mpi_uint, we can + * use a mbedtls_mpi_uint * to designate such a chunk, and small loops to handle it. + */ + +/* Add 64-bit chunks (dst += src) and update carry */ +static inline void add64(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry) +{ + unsigned char i; + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; + for (i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); i++, dst++, src++) { + *dst += c; c = (*dst < c); + *dst += *src; c += (*dst < *src); + } + *carry += c; +} + +/* Add carry to a 64-bit chunk and update carry */ +static inline void carry64(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry) +{ + unsigned char i; + for (i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); i++, dst++) { + *dst += *carry; + *carry = (*dst < *carry); + } +} + +#define WIDTH 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) +#define A(i) Np + (i) * WIDTH +#define ADD(i) add64(p, A(i), &c) +#define NEXT p += WIDTH; carry64(p, &c) +#define LAST p += WIDTH; do *p = 0; while (++p < end) +#define RESET last_carry[0] = c; c = 0; p = Np +#define ADD_LAST add64(p, last_carry, &c) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.1) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p192(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(192) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(N->p, expected_width); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *Np, size_t Nn) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, last_carry[WIDTH] = { 0 }; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, *end; + + if (Nn != BITS_TO_LIMBS(192) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + p = Np; + end = p + Nn; + + ADD(3); ADD(5); NEXT; // A0 += A3 + A5 + ADD(3); ADD(4); ADD(5); NEXT; // A1 += A3 + A4 + A5 + ADD(4); ADD(5); // A2 += A4 + A5 + + RESET; + + /* Use the reduction for the carry as well: + * 2^192 * last_carry = 2^64 * last_carry + last_carry mod P192 + * It can generate a carry. */ + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 += last_carry + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A1 += last_carry + // A2 += carry + + RESET; + + /* Use the reduction for the carry as well: + * 2^192 * last_carry = 2^64 * last_carry + last_carry mod P192 + */ + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 += last_carry + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A1 += last_carry + // A2 += carry + + LAST; + + return 0; +} + +#undef WIDTH +#undef A +#undef ADD +#undef NEXT +#undef LAST +#undef RESET +#undef ADD_LAST +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + +/* + * The reader is advised to first understand ecp_mod_p192() since the same + * general structure is used here, but with additional complications: + * (1) chunks of 32 bits, and (2) subtractions. + */ + +/* + * For these primes, we need to handle data in chunks of 32 bits. + * This makes it more complicated if we use 64 bits limbs in MPI, + * which prevents us from using a uniform access method as for p192. + * + * So, we define a mini abstraction layer to access 32 bit chunks, + * load them in 'cur' for work, and store them back from 'cur' when done. + * + * While at it, also define the size of N in terms of 32-bit chunks. + */ +#define LOAD32 cur = A(i); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) /* 32 bit */ + +#define MAX32 X_limbs +#define A(j) X[j] +#define STORE32 X[i] = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur; +#define STORE0 X[i] = 0; + +#else /* 64 bit */ + +#define MAX32 X_limbs * 2 +#define A(j) \ + (j) % 2 ? \ + (uint32_t) (X[(j) / 2] >> 32) : \ + (uint32_t) (X[(j) / 2]) +#define STORE32 \ + if (i % 2) { \ + X[i/2] &= 0x00000000FFFFFFFF; \ + X[i/2] |= (uint64_t) (cur) << 32; \ + } else { \ + X[i/2] &= 0xFFFFFFFF00000000; \ + X[i/2] |= (uint32_t) cur; \ + } + +#define STORE0 \ + if (i % 2) { \ + X[i/2] &= 0x00000000FFFFFFFF; \ + } else { \ + X[i/2] &= 0xFFFFFFFF00000000; \ + } + +#endif + +static inline int8_t extract_carry(int64_t cur) +{ + return (int8_t) (cur >> 32); +} + +#define ADD(j) cur += A(j) +#define SUB(j) cur -= A(j) + +#define ADD_CARRY(cc) cur += (cc) +#define SUB_CARRY(cc) cur -= (cc) + +#define ADD_LAST ADD_CARRY(last_c) +#define SUB_LAST SUB_CARRY(last_c) + +/* + * Helpers for the main 'loop' + */ +#define INIT(b) \ + int8_t c = 0, last_c; \ + int64_t cur; \ + size_t i = 0; \ + LOAD32; + +#define NEXT \ + c = extract_carry(cur); \ + STORE32; i++; LOAD32; \ + ADD_CARRY(c); + +#define RESET \ + c = extract_carry(cur); \ + last_c = c; \ + STORE32; i = 0; LOAD32; \ + c = 0; \ + +#define LAST \ + c = extract_carry(cur); \ + STORE32; i++; \ + if (c != 0) \ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; \ + while (i < MAX32) { STORE0; i++; } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.2) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p224(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(224) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw(N->p, expected_width); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(224) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + INIT(224); + + SUB(7); SUB(11); NEXT; // A0 += -A7 - A11 + SUB(8); SUB(12); NEXT; // A1 += -A8 - A12 + SUB(9); SUB(13); NEXT; // A2 += -A9 - A13 + SUB(10); ADD(7); ADD(11); NEXT; // A3 += -A10 + A7 + A11 + SUB(11); ADD(8); ADD(12); NEXT; // A4 += -A11 + A8 + A12 + SUB(12); ADD(9); ADD(13); NEXT; // A5 += -A12 + A9 + A13 + SUB(13); ADD(10); // A6 += -A13 + A10 + + RESET; + + /* Use 2^224 = P + 2^96 - 1 to modulo reduce the final carry */ + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A0 -= last_c + ; NEXT; // A1 + ; NEXT; // A2 + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A3 += last_c + ; NEXT; // A4 + ; NEXT; // A5 + // A6 + + /* The carry reduction cannot generate a carry + * (see commit 73e8553 for details)*/ + + LAST; + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.3) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p256(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(256) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw(N->p, expected_width); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(256) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + INIT(256); + + ADD(8); ADD(9); + SUB(11); SUB(12); SUB(13); SUB(14); NEXT; // A0 + + ADD(9); ADD(10); + SUB(12); SUB(13); SUB(14); SUB(15); NEXT; // A1 + + ADD(10); ADD(11); + SUB(13); SUB(14); SUB(15); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD(11); ADD(11); ADD(12); ADD(12); ADD(13); + SUB(15); SUB(8); SUB(9); NEXT; // A3 + + ADD(12); ADD(12); ADD(13); ADD(13); ADD(14); + SUB(9); SUB(10); NEXT; // A4 + + ADD(13); ADD(13); ADD(14); ADD(14); ADD(15); + SUB(10); SUB(11); NEXT; // A5 + + ADD(14); ADD(14); ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(14); ADD(13); + SUB(8); SUB(9); NEXT; // A6 + + ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(8); + SUB(10); SUB(11); SUB(12); SUB(13); // A7 + + RESET; + + /* Use 2^224 * (2^32 - 1) + 2^192 + 2^96 - 1 + * to modulo reduce the final carry. */ + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 + ; NEXT; // A1 + ; NEXT; // A2 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A3 + ; NEXT; // A4 + ; NEXT; // A5 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A6 + ADD_LAST; // A7 + + RESET; + + /* Use 2^224 * (2^32 - 1) + 2^192 + 2^96 - 1 + * to modulo reduce the carry generated by the previous reduction. */ + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 + ; NEXT; // A1 + ; NEXT; // A2 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A3 + ; NEXT; // A4 + ; NEXT; // A5 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A6 + ADD_LAST; // A7 + + LAST; + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p384 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.4) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p384(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(384) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw(N->p, expected_width); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(384) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + INIT(384); + + ADD(12); ADD(21); ADD(20); + SUB(23); NEXT; // A0 + + ADD(13); ADD(22); ADD(23); + SUB(12); SUB(20); NEXT; // A1 + + ADD(14); ADD(23); + SUB(13); SUB(21); NEXT; // A2 + + ADD(15); ADD(12); ADD(20); ADD(21); + SUB(14); SUB(22); SUB(23); NEXT; // A3 + + ADD(21); ADD(21); ADD(16); ADD(13); ADD(12); ADD(20); ADD(22); + SUB(15); SUB(23); SUB(23); NEXT; // A4 + + ADD(22); ADD(22); ADD(17); ADD(14); ADD(13); ADD(21); ADD(23); + SUB(16); NEXT; // A5 + + ADD(23); ADD(23); ADD(18); ADD(15); ADD(14); ADD(22); + SUB(17); NEXT; // A6 + + ADD(19); ADD(16); ADD(15); ADD(23); + SUB(18); NEXT; // A7 + + ADD(20); ADD(17); ADD(16); + SUB(19); NEXT; // A8 + + ADD(21); ADD(18); ADD(17); + SUB(20); NEXT; // A9 + + ADD(22); ADD(19); ADD(18); + SUB(21); NEXT; // A10 + + ADD(23); ADD(20); ADD(19); + SUB(22); // A11 + + RESET; + + /* Use 2^384 = P + 2^128 + 2^96 - 2^32 + 1 to modulo reduce the final carry */ + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A1 + ; NEXT; // A2 + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A3 + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A4 + ; NEXT; // A5 + ; NEXT; // A6 + ; NEXT; // A7 + ; NEXT; // A8 + ; NEXT; // A9 + ; NEXT; // A10 + // A11 + + RESET; + + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 + SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A1 + ; NEXT; // A2 + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A3 + ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A4 + ; NEXT; // A5 + ; NEXT; // A6 + ; NEXT; // A7 + ; NEXT; // A8 + ; NEXT; // A9 + ; NEXT; // A10 + // A11 + + LAST; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#undef LOAD32 +#undef MAX32 +#undef A +#undef STORE32 +#undef STORE0 +#undef ADD +#undef SUB +#undef ADD_CARRY +#undef SUB_CARRY +#undef ADD_LAST +#undef SUB_LAST +#undef INIT +#undef NEXT +#undef RESET +#undef LAST + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) +/* Size of p521 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P521_WIDTH (521 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1) + +/* Bits to keep in the most significant mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P521_MASK 0x01FF + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 = 2^521 - 1 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5) + */ +static int ecp_mod_p521(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(521) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(N->p, expected_width); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_uint carry = 0; + + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(521) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Step 1: Reduction to P521_WIDTH limbs */ + /* Helper references for bottom part of X */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X0 = X; + size_t X0_limbs = P521_WIDTH; + /* Helper references for top part of X */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *X1 = X + X0_limbs; + size_t X1_limbs = X_limbs - X0_limbs; + /* Split X as X0 + 2^P521_WIDTH X1 and compute X0 + 2^(biL - 9) X1. + * (We are using that 2^P521_WIDTH = 2^(512 + biL) and that + * 2^(512 + biL) X1 = 2^(biL - 9) X1 mod P521.) + * The high order limb of the result will be held in carry and the rest + * in X0 (that is the result will be represented as + * 2^P521_WIDTH carry + X0). + * + * Also, note that the resulting carry is either 0 or 1: + * X0 < 2^P521_WIDTH = 2^(512 + biL) and X1 < 2^(P521_WIDTH-biL) = 2^512 + * therefore + * X0 + 2^(biL - 9) X1 < 2^(512 + biL) + 2^(512 + biL - 9) + * which in turn is less than 2 * 2^(512 + biL). + */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint shift = ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1u) << (biL - 9); + carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(X0, X0_limbs, X1, X1_limbs, shift); + /* Set X to X0 (by clearing the top part). */ + memset(X1, 0, X1_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)); + + /* Step 2: Reduction modulo P521 + * + * At this point X is reduced to P521_WIDTH limbs. What remains is to add + * the carry (that is 2^P521_WIDTH carry) and to reduce mod P521. */ + + /* 2^P521_WIDTH carry = 2^(512 + biL) carry = 2^(biL - 9) carry mod P521. + * Also, recall that carry is either 0 or 1. */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint addend = carry << (biL - 9); + /* Keep the top 9 bits and reduce the rest, using 2^521 = 1 mod P521. */ + addend += (X[P521_WIDTH - 1] >> 9); + X[P521_WIDTH - 1] &= P521_MASK; + + /* Reuse the top part of X (already zeroed) as a helper array for + * carrying out the addition. */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint *addend_arr = X + P521_WIDTH; + addend_arr[0] = addend; + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, addend_arr, P521_WIDTH); + /* Both addends were less than P521 therefore X < 2 * P521. (This also means + * that the result fit in P521_WIDTH limbs and there won't be any carry.) */ + + /* Clear the reused part of X. */ + addend_arr[0] = 0; + + return 0; +} + +#undef P521_WIDTH +#undef P521_MASK + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + +/* Size of p255 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P255_WIDTH (255 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p255 = 2^255 - 19 + * Write N as A0 + 2^256 A1, return A0 + 38 * A1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p255(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(255) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw(N->p, expected_width); +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_Limbs) +{ + + if (X_Limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(255) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry = mbedtls_calloc(P255_WIDTH, ciL); + if (carry == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + /* Step 1: Reduction to P255_WIDTH limbs */ + if (X_Limbs > P255_WIDTH) { + /* Helper references for top part of X */ + mbedtls_mpi_uint * const A1 = X + P255_WIDTH; + const size_t A1_limbs = X_Limbs - P255_WIDTH; + + /* X = A0 + 38 * A1, capture carry out */ + *carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(X, P255_WIDTH, A1, A1_limbs, 38); + /* Clear top part */ + memset(A1, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * A1_limbs); + } + + /* Step 2: Reduce to <2p + * Split as A0 + 2^255*c, with c a scalar, and compute A0 + 19*c */ + *carry <<= 1; + *carry += (X[P255_WIDTH - 1] >> (biL - 1)); + *carry *= 19; + + /* Clear top bit */ + X[P255_WIDTH - 1] <<= 1; X[P255_WIDTH - 1] >>= 1; + /* Since the top bit for X has been cleared 0 + 0 + Carry + * will not overflow. + * + * Furthermore for 2p = 2^256-38. When a carry propagation on the highest + * limb occurs, X > 2^255 and all the remaining bits on the limb are zero. + * - If X < 2^255 ==> X < 2p + * - If X > 2^255 ==> X < 2^256 - 2^255 < 2p */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, carry, P255_WIDTH); + + mbedtls_free(carry); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + +/* Size of p448 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */ +#define P448_WIDTH (448 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) + +/* Number of limbs fully occupied by 2^224 (max), and limbs used by it (min) */ +#define DIV_ROUND_UP(X, Y) (((X) + (Y) -1) / (Y)) +#define P224_SIZE (224 / 8) +#define P224_WIDTH_MIN (P224_SIZE / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) +#define P224_WIDTH_MAX DIV_ROUND_UP(P224_SIZE, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) +#define P224_UNUSED_BITS ((P224_WIDTH_MAX * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * 8) - 224) + +static int ecp_mod_p448(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(448) * 2; + + /* This is required as some tests and use cases do not pass in a Bignum of + * the correct size, and expect the growth to be done automatically, which + * will no longer happen. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw(N->p, N->n); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p448 = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 + * Write X as A0 + 2^448 A1 and A1 as B0 + 2^224 B1, and return A0 + A1 + B1 + + * (B0 + B1) * 2^224. This is different to the reference implementation of + * Curve448, which uses its own special 56-bit limbs rather than a generic + * bignum library. We could squeeze some extra speed out on 32-bit machines by + * splitting N up into 32-bit limbs and doing the arithmetic using the limbs + * directly as we do for the NIST primes above, but for 64-bit targets it should + * use half the number of operations if we do the reduction with 224-bit limbs, + * since mpi_core_add will then use 64-bit adds. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + size_t round; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(448) * 2) { + return 0; + } + + size_t M_limbs = X_limbs - (P448_WIDTH); + + if (M_limbs > P448_WIDTH) { + /* Shouldn't be called with X larger than 2^896! */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Both M and Q require an extra limb to catch carries. */ + M_limbs++; + + const size_t Q_limbs = M_limbs; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *M = NULL; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *Q = NULL; + + M = mbedtls_calloc(M_limbs, ciL); + + if (M == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + Q = mbedtls_calloc(Q_limbs, ciL); + + if (Q == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* M = A1 */ + memset(M, 0, (M_limbs * ciL)); + /* Do not copy into the overflow limb, as this would read past the end of + * X. */ + memcpy(M, X + P448_WIDTH, ((M_limbs - 1) * ciL)); + + /* X = A0 */ + memset(X + P448_WIDTH, 0, ((M_limbs - 1) * ciL)); + + /* X = X + M = A0 + A1 */ + /* Carry here fits in oversize X. Oversize M means it will get + * added in, not returned as carry. */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, M, M_limbs); + + /* Q = B1 = M >> 224 */ + memcpy(Q, (char *) M + P224_SIZE, P224_SIZE); + memset((char *) Q + P224_SIZE, 0, P224_SIZE); + + /* X = X + Q = (A0 + A1) + B1 + * Oversize Q catches potential carry here when X is already max 448 bits. + */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, Q, Q_limbs); + + /* M = B0 */ +#ifdef MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 + M[P224_WIDTH_MIN] &= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint)-1) >> (P224_UNUSED_BITS); + #endif + memset(M + P224_WIDTH_MAX, 0, ((M_limbs - P224_WIDTH_MAX) * ciL)); + + /* M = M + Q = B0 + B1 */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(M, M, Q, Q_limbs); + + /* M = (B0 + B1) * 2^224 */ + /* Shifted carry bit from the addition fits in oversize M. */ + memmove((char *) M + P224_SIZE, M, P224_SIZE + ciL); + memset(M, 0, P224_SIZE); + + /* X = X + M = (A0 + A1 + B1) + (B0 + B1) * 2^224 */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, M, M_limbs); + + /* In the second and third rounds A1 and B0 have at most 1 non-zero limb and + * B1=0. + * Using this we need to calculate: + * A0 + A1 + B1 + (B0 + B1) * 2^224 = A0 + A1 + B0 * 2^224. */ + for (round = 0; round < 2; ++round) { + + /* M = A1 */ + memset(M, 0, (M_limbs * ciL)); + memcpy(M, X + P448_WIDTH, ((M_limbs - 1) * ciL)); + + /* X = A0 */ + memset(X + P448_WIDTH, 0, ((M_limbs - 1) * ciL)); + + /* M = A1 + B0 * 2^224 + * We know that only one limb of A1 will be non-zero and that it will be + * limb 0. We also know that B0 is the bottom 224 bits of A1 (which is + * then shifted up 224 bits), so, given M is currently A1 this turns + * into: + * M = M + (M << 224) + * As the single non-zero limb in B0 will be A1 limb 0 shifted up by 224 + * bits, we can just move that into the right place, shifted up + * accordingly.*/ + M[P224_WIDTH_MIN] = M[0] << (224 & (biL - 1)); + + /* X = A0 + (A1 + B0 * 2^224) */ + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, M, M_limbs); + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_free(M); + mbedtls_free(Q); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo P = 2^s - R, + * with R about 33 bits, used by the Koblitz curves. + * + * Write X as A0 + 2^224 A1, return A0 + R * A1. + */ +#define P_KOBLITZ_R (8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) // Limbs in R + +static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, + size_t X_limbs, + mbedtls_mpi_uint *R, + size_t bits) +{ + int ret = 0; + + /* Determine if A1 is aligned to limb bitsize. If not then the used limbs + * of P, A0 and A1 must be set accordingly and there is a middle limb + * which is shared by A0 and A1 and need to handle accordingly. + */ + size_t shift = bits % biL; + size_t adjust = (shift + biL - 1) / biL; + size_t P_limbs = bits / biL + adjust; + + mbedtls_mpi_uint *A1 = mbedtls_calloc(P_limbs, ciL); + if (A1 == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + /* Create a buffer to store the value of `R * A1` */ + size_t R_limbs = P_KOBLITZ_R; + size_t M_limbs = P_limbs + R_limbs; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *M = mbedtls_calloc(M_limbs, ciL); + if (M == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = 0; + if (adjust != 0) { + mask = ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << shift) - 1; + } + + /* Two passes are needed to reduce the value of `A0 + R * A1` and then + * we need an additional one to reduce the possible overflow during + * the addition. + */ + for (size_t pass = 0; pass < 3; pass++) { + /* Copy A1 */ + memcpy(A1, X + P_limbs - adjust, P_limbs * ciL); + + /* Shift A1 to be aligned */ + if (shift != 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(A1, P_limbs, shift); + } + + /* Zeroize the A1 part of the shared limb */ + if (mask != 0) { + X[P_limbs - 1] &= mask; + } + + /* X = A0 + * Zeroize the A1 part of X to keep only the A0 part. + */ + for (size_t i = P_limbs; i < X_limbs; i++) { + X[i] = 0; + } + + /* X = A0 + R * A1 */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(M, A1, P_limbs, R, R_limbs); + (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, M, P_limbs + R_limbs); + + /* Carry can not be generated since R is a 33-bit value and stored in + * 64 bits. The result value of the multiplication is at most + * P length + 33 bits in length and the result value of the addition + * is at most P length + 34 bits in length. So the result of the + * addition always fits in P length + 64 bits. + */ + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_free(M); + mbedtls_free(A1); + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192k1 = 2^192 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x01000011C9 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(192) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw(N->p, expected_width); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) + }; + + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(192) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ecp_mod_koblitz(X, X_limbs, Rp, 192); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224k1 = 2^224 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^11 + 2^9 + 2^7 + 2^4 + 2 + 1 = 0x0100001A93 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(224) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw(N->p, expected_width); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) + }; + + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(224) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ecp_mod_koblitz(X, X_limbs, Rp, 224); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + +/* + * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256k1 = 2^256 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^9 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^4 + 1 = 0x01000003D1 + */ +static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(256) * 2; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width)); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw(N->p, expected_width); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs) +{ + static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) + }; + + if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(256) * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ecp_mod_koblitz(X, X_limbs, Rp, 256); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id id, + const mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type ctype) +{ + mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn modp = NULL; + mbedtls_mpi_uint *p = NULL; + size_t p_limbs; + + if (!(ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE || \ + ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + switch (id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw; +#endif + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw; +#endif + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw; +#endif + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw; +#endif + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp384r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp384r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp384r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp384r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw; +#endif + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp521r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp521r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp521r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp521r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP256r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP256r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP256r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP256r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP384r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP384r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP384r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP384r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP512r1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP512r1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP512r1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP512r1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw; + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve25519_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve25519_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve25519_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve25519_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw; + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192k1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192k1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192k1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192k1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw; + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224k1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224k1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224k1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224k1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw; + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256k1_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256k1_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256k1_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256k1_n)); + } + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) { + modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw; + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve448_p; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve448_p)); + } else { + p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve448_n; + p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve448_n)); + } + break; +#endif + + default: + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (modp != NULL) { + if (mbedtls_mpi_mod_optred_modulus_setup(N, p, p_limbs, modp)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + } else { + if (mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(N, p, p_limbs)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +mbedtls_ecp_variant mbedtls_ecp_get_variant(void) +{ + return MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_UINT; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */ diff --git a/library/ecp_internal_alt.h b/library/ecp_internal_alt.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..668edc74c97 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ecp_internal_alt.h @@ -0,0 +1,287 @@ +/** + * \file ecp_internal_alt.h + * + * \brief Function declarations for alternative implementation of elliptic curve + * point arithmetic. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * References: + * + * [1] BERNSTEIN, Daniel J. Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records. + * + * + * [2] CORON, Jean-S'ebastien. Resistance against differential power analysis + * for elliptic curve cryptosystems. In : Cryptographic Hardware and + * Embedded Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999. p. 292-302. + * + * + * [3] HEDABOU, Mustapha, PINEL, Pierre, et B'EN'ETEAU, Lucien. A comb method to + * render ECC resistant against Side Channel Attacks. IACR Cryptology + * ePrint Archive, 2004, vol. 2004, p. 342. + * + * + * [4] Certicom Research. SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters. + * + * + * [5] HANKERSON, Darrel, MENEZES, Alfred J., VANSTONE, Scott. Guide to Elliptic + * Curve Cryptography. + * + * [6] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS 186-4. + * + * + * [7] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer + * Security (TLS), RFC 4492. + * + * + * [8] + * + * [9] COHEN, Henri. A Course in Computational Algebraic Number Theory. + * Springer Science & Business Media, 1 Aug 2000 + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + +/** + * \brief Indicate if the Elliptic Curve Point module extension can + * handle the group. + * + * \param grp The pointer to the elliptic curve group that will be the + * basis of the cryptographic computations. + * + * \return Non-zero if successful. + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp); + +/** + * \brief Initialise the Elliptic Curve Point module extension. + * + * If mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable returns true for a + * group, this function has to be able to initialise the + * module for it. + * + * This module can be a driver to a crypto hardware + * accelerator, for which this could be an initialise function. + * + * \param grp The pointer to the group the module needs to be + * initialised for. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_init(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp); + +/** + * \brief Frees and deallocates the Elliptic Curve Point module + * extension. + * + * \param grp The pointer to the group the module was initialised for. + */ +void mbedtls_internal_ecp_free(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) +/** + * \brief Randomize jacobian coordinates: + * (X, Y, Z) -> (l^2 X, l^3 Y, l Z) for random l. + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param pt The point on the curve to be randomised, given with Jacobian + * coordinates. + * + * \param f_rng A function pointer to the random number generator. + * + * \param p_rng A pointer to the random number generator state. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, int (*f_rng)(void *, + unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) +/** + * \brief Addition: R = P + Q, mixed affine-Jacobian coordinates. + * + * The coordinates of Q must be normalized (= affine), + * but those of P don't need to. R is not normalized. + * + * This function is used only as a subrutine of + * ecp_mul_comb(). + * + * Special cases: (1) P or Q is zero, (2) R is zero, + * (3) P == Q. + * None of these cases can happen as intermediate step in + * ecp_mul_comb(): + * - at each step, P, Q and R are multiples of the base + * point, the factor being less than its order, so none of + * them is zero; + * - Q is an odd multiple of the base point, P an even + * multiple, due to the choice of precomputed points in the + * modified comb method. + * So branches for these cases do not leak secret information. + * + * We accept Q->Z being unset (saving memory in tables) as + * meaning 1. + * + * Cost in field operations if done by [5] 3.22: + * 1A := 8M + 3S + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param R Pointer to a point structure to hold the result. + * + * \param P Pointer to the first summand, given with Jacobian + * coordinates + * + * \param Q Pointer to the second summand, given with affine + * coordinates. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_add_mixed(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Point doubling R = 2 P, Jacobian coordinates. + * + * Cost: 1D := 3M + 4S (A == 0) + * 4M + 4S (A == -3) + * 3M + 6S + 1a otherwise + * when the implementation is based on the "dbl-1998-cmo-2" + * doubling formulas in [8] and standard optimizations are + * applied when curve parameter A is one of { 0, -3 }. + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param R Pointer to a point structure to hold the result. + * + * \param P Pointer to the point that has to be doubled, given with + * Jacobian coordinates. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Normalize jacobian coordinates of an array of (pointers to) + * points. + * + * Using Montgomery's trick to perform only one inversion mod P + * the cost is: + * 1N(t) := 1I + (6t - 3)M + 1S + * (See for example Algorithm 10.3.4. in [9]) + * + * This function is used only as a subrutine of + * ecp_mul_comb(). + * + * Warning: fails (returning an error) if one of the points is + * zero! + * This should never happen, see choice of w in ecp_mul_comb(). + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param T Array of pointers to the points to normalise. + * + * \param t_len Number of elements in the array. + * + * \return 0 if successful, + * an error if one of the points is zero. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac_many(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *T[], size_t t_len); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Normalize jacobian coordinates so that Z == 0 || Z == 1. + * + * Cost in field operations if done by [5] 3.2.1: + * 1N := 1I + 3M + 1S + * + * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve. + * + * \param pt pointer to the point to be normalised. This is an + * input/output parameter. + * + * \return 0 if successful. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *pt); +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_add_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *R, + mbedtls_ecp_point *S, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *d); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Randomize projective x/z coordinates: + * (X, Z) -> (l X, l Z) for random l + * + * \param grp pointer to the group representing the curve + * + * \param P the point on the curve to be randomised given with + * projective coordinates. This is an input/output parameter. + * + * \param f_rng a function pointer to the random number generator + * + * \param p_rng a pointer to the random number generator state + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int (*f_rng)(void *, + unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_rng); +#endif + +/** + * \brief Normalize Montgomery x/z coordinates: X = X/Z, Z = 1. + * + * \param grp pointer to the group representing the curve + * + * \param P pointer to the point to be normalised. This is an + * input/output parameter. + * + * \return 0 if successful + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, + mbedtls_ecp_point *P); +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ + +#endif /* ecp_internal_alt.h */ diff --git a/library/ecp_invasive.h b/library/ecp_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ff9f9ecf1d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ecp_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,325 @@ +/** + * \file ecp_invasive.h + * + * \brief ECP module: interfaces for invasive testing only. + * + * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only. + * They SHOULD NOT be made available in library integrations except when + * building the library for testing. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "bignum_mod.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" + +/* + * Curve modulus types + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_NONE = 0, + MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE, + MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR +} mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type; + +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_NONE = 0, + MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_STRUCT, + MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_UINT +} mbedtls_ecp_variant; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) + +/** Queries the ecp variant. + * + * \return The id of the ecp variant. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +mbedtls_ecp_variant mbedtls_ecp_get_variant(void); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) +/** Generate a private key on a Montgomery curve (Curve25519 or Curve448). + * + * This function implements key generation for the set of secret keys + * specified in [Curve25519] p. 5 and in [Curve448]. The resulting value + * has the lower bits masked but is not necessarily canonical. + * + * \note - [Curve25519] http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf + * - [RFC7748] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748 + * + * \p high_bit The position of the high-order bit of the key to generate. + * This is the bit-size of the key minus 1: + * 254 for Curve25519 or 447 for Curve448. + * \param d The randomly generated key. This is a number of size + * exactly \p high_bit + 1 bits, with the least significant bits + * masked as specified in [Curve25519] and in [RFC7748] §5. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_xxx or MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx(size_t high_bit, + mbedtls_mpi *d, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.1) + * + * This operation expects a 384 bit MPI and the result of the reduction + * is a 192 bit MPI. + * + * \param[in,out] Np The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * Upon return this holds the reduced value. The bitlength + * of the reduced value is the same as that of the modulus + * (192 bits). + * \param[in] Nn The length of \p Np in limbs. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *Np, size_t Nn); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.2) + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 448-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (224 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X_limbs is not the + * limb size that sores a 448-bit MPI. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.3) + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 512-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (256 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X_limbs is not the + * limb size that sores a 512-bit MPI. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 = 2^521 - 1 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5) + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have twice as many limbs as the modulus + * (the modulus is 521 bits long). Upon return this + * holds the reduced value. The reduced value is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * and its the bitlength is one plus the bitlength + * of the modulus. + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X_limbs does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p384 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.4) + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 768-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (384 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p N in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p N_n does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192k1 = 2^192 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x01000011C9 + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 384-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (192 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224k1 = 2^224 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^11 + 2^9 + 2^7 + 2^4 + 2 + 1 = 0x0100001A93 + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 448-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (224 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256k1 = 2^256 - R, + * with R = 2^32 + 2^9 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^4 + 1 = 0x01000003D1 + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 512-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as + * that of the modulus (256 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p255 = 2^255 - 19 + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 510-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). + * Upon return holds the reduced value which is + * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + +/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p448 = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 + * Write X as A0 + 2^448 A1 and A1 as B0 + 2^224 B1, and return A0 + A1 + B1 + + * (B0 + B1) * 2^224. + * + * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. + * Must have exact limb size that stores a 896-bit MPI + * (double the bitlength of the modulus). Upon return + * holds the reduced value which is in range `0 <= X < + * N` (where N is the modulus). The bitlength of the + * reduced value is the same as that of the modulus + * (448 bits). + * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs. + * + * \return \c 0 on Success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have + * twice as many limbs as the modulus. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation + * failed. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ + +/** Initialise a modulus with hard-coded const curve data. + * + * \note The caller is responsible for the \p N modulus' memory. + * mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(&N) should be invoked at the + * end of its lifecycle. + * + * \param[in,out] N The address of the modulus structure to populate. + * Must be initialized. + * \param[in] id The mbedtls_ecp_group_id for which to initialise the modulus. + * \param[in] ctype The mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type identifier for a coordinate modulus (P) + * or a scalar modulus (N). + * + * \return \c 0 if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the given MPIs do not + * have the correct number of limbs. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ecp_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id id, + const mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type ctype); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/library/entropy.c b/library/entropy.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e3bc8516e2f --- /dev/null +++ b/library/entropy.c @@ -0,0 +1,676 @@ +/* + * Entropy accumulator implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "entropy_poll.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#define ENTROPY_MAX_LOOP 256 /**< Maximum amount to loop before error */ + +void mbedtls_entropy_init(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->source_count = 0; + memset(ctx->source, 0, sizeof(ctx->source)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex); +#endif + + ctx->accumulator_started = 0; + mbedtls_md_init(&ctx->accumulator); + + /* Reminder: Update ENTROPY_HAVE_STRONG in the test files + * when adding more strong entropy sources here. */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source(ctx, mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source(ctx, mbedtls_hardware_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + mbedtls_entropy_add_source(ctx, mbedtls_nv_seed_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG); + ctx->initial_entropy_run = 0; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES */ +} + +void mbedtls_entropy_free(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx) +{ + /* If the context was already free, don't call free() again. + * This is important for mutexes which don't allow double-free. */ + if (ctx->accumulator_started == -1) { + return; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex); +#endif + mbedtls_md_free(&ctx->accumulator); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + ctx->initial_entropy_run = 0; +#endif + ctx->source_count = 0; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->source, sizeof(ctx->source)); + ctx->accumulator_started = -1; +} + +int mbedtls_entropy_add_source(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, + mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source, void *p_source, + size_t threshold, int strong) +{ + int idx, ret = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + idx = ctx->source_count; + if (idx >= MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES; + goto exit; + } + + ctx->source[idx].f_source = f_source; + ctx->source[idx].p_source = p_source; + ctx->source[idx].threshold = threshold; + ctx->source[idx].strong = strong; + + ctx->source_count++; + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } +#endif + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Entropy accumulator update + */ +static int entropy_update(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, unsigned char source_id, + const unsigned char *data, size_t len) +{ + unsigned char header[2]; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t use_len = len; + const unsigned char *p = data; + int ret = 0; + + if (use_len > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD), + data, len, tmp)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + p = tmp; + use_len = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + + header[0] = source_id; + header[1] = use_len & 0xFF; + + /* + * Start the accumulator if this has not already happened. Note that + * it is sufficient to start the accumulator here only because all calls to + * gather entropy eventually execute this code. + */ + if (ctx->accumulator_started == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx->accumulator, + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&ctx->accumulator); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + ctx->accumulator_started = 1; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ctx->accumulator, header, 2)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ctx->accumulator, p, use_len); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_entropy_update_manual(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *data, size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + ret = entropy_update(ctx, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL, data, len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } +#endif + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Run through the different sources to add entropy to our accumulator + */ +static int entropy_gather_internal(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + int i; + int have_one_strong = 0; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER]; + size_t olen; + + if (ctx->source_count == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED; + } + + /* + * Run through our entropy sources + */ + for (i = 0; i < ctx->source_count; i++) { + if (ctx->source[i].strong == MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG) { + have_one_strong = 1; + } + + olen = 0; + if ((ret = ctx->source[i].f_source(ctx->source[i].p_source, + buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER, &olen)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Add if we actually gathered something + */ + if (olen > 0) { + if ((ret = entropy_update(ctx, (unsigned char) i, + buf, olen)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + ctx->source[i].size += olen; + } + } + + if (have_one_strong == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Thread-safe wrapper for entropy_gather_internal() + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_gather(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + ret = entropy_gather_internal(ctx); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } +#endif + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_entropy_func(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len) +{ + int ret, count = 0, i, thresholds_reached; + size_t strong_size; + mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx = (mbedtls_entropy_context *) data; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + if (len > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + /* Update the NV entropy seed before generating any entropy for outside + * use. + */ + if (ctx->initial_entropy_run == 0) { + ctx->initial_entropy_run = 1; + if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_nv_seed(ctx)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + /* + * Always gather extra entropy before a call + */ + do { + if (count++ > ENTROPY_MAX_LOOP) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = entropy_gather_internal(ctx)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + thresholds_reached = 1; + strong_size = 0; + for (i = 0; i < ctx->source_count; i++) { + if (ctx->source[i].size < ctx->source[i].threshold) { + thresholds_reached = 0; + } + if (ctx->source[i].strong == MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG) { + strong_size += ctx->source[i].size; + } + } + } while (!thresholds_reached || strong_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE); + + memset(buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE); + + /* + * Note that at this stage it is assumed that the accumulator was started + * in a previous call to entropy_update(). If this is not guaranteed, the + * code below will fail. + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&ctx->accumulator, buf)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Reset accumulator and counters and recycle existing entropy + */ + mbedtls_md_free(&ctx->accumulator); + mbedtls_md_init(&ctx->accumulator); + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx->accumulator, + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&ctx->accumulator); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ctx->accumulator, buf, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Perform second hashing on entropy + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD), + buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, buf)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + for (i = 0; i < ctx->source_count; i++) { + ctx->source[i].size = 0; + } + + memcpy(output, buf, len); + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } +#endif + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +int mbedtls_entropy_update_nv_seed(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + /* Read new seed and write it to NV */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_func(ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (mbedtls_nv_seed_write(buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + + /* Manually update the remaining stream with a separator value to diverge */ + memset(buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE); + ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_manual(ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + FILE *f = NULL; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_func(ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + if ((f = fopen(path, "wb")) == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + + if (fwrite(buf, 1, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, f) != MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + + if (f != NULL) { + fclose(f); + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path) +{ + int ret = 0; + FILE *f; + size_t n; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE]; + + if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + + fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); + n = (size_t) ftell(f); + fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET); + + if (n > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE) { + n = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE; + } + + if (fread(buf, 1, n, f) != n) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_manual(ctx, buf, n); + } + + fclose(f); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file(ctx, path); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * Dummy source function + */ +static int entropy_dummy_source(void *data, unsigned char *output, + size_t len, size_t *olen) +{ + ((void) data); + + memset(output, 0x2a, len); + *olen = len; + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) + +static int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_gather(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t entropy_len = 0; + size_t olen = 0; + size_t attempts = buf_len; + + while (attempts > 0 && entropy_len < buf_len) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_hardware_poll(NULL, buf + entropy_len, + buf_len - entropy_len, &olen)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + entropy_len += olen; + attempts--; + } + + if (entropy_len < buf_len) { + ret = 1; + } + + return ret; +} + + +static int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_check_bits(const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len) +{ + unsigned char set = 0xFF; + unsigned char unset = 0x00; + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < buf_len; i++) { + set &= buf[i]; + unset |= buf[i]; + } + + return set == 0xFF || unset == 0x00; +} + +/* + * A test to ensure that the entropy sources are functioning correctly + * and there is no obvious failure. The test performs the following checks: + * - The entropy source is not providing only 0s (all bits unset) or 1s (all + * bits set). + * - The entropy source is not providing values in a pattern. Because the + * hardware could be providing data in an arbitrary length, this check polls + * the hardware entropy source twice and compares the result to ensure they + * are not equal. + * - The error code returned by the entropy source is not an error. + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned char buf0[2 * sizeof(unsigned long long int)]; + unsigned char buf1[2 * sizeof(unsigned long long int)]; + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" ENTROPY_BIAS test: "); + } + + memset(buf0, 0x00, sizeof(buf0)); + memset(buf1, 0x00, sizeof(buf1)); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_gather(buf0, sizeof(buf0))) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_gather(buf1, sizeof(buf1))) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Make sure that the returned values are not all 0 or 1 */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_check_bits(buf0, sizeof(buf0))) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_check_bits(buf1, sizeof(buf1))) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Make sure that the entropy source is not returning values in a + * pattern */ + ret = memcmp(buf0, buf1, sizeof(buf0)) == 0; + +cleanup: + if (verbose != 0) { + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } else { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return ret != 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT */ + +/* + * The actual entropy quality is hard to test, but we can at least + * test that the functions don't cause errors and write the correct + * amount of data to buffers. + */ +int mbedtls_entropy_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int ret = 1; + mbedtls_entropy_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 }; + unsigned char acc[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 }; + size_t i, j; + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" ENTROPY test: "); + } + + mbedtls_entropy_init(&ctx); + + /* First do a gather to make sure we have default sources */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_gather(&ctx)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_entropy_add_source(&ctx, entropy_dummy_source, NULL, 16, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_manual(&ctx, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * To test that mbedtls_entropy_func writes correct number of bytes: + * - use the whole buffer and rely on ASan to detect overruns + * - collect entropy 8 times and OR the result in an accumulator: + * any byte should then be 0 with probably 2^(-64), so requiring + * each of the 32 or 64 bytes to be non-zero has a false failure rate + * of at most 2^(-58) which is acceptable. + */ + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_func(&ctx, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + for (j = 0; j < sizeof(buf); j++) { + acc[j] |= buf[j]; + } + } + + for (j = 0; j < sizeof(buf); j++) { + if (acc[j] == 0) { + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) + if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test(0)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } +#endif + +cleanup: + mbedtls_entropy_free(&ctx); + + if (verbose != 0) { + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } else { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return ret != 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ diff --git a/library/entropy_poll.c b/library/entropy_poll.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..794ee03a831 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/entropy_poll.c @@ -0,0 +1,229 @@ +/* + * Platform-specific and custom entropy polling functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__midipix__) && !defined(_GNU_SOURCE) +/* Ensure that syscall() is available even when compiling with -std=c99 */ +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#endif + +#include "common.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "entropy_poll.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" +#endif +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) + +#if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ + !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) && !defined(__MVS__) +#error \ + "Platform entropy sources only work on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY in mbedtls_config.h" +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + +#include +#include +#include + +int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len, + size_t *olen) +{ + ((void) data); + *olen = 0; + + /* + * BCryptGenRandom takes ULONG for size, which is smaller than size_t on + * 64-bit Windows platforms. Extract entropy in chunks of len (dependent + * on ULONG_MAX) size. + */ + while (len != 0) { + unsigned long ulong_bytes = + (len > ULONG_MAX) ? ULONG_MAX : (unsigned long) len; + + if (!BCRYPT_SUCCESS(BCryptGenRandom(NULL, output, ulong_bytes, + BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG))) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + } + + *olen += ulong_bytes; + len -= ulong_bytes; + } + + return 0; +} +#else /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +/* + * Test for Linux getrandom() support. + * Since there is no wrapper in the libc yet, use the generic syscall wrapper + * available in GNU libc and compatible libc's (eg uClibc). + */ +#if ((defined(__linux__) && defined(__GLIBC__)) || defined(__midipix__)) +#include +#include +#if defined(SYS_getrandom) +#define HAVE_GETRANDOM +#include + +static int getrandom_wrapper(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags) +{ + /* MemSan cannot understand that the syscall writes to the buffer */ +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) + memset(buf, 0, buflen); +#endif +#endif + return (int) syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, flags); +} +#endif /* SYS_getrandom */ +#endif /* __linux__ || __midipix__ */ + +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) +#include +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || \ + (defined(__DragonFly__) && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) +#include +#include +#define HAVE_GETRANDOM +static int getrandom_wrapper(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags) +{ + return (int) getrandom(buf, buflen, flags); +} +#endif /* (__FreeBSD__ && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || + (__DragonFly__ && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) */ +#endif /* __FreeBSD__ || __DragonFly__ */ + +/* + * Some BSD systems provide KERN_ARND. + * This is equivalent to reading from /dev/urandom, only it doesn't require an + * open file descriptor, and provides up to 256 bytes per call (basically the + * same as getentropy(), but with a longer history). + * + * Documentation: https://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?sysctl+7 + */ +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && !defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) +#include +#include +#if defined(KERN_ARND) +#define HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND + +static int sysctl_arnd_wrapper(unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + int name[2]; + size_t len; + + name[0] = CTL_KERN; + name[1] = KERN_ARND; + + while (buflen > 0) { + len = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen; + if (sysctl(name, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1) { + return -1; + } + buflen -= len; + buf += len; + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* KERN_ARND */ +#endif /* __FreeBSD__ || __NetBSD__ */ + +#include + +int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen) +{ + FILE *file; + size_t read_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ((void) data); + +#if defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) + ret = getrandom_wrapper(output, len, 0); + if (ret >= 0) { + *olen = (size_t) ret; + return 0; + } else if (errno != ENOSYS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + } + /* Fall through if the system call isn't known. */ +#else + ((void) ret); +#endif /* HAVE_GETRANDOM */ + +#if defined(HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND) + ((void) file); + ((void) read_len); + if (sysctl_arnd_wrapper(output, len) == -1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + } + *olen = len; + return 0; +#else + + *olen = 0; + + file = fopen("/dev/urandom", "rb"); + if (file == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + } + + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(file, NULL); + + read_len = fread(output, 1, len, file); + if (read_len != len) { + fclose(file); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + } + + fclose(file); + *olen = len; + + return 0; +#endif /* HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND */ +} +#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +int mbedtls_nv_seed_poll(void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t use_len = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE; + ((void) data); + + memset(buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE); + + if (mbedtls_nv_seed_read(buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + } + + if (len < use_len) { + use_len = len; + } + + memcpy(output, buf, use_len); + *olen = use_len; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ diff --git a/library/entropy_poll.h b/library/entropy_poll.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..6b4aec03e18 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/entropy_poll.h @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/** + * \file entropy_poll.h + * + * \brief Platform-specific and custom entropy polling functions + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* + * Default thresholds for built-in sources, in bytes + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM 32 /**< Minimum for platform source */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE) +#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Minimum for the hardware source */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) +/** + * \brief Platform-specific entropy poll callback + */ +int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) +/** + * \brief Entropy poll callback for a hardware source + * + * \warning This is not provided by Mbed TLS! + * See \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT in mbedtls_config.h. + * + * \note This must accept NULL as its first argument. + */ +int mbedtls_hardware_poll(void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +/** + * \brief Entropy poll callback for a non-volatile seed file + * + * \note This must accept NULL as its first argument. + */ +int mbedtls_nv_seed_poll(void *data, + unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen); +#endif + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* entropy_poll.h */ diff --git a/library/error.c b/library/error.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..84b637aeb22 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/error.c @@ -0,0 +1,880 @@ +/* + * Error message information + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) +#include "mbedtls/aria.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) +#include "mbedtls/dhm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) +#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) +#include "mbedtls/lms.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs7.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) +#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha3.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#endif + + +const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code) +{ + int high_level_error_code; + + if (error_code < 0) { + error_code = -error_code; + } + + /* Extract the high-level part from the error code. */ + high_level_error_code = error_code & 0xFF80; + + switch (high_level_error_code) { + /* Begin Auto-Generated Code. */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "CIPHER - The selected feature is not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "CIPHER - Bad input parameters" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "CIPHER - Failed to allocate memory" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING): + return( "CIPHER - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED): + return( "CIPHER - Decryption of block requires a full block" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED): + return( "CIPHER - Authentication failed (for AEAD modes)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT): + return( "CIPHER - The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "DHM - Bad input parameters" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Reading of the DHM parameters failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Making of the DHM parameters failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Reading of the public values failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Making of the public value failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Calculation of the DHM secret failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "DHM - The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctly" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Allocation of memory failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "DHM - Read or write of file failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED): + return( "DHM - Setting the modulus and generator failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "ECP - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "ECP - The buffer is too small to write to" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "ECP - The requested feature is not available, for example, the requested curve is not supported" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "ECP - The signature is not valid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "ECP - Memory allocation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED): + return( "ECP - Generation of random value, such as ephemeral key, failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY): + return( "ECP - Invalid private or public key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH): + return( "ECP - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS): + return( "ECP - Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "MD - The selected feature is not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "MD - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "MD - Failed to allocate memory" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "MD - Opening or reading of file failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT): + return( "PEM - No PEM header or footer found" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA): + return( "PEM - PEM string is not as expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "PEM - Failed to allocate memory" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV): + return( "PEM - RSA IV is not in hex-format" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG): + return( "PEM - Unsupported key encryption algorithm" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED): + return( "PEM - Private key password can't be empty" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH): + return( "PEM - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PEM - Unavailable feature, e.g. hashing/encryption combination" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PEM - Bad input parameters to function" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "PK - Memory allocation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH): + return( "PK - Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PK - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "PK - Read/write of file failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION): + return( "PK - Unsupported key version" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "PK - Invalid key tag or value" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG): + return( "PK - Key algorithm is unsupported (only RSA and EC are supported)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED): + return( "PK - Private key password can't be empty" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH): + return( "PK - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY): + return( "PK - The pubkey tag or value is invalid (only RSA and EC are supported)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG): + return( "PK - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE): + return( "PK - Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PK - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH): + return( "PK - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "PK - The output buffer is too small" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PKCS12 - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PKCS12 - Feature not available, e.g. unsupported encryption scheme" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "PKCS12 - PBE ASN.1 data not as expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH): + return( "PKCS12 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PKCS5 - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "PKCS5 - Unexpected ASN.1 data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PKCS5 - Requested encryption or digest alg not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH): + return( "PKCS5 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "PKCS7 - The format is invalid, e.g. different type expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "PKCS7 - Unavailable feature, e.g. anything other than signed data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION): + return( "PKCS7 - The PKCS #7 version element is invalid or cannot be parsed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO): + return( "PKCS7 - The PKCS #7 content info is invalid or cannot be parsed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG): + return( "PKCS7 - The algorithm tag or value is invalid or cannot be parsed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT): + return( "PKCS7 - The certificate tag or value is invalid or cannot be parsed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNATURE): + return( "PKCS7 - Error parsing the signature" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO): + return( "PKCS7 - Error parsing the signer's info" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "PKCS7 - Input invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "PKCS7 - Allocation of memory failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL): + return( "PKCS7 - Verification Failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_CERT_DATE_INVALID): + return( "PKCS7 - The PKCS #7 date issued/expired dates are invalid" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "RSA - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING): + return( "RSA - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED): + return( "RSA - Something failed during generation of a key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED): + return( "RSA - Key failed to pass the validity check of the library" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED): + return( "RSA - The public key operation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED): + return( "RSA - The private key operation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "RSA - The PKCS#1 verification failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE): + return( "RSA - The output buffer for decryption is not large enough" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED): + return( "RSA - The random generator failed to generate non-zeros" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS): + return( "SSL - A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "SSL - The requested feature is not available" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SSL - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC): + return( "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD): + return( "SSL - An invalid SSL record was received" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF): + return( "SSL - The connection indicated an EOF" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR): + return( "SSL - A message could not be parsed due to a syntactic error" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG): + return( "SSL - No RNG was provided to the SSL module" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE): + return( "SSL - No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION): + return( "SSL - Client received an extended server hello containing an unsupported extension" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL): + return( "SSL - No ALPN protocols supported that the client advertises" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED): + return( "SSL - The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED): + return( "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE): + return( "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE): + return( "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME): + return( "SSL - No server could be identified matching the client's SNI" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY): + return( "SSL - The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE): + return( "SSL - Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET): + return( "SSL - * Received NewSessionTicket Post Handshake Message. This error code is experimental and may be changed or removed without notice" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA): + return( "SSL - Not possible to read early data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA): + return( "SSL - * Early data has been received as part of an on-going handshake. This error code can be returned only on server side if and only if early data has been enabled by means of the mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() API. This error code can then be returned by mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() if early data has been received as part of the handshake sequence they triggered. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA): + return( "SSL - Not possible to write early data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND): + return( "SSL - Cache entry not found" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "SSL - Memory allocation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "SSL - Hardware acceleration function returned with error" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH): + return( "SSL - Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION): + return( "SSL - Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE): + return( "SSL - The handshake negotiation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED): + return( "SSL - Session ticket has expired" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH): + return( "SSL - Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY): + return( "SSL - Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR): + return( "SSL - Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING): + return( "SSL - A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO): + return( "SSL - Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED): + return( "SSL - DTLS client must retry for hello verification" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "SSL - A buffer is too small to receive or write a message" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ): + return( "SSL - No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE): + return( "SSL - Connection requires a write call" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT): + return( "SSL - The operation timed out" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT): + return( "SSL - The client initiated a reconnect from the same port" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD): + return( "SSL - Record header looks valid but is not expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL): + return( "SSL - The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER): + return( "SSL - A field in a message was incorrect or inconsistent with other fields" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING): + return( "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS): + return( "SSL - The asynchronous operation is not completed yet" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE): + return( "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID): + return( "SSL - An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was received" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH): + return( "SSL - An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configuration" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG): + return( "SSL - Invalid value in SSL config" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE): + return( "X509 - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA hashing/encryption combination" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID): + return( "X509 - Requested OID is unknown" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT): + return( "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR format is invalid, e.g. different type expected" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION): + return( "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR version element is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL): + return( "X509 - The serial tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG): + return( "X509 - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME): + return( "X509 - The name tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE): + return( "X509 - The date tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE): + return( "X509 - The signature tag or value invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS): + return( "X509 - The extension tag or value is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION): + return( "X509 - CRT/CRL/CSR has an unsupported version number" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG): + return( "X509 - Signature algorithm (oid) is unsupported" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH): + return( "X509 - Signature algorithms do not match. (see \\c ::mbedtls_x509_crt sig_oid)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "X509 - Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT): + return( "X509 - Format not recognized as DER or PEM" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "X509 - Input invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "X509 - Allocation of memory failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "X509 - Read/write of file failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "X509 - Destination buffer is too small" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR): + return( "X509 - A fatal error occurred, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ + /* End Auto-Generated Code. */ + + default: + break; + } + + return NULL; +} + +const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code) +{ + int low_level_error_code; + + if (error_code < 0) { + error_code = -error_code; + } + + /* Extract the low-level part from the error code. */ + low_level_error_code = error_code & ~0xFF80; + + switch (low_level_error_code) { + /* Begin Auto-Generated Code. */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH): + return( "AES - Invalid key length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "AES - Invalid data input length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "AES - Invalid input data" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "ARIA - Bad input data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "ARIA - Invalid data input length" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA): + return( "ASN1 - Out of data when parsing an ASN1 data structure" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG): + return( "ASN1 - ASN1 tag was of an unexpected value" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH): + return( "ASN1 - Error when trying to determine the length or invalid length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH): + return( "ASN1 - Actual length differs from expected length" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA): + return( "ASN1 - Data is invalid" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "ASN1 - Memory allocation failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL): + return( "ASN1 - Buffer too small when writing ASN.1 data structure" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "BASE64 - Output buffer too small" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER): + return( "BASE64 - Invalid character in input" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "BIGNUM - An error occurred while reading from or writing to a file" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "BIGNUM - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER): + return( "BIGNUM - There is an invalid character in the digit string" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "BIGNUM - The buffer is too small to write to" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE): + return( "BIGNUM - The input arguments are negative or result in illegal output" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO): + return( "BIGNUM - The input argument for division is zero, which is not allowed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE): + return( "BIGNUM - The input arguments are not acceptable" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "BIGNUM - Memory allocation failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "CAMELLIA - Bad input data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "CAMELLIA - Invalid data input length" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT): + return( "CCM - Bad input parameters to the function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED): + return( "CCM - Authenticated decryption failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "CHACHA20 - Invalid input parameter(s)" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE): + return( "CHACHAPOLY - The requested operation is not permitted in the current state" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED): + return( "CHACHAPOLY - Authenticated decryption failed: data was not authentic" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED): + return( "CTR_DRBG - The entropy source failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG): + return( "CTR_DRBG - The requested random buffer length is too big" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG): + return( "CTR_DRBG - The input (entropy + additional data) is too large" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "CTR_DRBG - Read or write error in file" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH): + return( "DES - The data input has an invalid length" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED): + return( "ENTROPY - Critical entropy source failure" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES): + return( "ENTROPY - No more sources can be added" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED): + return( "ENTROPY - No sources have been added to poll" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE): + return( "ENTROPY - No strong sources have been added to poll" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "ENTROPY - Read/write error in file" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR): + return( "ERROR - Generic error" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED): + return( "ERROR - This is a bug in the library" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED): + return( "PLATFORM - Hardware accelerator failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED): + return( "PLATFORM - The requested feature is not supported by the platform" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED): + return( "GCM - Authenticated decryption failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT): + return( "GCM - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "GCM - An output buffer is too small" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "HKDF - Bad input parameters to function" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG): + return( "HMAC_DRBG - Too many random requested in single call" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG): + return( "HMAC_DRBG - Input too large (Entropy + additional)" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR): + return( "HMAC_DRBG - Read/write error in file" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED): + return( "HMAC_DRBG - The entropy source failed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "LMS - Bad data has been input to an LMS function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_OUT_OF_PRIVATE_KEYS): + return( "LMS - Specified LMS key has utilised all of its private keys" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED): + return( "LMS - LMS signature verification failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED): + return( "LMS - LMS failed to allocate space for a private key" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "LMS - Input/output buffer is too small to contain requited data" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LMS_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED): + return( "NET - Failed to open a socket" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED): + return( "NET - The connection to the given server / port failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED): + return( "NET - Binding of the socket failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED): + return( "NET - Could not listen on the socket" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED): + return( "NET - Could not accept the incoming connection" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED): + return( "NET - Reading information from the socket failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED): + return( "NET - Sending information through the socket failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET): + return( "NET - Connection was reset by peer" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST): + return( "NET - Failed to get an IP address for the given hostname" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL): + return( "NET - Buffer is too small to hold the data" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT): + return( "NET - The context is invalid, eg because it was free()ed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED): + return( "NET - Polling the net context failed" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "NET - Input invalid" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND): + return( "OID - OID is not found" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL): + return( "OID - output buffer is too small" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "POLY1305 - Invalid input parameter(s)" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SHA1 - SHA-1 input data was malformed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SHA256 - SHA-256 input data was malformed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA3_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SHA3 - SHA-3 input data was malformed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA3_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "SHA512 - SHA-512 input data was malformed" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA): + return( "THREADING - Bad input parameters to function" ); + case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR): + return( "THREADING - Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code" ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + /* End Auto-Generated Code. */ + + default: + break; + } + + return NULL; +} + +void mbedtls_strerror(int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + size_t len; + int use_ret; + const char *high_level_error_description = NULL; + const char *low_level_error_description = NULL; + + if (buflen == 0) { + return; + } + + memset(buf, 0x00, buflen); + + if (ret < 0) { + ret = -ret; + } + + if (ret & 0xFF80) { + use_ret = ret & 0xFF80; + + // Translate high level error code. + high_level_error_description = mbedtls_high_level_strerr(ret); + + if (high_level_error_description == NULL) { + mbedtls_snprintf(buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", (unsigned int) use_ret); + } else { + mbedtls_snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s", high_level_error_description); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + // Early return in case of a fatal error - do not try to translate low + // level code. + if (use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE)) { + return; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ + } + + use_ret = ret & ~0xFF80; + + if (use_ret == 0) { + return; + } + + // If high level code is present, make a concatenation between both + // error strings. + // + len = strlen(buf); + + if (len > 0) { + if (buflen - len < 5) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len, " : "); + + buf += len + 3; + buflen -= len + 3; + } + + // Translate low level error code. + low_level_error_description = mbedtls_low_level_strerr(ret); + + if (low_level_error_description == NULL) { + mbedtls_snprintf(buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", (unsigned int) use_ret); + } else { + mbedtls_snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s", low_level_error_description); + } +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ + +/* + * Provide a dummy implementation when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is not defined + */ +void mbedtls_strerror(int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + ((void) ret); + + if (buflen > 0) { + buf[0] = '\0'; + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +void (*mbedtls_test_hook_error_add)(int, int, const char *, int); +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C || MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY */ diff --git a/library/gcm.c b/library/gcm.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..5dfac2349c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/gcm.c @@ -0,0 +1,1330 @@ +/* + * NIST SP800-38D compliant GCM implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf + * + * See also: + * [MGV] http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/gcm/gcm-revised-spec.pdf + * + * We use the algorithm described as Shoup's method with 4-bit tables in + * [MGV] 4.1, pp. 12-13, to enhance speed without using too much memory. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) +#include "block_cipher_internal.h" +#endif + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) +#include "aesni.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) +#include "aesce.h" +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) + +/* Used to select the acceleration mechanism */ +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_SMALLTABLE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_LARGETABLE 1 +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESNI 2 +#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESCE 3 + +/* + * Initialize a context + */ +void mbedtls_gcm_init(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_gcm_context)); +} + +static inline void gcm_set_acceleration(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE) + ctx->acceleration = MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_LARGETABLE; +#else + ctx->acceleration = MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_SMALLTABLE; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) + /* With CLMUL support, we need only h, not the rest of the table */ + if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL)) { + ctx->acceleration = MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESNI; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + ctx->acceleration = MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESCE; + } +#endif +} + +static inline void gcm_gen_table_rightshift(uint64_t dst[2], const uint64_t src[2]) +{ + uint8_t *u8Dst = (uint8_t *) dst; + uint8_t *u8Src = (uint8_t *) src; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(&src[1], 0) >> 1, &dst[1], 0); + u8Dst[8] |= (u8Src[7] & 0x01) << 7; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(&src[0], 0) >> 1, &dst[0], 0); + u8Dst[0] ^= (u8Src[15] & 0x01) ? 0xE1 : 0; +} + +/* + * Precompute small multiples of H, that is set + * HH[i] || HL[i] = H times i, + * where i is seen as a field element as in [MGV], ie high-order bits + * correspond to low powers of P. The result is stored in the same way, that + * is the high-order bit of HH corresponds to P^0 and the low-order bit of HL + * corresponds to P^127. + */ +static int gcm_gen_table(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx) +{ + int ret, i, j; + uint64_t u64h[2] = { 0 }; + uint8_t *h = (uint8_t *) u64h; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, h, h); +#else + size_t olen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, h, 16, h, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + gcm_set_acceleration(ctx); + + /* MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2 = 1000 corresponds to 1 in GF(2^128) */ + ctx->H[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2][0] = u64h[0]; + ctx->H[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2][1] = u64h[1]; + + switch (ctx->acceleration) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESNI: + return 0; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESCE: + return 0; +#endif + + default: + /* 0 corresponds to 0 in GF(2^128) */ + ctx->H[0][0] = 0; + ctx->H[0][1] = 0; + + for (i = MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/4; i > 0; i >>= 1) { + gcm_gen_table_rightshift(ctx->H[i], ctx->H[i*2]); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE) + /* pack elements of H as 64-bits ints, big-endian */ + for (i = MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2; i > 0; i >>= 1) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ctx->H[i][0], &ctx->H[i][0], 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ctx->H[i][1], &ctx->H[i][1], 0); + } +#endif + + for (i = 2; i < MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE; i <<= 1) { + for (j = 1; j < i; j++) { + mbedtls_xor_no_simd((unsigned char *) ctx->H[i+j], + (unsigned char *) ctx->H[i], + (unsigned char *) ctx->H[j], + 16); + } + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_setkey(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (keybits != 128 && keybits != 192 && keybits != 256) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, cipher)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, key, keybits)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#else + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher, keybits, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB); + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(cipher_info) != 16) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&ctx->cipher_ctx, key, keybits, + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + if ((ret = gcm_gen_table(ctx)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE) +static const uint16_t last8[256] = { + 0x0000, 0xc201, 0x8403, 0x4602, 0x0807, 0xca06, 0x8c04, 0x4e05, + 0x100e, 0xd20f, 0x940d, 0x560c, 0x1809, 0xda08, 0x9c0a, 0x5e0b, + 0x201c, 0xe21d, 0xa41f, 0x661e, 0x281b, 0xea1a, 0xac18, 0x6e19, + 0x3012, 0xf213, 0xb411, 0x7610, 0x3815, 0xfa14, 0xbc16, 0x7e17, + 0x4038, 0x8239, 0xc43b, 0x063a, 0x483f, 0x8a3e, 0xcc3c, 0x0e3d, + 0x5036, 0x9237, 0xd435, 0x1634, 0x5831, 0x9a30, 0xdc32, 0x1e33, + 0x6024, 0xa225, 0xe427, 0x2626, 0x6823, 0xaa22, 0xec20, 0x2e21, + 0x702a, 0xb22b, 0xf429, 0x3628, 0x782d, 0xba2c, 0xfc2e, 0x3e2f, + 0x8070, 0x4271, 0x0473, 0xc672, 0x8877, 0x4a76, 0x0c74, 0xce75, + 0x907e, 0x527f, 0x147d, 0xd67c, 0x9879, 0x5a78, 0x1c7a, 0xde7b, + 0xa06c, 0x626d, 0x246f, 0xe66e, 0xa86b, 0x6a6a, 0x2c68, 0xee69, + 0xb062, 0x7263, 0x3461, 0xf660, 0xb865, 0x7a64, 0x3c66, 0xfe67, + 0xc048, 0x0249, 0x444b, 0x864a, 0xc84f, 0x0a4e, 0x4c4c, 0x8e4d, + 0xd046, 0x1247, 0x5445, 0x9644, 0xd841, 0x1a40, 0x5c42, 0x9e43, + 0xe054, 0x2255, 0x6457, 0xa656, 0xe853, 0x2a52, 0x6c50, 0xae51, + 0xf05a, 0x325b, 0x7459, 0xb658, 0xf85d, 0x3a5c, 0x7c5e, 0xbe5f, + 0x00e1, 0xc2e0, 0x84e2, 0x46e3, 0x08e6, 0xcae7, 0x8ce5, 0x4ee4, + 0x10ef, 0xd2ee, 0x94ec, 0x56ed, 0x18e8, 0xdae9, 0x9ceb, 0x5eea, + 0x20fd, 0xe2fc, 0xa4fe, 0x66ff, 0x28fa, 0xeafb, 0xacf9, 0x6ef8, + 0x30f3, 0xf2f2, 0xb4f0, 0x76f1, 0x38f4, 0xfaf5, 0xbcf7, 0x7ef6, + 0x40d9, 0x82d8, 0xc4da, 0x06db, 0x48de, 0x8adf, 0xccdd, 0x0edc, + 0x50d7, 0x92d6, 0xd4d4, 0x16d5, 0x58d0, 0x9ad1, 0xdcd3, 0x1ed2, + 0x60c5, 0xa2c4, 0xe4c6, 0x26c7, 0x68c2, 0xaac3, 0xecc1, 0x2ec0, + 0x70cb, 0xb2ca, 0xf4c8, 0x36c9, 0x78cc, 0xbacd, 0xfccf, 0x3ece, + 0x8091, 0x4290, 0x0492, 0xc693, 0x8896, 0x4a97, 0x0c95, 0xce94, + 0x909f, 0x529e, 0x149c, 0xd69d, 0x9898, 0x5a99, 0x1c9b, 0xde9a, + 0xa08d, 0x628c, 0x248e, 0xe68f, 0xa88a, 0x6a8b, 0x2c89, 0xee88, + 0xb083, 0x7282, 0x3480, 0xf681, 0xb884, 0x7a85, 0x3c87, 0xfe86, + 0xc0a9, 0x02a8, 0x44aa, 0x86ab, 0xc8ae, 0x0aaf, 0x4cad, 0x8eac, + 0xd0a7, 0x12a6, 0x54a4, 0x96a5, 0xd8a0, 0x1aa1, 0x5ca3, 0x9ea2, + 0xe0b5, 0x22b4, 0x64b6, 0xa6b7, 0xe8b2, 0x2ab3, 0x6cb1, 0xaeb0, + 0xf0bb, 0x32ba, 0x74b8, 0xb6b9, 0xf8bc, 0x3abd, 0x7cbf, 0xbebe +}; + +static void gcm_mult_largetable(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *x, uint64_t H[256][2]) +{ + int i; + uint64_t u64z[2]; + uint16_t *u16z = (uint16_t *) u64z; + uint8_t *u8z = (uint8_t *) u64z; + uint8_t rem; + + u64z[0] = 0; + u64z[1] = 0; + + if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) { + for (i = 15; i > 0; i--) { + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[x[i]], 16); + rem = u8z[15]; + + u64z[1] >>= 8; + u8z[8] = u8z[7]; + u64z[0] >>= 8; + + u16z[0] ^= MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE(&last8[rem], 0); + } + } else { + for (i = 15; i > 0; i--) { + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[x[i]], 16); + rem = u8z[15]; + + u64z[1] <<= 8; + u8z[8] = u8z[7]; + u64z[0] <<= 8; + + u16z[0] ^= last8[rem]; + } + } + + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(output, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[x[0]], 16); +} +#else +/* + * Shoup's method for multiplication use this table with + * last4[x] = x times P^128 + * where x and last4[x] are seen as elements of GF(2^128) as in [MGV] + */ +static const uint16_t last4[16] = +{ + 0x0000, 0x1c20, 0x3840, 0x2460, + 0x7080, 0x6ca0, 0x48c0, 0x54e0, + 0xe100, 0xfd20, 0xd940, 0xc560, + 0x9180, 0x8da0, 0xa9c0, 0xb5e0 +}; + +static void gcm_mult_smalltable(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *x, uint64_t H[16][2]) +{ + int i = 0; + unsigned char lo, hi, rem; + uint64_t u64z[2]; + const uint64_t *pu64z = NULL; + uint8_t *u8z = (uint8_t *) u64z; + + lo = x[15] & 0xf; + hi = (x[15] >> 4) & 0xf; + + pu64z = H[lo]; + + rem = (unsigned char) pu64z[1] & 0xf; + u64z[1] = (pu64z[0] << 60) | (pu64z[1] >> 4); + u64z[0] = (pu64z[0] >> 4); + u64z[0] ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[hi], 16); + + for (i = 14; i >= 0; i--) { + lo = x[i] & 0xf; + hi = (x[i] >> 4) & 0xf; + + rem = (unsigned char) u64z[1] & 0xf; + u64z[1] = (u64z[0] << 60) | (u64z[1] >> 4); + u64z[0] = (u64z[0] >> 4); + u64z[0] ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[lo], 16); + + rem = (unsigned char) u64z[1] & 0xf; + u64z[1] = (u64z[0] << 60) | (u64z[1] >> 4); + u64z[0] = (u64z[0] >> 4); + u64z[0] ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48; + mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[hi], 16); + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(u64z[0], output, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(u64z[1], output, 8); +} +#endif + +/* + * Sets output to x times H using the precomputed tables. + * x and output are seen as elements of GF(2^128) as in [MGV]. + */ +static void gcm_mult(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char x[16], + unsigned char output[16]) +{ + switch (ctx->acceleration) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESNI: + mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(output, x, (uint8_t *) ctx->H[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2]); + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESCE: + mbedtls_aesce_gcm_mult(output, x, (uint8_t *) ctx->H[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2]); + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE) + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_LARGETABLE: + gcm_mult_largetable(output, x, ctx->H); + break; +#else + case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_SMALLTABLE: + gcm_mult_smalltable(output, x, ctx->H); + break; +#endif + } + + return; +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char work_buf[16]; + const unsigned char *p; + size_t use_len; + uint64_t iv_bits; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + size_t olen = 0; +#endif + + /* IV is limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */ + /* IV is not allowed to be zero length */ + if (iv_len == 0 || (uint64_t) iv_len >> 61 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + memset(ctx->y, 0x00, sizeof(ctx->y)); + memset(ctx->buf, 0x00, sizeof(ctx->buf)); + + ctx->mode = mode; + ctx->len = 0; + ctx->add_len = 0; + + if (iv_len == 12) { + memcpy(ctx->y, iv, iv_len); + ctx->y[15] = 1; + } else { + memset(work_buf, 0x00, 16); + iv_bits = (uint64_t) iv_len * 8; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(iv_bits, work_buf, 8); + + p = iv; + while (iv_len > 0) { + use_len = (iv_len < 16) ? iv_len : 16; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 70110) +#pragma GCC diagnostic push +#pragma GCC diagnostic warning "-Wstringop-overflow=0" +#endif + + mbedtls_xor(ctx->y, ctx->y, p, use_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 70110) +#pragma GCC diagnostic pop +#endif + + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); + + iv_len -= use_len; + p += use_len; + } + + mbedtls_xor(ctx->y, ctx->y, work_buf, 16); + + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y); + } + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->base_ectr); +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->base_ectr, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * mbedtls_gcm_context::buf contains the partial state of the computation of + * the authentication tag. + * mbedtls_gcm_context::add_len and mbedtls_gcm_context::len indicate + * different stages of the computation: + * * len == 0 && add_len == 0: initial state + * * len == 0 && add_len % 16 != 0: the first `add_len % 16` bytes have + * a partial block of AD that has been + * xored in but not yet multiplied in. + * * len == 0 && add_len % 16 == 0: the authentication tag is correct if + * the data ends now. + * * len % 16 != 0: the first `len % 16` bytes have + * a partial block of ciphertext that has + * been xored in but not yet multiplied in. + * * len > 0 && len % 16 == 0: the authentication tag is correct if + * the data ends now. + */ +int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len) +{ + const unsigned char *p; + size_t use_len, offset; + uint64_t new_add_len; + + /* AD is limited to 2^64 bits, ie 2^61 bytes + * Also check for possible overflow */ +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL + if (add_len > 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; + } +#endif + new_add_len = ctx->add_len + (uint64_t) add_len; + if (new_add_len < ctx->add_len || new_add_len >> 61 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + offset = ctx->add_len % 16; + p = add; + + if (offset != 0) { + use_len = 16 - offset; + if (use_len > add_len) { + use_len = add_len; + } + + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf + offset, ctx->buf + offset, p, use_len); + + if (offset + use_len == 16) { + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + } + + ctx->add_len += use_len; + add_len -= use_len; + p += use_len; + } + + ctx->add_len += add_len; + + while (add_len >= 16) { + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf, ctx->buf, p, 16); + + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + + add_len -= 16; + p += 16; + } + + if (add_len > 0) { + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf, ctx->buf, p, add_len); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Increment the counter. */ +static void gcm_incr(unsigned char y[16]) +{ + uint32_t x = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(y, 12); + x++; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(x, y, 12); +} + +/* Calculate and apply the encryption mask. Process use_len bytes of data, + * starting at position offset in the mask block. */ +static int gcm_mask(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + unsigned char ectr[16], + size_t offset, size_t use_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ectr); +#else + size_t olen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ectr, &olen); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ectr, 16); + return ret; + } + + if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT) { + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf + offset, ctx->buf + offset, input, use_len); + } + mbedtls_xor(output, ectr + offset, input, use_len); + if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT) { + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf + offset, ctx->buf + offset, output, use_len); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_update(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_length, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = input; + unsigned char *out_p = output; + size_t offset; + unsigned char ectr[16] = { 0 }; + + if (output_size < input_length) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + *output_length = input_length; + + /* Exit early if input_length==0 so that we don't do any pointer arithmetic + * on a potentially null pointer. + * Returning early also means that the last partial block of AD remains + * untouched for mbedtls_gcm_finish */ + if (input_length == 0) { + return 0; + } + + if (output > input && (size_t) (output - input) < input_length) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + /* Total length is restricted to 2^39 - 256 bits, ie 2^36 - 2^5 bytes + * Also check for possible overflow */ + if (ctx->len + input_length < ctx->len || + (uint64_t) ctx->len + input_length > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (ctx->len == 0 && ctx->add_len % 16 != 0) { + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + } + + offset = ctx->len % 16; + if (offset != 0) { + size_t use_len = 16 - offset; + if (use_len > input_length) { + use_len = input_length; + } + + if ((ret = gcm_mask(ctx, ectr, offset, use_len, p, out_p)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (offset + use_len == 16) { + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + } + + ctx->len += use_len; + input_length -= use_len; + p += use_len; + out_p += use_len; + } + + ctx->len += input_length; + + while (input_length >= 16) { + gcm_incr(ctx->y); + if ((ret = gcm_mask(ctx, ectr, 0, 16, p, out_p)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + + input_length -= 16; + p += 16; + out_p += 16; + } + + if (input_length > 0) { + gcm_incr(ctx->y); + if ((ret = gcm_mask(ctx, ectr, 0, input_length, p, out_p)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ectr, sizeof(ectr)); + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_finish(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length, + unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len) +{ + unsigned char work_buf[16]; + uint64_t orig_len; + uint64_t orig_add_len; + + /* We never pass any output in finish(). The output parameter exists only + * for the sake of alternative implementations. */ + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + *output_length = 0; + + /* Total length is restricted to 2^39 - 256 bits, ie 2^36 - 2^5 bytes + * and AD length is restricted to 2^64 bits, ie 2^61 bytes so neither of + * the two multiplications would overflow. */ + orig_len = ctx->len * 8; + orig_add_len = ctx->add_len * 8; + + if (ctx->len == 0 && ctx->add_len % 16 != 0) { + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + } + + if (tag_len > 16 || tag_len < 4) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; + } + + if (ctx->len % 16 != 0) { + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + } + + memcpy(tag, ctx->base_ectr, tag_len); + + if (orig_len || orig_add_len) { + memset(work_buf, 0x00, 16); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE((orig_add_len >> 32), work_buf, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE((orig_add_len), work_buf, 4); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE((orig_len >> 32), work_buf, 8); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE((orig_len), work_buf, 12); + + mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf, ctx->buf, work_buf, 16); + + gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf); + + mbedtls_xor(tag, tag, ctx->buf, tag_len); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t tag_len, + unsigned char *tag) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts(ctx, mode, iv, iv_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(ctx, add, add_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(ctx, input, length, + output, length, &olen)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(ctx, NULL, 0, &olen, tag, tag_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, + size_t length, + const unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len, + const unsigned char *add, + size_t add_len, + const unsigned char *tag, + size_t tag_len, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char check_tag[16]; + int diff; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, length, + iv, iv_len, add, add_len, + input, output, tag_len, check_tag)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Check tag in "constant-time" */ + diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, tag_len); + + if (diff != 0) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(output, length); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_gcm_free(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) + mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx); +#else + mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx); +#endif + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_gcm_context)); +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) +/* + * AES-GCM test vectors from: + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/mac/gcmtestvectors.zip + */ +#define MAX_TESTS 6 + +static const int key_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = +{ 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; + +static const unsigned char key_test_data[][32] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c, + 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08, + 0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c, + 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08 }, +}; + +static const size_t iv_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = +{ 12, 12, 12, 12, 8, 60 }; + +static const int iv_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = +{ 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2 }; + +static const unsigned char iv_test_data[][64] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad, + 0xde, 0xca, 0xf8, 0x88 }, + { 0x93, 0x13, 0x22, 0x5d, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, + 0x55, 0x90, 0x9c, 0x5a, 0xff, 0x52, 0x69, 0xaa, + 0x6a, 0x7a, 0x95, 0x38, 0x53, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0xa1, + 0xe4, 0xc3, 0x03, 0xd2, 0xa3, 0x18, 0xa7, 0x28, + 0xc3, 0xc0, 0xc9, 0x51, 0x56, 0x80, 0x95, 0x39, + 0xfc, 0xf0, 0xe2, 0x42, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0x52, 0x54, + 0x16, 0xae, 0xdb, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0xde, 0x6a, 0x57, + 0xa6, 0x37, 0xb3, 0x9b }, +}; + +static const size_t add_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = +{ 0, 0, 0, 20, 20, 20 }; + +static const int add_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = +{ 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 }; + +static const unsigned char additional_test_data[][64] = +{ + { 0x00 }, + { 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, + 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, + 0xab, 0xad, 0xda, 0xd2 }, +}; + +static const size_t pt_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = +{ 0, 16, 64, 60, 60, 60 }; + +static const int pt_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = +{ 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 }; + +static const unsigned char pt_test_data[][64] = +{ + { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5, + 0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a, + 0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda, + 0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72, + 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53, + 0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25, + 0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57, + 0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0xd2, 0x55 }, +}; + +static const unsigned char ct_test_data[][64] = +{ + { 0x00 }, + { 0x03, 0x88, 0xda, 0xce, 0x60, 0xb6, 0xa3, 0x92, + 0xf3, 0x28, 0xc2, 0xb9, 0x71, 0xb2, 0xfe, 0x78 }, + { 0x42, 0x83, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x21, 0x77, 0x74, 0x24, + 0x4b, 0x72, 0x21, 0xb7, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0x9c, + 0xe3, 0xaa, 0x21, 0x2f, 0x2c, 0x02, 0xa4, 0xe0, + 0x35, 0xc1, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x29, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x2e, + 0x21, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xb2, 0x54, 0x66, 0x93, 0x1c, + 0x7d, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0x5a, 0xac, 0x84, 0xaa, 0x05, + 0x1b, 0xa3, 0x0b, 0x39, 0x6a, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x97, + 0x3d, 0x58, 0xe0, 0x91, 0x47, 0x3f, 0x59, 0x85 }, + { 0x42, 0x83, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x21, 0x77, 0x74, 0x24, + 0x4b, 0x72, 0x21, 0xb7, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0x9c, + 0xe3, 0xaa, 0x21, 0x2f, 0x2c, 0x02, 0xa4, 0xe0, + 0x35, 0xc1, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x29, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x2e, + 0x21, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xb2, 0x54, 0x66, 0x93, 0x1c, + 0x7d, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0x5a, 0xac, 0x84, 0xaa, 0x05, + 0x1b, 0xa3, 0x0b, 0x39, 0x6a, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x97, + 0x3d, 0x58, 0xe0, 0x91 }, + { 0x61, 0x35, 0x3b, 0x4c, 0x28, 0x06, 0x93, 0x4a, + 0x77, 0x7f, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0xa2, 0x2a, 0x47, 0x55, + 0x69, 0x9b, 0x2a, 0x71, 0x4f, 0xcd, 0xc6, 0xf8, + 0x37, 0x66, 0xe5, 0xf9, 0x7b, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x23, + 0x73, 0x80, 0x69, 0x00, 0xe4, 0x9f, 0x24, 0xb2, + 0x2b, 0x09, 0x75, 0x44, 0xd4, 0x89, 0x6b, 0x42, + 0x49, 0x89, 0xb5, 0xe1, 0xeb, 0xac, 0x0f, 0x07, + 0xc2, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x98 }, + { 0x8c, 0xe2, 0x49, 0x98, 0x62, 0x56, 0x15, 0xb6, + 0x03, 0xa0, 0x33, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0x94, + 0xbe, 0x91, 0x12, 0xa5, 0xc3, 0xa2, 0x11, 0xa8, + 0xba, 0x26, 0x2a, 0x3c, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x2c, 0xa7, + 0x01, 0xe4, 0xa9, 0xa4, 0xfb, 0xa4, 0x3c, 0x90, + 0xcc, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0x81, 0xd4, 0x8c, 0x7c, 0x6f, + 0xd6, 0x28, 0x75, 0xd2, 0xac, 0xa4, 0x17, 0x03, + 0x4c, 0x34, 0xae, 0xe5 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { 0x00 }, + { 0x98, 0xe7, 0x24, 0x7c, 0x07, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x41, + 0x1c, 0x26, 0x7e, 0x43, 0x84, 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x00 }, + { 0x39, 0x80, 0xca, 0x0b, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xe8, 0x41, + 0xeb, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xc4, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x57, + 0x85, 0x9e, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xa6, 0xef, 0xd9, 0x84, + 0x62, 0x85, 0x93, 0xb4, 0x0c, 0xa1, 0xe1, 0x9c, + 0x7d, 0x77, 0x3d, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x44, 0xc5, 0x25, + 0xac, 0x61, 0x9d, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0x47, + 0x18, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x24, 0xd9, + 0xcc, 0xda, 0x27, 0x10, 0xac, 0xad, 0xe2, 0x56 }, + { 0x39, 0x80, 0xca, 0x0b, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xe8, 0x41, + 0xeb, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xc4, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x57, + 0x85, 0x9e, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xa6, 0xef, 0xd9, 0x84, + 0x62, 0x85, 0x93, 0xb4, 0x0c, 0xa1, 0xe1, 0x9c, + 0x7d, 0x77, 0x3d, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x44, 0xc5, 0x25, + 0xac, 0x61, 0x9d, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0x47, + 0x18, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x24, 0xd9, + 0xcc, 0xda, 0x27, 0x10 }, + { 0x0f, 0x10, 0xf5, 0x99, 0xae, 0x14, 0xa1, 0x54, + 0xed, 0x24, 0xb3, 0x6e, 0x25, 0x32, 0x4d, 0xb8, + 0xc5, 0x66, 0x63, 0x2e, 0xf2, 0xbb, 0xb3, 0x4f, + 0x83, 0x47, 0x28, 0x0f, 0xc4, 0x50, 0x70, 0x57, + 0xfd, 0xdc, 0x29, 0xdf, 0x9a, 0x47, 0x1f, 0x75, + 0xc6, 0x65, 0x41, 0xd4, 0xd4, 0xda, 0xd1, 0xc9, + 0xe9, 0x3a, 0x19, 0xa5, 0x8e, 0x8b, 0x47, 0x3f, + 0xa0, 0xf0, 0x62, 0xf7 }, + { 0xd2, 0x7e, 0x88, 0x68, 0x1c, 0xe3, 0x24, 0x3c, + 0x48, 0x30, 0x16, 0x5a, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0xf9, 0xff, + 0x1d, 0xe9, 0xa1, 0xd8, 0xe6, 0xb4, 0x47, 0xef, + 0x6e, 0xf7, 0xb7, 0x98, 0x28, 0x66, 0x6e, 0x45, + 0x81, 0xe7, 0x90, 0x12, 0xaf, 0x34, 0xdd, 0xd9, + 0xe2, 0xf0, 0x37, 0x58, 0x9b, 0x29, 0x2d, 0xb3, + 0xe6, 0x7c, 0x03, 0x67, 0x45, 0xfa, 0x22, 0xe7, + 0xe9, 0xb7, 0x37, 0x3b }, + { 0x00 }, + { 0xce, 0xa7, 0x40, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0x60, 0x6b, 0x6e, + 0x07, 0x4e, 0xc5, 0xd3, 0xba, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x18 }, + { 0x52, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x99, 0x56, 0x7d, 0x07, + 0xf4, 0x7f, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7d, + 0x64, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0xc9, + 0x75, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x55, 0xd1, 0xaa, + 0x8c, 0xb0, 0x8e, 0x48, 0x59, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0x3d, + 0xa7, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x10, 0x56, 0x82, 0x88, 0x38, + 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1e, 0x63, 0x93, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0a, + 0xbc, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0x62, 0x89, 0x80, 0x15, 0xad }, + { 0x52, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x99, 0x56, 0x7d, 0x07, + 0xf4, 0x7f, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7d, + 0x64, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0xc9, + 0x75, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x55, 0xd1, 0xaa, + 0x8c, 0xb0, 0x8e, 0x48, 0x59, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0x3d, + 0xa7, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x10, 0x56, 0x82, 0x88, 0x38, + 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1e, 0x63, 0x93, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0a, + 0xbc, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0x62 }, + { 0xc3, 0x76, 0x2d, 0xf1, 0xca, 0x78, 0x7d, 0x32, + 0xae, 0x47, 0xc1, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0x98, 0x44, 0xcb, + 0xaf, 0x1a, 0xe1, 0x4d, 0x0b, 0x97, 0x6a, 0xfa, + 0xc5, 0x2f, 0xf7, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0xba, 0x9d, 0xe0, + 0xfe, 0xb5, 0x82, 0xd3, 0x39, 0x34, 0xa4, 0xf0, + 0x95, 0x4c, 0xc2, 0x36, 0x3b, 0xc7, 0x3f, 0x78, + 0x62, 0xac, 0x43, 0x0e, 0x64, 0xab, 0xe4, 0x99, + 0xf4, 0x7c, 0x9b, 0x1f }, + { 0x5a, 0x8d, 0xef, 0x2f, 0x0c, 0x9e, 0x53, 0xf1, + 0xf7, 0x5d, 0x78, 0x53, 0x65, 0x9e, 0x2a, 0x20, + 0xee, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0x2a, 0xaf, 0xde, 0x64, 0x19, + 0xa0, 0x58, 0xab, 0x4f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x6b, 0xf4, + 0x0f, 0xc0, 0xc3, 0xb7, 0x80, 0xf2, 0x44, 0x45, + 0x2d, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0xf1, 0xc5, 0xd8, 0x2c, 0xde, + 0xa2, 0x41, 0x89, 0x97, 0x20, 0x0e, 0xf8, 0x2e, + 0x44, 0xae, 0x7e, 0x3f }, +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ +}; + +static const unsigned char tag_test_data[][16] = +{ + { 0x58, 0xe2, 0xfc, 0xce, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0x30, 0x61, + 0x36, 0x7f, 0x1d, 0x57, 0xa4, 0xe7, 0x45, 0x5a }, + { 0xab, 0x6e, 0x47, 0xd4, 0x2c, 0xec, 0x13, 0xbd, + 0xf5, 0x3a, 0x67, 0xb2, 0x12, 0x57, 0xbd, 0xdf }, + { 0x4d, 0x5c, 0x2a, 0xf3, 0x27, 0xcd, 0x64, 0xa6, + 0x2c, 0xf3, 0x5a, 0xbd, 0x2b, 0xa6, 0xfa, 0xb4 }, + { 0x5b, 0xc9, 0x4f, 0xbc, 0x32, 0x21, 0xa5, 0xdb, + 0x94, 0xfa, 0xe9, 0x5a, 0xe7, 0x12, 0x1a, 0x47 }, + { 0x36, 0x12, 0xd2, 0xe7, 0x9e, 0x3b, 0x07, 0x85, + 0x56, 0x1b, 0xe1, 0x4a, 0xac, 0xa2, 0xfc, 0xcb }, + { 0x61, 0x9c, 0xc5, 0xae, 0xff, 0xfe, 0x0b, 0xfa, + 0x46, 0x2a, 0xf4, 0x3c, 0x16, 0x99, 0xd0, 0x50 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { 0xcd, 0x33, 0xb2, 0x8a, 0xc7, 0x73, 0xf7, 0x4b, + 0xa0, 0x0e, 0xd1, 0xf3, 0x12, 0x57, 0x24, 0x35 }, + { 0x2f, 0xf5, 0x8d, 0x80, 0x03, 0x39, 0x27, 0xab, + 0x8e, 0xf4, 0xd4, 0x58, 0x75, 0x14, 0xf0, 0xfb }, + { 0x99, 0x24, 0xa7, 0xc8, 0x58, 0x73, 0x36, 0xbf, + 0xb1, 0x18, 0x02, 0x4d, 0xb8, 0x67, 0x4a, 0x14 }, + { 0x25, 0x19, 0x49, 0x8e, 0x80, 0xf1, 0x47, 0x8f, + 0x37, 0xba, 0x55, 0xbd, 0x6d, 0x27, 0x61, 0x8c }, + { 0x65, 0xdc, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xcf, 0x62, 0x3a, 0x24, + 0x09, 0x4f, 0xcc, 0xa4, 0x0d, 0x35, 0x33, 0xf8 }, + { 0xdc, 0xf5, 0x66, 0xff, 0x29, 0x1c, 0x25, 0xbb, + 0xb8, 0x56, 0x8f, 0xc3, 0xd3, 0x76, 0xa6, 0xd9 }, + { 0x53, 0x0f, 0x8a, 0xfb, 0xc7, 0x45, 0x36, 0xb9, + 0xa9, 0x63, 0xb4, 0xf1, 0xc4, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x8b }, + { 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xc8, 0xa7, 0x99, 0x99, 0x6b, 0xf0, + 0x26, 0x5b, 0x98, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0x8a, 0xb9, 0x19 }, + { 0xb0, 0x94, 0xda, 0xc5, 0xd9, 0x34, 0x71, 0xbd, + 0xec, 0x1a, 0x50, 0x22, 0x70, 0xe3, 0xcc, 0x6c }, + { 0x76, 0xfc, 0x6e, 0xce, 0x0f, 0x4e, 0x17, 0x68, + 0xcd, 0xdf, 0x88, 0x53, 0xbb, 0x2d, 0x55, 0x1b }, + { 0x3a, 0x33, 0x7d, 0xbf, 0x46, 0xa7, 0x92, 0xc4, + 0x5e, 0x45, 0x49, 0x13, 0xfe, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf2 }, + { 0xa4, 0x4a, 0x82, 0x66, 0xee, 0x1c, 0x8e, 0xb0, + 0xc8, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0xcf, 0x5a, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0x9a }, +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ +}; + +int mbedtls_gcm_self_test(int verbose) +{ + mbedtls_gcm_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[64]; + unsigned char tag_buf[16]; + int i, j, ret; + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES; + size_t olen; + + if (verbose != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) + mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: alternative implementation.\n"); +#else /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE) + if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL)) { + mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: using AESNI.\n"); + } else +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE) + if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) { + mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: using AESCE.\n"); + } else +#endif + + mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: built-in implementation.\n"); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ + } + + static const int loop_limit = + (sizeof(ct_test_data) / sizeof(*ct_test_data)) / MAX_TESTS; + + for (j = 0; j < loop_limit; j++) { + int key_len = 128 + 64 * j; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_TESTS; i++) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-GCM-%3d #%d (%s): ", + key_len, i, "enc"); + } + + mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx); + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], + key_len); + /* + * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when + * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when + * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined. + */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && key_len == 192) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + break; + } else if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, + pt_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i], + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i], + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + buf, 16, tag_buf); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) + /* Allow alternative implementations to only support 12-byte nonces. */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && + iv_len_test_data[i] != 12) { + mbedtls_printf("skipped\n"); + break; + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) */ + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (memcmp(buf, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], + pt_len_test_data[i]) != 0 || + memcmp(tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + + mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-GCM-%3d #%d (%s): ", + key_len, i, "dec"); + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], + key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, + pt_len_test_data[i], + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i], + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i], + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], buf, 16, tag_buf); + + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (memcmp(buf, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + pt_len_test_data[i]) != 0 || + memcmp(tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + + mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-GCM-%3d #%d split (%s): ", + key_len, i, "enc"); + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], + key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i]); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i]); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (pt_len_test_data[i] > 32) { + size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32; + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + 32, + buf, sizeof(buf), &olen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if (olen != 32) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]] + 32, + rest_len, + buf + 32, sizeof(buf) - 32, &olen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if (olen != rest_len) { + goto exit; + } + } else { + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, + pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + pt_len_test_data[i], + buf, sizeof(buf), &olen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if (olen != pt_len_test_data[i]) { + goto exit; + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, NULL, 0, &olen, tag_buf, 16); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (memcmp(buf, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], + pt_len_test_data[i]) != 0 || + memcmp(tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + + mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" AES-GCM-%3d #%d split (%s): ", + key_len, i, "dec"); + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&ctx, cipher, + key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]], + key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, + iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]], + iv_len_test_data[i]); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, + additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]], + add_len_test_data[i]); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (pt_len_test_data[i] > 32) { + size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32; + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], 32, + buf, sizeof(buf), &olen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if (olen != 32) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i] + 32, + rest_len, + buf + 32, sizeof(buf) - 32, &olen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if (olen != rest_len) { + goto exit; + } + } else { + ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, + ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], + pt_len_test_data[i], + buf, sizeof(buf), &olen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if (olen != pt_len_test_data[i]) { + goto exit; + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, NULL, 0, &olen, tag_buf, 16); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (memcmp(buf, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]], + pt_len_test_data[i]) != 0 || + memcmp(tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + if (ret != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); + } + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ diff --git a/library/hkdf.c b/library/hkdf.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..631ac24e530 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/hkdf.c @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +/* + * HKDF implementation -- RFC 5869 + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) + +#include +#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +int mbedtls_hkdf(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *salt, + size_t salt_len, const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len, + const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len, + unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char prk[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + + ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract(md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk); + + if (ret == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_hkdf_expand(md, prk, mbedtls_md_get_size(md), + info, info_len, okm, okm_len); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(prk, sizeof(prk)); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_hkdf_extract(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, + const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len, + const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len, + unsigned char *prk) +{ + unsigned char null_salt[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE] = { '\0' }; + + if (salt == NULL) { + size_t hash_len; + + if (salt_len != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md); + + if (hash_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + salt = null_salt; + salt_len = hash_len; + } + + return mbedtls_md_hmac(md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk); +} + +int mbedtls_hkdf_expand(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *prk, + size_t prk_len, const unsigned char *info, + size_t info_len, unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len) +{ + size_t hash_len; + size_t where = 0; + size_t n; + size_t t_len = 0; + size_t i; + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + unsigned char t[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + + if (okm == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md); + + if (prk_len < hash_len || hash_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (info == NULL) { + info = (const unsigned char *) ""; + info_len = 0; + } + + n = okm_len / hash_len; + + if (okm_len % hash_len != 0) { + n++; + } + + /* + * Per RFC 5869 Section 2.3, okm_len must not exceed + * 255 times the hash length + */ + if (n > 255) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx, md, 1)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + memset(t, 0, hash_len); + + /* + * Compute T = T(1) | T(2) | T(3) | ... | T(N) + * Where T(N) is defined in RFC 5869 Section 2.3 + */ + for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) { + size_t num_to_copy; + unsigned char c = i & 0xff; + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&ctx, prk, prk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx, t, t_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx, info, info_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* The constant concatenated to the end of each T(n) is a single octet. + * */ + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx, &c, 1); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&ctx, t); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + num_to_copy = i != n ? hash_len : okm_len - where; + memcpy(okm + where, t, num_to_copy); + where += hash_len; + t_len = hash_len; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&ctx); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(t, sizeof(t)); + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ diff --git a/library/hmac_drbg.c b/library/hmac_drbg.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..90174d5d17d --- /dev/null +++ b/library/hmac_drbg.c @@ -0,0 +1,633 @@ +/* + * HMAC_DRBG implementation (NIST SP 800-90) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * The NIST SP 800-90A DRBGs are described in the following publication. + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf + * References below are based on rev. 1 (January 2012). + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG context initialization + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context)); + + ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; +} + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG update, using optional additional data (10.1.2.2) + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, + size_t add_len) +{ + size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_ctx.md_info); + unsigned char rounds = (additional != NULL && add_len != 0) ? 2 : 1; + unsigned char sep[1]; + unsigned char K[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + for (sep[0] = 0; sep[0] < rounds; sep[0]++) { + /* Step 1 or 4 */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&ctx->md_ctx)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx->md_ctx, + ctx->V, md_len)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx->md_ctx, + sep, 1)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if (rounds == 2) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx->md_ctx, + additional, add_len)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&ctx->md_ctx, K)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Step 2 or 5 */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&ctx->md_ctx, K, md_len)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx->md_ctx, + ctx->V, md_len)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(K, sizeof(K)); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation (for use with deterministic ECDSA) + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex); +#endif + + /* + * Set initial working state. + * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the + * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value. + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, + mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info))) != 0) { + return ret; + } + memset(ctx->V, 0x01, mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, data, data_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Internal function used both for seeding and reseeding the DRBG. + * Comments starting with arabic numbers refer to section 10.1.2.4 + * of SP800-90A, while roman numbers refer to section 9.2. + */ +static int hmac_drbg_reseed_core(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t len, + int use_nonce) +{ + unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; + size_t seedlen = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + { + size_t total_entropy_len; + + if (use_nonce == 0) { + total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len; + } else { + total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len * 3 / 2; + } + + /* III. Check input length */ + if (len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT || + total_entropy_len + len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; + } + } + + memset(seed, 0, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT); + + /* IV. Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy for the seed */ + if ((ret = ctx->f_entropy(ctx->p_entropy, + seed, ctx->entropy_len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + } + seedlen += ctx->entropy_len; + + /* For initial seeding, allow adding of nonce generated + * from the entropy source. See Sect 8.6.7 in SP800-90A. */ + if (use_nonce) { + /* Note: We don't merge the two calls to f_entropy() in order + * to avoid requesting too much entropy from f_entropy() + * at once. Specifically, if the underlying digest is not + * SHA-1, 3 / 2 * entropy_len is at least 36 Bytes, which + * is larger than the maximum of 32 Bytes that our own + * entropy source implementation can emit in a single + * call in configurations disabling SHA-512. */ + if ((ret = ctx->f_entropy(ctx->p_entropy, + seed + seedlen, + ctx->entropy_len / 2)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + } + + seedlen += ctx->entropy_len / 2; + } + + + /* 1. Concatenate entropy and additional data if any */ + if (additional != NULL && len != 0) { + memcpy(seed + seedlen, additional, len); + seedlen += len; + } + + /* 2. Update state */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, seed, seedlen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* 3. Reset reseed_counter */ + ctx->reseed_counter = 1; + +exit: + /* 4. Done */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seed, seedlen); + return ret; +} + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG reseeding: 10.1.2.4 + 9.2 + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t len) +{ + return hmac_drbg_reseed_core(ctx, additional, len, 0); +} + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG initialisation (10.1.2.3 + 9.1) + * + * The nonce is not passed as a separate parameter but extracted + * from the entropy source as suggested in 8.6.7. + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_entropy, + const unsigned char *custom, + size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t md_size; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* The mutex is initialized iff the md context is set up. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex); +#endif + + md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + + /* + * Set initial working state. + * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the + * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value. + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_size)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + memset(ctx->V, 0x01, md_size); + + ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy; + ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy; + + if (ctx->entropy_len == 0) { + /* + * See SP800-57 5.6.1 (p. 65-66) for the security strength provided by + * each hash function, then according to SP800-90A rev1 10.1 table 2, + * min_entropy_len (in bits) is security_strength. + * + * (This also matches the sizes used in the NIST test vectors.) + */ + ctx->entropy_len = md_size <= 20 ? 16 : /* 160-bits hash -> 128 bits */ + md_size <= 28 ? 24 : /* 224-bits hash -> 192 bits */ + 32; /* better (256+) -> 256 bits */ + } + + if ((ret = hmac_drbg_reseed_core(ctx, custom, len, + 1 /* add nonce */)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Set prediction resistance + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, + int resistance) +{ + ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance; +} + +/* + * Set entropy length grabbed for seeding + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len) +{ + ctx->entropy_len = len; +} + +/* + * Set reseed interval + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, int interval) +{ + ctx->reseed_interval = interval; +} + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG random function with optional additional data: + * 10.1.2.5 (arabic) + 9.3 (Roman) + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, size_t out_len, + const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng; + size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_ctx.md_info); + size_t left = out_len; + unsigned char *out = output; + + /* II. Check request length */ + if (out_len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG; + } + + /* III. Check input length */ + if (add_len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; + } + + /* 1. (aka VII and IX) Check reseed counter and PR */ + if (ctx->f_entropy != NULL && /* For no-reseeding instances */ + (ctx->prediction_resistance == MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON || + ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval)) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, add_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + add_len = 0; /* VII.4 */ + } + + /* 2. Use additional data if any */ + if (additional != NULL && add_len != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, + additional, add_len)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + /* 3, 4, 5. Generate bytes */ + while (left != 0) { + size_t use_len = left > md_len ? md_len : left; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&ctx->md_ctx)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx->md_ctx, + ctx->V, md_len)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + memcpy(out, ctx->V, use_len); + out += use_len; + left -= use_len; + } + + /* 6. Update */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, + additional, add_len)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* 7. Update reseed counter */ + ctx->reseed_counter++; + +exit: + /* 8. Done */ + return ret; +} + +/* + * HMAC_DRBG random function + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add(ctx, output, out_len, NULL, 0); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } +#endif + + return ret; +} + +/* + * This function resets HMAC_DRBG context to the state immediately + * after initial call of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(). + */ +void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* The mutex is initialized iff the md context is set up. */ + if (ctx->md_ctx.md_info != NULL) { + mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex); + } +#endif + mbedtls_md_free(&ctx->md_ctx); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context)); + ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + FILE *f; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT]; + + if ((f = fopen(path, "wb")) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(ctx, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (fwrite(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f) != sizeof(buf)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + fclose(f); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path) +{ + int ret = 0; + FILE *f = NULL; + size_t n; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT]; + unsigned char c; + + if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + + n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f); + if (fread(&c, 1, 1, f) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; + goto exit; + } + if (n == 0 || ferror(f)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + fclose(f); + f = NULL; + + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, buf, n); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (f != NULL) { + fclose(f); + } + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + return mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file(ctx, path); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +/* Dummy checkup routine */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test(int verbose) +{ + (void) verbose; + return 0; +} +#else + +#define OUTPUT_LEN 80 + +/* From a NIST PR=true test vector */ +static const unsigned char entropy_pr[] = { + 0xa0, 0xc9, 0xab, 0x58, 0xf1, 0xe2, 0xe5, 0xa4, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xbd, 0x4f, + 0xf7, 0x3e, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xef, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x02, 0x8c, 0xf8, 0x11, + 0x48, 0xa5, 0x84, 0xfe, 0x69, 0xab, 0x5a, 0xee, 0x42, 0xaa, 0x4d, 0x42, + 0x17, 0x60, 0x99, 0xd4, 0x5e, 0x13, 0x97, 0xdc, 0x40, 0x4d, 0x86, 0xa3, + 0x7b, 0xf5, 0x59, 0x54, 0x75, 0x69, 0x51, 0xe4 +}; +static const unsigned char result_pr[OUTPUT_LEN] = { + 0x9a, 0x00, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0xd5, 0x9b, 0xfe, 0x31, 0xec, 0xb1, 0x39, + 0x9b, 0x60, 0x81, 0x48, 0xd1, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x25, 0x0d, 0x3c, 0x1e, 0x94, + 0x10, 0x10, 0x98, 0x12, 0x93, 0x25, 0xca, 0xb8, 0xfc, 0xcc, 0x2d, 0x54, + 0x73, 0x19, 0x70, 0xc0, 0x10, 0x7a, 0xa4, 0x89, 0x25, 0x19, 0x95, 0x5e, + 0x4b, 0xc6, 0x00, 0x1d, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x6a, 0x2b, 0xf8, 0xa3, 0x01, 0xab, + 0x46, 0x05, 0x5c, 0x09, 0xa6, 0x71, 0x88, 0xf1, 0xa7, 0x40, 0xee, 0xf3, + 0xe1, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x9b, 0x44, 0xaf, 0x03, 0x44 +}; + +/* From a NIST PR=false test vector */ +static const unsigned char entropy_nopr[] = { + 0x79, 0x34, 0x9b, 0xbf, 0x7c, 0xdd, 0xa5, 0x79, 0x95, 0x57, 0x86, 0x66, + 0x21, 0xc9, 0x13, 0x83, 0x11, 0x46, 0x73, 0x3a, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0x35, 0xc8, + 0xc7, 0x21, 0x5b, 0x5b, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x9b, 0x33, 0x8c, 0x74, 0xe3, + 0xe9, 0x9d, 0xfe, 0xdf +}; +static const unsigned char result_nopr[OUTPUT_LEN] = { + 0xc6, 0xa1, 0x6a, 0xb8, 0xd4, 0x20, 0x70, 0x6f, 0x0f, 0x34, 0xab, 0x7f, + 0xec, 0x5a, 0xdc, 0xa9, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x3e, 0x15, 0x9c, 0xa6, + 0xac, 0x43, 0xc6, 0xf8, 0xa2, 0xbe, 0x22, 0x83, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0x0a, + 0xff, 0xb1, 0x0d, 0x71, 0x94, 0xf1, 0xc1, 0xa5, 0xcf, 0x73, 0x22, 0xec, + 0x1a, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x4e, 0xd4, 0xbf, 0x12, 0x27, 0x46, 0xe0, 0x87, 0xfd, + 0xb5, 0xb3, 0xe9, 0x1b, 0x34, 0x93, 0xd5, 0xbb, 0x98, 0xfa, 0xed, 0x49, + 0xe8, 0x5f, 0x13, 0x0f, 0xc8, 0xa4, 0x59, 0xb7 +}; + +/* "Entropy" from buffer */ +static size_t test_offset; +static int hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy(void *data, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + const unsigned char *p = data; + memcpy(buf, p + test_offset, len); + test_offset += len; + return 0; +} + +#define CHK(c) if ((c) != 0) \ + { \ + if (verbose != 0) \ + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); \ + return 1; \ + } + +/* + * Checkup routine for HMAC_DRBG with SHA-1 + */ +int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test(int verbose) +{ + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ctx; + unsigned char buf[OUTPUT_LEN]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1); + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(&ctx); + + /* + * PR = True + */ + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" HMAC_DRBG (PR = True) : "); + } + + test_offset = 0; + CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(&ctx, md_info, + hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_pr, + NULL, 0)); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance(&ctx, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON); + CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN)); + CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN)); + CHK(memcmp(buf, result_pr, OUTPUT_LEN)); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&ctx); + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&ctx); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + + /* + * PR = False + */ + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" HMAC_DRBG (PR = False) : "); + } + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(&ctx); + + test_offset = 0; + CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(&ctx, md_info, + hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_nopr, + NULL, 0)); + CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed(&ctx, NULL, 0)); + CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN)); + CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN)); + CHK(memcmp(buf, result_nopr, OUTPUT_LEN)); + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&ctx); + + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&ctx); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ diff --git a/library/lmots.c b/library/lmots.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c7091b49e18 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/lmots.c @@ -0,0 +1,778 @@ +/* + * The LM-OTS one-time public-key signature scheme + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation + * of the LM-OTS algorithm: + * + * [1] IETF RFC8554 + * D. McGrew, M. Curcio, S.Fluhrer + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8554 + * + * [2] NIST Special Publication 800-208 + * David A. Cooper et. al. + * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-208.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) + +#include + +#include "lmots.h" + +#include "mbedtls/lms.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_lms_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_lms_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) + +#define PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET (0) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_KEY_HASH_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN) + +/* We only support parameter sets that use 8-bit digits, as it does not require + * translation logic between digits and bytes */ +#define W_WINTERNITZ_PARAMETER (8u) +#define CHECKSUM_LEN (2) +#define I_DIGIT_IDX_LEN (2) +#define J_HASH_IDX_LEN (1) +#define D_CONST_LEN (2) + +#define DIGIT_MAX_VALUE ((1u << W_WINTERNITZ_PARAMETER) - 1u) + +#define D_CONST_LEN (2) +static const unsigned char D_PUBLIC_CONSTANT_BYTES[D_CONST_LEN] = { 0x80, 0x80 }; +static const unsigned char D_MESSAGE_CONSTANT_BYTES[D_CONST_LEN] = { 0x81, 0x81 }; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +int (*mbedtls_lmots_sign_private_key_invalidated_hook)(unsigned char *) = NULL; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) */ + +/* Calculate the checksum digits that are appended to the end of the LMOTS digit + * string. See NIST SP800-208 section 3.1 or RFC8554 Algorithm 2 for details of + * the checksum algorithm. + * + * params The LMOTS parameter set, I and q values which + * describe the key being used. + * + * digest The digit string to create the digest from. As + * this does not contain a checksum, it is the same + * size as a hash output. + */ +static unsigned short lmots_checksum_calculate(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *digest) +{ + size_t idx; + unsigned sum = 0; + + for (idx = 0; idx < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type); idx++) { + sum += DIGIT_MAX_VALUE - digest[idx]; + } + + return sum; +} + +/* Create the string of digest digits (in the base determined by the Winternitz + * parameter with the checksum appended to the end (Q || cksm(Q)). See NIST + * SP800-208 section 3.1 or RFC8554 Algorithm 3 step 5 (also used in Algorithm + * 4b step 3) for details. + * + * params The LMOTS parameter set, I and q values which + * describe the key being used. + * + * msg The message that will be hashed to create the + * digest. + * + * msg_size The size of the message. + * + * C_random_value The random value that will be combined with the + * message digest. This is always the same size as a + * hash output for whichever hash algorithm is + * determined by the parameter set. + * + * output An output containing the digit string (+ + * checksum) of length P digits (in the case of + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8, this means it is of + * size P bytes). + */ +static int create_digit_array_with_checksum(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *msg, + size_t msg_len, + const unsigned char *C_random_value, + unsigned char *out) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + unsigned short checksum; + + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->q_leaf_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, D_MESSAGE_CONSTANT_BYTES, D_CONST_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, C_random_value, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(params->type)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, msg, msg_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, out, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + checksum = lmots_checksum_calculate(params, out); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(checksum, out, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)); + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +/* Hash each element of the string of digits (+ checksum), producing a hash + * output for each element. This is used in several places (by varying the + * hash_idx_min/max_values) in order to calculate a public key from a private + * key (RFC8554 Algorithm 1 step 4), in order to sign a message (RFC8554 + * Algorithm 3 step 5), and to calculate a public key candidate from a + * signature and message (RFC8554 Algorithm 4b step 3). + * + * params The LMOTS parameter set, I and q values which + * describe the key being used. + * + * x_digit_array The array of digits (of size P, 34 in the case of + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8). + * + * hash_idx_min_values An array of the starting values of the j iterator + * for each of the members of the digit array. If + * this value in NULL, then all iterators will start + * at 0. + * + * hash_idx_max_values An array of the upper bound values of the j + * iterator for each of the members of the digit + * array. If this value in NULL, then iterator is + * bounded to be less than 2^w - 1 (255 in the case + * of MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) + * + * output An array containing a hash output for each member + * of the digit string P. In the case of + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8, this is of size 32 * + * 34. + */ +static int hash_digit_array(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *x_digit_array, + const unsigned char *hash_idx_min_values, + const unsigned char *hash_idx_max_values, + unsigned char *output) +{ + unsigned int i_digit_idx; + unsigned char i_digit_idx_bytes[I_DIGIT_IDX_LEN]; + unsigned int j_hash_idx; + unsigned char j_hash_idx_bytes[J_HASH_IDX_LEN]; + unsigned int j_hash_idx_min; + unsigned int j_hash_idx_max; + psa_hash_operation_t op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + unsigned char tmp_hash[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + + for (i_digit_idx = 0; + i_digit_idx < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(params->type); + i_digit_idx++) { + + memcpy(tmp_hash, + &x_digit_array[i_digit_idx * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)], + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)); + + j_hash_idx_min = hash_idx_min_values != NULL ? + hash_idx_min_values[i_digit_idx] : 0; + j_hash_idx_max = hash_idx_max_values != NULL ? + hash_idx_max_values[i_digit_idx] : DIGIT_MAX_VALUE; + + for (j_hash_idx = j_hash_idx_min; + j_hash_idx < j_hash_idx_max; + j_hash_idx++) { + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, + params->I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, + params->q_leaf_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(i_digit_idx, i_digit_idx_bytes, 0); + status = psa_hash_update(&op, i_digit_idx_bytes, I_DIGIT_IDX_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + j_hash_idx_bytes[0] = (uint8_t) j_hash_idx; + status = psa_hash_update(&op, j_hash_idx_bytes, J_HASH_IDX_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, tmp_hash, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, tmp_hash, sizeof(tmp_hash), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + psa_hash_abort(&op); + } + + memcpy(&output[i_digit_idx * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)], + tmp_hash, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)); + } + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_hash, sizeof(tmp_hash)); + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +/* Combine the hashes of the digit array into a public key. This is used in + * in order to calculate a public key from a private key (RFC8554 Algorithm 1 + * step 4), and to calculate a public key candidate from a signature and message + * (RFC8554 Algorithm 4b step 3). + * + * params The LMOTS parameter set, I and q values which describe + * the key being used. + * y_hashed_digits The array of hashes, one hash for each digit of the + * symbol array (which is of size P, 34 in the case of + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) + * + * pub_key The output public key (or candidate public key in + * case this is being run as part of signature + * verification), in the form of a hash output. + */ +static int public_key_from_hashed_digit_array(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *y_hashed_digits, + unsigned char *pub_key) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, + params->I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->q_leaf_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, D_PUBLIC_CONSTANT_BYTES, D_CONST_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, y_hashed_digits, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(params->type) * + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, pub_key, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + } + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +int mbedtls_lms_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status) +{ + switch (status) { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + return 0; + case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; + case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + } +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +void mbedtls_lmots_public_init(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +void mbedtls_lmots_public_free(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_import_public_key(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ + if (key_len < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->params.type = (mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t) + MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET); + + if (key_len != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memcpy(ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + key + PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + + memcpy(ctx->params.q_leaf_identifier, + key + PUBLIC_KEY_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + + memcpy(ctx->public_key, + key + PUBLIC_KEY_KEY_HASH_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type)); + + ctx->have_public_key = 1; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_export_public_key(const mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + unsigned char *key, size_t key_size, + size_t *key_len) +{ + if (key_size < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (!ctx->have_public_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.type, key, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET); + + memcpy(key + PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + + memcpy(key + PUBLIC_KEY_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET, + ctx->params.q_leaf_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + + memcpy(key + PUBLIC_KEY_KEY_HASH_OFFSET, ctx->public_key, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type)); + + if (key_len != NULL) { + *key_len = MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key_candidate(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *msg, + size_t msg_size, + const unsigned char *sig, + size_t sig_size, + unsigned char *out, + size_t out_size, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char tmp_digit_array[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX]; + unsigned char y_hashed_digits[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX][MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (msg == NULL && msg_size != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (sig_size != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(params->type) || + out_size < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = create_digit_array_with_checksum(params, msg, msg_size, + sig + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_C_RANDOM_OFFSET, + tmp_digit_array); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + ret = hash_digit_array(params, + sig + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_SIGNATURE_OFFSET(params->type), + tmp_digit_array, NULL, (unsigned char *) y_hashed_digits); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + ret = public_key_from_hashed_digit_array(params, + (unsigned char *) y_hashed_digits, + out); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + if (out_len != NULL) { + *out_len = MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_verify(const mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size) +{ + unsigned char Kc_public_key_candidate[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (msg == NULL && msg_size != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (!ctx->have_public_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->params.type != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (sig_size < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(sig, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET) != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + ret = mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key_candidate(&ctx->params, + msg, msg_size, sig, sig_size, + Kc_public_key_candidate, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type), + NULL); + if (ret) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (memcmp(&Kc_public_key_candidate, ctx->public_key, + sizeof(ctx->public_key))) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) + +void mbedtls_lmots_private_init(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +void mbedtls_lmots_private_free(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, + sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_generate_private_key(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx, + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t type, + const unsigned char I_key_identifier[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN], + uint32_t q_leaf_identifier, + const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + unsigned int i_digit_idx; + unsigned char i_digit_idx_bytes[2]; + unsigned char const_bytes[1] = { 0xFF }; + + if (ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (type != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->params.type = type; + + memcpy(ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + I_key_identifier, + sizeof(ctx->params.I_key_identifier)); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(q_leaf_identifier, ctx->params.q_leaf_identifier, 0); + + for (i_digit_idx = 0; + i_digit_idx < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(ctx->params.type); + i_digit_idx++) { + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + sizeof(ctx->params.I_key_identifier)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, + ctx->params.q_leaf_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(i_digit_idx, i_digit_idx_bytes, 0); + status = psa_hash_update(&op, i_digit_idx_bytes, I_DIGIT_IDX_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, const_bytes, sizeof(const_bytes)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, seed, seed_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, + ctx->private_key[i_digit_idx], + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + psa_hash_abort(&op); + } + + ctx->have_private_key = 1; + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_lmots_private_t *priv_ctx) +{ + unsigned char y_hashed_digits[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX][MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Check that a private key is loaded */ + if (!priv_ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = hash_digit_array(&priv_ctx->params, + (unsigned char *) priv_ctx->private_key, NULL, + NULL, (unsigned char *) y_hashed_digits); + if (ret) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = public_key_from_hashed_digit_array(&priv_ctx->params, + (unsigned char *) y_hashed_digits, + ctx->public_key); + if (ret) { + goto exit; + } + + memcpy(&ctx->params, &priv_ctx->params, + sizeof(ctx->params)); + + ctx->have_public_key = 1; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(y_hashed_digits, sizeof(y_hashed_digits)); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_lmots_sign(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len) +{ + unsigned char tmp_digit_array[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX]; + /* Create a temporary buffer to prepare the signature in. This allows us to + * finish creating a signature (ensuring the process doesn't fail), and then + * erase the private key **before** writing any data into the sig parameter + * buffer. If data were directly written into the sig buffer, it might leak + * a partial signature on failure, which effectively compromises the private + * key. + */ + unsigned char tmp_sig[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX][MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + unsigned char tmp_c_random[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (msg == NULL && msg_size != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (sig_size < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* Check that a private key is loaded */ + if (!ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = f_rng(p_rng, tmp_c_random, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type)); + if (ret) { + return ret; + } + + ret = create_digit_array_with_checksum(&ctx->params, + msg, msg_size, + tmp_c_random, + tmp_digit_array); + if (ret) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = hash_digit_array(&ctx->params, (unsigned char *) ctx->private_key, + NULL, tmp_digit_array, (unsigned char *) tmp_sig); + if (ret) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.type, sig, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET); + + /* Test hook to check if sig is being written to before we invalidate the + * private key. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if (mbedtls_lmots_sign_private_key_invalidated_hook != NULL) { + ret = (*mbedtls_lmots_sign_private_key_invalidated_hook)(sig); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) */ + + /* We've got a valid signature now, so it's time to make sure the private + * key can't be reused. + */ + ctx->have_private_key = 0; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->private_key, + sizeof(ctx->private_key)); + + memcpy(sig + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_C_RANDOM_OFFSET, tmp_c_random, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(ctx->params.type)); + + memcpy(sig + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_SIGNATURE_OFFSET(ctx->params.type), tmp_sig, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(ctx->params.type) + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type)); + + if (sig_len != NULL) { + *sig_len = MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type); + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_digit_array, sizeof(tmp_digit_array)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_sig, sizeof(tmp_sig)); + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */ +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) */ diff --git a/library/lmots.h b/library/lmots.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..cf92d326c98 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/lmots.h @@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ +/** + * \file lmots.h + * + * \brief This file provides an API for the LM-OTS post-quantum-safe one-time + * public-key signature scheme as defined in RFC8554 and NIST.SP.200-208. + * This implementation currently only supports a single parameter set + * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8 in order to reduce complexity. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_LMOTS_H +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#include "mbedtls/lms.h" + +#include +#include + + +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(type) (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(type)) + +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET (0) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_C_RANDOM_OFFSET (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) +#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_SIGNATURE_OFFSET(type) (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_C_RANDOM_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(type)) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +extern int (*mbedtls_lmots_sign_private_key_invalidated_hook)(unsigned char *); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/** + * \brief This function converts a \ref psa_status_t to a + * low-level LMS error code. + * + * \param status The psa_status_t to convert + * + * \return The corresponding LMS error code. + */ +int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_lms_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status); +#endif + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a public LMOTS context + * + * \param ctx The uninitialized LMOTS context that will then be + * initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lmots_public_init(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function uninitializes a public LMOTS context + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context that will then be + * uninitialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lmots_public_free(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function imports an LMOTS public key into a + * LMOTS context. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized. + * + * \note See IETF RFC8554 for details of the encoding of + * this public key. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context store the key in. + * \param key The buffer from which the key will be read. + * #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN bytes will be read + * from this. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_import_public_key(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t key_size); + +/** + * \brief This function exports an LMOTS public key from a + * LMOTS context that already contains a public key. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and the context must contain + * a public key. + * + * \note See IETF RFC8554 for details of the encoding of + * this public key. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context that contains the + * public key. + * \param key The buffer into which the key will be output. Must + * be at least #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN in size. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_export_public_key(const mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + unsigned char *key, size_t key_size, + size_t *key_len); + +/** + * \brief This function creates a candidate public key from + * an LMOTS signature. This can then be compared to + * the real public key to determine the validity of + * the signature. + * + * \note This function is exposed publicly to be used in LMS + * signature verification, it is expected that + * mbedtls_lmots_verify will be used for LMOTS + * signature verification. + * + * \param params The LMOTS parameter set, q and I values as an + * mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t struct. + * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read. + * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read. + * \param sig The buffer from which the signature will be read. + * #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN bytes will be read from + * this. + * \param out The buffer where the candidate public key will be + * stored. Must be at least #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN + * bytes in size. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key_candidate(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *msg, + size_t msg_size, + const unsigned char *sig, + size_t sig_size, + unsigned char *out, + size_t out_size, + size_t *out_len); + +/** + * \brief This function verifies a LMOTS signature, using a + * LMOTS context that contains a public key. + * + * \warning This function is **not intended for use in + * production**, due to as-yet unsolved problems with + * handling stateful keys. The API for this function + * may change considerably in future versions. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and must contain a public key + * (either by import or calculation from a private + * key). + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context from which the public + * key will be read. + * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read. + * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read. + * \param sig The buf from which the signature will be read. + * #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN bytes will be read from + * this. + * + * \return \c 0 on successful verification. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_verify(const mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *msg, + size_t msg_size, const unsigned char *sig, + size_t sig_size); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) + +/** + * \brief This function initializes a private LMOTS context + * + * \param ctx The uninitialized LMOTS context that will then be + * initialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lmots_private_init(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function uninitializes a private LMOTS context + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context that will then be + * uninitialized. + */ +void mbedtls_lmots_private_free(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function calculates an LMOTS private key, and + * stores in into an LMOTS context. + * + * \warning This function is **not intended for use in + * production**, due to as-yet unsolved problems with + * handling stateful keys. The API for this function + * may change considerably in future versions. + * + * \note The seed must have at least 256 bits of entropy. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context to generate the key + * into. + * \param I_key_identifier The key identifier of the key, as a 16-byte string. + * \param q_leaf_identifier The leaf identifier of key. If this LMOTS key is + * not being used as part of an LMS key, this should + * be set to 0. + * \param seed The seed used to deterministically generate the + * key. + * \param seed_size The length of the seed. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_generate_private_key(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx, + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t type, + const unsigned char I_key_identifier[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN], + uint32_t q_leaf_identifier, + const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size); + +/** + * \brief This function generates an LMOTS public key from a + * LMOTS context that already contains a private key. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and the context must contain + * a private key. + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context to generate the key + * from and store it into. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_lmots_private_t *priv_ctx); + +/** + * \brief This function creates a LMOTS signature, using a + * LMOTS context that contains a private key. + * + * \note Before this function is called, the context must + * have been initialized and must contain a private + * key. + * + * \note LMOTS private keys can only be used once, otherwise + * attackers may be able to create forged signatures. + * If the signing operation is successful, the private + * key in the context will be erased, and no further + * signing will be possible until another private key + * is loaded + * + * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context from which the + * private key will be read. + * \param f_rng The RNG function to be used for signature + * generation. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to f_rng + * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read. + * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read. + * \param sig The buf into which the signature will be stored. + * Must be at least #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN in size. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A non-zero error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_lmots_sign(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len); + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LMOTS_H */ diff --git a/library/lms.c b/library/lms.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..8d3cae05249 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/lms.c @@ -0,0 +1,761 @@ +/* + * The LMS stateful-hash public-key signature scheme + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation + * of the LMS algorithm: + * + * [1] IETF RFC8554 + * D. McGrew, M. Curcio, S.Fluhrer + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8554 + * + * [2] NIST Special Publication 800-208 + * David A. Cooper et. al. + * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-208.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) + +#include + +#include "lmots.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/lms.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_lms_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_lms_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) + +#define SIG_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET (0) +#define SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET (SIG_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN) +#define SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(otstype) (SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(otstype)) +#define SIG_PATH_OFFSET(otstype) (SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(otstype) + \ + MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN) + +#define PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET (0) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_OTSTYPE_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_OTSTYPE_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) +#define PUBLIC_KEY_ROOT_NODE_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET + \ + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN) + + +/* Currently only support H=10 */ +#define H_TREE_HEIGHT_MAX 10 +#define MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(type) ((size_t) 1 << (MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type) + 1u)) +#define MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(type) ((size_t) 1 << MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type)) +#define MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(type) ((unsigned int) \ + (1u << MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type))) + +#define D_CONST_LEN (2) +static const unsigned char D_LEAF_CONSTANT_BYTES[D_CONST_LEN] = { 0x82, 0x82 }; +static const unsigned char D_INTR_CONSTANT_BYTES[D_CONST_LEN] = { 0x83, 0x83 }; + + +/* Calculate the value of a leaf node of the Merkle tree (which is a hash of a + * public key and some other parameters like the leaf index). This function + * implements RFC8554 section 5.3, in the case where r >= 2^h. + * + * params The LMS parameter set, the underlying LMOTS + * parameter set, and I value which describe the key + * being used. + * + * pub_key The public key of the private whose index + * corresponds to the index of this leaf node. This + * is a hash output. + * + * r_node_idx The index of this node in the Merkle tree. Note + * that the root node of the Merkle tree is + * 1-indexed. + * + * out The output node value, which is a hash output. + */ +static int create_merkle_leaf_value(const mbedtls_lms_parameters_t *params, + unsigned char *pub_key, + unsigned int r_node_idx, + unsigned char *out) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t op; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + unsigned char r_node_idx_bytes[4]; + + op = psa_hash_operation_init(); + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(r_node_idx, r_node_idx_bytes, 0); + status = psa_hash_update(&op, r_node_idx_bytes, 4); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, D_LEAF_CONSTANT_BYTES, D_CONST_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, pub_key, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->otstype)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, out, MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(params->type), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +/* Calculate the value of an internal node of the Merkle tree (which is a hash + * of a public key and some other parameters like the node index). This function + * implements RFC8554 section 5.3, in the case where r < 2^h. + * + * params The LMS parameter set, the underlying LMOTS + * parameter set, and I value which describe the key + * being used. + * + * left_node The value of the child of this node which is on + * the left-hand side. As with all nodes on the + * Merkle tree, this is a hash output. + * + * right_node The value of the child of this node which is on + * the right-hand side. As with all nodes on the + * Merkle tree, this is a hash output. + * + * r_node_idx The index of this node in the Merkle tree. Note + * that the root node of the Merkle tree is + * 1-indexed. + * + * out The output node value, which is a hash output. + */ +static int create_merkle_internal_value(const mbedtls_lms_parameters_t *params, + const unsigned char *left_node, + const unsigned char *right_node, + unsigned int r_node_idx, + unsigned char *out) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t op; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_hash_len; + unsigned char r_node_idx_bytes[4]; + + op = psa_hash_operation_init(); + status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(r_node_idx, r_node_idx_bytes, 0); + status = psa_hash_update(&op, r_node_idx_bytes, 4); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, D_INTR_CONSTANT_BYTES, D_CONST_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, left_node, + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(params->type)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&op, right_node, + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(params->type)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&op, out, MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(params->type), + &output_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&op); + + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +void mbedtls_lms_public_init(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +void mbedtls_lms_public_free(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +int mbedtls_lms_import_public_key(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t key_size) +{ + mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t type; + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t otstype; + + type = (mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET); + if (type != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + ctx->params.type = type; + + if (key_size != MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + otstype = (mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t) + MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, PUBLIC_KEY_OTSTYPE_OFFSET); + if (otstype != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + ctx->params.otstype = otstype; + + memcpy(ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + key + PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + memcpy(ctx->T_1_pub_key, key + PUBLIC_KEY_ROOT_NODE_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)); + + ctx->have_public_key = 1; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_lms_export_public_key(const mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + unsigned char *key, + size_t key_size, size_t *key_len) +{ + if (key_size < MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (!ctx->have_public_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.type, key, PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.otstype, key, PUBLIC_KEY_OTSTYPE_OFFSET); + memcpy(key + PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + memcpy(key +PUBLIC_KEY_ROOT_NODE_OFFSET, + ctx->T_1_pub_key, + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)); + + if (key_len != NULL) { + *key_len = MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_lms_verify(const mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size) +{ + unsigned int q_leaf_identifier; + unsigned char Kc_candidate_ots_pub_key[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX]; + unsigned char Tc_candidate_root_node[MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES_MAX]; + unsigned int height; + unsigned int curr_node_id; + unsigned int parent_node_id; + const unsigned char *left_node; + const unsigned char *right_node; + mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t ots_params; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (!ctx->have_public_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->params.type + != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->params.otstype + != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (sig_size != MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, ctx->params.otstype)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (sig_size < SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(sig, SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET) + != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (sig_size < SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype) + MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(sig, SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype)) + != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + + q_leaf_identifier = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(sig, SIG_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET); + + if (q_leaf_identifier >= MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(ots_params.I_key_identifier, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(q_leaf_identifier, ots_params.q_leaf_identifier, 0); + ots_params.type = ctx->params.otstype; + + ret = mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key_candidate(&ots_params, + msg, + msg_size, + sig + SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.otstype), + Kc_candidate_ots_pub_key, + sizeof(Kc_candidate_ots_pub_key), + NULL); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + create_merkle_leaf_value( + &ctx->params, + Kc_candidate_ots_pub_key, + MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) + q_leaf_identifier, + Tc_candidate_root_node); + + curr_node_id = MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) + + q_leaf_identifier; + + for (height = 0; height < MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(ctx->params.type); + height++) { + parent_node_id = curr_node_id / 2; + + /* Left/right node ordering matters for the hash */ + if (curr_node_id & 1) { + left_node = sig + SIG_PATH_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype) + + height * MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type); + right_node = Tc_candidate_root_node; + } else { + left_node = Tc_candidate_root_node; + right_node = sig + SIG_PATH_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype) + + height * MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type); + } + + create_merkle_internal_value(&ctx->params, left_node, right_node, + parent_node_id, Tc_candidate_root_node); + + curr_node_id /= 2; + } + + if (memcmp(Tc_candidate_root_node, ctx->T_1_pub_key, + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type))) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) + +/* Calculate a full Merkle tree based on a private key. This function + * implements RFC8554 section 5.3, and is used to generate a public key (as the + * public key is the root node of the Merkle tree). + * + * ctx The LMS private context, containing a parameter + * set and private key material consisting of both + * public and private OTS. + * + * tree The output tree, which is 2^(H + 1) hash outputs. + * In the case of H=10 we have 2048 tree nodes (of + * which 1024 of them are leaf nodes). Note that + * because the Merkle tree root is 1-indexed, the 0 + * index tree node is never used. + */ +static int calculate_merkle_tree(const mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx, + unsigned char *tree) +{ + unsigned int priv_key_idx; + unsigned int r_node_idx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* First create the leaf nodes, in ascending order */ + for (priv_key_idx = 0; + priv_key_idx < MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); + priv_key_idx++) { + r_node_idx = MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) + priv_key_idx; + + ret = create_merkle_leaf_value(&ctx->params, + ctx->ots_public_keys[priv_key_idx].public_key, + r_node_idx, + &tree[r_node_idx * MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES( + ctx->params.type)]); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + /* Then the internal nodes, in reverse order so that we can guarantee the + * parent has been created */ + for (r_node_idx = MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) - 1; + r_node_idx > 0; + r_node_idx--) { + ret = create_merkle_internal_value(&ctx->params, + &tree[(r_node_idx * 2) * + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)], + &tree[(r_node_idx * 2 + 1) * + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)], + r_node_idx, + &tree[r_node_idx * + MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)]); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Calculate a path from a leaf node of the Merkle tree to the root of the tree, + * and return the full path. This function implements RFC8554 section 5.4.1, as + * the Merkle path is the main component of an LMS signature. + * + * ctx The LMS private context, containing a parameter + * set and private key material consisting of both + * public and private OTS. + * + * leaf_node_id Which leaf node to calculate the path from. + * + * path The output path, which is H hash outputs. + */ +static int get_merkle_path(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx, + unsigned int leaf_node_id, + unsigned char *path) +{ + const size_t node_bytes = MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type); + unsigned int curr_node_id = leaf_node_id; + unsigned int adjacent_node_id; + unsigned char *tree = NULL; + unsigned int height; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + tree = mbedtls_calloc((size_t) MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type), + node_bytes); + if (tree == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + ret = calculate_merkle_tree(ctx, tree); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + for (height = 0; height < MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(ctx->params.type); + height++) { + adjacent_node_id = curr_node_id ^ 1; + + memcpy(&path[height * node_bytes], + &tree[adjacent_node_id * node_bytes], node_bytes); + + curr_node_id >>= 1; + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(tree, node_bytes * + (size_t) MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type)); + + return ret; +} + +void mbedtls_lms_private_init(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + +void mbedtls_lms_private_free(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx) +{ + unsigned int idx; + + if (ctx->have_private_key) { + if (ctx->ots_private_keys != NULL) { + for (idx = 0; idx < MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); idx++) { + mbedtls_lmots_private_free(&ctx->ots_private_keys[idx]); + } + } + + if (ctx->ots_public_keys != NULL) { + for (idx = 0; idx < MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); idx++) { + mbedtls_lmots_public_free(&ctx->ots_public_keys[idx]); + } + } + + mbedtls_free(ctx->ots_private_keys); + mbedtls_free(ctx->ots_public_keys); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); +} + + +int mbedtls_lms_generate_private_key(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx, + mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t type, + mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t otstype, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size) +{ + unsigned int idx = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (type != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (otstype != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->params.type = type; + ctx->params.otstype = otstype; + ctx->have_private_key = 1; + + ret = f_rng(p_rng, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Requires a cast to size_t to avoid an implicit cast warning on certain + * platforms (particularly Windows) */ + ctx->ots_private_keys = mbedtls_calloc((size_t) MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type), + sizeof(*ctx->ots_private_keys)); + if (ctx->ots_private_keys == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + /* Requires a cast to size_t to avoid an implicit cast warning on certain + * platforms (particularly Windows) */ + ctx->ots_public_keys = mbedtls_calloc((size_t) MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type), + sizeof(*ctx->ots_public_keys)); + if (ctx->ots_public_keys == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + for (idx = 0; idx < MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); idx++) { + mbedtls_lmots_private_init(&ctx->ots_private_keys[idx]); + mbedtls_lmots_public_init(&ctx->ots_public_keys[idx]); + } + + + for (idx = 0; idx < MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); idx++) { + ret = mbedtls_lmots_generate_private_key(&ctx->ots_private_keys[idx], + otstype, + ctx->params.I_key_identifier, + idx, seed, seed_size); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key(&ctx->ots_public_keys[idx], + &ctx->ots_private_keys[idx]); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + ctx->q_next_usable_key = 0; + +exit: + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_lms_private_free(ctx); + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_lms_calculate_public_key(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx, + const mbedtls_lms_private_t *priv_ctx) +{ + const size_t node_bytes = MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(priv_ctx->params.type); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *tree = NULL; + + if (!priv_ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (priv_ctx->params.type + != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (priv_ctx->params.otstype + != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + tree = mbedtls_calloc((size_t) MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(priv_ctx->params.type), + node_bytes); + if (tree == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(&ctx->params, &priv_ctx->params, + sizeof(mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t)); + + ret = calculate_merkle_tree(priv_ctx, tree); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Root node is always at position 1, due to 1-based indexing */ + memcpy(ctx->T_1_pub_key, &tree[node_bytes], node_bytes); + + ctx->have_public_key = 1; + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(tree, node_bytes * + (size_t) MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(priv_ctx->params.type)); + + return ret; +} + + +int mbedtls_lms_sign(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, const unsigned char *msg, + unsigned int msg_size, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *sig_len) +{ + uint32_t q_leaf_identifier; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (!ctx->have_private_key) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (sig_size < MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, ctx->params.otstype)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (ctx->params.type != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->params.otstype + != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->q_next_usable_key >= MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_OUT_OF_PRIVATE_KEYS; + } + + + q_leaf_identifier = ctx->q_next_usable_key; + /* This new value must _always_ be written back to the disk before the + * signature is returned. + */ + ctx->q_next_usable_key += 1; + + if (MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, ctx->params.otstype) + < SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = mbedtls_lmots_sign(&ctx->ots_private_keys[q_leaf_identifier], + f_rng, + p_rng, + msg, + msg_size, + sig + SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET, + MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, + ctx->params.otstype) - SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET, + NULL); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.type, sig, SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype)); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(q_leaf_identifier, sig, SIG_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET); + + ret = get_merkle_path(ctx, + MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) + q_leaf_identifier, + sig + SIG_PATH_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype)); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (sig_len != NULL) { + *sig_len = MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, ctx->params.otstype); + } + + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */ +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) */ diff --git a/library/md.c b/library/md.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..12a3ea2374a --- /dev/null +++ b/library/md.c @@ -0,0 +1,1108 @@ +/** + * \file md.c + * + * \brief Generic message digest wrapper for Mbed TLS + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +/* + * Availability of functions in this module is controlled by two + * feature macros: + * - MBEDTLS_MD_C enables the whole module; + * - MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT enables only functions for hashing and accessing + * most hash metadata (everything except string names); is it + * automatically set whenever MBEDTLS_MD_C is defined. + * + * In this file, functions from MD_LIGHT are at the top, MD_C at the end. + * + * In the future we may want to change the contract of some functions + * (behaviour with NULL arguments) depending on whether MD_C is defined or + * only MD_LIGHT. Also, the exact scope of MD_LIGHT might vary. + * + * For these reasons, we're keeping MD_LIGHT internal for now. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "md_wrap.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha3.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#include +#include "md_psa.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#endif + +/* See comment above MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE in md.h */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE < PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE +#error "Internal error: MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE < PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) +#define MD_INFO(type, out_size, block_size) type, out_size, block_size, +#else +#define MD_INFO(type, out_size, block_size) type, out_size, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, 16, 64) +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, 20, 64) +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, 64) +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, 28, 64) +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, 32, 64) +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, 48, 128) +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, 64, 128) +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha3_224_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224, 28, 144) +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha3_256_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256, 32, 136) +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha3_384_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384, 48, 104) +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) +static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha3_512_info = { + MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512, 64, 72) +}; +#endif + +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type) +{ + switch (md_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return &mbedtls_md5_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return &mbedtls_ripemd160_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return &mbedtls_sha1_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return &mbedtls_sha224_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return &mbedtls_sha256_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return &mbedtls_sha384_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return &mbedtls_sha512_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + return &mbedtls_sha3_224_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + return &mbedtls_sha3_256_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + return &mbedtls_sha3_384_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return &mbedtls_sha3_512_info; +#endif + default: + return NULL; + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) +static psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_of_md(const mbedtls_md_info_t *info) +{ + switch (info->type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return PSA_ALG_MD5; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return PSA_ALG_SHA_1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return PSA_ALG_SHA_224; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return PSA_ALG_SHA_256; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return PSA_ALG_SHA_384; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return PSA_ALG_SHA_512; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + return PSA_ALG_SHA3_224; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + return PSA_ALG_SHA3_256; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + return PSA_ALG_SHA3_384; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512_VIA_PSA) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return PSA_ALG_SHA3_512; +#endif + default: + return PSA_ALG_NONE; + } +} + +static int md_can_use_psa(const mbedtls_md_info_t *info) +{ + psa_algorithm_t alg = psa_alg_of_md(info); + if (alg == PSA_ALG_NONE) { + return 0; + } + + return psa_can_do_hash(alg); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA */ + +void mbedtls_md_init(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) +{ + /* Note: this sets engine (if present) to MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_LEGACY */ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_md_context_t)); +} + +void mbedtls_md_free(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL) { + return; + } + + if (ctx->md_ctx != NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_hash_abort(ctx->md_ctx); + } else +#endif + switch (ctx->md_info->type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_free(ctx->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_free(ctx->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + mbedtls_sha1_free(ctx->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + mbedtls_sha256_free(ctx->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + mbedtls_sha256_free(ctx->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + mbedtls_sha512_free(ctx->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + mbedtls_sha512_free(ctx->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + mbedtls_sha3_free(ctx->md_ctx); + break; +#endif + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + break; + } + mbedtls_free(ctx->md_ctx); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + if (ctx->hmac_ctx != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ctx->hmac_ctx, + 2 * ctx->md_info->block_size); + } +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_md_context_t)); +} + +int mbedtls_md_clone(mbedtls_md_context_t *dst, + const mbedtls_md_context_t *src) +{ + if (dst == NULL || dst->md_info == NULL || + src == NULL || src->md_info == NULL || + dst->md_info != src->md_info) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (src->engine != dst->engine) { + /* This can happen with src set to legacy because PSA wasn't ready + * yet, and dst to PSA because it became ready in the meantime. + * We currently don't support that case (we'd need to re-allocate + * md_ctx to the size of the appropriate MD context). */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + if (src->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_clone(src->md_ctx, dst->md_ctx); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } +#endif + + switch (src->md_info->type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + mbedtls_sha1_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + mbedtls_sha256_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + mbedtls_sha256_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + mbedtls_sha512_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + mbedtls_sha512_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + mbedtls_sha3_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx); + break; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} + +#define ALLOC(type) \ + do { \ + ctx->md_ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_##type##_context)); \ + if (ctx->md_ctx == NULL) \ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED; \ + mbedtls_##type##_init(ctx->md_ctx); \ + } \ + while (0) + +int mbedtls_md_setup(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int hmac) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + if (ctx == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->md_info = md_info; + ctx->md_ctx = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + ctx->hmac_ctx = NULL; +#else + if (hmac != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (md_can_use_psa(ctx->md_info)) { + ctx->md_ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(psa_hash_operation_t)); + if (ctx->md_ctx == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + ctx->engine = MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA; + } else +#endif + switch (md_info->type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + ALLOC(md5); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + ALLOC(ripemd160); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + ALLOC(sha1); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + ALLOC(sha256); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + ALLOC(sha256); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + ALLOC(sha512); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + ALLOC(sha512); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + ALLOC(sha3); + break; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + if (hmac != 0) { + ctx->hmac_ctx = mbedtls_calloc(2, md_info->block_size); + if (ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL) { + mbedtls_md_free(ctx); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + } +#endif + + return 0; +} +#undef ALLOC + +int mbedtls_md_starts(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_algorithm_t alg = psa_alg_of_md(ctx->md_info); + psa_hash_abort(ctx->md_ctx); + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_setup(ctx->md_ctx, alg); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } +#endif + + switch (ctx->md_info->type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return mbedtls_md5_starts(ctx->md_ctx); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(ctx->md_ctx); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return mbedtls_sha1_starts(ctx->md_ctx); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return mbedtls_sha256_starts(ctx->md_ctx, 1); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return mbedtls_sha256_starts(ctx->md_ctx, 0); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return mbedtls_sha512_starts(ctx->md_ctx, 1); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return mbedtls_sha512_starts(ctx->md_ctx, 0); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + return mbedtls_sha3_starts(ctx->md_ctx, MBEDTLS_SHA3_224); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + return mbedtls_sha3_starts(ctx->md_ctx, MBEDTLS_SHA3_256); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + return mbedtls_sha3_starts(ctx->md_ctx, MBEDTLS_SHA3_384); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return mbedtls_sha3_starts(ctx->md_ctx, MBEDTLS_SHA3_512); +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +int mbedtls_md_update(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) { + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } +#endif + + switch (ctx->md_info->type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return mbedtls_md5_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return mbedtls_ripemd160_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return mbedtls_sha1_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return mbedtls_sha256_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return mbedtls_sha256_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return mbedtls_sha512_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return mbedtls_sha512_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return mbedtls_sha3_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen); +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +int mbedtls_md_finish(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) { + size_t size = ctx->md_info->size; + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_finish(ctx->md_ctx, + output, size, &size); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } +#endif + + switch (ctx->md_info->type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return mbedtls_md5_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return mbedtls_sha1_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return mbedtls_sha256_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return mbedtls_sha256_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return mbedtls_sha512_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return mbedtls_sha512_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return mbedtls_sha3_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output, ctx->md_info->size); +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +int mbedtls_md(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output) +{ + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA) + if (md_can_use_psa(md_info)) { + size_t size = md_info->size; + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_compute(psa_alg_of_md(md_info), + input, ilen, + output, size, &size); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } +#endif + + switch (md_info->type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return mbedtls_md5(input, ilen, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return mbedtls_ripemd160(input, ilen, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return mbedtls_sha1(input, ilen, output); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return mbedtls_sha256(input, ilen, output, 1); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return mbedtls_sha256(input, ilen, output, 0); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return mbedtls_sha512(input, ilen, output, 1); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return mbedtls_sha512(input, ilen, output, 0); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + return mbedtls_sha3(MBEDTLS_SHA3_224, input, ilen, output, md_info->size); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + return mbedtls_sha3(MBEDTLS_SHA3_256, input, ilen, output, md_info->size); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + return mbedtls_sha3(MBEDTLS_SHA3_384, input, ilen, output, md_info->size); + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return mbedtls_sha3(MBEDTLS_SHA3_512, input, ilen, output, md_info->size); +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) +{ + if (md_info == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return md_info->size; +} + +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) +{ + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + } + + return md_info->type; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +int mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status) +{ + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, psa_to_md_errors, + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + + +/************************************************************************ + * Functions above this separator are part of MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT, * + * functions below are only available when MBEDTLS_MD_C is set. * + ************************************************************************/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + +/* + * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new hash! + */ +static const int supported_digests[] = { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512, +#endif + + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE +}; + +const int *mbedtls_md_list(void) +{ + return supported_digests; +} + +typedef struct { + const char *md_name; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; +} md_name_entry; + +static const md_name_entry md_names[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + { "MD5", MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) + { "RIPEMD160", MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { "SHA1", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 }, + { "SHA", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 }, // compatibility fallback +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + { "SHA224", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { "SHA256", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { "SHA384", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + { "SHA512", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) + { "SHA3-224", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) + { "SHA3-256", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) + { "SHA3-384", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) + { "SHA3-512", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512 }, +#endif + { NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE }, +}; + +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string(const char *md_name) +{ + if (NULL == md_name) { + return NULL; + } + + const md_name_entry *entry = md_names; + while (entry->md_name != NULL && + strcmp(entry->md_name, md_name) != 0) { + ++entry; + } + + return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(entry->md_type); +} + +const char *mbedtls_md_get_name(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info) +{ + if (md_info == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + const md_name_entry *entry = md_names; + while (entry->md_type != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && + entry->md_type != md_info->type) { + ++entry; + } + + return entry->md_name; +} + +const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_ctx( + const mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_info); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_md_file(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *path, unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + FILE *f; + size_t n; + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + + mbedtls_md_init(&ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&ctx)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + while ((n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f)) > 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ctx, buf, n)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + } + + if (ferror(f) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&ctx, output); + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + fclose(f); + mbedtls_md_free(&ctx); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char sum[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *ipad, *opad; + + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (keylen > (size_t) ctx->md_info->block_size) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(ctx)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(ctx, key, keylen)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, sum)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + keylen = ctx->md_info->size; + key = sum; + } + + ipad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx; + opad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx + ctx->md_info->block_size; + + memset(ipad, 0x36, ctx->md_info->block_size); + memset(opad, 0x5C, ctx->md_info->block_size); + + mbedtls_xor(ipad, ipad, key, keylen); + mbedtls_xor(opad, opad, key, keylen); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(ctx)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(ctx, ipad, + ctx->md_info->block_size)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sum, sizeof(sum)); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_md_hmac_update(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen) +{ + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return mbedtls_md_update(ctx, input, ilen); +} + +int mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *opad; + + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + opad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx + ctx->md_info->block_size; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, tmp)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(ctx)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(ctx, opad, + ctx->md_info->block_size)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(ctx, tmp, + ctx->md_info->size)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + return mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, output); +} + +int mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *ipad; + + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ipad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(ctx)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + return mbedtls_md_update(ctx, ipad, ctx->md_info->block_size); +} + +int mbedtls_md_hmac(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output) +{ + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&ctx, key, keylen)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_md_free(&ctx); + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT */ diff --git a/library/md5.c b/library/md5.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e4a87a2e093 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/md5.c @@ -0,0 +1,426 @@ +/* + * RFC 1321 compliant MD5 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * The MD5 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1991. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) + +void mbedtls_md5_init(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_md5_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_md5_free(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_md5_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_md5_clone(mbedtls_md5_context *dst, + const mbedtls_md5_context *src) +{ + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * MD5 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_md5_starts(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; + ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; + + return 0; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_md5_process(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64]) +{ + struct { + uint32_t X[16], A, B, C, D; + } local; + + local.X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 0); + local.X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 4); + local.X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 8); + local.X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 12); + local.X[4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 16); + local.X[5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 20); + local.X[6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 24); + local.X[7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 28); + local.X[8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 32); + local.X[9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 36); + local.X[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 40); + local.X[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 44); + local.X[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 48); + local.X[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 52); + local.X[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 56); + local.X[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 60); + +#define S(x, n) \ + (((x) << (n)) | (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - (n)))) + +#define P(a, b, c, d, k, s, t) \ + do \ + { \ + (a) += F((b), (c), (d)) + local.X[(k)] + (t); \ + (a) = S((a), (s)) + (b); \ + } while (0) + + local.A = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = ctx->state[3]; + +#define F(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) + + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 0, 7, 0xD76AA478); + P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 1, 12, 0xE8C7B756); + P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 2, 17, 0x242070DB); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 3, 22, 0xC1BDCEEE); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 4, 7, 0xF57C0FAF); + P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 5, 12, 0x4787C62A); + P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 6, 17, 0xA8304613); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 7, 22, 0xFD469501); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 8, 7, 0x698098D8); + P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 9, 12, 0x8B44F7AF); + P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 10, 17, 0xFFFF5BB1); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 11, 22, 0x895CD7BE); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 12, 7, 0x6B901122); + P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 13, 12, 0xFD987193); + P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 14, 17, 0xA679438E); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 15, 22, 0x49B40821); + +#undef F + +#define F(x, y, z) ((y) ^ ((z) & ((x) ^ (y)))) + + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 1, 5, 0xF61E2562); + P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 6, 9, 0xC040B340); + P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 11, 14, 0x265E5A51); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 0, 20, 0xE9B6C7AA); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 5, 0xD62F105D); + P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 10, 9, 0x02441453); + P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 15, 14, 0xD8A1E681); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 4, 20, 0xE7D3FBC8); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 5, 0x21E1CDE6); + P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 14, 9, 0xC33707D6); + P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 3, 14, 0xF4D50D87); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 8, 20, 0x455A14ED); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 13, 5, 0xA9E3E905); + P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 2, 9, 0xFCEFA3F8); + P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 7, 14, 0x676F02D9); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 12, 20, 0x8D2A4C8A); + +#undef F + +#define F(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) + + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 4, 0xFFFA3942); + P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 8, 11, 0x8771F681); + P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 11, 16, 0x6D9D6122); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 14, 23, 0xFDE5380C); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 1, 4, 0xA4BEEA44); + P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 4, 11, 0x4BDECFA9); + P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 7, 16, 0xF6BB4B60); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 10, 23, 0xBEBFBC70); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 13, 4, 0x289B7EC6); + P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 0, 11, 0xEAA127FA); + P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 3, 16, 0xD4EF3085); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 6, 23, 0x04881D05); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 4, 0xD9D4D039); + P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 12, 11, 0xE6DB99E5); + P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 15, 16, 0x1FA27CF8); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 2, 23, 0xC4AC5665); + +#undef F + +#define F(x, y, z) ((y) ^ ((x) | ~(z))) + + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 0, 6, 0xF4292244); + P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 7, 10, 0x432AFF97); + P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 14, 15, 0xAB9423A7); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 5, 21, 0xFC93A039); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 12, 6, 0x655B59C3); + P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 3, 10, 0x8F0CCC92); + P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 10, 15, 0xFFEFF47D); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 1, 21, 0x85845DD1); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 8, 6, 0x6FA87E4F); + P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 15, 10, 0xFE2CE6E0); + P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 6, 15, 0xA3014314); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 13, 21, 0x4E0811A1); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 4, 6, 0xF7537E82); + P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 11, 10, 0xBD3AF235); + P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 2, 15, 0x2AD7D2BB); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 9, 21, 0xEB86D391); + +#undef F + + ctx->state[0] += local.A; + ctx->state[1] += local.B; + ctx->state[2] += local.C; + ctx->state[3] += local.D; + + /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&local, sizeof(local)); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * MD5 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_md5_update(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + uint32_t left; + + if (ilen == 0) { + return 0; + } + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if (ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen) { + ctx->total[1]++; + } + + if (left && ilen >= fill) { + memcpy((void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill); + if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while (ilen >= 64) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process(ctx, input)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if (ilen > 0) { + memcpy((void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * MD5 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_md5_finish(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[16]) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t used; + uint32_t high, low; + + /* + * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length + */ + used = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + + ctx->buffer[used++] = 0x80; + + if (used <= 56) { + /* Enough room for padding + length in current block */ + memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 56 - used); + } else { + /* We'll need an extra block */ + memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + memset(ctx->buffer, 0, 56); + } + + /* + * Add message length + */ + high = (ctx->total[0] >> 29) + | (ctx->total[1] << 3); + low = (ctx->total[0] << 3); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(low, ctx->buffer, 56); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(high, ctx->buffer, 60); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Output final state + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[0], output, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[1], output, 4); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[2], output, 8); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_md5_free(ctx); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ + +/* + * output = MD5( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_md5(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[16]) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md5_context ctx; + + mbedtls_md5_init(&ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_starts(&ctx)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md5_free(&ctx); + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * RFC 1321 test vectors + */ +static const unsigned char md5_test_buf[7][81] = +{ + { "" }, + { "a" }, + { "abc" }, + { "message digest" }, + { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, + { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, + { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" } +}; + +static const size_t md5_test_buflen[7] = +{ + 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 62, 80 +}; + +static const unsigned char md5_test_sum[7][16] = +{ + { 0xD4, 0x1D, 0x8C, 0xD9, 0x8F, 0x00, 0xB2, 0x04, + 0xE9, 0x80, 0x09, 0x98, 0xEC, 0xF8, 0x42, 0x7E }, + { 0x0C, 0xC1, 0x75, 0xB9, 0xC0, 0xF1, 0xB6, 0xA8, + 0x31, 0xC3, 0x99, 0xE2, 0x69, 0x77, 0x26, 0x61 }, + { 0x90, 0x01, 0x50, 0x98, 0x3C, 0xD2, 0x4F, 0xB0, + 0xD6, 0x96, 0x3F, 0x7D, 0x28, 0xE1, 0x7F, 0x72 }, + { 0xF9, 0x6B, 0x69, 0x7D, 0x7C, 0xB7, 0x93, 0x8D, + 0x52, 0x5A, 0x2F, 0x31, 0xAA, 0xF1, 0x61, 0xD0 }, + { 0xC3, 0xFC, 0xD3, 0xD7, 0x61, 0x92, 0xE4, 0x00, + 0x7D, 0xFB, 0x49, 0x6C, 0xCA, 0x67, 0xE1, 0x3B }, + { 0xD1, 0x74, 0xAB, 0x98, 0xD2, 0x77, 0xD9, 0xF5, + 0xA5, 0x61, 0x1C, 0x2C, 0x9F, 0x41, 0x9D, 0x9F }, + { 0x57, 0xED, 0xF4, 0xA2, 0x2B, 0xE3, 0xC9, 0x55, + 0xAC, 0x49, 0xDA, 0x2E, 0x21, 0x07, 0xB6, 0x7A } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_md5_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char md5sum[16]; + + for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" MD5 test #%d: ", i + 1); + } + + ret = mbedtls_md5(md5_test_buf[i], md5_test_buflen[i], md5sum); + if (ret != 0) { + goto fail; + } + + if (memcmp(md5sum, md5_test_sum[i], 16) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return 0; + +fail: + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ diff --git a/library/md_psa.h b/library/md_psa.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..028ba2409cd --- /dev/null +++ b/library/md_psa.h @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/** + * Translation between MD and PSA identifiers (algorithms, errors). + * + * Note: this internal module will go away when everything becomes based on + * PSA Crypto; it is a helper for the transition period. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_PSA_H +#define MBEDTLS_MD_PSA_H + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +/** Convert PSA status to MD error code. + * + * \param status PSA status. + * + * \return The corresponding MD error code, + */ +int mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_PSA_H */ diff --git a/library/md_wrap.h b/library/md_wrap.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..dad123540a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/md_wrap.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/** + * \file md_wrap.h + * + * \brief Message digest wrappers. + * + * \warning This in an internal header. Do not include directly. + * + * \author Adriaan de Jong + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H +#define MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * Message digest information. + * Allows message digest functions to be called in a generic way. + */ +struct mbedtls_md_info_t { + /** Digest identifier */ + mbedtls_md_type_t type; + + /** Output length of the digest function in bytes */ + unsigned char size; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + /** Block length of the digest function in bytes */ + unsigned char block_size; +#endif +}; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H */ diff --git a/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c b/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..79b0a8b8fa9 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c @@ -0,0 +1,745 @@ +/* + * Buffer-based memory allocator + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) +#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h" + +/* No need for the header guard as MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C + is dependent upon MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +#define MAGIC1 0xFF00AA55 +#define MAGIC2 0xEE119966 +#define MAX_BT 20 + +typedef struct _memory_header memory_header; +struct _memory_header { + size_t magic1; + size_t size; + size_t alloc; + memory_header *prev; + memory_header *next; + memory_header *prev_free; + memory_header *next_free; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + char **trace; + size_t trace_count; +#endif + size_t magic2; +}; + +typedef struct { + unsigned char *buf; + size_t len; + memory_header *first; + memory_header *first_free; + int verify; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + size_t alloc_count; + size_t free_count; + size_t total_used; + size_t maximum_used; + size_t header_count; + size_t maximum_header_count; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex; +#endif +} +buffer_alloc_ctx; + +static buffer_alloc_ctx heap; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) +static void debug_header(memory_header *hdr) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + size_t i; +#endif + + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "HDR: PTR(%10zu), PREV(%10zu), NEXT(%10zu), " + "ALLOC(%zu), SIZE(%10zu)\n", + (size_t) hdr, (size_t) hdr->prev, (size_t) hdr->next, + hdr->alloc, hdr->size); + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, " FPREV(%10zu), FNEXT(%10zu)\n", + (size_t) hdr->prev_free, (size_t) hdr->next_free); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "TRACE: \n"); + for (i = 0; i < hdr->trace_count; i++) { + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", hdr->trace[i]); + } + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "\n"); +#endif +} + +static void debug_chain(void) +{ + memory_header *cur = heap.first; + + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "\nBlock list\n"); + while (cur != NULL) { + debug_header(cur); + cur = cur->next; + } + + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "Free list\n"); + cur = heap.first_free; + + while (cur != NULL) { + debug_header(cur); + cur = cur->next_free; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ + +static int verify_header(memory_header *hdr) +{ + if (hdr->magic1 != MAGIC1) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: MAGIC1 mismatch\n"); +#endif + return 1; + } + + if (hdr->magic2 != MAGIC2) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: MAGIC2 mismatch\n"); +#endif + return 1; + } + + if (hdr->alloc > 1) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: alloc has illegal value\n"); +#endif + return 1; + } + + if (hdr->prev != NULL && hdr->prev == hdr->next) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: prev == next\n"); +#endif + return 1; + } + + if (hdr->prev_free != NULL && hdr->prev_free == hdr->next_free) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: prev_free == next_free\n"); +#endif + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int verify_chain(void) +{ + memory_header *prv = heap.first, *cur; + + if (prv == NULL || verify_header(prv) != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: verification of first header " + "failed\n"); +#endif + return 1; + } + + if (heap.first->prev != NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: verification failed: " + "first->prev != NULL\n"); +#endif + return 1; + } + + cur = heap.first->next; + + while (cur != NULL) { + if (verify_header(cur) != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: verification of header " + "failed\n"); +#endif + return 1; + } + + if (cur->prev != prv) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: verification failed: " + "cur->prev != prv\n"); +#endif + return 1; + } + + prv = cur; + cur = cur->next; + } + + return 0; +} + +static void *buffer_alloc_calloc(size_t n, size_t size) +{ + memory_header *new, *cur = heap.first_free; + unsigned char *p; + void *ret; + size_t original_len, len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + void *trace_buffer[MAX_BT]; + size_t trace_cnt; +#endif + + if (heap.buf == NULL || heap.first == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + original_len = len = n * size; + + if (n == 0 || size == 0 || len / n != size) { + return NULL; + } else if (len > (size_t) -MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE) { + return NULL; + } + + if (len % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE) { + len -= len % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE; + len += MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE; + } + + // Find block that fits + // + while (cur != NULL) { + if (cur->size >= len) { + break; + } + + cur = cur->next_free; + } + + if (cur == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + if (cur->alloc != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: block in free_list but allocated " + "data\n"); +#endif + mbedtls_exit(1); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.alloc_count++; +#endif + + // Found location, split block if > memory_header + 4 room left + // + if (cur->size - len < sizeof(memory_header) + + MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE) { + cur->alloc = 1; + + // Remove from free_list + // + if (cur->prev_free != NULL) { + cur->prev_free->next_free = cur->next_free; + } else { + heap.first_free = cur->next_free; + } + + if (cur->next_free != NULL) { + cur->next_free->prev_free = cur->prev_free; + } + + cur->prev_free = NULL; + cur->next_free = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.total_used += cur->size; + if (heap.total_used > heap.maximum_used) { + heap.maximum_used = heap.total_used; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + trace_cnt = backtrace(trace_buffer, MAX_BT); + cur->trace = backtrace_symbols(trace_buffer, trace_cnt); + cur->trace_count = trace_cnt; +#endif + + if ((heap.verify & MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC) && verify_chain() != 0) { + mbedtls_exit(1); + } + + ret = (unsigned char *) cur + sizeof(memory_header); + memset(ret, 0, original_len); + + return ret; + } + + p = ((unsigned char *) cur) + sizeof(memory_header) + len; + new = (memory_header *) p; + + new->size = cur->size - len - sizeof(memory_header); + new->alloc = 0; + new->prev = cur; + new->next = cur->next; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + new->trace = NULL; + new->trace_count = 0; +#endif + new->magic1 = MAGIC1; + new->magic2 = MAGIC2; + + if (new->next != NULL) { + new->next->prev = new; + } + + // Replace cur with new in free_list + // + new->prev_free = cur->prev_free; + new->next_free = cur->next_free; + if (new->prev_free != NULL) { + new->prev_free->next_free = new; + } else { + heap.first_free = new; + } + + if (new->next_free != NULL) { + new->next_free->prev_free = new; + } + + cur->alloc = 1; + cur->size = len; + cur->next = new; + cur->prev_free = NULL; + cur->next_free = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.header_count++; + if (heap.header_count > heap.maximum_header_count) { + heap.maximum_header_count = heap.header_count; + } + heap.total_used += cur->size; + if (heap.total_used > heap.maximum_used) { + heap.maximum_used = heap.total_used; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + trace_cnt = backtrace(trace_buffer, MAX_BT); + cur->trace = backtrace_symbols(trace_buffer, trace_cnt); + cur->trace_count = trace_cnt; +#endif + + if ((heap.verify & MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC) && verify_chain() != 0) { + mbedtls_exit(1); + } + + ret = (unsigned char *) cur + sizeof(memory_header); + memset(ret, 0, original_len); + + return ret; +} + +static void buffer_alloc_free(void *ptr) +{ + memory_header *hdr, *old = NULL; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) ptr; + + if (ptr == NULL || heap.buf == NULL || heap.first == NULL) { + return; + } + + if (p < heap.buf || p >= heap.buf + heap.len) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: mbedtls_free() outside of managed " + "space\n"); +#endif + mbedtls_exit(1); + } + + p -= sizeof(memory_header); + hdr = (memory_header *) p; + + if (verify_header(hdr) != 0) { + mbedtls_exit(1); + } + + if (hdr->alloc != 1) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: mbedtls_free() on unallocated " + "data\n"); +#endif + mbedtls_exit(1); + } + + hdr->alloc = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.free_count++; + heap.total_used -= hdr->size; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + free(hdr->trace); + hdr->trace = NULL; + hdr->trace_count = 0; +#endif + + // Regroup with block before + // + if (hdr->prev != NULL && hdr->prev->alloc == 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.header_count--; +#endif + hdr->prev->size += sizeof(memory_header) + hdr->size; + hdr->prev->next = hdr->next; + old = hdr; + hdr = hdr->prev; + + if (hdr->next != NULL) { + hdr->next->prev = hdr; + } + + memset(old, 0, sizeof(memory_header)); + } + + // Regroup with block after + // + if (hdr->next != NULL && hdr->next->alloc == 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.header_count--; +#endif + hdr->size += sizeof(memory_header) + hdr->next->size; + old = hdr->next; + hdr->next = hdr->next->next; + + if (hdr->prev_free != NULL || hdr->next_free != NULL) { + if (hdr->prev_free != NULL) { + hdr->prev_free->next_free = hdr->next_free; + } else { + heap.first_free = hdr->next_free; + } + + if (hdr->next_free != NULL) { + hdr->next_free->prev_free = hdr->prev_free; + } + } + + hdr->prev_free = old->prev_free; + hdr->next_free = old->next_free; + + if (hdr->prev_free != NULL) { + hdr->prev_free->next_free = hdr; + } else { + heap.first_free = hdr; + } + + if (hdr->next_free != NULL) { + hdr->next_free->prev_free = hdr; + } + + if (hdr->next != NULL) { + hdr->next->prev = hdr; + } + + memset(old, 0, sizeof(memory_header)); + } + + // Prepend to free_list if we have not merged + // (Does not have to stay in same order as prev / next list) + // + if (old == NULL) { + hdr->next_free = heap.first_free; + if (heap.first_free != NULL) { + heap.first_free->prev_free = hdr; + } + heap.first_free = hdr; + } + + if ((heap.verify & MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE) && verify_chain() != 0) { + mbedtls_exit(1); + } +} + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify(int verify) +{ + heap.verify = verify; +} + +int mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify(void) +{ + return verify_chain(); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status(void) +{ + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, + "Current use: %zu blocks / %zu bytes, max: %zu blocks / " + "%zu bytes (total %zu bytes), alloc / free: %zu / %zu\n", + heap.header_count, heap.total_used, + heap.maximum_header_count, heap.maximum_used, + heap.maximum_header_count * sizeof(memory_header) + + heap.maximum_used, + heap.alloc_count, heap.free_count); + + if (heap.first->next == NULL) { + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "All memory de-allocated in stack buffer\n"); + } else { + mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "Memory currently allocated:\n"); + debug_chain(); + } +} + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_count_get(size_t *alloc_count, size_t *free_count) +{ + *alloc_count = heap.alloc_count; + *free_count = heap.free_count; +} + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get(size_t *max_used, size_t *max_blocks) +{ + *max_used = heap.maximum_used; + *max_blocks = heap.maximum_header_count; +} + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset(void) +{ + heap.maximum_used = 0; + heap.maximum_header_count = 0; +} + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get(size_t *cur_used, size_t *cur_blocks) +{ + *cur_used = heap.total_used; + *cur_blocks = heap.header_count; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +static void *buffer_alloc_calloc_mutexed(size_t n, size_t size) +{ + void *buf; + if (mbedtls_mutex_lock(&heap.mutex) != 0) { + return NULL; + } + buf = buffer_alloc_calloc(n, size); + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&heap.mutex)) { + return NULL; + } + return buf; +} + +static void buffer_alloc_free_mutexed(void *ptr) +{ + /* We have no good option here, but corrupting the heap seems + * worse than losing memory. */ + if (mbedtls_mutex_lock(&heap.mutex)) { + return; + } + buffer_alloc_free(ptr); + (void) mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&heap.mutex); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init(unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + memset(&heap, 0, sizeof(buffer_alloc_ctx)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init(&heap.mutex); + mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free(buffer_alloc_calloc_mutexed, + buffer_alloc_free_mutexed); +#else + mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free(buffer_alloc_calloc, buffer_alloc_free); +#endif + + if (len < sizeof(memory_header) + MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE) { + return; + } else if ((size_t) buf % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE) { + /* Adjust len first since buf is used in the computation */ + len -= MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE + - (size_t) buf % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE; + buf += MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE + - (size_t) buf % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE; + } + + memset(buf, 0, len); + + heap.buf = buf; + heap.len = len; + + heap.first = (memory_header *) buf; + heap.first->size = len - sizeof(memory_header); + heap.first->magic1 = MAGIC1; + heap.first->magic2 = MAGIC2; + heap.first_free = heap.first; +} + +void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free(void) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free(&heap.mutex); +#endif + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&heap, sizeof(buffer_alloc_ctx)); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +static int check_pointer(void *p) +{ + if (p == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + if ((size_t) p % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE != 0) { + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int check_all_free(void) +{ + if ( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + heap.total_used != 0 || +#endif + heap.first != heap.first_free || + (void *) heap.first != (void *) heap.buf) { + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +#define TEST_ASSERT(condition) \ + if (!(condition)) \ + { \ + if (verbose != 0) \ + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); \ + \ + ret = 1; \ + goto cleanup; \ + } + +int mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test(int verbose) +{ + unsigned char buf[1024]; + unsigned char *p, *q, *r, *end; + int ret = 0; + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" MBA test #1 (basic alloc-free cycle): "); + } + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init(buf, sizeof(buf)); + + p = mbedtls_calloc(1, 1); + q = mbedtls_calloc(1, 128); + r = mbedtls_calloc(1, 16); + + TEST_ASSERT(check_pointer(p) == 0 && + check_pointer(q) == 0 && + check_pointer(r) == 0); + + mbedtls_free(r); + mbedtls_free(q); + mbedtls_free(p); + + TEST_ASSERT(check_all_free() == 0); + + /* Memorize end to compare with the next test */ + end = heap.buf + heap.len; + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free(); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" MBA test #2 (buf not aligned): "); + } + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init(buf + 1, sizeof(buf) - 1); + + TEST_ASSERT(heap.buf + heap.len == end); + + p = mbedtls_calloc(1, 1); + q = mbedtls_calloc(1, 128); + r = mbedtls_calloc(1, 16); + + TEST_ASSERT(check_pointer(p) == 0 && + check_pointer(q) == 0 && + check_pointer(r) == 0); + + mbedtls_free(r); + mbedtls_free(q); + mbedtls_free(p); + + TEST_ASSERT(check_all_free() == 0); + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free(); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" MBA test #3 (full): "); + } + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init(buf, sizeof(buf)); + + p = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(buf) - sizeof(memory_header)); + + TEST_ASSERT(check_pointer(p) == 0); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_calloc(1, 1) == NULL); + + mbedtls_free(p); + + p = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(buf) - 2 * sizeof(memory_header) - 16); + q = mbedtls_calloc(1, 16); + + TEST_ASSERT(check_pointer(p) == 0 && check_pointer(q) == 0); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_calloc(1, 1) == NULL); + + mbedtls_free(q); + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_calloc(1, 17) == NULL); + + mbedtls_free(p); + + TEST_ASSERT(check_all_free() == 0); + + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free(); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free(); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C */ diff --git a/library/mps_common.h b/library/mps_common.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f9fe0998804 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/mps_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,181 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/** + * \file mps_common.h + * + * \brief Common functions and macros used by MPS + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H + +#include "mps_error.h" + +#include + +/** + * \name SECTION: MPS Configuration + * + * \{ + */ + +/*! This flag controls whether the MPS-internal components + * (reader, writer, Layer 1-3) perform validation of the + * expected abstract state at the entry of API calls. + * + * Context: All MPS API functions impose assumptions/preconditions on the + * context on which they operate. For example, every structure has a notion of + * state integrity which is established by `xxx_init()` and preserved by any + * calls to the MPS API which satisfy their preconditions and either succeed, + * or fail with an error code which is explicitly documented to not corrupt + * structure integrity (such as WANT_READ and WANT_WRITE); + * apart from `xxx_init()` any function assumes state integrity as a + * precondition (but usually more). If any of the preconditions is violated, + * the function's behavior is entirely undefined. + * In addition to state integrity, all MPS structures have a more refined + * notion of abstract state that the API operates on. For example, all layers + * have a notion of 'abstract read state' which indicates if incoming data has + * been passed to the user, e.g. through mps_l2_read_start() for Layer 2 + * or mps_l3_read() in Layer 3. After such a call, it doesn't make sense to + * call these reading functions again until the incoming data has been + * explicitly 'consumed', e.g. through mps_l2_read_consume() for Layer 2 or + * mps_l3_read_consume() on Layer 3. However, even if it doesn't make sense, + * it's a design choice whether the API should fail gracefully on such + * non-sensical calls or not, and that's what this option is about: + * + * This option determines whether the expected abstract state + * is part of the API preconditions or not: If the option is set, + * then the abstract state is not part of the precondition and is + * thus required to be validated by the implementation. If an unexpected + * abstract state is encountered, the implementation must fail gracefully + * with error #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED. + * Conversely, if this option is not set, then the expected abstract state + * is included in the preconditions of the respective API calls, and + * an implementation's behaviour is undefined if the abstract state is + * not as expected. + * + * For example: Enabling this makes mps_l2_read_done() fail if + * no incoming record is currently open; disabling this would + * lead to undefined behavior in this case. + * + * Comment this to remove state validation. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION + +/*! This flag enables/disables assertions on the internal state of MPS. + * + * Assertions are sanity checks that should never trigger when MPS + * is used within the bounds of its API and preconditions. + * + * Enabling this increases security by limiting the scope of + * potential bugs, but comes at the cost of increased code size. + * + * Note: So far, there is no guiding principle as to what + * expected conditions merit an assertion, and which don't. + * + * Comment this to disable assertions. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS + +/*! This flag controls whether tracing for MPS should be enabled. */ +//#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW(cond, string) \ + do \ + { \ + if (!(cond)) \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, string); \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW(cond, string) \ + do \ + { \ + (cond); \ + } while (0) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ASSERT_RAW(cond, string) \ + do \ + { \ + if (!(cond)) \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, string); \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_INTERNAL_ERROR); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ASSERT_RAW(cond, string) do {} while (0) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */ + + +/* \} name SECTION: MPS Configuration */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: Common types + * + * Various common types used throughout MPS. + * \{ + */ + +/** \brief The type of buffer sizes and offsets used in MPS structures. + * + * This is an unsigned integer type that should be large enough to + * hold the length of any buffer or message processed by MPS. + * + * The reason to pick a value as small as possible here is + * to reduce the size of MPS structures. + * + * \warning Care has to be taken when using a narrower type + * than ::mbedtls_mps_size_t here because of + * potential truncation during conversion. + * + * \warning Handshake messages in TLS may be up to 2^24 ~ 16Mb in size. + * If mbedtls_mps_[opt_]stored_size_t is smaller than that, the + * maximum handshake message is restricted accordingly. + * + * For now, we use the default type of size_t throughout, and the use of + * smaller types or different types for ::mbedtls_mps_size_t and + * ::mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t is not yet supported. + * + */ +typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t; +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX (SIZE_MAX) + +/** \brief The type of buffer sizes and offsets used in the MPS API + * and implementation. + * + * This must be at least as wide as ::mbedtls_stored_size_t but + * may be chosen to be strictly larger if more suitable for the + * target architecture. + * + * For example, in a test build for ARM Thumb, using uint_fast16_t + * instead of uint16_t reduced the code size from 1060 Byte to 962 Byte, + * so almost 10%. + */ +typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_size_t; +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX (SIZE_MAX) + +#if MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX > MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX +#error "Misconfiguration of mbedtls_mps_size_t and mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t." +#endif + +/* \} SECTION: Common types */ + + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/library/mps_error.h b/library/mps_error.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..016a84ce49e --- /dev/null +++ b/library/mps_error.h @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/** + * \file mps_error.h + * + * \brief Error codes used by MPS + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H + + +/* TODO: The error code allocation needs to be revisited: + * + * - Should we make (some of) the MPS Reader error codes public? + * If so, we need to adjust MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR() to hit + * a gap in the Mbed TLS public error space. + * If not, we have to make sure we don't forward those errors + * at the level of the public API -- no risk at the moment as + * long as MPS is an experimental component not accessible from + * public API. + */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: MPS general error codes + * + * \{ + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE (0) +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR(code) \ + (-(MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE | (code))) + +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR(0x1) +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR(0x2) + +/* \} name SECTION: MPS general error codes */ + +/** + * \name SECTION: MPS Reader error codes + * + * \{ + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE (1 << 8) +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(code) \ + (-(MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE | (code))) + +/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because + * the user hasn't yet read and committed all of it. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_DATA_LEFT MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(0x1) + +/*! An invalid argument was passed to the reader. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INVALID_ARG MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(0x2) + +/*! An attempt to move a reader to consuming mode through mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() + * after pausing failed because the provided data is not sufficient to serve the + * read requests that led to the pausing. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(0x3) + +/*! A get request failed because not enough data is available in the reader. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(0x4) + +/*!< A get request after pausing and reactivating the reader failed because + * the request is not in line with the request made prior to pausing. The user + * must not change it's 'strategy' after pausing and reactivating a reader. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INCONSISTENT_REQUESTS MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(0x5) + +/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because the reader + * has no accumulator it can use to backup the data that hasn't been processed. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(0x6) + +/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because the + * accumulator passed to the reader is not large enough to hold both the + * data that hasn't been processed and the excess of the last read-request. */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_ACCUMULATOR_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(0x7) + +/* \} name SECTION: MPS Reader error codes */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H */ diff --git a/library/mps_reader.c b/library/mps_reader.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..27d0c04c108 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/mps_reader.c @@ -0,0 +1,538 @@ +/* + * Message Processing Stack, Reader implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#include "mps_reader.h" +#include "mps_common.h" +#include "mps_trace.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE) +static int mbedtls_mps_trace_id = MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE */ + +/* + * GENERAL NOTE ON CODING STYLE + * + * The following code intentionally separates memory loads + * and stores from other operations (arithmetic or branches). + * This leads to the introduction of many local variables + * and significantly increases the C-code line count, but + * should not increase the size of generated assembly. + * + * The reason for this is twofold: + * (1) It will ease verification efforts using the VST + * (Verified Software Toolchain) + * whose program logic cannot directly reason + * about instructions containing a load or store in + * addition to other operations (e.g. *p = *q or + * tmp = *p + 42). + * (2) Operating on local variables and writing the results + * back to the target contexts on success only + * allows to maintain structure invariants even + * on failure - this in turn has two benefits: + * (2.a) If for some reason an error code is not caught + * and operation continues, functions are nonetheless + * called with sane contexts, reducing the risk + * of dangerous behavior. + * (2.b) Randomized testing is easier if structures + * remain intact even in the face of failing + * and/or non-sensical calls. + * Moreover, it might even reduce code-size because + * the compiler need not write back temporary results + * to memory in case of failure. + * + */ + +static inline int mps_reader_is_accumulating( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_remaining; + if (rd->acc == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + acc_remaining = rd->acc_share.acc_remaining; + return acc_remaining > 0; +} + +static inline int mps_reader_is_producing( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd) +{ + unsigned char *frag = rd->frag; + return frag == NULL; +} + +static inline int mps_reader_is_consuming( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd) +{ + return !mps_reader_is_producing(rd); +} + +static inline mbedtls_mps_size_t mps_reader_get_fragment_offset( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd) +{ + unsigned char *acc = rd->acc; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_offset; + + if (acc == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + frag_offset = rd->acc_share.frag_offset; + return frag_offset; +} + +static inline mbedtls_mps_size_t mps_reader_serving_from_accumulator( + mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_offset, end; + + frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset(rd); + end = rd->end; + + return end < frag_offset; +} + +static inline void mps_reader_zero(mbedtls_mps_reader *rd) +{ + /* A plain memset() would likely be more efficient, + * but the current way of zeroing makes it harder + * to overlook fields which should not be zero-initialized. + * It's also more suitable for FV efforts since it + * doesn't require reasoning about structs being + * interpreted as unstructured binary blobs. */ + static mbedtls_mps_reader const zero = + { .frag = NULL, + .frag_len = 0, + .commit = 0, + .end = 0, + .pending = 0, + .acc = NULL, + .acc_len = 0, + .acc_available = 0, + .acc_share = { .acc_remaining = 0 } }; + *rd = zero; +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_init(mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + unsigned char *acc, + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len) +{ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT("mbedtls_mps_reader_init"); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "* Accumulator size: %u bytes", (unsigned) acc_len); + mps_reader_zero(rd); + rd->acc = acc; + rd->acc_len = acc_len; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(0); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_free(mbedtls_mps_reader *rd) +{ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT("mbedtls_mps_reader_free"); + mps_reader_zero(rd); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(0); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + unsigned char *new_frag, + mbedtls_mps_size_t new_frag_len) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t copy_to_acc; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT("mbedtls_mps_reader_feed"); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "* Fragment length: %u bytes", (unsigned) new_frag_len); + + if (new_frag == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INVALID_ARG); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW(mps_reader_is_producing( + rd), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() requires reader to be in producing mode"); + + if (mps_reader_is_accumulating(rd)) { + unsigned char *acc = rd->acc; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_remaining = rd->acc_share.acc_remaining; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_available = rd->acc_available; + + /* Skip over parts of the accumulator that have already been filled. */ + acc += acc_available; + + copy_to_acc = acc_remaining; + if (copy_to_acc > new_frag_len) { + copy_to_acc = new_frag_len; + } + + /* Copy new contents to accumulator. */ + memcpy(acc, new_frag, copy_to_acc); + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Copy new data of size %u of %u into accumulator at offset %u", + (unsigned) copy_to_acc, (unsigned) new_frag_len, + (unsigned) acc_available); + + /* Check if, with the new fragment, we have enough data. */ + acc_remaining -= copy_to_acc; + if (acc_remaining > 0) { + /* We need to accumulate more data. Stay in producing mode. */ + acc_available += copy_to_acc; + rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = acc_remaining; + rd->acc_available = acc_available; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE); + } + + /* We have filled the accumulator: Move to consuming mode. */ + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Enough data available to serve user request"); + + /* Remember overlap of accumulator and fragment. */ + rd->acc_share.frag_offset = acc_available; + acc_available += copy_to_acc; + rd->acc_available = acc_available; + } else { /* Not accumulating */ + rd->acc_share.frag_offset = 0; + } + + rd->frag = new_frag; + rd->frag_len = new_frag_len; + rd->commit = 0; + rd->end = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(0); +} + + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_get(mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + mbedtls_mps_size_t desired, + unsigned char **buffer, + mbedtls_mps_size_t *buflen) +{ + unsigned char *frag; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_len, frag_offset, end, frag_fetched, frag_remaining; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT("mbedtls_mps_reader_get"); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "* Bytes requested: %u", (unsigned) desired); + + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW(mps_reader_is_consuming( + rd), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_get() requires reader to be in consuming mode"); + + end = rd->end; + frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset(rd); + + /* Check if we're still serving from the accumulator. */ + if (mps_reader_serving_from_accumulator(rd)) { + /* Illustration of supported and unsupported cases: + * + * - Allowed #1 + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end+desired + * | | + * +-----v-------v-------------+ + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * - Allowed #2 + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end+desired + * | | + * +----------v----------------v + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * - Not allowed #1 (could be served, but we don't actually use it): + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end+desired + * | | + * +------v-------------v------+ + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * + * - Not allowed #2 (can't be served with a contiguous buffer): + * + * +-----------------------------------+ + * | frag | + * +-----------------------------------+ + * + * end end + desired + * | | + * +------v--------------------+ v + * | acc | + * +---------------------------+ + * | | + * frag_offset acc_available + * + * In case of Allowed #2 we're switching to serve from + * `frag` starting from the next call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(). + */ + + unsigned char *acc; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Serve the request from the accumulator"); + if (frag_offset - end < desired) { + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_available; + acc_available = rd->acc_available; + if (acc_available - end != desired) { + /* It might be possible to serve some of these situations by + * making additional space in the accumulator, removing those + * parts that have already been committed. + * On the other hand, this brings additional complexity and + * enlarges the code size, while there doesn't seem to be a use + * case where we don't attempt exactly the same `get` calls when + * resuming on a reader than what we tried before pausing it. + * If we believe we adhere to this restricted usage throughout + * the library, this check is a good opportunity to + * validate this. */ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INCONSISTENT_REQUESTS); + } + } + + acc = rd->acc; + acc += end; + + *buffer = acc; + if (buflen != NULL) { + *buflen = desired; + } + + end += desired; + rd->end = end; + rd->pending = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(0); + } + + /* Attempt to serve the request from the current fragment */ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Serve the request from the current fragment."); + + frag_len = rd->frag_len; + frag_fetched = end - frag_offset; /* The amount of data from the current + * fragment that has already been passed + * to the user. */ + frag_remaining = frag_len - frag_fetched; /* Remaining data in fragment */ + + /* Check if we can serve the read request from the fragment. */ + if (frag_remaining < desired) { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "There's not enough data in the current fragment " + "to serve the request."); + /* There's not enough data in the current fragment, + * so either just RETURN what we have or fail. */ + if (buflen == NULL) { + if (frag_remaining > 0) { + rd->pending = desired - frag_remaining; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Remember to collect %u bytes before re-opening", + (unsigned) rd->pending); + } + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA); + } + + desired = frag_remaining; + } + + /* There's enough data in the current fragment to serve the + * (potentially modified) read request. */ + + frag = rd->frag; + frag += frag_fetched; + + *buffer = frag; + if (buflen != NULL) { + *buflen = desired; + } + + end += desired; + rd->end = end; + rd->pending = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(0); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_commit(mbedtls_mps_reader *rd) +{ + mbedtls_mps_size_t end; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT("mbedtls_mps_reader_commit"); + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW(mps_reader_is_consuming( + rd), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_commit() requires reader to be in consuming mode"); + + end = rd->end; + rd->commit = end; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(0); +} + +int mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(mbedtls_mps_reader *rd, + int *paused) +{ + unsigned char *frag, *acc; + mbedtls_mps_size_t pending, commit; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len, frag_offset, frag_len; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT("mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim"); + + if (paused != NULL) { + *paused = 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW(mps_reader_is_consuming( + rd), + "mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() requires reader to be in consuming mode"); + + frag = rd->frag; + acc = rd->acc; + pending = rd->pending; + commit = rd->commit; + frag_len = rd->frag_len; + + frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset(rd); + + if (pending == 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "No unsatisfied read-request has been logged."); + + /* Check if there's data left to be consumed. */ + if (commit < frag_offset || commit - frag_offset < frag_len) { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "There is data left to be consumed."); + rd->end = commit; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_DATA_LEFT); + } + + rd->acc_available = 0; + rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Fragment has been fully processed and committed."); + } else { + int overflow; + + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_backup_offset; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_backup_len; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_backup_offset; + mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_backup_len; + + mbedtls_mps_size_t backup_len; + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len_needed; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "There has been an unsatisfied read with %u bytes overhead.", + (unsigned) pending); + + if (acc == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "No accumulator present"); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_ACCUMULATOR); + } + acc_len = rd->acc_len; + + /* Check if the upper layer has already fetched + * and committed the contents of the accumulator. */ + if (commit < frag_offset) { + /* No, accumulator is still being processed. */ + frag_backup_offset = 0; + frag_backup_len = frag_len; + acc_backup_offset = commit; + acc_backup_len = frag_offset - commit; + } else { + /* Yes, the accumulator is already processed. */ + frag_backup_offset = commit - frag_offset; + frag_backup_len = frag_len - frag_backup_offset; + acc_backup_offset = 0; + acc_backup_len = 0; + } + + backup_len = acc_backup_len + frag_backup_len; + acc_len_needed = backup_len + pending; + + overflow = 0; + overflow |= (backup_len < acc_backup_len); + overflow |= (acc_len_needed < backup_len); + + if (overflow || acc_len < acc_len_needed) { + /* Except for the different return code, we behave as if + * there hadn't been a call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * since the last commit. */ + rd->end = commit; + rd->pending = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + "The accumulator is too small to handle the backup."); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + "* Size: %u", (unsigned) acc_len); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + "* Needed: %u (%u + %u)", + (unsigned) acc_len_needed, + (unsigned) backup_len, (unsigned) pending); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN( + MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_ACCUMULATOR_TOO_SMALL); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Fragment backup: %u", (unsigned) frag_backup_len); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Accumulator backup: %u", (unsigned) acc_backup_len); + + /* Move uncommitted parts from the accumulator to the front + * of the accumulator. */ + memmove(acc, acc + acc_backup_offset, acc_backup_len); + + /* Copy uncommitted parts of the current fragment to the + * accumulator. */ + memcpy(acc + acc_backup_len, + frag + frag_backup_offset, frag_backup_len); + + rd->acc_available = backup_len; + rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = pending; + + if (paused != NULL) { + *paused = 1; + } + } + + rd->frag = NULL; + rd->frag_len = 0; + + rd->commit = 0; + rd->end = 0; + rd->pending = 0; + + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + "Final state: aa %u, al %u, ar %u", + (unsigned) rd->acc_available, (unsigned) rd->acc_len, + (unsigned) rd->acc_share.acc_remaining); + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(0); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/library/mps_reader.h b/library/mps_reader.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3193a5e334e --- /dev/null +++ b/library/mps_reader.h @@ -0,0 +1,366 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/** + * \file mps_reader.h + * + * \brief This file defines reader objects, which together with their + * sibling writer objects form the basis for the communication + * between the various layers of the Mbed TLS messaging stack, + * as well as the communication between the messaging stack and + * the (D)TLS handshake protocol implementation. + * + * Readers provide a means of transferring incoming data from + * a 'producer' providing it in chunks of arbitrary size, to + * a 'consumer' which fetches and processes it in chunks of + * again arbitrary, and potentially different, size. + * + * Readers can thus be seen as datagram-to-stream converters, + * and they abstract away the following two tasks from the user: + * 1. The pointer arithmetic of stepping through a producer- + * provided chunk in smaller chunks. + * 2. The merging of incoming data chunks in case the + * consumer requests data in larger chunks than what the + * producer provides. + * + * The basic abstract flow of operation is the following: + * - Initially, the reader is in 'producing mode'. + * - The producer hands an incoming data buffer to the reader, + * moving it from 'producing' to 'consuming' mode. + * - The consumer subsequently fetches and processes the buffer + * content. Once that's done -- or partially done and a consumer's + * request can't be fulfilled -- the producer revokes the reader's + * access to the incoming data buffer, putting the reader back to + * producing mode. + * - The producer subsequently gathers more incoming data and hands + * it to the reader until it switches back to consuming mode + * if enough data is available for the last consumer request to + * be satisfiable. + * - Repeat the above. + * + * The abstract states of the reader from the producer's and + * consumer's perspective are as follows: + * + * - From the perspective of the consumer, the state of the + * reader consists of the following: + * - A byte stream representing (concatenation of) the data + * received through calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(), + * - A marker within that byte stream indicating which data + * can be considered processed, and hence need not be retained, + * when the reader is passed back to the producer via + * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * The marker is set via mbedtls_mps_reader_commit() + * which places it at the end of the current byte stream. + * The consumer need not be aware of the distinction between consumer + * and producer mode, because it only interfaces with the reader + * when the latter is in consuming mode. + * + * - From the perspective of the producer, the reader's state is one of: + * - Attached: The reader is in consuming mode. + * - Unset: No incoming data buffer is currently managed by the reader, + * and all previously handed incoming data buffers have been + * fully processed. More data needs to be fed into the reader + * via mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). + * + * - Accumulating: No incoming data buffer is currently managed by the + * reader, but some data from the previous incoming data + * buffer hasn't been processed yet and is internally + * held back. + * The Attached state belongs to consuming mode, while the Unset and + * Accumulating states belong to producing mode. + * + * Transitioning from the Unset or Accumulating state to Attached is + * done via successful calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(), while + * transitioning from Attached to either Unset or Accumulating (depending + * on what has been processed) is done via mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * + * The following diagram depicts the producer-state progression: + * + * +------------------+ reclaim + * | Unset +<-------------------------------------+ get + * +--------|---------+ | +------+ + * | | | | + * | | | | + * | feed +---------+---+--+ | + * +--------------------------------------> <---+ + * | Attached | + * +--------------------------------------> <---+ + * | feed, enough data available +---------+---+--+ | + * | to serve previous consumer request | | | + * | | | | + * +--------+---------+ | +------+ + * +----> Accumulating |<-------------------------------------+ commit + * | +---+--------------+ reclaim, previous read request + * | | couldn't be fulfilled + * | | + * +--------+ + * feed, need more data to serve + * previous consumer request + * | + * | + * producing mode | consuming mode + * | + * + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_READER_H +#define MBEDTLS_READER_H + +#include + +#include "mps_common.h" +#include "mps_error.h" + +struct mbedtls_mps_reader; +typedef struct mbedtls_mps_reader mbedtls_mps_reader; + +/* + * Structure definitions + */ + +struct mbedtls_mps_reader { + unsigned char *frag; /*!< The fragment of incoming data managed by + * the reader; it is provided to the reader + * through mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). The reader + * does not own the fragment and does not + * perform any allocation operations on it, + * but does have read and write access to it. + * + * The reader is in consuming mode if + * and only if \c frag is not \c NULL. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t frag_len; + /*!< The length of the current fragment. + * Must be 0 if \c frag == \c NULL. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t commit; + /*!< The offset of the last commit, relative + * to the first byte in the fragment, if + * no accumulator is present. If an accumulator + * is present, it is viewed as a prefix to the + * current fragment, and this variable contains + * an offset from the beginning of the accumulator. + * + * This is only used when the reader is in + * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL; + * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t end; + /*!< The offset of the end of the last chunk + * passed to the user through a call to + * mbedtls_mps_reader_get(), relative to the first + * byte in the fragment, if no accumulator is + * present. If an accumulator is present, it is + * viewed as a prefix to the current fragment, and + * this variable contains an offset from the + * beginning of the accumulator. + * + * This is only used when the reader is in + * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL; + * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t pending; + /*!< The amount of incoming data missing on the + * last call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(). + * In particular, it is \c 0 if the last call + * was successful. + * If a reader is reclaimed after an + * unsuccessful call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(), + * this variable is used to have the reader + * remember how much data should be accumulated + * so that the call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * succeeds next time. + * This is only used when the reader is in + * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL; + * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */ + + /* The accumulator is only needed if we need to be able to pause + * the reader. A few bytes could be saved by moving this to a + * separate struct and using a pointer here. */ + + unsigned char *acc; /*!< The accumulator is used to gather incoming + * data if a read-request via mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * cannot be served from the current fragment. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_len; + /*!< The total size of the accumulator. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_available; + /*!< The number of bytes currently gathered in + * the accumulator. This is both used in + * producing and in consuming mode: + * While producing, it is increased until + * it reaches the value of \c acc_remaining below. + * While consuming, it is used to judge if a + * get request can be served from the + * accumulator or not. + * Must not be larger than \c acc_len. */ + union { + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_remaining; + /*!< This indicates the amount of data still + * to be gathered in the accumulator. It is + * only used in producing mode. + * Must be at most acc_len - acc_available. */ + mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t frag_offset; + /*!< If an accumulator is present and in use, this + * field indicates the offset of the current + * fragment from the beginning of the + * accumulator. If no accumulator is present + * or the accumulator is not in use, this is \c 0. + * It is only used in consuming mode. + * Must not be larger than \c acc_available. */ + } acc_share; +}; + +/* + * API organization: + * A reader object is usually prepared and maintained + * by some lower layer and passed for usage to an upper + * layer, and the API naturally splits according to which + * layer is supposed to use the respective functions. + */ + +/* + * Maintenance API (Lower layer) + */ + +/** + * \brief Initialize a reader object + * + * \param reader The reader to be initialized. + * \param acc The buffer to be used as a temporary accumulator + * in case get requests through mbedtls_mps_reader_get() + * exceed the buffer provided by mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). + * This buffer is owned by the caller and exclusive use + * for reading and writing is given to the reader for the + * duration of the reader's lifetime. It is thus the caller's + * responsibility to maintain (and not touch) the buffer for + * the lifetime of the reader, and to properly zeroize and + * free the memory after the reader has been destroyed. + * \param acc_len The size in Bytes of \p acc. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_init(mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + unsigned char *acc, + mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len); + +/** + * \brief Free a reader object + * + * \param reader The reader to be freed. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_free(mbedtls_mps_reader *reader); + +/** + * \brief Pass chunk of data for the reader to manage. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must be + * in producing mode. + * \param buf The buffer to be managed by the reader. + * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, the reader will be + * moved to consuming mode and obtains read access + * of \p buf until mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() + * is called. It is the responsibility of the caller + * to ensure that the \p buf persists and is not changed + * between successful calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() + * and mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE if more input data is + * required to fulfill a previous request to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(). + * In this case, the reader remains in producing mode and + * takes no ownership of the provided buffer (an internal copy + * is made instead). + * \return Another negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on + * different kinds of failures. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + unsigned char *buf, + mbedtls_mps_size_t buflen); + +/** + * \brief Reclaim reader's access to the current input buffer. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must be + * in consuming mode. + * \param paused If not \c NULL, the integer at address \p paused will be + * modified to indicate whether the reader has been paused + * (value \c 1) or not (value \c 0). Pausing happens if there + * is uncommitted data and a previous request to + * mbedtls_mps_reader_get() has exceeded the bounds of the + * input buffer. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + int *paused); + +/* + * Usage API (Upper layer) + */ + +/** + * \brief Request data from the reader. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must + * be in consuming mode. + * \param desired The desired amount of data to be read, in Bytes. + * \param buffer The address to store the buffer pointer in. + * This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buflen The address to store the actual buffer + * length in, or \c NULL. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, \c *buf holds the + * address of a buffer of size \c *buflen + * (if \c buflen != \c NULL) or \c desired + * (if \c buflen == \c NULL). The user has read access + * to the buffer and guarantee of stability of the data + * until the next call to mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA if there is not enough + * data available to serve the get request. In this case, the + * reader remains intact and in consuming mode, and the consumer + * should retry the call after a successful cycle of + * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() and mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). + * If, after such a cycle, the consumer requests a different + * amount of data, the result is implementation-defined; + * progress is guaranteed only if the same amount of data + * is requested after a mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() and + * mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() cycle. + * \return Another negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error + * code for different kinds of failure. + * + * \note Passing \c NULL as \p buflen is a convenient way to + * indicate that fragmentation is not tolerated. + * It's functionally equivalent to passing a valid + * address as buflen and checking \c *buflen == \c desired + * afterwards. + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_get(mbedtls_mps_reader *reader, + mbedtls_mps_size_t desired, + unsigned char **buffer, + mbedtls_mps_size_t *buflen); + +/** + * \brief Mark data obtained from mbedtls_mps_reader_get() as processed. + * + * This call indicates that all data received from prior calls to + * mbedtls_mps_reader_get() has been or will have been + * processed when mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called, + * and thus need not be backed up. + * + * This function has no user observable effect until + * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called. In particular, + * buffers received from mbedtls_mps_reader_get() remain + * valid until mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called. + * + * \param reader The reader context to use. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure. + * + */ +int mbedtls_mps_reader_commit(mbedtls_mps_reader *reader); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_READER_H */ diff --git a/library/mps_trace.c b/library/mps_trace.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..69f6e5a0f95 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/mps_trace.c @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +/* + * Message Processing Stack, Trace module + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#include "mps_common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE) + +#include "mps_trace.h" +#include + +static int trace_depth = 0; + +#define color_default "\x1B[0m" +#define color_red "\x1B[1;31m" +#define color_green "\x1B[1;32m" +#define color_yellow "\x1B[1;33m" +#define color_blue "\x1B[1;34m" +#define color_magenta "\x1B[1;35m" +#define color_cyan "\x1B[1;36m" +#define color_white "\x1B[1;37m" + +static char const *colors[] = +{ + color_default, + color_green, + color_yellow, + color_magenta, + color_cyan, + color_blue, + color_white +}; + +#define MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE 100 + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg(int id, int line, const char *format, ...) +{ + int ret; + char str[MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE]; + va_list argp; + va_start(argp, format); + ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf(str, MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE, format, argp); + va_end(argp); + + if (ret >= 0 && ret < MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE) { + str[ret] = '\0'; + mbedtls_printf("[%d|L%d]: %s\n", id, line, str); + } +} + +int mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth() +{ + return trace_depth; +} +void mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth() +{ + trace_depth--; +} +void mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth() +{ + trace_depth++; +} + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_color(int id) +{ + if (id > (int) (sizeof(colors) / sizeof(*colors))) { + return; + } + printf("%s", colors[id]); +} + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_indent(int level, mbedtls_mps_trace_type ty) +{ + if (level > 0) { + while (--level) { + printf("| "); + } + + printf("| "); + } + + switch (ty) { + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT: + mbedtls_printf("@ "); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL: + mbedtls_printf("+--> "); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR: + mbedtls_printf("E "); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN: + mbedtls_printf("< "); + break; + + default: + break; + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/library/mps_trace.h b/library/mps_trace.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b456b2ffddf --- /dev/null +++ b/library/mps_trace.h @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/** + * \file mps_trace.h + * + * \brief Tracing module for MPS + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "mps_common.h" +#include "mps_trace.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE) + +/* + * Adapt this to enable/disable tracing output + * from the various layers of the MPS. + */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_1 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_2 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_3 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_4 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_READER +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_WRITER + +/* + * To use the existing trace module, only change + * MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_XXX above, but don't modify the + * rest of this file. + */ + +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT, + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL, + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN +} mbedtls_mps_trace_type; + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_1 1 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_2 2 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_3 3 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_4 4 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_WRITER 5 +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER 6 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_1) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_1) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_2) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_2) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_3) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_3) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_4) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_4) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_READER) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_WRITER) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_WRITER) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER 0 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK (MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER | \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER) + +/* We have to avoid globals because E-ACSL chokes on them... + * Wrap everything in stub functions. */ +int mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth(void); +void mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth(void); +void mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth(void); + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_color(int id); +void mbedtls_mps_trace_indent(int level, mbedtls_mps_trace_type ty); + +void mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg(int id, int line, const char *format, ...); + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(type, ...) \ + do { \ + if (!(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & (1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id))) \ + break; \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_indent(mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth(), type); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_color(mbedtls_mps_trace_id); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg(mbedtls_mps_trace_id, __LINE__, __VA_ARGS__); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_color(0); \ + } while (0) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT(...) \ + do { \ + if (!(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & (1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id))) \ + break; \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL, __VA_ARGS__); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth(); \ + } while (0) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END(val) \ + do { \ + if (!(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & (1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id))) \ + break; \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN, "%d (-%#04x)", \ + (int) (val), -((unsigned) (val))); \ + mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth(); \ + } while (0) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(val) \ + do { \ + /* Breaks tail recursion. */ \ + int ret__ = val; \ + MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END(ret__); \ + return ret__; \ + } while (0) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE */ + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(type, ...) do { } while (0) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT(...) do { } while (0) +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END do { } while (0) + +#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(val) return val; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H */ diff --git a/library/net_sockets.c b/library/net_sockets.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..edec5876ad8 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/net_sockets.c @@ -0,0 +1,696 @@ +/* + * TCP/IP or UDP/IP networking functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* Enable definition of getaddrinfo() even when compiling with -std=c99. Must + * be set before mbedtls_config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h indirectly. + * Harmless on other platforms. */ +#ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L +#endif +#ifndef _XOPEN_SOURCE +#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 600 /* sockaddr_storage */ +#endif + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) + +#if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ + !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) +#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NET_C in mbedtls_config.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + +#define IS_EINTR(ret) ((ret) == WSAEINTR) + +#include + +#include +#include +#if (_WIN32_WINNT < 0x0501) +#include +#endif + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#if defined(_WIN32_WCE) +#pragma comment( lib, "ws2.lib" ) +#else +#pragma comment( lib, "ws2_32.lib" ) +#endif +#endif /* _MSC_VER */ + +#define read(fd, buf, len) recv(fd, (char *) (buf), (int) (len), 0) +#define write(fd, buf, len) send(fd, (char *) (buf), (int) (len), 0) +#define close(fd) closesocket(fd) + +static int wsa_init_done = 0; + +#else /* ( _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE ) && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define IS_EINTR(ret) ((ret) == EINTR) +#define SOCKET int + +#endif /* ( _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE ) && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +/* Some MS functions want int and MSVC warns if we pass size_t, + * but the standard functions use socklen_t, so cast only for MSVC */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#define MSVC_INT_CAST (int) +#else +#define MSVC_INT_CAST +#endif + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include +#endif + +#include + +/* + * Prepare for using the sockets interface + */ +static int net_prepare(void) +{ +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + WSADATA wsaData; + + if (wsa_init_done == 0) { + if (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2, 0), &wsaData) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED; + } + + wsa_init_done = 1; + } +#else +#if !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); +#endif +#endif + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return 0 if the file descriptor is valid, an error otherwise. + * If for_select != 0, check whether the file descriptor is within the range + * allowed for fd_set used for the FD_xxx macros and the select() function. + */ +static int check_fd(int fd, int for_select) +{ + if (fd < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT; + } + +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + (void) for_select; +#else + /* A limitation of select() is that it only works with file descriptors + * that are strictly less than FD_SETSIZE. This is a limitation of the + * fd_set type. Error out early, because attempting to call FD_SET on a + * large file descriptor is a buffer overflow on typical platforms. */ + if (for_select && fd >= FD_SETSIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED; + } +#endif + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Initialize a context + */ +void mbedtls_net_init(mbedtls_net_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->fd = -1; +} + +/* + * Initiate a TCP connection with host:port and the given protocol + */ +int mbedtls_net_connect(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *host, + const char *port, int proto) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + struct addrinfo hints, *addr_list, *cur; + + if ((ret = net_prepare()) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Do name resolution with both IPv6 and IPv4 */ + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC; + hints.ai_socktype = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP; + + if (getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &addr_list) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST; + } + + /* Try the sockaddrs until a connection succeeds */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST; + for (cur = addr_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->ai_next) { + ctx->fd = (int) socket(cur->ai_family, cur->ai_socktype, + cur->ai_protocol); + if (ctx->fd < 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED; + continue; + } + + if (connect(ctx->fd, cur->ai_addr, MSVC_INT_CAST cur->ai_addrlen) == 0) { + ret = 0; + break; + } + + close(ctx->fd); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED; + } + + freeaddrinfo(addr_list); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Create a listening socket on bind_ip:port + */ +int mbedtls_net_bind(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char *port, int proto) +{ + int n, ret; + struct addrinfo hints, *addr_list, *cur; + + if ((ret = net_prepare()) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Bind to IPv6 and/or IPv4, but only in the desired protocol */ + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC; + hints.ai_socktype = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM; + hints.ai_protocol = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP; + if (bind_ip == NULL) { + hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; + } + + if (getaddrinfo(bind_ip, port, &hints, &addr_list) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST; + } + + /* Try the sockaddrs until a binding succeeds */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST; + for (cur = addr_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->ai_next) { + ctx->fd = (int) socket(cur->ai_family, cur->ai_socktype, + cur->ai_protocol); + if (ctx->fd < 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED; + continue; + } + + n = 1; + if (setsockopt(ctx->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, + (const char *) &n, sizeof(n)) != 0) { + close(ctx->fd); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED; + continue; + } + + if (bind(ctx->fd, cur->ai_addr, MSVC_INT_CAST cur->ai_addrlen) != 0) { + close(ctx->fd); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED; + continue; + } + + /* Listen only makes sense for TCP */ + if (proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP) { + if (listen(ctx->fd, MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG) != 0) { + close(ctx->fd); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED; + continue; + } + } + + /* Bind was successful */ + ret = 0; + break; + } + + freeaddrinfo(addr_list); + + return ret; + +} + +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) +/* + * Check if the requested operation would be blocking on a non-blocking socket + * and thus 'failed' with a negative return value. + */ +static int net_would_block(const mbedtls_net_context *ctx) +{ + ((void) ctx); + return WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK; +} +#else +/* + * Check if the requested operation would be blocking on a non-blocking socket + * and thus 'failed' with a negative return value. + * + * Note: on a blocking socket this function always returns 0! + */ +static int net_would_block(const mbedtls_net_context *ctx) +{ + int err = errno; + + /* + * Never return 'WOULD BLOCK' on a blocking socket + */ + if ((fcntl(ctx->fd, F_GETFL) & O_NONBLOCK) != O_NONBLOCK) { + errno = err; + return 0; + } + + switch (errno = err) { +#if defined EAGAIN + case EAGAIN: +#endif +#if defined EWOULDBLOCK && EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN + case EWOULDBLOCK: +#endif + return 1; + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* ( _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE ) && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +/* + * Accept a connection from a remote client + */ +int mbedtls_net_accept(mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx, + mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx, + void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *cip_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int type; + + struct sockaddr_storage client_addr; + +#if defined(__socklen_t_defined) || defined(_SOCKLEN_T) || \ + defined(_SOCKLEN_T_DECLARED) || defined(__DEFINED_socklen_t) || \ + defined(socklen_t) || (defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200112L) + socklen_t n = (socklen_t) sizeof(client_addr); + socklen_t type_len = (socklen_t) sizeof(type); +#else + int n = (int) sizeof(client_addr); + int type_len = (int) sizeof(type); +#endif + + /* Is this a TCP or UDP socket? */ + if (getsockopt(bind_ctx->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TYPE, + (void *) &type, &type_len) != 0 || + (type != SOCK_STREAM && type != SOCK_DGRAM)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED; + } + + if (type == SOCK_STREAM) { + /* TCP: actual accept() */ + ret = client_ctx->fd = (int) accept(bind_ctx->fd, + (struct sockaddr *) &client_addr, &n); + } else { + /* UDP: wait for a message, but keep it in the queue */ + char buf[1] = { 0 }; + + ret = (int) recvfrom(bind_ctx->fd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_PEEK, + (struct sockaddr *) &client_addr, &n); + +#if defined(_WIN32) + if (ret == SOCKET_ERROR && + WSAGetLastError() == WSAEMSGSIZE) { + /* We know buf is too small, thanks, just peeking here */ + ret = 0; + } +#endif + } + + if (ret < 0) { + if (net_would_block(bind_ctx) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ; + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED; + } + + /* UDP: hijack the listening socket to communicate with the client, + * then bind a new socket to accept new connections */ + if (type != SOCK_STREAM) { + struct sockaddr_storage local_addr; + int one = 1; + + if (connect(bind_ctx->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &client_addr, n) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED; + } + + client_ctx->fd = bind_ctx->fd; + bind_ctx->fd = -1; /* In case we exit early */ + + n = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage); + if (getsockname(client_ctx->fd, + (struct sockaddr *) &local_addr, &n) != 0 || + (bind_ctx->fd = (int) socket(local_addr.ss_family, + SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP)) < 0 || + setsockopt(bind_ctx->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, + (const char *) &one, sizeof(one)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED; + } + + if (bind(bind_ctx->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &local_addr, n) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED; + } + } + + if (client_ip != NULL) { + if (client_addr.ss_family == AF_INET) { + struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *) &client_addr; + *cip_len = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr); + + if (buf_size < *cip_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(client_ip, &addr4->sin_addr.s_addr, *cip_len); + } else { + struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) &client_addr; + *cip_len = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr); + + if (buf_size < *cip_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(client_ip, &addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, *cip_len); + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Set the socket blocking or non-blocking + */ +int mbedtls_net_set_block(mbedtls_net_context *ctx) +{ +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + u_long n = 0; + return ioctlsocket(ctx->fd, FIONBIO, &n); +#else + return fcntl(ctx->fd, F_SETFL, fcntl(ctx->fd, F_GETFL) & ~O_NONBLOCK); +#endif +} + +int mbedtls_net_set_nonblock(mbedtls_net_context *ctx) +{ +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + u_long n = 1; + return ioctlsocket(ctx->fd, FIONBIO, &n); +#else + return fcntl(ctx->fd, F_SETFL, fcntl(ctx->fd, F_GETFL) | O_NONBLOCK); +#endif +} + +/* + * Check if data is available on the socket + */ + +int mbedtls_net_poll(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, uint32_t rw, uint32_t timeout) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + struct timeval tv; + + fd_set read_fds; + fd_set write_fds; + + int fd = ctx->fd; + + ret = check_fd(fd, 1); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) + /* Ensure that memory sanitizers consider read_fds and write_fds as + * initialized even on platforms such as Glibc/x86_64 where FD_ZERO + * is implemented in assembly. */ + memset(&read_fds, 0, sizeof(read_fds)); + memset(&write_fds, 0, sizeof(write_fds)); +#endif +#endif + + FD_ZERO(&read_fds); + if (rw & MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ) { + rw &= ~MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ; + FD_SET((SOCKET) fd, &read_fds); + } + + FD_ZERO(&write_fds); + if (rw & MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE) { + rw &= ~MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE; + FD_SET((SOCKET) fd, &write_fds); + } + + if (rw != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + tv.tv_sec = timeout / 1000; + tv.tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000; + + do { + ret = select(fd + 1, &read_fds, &write_fds, NULL, + timeout == (uint32_t) -1 ? NULL : &tv); + } while (IS_EINTR(ret)); + + if (ret < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED; + } + + ret = 0; + if (FD_ISSET(fd, &read_fds)) { + ret |= MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ; + } + if (FD_ISSET(fd, &write_fds)) { + ret |= MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE; + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Portable usleep helper + */ +void mbedtls_net_usleep(unsigned long usec) +{ +#if defined(_WIN32) + Sleep((usec + 999) / 1000); +#else + struct timeval tv; + tv.tv_sec = usec / 1000000; +#if defined(__unix__) || defined(__unix) || \ + (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)) + tv.tv_usec = (suseconds_t) usec % 1000000; +#else + tv.tv_usec = usec % 1000000; +#endif + select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &tv); +#endif +} + +/* + * Read at most 'len' characters + */ +int mbedtls_net_recv(void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; + + ret = check_fd(fd, 0); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = (int) read(fd, buf, len); + + if (ret < 0) { + if (net_would_block(ctx) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ; + } + +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + if (WSAGetLastError() == WSAECONNRESET) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET; + } +#else + if (errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET; + } + + if (errno == EINTR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ; + } +#endif + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED; + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Read at most 'len' characters, blocking for at most 'timeout' ms + */ +int mbedtls_net_recv_timeout(void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, uint32_t timeout) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + struct timeval tv; + fd_set read_fds; + int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; + + ret = check_fd(fd, 1); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + FD_ZERO(&read_fds); + FD_SET((SOCKET) fd, &read_fds); + + tv.tv_sec = timeout / 1000; + tv.tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000; + + ret = select(fd + 1, &read_fds, NULL, NULL, timeout == 0 ? NULL : &tv); + + /* Zero fds ready means we timed out */ + if (ret == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; + } + + if (ret < 0) { +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + if (WSAGetLastError() == WSAEINTR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ; + } +#else + if (errno == EINTR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ; + } +#endif + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED; + } + + /* This call will not block */ + return mbedtls_net_recv(ctx, buf, len); +} + +/* + * Write at most 'len' characters + */ +int mbedtls_net_send(void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd; + + ret = check_fd(fd, 0); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = (int) write(fd, buf, len); + + if (ret < 0) { + if (net_would_block(ctx) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE; + } + +#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \ + !defined(EFI32) + if (WSAGetLastError() == WSAECONNRESET) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET; + } +#else + if (errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET; + } + + if (errno == EINTR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE; + } +#endif + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED; + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Close the connection + */ +void mbedtls_net_close(mbedtls_net_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx->fd == -1) { + return; + } + + close(ctx->fd); + + ctx->fd = -1; +} + +/* + * Gracefully close the connection + */ +void mbedtls_net_free(mbedtls_net_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx->fd == -1) { + return; + } + + shutdown(ctx->fd, 2); + close(ctx->fd); + + ctx->fd = -1; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ diff --git a/library/nist_kw.c b/library/nist_kw.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f15425b8bd6 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/nist_kw.c @@ -0,0 +1,725 @@ +/* + * Implementation of NIST SP 800-38F key wrapping, supporting KW and KWP modes + * only + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * Definition of Key Wrapping: + * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf + * RFC 3394 "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm" + * RFC 5649 "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm" + * + * Note: RFC 3394 defines different methodology for intermediate operations for + * the wrapping and unwrapping operation than the definition in NIST SP 800-38F. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + +#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT) + +#define KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH 8 +#define MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT 3 + +/*! The 64-bit default integrity check value (ICV) for KW mode. */ +static const unsigned char NIST_KW_ICV1[] = { 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6 }; +/*! The 32-bit default integrity check value (ICV) for KWP mode. */ +static const unsigned char NIST_KW_ICV2[] = { 0xA6, 0x59, 0x59, 0xA6 }; + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_nist_kw_init(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_nist_kw_context)); +} + +int mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher, + const unsigned char *key, + unsigned int keybits, + const int is_wrap) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher, + keybits, + MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB); + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(cipher_info) != 16) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * SP 800-38F currently defines AES cipher as the only block cipher allowed: + * "For KW and KWP, the underlying block cipher shall be approved, and the + * block size shall be 128 bits. Currently, the AES block cipher, with key + * lengths of 128, 192, or 256 bits, is the only block cipher that fits + * this profile." + * Currently we don't support other 128 bit block ciphers for key wrapping, + * such as Camellia and Aria. + */ + if (cipher != MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&ctx->cipher_ctx, key, keybits, + is_wrap ? MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT : + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) + ) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_nist_kw_free(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_nist_kw_context)); +} + +/* + * Helper function for Xoring the uint64_t "t" with the encrypted A. + * Defined in NIST SP 800-38F section 6.1 + */ +static void calc_a_xor_t(unsigned char A[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH], uint64_t t) +{ + size_t i = 0; + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(t); i++) { + A[i] ^= (t >> ((sizeof(t) - 1 - i) * 8)) & 0xff; + } +} + +/* + * KW-AE as defined in SP 800-38F section 6.2 + * KWP-AE as defined in SP 800-38F section 6.3 + */ +int mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode, + const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *output, size_t *out_len, size_t out_size) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t semiblocks = 0; + size_t s; + size_t olen, padlen = 0; + uint64_t t = 0; + unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; + unsigned char inbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; + + *out_len = 0; + /* + * Generate the String to work on + */ + if (mode == MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW) { + if (out_size < in_len + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * According to SP 800-38F Table 1, the plaintext length for KW + * must be between 2 to 2^54-1 semiblocks inclusive. + */ + if (in_len < 16 || +#if SIZE_MAX > 0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFF8 + in_len > 0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFF8 || +#endif + in_len % KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memcpy(output, NIST_KW_ICV1, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH); + memmove(output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, input, in_len); + } else { + if (in_len % 8 != 0) { + padlen = (8 - (in_len % 8)); + } + + if (out_size < in_len + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + padlen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * According to SP 800-38F Table 1, the plaintext length for KWP + * must be between 1 and 2^32-1 octets inclusive. + */ + if (in_len < 1 +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFF + || in_len > 0xFFFFFFFF +#endif + ) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memcpy(output, NIST_KW_ICV2, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE((in_len & 0xffffffff), output, + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2); + + memcpy(output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, input, in_len); + memset(output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + in_len, 0, padlen); + } + semiblocks = ((in_len + padlen) / KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH) + 1; + + s = 6 * (semiblocks - 1); + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP + && in_len <= KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH) { + memcpy(inbuff, output, 16); + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, + inbuff, 16, output, &olen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + } else { + unsigned char *R2 = output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + unsigned char *A = output; + + /* + * Do the wrapping function W, as defined in RFC 3394 section 2.2.1 + */ + if (semiblocks < MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Calculate intermediate values */ + for (t = 1; t <= s; t++) { + memcpy(inbuff, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH); + memcpy(inbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, R2, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH); + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, + inbuff, 16, outbuff, &olen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + memcpy(A, outbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH); + calc_a_xor_t(A, t); + + memcpy(R2, outbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH); + R2 += KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + if (R2 >= output + (semiblocks * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH)) { + R2 = output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + } + } + } + + *out_len = semiblocks * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + +cleanup: + + if (ret != 0) { + memset(output, 0, semiblocks * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH); + } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(inbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(outbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * W-1 function as defined in RFC 3394 section 2.2.2 + * This function assumes the following: + * 1. Output buffer is at least of size ( semiblocks - 1 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH. + * 2. The input buffer is of size semiblocks * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH. + * 3. Minimal number of semiblocks is 3. + * 4. A is a buffer to hold the first semiblock of the input buffer. + */ +static int unwrap(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t semiblocks, + unsigned char A[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH], + unsigned char *output, size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = 0; + const size_t s = 6 * (semiblocks - 1); + size_t olen; + uint64_t t = 0; + unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; + unsigned char inbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; + unsigned char *R = NULL; + *out_len = 0; + + if (semiblocks < MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memcpy(A, input, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH); + memmove(output, input + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, (semiblocks - 1) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH); + R = output + (semiblocks - 2) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + + /* Calculate intermediate values */ + for (t = s; t >= 1; t--) { + calc_a_xor_t(A, t); + + memcpy(inbuff, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH); + memcpy(inbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, R, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH); + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, + inbuff, 16, outbuff, &olen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + memcpy(A, outbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH); + + /* Set R as LSB64 of outbuff */ + memcpy(R, outbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH); + + if (R == output) { + R = output + (semiblocks - 2) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + } else { + R -= KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + } + } + + *out_len = (semiblocks - 1) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + memset(output, 0, (semiblocks - 1) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH); + } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(inbuff, sizeof(inbuff)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(outbuff, sizeof(outbuff)); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * KW-AD as defined in SP 800-38F section 6.2 + * KWP-AD as defined in SP 800-38F section 6.3 + */ +int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, + mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode, + const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *output, size_t *out_len, size_t out_size) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t olen; + unsigned char A[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH]; + int diff; + + *out_len = 0; + if (out_size < in_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW) { + /* + * According to SP 800-38F Table 1, the ciphertext length for KW + * must be between 3 to 2^54 semiblocks inclusive. + */ + if (in_len < 24 || +#if SIZE_MAX > 0x200000000000000 + in_len > 0x200000000000000 || +#endif + in_len % KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = unwrap(ctx, input, in_len / KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, + A, output, out_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Check ICV in "constant-time" */ + diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(NIST_KW_ICV1, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH); + + if (diff != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + } else if (mode == MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP) { + size_t padlen = 0; + uint32_t Plen; + /* + * According to SP 800-38F Table 1, the ciphertext length for KWP + * must be between 2 to 2^29 semiblocks inclusive. + */ + if (in_len < KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2 || +#if SIZE_MAX > 0x100000000 + in_len > 0x100000000 || +#endif + in_len % KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (in_len == KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2) { + unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2]; + ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, + input, 16, outbuff, &olen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + memcpy(A, outbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH); + memcpy(output, outbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(outbuff, sizeof(outbuff)); + *out_len = KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH; + } else { + /* in_len >= KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 3 */ + ret = unwrap(ctx, input, in_len / KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, + A, output, out_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* Check ICV in "constant-time" */ + diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(NIST_KW_ICV2, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2); + + if (diff != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + } + + Plen = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2); + + /* + * Plen is the length of the plaintext, when the input is valid. + * If Plen is larger than the plaintext and padding, padlen will be + * larger than 8, because of the type wrap around. + */ + padlen = in_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - Plen; + ret = mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padlen, 7), + MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED, ret); + padlen &= 7; + + /* Check padding in "constant-time" */ + const uint8_t zero[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH] = { 0 }; + diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial( + &output[*out_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH], zero, + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - padlen, 0); + + if (diff != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED; + } + + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + memset(output + Plen, 0, padlen); + *out_len = Plen; + } else { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + memset(output, 0, *out_len); + *out_len = 0; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&diff, sizeof(diff)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(A, sizeof(A)); + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + +/* + * Test vectors taken from NIST + * https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/CAVP-TESTING-BLOCK-CIPHER-MODES#KW + */ +static const unsigned int key_len[] = { + 16, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + 24, + 32 +#endif +}; + +static const unsigned char kw_key[][32] = { + { 0x75, 0x75, 0xda, 0x3a, 0x93, 0x60, 0x7c, 0xc2, + 0xbf, 0xd8, 0xce, 0xc7, 0xaa, 0xdf, 0xd9, 0xa6 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { 0x2d, 0x85, 0x26, 0x08, 0x1d, 0x02, 0xfb, 0x5b, + 0x85, 0xf6, 0x9a, 0xc2, 0x86, 0xec, 0xd5, 0x7d, + 0x40, 0xdf, 0x5d, 0xf3, 0x49, 0x47, 0x44, 0xd3 }, + { 0x11, 0x2a, 0xd4, 0x1b, 0x48, 0x56, 0xc7, 0x25, + 0x4a, 0x98, 0x48, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xdd, 0x78, 0x33, + 0x5b, 0x03, 0x9a, 0x48, 0xa8, 0x96, 0x2c, 0x4d, + 0x1c, 0xb7, 0x8e, 0xab, 0xd5, 0xda, 0xd7, 0x88 } +#endif +}; + +static const unsigned char kw_msg[][40] = { + { 0x42, 0x13, 0x6d, 0x3c, 0x38, 0x4a, 0x3e, 0xea, + 0xc9, 0x5a, 0x06, 0x6f, 0xd2, 0x8f, 0xed, 0x3f }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { 0x95, 0xc1, 0x1b, 0xf5, 0x35, 0x3a, 0xfe, 0xdb, + 0x98, 0xfd, 0xd6, 0xc8, 0xca, 0x6f, 0xdb, 0x6d, + 0xa5, 0x4b, 0x74, 0xb4, 0x99, 0x0f, 0xdc, 0x45, + 0xc0, 0x9d, 0x15, 0x8f, 0x51, 0xce, 0x62, 0x9d, + 0xe2, 0xaf, 0x26, 0xe3, 0x25, 0x0e, 0x6b, 0x4c }, + { 0x1b, 0x20, 0xbf, 0x19, 0x90, 0xb0, 0x65, 0xd7, + 0x98, 0xe1, 0xb3, 0x22, 0x64, 0xad, 0x50, 0xa8, + 0x74, 0x74, 0x92, 0xba, 0x09, 0xa0, 0x4d, 0xd1 } +#endif +}; + +static const size_t kw_msg_len[] = { + 16, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + 40, + 24 +#endif +}; +static const size_t kw_out_len[] = { + 24, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + 48, + 32 +#endif +}; +static const unsigned char kw_res[][48] = { + { 0x03, 0x1f, 0x6b, 0xd7, 0xe6, 0x1e, 0x64, 0x3d, + 0xf6, 0x85, 0x94, 0x81, 0x6f, 0x64, 0xca, 0xa3, + 0xf5, 0x6f, 0xab, 0xea, 0x25, 0x48, 0xf5, 0xfb }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { 0x44, 0x3c, 0x6f, 0x15, 0x09, 0x83, 0x71, 0x91, + 0x3e, 0x5c, 0x81, 0x4c, 0xa1, 0xa0, 0x42, 0xec, + 0x68, 0x2f, 0x7b, 0x13, 0x6d, 0x24, 0x3a, 0x4d, + 0x6c, 0x42, 0x6f, 0xc6, 0x97, 0x15, 0x63, 0xe8, + 0xa1, 0x4a, 0x55, 0x8e, 0x09, 0x64, 0x16, 0x19, + 0xbf, 0x03, 0xfc, 0xaf, 0x90, 0xb1, 0xfc, 0x2d }, + { 0xba, 0x8a, 0x25, 0x9a, 0x47, 0x1b, 0x78, 0x7d, + 0xd5, 0xd5, 0x40, 0xec, 0x25, 0xd4, 0x3d, 0x87, + 0x20, 0x0f, 0xda, 0xdc, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0x05, 0xd9, + 0x16, 0x58, 0x4f, 0xa9, 0xf6, 0xcb, 0xf5, 0x12 } +#endif +}; + +static const unsigned char kwp_key[][32] = { + { 0x78, 0x65, 0xe2, 0x0f, 0x3c, 0x21, 0x65, 0x9a, + 0xb4, 0x69, 0x0b, 0x62, 0x9c, 0xdf, 0x3c, 0xc4 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { 0xf5, 0xf8, 0x96, 0xa3, 0xbd, 0x2f, 0x4a, 0x98, + 0x23, 0xef, 0x16, 0x2b, 0x00, 0xb8, 0x05, 0xd7, + 0xde, 0x1e, 0xa4, 0x66, 0x26, 0x96, 0xa2, 0x58 }, + { 0x95, 0xda, 0x27, 0x00, 0xca, 0x6f, 0xd9, 0xa5, + 0x25, 0x54, 0xee, 0x2a, 0x8d, 0xf1, 0x38, 0x6f, + 0x5b, 0x94, 0xa1, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xd8, 0xa4, 0xae, + 0xf6, 0x0a, 0x8d, 0x61, 0xab, 0x5f, 0x22, 0x5a } +#endif +}; + +static const unsigned char kwp_msg[][31] = { + { 0xbd, 0x68, 0x43, 0xd4, 0x20, 0x37, 0x8d, 0xc8, + 0x96 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { 0x6c, 0xcd, 0xd5, 0x85, 0x18, 0x40, 0x97, 0xeb, + 0xd5, 0xc3, 0xaf, 0x3e, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x19, + 0x14, 0x7b, 0x4d, 0x99, 0x5f, 0x96, 0x43, 0x66, + 0x91, 0x56, 0x75, 0x8c, 0x13, 0x16, 0x8f }, + { 0xd1 } +#endif +}; +static const size_t kwp_msg_len[] = { + 9, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + 31, + 1 +#endif +}; + +static const unsigned char kwp_res[][48] = { + { 0x41, 0xec, 0xa9, 0x56, 0xd4, 0xaa, 0x04, 0x7e, + 0xb5, 0xcf, 0x4e, 0xfe, 0x65, 0x96, 0x61, 0xe7, + 0x4d, 0xb6, 0xf8, 0xc5, 0x64, 0xe2, 0x35, 0x00 }, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + { 0x4e, 0x9b, 0xc2, 0xbc, 0xbc, 0x6c, 0x1e, 0x13, + 0xd3, 0x35, 0xbc, 0xc0, 0xf7, 0x73, 0x6a, 0x88, + 0xfa, 0x87, 0x53, 0x66, 0x15, 0xbb, 0x8e, 0x63, + 0x8b, 0xcc, 0x81, 0x66, 0x84, 0x68, 0x17, 0x90, + 0x67, 0xcf, 0xa9, 0x8a, 0x9d, 0x0e, 0x33, 0x26 }, + { 0x06, 0xba, 0x7a, 0xe6, 0xf3, 0x24, 0x8c, 0xfd, + 0xcf, 0x26, 0x75, 0x07, 0xfa, 0x00, 0x1b, 0xc4 } +#endif +}; +static const size_t kwp_out_len[] = { + 24, +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + 40, + 16 +#endif +}; + +int mbedtls_nist_kw_self_test(int verbose) +{ + mbedtls_nist_kw_context ctx; + unsigned char out[48]; + size_t olen; + int i; + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_nist_kw_init(&ctx); + + /* + * KW mode + */ + { + static const int num_tests = sizeof(kw_key) / sizeof(*kw_key); + + for (i = 0; i < num_tests; i++) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" KW-AES-%u ", (unsigned int) key_len[i] * 8); + } + + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + kw_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 1); + if (ret != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" KW: setup failed "); + } + + goto end; + } + + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, kw_msg[i], + kw_msg_len[i], out, &olen, sizeof(out)); + if (ret != 0 || kw_out_len[i] != olen || + memcmp(out, kw_res[i], kw_out_len[i]) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed. "); + } + + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + kw_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 0)) + != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" KW: setup failed "); + } + + goto end; + } + + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, + out, olen, out, &olen, sizeof(out)); + + if (ret != 0 || olen != kw_msg_len[i] || + memcmp(out, kw_msg[i], kw_msg_len[i]) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" passed\n"); + } + } + } + + /* + * KWP mode + */ + { + static const int num_tests = sizeof(kwp_key) / sizeof(*kwp_key); + + for (i = 0; i < num_tests; i++) { + olen = sizeof(out); + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" KWP-AES-%u ", (unsigned int) key_len[i] * 8); + } + + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, kwp_key[i], + key_len[i] * 8, 1); + if (ret != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" KWP: setup failed "); + } + + goto end; + } + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, kwp_msg[i], + kwp_msg_len[i], out, &olen, sizeof(out)); + + if (ret != 0 || kwp_out_len[i] != olen || + memcmp(out, kwp_res[i], kwp_out_len[i]) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed. "); + } + + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, + kwp_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 0)) + != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" KWP: setup failed "); + } + + goto end; + } + + ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, out, + olen, out, &olen, sizeof(out)); + + if (ret != 0 || olen != kwp_msg_len[i] || + memcmp(out, kwp_msg[i], kwp_msg_len[i]) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed. "); + } + + ret = 1; + goto end; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" passed\n"); + } + } + } +end: + mbedtls_nist_kw_free(&ctx); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ diff --git a/library/oid.c b/library/oid.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1d6b1eb866b --- /dev/null +++ b/library/oid.c @@ -0,0 +1,1166 @@ +/** + * \file oid.c + * + * \brief Object Identifier (OID) database + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) + +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +/* + * Macro to automatically add the size of #define'd OIDs + */ +#define ADD_LEN(s) s, MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(s) + +/* + * Macro to generate mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +#define OID_DESCRIPTOR(s, name, description) { ADD_LEN(s), name, description } +#define NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL } +#else +#define OID_DESCRIPTOR(s, name, description) { ADD_LEN(s) } +#define NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR { NULL, 0 } +#endif + +/* + * Macro to generate an internal function for oid_XXX_from_asn1() (used by + * the other functions) + */ +#define FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(TYPE_T, NAME, LIST) \ + static const TYPE_T *oid_ ## NAME ## _from_asn1( \ + const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid) \ + { \ + const TYPE_T *p = (LIST); \ + const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *cur = \ + (const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *) p; \ + if (p == NULL || oid == NULL) return NULL; \ + while (cur->asn1 != NULL) { \ + if (cur->asn1_len == oid->len && \ + memcmp(cur->asn1, oid->p, oid->len) == 0) { \ + return p; \ + } \ + p++; \ + cur = (const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *) p; \ + } \ + return NULL; \ + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +/* + * Macro to generate a function for retrieving a single attribute from the + * descriptor of an mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. + */ +#define FN_OID_GET_DESCRIPTOR_ATTR1(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, TYPE_NAME, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1) \ + int FN_NAME(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1) \ + { \ + const TYPE_T *data = oid_ ## TYPE_NAME ## _from_asn1(oid); \ + if (data == NULL) return MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND; \ + *ATTR1 = data->descriptor.ATTR1; \ + return 0; \ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ + +/* + * Macro to generate a function for retrieving a single attribute from an + * mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. + */ +#define FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, TYPE_NAME, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1) \ + int FN_NAME(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1) \ + { \ + const TYPE_T *data = oid_ ## TYPE_NAME ## _from_asn1(oid); \ + if (data == NULL) return MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND; \ + *ATTR1 = data->ATTR1; \ + return 0; \ + } + +/* + * Macro to generate a function for retrieving two attributes from an + * mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. + */ +#define FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, TYPE_NAME, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1, \ + ATTR2_TYPE, ATTR2) \ + int FN_NAME(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1, \ + ATTR2_TYPE * ATTR2) \ + { \ + const TYPE_T *data = oid_ ## TYPE_NAME ## _from_asn1(oid); \ + if (data == NULL) return MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND; \ + *(ATTR1) = data->ATTR1; \ + *(ATTR2) = data->ATTR2; \ + return 0; \ + } + +/* + * Macro to generate a function for retrieving the OID based on a single + * attribute from a mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. + */ +#define FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, LIST, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1) \ + int FN_NAME(ATTR1_TYPE ATTR1, const char **oid, size_t *olen) \ + { \ + const TYPE_T *cur = (LIST); \ + while (cur->descriptor.asn1 != NULL) { \ + if (cur->ATTR1 == (ATTR1)) { \ + *oid = cur->descriptor.asn1; \ + *olen = cur->descriptor.asn1_len; \ + return 0; \ + } \ + cur++; \ + } \ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND; \ + } + +/* + * Macro to generate a function for retrieving the OID based on two + * attributes from a mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper. + */ +#define FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR2(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, LIST, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1, \ + ATTR2_TYPE, ATTR2) \ + int FN_NAME(ATTR1_TYPE ATTR1, ATTR2_TYPE ATTR2, const char **oid, \ + size_t *olen) \ + { \ + const TYPE_T *cur = (LIST); \ + while (cur->descriptor.asn1 != NULL) { \ + if (cur->ATTR1 == (ATTR1) && cur->ATTR2 == (ATTR2)) { \ + *oid = cur->descriptor.asn1; \ + *olen = cur->descriptor.asn1_len; \ + return 0; \ + } \ + cur++; \ + } \ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND; \ + } + +/* + * For X520 attribute types + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + const char *short_name; +} oid_x520_attr_t; + +static const oid_x520_attr_t oid_x520_attr_type[] = +{ + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, "id-at-commonName", "Common Name"), + "CN", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, "id-at-countryName", "Country"), + "C", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, "id-at-locality", "Locality"), + "L", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, "id-at-state", "State"), + "ST", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION, "id-at-organizationName", + "Organization"), + "O", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, "id-at-organizationalUnitName", "Org Unit"), + "OU", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, + "emailAddress", + "E-mail address"), + "emailAddress", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER, + "id-at-serialNumber", + "Serial number"), + "serialNumber", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS, + "id-at-postalAddress", + "Postal address"), + "postalAddress", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE, "id-at-postalCode", "Postal code"), + "postalCode", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, "id-at-surName", "Surname"), + "SN", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, "id-at-givenName", "Given name"), + "GN", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS, "id-at-initials", "Initials"), + "initials", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER, + "id-at-generationQualifier", + "Generation qualifier"), + "generationQualifier", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE, "id-at-title", "Title"), + "title", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER, + "id-at-dnQualifier", + "Distinguished Name qualifier"), + "dnQualifier", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM, "id-at-pseudonym", "Pseudonym"), + "pseudonym", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_UID, "id-uid", "User Id"), + "uid", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, + "id-domainComponent", + "Domain component"), + "DC", + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER, + "id-at-uniqueIdentifier", + "Unique Identifier"), + "uniqueIdentifier", + }, + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, + NULL, + } +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_x520_attr_t, x520_attr, oid_x520_attr_type) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name, + oid_x520_attr_t, + x520_attr, + const char *, + short_name) + +/* + * For X509 extensions + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + int ext_type; +} oid_x509_ext_t; + +static const oid_x509_ext_t oid_x509_ext[] = +{ + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, + "id-ce-basicConstraints", + "Basic Constraints"), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, "id-ce-keyUsage", "Key Usage"), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, + "id-ce-extKeyUsage", + "Extended Key Usage"), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, + "id-ce-subjectAltName", + "Subject Alt Name"), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, + "id-netscape-certtype", + "Netscape Certificate Type"), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, + "id-ce-certificatePolicies", + "Certificate Policies"), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + "id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier", + "Subject Key Identifier"), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + "id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier", + "Authority Key Identifier"), + MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + }, + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, + 0, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_x509_ext_t, x509_ext, oid_x509_ext) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type, oid_x509_ext_t, x509_ext, int, ext_type) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_ext_key_usage[] = +{ + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH, + "id-kp-serverAuth", + "TLS Web Server Authentication"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH, + "id-kp-clientAuth", + "TLS Web Client Authentication"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING, "id-kp-codeSigning", "Code Signing"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION, "id-kp-emailProtection", "E-mail Protection"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING, "id-kp-timeStamping", "Time Stamping"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING, "id-kp-OCSPSigning", "OCSP Signing"), + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_WISUN_FAN, + "id-kp-wisun-fan-device", + "Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network (FAN)"), + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, ext_key_usage, oid_ext_key_usage) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage, + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, + ext_key_usage, + const char *, + description) + +static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_certificate_policies[] = +{ + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, "anyPolicy", "Any Policy"), + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, certificate_policies, oid_certificate_policies) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies, + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, + certificate_policies, + const char *, + description) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ + +/* + * For SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; +} oid_sig_alg_t; + +static const oid_sig_alg_t oid_sig_alg[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5, "md5WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD5"), + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1, "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224, "sha224WithRSAEncryption", + "RSA with SHA-224"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256, "sha256WithRSAEncryption", + "RSA with SHA-256"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384, "sha384WithRSAEncryption", + "RSA with SHA-384"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512, "sha512WithRSAEncryption", + "RSA with SHA-512"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS, "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1, "ecdsa-with-SHA1", "ECDSA with SHA1"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224, "ecdsa-with-SHA224", "ECDSA with SHA224"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256, "ecdsa-with-SHA256", "ECDSA with SHA256"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384, "ecdsa-with-SHA384", "ECDSA with SHA384"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512, "ecdsa-with-SHA512", "ECDSA with SHA512"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS, "RSASSA-PSS", "RSASSA-PSS"), + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, oid_sig_alg) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +FN_OID_GET_DESCRIPTOR_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc, + oid_sig_alg_t, + sig_alg, + const char *, + description) +#endif + +FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg, + oid_sig_alg_t, + sig_alg, + mbedtls_md_type_t, + md_alg, + mbedtls_pk_type_t, + pk_alg) +FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg, + oid_sig_alg_t, + oid_sig_alg, + mbedtls_pk_type_t, + pk_alg, + mbedtls_md_type_t, + md_alg) + +/* + * For PublicKeyInfo (PKCS1, RFC 5480) + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; +} oid_pk_alg_t; + +static const oid_pk_alg_t oid_pk_alg[] = +{ + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA, "rsaEncryption", "RSA"), + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED, "id-ecPublicKey", "Generic EC key"), + MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH, "id-ecDH", "EC key for ECDH"), + MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, + }, + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, + MBEDTLS_PK_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_pk_alg_t, pk_alg, oid_pk_alg) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg, oid_pk_alg_t, pk_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg) +FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg, + oid_pk_alg_t, + oid_pk_alg, + mbedtls_pk_type_t, + pk_alg) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +/* + * For elliptic curves that use namedCurve inside ECParams (RFC 5480) + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; +} oid_ecp_grp_t; + +static const oid_ecp_grp_t oid_ecp_grp[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1, "secp192r1", "secp192r1"), + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1, "secp224r1", "secp224r1"), + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1, "secp256r1", "secp256r1"), + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1, "secp384r1", "secp384r1"), + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1, "secp521r1", "secp521r1"), + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1, "secp192k1", "secp192k1"), + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1, "secp224k1", "secp224k1"), + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1, "secp256k1", "secp256k1"), + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1, "brainpoolP256r1", "brainpool256r1"), + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1, "brainpoolP384r1", "brainpool384r1"), + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1, "brainpoolP512r1", "brainpool512r1"), + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1 */ + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_ecp_grp_t, grp_id, oid_ecp_grp) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp, oid_ecp_grp_t, grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_group_id, grp_id) +FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp, + oid_ecp_grp_t, + oid_ecp_grp, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id, + grp_id) + +/* + * For Elliptic Curve algorithms that are directly + * encoded in the AlgorithmIdentifier (RFC 8410) + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; +} oid_ecp_grp_algid_t; + +static const oid_ecp_grp_algid_t oid_ecp_grp_algid[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_X25519, "X25519", "X25519"), + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_X448, "X448", "X448"), + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448 */ + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_ecp_grp_algid_t, grp_id_algid, oid_ecp_grp_algid) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp_algid, + oid_ecp_grp_algid_t, + grp_id_algid, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id, + grp_id) +FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp_algid, + oid_ecp_grp_algid_t, + oid_ecp_grp_algid, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id, + grp_id) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +/* + * For PKCS#5 PBES2 encryption algorithm + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; +} oid_cipher_alg_t; + +static const oid_cipher_alg_t oid_cipher_alg[] = +{ + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC, "desCBC", "DES-CBC"), + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC, "des-ede3-cbc", "DES-EDE3-CBC"), + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AES_128_CBC, "aes128-cbc", "AES128-CBC"), + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AES_192_CBC, "aes192-cbc", "AES192-CBC"), + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AES_256_CBC, "aes256-cbc", "AES256-CBC"), + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, + }, + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_cipher_alg_t, cipher_alg, oid_cipher_alg) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg, + oid_cipher_alg_t, + cipher_alg, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t, + cipher_alg) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + +/* + * For digestAlgorithm + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; +} oid_md_alg_t; + +static const oid_md_alg_t oid_md_alg[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5, "id-md5", "MD5"), + MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, + }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1, "id-sha1", "SHA-1"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224, "id-sha224", "SHA-224"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, + }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256, "id-sha256", "SHA-256"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384, "id-sha384", "SHA-384"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, + }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512, "id-sha512", "SHA-512"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, + }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160, "id-ripemd160", "RIPEMD-160"), + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, + }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_224, "id-sha3-224", "SHA-3-224"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224, + }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_256, "id-sha3-256", "SHA-3-256"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256, + }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_384, "id-sha3-384", "SHA-3-384"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384, + }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_512, "id-sha3-512", "SHA-3-512"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512, + }, +#endif + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_md_alg_t, md_alg, oid_md_alg) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg, oid_md_alg_t, md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg) +FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md, + oid_md_alg_t, + oid_md_alg, + mbedtls_md_type_t, + md_alg) + +/* + * For HMAC digestAlgorithm + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_hmac; +} oid_md_hmac_t; + +static const oid_md_hmac_t oid_md_hmac[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1, "hmacSHA1", "HMAC-SHA-1"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224, "hmacSHA224", "HMAC-SHA-224"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA256, "hmacSHA256", "HMAC-SHA-256"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA384, "hmacSHA384", "HMAC-SHA-384"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512, "hmacSHA512", "HMAC-SHA-512"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_224, "hmacSHA3-224", "HMAC-SHA3-224"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_256, "hmacSHA3-256", "HMAC-SHA3-256"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_384, "hmacSHA3-384", "HMAC-SHA3-384"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_512, "hmacSHA3-512", "HMAC-SHA3-512"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_RIPEMD160, "hmacRIPEMD160", "HMAC-RIPEMD160"), + MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, + }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160 */ + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_md_hmac_t, md_hmac, oid_md_hmac) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac, oid_md_hmac_t, md_hmac, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_hmac) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +/* + * For PKCS#12 PBEs + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; +} oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t; + +static const oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg[] = +{ + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC, + "pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC", + "PBE with SHA1 and 3-Key 3DES"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC, + "pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC", + "PBE with SHA1 and 2-Key 3DES"), + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, + }, + { + NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, + }, +}; + +FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t, pkcs12_pbe_alg, oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg) +FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg, + oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t, + pkcs12_pbe_alg, + mbedtls_md_type_t, + md_alg, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t, + cipher_alg) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + +/* Return the x.y.z.... style numeric string for the given OID */ +int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(char *buf, size_t size, + const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + char *p = buf; + size_t n = size; + unsigned int value = 0; + + if (size > INT_MAX) { + /* Avoid overflow computing return value */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH; + } + + if (oid->len <= 0) { + /* OID must not be empty */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; + } + + for (size_t i = 0; i < oid->len; i++) { + /* Prevent overflow in value. */ + if (value > (UINT_MAX >> 7)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + if ((value == 0) && ((oid->p[i]) == 0x80)) { + /* Overlong encoding is not allowed */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + + value <<= 7; + value |= oid->p[i] & 0x7F; + + if (!(oid->p[i] & 0x80)) { + /* Last byte */ + if (n == size) { + int component1; + unsigned int component2; + /* First subidentifier contains first two OID components */ + if (value >= 80) { + component1 = '2'; + component2 = value - 80; + } else if (value >= 40) { + component1 = '1'; + component2 = value - 40; + } else { + component1 = '0'; + component2 = value; + } + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%c.%u", component1, component2); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, ".%u", value); + } + if (ret < 2 || (size_t) ret >= n) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + n -= (size_t) ret; + p += ret; + value = 0; + } + } + + if (value != 0) { + /* Unterminated subidentifier */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA; + } + + return (int) (size - n); +} + +static int oid_parse_number(unsigned int *num, const char **p, const char *bound) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + + *num = 0; + + while (*p < bound && **p >= '0' && **p <= '9') { + ret = 0; + if (*num > (UINT_MAX / 10)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + *num *= 10; + *num += **p - '0'; + (*p)++; + } + return ret; +} + +static size_t oid_subidentifier_num_bytes(unsigned int value) +{ + size_t num_bytes = 0; + + do { + value >>= 7; + num_bytes++; + } while (value != 0); + + return num_bytes; +} + +static int oid_subidentifier_encode_into(unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *bound, + unsigned int value) +{ + size_t num_bytes = oid_subidentifier_num_bytes(value); + + if ((size_t) (bound - *p) < num_bytes) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + (*p)[num_bytes - 1] = (unsigned char) (value & 0x7f); + value >>= 7; + + for (size_t i = 2; i <= num_bytes; i++) { + (*p)[num_bytes - i] = 0x80 | (unsigned char) (value & 0x7f); + value >>= 7; + } + *p += num_bytes; + + return 0; +} + +/* Return the OID for the given x.y.z.... style numeric string */ +int mbedtls_oid_from_numeric_string(mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, + const char *oid_str, size_t size) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + const char *str_ptr = oid_str; + const char *str_bound = oid_str + size; + unsigned int val = 0; + unsigned int component1, component2; + size_t encoded_len; + unsigned char *resized_mem; + + /* Count the number of dots to get a worst-case allocation size. */ + size_t num_dots = 0; + for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) { + if (oid_str[i] == '.') { + num_dots++; + } + } + /* Allocate maximum possible required memory: + * There are (num_dots + 1) integer components, but the first 2 share the + * same subidentifier, so we only need num_dots subidentifiers maximum. */ + if (num_dots == 0 || (num_dots > MBEDTLS_OID_MAX_COMPONENTS - 1)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + /* Each byte can store 7 bits, calculate number of bytes for a + * subidentifier: + * + * bytes = ceil(subidentifer_size * 8 / 7) + */ + size_t bytes_per_subidentifier = (((sizeof(unsigned int) * 8) - 1) / 7) + + 1; + size_t max_possible_bytes = num_dots * bytes_per_subidentifier; + oid->p = mbedtls_calloc(max_possible_bytes, 1); + if (oid->p == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + unsigned char *out_ptr = oid->p; + unsigned char *out_bound = oid->p + max_possible_bytes; + + ret = oid_parse_number(&component1, &str_ptr, str_bound); + if (ret != 0) { + goto error; + } + if (component1 > 2) { + /* First component can't be > 2 */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + if (str_ptr >= str_bound || *str_ptr != '.') { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + str_ptr++; + + ret = oid_parse_number(&component2, &str_ptr, str_bound); + if (ret != 0) { + goto error; + } + if ((component1 < 2) && (component2 > 39)) { + /* Root nodes 0 and 1 may have up to 40 children, numbered 0-39 */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + if (str_ptr < str_bound) { + if (*str_ptr == '.') { + str_ptr++; + } else { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + } + + if (component2 > (UINT_MAX - (component1 * 40))) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + ret = oid_subidentifier_encode_into(&out_ptr, out_bound, + (component1 * 40) + component2); + if (ret != 0) { + goto error; + } + + while (str_ptr < str_bound) { + ret = oid_parse_number(&val, &str_ptr, str_bound); + if (ret != 0) { + goto error; + } + if (str_ptr < str_bound) { + if (*str_ptr == '.') { + str_ptr++; + } else { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto error; + } + } + + ret = oid_subidentifier_encode_into(&out_ptr, out_bound, val); + if (ret != 0) { + goto error; + } + } + + encoded_len = (size_t) (out_ptr - oid->p); + resized_mem = mbedtls_calloc(encoded_len, 1); + if (resized_mem == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; + } + memcpy(resized_mem, oid->p, encoded_len); + mbedtls_free(oid->p); + oid->p = resized_mem; + oid->len = encoded_len; + + oid->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + + return 0; + +error: + mbedtls_free(oid->p); + oid->p = NULL; + oid->len = 0; + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ diff --git a/library/padlock.c b/library/padlock.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1f006910c2e --- /dev/null +++ b/library/padlock.c @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +/* + * VIA PadLock support functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * This implementation is based on the VIA PadLock Programming Guide: + * + * http://www.via.com.tw/en/downloads/whitepapers/initiatives/padlock/ + * programming_guide.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) + +#include "padlock.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE) + +/* + * PadLock detection routine + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_has_support(int feature) +{ + static int flags = -1; + int ebx = 0, edx = 0; + + if (flags == -1) { + asm ("movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t" + "movl $0xC0000000, %%eax \n\t" + "cpuid \n\t" + "cmpl $0xC0000001, %%eax \n\t" + "movl $0, %%edx \n\t" + "jb 1f \n\t" + "movl $0xC0000001, %%eax \n\t" + "cpuid \n\t" + "1: \n\t" + "movl %%edx, %1 \n\t" + "movl %2, %%ebx \n\t" + : "=m" (ebx), "=m" (edx) + : "m" (ebx) + : "eax", "ecx", "edx"); + + flags = edx; + } + + return flags & feature; +} + +/* + * PadLock AES-ECB block en(de)cryption + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]) +{ + int ebx = 0; + uint32_t *rk; + uint32_t *blk; + uint32_t *ctrl; + unsigned char buf[256]; + + rk = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; + + if (((long) rk & 15) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED; + } + + blk = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16(buf); + memcpy(blk, input, 16); + + ctrl = blk + 4; + *ctrl = 0x80 | ctx->nr | ((ctx->nr + (mode^1) - 10) << 9); + + asm ("pushfl \n\t" + "popfl \n\t" + "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t" + "movl $1, %%ecx \n\t" + "movl %2, %%edx \n\t" + "movl %3, %%ebx \n\t" + "movl %4, %%esi \n\t" + "movl %4, %%edi \n\t" + ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xc8 \n\t" + "movl %1, %%ebx \n\t" + : "=m" (ebx) + : "m" (ebx), "m" (ctrl), "m" (rk), "m" (blk) + : "memory", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi"); + + memcpy(output, blk, 16); + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) +/* + * PadLock AES-CBC buffer en(de)cryption + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ebx = 0; + size_t count; + uint32_t *rk; + uint32_t *iw; + uint32_t *ctrl; + unsigned char buf[256]; + + rk = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset; + + if (((long) input & 15) != 0 || + ((long) output & 15) != 0 || + ((long) rk & 15) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED; + } + + iw = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16(buf); + memcpy(iw, iv, 16); + + ctrl = iw + 4; + *ctrl = 0x80 | ctx->nr | ((ctx->nr + (mode ^ 1) - 10) << 9); + + count = (length + 15) >> 4; + + asm ("pushfl \n\t" + "popfl \n\t" + "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t" + "movl %2, %%ecx \n\t" + "movl %3, %%edx \n\t" + "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" + "movl %5, %%esi \n\t" + "movl %6, %%edi \n\t" + "movl %7, %%eax \n\t" + ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xd0 \n\t" + "movl %1, %%ebx \n\t" + : "=m" (ebx) + : "m" (ebx), "m" (count), "m" (ctrl), + "m" (rk), "m" (input), "m" (output), "m" (iw) + : "memory", "eax", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi"); + + memcpy(iv, iw, 16); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ diff --git a/library/padlock.h b/library/padlock.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..92d72af516e --- /dev/null +++ b/library/padlock.h @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +/** + * \file padlock.h + * + * \brief VIA PadLock ACE for HW encryption/decryption supported by some + * processors + * + * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call them directly. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" + +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED -0x0030 /**< Input data should be aligned. */ + +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(address_sanitizer) +#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASAN +#endif +#endif + +/* + * - `padlock` is implements with GNUC assembly for x86 target. + * - Some versions of ASan result in errors about not enough registers. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && \ + defined(__GNUC__) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASAN) + +#define MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE + +#include + +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_RNG 0x000C +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE 0x00C0 +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PHE 0x0C00 +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PMM 0x3000 + +#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16(x) (uint32_t *) (16 + ((int32_t) (x) & ~15)) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** + * \brief Internal PadLock detection routine + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param feature The feature to detect + * + * \return non-zero if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_has_support(int feature); + +/** + * \brief Internal PadLock AES-ECB block en(de)cryption + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param ctx AES context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT + * \param input 16-byte input block + * \param output 16-byte output block + * + * \return 0 if success, 1 if operation failed + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + const unsigned char input[16], + unsigned char output[16]); + +/** + * \brief Internal PadLock AES-CBC buffer en(de)cryption + * + * \note This function is only for internal use by other library + * functions; you must not call it directly. + * + * \param ctx AES context + * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT + * \param length length of the input data + * \param iv initialization vector (updated after use) + * \param input buffer holding the input data + * \param output buffer holding the output data + * + * \return 0 if success, 1 if operation failed + */ +int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, + int mode, + size_t length, + unsigned char iv[16], + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* HAVE_X86 */ + +#endif /* padlock.h */ diff --git a/library/pem.c b/library/pem.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0fee5df43a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/pem.c @@ -0,0 +1,547 @@ +/* + * Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) decoding + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#include "mbedtls/base64.h" +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) +#define PEM_RFC1421 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5 && + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC && + ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_pem_init(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_pem_context)); +} + +#if defined(PEM_RFC1421) +/* + * Read a 16-byte hex string and convert it to binary + */ +static int pem_get_iv(const unsigned char *s, unsigned char *iv, + size_t iv_len) +{ + size_t i, j, k; + + memset(iv, 0, iv_len); + + for (i = 0; i < iv_len * 2; i++, s++) { + if (*s >= '0' && *s <= '9') { + j = *s - '0'; + } else + if (*s >= 'A' && *s <= 'F') { + j = *s - '7'; + } else + if (*s >= 'a' && *s <= 'f') { + j = *s - 'W'; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV; + } + + k = ((i & 1) != 0) ? j : j << 4; + + iv[i >> 1] = (unsigned char) (iv[i >> 1] | k); + } + + return 0; +} + +static int pem_pbkdf1(unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + unsigned char *iv, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen) +{ + mbedtls_md_context_t md5_ctx; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md5_info; + unsigned char md5sum[16]; + size_t use_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md_init(&md5_ctx); + + /* Prepare the context. (setup() errors gracefully on NULL info.) */ + md5_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5); + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md5_ctx, md5_info, 0)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* + * key[ 0..15] = MD5(pwd || IV) + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md5_ctx)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, iv, 8)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md5_ctx, md5sum)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (keylen <= 16) { + memcpy(key, md5sum, keylen); + goto exit; + } + + memcpy(key, md5sum, 16); + + /* + * key[16..23] = MD5(key[ 0..15] || pwd || IV]) + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md5_ctx)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, md5sum, 16)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, iv, 8)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md5_ctx, md5sum)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + use_len = 16; + if (keylen < 32) { + use_len = keylen - 16; + } + + memcpy(key + 16, md5sum, use_len); + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&md5_ctx); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(md5sum, 16); + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +/* + * Decrypt with DES-CBC, using PBKDF1 for key derivation + */ +static int pem_des_decrypt(unsigned char des_iv[8], + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen) +{ + mbedtls_des_context des_ctx; + unsigned char des_key[8]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_des_init(&des_ctx); + + if ((ret = pem_pbkdf1(des_key, 8, des_iv, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_dec(&des_ctx, des_key)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc(&des_ctx, MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT, buflen, + des_iv, buf, buf); + +exit: + mbedtls_des_free(&des_ctx); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(des_key, 8); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Decrypt with 3DES-CBC, using PBKDF1 for key derivation + */ +static int pem_des3_decrypt(unsigned char des3_iv[8], + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen) +{ + mbedtls_des3_context des3_ctx; + unsigned char des3_key[24]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_des3_init(&des3_ctx); + + if ((ret = pem_pbkdf1(des3_key, 24, des3_iv, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec(&des3_ctx, des3_key)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc(&des3_ctx, MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT, buflen, + des3_iv, buf, buf); + +exit: + mbedtls_des3_free(&des3_ctx); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(des3_key, 24); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +/* + * Decrypt with AES-XXX-CBC, using PBKDF1 for key derivation + */ +static int pem_aes_decrypt(unsigned char aes_iv[16], unsigned int keylen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen) +{ + mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx; + unsigned char aes_key[32]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_aes_init(&aes_ctx); + + if ((ret = pem_pbkdf1(aes_key, keylen, aes_iv, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&aes_ctx, aes_key, keylen * 8)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, buflen, + aes_iv, buf, buf); + +exit: + mbedtls_aes_free(&aes_ctx); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(aes_key, keylen); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) +static int pem_check_pkcs_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, size_t *data_len) +{ + /* input_len > 0 is guaranteed by mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(). */ + size_t pad_len = input[input_len - 1]; + size_t i; + + if (pad_len > input_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + } + + *data_len = input_len - pad_len; + + for (i = *data_len; i < input_len; i++) { + if (input[i] != pad_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + } + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C || MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + +#endif /* PEM_RFC1421 */ + +int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const char *footer, + const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *pwd, + size_t pwdlen, size_t *use_len) +{ + int ret, enc; + size_t len; + unsigned char *buf; + const unsigned char *s1, *s2, *end; +#if defined(PEM_RFC1421) + unsigned char pem_iv[16]; + mbedtls_cipher_type_t enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE; +#else + ((void) pwd); + ((void) pwdlen); +#endif /* PEM_RFC1421 */ + + if (ctx == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + s1 = (unsigned char *) strstr((const char *) data, header); + + if (s1 == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + } + + s2 = (unsigned char *) strstr((const char *) data, footer); + + if (s2 == NULL || s2 <= s1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + } + + s1 += strlen(header); + if (*s1 == ' ') { + s1++; + } + if (*s1 == '\r') { + s1++; + } + if (*s1 == '\n') { + s1++; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + } + + end = s2; + end += strlen(footer); + if (*end == ' ') { + end++; + } + if (*end == '\r') { + end++; + } + if (*end == '\n') { + end++; + } + *use_len = (size_t) (end - data); + + enc = 0; + + if (s2 - s1 >= 22 && memcmp(s1, "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED", 22) == 0) { +#if defined(PEM_RFC1421) + enc++; + + s1 += 22; + if (*s1 == '\r') { + s1++; + } + if (*s1 == '\n') { + s1++; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA; + } + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + if (s2 - s1 >= 23 && memcmp(s1, "DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,", 23) == 0) { + enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC; + + s1 += 23; + if (s2 - s1 < 16 || pem_get_iv(s1, pem_iv, 8) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV; + } + + s1 += 16; + } else if (s2 - s1 >= 18 && memcmp(s1, "DEK-Info: DES-CBC,", 18) == 0) { + enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC; + + s1 += 18; + if (s2 - s1 < 16 || pem_get_iv(s1, pem_iv, 8) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV; + } + + s1 += 16; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + if (s2 - s1 >= 14 && memcmp(s1, "DEK-Info: AES-", 14) == 0) { + if (s2 - s1 < 22) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG; + } else if (memcmp(s1, "DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,", 22) == 0) { + enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC; + } else if (memcmp(s1, "DEK-Info: AES-192-CBC,", 22) == 0) { + enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC; + } else if (memcmp(s1, "DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,", 22) == 0) { + enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG; + } + + s1 += 22; + if (s2 - s1 < 32 || pem_get_iv(s1, pem_iv, 16) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV; + } + + s1 += 32; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + + if (enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG; + } + + if (*s1 == '\r') { + s1++; + } + if (*s1 == '\n') { + s1++; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA; + } +#else + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif /* PEM_RFC1421 */ + } + + if (s1 >= s2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA; + } + + ret = mbedtls_base64_decode(NULL, 0, &len, s1, (size_t) (s2 - s1)); + + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA, ret); + } + + if (len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, len)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_base64_decode(buf, len, &len, s1, (size_t) (s2 - s1))) != 0) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len); + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA, ret); + } + + if (enc != 0) { +#if defined(PEM_RFC1421) + if (pwd == NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED; + } + + ret = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + if (enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC) { + ret = pem_des3_decrypt(pem_iv, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen); + } else if (enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC) { + ret = pem_des_decrypt(pem_iv, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + if (enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC) { + ret = pem_aes_decrypt(pem_iv, 16, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen); + } else if (enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC) { + ret = pem_aes_decrypt(pem_iv, 24, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen); + } else if (enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC) { + ret = pem_aes_decrypt(pem_iv, 32, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ + + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len); + return ret; + } + + /* Check PKCS padding and update data length based on padding info. + * This can be used to detect invalid padding data and password + * mismatches. */ + size_t unpadded_len; + ret = pem_check_pkcs_padding(buf, len, &unpadded_len); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len); + return ret; + } + len = unpadded_len; +#else + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif /* PEM_RFC1421 */ + } + + ctx->buf = buf; + ctx->buflen = len; + + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_pem_free(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx->buf != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ctx->buf, ctx->buflen); + } + mbedtls_free(ctx->info); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_pem_context)); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +int mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(const char *header, const char *footer, + const unsigned char *der_data, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *encode_buf = NULL, *c, *p = buf; + size_t len = 0, use_len, add_len = 0; + + mbedtls_base64_encode(NULL, 0, &use_len, der_data, der_len); + add_len = strlen(header) + strlen(footer) + (((use_len > 2) ? (use_len - 2) : 0) / 64) + 1; + + if (use_len + add_len > buf_len) { + *olen = use_len + add_len; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (use_len != 0 && + ((encode_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, use_len)) == NULL)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_base64_encode(encode_buf, use_len, &use_len, der_data, + der_len)) != 0) { + mbedtls_free(encode_buf); + return ret; + } + + memcpy(p, header, strlen(header)); + p += strlen(header); + c = encode_buf; + + while (use_len) { + len = (use_len > 64) ? 64 : use_len; + memcpy(p, c, len); + use_len -= len; + p += len; + c += len; + *p++ = '\n'; + } + + memcpy(p, footer, strlen(footer)); + p += strlen(footer); + + *p++ = '\0'; + *olen = (size_t) (p - buf); + + /* Clean any remaining data previously written to the buffer */ + memset(buf + *olen, 0, buf_len - *olen); + + mbedtls_free(encode_buf); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..097777f2c09 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -0,0 +1,1531 @@ +/* + * Public Key abstraction layer + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "pk_wrap.h" +#include "pkwrite.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "rsa_internal.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif + +#include +#include + +#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_OR_PUBLIC_MAX_SIZE \ + (PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE > PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE) ? \ + PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE : PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE + +/* + * Initialise a mbedtls_pk_context + */ +void mbedtls_pk_init(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->pk_info = NULL; + ctx->pk_ctx = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ctx->priv_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + memset(ctx->pub_raw, 0, sizeof(ctx->pub_raw)); + ctx->pub_raw_len = 0; + ctx->ec_family = 0; + ctx->ec_bits = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +} + +/* + * Free (the components of) a mbedtls_pk_context + */ +void mbedtls_pk_free(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + if ((ctx->pk_info != NULL) && (ctx->pk_info->ctx_free_func != NULL)) { + ctx->pk_info->ctx_free_func(ctx->pk_ctx); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + /* The ownership of the priv_id key for opaque keys is external of the PK + * module. It's the user responsibility to clear it after use. */ + if ((ctx->pk_info != NULL) && (ctx->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE)) { + psa_destroy_key(ctx->priv_id); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_pk_context)); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_pk_restart_init(mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx) +{ + ctx->pk_info = NULL; + ctx->rs_ctx = NULL; +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_pk_restart_free(mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL || + ctx->pk_info->rs_free_func == NULL) { + return; + } + + ctx->pk_info->rs_free_func(ctx->rs_ctx); + + ctx->pk_info = NULL; + ctx->rs_ctx = NULL; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* + * Get pk_info structure from type + */ +const mbedtls_pk_info_t *mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type) +{ + switch (pk_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + return &mbedtls_rsa_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + return &mbedtls_eckey_info; + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + return &mbedtls_eckeydh_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + return &mbedtls_ecdsa_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME */ + /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT omitted on purpose */ + default: + return NULL; + } +} + +/* + * Initialise context + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info) +{ + if (info == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((info->ctx_alloc_func != NULL) && + ((ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func()) == NULL)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + ctx->pk_info = info; + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* + * Initialise a PSA-wrapping context + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +{ + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info = NULL; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t type; + + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + info = &mbedtls_ecdsa_opaque_info; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + if (type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + info = &mbedtls_rsa_opaque_info; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + ctx->pk_info = info; + ctx->priv_id = key; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +/* + * Initialize an RSA-alt context + */ +int mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, void *key, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func decrypt_func, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func sign_func, + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func key_len_func) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info = &mbedtls_rsa_alt_info; + + if (ctx->pk_info != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func()) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + ctx->pk_info = info; + + rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx->pk_ctx; + + rsa_alt->key = key; + rsa_alt->decrypt_func = decrypt_func; + rsa_alt->sign_func = sign_func; + rsa_alt->key_len_func = key_len_func; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * Tell if a PK can do the operations of the given type + */ +int mbedtls_pk_can_do(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_type_t type) +{ + /* A context with null pk_info is not set up yet and can't do anything. + * For backward compatibility, also accept NULL instead of a context + * pointer. */ + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return ctx->pk_info->can_do(type); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* + * Tell if a PK can do the operations of the given PSA algorithm + */ +int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_usage_t usage) +{ + psa_key_usage_t key_usage; + + /* A context with null pk_info is not set up yet and can't do anything. + * For backward compatibility, also accept NULL instead of a context + * pointer. */ + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + /* Filter out non allowed algorithms */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) == 0 && + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) == 0 && + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) == 0 && + alg != PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT && + PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + /* Filter out non allowed usage flags */ + if (usage == 0 || + (usage & ~(PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE)) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + /* Wildcard hash is not allowed */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) && + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) { + return 0; + } + + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(ctx) != MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + mbedtls_pk_type_t type; + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg)) { + type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY; + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || + alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) { + type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)) { + type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; + } else { + return 0; + } + + if (ctx->pk_info->can_do(type) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + switch (type) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE; + break; + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS: + key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT; + break; + default: + /* Should never happen */ + return 0; + } + + return (key_usage & usage) == usage; + } + + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(ctx->priv_id, &attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return 0; + } + + psa_algorithm_t key_alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes); + /* Key's enrollment is available only when an Mbed TLS implementation of PSA + * Crypto is being used, i.e. when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined. + * Even though we don't officially support using other implementations of PSA + * Crypto with TLS and X.509 (yet), we try to keep vendor's customizations + * separated. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + psa_algorithm_t key_alg2 = psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm(&attributes); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + key_usage = psa_get_key_usage_flags(&attributes); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + + if ((key_usage & usage) != usage) { + return 0; + } + + /* + * Common case: the key alg [or alg2] only allows alg. + * This will match PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT & PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH + * directly. + * This would also match ECDSA/RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN/RSA_PSS with + * a fixed hash on key_alg [or key_alg2]. + */ + if (alg == key_alg) { + return 1; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + if (alg == key_alg2) { + return 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + + /* + * If key_alg [or key_alg2] is a hash-and-sign with a wildcard for the hash, + * and alg is the same hash-and-sign family with any hash, + * then alg is compliant with this key alg + */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)) { + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(key_alg) && + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(key_alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH && + (alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == (key_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) { + return 1; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(key_alg2) && + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(key_alg2) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH && + (alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == (key_alg2 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) { + return 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +static psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm_for_rsa(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + int want_crypt) +{ + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + if (want_crypt) { + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa); + return PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type)); + } else { + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); + } + } else { + if (want_crypt) { + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT; + } else { + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); + } + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk); + + psa_key_usage_t more_usage = usage; + if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE) { + more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; + } else if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) { + more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH; + } else if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT) { + more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT; + } + more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY; + + int want_private = !(usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE || + usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH || + usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + + switch (pk_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + { + int want_crypt = 0; /* 0: sign/verify; 1: encrypt/decrypt */ + switch (usage) { + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: + /* Nothing to do. */ + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT: + want_crypt = 1; + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + /* Detect the presence of a private key in a way that works both + * in CRT and non-CRT configurations. */ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk); + int has_private = (mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(rsa) == 0); + if (want_private && !has_private) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + psa_set_key_type(attributes, (want_private ? + PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR : + PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)); + psa_set_key_bits(attributes, mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(pk)); + psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, + psa_algorithm_for_rsa(rsa, want_crypt)); + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + { + int sign_ok = (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH); + int derive_ok = (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + psa_ecc_family_t family = pk->ec_family; + size_t bits = pk->ec_bits; + int has_private = 0; + if (pk->priv_id != MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT) { + has_private = 1; + } +#else + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk); + int has_private = (ec->d.n != 0); + size_t bits = 0; + psa_ecc_family_t family = + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id, &bits); +#endif + psa_algorithm_t alg = 0; + switch (usage) { + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: + if (!sign_ok) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + alg = PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); +#else + alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); +#endif + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE: + alg = PSA_ALG_ECDH; + if (!derive_ok) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + if (want_private && !has_private) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + psa_set_key_type(attributes, (want_private ? + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(family) : + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(family))); + psa_set_key_bits(attributes, bits); + psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, alg); + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: + { + psa_key_attributes_t old_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &old_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + psa_key_type_t old_type = psa_get_key_type(&old_attributes); + switch (usage) { + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: + if (!(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(old_type) || + old_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT: + if (old_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE: + if (!(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(old_type))) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + psa_key_type_t new_type = old_type; + /* Opaque keys are always key pairs, so we don't need a check + * on the input if the required usage is private. We just need + * to adjust the type correctly if the required usage is public. */ + if (!want_private) { + new_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(new_type); + } + more_usage = psa_get_key_usage_flags(&old_attributes); + if ((usage & more_usage) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + psa_set_key_type(attributes, new_type); + psa_set_key_bits(attributes, psa_get_key_bits(&old_attributes)); + psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, psa_get_key_algorithm(&old_attributes)); + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(attributes, more_usage); + /* Key's enrollment is available only when an Mbed TLS implementation of PSA + * Crypto is being used, i.e. when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined. + * Even though we don't officially support using other implementations of PSA + * Crypto with TLS and X.509 (yet), we try to keep vendor's customizations + * separated. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm(attributes, PSA_ALG_NONE); +#endif + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) || defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static psa_status_t export_import_into_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t old_key_id, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *new_key_id) +{ + unsigned char key_buffer[PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t key_length = 0; + psa_status_t status = psa_export_key(old_key_id, + key_buffer, sizeof(key_buffer), + &key_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + status = psa_import_key(attributes, key_buffer, key_length, new_key_id); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_buffer, key_length); + return status; +} + +static int copy_into_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t old_key_id, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *new_key_id) +{ + /* Normally, we prefer copying: it's more efficient and works even + * for non-exportable keys. */ + psa_status_t status = psa_copy_key(old_key_id, attributes, new_key_id); + if (status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED /*missing COPY usage*/ || + status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT /*incompatible policy*/) { + /* There are edge cases where copying won't work, but export+import + * might: + * - If the old key does not allow PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY. + * - If the old key's usage does not allow what attributes wants. + * Because the key was intended for use in the pk module, and may + * have had a policy chosen solely for what pk needs rather than + * based on a detailed understanding of PSA policies, we are a bit + * more liberal than psa_copy_key() here. + */ + /* Here we need to check that the types match, otherwise we risk + * importing nonsensical data. */ + psa_key_attributes_t old_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + status = psa_get_key_attributes(old_key_id, &old_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + psa_key_type_t old_type = psa_get_key_type(&old_attributes); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&old_attributes); + if (old_type != psa_get_key_type(attributes)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + status = export_import_into_psa(old_key_id, attributes, new_key_id); + } + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA || MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +static int import_pair_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_id) +{ + switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + { + if (psa_get_key_type(attributes) != PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + unsigned char key_buffer[ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)]; + unsigned char *const key_end = key_buffer + sizeof(key_buffer); + unsigned char *key_data = key_end; + int ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), + key_buffer, &key_data); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + size_t key_length = key_end - key_data; + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(psa_import_key(attributes, + key_data, key_length, + key_id)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_data, key_length); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + { + /* We need to check the curve family, otherwise the import could + * succeed with nonsensical data. + * We don't check the bit-size: it's optional in attributes, + * and if it's specified, psa_import_key() will know from the key + * data length and will check that the bit-size matches. */ + psa_key_type_t to_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + psa_ecc_family_t from_family = pk->ec_family; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk); + size_t from_bits = 0; + psa_ecc_family_t from_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id, + &from_bits); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + if (to_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(from_family)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(pk->priv_id)) { + /* We have a public key and want a key pair. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + return copy_into_psa(pk->priv_id, attributes, key_id); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + if (ec->d.n == 0) { + /* Private key not set. Assume the input is a public key only. + * (The other possibility is that it's an incomplete object + * where the group is set but neither the public key nor + * the private key. This is not possible through ecp.h + * functions, so we don't bother reporting a more suitable + * error in that case.) */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + unsigned char key_buffer[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + size_t key_length = 0; + int ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(ec, &key_length, + key_buffer, sizeof(key_buffer)); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(psa_import_key(attributes, + key_buffer, key_length, + key_id)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_buffer, key_length); + return ret; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: + return copy_into_psa(pk->priv_id, attributes, key_id); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +static int import_public_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_id) +{ + psa_key_type_t psa_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char key_buffer[PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE]; +#endif + unsigned char *key_data = NULL; + size_t key_length = 0; + + switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + { + if (psa_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + unsigned char *const key_end = key_buffer + sizeof(key_buffer); + key_data = key_end; + int ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), + key_buffer, &key_data); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + key_length = (size_t) ret; + break; + } +#endif /*MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + { + /* We need to check the curve family, otherwise the import could + * succeed with nonsensical data. + * We don't check the bit-size: it's optional in attributes, + * and if it's specified, psa_import_key() will know from the key + * data length and will check that the bit-size matches. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + if (psa_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(pk->ec_family)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + key_data = (unsigned char *) pk->pub_raw; + key_length = pk->pub_raw_len; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk); + size_t from_bits = 0; + psa_ecc_family_t from_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id, + &from_bits); + if (psa_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(from_family)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + int ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key( + ec, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &key_length, key_buffer, sizeof(key_buffer)); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + key_data = key_buffer; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: + { + psa_key_attributes_t old_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = + psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &old_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + psa_key_type_t old_type = psa_get_key_type(&old_attributes); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&old_attributes); + if (psa_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(old_type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + status = psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, + key_buffer, sizeof(key_buffer), + &key_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + key_data = key_buffer; + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(psa_import_key(attributes, + key_data, key_length, + key_id)); +} + +int mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_id) +{ + /* Set the output immediately so that it won't contain garbage even + * if we error out before calling psa_import_key(). */ + *key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + + int want_public = PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(psa_get_key_type(attributes)); + if (want_public) { + return import_public_into_psa(pk, attributes, key_id); + } else { + return import_pair_into_psa(pk, attributes, key_id); + } +} + +static int copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + int public_only) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_algorithm_t alg_type; + size_t key_bits; + /* Use a buffer size large enough to contain either a key pair or public key. */ + unsigned char exp_key[PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_OR_PUBLIC_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t exp_key_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + + if (pk == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(key_id, &key_attr); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (public_only) { + status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, exp_key, sizeof(exp_key), &exp_key_len); + } else { + status = psa_export_key(key_id, exp_key, sizeof(exp_key), &exp_key_len); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + key_type = psa_get_key_type(&key_attr); + if (public_only) { + key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(key_type); + } + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attr); + alg_type = psa_get_key_algorithm(&key_attr); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if ((key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) || + (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)) { + + ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), exp_key, exp_key_len); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), exp_key, exp_key_len); + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + if (PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg_type) != PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) { + md_type = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(alg_type); + } + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg_type) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg_type)) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_type); + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg_type) || + alg_type == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, md_type); + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type)) { + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + + ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(key_type), key_bits); + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(pk, grp_id); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type)) { + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(pk, exp_key, exp_key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(pk, exp_key, exp_key_len, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(pk, exp_key, exp_key_len); + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(exp_key, sizeof(exp_key)); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + return copy_from_psa(key_id, pk, 0); +} + +int mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + return copy_from_psa(key_id, pk, 1); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ + +/* + * Helper for mbedtls_pk_sign and mbedtls_pk_verify + */ +static inline int pk_hashlen_helper(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, size_t *hash_len) +{ + if (*hash_len != 0) { + return 0; + } + + *hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + + if (*hash_len == 0) { + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Helper to set up a restart context if needed + */ +static int pk_restart_setup(mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx, + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info) +{ + /* Don't do anything if already set up or invalid */ + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL) { + return 0; + } + + /* Should never happen when we're called */ + if (info->rs_alloc_func == NULL || info->rs_free_func == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((ctx->rs_ctx = info->rs_alloc_func()) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + ctx->pk_info = info; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +/* + * Verify a signature (restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hash_len != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->pk_info == NULL || + pk_hashlen_helper(md_alg, &hash_len) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* optimization: use non-restartable version if restart disabled */ + if (rs_ctx != NULL && + mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && + ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func != NULL) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = pk_restart_setup(rs_ctx, ctx->pk_info)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func(ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, rs_ctx->rs_ctx); + + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + mbedtls_pk_restart_free(rs_ctx); + } + + return ret; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + if (ctx->pk_info->verify_func == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + + return ctx->pk_info->verify_func(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len); +} + +/* + * Verify a signature + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + return mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len, NULL); +} + +/* + * Verify a signature with options + */ +int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options, + mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hash_len != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(ctx, type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + + if (type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { + /* General case: no options */ + if (options != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return mbedtls_pk_verify(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); + } + + /* Ensure the PK context is of the right type otherwise mbedtls_pk_rsa() + * below would return a NULL pointer. */ + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(ctx) != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + + if (options == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + pss_opts = (const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *) options; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id == md_alg) { + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p; + int key_len; + size_t signature_length; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT; + psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT; + + psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(psa_md_alg); + p = buf + sizeof(buf); + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), buf, &p); + + if (key_len < 0) { + return key_len; + } + + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_alg); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len, + &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_destroy_key(key_id); + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + /* This function requires returning MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH + * on a valid signature with trailing data in a buffer, but + * mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash requires the sig_len to be exact, + * so for this reason the passed sig_len is overwritten. Smaller + * signature lengths should not be accepted for verification. */ + signature_length = sig_len > mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx) ? + mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx) : sig_len; + status = psa_verify_hash(key_id, psa_sig_alg, hash, + hash_len, sig, signature_length); + destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && sig_len > mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = destruction_status; + } + + return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { + if (sig_len < mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), + md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, + pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id, + pss_opts->expected_salt_len, + sig); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (sig_len > mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; + } + + return 0; + } +#else + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ +} + +/* + * Make a signature (restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hash_len != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->pk_info == NULL || pk_hashlen_helper(md_alg, &hash_len) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* optimization: use non-restartable version if restart disabled */ + if (rs_ctx != NULL && + mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && + ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func != NULL) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = pk_restart_setup(rs_ctx, ctx->pk_info)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func(ctx, md_alg, + hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx->rs_ctx); + + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + mbedtls_pk_restart_free(rs_ctx); + } + + return ret; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + if (ctx->pk_info->sign_func == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + + return ctx->pk_info->sign_func(ctx, md_alg, + hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng); +} + +/* + * Make a signature + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + return mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng, NULL); +} + +/* + * Make a signature given a signature type. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_sign_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type, + mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(ctx, pk_type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + + if (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { + return mbedtls_pk_sign(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + const psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + if (psa_md_alg == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(ctx) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t psa_alg, sign_alg; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + psa_algorithm_t psa_enrollment_alg; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(ctx->priv_id, &key_attr); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + psa_alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&key_attr); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + psa_enrollment_alg = psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm(&key_attr); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + + /* Since we're PK type is MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS at least one between + * alg and enrollment alg should be of type RSA_PSS. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(psa_alg)) { + sign_alg = psa_alg; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(psa_enrollment_alg)) { + sign_alg = psa_enrollment_alg; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + else { + /* The opaque key has no RSA PSS algorithm associated. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* Adjust the hashing algorithm. */ + sign_alg = (sign_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(psa_md_alg); + + status = psa_sign_hash(ctx->priv_id, sign_alg, + hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len); + return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(psa_md_alg), + ctx->pk_ctx, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len); +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if (sig_size < mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + if (pk_hashlen_helper(md_alg, &hash_len) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_rsa_context *const rsa_ctx = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx); + + const int ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(rsa_ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig); + if (ret == 0) { + *sig_len = rsa_ctx->len; + } + return ret; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#else + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ +} + +/* + * Decrypt message + */ +int mbedtls_pk_decrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->pk_info->decrypt_func == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + + return ctx->pk_info->decrypt_func(ctx, input, ilen, + output, olen, osize, f_rng, p_rng); +} + +/* + * Encrypt message + */ +int mbedtls_pk_encrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->pk_info->encrypt_func == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + + return ctx->pk_info->encrypt_func(ctx, input, ilen, + output, olen, osize, f_rng, p_rng); +} + +/* + * Check public-private key pair + */ +int mbedtls_pk_check_pair(const mbedtls_pk_context *pub, + const mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + if (pub->pk_info == NULL || + prv->pk_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (prv->pk_info->check_pair_func == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + if (prv->pk_info->type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT) { + if (pub->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + } else { + if ((prv->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) && + (pub->pk_info != prv->pk_info)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + } + + return prv->pk_info->check_pair_func((mbedtls_pk_context *) pub, + (mbedtls_pk_context *) prv, + f_rng, p_rng); +} + +/* + * Get key size in bits + */ +size_t mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) +{ + /* For backward compatibility, accept NULL or a context that + * isn't set up yet, and return a fake value that should be safe. */ + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return ctx->pk_info->get_bitlen((mbedtls_pk_context *) ctx); +} + +/* + * Export debug information + */ +int mbedtls_pk_debug(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items) +{ + if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->pk_info->debug_func == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + + ctx->pk_info->debug_func((mbedtls_pk_context *) ctx, items); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Access the PK type name + */ +const char *mbedtls_pk_get_name(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL) { + return "invalid PK"; + } + + return ctx->pk_info->name; +} + +/* + * Access the PK type + */ +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + } + + return ctx->pk_info->type; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ diff --git a/library/pk_ecc.c b/library/pk_ecc.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..86218fffc89 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/pk_ecc.c @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ +/* + * ECC setters for PK. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + size_t ec_bits; + psa_ecc_family_t ec_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(grp_id, &ec_bits); + + /* group may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match */ + if ((pk->ec_family != 0 && pk->ec_family != ec_family) || + (pk->ec_bits != 0 && pk->ec_bits != ec_bits)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + /* set group */ + pk->ec_family = ec_family; + pk->ec_bits = ec_bits; + + return 0; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk); + + /* grp may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match */ + if (mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE && + mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id != grp_id) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + /* set group */ + return mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&(ecp->grp), grp_id); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +} + +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_usage_t flags; + psa_status_t status; + + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(pk->ec_family)); + if (pk->ec_family == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY) { + /* Do not set algorithm here because Montgomery keys cannot do ECDSA and + * the PK module cannot do ECDH. When the key will be used in TLS for + * ECDH, it will be exported and then re-imported with proper flags + * and algorithm. */ + flags = PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT; + } else { + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, + MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)); + flags = PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT; + } + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, flags); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &pk->priv_id); + return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status); + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk); + int ret = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(eck->grp.id, eck, key, key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + return 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +} + +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *prv, size_t prv_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + (void) prv; + (void) prv_len; + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, pk->pub_raw, sizeof(pk->pub_raw), + &pk->pub_raw_len); + return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status); + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /* && !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + psa_status_t status; + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx; + size_t curve_bits; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(eck->grp.id, &curve_bits); + + /* Import private key into PSA, from serialized input */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT); + status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, prv, prv_len, &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status); + } + + /* Export public key from PSA */ + unsigned char pub[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t pub_len; + status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, pub, sizeof(pub), &pub_len); + psa_status_t destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status); + } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(destruction_status); + } + + /* Load serialized public key into ecp_keypair structure */ + return mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&eck->grp, &eck->Q, pub, pub_len); + +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + (void) prv; + (void) prv_len; + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx; + return mbedtls_ecp_mul(&eck->grp, &eck->Q, &eck->d, &eck->grp.G, f_rng, p_rng); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +/* + * Set the public key: fallback using ECP_LIGHT in the USE_PSA_EC_DATA case. + * + * Normally, when MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is enabled, we only use PSA + * functions to handle keys. However, currently psa_import_key() does not + * support compressed points. In case that support was explicitly requested, + * this fallback uses ECP functions to get the job done. This is the reason + * why MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED auto-enables MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT. + * + * [in/out] pk: in: must have the group set, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(). + * out: will have the public key set. + * [in] pub, pub_len: the public key as an ECPoint, + * in any format supported by ECP. + * + * Return: + * - 0 on success; + * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the format is potentially valid + * but not supported; + * - another error code otherwise. + */ +static int pk_ecc_set_pubkey_psa_ecp_fallback(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *pub, + size_t pub_len) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED) + (void) pk; + (void) pub; + (void) pub_len; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED */ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair ecp_key; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_group_id; + int ret; + + ecp_group_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ecp_key); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&(ecp_key.grp), ecp_group_id); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&(ecp_key.grp), &ecp_key.Q, + pub, pub_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&(ecp_key.grp), &ecp_key.Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &pk->pub_raw_len, pk->pub_raw, + sizeof(pk->pub_raw)); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ecp_key); + return ret; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *pub, size_t pub_len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + + /* Load the key */ + if (!PSA_ECC_FAMILY_IS_WEIERSTRASS(pk->ec_family) || *pub == 0x04) { + /* Format directly supported by PSA: + * - non-Weierstrass curves that only have one format; + * - uncompressed format for Weierstrass curves. */ + if (pub_len > sizeof(pk->pub_raw)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + memcpy(pk->pub_raw, pub, pub_len); + pk->pub_raw_len = pub_len; + } else { + /* Other format, try the fallback */ + int ret = pk_ecc_set_pubkey_psa_ecp_fallback(pk, pub, pub_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + /* Validate the key by trying to import it */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attrs = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attrs, 0); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attrs, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(pk->ec_family)); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attrs, pk->ec_bits); + + if ((psa_import_key(&key_attrs, pk->pub_raw, pk->pub_raw_len, + &key_id) != PSA_SUCCESS) || + (psa_destroy_key(key_id) != PSA_SUCCESS)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; + } + + return 0; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + + int ret; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec_key = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx; + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&ec_key->grp, &ec_key->Q, pub, pub_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + return mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(&ec_key->grp, &ec_key->Q); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ diff --git a/library/pk_internal.h b/library/pk_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e86a3a09d2c --- /dev/null +++ b/library/pk_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ +/** + * \file pk_internal.h + * + * \brief Public Key abstraction layer: internal (i.e. library only) functions + * and definitions. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_PK_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#define PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status) +#define PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, \ + psa_to_pk_rsa_errors, \ + psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls) +#define PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, \ + psa_to_pk_ecdsa_errors, \ + psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ + +/* Headers/footers for PEM files */ +#define PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----" +#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----" +#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_BEGIN_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----" +#define PEM_END_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +/** + * Public function mbedtls_pk_ec() can be used to get direct access to the + * wrapped ecp_keypair structure pointed to the pk_ctx. However this is not + * ideal because it bypasses the PK module on the control of its internal + * structure (pk_context) fields. + * For backward compatibility we keep mbedtls_pk_ec() when ECP_C is defined, but + * we provide 2 very similar functions when only ECP_LIGHT is enabled and not + * ECP_C. + * These variants embed the "ro" or "rw" keywords in their name to make the + * usage of the returned pointer explicit. Of course the returned value is + * const or non-const accordingly. + */ +static inline const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(const mbedtls_pk_context pk) +{ + switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk)) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + return (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx); + default: + return NULL; + } +} + +static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(const mbedtls_pk_context pk) +{ + switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk)) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + return (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx); + default: + return NULL; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS && !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +static inline mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id id; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + psa_key_attributes_t opaque_attrs = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t opaque_key_type; + psa_ecc_family_t curve; + + if (psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &opaque_attrs) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + } + opaque_key_type = psa_get_key_type(&opaque_attrs); + curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(opaque_key_type); + id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, psa_get_key_bits(&opaque_attrs)); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&opaque_attrs); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + id = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + } + + return id; +} + +/* Helper for Montgomery curves */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519 || MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 */ + +#define MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(id) \ + ((id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) || (id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448)) + +static inline int mbedtls_pk_is_rfc8410(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + + return MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(id); +} + +/* + * Set the group used by this key. + * + * [in/out] pk: in: must have been pk_setup() to an ECC type + * out: will have group (curve) information set + * [in] grp_in: a supported group ID (not NONE) + */ +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id); + +/* + * Set the private key material + * + * [in/out] pk: in: must have the group set already, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(). + * out: will have the private key set. + * [in] key, key_len: the raw private key (no ASN.1 wrapping). + */ +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, unsigned char *key, size_t key_len); + +/* + * Set the public key. + * + * [in/out] pk: in: must have its group set, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(). + * out: will have the public key set. + * [in] pub, pub_len: the raw public key (an ECPoint). + * + * Return: + * - 0 on success; + * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the format is potentially valid + * but not supported; + * - another error code otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *pub, size_t pub_len); + +/* + * Derive a public key from its private counterpart. + * Computationally intensive, only use when public key is not available. + * + * [in/out] pk: in: must have the private key set, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(). + * out: will have the public key set. + * [in] prv, prv_len: the raw private key (see note below). + * [in] f_rng, p_rng: RNG function and context. + * + * Note: the private key information is always available from pk, + * however for convenience the serialized version is also passed, + * as it's available at each calling site, and useful in some configs + * (as otherwise we would have to re-serialize it from the pk context). + * + * There are three implementations of this function: + * 1. MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA, + * 2. MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO but not MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA, + * 3. not MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *prv, size_t prv_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +/* Helper for (deterministic) ECDSA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET PSA_ALG_ECDSA +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_pk_load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n); +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.c b/library/pk_wrap.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..19196b559ae --- /dev/null +++ b/library/pk_wrap.c @@ -0,0 +1,1584 @@ +/* + * Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#include "pk_wrap.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +/* Even if RSA not activated, for the sake of RSA-alt */ +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "pkwrite.h" +#include "rsa_internal.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +static int rsa_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) +{ + return type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; +} + +static size_t rsa_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + return mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(rsa); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int rsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + int key_len; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf); + psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_md; + size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + psa_alg_md = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)); + } else { + psa_alg_md = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)); + } + + if (sig_len < rsa_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa, buf, &p); + if (key_len <= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_alg_md); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len, + &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_verify_hash(key_id, psa_alg_md, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return ret; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int rsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + + if (sig_len < rsa_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(rsa, md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_len, + hash, sig)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* The buffer contains a valid signature followed by extra data. + * We have a special error code for that so that so that callers can + * use mbedtls_pk_verify() to check "Does the buffer start with a + * valid signature?" and not just "Does the buffer contain a valid + * signature?". */ + if (sig_len > rsa_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa_ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *sig_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + int key_len; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + unsigned char *p; + + buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES); + if (buf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + p = buf + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES; + + *sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa_ctx); + if (sig_size < *sig_len) { + mbedtls_free(buf); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(rsa_ctx, buf, &p); + if (key_len <= 0) { + mbedtls_free(buf); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + buf + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES - key_len, key_len, + &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_sign_hash(key_id, alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_free(buf); + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int rsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg; + psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + if (psa_md_alg == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + psa_algorithm_t psa_alg; + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk)) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + psa_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(psa_md_alg); + } else { + psa_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(psa_md_alg); + } + + return mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_alg, pk->pk_ctx, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int rsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + + *sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); + if (sig_size < *sig_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(rsa, f_rng, p_rng, + md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, + hash, sig); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int rsa_decrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg, decrypt_alg; + psa_status_t status; + int key_len; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf); + + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + if (ilen != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(rsa, buf, &p); + if (key_len <= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa)); + decrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(psa_md_alg); + } else { + decrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT; + } + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, decrypt_alg); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len, + &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_asymmetric_decrypt(key_id, decrypt_alg, + input, ilen, + NULL, 0, + output, osize, olen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return ret; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int rsa_decrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + + if (ilen != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(rsa, f_rng, p_rng, + olen, input, output, osize); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int rsa_encrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg, psa_encrypt_alg; + psa_status_t status; + int key_len; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf); + + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa) > osize) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; + } + + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa, buf, &p); + if (key_len <= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa)); + psa_encrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(psa_md_alg); + } else { + psa_encrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT; + } + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_encrypt_alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len, + &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_asymmetric_encrypt(key_id, psa_encrypt_alg, + input, ilen, + NULL, 0, + output, osize, olen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return ret; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int rsa_encrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + *olen = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); + + if (*olen > osize) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; + } + + return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(rsa, f_rng, p_rng, + ilen, input, output); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +static int rsa_check_pair_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + return mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv((const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pub->pk_ctx, + (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) prv->pk_ctx); +} + +static void *rsa_alloc_wrap(void) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context)); + + if (ctx != NULL) { + mbedtls_rsa_init((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx); + } + + return ctx; +} + +static void rsa_free_wrap(void *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_free((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx); + mbedtls_free(ctx); +} + +static void rsa_debug(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + /* Not supported */ + (void) pk; + (void) items; +#else + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; + + items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI; + items->name = "rsa.N"; + items->value = &(rsa->N); + + items++; + + items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI; + items->name = "rsa.E"; + items->value = &(rsa->E); +#endif +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info = { + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, + .name = "RSA", + .get_bitlen = rsa_get_bitlen, + .can_do = rsa_can_do, + .verify_func = rsa_verify_wrap, + .sign_func = rsa_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + .verify_rs_func = NULL, + .sign_rs_func = NULL, + .rs_alloc_func = NULL, + .rs_free_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = rsa_decrypt_wrap, + .encrypt_func = rsa_encrypt_wrap, + .check_pair_func = rsa_check_pair_wrap, + .ctx_alloc_func = rsa_alloc_wrap, + .ctx_free_func = rsa_free_wrap, + .debug_func = rsa_debug, +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +/* + * Generic EC key + */ +static int eckey_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) +{ + return type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; +} + +static size_t eckey_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + return pk->ec_bits; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx; + return ecp->grp.pbits; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Common helper for ECDSA verify using PSA functions. */ +static int ecdsa_verify_psa(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, + psa_ecc_family_t curve, size_t curve_bits, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY; + size_t signature_len = PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(curve_bits); + size_t converted_sig_len; + unsigned char extracted_sig[PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *p; + psa_status_t status; + + if (curve == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_md); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (signature_len > sizeof(extracted_sig)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + p = (unsigned char *) sig; + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(curve_bits, p, sig_len, extracted_sig, + sizeof(extracted_sig), &converted_sig_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (converted_sig_len != signature_len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_verify_hash(key_id, psa_sig_md, hash, hash_len, + extracted_sig, signature_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int ecdsa_opaque_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + (void) md_alg; + unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN]; + size_t key_len; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_ecc_family_t curve; + size_t curve_bits; + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &key_attr); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(psa_get_key_type(&key_attr)); + curve_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attr); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + + status = psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, key, sizeof(key), &key_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return ecdsa_verify_psa(key, key_len, curve, curve_bits, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + (void) md_alg; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = pk->ec_family; + size_t curve_bits = pk->ec_bits; + + return ecdsa_verify_psa(pk->pub_raw, pk->pub_raw_len, curve, curve_bits, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + (void) md_alg; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx = pk->pk_ctx; + unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t key_len; + size_t curve_bits; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits); + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &key_len, key, sizeof(key)); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return ecdsa_verify_psa(key, key_len, curve, curve_bits, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ((void) md_alg); + + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len); + + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Common helper for ECDSA sign using PSA functions. + * Instead of extracting key's properties in order to check which kind of ECDSA + * signature it supports, we try both deterministic and non-deterministic. + */ +static int ecdsa_sign_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + size_t key_bits = 0; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(key_id, &key_attr); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attr); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); + + status = psa_sign_hash(key_id, + PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)), + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto done; + } else if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED) { + return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + status = psa_sign_hash(key_id, + PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)), + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + +done: + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(key_bits, sig, *sig_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len); + + return ret; +} + +static int ecdsa_opaque_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + return ecdsa_sign_psa(pk->priv_id, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, + sig_len); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +/* When PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is defined opaque and non-opaque keys end up + * using the same function. */ +#define ecdsa_sign_wrap ecdsa_opaque_sign_wrap +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx = pk->pk_ctx; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH]; + size_t curve_bits; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits); + size_t key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits); + psa_algorithm_t psa_hash = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET(psa_hash); + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + if (curve == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (key_len > sizeof(buf)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->d, buf, key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_md); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, buf, key_len, &key_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = ecdsa_sign_psa(key_id, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* Forward declarations */ +static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + void *rs_ctx); + +static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + void *rs_ctx); + +/* + * Restart context for ECDSA operations with ECKEY context + * + * We need to store an actual ECDSA context, as we need to pass the same to + * the underlying ecdsa function, so we can't create it on the fly every time. + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx ecdsa_rs; + mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa_ctx; +} eckey_restart_ctx; + +static void *eckey_rs_alloc(void) +{ + eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx; + + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(eckey_restart_ctx)); + + if (ctx != NULL) { + rs_ctx = ctx; + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(&rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs); + mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx); + } + + return ctx; +} + +static void eckey_rs_free(void *ctx) +{ + eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + rs_ctx = ctx; + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(&rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs); + mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx); + + mbedtls_free(ctx); +} + +static int eckey_verify_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + void *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx; + + /* Should never happen */ + if (rs == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */ + if (rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, pk->pk_ctx)); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(pk, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, + sig, sig_len, &rs->ecdsa_rs)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +static int eckey_sign_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + void *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx; + + /* Should never happen */ + if (rs == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */ + if (rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, pk->pk_ctx)); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(pk, md_alg, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng, &rs->ecdsa_rs)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +static int eckey_check_pair_psa(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv) +{ + psa_status_t status; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t prv_key_buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t prv_key_len; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = prv->priv_id; + + status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, prv_key_buf, sizeof(prv_key_buf), + &prv_key_len); + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (memcmp(prv_key_buf, pub->pub_raw, pub->pub_raw_len) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +static int eckey_check_pair_psa(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv) +{ + psa_status_t status; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t prv_key_buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t prv_key_len; + psa_status_t destruction_status; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t pub_key_buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH]; + size_t pub_key_len; + size_t curve_bits; + const psa_ecc_family_t curve = + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*prv)->grp.id, &curve_bits); + const size_t curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits); + + if (curve == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT); + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*prv)->d, + prv_key_buf, curve_bytes); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(prv_key_buf, sizeof(prv_key_buf)); + return ret; + } + + status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, prv_key_buf, curve_bytes, &key_id); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(prv_key_buf, sizeof(prv_key_buf)); + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + // From now on prv_key_buf is used to store the public key of prv. + status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, prv_key_buf, sizeof(prv_key_buf), + &prv_key_len); + ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(key_id); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(destruction_status); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pub)->grp, + &mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pub)->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &pub_key_len, pub_key_buf, + sizeof(pub_key_buf)); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (memcmp(prv_key_buf, pub_key_buf, curve_bytes) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + +static int eckey_check_pair_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + return eckey_check_pair_psa(pub, prv); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +static int eckey_check_pair_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + return mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv((const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pub->pk_ctx, + (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) prv->pk_ctx, + f_rng, p_rng); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +/* When PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is defined opaque and non-opaque keys end up + * using the same function. */ +#define ecdsa_opaque_check_pair_wrap eckey_check_pair_wrap +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +static int ecdsa_opaque_check_pair_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, + mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t exp_pub_key[MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN]; + size_t exp_pub_key_len = 0; + uint8_t pub_key[MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN]; + size_t pub_key_len = 0; + int ret; + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + + status = psa_export_public_key(prv->priv_id, exp_pub_key, sizeof(exp_pub_key), + &exp_pub_key_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status); + return ret; + } + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&(mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pub)->grp), + &(mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pub)->Q), + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &pub_key_len, pub_key, sizeof(pub_key)); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + if ((exp_pub_key_len != pub_key_len) || + memcmp(exp_pub_key, pub_key, exp_pub_key_len)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +static void *eckey_alloc_wrap(void) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecp_keypair)); + + if (ctx != NULL) { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ctx); + } + + return ctx; +} + +static void eckey_free_wrap(void *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx); + mbedtls_free(ctx); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + +static void eckey_debug(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_PSA_EC; + items->name = "eckey.Q"; + items->value = pk; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx; + items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP; + items->name = "eckey.Q"; + items->value = &(ecp->Q); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info = { + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY, + .name = "EC", + .get_bitlen = eckey_get_bitlen, + .can_do = eckey_can_do, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) + .verify_func = ecdsa_verify_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ + .verify_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) + .sign_func = ecdsa_sign_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ + .sign_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + .verify_rs_func = eckey_verify_rs_wrap, + .sign_rs_func = eckey_sign_rs_wrap, + .rs_alloc_func = eckey_rs_alloc, + .rs_free_func = eckey_rs_free, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = NULL, + .encrypt_func = NULL, + .check_pair_func = eckey_check_pair_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + .ctx_alloc_func = NULL, + .ctx_free_func = NULL, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .ctx_alloc_func = eckey_alloc_wrap, + .ctx_free_func = eckey_free_wrap, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .debug_func = eckey_debug, +}; + +/* + * EC key restricted to ECDH + */ +static int eckeydh_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) +{ + return type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH; +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info = { + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, + .name = "EC_DH", + .get_bitlen = eckey_get_bitlen, /* Same underlying key structure */ + .can_do = eckeydh_can_do, + .verify_func = NULL, + .sign_func = NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + .verify_rs_func = NULL, + .sign_rs_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = NULL, + .encrypt_func = NULL, + .check_pair_func = eckey_check_pair_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + .ctx_alloc_func = NULL, + .ctx_free_func = NULL, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .ctx_alloc_func = eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ + .ctx_free_func = eckey_free_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .debug_func = eckey_debug, /* Same underlying key structure */ +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) +static int ecdsa_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) +{ + return type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + void *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ((void) md_alg); + + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( + (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx, + hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, + (mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx); + + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; + } + + return ret; +} + +static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + void *rs_ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( + (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx, + md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, + (mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx); + +} + +static void *ecdsa_rs_alloc(void) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx)); + + if (ctx != NULL) { + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(ctx); + } + + return ctx; +} + +static void ecdsa_rs_free(void *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(ctx); + mbedtls_free(ctx); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info = { + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA, + .name = "ECDSA", + .get_bitlen = eckey_get_bitlen, /* Compatible key structures */ + .can_do = ecdsa_can_do, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) + .verify_func = ecdsa_verify_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ + .verify_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) + .sign_func = ecdsa_sign_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */ + .sign_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + .verify_rs_func = ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap, + .sign_rs_func = ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap, + .rs_alloc_func = ecdsa_rs_alloc, + .rs_free_func = ecdsa_rs_free, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = NULL, + .encrypt_func = NULL, + .check_pair_func = eckey_check_pair_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + .ctx_alloc_func = NULL, + .ctx_free_func = NULL, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .ctx_alloc_func = eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ + .ctx_free_func = eckey_free_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + .debug_func = eckey_debug, /* Compatible key structures */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +/* + * Support for alternative RSA-private implementations + */ + +static int rsa_alt_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) +{ + return type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; +} + +static size_t rsa_alt_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = pk->pk_ctx; + + return 8 * rsa_alt->key_len_func(rsa_alt->key); +} + +static int rsa_alt_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = pk->pk_ctx; + +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if (UINT_MAX < hash_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + + *sig_len = rsa_alt->key_len_func(rsa_alt->key); + if (*sig_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (*sig_len > sig_size) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + return rsa_alt->sign_func(rsa_alt->key, f_rng, p_rng, + md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig); +} + +static int rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = pk->pk_ctx; + + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + + if (ilen != rsa_alt->key_len_func(rsa_alt->key)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return rsa_alt->decrypt_func(rsa_alt->key, + olen, input, output, osize); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +static int rsa_alt_check_pair(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char hash[32]; + size_t sig_len = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (rsa_alt_get_bitlen(prv) != rsa_get_bitlen(pub)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + + memset(hash, 0x2a, sizeof(hash)); + + if ((ret = rsa_alt_sign_wrap(prv, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + hash, sizeof(hash), + sig, sizeof(sig), &sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (rsa_verify_wrap(pub, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + hash, sizeof(hash), sig, sig_len) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +static void *rsa_alt_alloc_wrap(void) +{ + void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_alt_context)); + + if (ctx != NULL) { + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_alt_context)); + } + + return ctx; +} + +static void rsa_alt_free_wrap(void *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_alt_context)); +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info = { + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT, + .name = "RSA-alt", + .get_bitlen = rsa_alt_get_bitlen, + .can_do = rsa_alt_can_do, + .verify_func = NULL, + .sign_func = rsa_alt_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + .verify_rs_func = NULL, + .sign_rs_func = NULL, + .rs_alloc_func = NULL, + .rs_free_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap, + .encrypt_func = NULL, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + .check_pair_func = rsa_alt_check_pair, +#else + .check_pair_func = NULL, +#endif + .ctx_alloc_func = rsa_alt_alloc_wrap, + .ctx_free_func = rsa_alt_free_wrap, + .debug_func = NULL, +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static size_t opaque_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t bits; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + if (PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &attributes)) { + return 0; + } + + bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + return bits; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +static int ecdsa_opaque_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) +{ + return type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_opaque_info = { + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, + .name = "Opaque", + .get_bitlen = opaque_get_bitlen, + .can_do = ecdsa_opaque_can_do, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) + .verify_func = ecdsa_opaque_verify_wrap, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ + .verify_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) + .sign_func = ecdsa_opaque_sign_wrap, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */ + .sign_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + .verify_rs_func = NULL, + .sign_rs_func = NULL, + .rs_alloc_func = NULL, + .rs_free_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + .decrypt_func = NULL, + .encrypt_func = NULL, + .check_pair_func = ecdsa_opaque_check_pair_wrap, + .ctx_alloc_func = NULL, + .ctx_free_func = NULL, + .debug_func = NULL, +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +static int rsa_opaque_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) +{ + return type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA || + type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; +} + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +static int rsa_opaque_decrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_type_t type; + psa_status_t status; + + /* PSA has its own RNG */ + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); + alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + status = psa_asymmetric_decrypt(pk->priv_id, alg, input, ilen, NULL, 0, output, osize, olen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ + +static int rsa_opaque_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_type_t type; + psa_status_t status; + + /* PSA has its own RNG */ + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); + alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) { + alg = (alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + status = psa_sign_hash(pk->priv_id, alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) { + return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } else { + return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + } + + return 0; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + ((void) pk); + ((void) md_alg); + ((void) hash); + ((void) hash_len); + ((void) sig); + ((void) sig_size); + ((void) sig_len); + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +} + +const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_opaque_info = { + .type = MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, + .name = "Opaque", + .get_bitlen = opaque_get_bitlen, + .can_do = rsa_opaque_can_do, + .verify_func = NULL, + .sign_func = rsa_opaque_sign_wrap, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + .verify_rs_func = NULL, + .sign_rs_func = NULL, + .rs_alloc_func = NULL, + .rs_free_func = NULL, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) + .decrypt_func = rsa_opaque_decrypt, +#else /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ + .decrypt_func = NULL, +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ + .encrypt_func = NULL, + .check_pair_func = NULL, + .ctx_alloc_func = NULL, + .ctx_free_func = NULL, + .debug_func = NULL, +}; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.h b/library/pk_wrap.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..be096da53ac --- /dev/null +++ b/library/pk_wrap.h @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +/** + * \file pk_wrap.h + * + * \brief Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +struct mbedtls_pk_info_t { + /** Public key type */ + mbedtls_pk_type_t type; + + /** Type name */ + const char *name; + + /** Get key size in bits */ + size_t (*get_bitlen)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk); + + /** Tell if the context implements this type (e.g. ECKEY can do ECDSA) */ + int (*can_do)(mbedtls_pk_type_t type); + + /** Verify signature */ + int (*verify_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len); + + /** Make signature */ + int (*sign_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /** Verify signature (restartable) */ + int (*verify_rs_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len, + void *rs_ctx); + + /** Make signature (restartable) */ + int (*sign_rs_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, void *rs_ctx); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + /** Decrypt message */ + int (*decrypt_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + + /** Encrypt message */ + int (*encrypt_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + + /** Check public-private key pair */ + int (*check_pair_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + + /** Allocate a new context */ + void * (*ctx_alloc_func)(void); + + /** Free the given context */ + void (*ctx_free_func)(void *ctx); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /** Allocate the restart context */ + void *(*rs_alloc_func)(void); + + /** Free the restart context */ + void (*rs_free_func)(void *rs_ctx); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + /** Interface with the debug module */ + void (*debug_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items); + +}; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +/* Container for RSA-alt */ +typedef struct { + void *key; + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func decrypt_func; + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func sign_func; + mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func key_len_func; +} mbedtls_rsa_alt_context; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info; +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_opaque_info; +extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_opaque_info; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +int mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_md, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa_ctx, + const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + size_t *sig_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H */ diff --git a/library/pkcs12.c b/library/pkcs12.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a3467b98208 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/pkcs12.c @@ -0,0 +1,437 @@ +/* + * PKCS#12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * The PKCS #12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard v1.1 + * + * http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/pkcs/files/h11301-wp-pkcs-12v1-1-personal-information-exchange-syntax.pdf + * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/pkcs-12v1-1.asn + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) + +#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#endif + +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + +static int pkcs12_parse_pbe_params(mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char **p = ¶ms->p; + const unsigned char *end = params->p + params->len; + + /* + * pkcs-12PbeParams ::= SEQUENCE { + * salt OCTET STRING, + * iterations INTEGER + * } + * + */ + if (params->tag != (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &salt->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + salt->p = *p; + *p += salt->len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, iterations)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +#define PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN 128 + +static int pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen) +{ + int ret, iterations = 0; + mbedtls_asn1_buf salt; + size_t i; + unsigned char unipwd[PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN * 2 + 2]; + + if (pwdlen > PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memset(&salt, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf)); + memset(&unipwd, 0, sizeof(unipwd)); + + if ((ret = pkcs12_parse_pbe_params(pbe_params, &salt, + &iterations)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + for (i = 0; i < pwdlen; i++) { + unipwd[i * 2 + 1] = pwd[i]; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(key, keylen, unipwd, pwdlen * 2 + 2, + salt.p, salt.len, md_type, + MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY, iterations)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (iv == NULL || ivlen == 0) { + return 0; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(iv, ivlen, unipwd, pwdlen * 2 + 2, + salt.p, salt.len, md_type, + MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV, iterations)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +#undef PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) +int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t len, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_len); +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t len, + unsigned char *output) +{ + size_t output_len = 0; + + /* We assume caller of the function is providing a big enough output buffer + * so we pass output_size as SIZE_MAX to pass checks, However, no guarantees + * for the output size actually being correct. + */ + return mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(pbe_params, mode, cipher_type, md_type, + pwd, pwdlen, data, len, output, SIZE_MAX, + &output_len); +} +#endif + +int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t len, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_len) +{ + int ret, keylen = 0; + unsigned char key[32]; + unsigned char iv[16]; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; + size_t iv_len = 0; + size_t finish_olen = 0; + unsigned int padlen = 0; + + if (pwd == NULL && pwdlen != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_type); + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + keylen = (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info) / 8; + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT) { + if (output_size < len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + } + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT) { + padlen = cipher_info->block_size - (len % cipher_info->block_size); + if (output_size < (len + padlen)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + } + + iv_len = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(cipher_info); + if ((ret = pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv(pbe_params, md_type, pwd, pwdlen, + key, keylen, + iv, iv_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_cipher_init(&cipher_ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&cipher_ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, + (mbedtls_operation_t) mode)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) + { + /* PKCS12 uses CBC with PKCS7 padding */ + mbedtls_cipher_padding_t padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) + /* For historical reasons, when decrypting, this function works when + * decrypting even when support for PKCS7 padding is disabled. In this + * case, it ignores the padding, and so will never report a + * password mismatch. + */ + if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT) { + padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE; + } +#endif + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&cipher_ctx, padding)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&cipher_ctx, iv, iv_len, data, len, output, &finish_olen); + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + } + + *output_len += finish_olen; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key, sizeof(key)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(iv, sizeof(iv)); + mbedtls_cipher_free(&cipher_ctx); + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + +static void pkcs12_fill_buffer(unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + const unsigned char *filler, size_t fill_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = data; + size_t use_len; + + if (filler != NULL && fill_len != 0) { + while (data_len > 0) { + use_len = (data_len > fill_len) ? fill_len : data_len; + memcpy(p, filler, use_len); + p += use_len; + data_len -= use_len; + } + } else { + /* If either of the above are not true then clearly there is nothing + * that this function can do. The function should *not* be called + * under either of those circumstances, as you could end up with an + * incorrect output but for safety's sake, leaving the check in as + * otherwise we could end up with memory corruption.*/ + } +} + + +static int calculate_hashes(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, int iterations, + unsigned char *diversifier, unsigned char *salt_block, + unsigned char *pwd_block, unsigned char *hash_output, int use_salt, + int use_password, size_t hlen, size_t v) +{ + int ret = -1; + size_t i; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + // Calculate hash( diversifier || salt_block || pwd_block ) + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, diversifier, v)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (use_salt != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt_block, v)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + if (use_password != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, pwd_block, v)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, hash_output)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + // Perform remaining ( iterations - 1 ) recursive hash calculations + for (i = 1; i < (size_t) iterations; i++) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, hash_output, hlen, hash_output)) + != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + return ret; +} + + +int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, int id, int iterations) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned int j; + + unsigned char diversifier[128]; + unsigned char salt_block[128], pwd_block[128], hash_block[128] = { 0 }; + unsigned char hash_output[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char c; + int use_password = 0; + int use_salt = 0; + + size_t hlen, use_len, v, i; + + // This version only allows max of 64 bytes of password or salt + if (datalen > 128 || pwdlen > 64 || saltlen > 64) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (pwd == NULL && pwdlen != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (salt == NULL && saltlen != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + use_password = (pwd && pwdlen != 0); + use_salt = (salt && saltlen != 0); + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_type); + + if (hlen <= 32) { + v = 64; + } else { + v = 128; + } + + memset(diversifier, (unsigned char) id, v); + + if (use_salt != 0) { + pkcs12_fill_buffer(salt_block, v, salt, saltlen); + } + + if (use_password != 0) { + pkcs12_fill_buffer(pwd_block, v, pwd, pwdlen); + } + + p = data; + while (datalen > 0) { + if (calculate_hashes(md_type, iterations, diversifier, salt_block, + pwd_block, hash_output, use_salt, use_password, hlen, + v) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + use_len = (datalen > hlen) ? hlen : datalen; + memcpy(p, hash_output, use_len); + datalen -= use_len; + p += use_len; + + if (datalen == 0) { + break; + } + + // Concatenating copies of hash_output into hash_block (B) + pkcs12_fill_buffer(hash_block, v, hash_output, hlen); + + // B += 1 + for (i = v; i > 0; i--) { + if (++hash_block[i - 1] != 0) { + break; + } + } + + if (use_salt != 0) { + // salt_block += B + c = 0; + for (i = v; i > 0; i--) { + j = salt_block[i - 1] + hash_block[i - 1] + c; + c = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(j); + salt_block[i - 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(j); + } + } + + if (use_password != 0) { + // pwd_block += B + c = 0; + for (i = v; i > 0; i--) { + j = pwd_block[i - 1] + hash_block[i - 1] + c; + c = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(j); + pwd_block[i - 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(j); + } + } + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(salt_block, sizeof(salt_block)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(pwd_block, sizeof(pwd_block)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hash_block, sizeof(hash_block)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hash_output, sizeof(hash_output)); + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ diff --git a/library/pkcs5.c b/library/pkcs5.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c6c53054b62 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/pkcs5.c @@ -0,0 +1,500 @@ +/** + * \file pkcs5.c + * + * \brief PKCS#5 functions + * + * \author Mathias Olsson + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * PKCS#5 includes PBKDF2 and more + * + * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2898 (Specification) + * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6070 (Test vectors) + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + +#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +static int pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations, + int *keylen, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_type) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_asn1_buf prf_alg_oid; + unsigned char *p = params->p; + const unsigned char *end = params->p + params->len; + + if (params->tag != (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + /* + * PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE { + * salt OCTET STRING, + * iterationCount INTEGER, + * keyLength INTEGER OPTIONAL + * prf AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT algid-hmacWithSHA1 + * } + * + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &salt->len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + salt->p = p; + p += salt->len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, iterations)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if (p == end) { + return 0; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, keylen)) != 0) { + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + } + + if (p == end) { + return 0; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(&p, end, &prf_alg_oid)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if (mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac(&prf_alg_oid, md_type) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_len); +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + unsigned char *output) +{ + size_t output_len = 0; + + /* We assume caller of the function is providing a big enough output buffer + * so we pass output_size as SIZE_MAX to pass checks, However, no guarantees + * for the output size actually being correct. + */ + return mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(pbe_params, mode, pwd, pwdlen, data, + datalen, output, SIZE_MAX, &output_len); +} +#endif + +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_len) +{ + int ret, iterations = 0, keylen = 0; + unsigned char *p, *end; + mbedtls_asn1_buf kdf_alg_oid, enc_scheme_oid, kdf_alg_params, enc_scheme_params; + mbedtls_asn1_buf salt; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + unsigned char key[32], iv[32]; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; + unsigned int padlen = 0; + + p = pbe_params->p; + end = p + pbe_params->len; + + /* + * PBES2-params ::= SEQUENCE { + * keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-KDFs}}, + * encryptionScheme AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-Encs}} + * } + */ + if (pbe_params->tag != (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&p, end, &kdf_alg_oid, + &kdf_alg_params)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + // Only PBKDF2 supported at the moment + // + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2, &kdf_alg_oid) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + if ((ret = pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params(&kdf_alg_params, + &salt, &iterations, &keylen, + &md_type)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&p, end, &enc_scheme_oid, + &enc_scheme_params)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if (mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg(&enc_scheme_oid, &cipher_alg) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_alg); + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + /* + * The value of keylen from pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params() is ignored + * since it is optional and we don't know if it was set or not + */ + keylen = (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info) / 8; + + if (enc_scheme_params.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING || + enc_scheme_params.len != mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(cipher_info)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT) { + if (output_size < datalen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + } + + if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT) { + padlen = cipher_info->block_size - (datalen % cipher_info->block_size); + if (output_size < (datalen + padlen)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + } + + mbedtls_cipher_init(&cipher_ctx); + + memcpy(iv, enc_scheme_params.p, enc_scheme_params.len); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(md_type, pwd, pwdlen, salt.p, + salt.len, iterations, keylen, + key)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&cipher_ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, + (mbedtls_operation_t) mode)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING) + { + /* PKCS5 uses CBC with PKCS7 padding (which is the same as + * "PKCS5 padding" except that it's typically only called PKCS5 + * with 64-bit-block ciphers). + */ + mbedtls_cipher_padding_t padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) + /* For historical reasons, when decrypting, this function works when + * decrypting even when support for PKCS7 padding is disabled. In this + * case, it ignores the padding, and so will never report a + * password mismatch. + */ + if (mode == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) { + padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE; + } +#endif + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&cipher_ctx, padding)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&cipher_ctx, iv, enc_scheme_params.len, + data, datalen, output, output_len)) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_cipher_free(&cipher_ctx); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + +static int pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *password, + size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned int iteration_count, + uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned int i; + unsigned char md1[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char work[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_info); + size_t use_len; + unsigned char *out_p = output; + unsigned char counter[4]; + + memset(counter, 0, 4); + counter[3] = 1; + +#if UINT_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFF + if (iteration_count > 0xFFFFFFFF) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(ctx, password, plen)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + while (key_length) { + // U1 ends up in work + // + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(ctx, salt, slen)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(ctx, counter, 4)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(ctx, work)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(ctx)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + memcpy(md1, work, md_size); + + for (i = 1; i < iteration_count; i++) { + // U2 ends up in md1 + // + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(ctx, md1, md_size)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(ctx, md1)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(ctx)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + // U1 xor U2 + // + mbedtls_xor(work, work, md1, md_size); + } + + use_len = (key_length < md_size) ? key_length : md_size; + memcpy(out_p, work, use_len); + + key_length -= (uint32_t) use_len; + out_p += use_len; + + for (i = 4; i > 0; i--) { + if (++counter[i - 1] != 0) { + break; + } + } + } + +cleanup: + /* Zeroise buffers to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(work, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(md1, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE); + + return ret; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *password, + size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned int iteration_count, + uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output) +{ + return pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(ctx, password, plen, salt, slen, iteration_count, + key_length, output); +} +#endif + +int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *password, + size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned int iteration_count, + uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output) +{ + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(&md_ctx, password, plen, salt, slen, + iteration_count, key_length, output); +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test(int verbose) +{ + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" PBKDF2 (SHA1): skipped\n\n"); + } + + return 0; +} +#else + +#define MAX_TESTS 6 + +static const size_t plen_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = +{ 8, 8, 8, 24, 9 }; + +static const unsigned char password_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = +{ + "password", + "password", + "password", + "passwordPASSWORDpassword", + "pass\0word", +}; + +static const size_t slen_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = +{ 4, 4, 4, 36, 5 }; + +static const unsigned char salt_test_data[MAX_TESTS][40] = +{ + "salt", + "salt", + "salt", + "saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt", + "sa\0lt", +}; + +static const uint32_t it_cnt_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = +{ 1, 2, 4096, 4096, 4096 }; + +static const uint32_t key_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] = +{ 20, 20, 20, 25, 16 }; + +static const unsigned char result_key_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] = +{ + { 0x0c, 0x60, 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x96, 0x1f, 0x0e, 0x71, + 0xf3, 0xa9, 0xb5, 0x24, 0xaf, 0x60, 0x12, 0x06, + 0x2f, 0xe0, 0x37, 0xa6 }, + { 0xea, 0x6c, 0x01, 0x4d, 0xc7, 0x2d, 0x6f, 0x8c, + 0xcd, 0x1e, 0xd9, 0x2a, 0xce, 0x1d, 0x41, 0xf0, + 0xd8, 0xde, 0x89, 0x57 }, + { 0x4b, 0x00, 0x79, 0x01, 0xb7, 0x65, 0x48, 0x9a, + 0xbe, 0xad, 0x49, 0xd9, 0x26, 0xf7, 0x21, 0xd0, + 0x65, 0xa4, 0x29, 0xc1 }, + { 0x3d, 0x2e, 0xec, 0x4f, 0xe4, 0x1c, 0x84, 0x9b, + 0x80, 0xc8, 0xd8, 0x36, 0x62, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x4a, + 0x8b, 0x29, 0x1a, 0x96, 0x4c, 0xf2, 0xf0, 0x70, + 0x38 }, + { 0x56, 0xfa, 0x6a, 0xa7, 0x55, 0x48, 0x09, 0x9d, + 0xcc, 0x37, 0xd7, 0xf0, 0x34, 0x25, 0xe0, 0xc3 }, +}; + +int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int ret, i; + unsigned char key[64]; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_TESTS; i++) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" PBKDF2 (SHA1) #%d: ", i); + } + + ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, password_test_data[i], + plen_test_data[i], salt_test_data[i], + slen_test_data[i], it_cnt_test_data[i], + key_len_test_data[i], key); + if (ret != 0 || + memcmp(result_key_test_data[i], key, key_len_test_data[i]) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + ret = 1; + goto exit; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + +exit: + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ diff --git a/library/pkcs7.c b/library/pkcs7.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3aac662ba69 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/pkcs7.c @@ -0,0 +1,773 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs7.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#include +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +#include +#endif + +/** + * Initializes the mbedtls_pkcs7 structure. + */ +void mbedtls_pkcs7_init(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7) +{ + memset(pkcs7, 0, sizeof(*pkcs7)); +} + +static int pkcs7_get_next_content_len(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + size_t *len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC); + if (ret != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret); + } else if ((size_t) (end - *p) != *len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * version Version + * Version ::= INTEGER + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_version(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, int *ver) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, ver); + if (ret != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION, ret); + } + + /* If version != 1, return invalid version */ + if (*ver != MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SUPPORTED_VERSION) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION; + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * contentType ContentType, + * content + * [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL } + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_content_info_type(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + unsigned char **seq_end, + mbedtls_pkcs7_buf *pkcs7) +{ + size_t len = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *start = *p; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret != 0) { + *p = start; + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret); + } + *seq_end = *p + len; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, *seq_end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID); + if (ret != 0) { + *p = start; + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret); + } + + pkcs7->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + pkcs7->len = len; + pkcs7->p = *p; + *p += len; + + return ret; +} + +/** + * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * + * This is from x509.h + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(p, end, alg)) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers :: SET of DigestAlgorithmIdentifier + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm_set(unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg) +{ + size_t len = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + end = *p + len; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(p, end, alg); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + /** For now, it assumes there is only one digest algorithm specified **/ + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * certificates :: SET OF ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate, + * ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate ::= CHOICE { + * certificate Certificate -- x509, + * extendedCertificate[0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate } + * Return number of certificates added to the signed data, + * 0 or higher is valid. + * Return negative error code for failure. + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_certificates(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_crt *certs) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len1 = 0; + size_t len2 = 0; + unsigned char *end_set, *end_cert, *start; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len1, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC); + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + return 0; + } + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + start = *p; + end_set = *p + len1; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_set, &len2, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT, ret); + } + + end_cert = *p + len2; + + /* + * This is to verify that there is only one signer certificate. It seems it is + * not easy to differentiate between the chain vs different signer's certificate. + * So, we support only the root certificate and the single signer. + * The behaviour would be improved with addition of multiple signer support. + */ + if (end_cert != end_set) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(certs, start, len1)) < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT; + } + + *p = end_cert; + + /* + * Since in this version we strictly support single certificate, and reaching + * here implies we have parsed successfully, we return 1. + */ + return 1; +} + +/** + * EncryptedDigest ::= OCTET STRING + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_signature(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pkcs7_buf *signature) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + signature->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + signature->len = len; + signature->p = *p; + + *p = *p + len; + + return 0; +} + +static void pkcs7_free_signer_info(mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer) +{ + mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur; + mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv; + + if (signer == NULL) { + return; + } + + name_cur = signer->issuer.next; + while (name_cur != NULL) { + name_prv = name_cur; + name_cur = name_cur->next; + mbedtls_free(name_prv); + } + signer->issuer.next = NULL; +} + +/** + * SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version; + * issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber, + * digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, + * authenticatedAttributes + * [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL, + * digestEncryptionAlgorithm DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, + * encryptedDigest EncryptedDigest, + * unauthenticatedAttributes + * [1] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL, + * Returns 0 if the signerInfo is valid. + * Return negative error code for failure. + * Structure must not contain vales for authenticatedAttributes + * and unauthenticatedAttributes. + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_signer_info(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg) +{ + unsigned char *end_signer, *end_issuer_and_sn; + int asn1_ret = 0, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + asn1_ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (asn1_ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + end_signer = *p + len; + + ret = pkcs7_get_version(p, end_signer, &signer->version); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + asn1_ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_signer, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (asn1_ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + end_issuer_and_sn = *p + len; + /* Parsing IssuerAndSerialNumber */ + signer->issuer_raw.p = *p; + + asn1_ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_issuer_and_sn, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (asn1_ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(p, *p + len, &signer->issuer); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + signer->issuer_raw.len = (size_t) (*p - signer->issuer_raw.p); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial(p, end_issuer_and_sn, &signer->serial); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + /* ensure no extra or missing bytes */ + if (*p != end_issuer_and_sn) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO; + goto out; + } + + ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm(p, end_signer, &signer->alg_identifier); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + /* Check that the digest algorithm used matches the one provided earlier */ + if (signer->alg_identifier.tag != alg->tag || + signer->alg_identifier.len != alg->len || + memcmp(signer->alg_identifier.p, alg->p, alg->len) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO; + goto out; + } + + /* Assume authenticatedAttributes is nonexistent */ + ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm(p, end_signer, &signer->sig_alg_identifier); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + ret = pkcs7_get_signature(p, end_signer, &signer->sig); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + /* Do not permit any unauthenticated attributes */ + if (*p != end_signer) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO; + } + +out: + if (asn1_ret != 0 || ret != 0) { + pkcs7_free_signer_info(signer); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO, + asn1_ret); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * SignerInfos ::= SET of SignerInfo + * Return number of signers added to the signed data, + * 0 or higher is valid. + * Return negative error code for failure. + **/ +static int pkcs7_get_signers_info_set(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signers_set, + mbedtls_x509_buf *digest_alg) +{ + unsigned char *end_set; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int count = 0; + size_t len = 0; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO, ret); + } + + /* Detect zero signers */ + if (len == 0) { + return 0; + } + + end_set = *p + len; + + ret = pkcs7_get_signer_info(p, end_set, signers_set, digest_alg); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + count++; + + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *prev = signers_set; + while (*p != end_set) { + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer = + mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info)); + if (!signer) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = pkcs7_get_signer_info(p, end_set, signer, digest_alg); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(signer); + goto cleanup; + } + prev->next = signer; + prev = signer; + count++; + } + + return count; + +cleanup: + pkcs7_free_signer_info(signers_set); + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer = signers_set->next; + while (signer != NULL) { + prev = signer; + signer = signer->next; + pkcs7_free_signer_info(prev); + mbedtls_free(prev); + } + signers_set->next = NULL; + return ret; +} + +/** + * SignedData ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers, + * contentInfo ContentInfo, + * certificates + * [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates + * OPTIONAL, + * crls + * [0] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists OPTIONAL, + * signerInfos SignerInfos } + */ +static int pkcs7_get_signed_data(unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data *signed_data) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *end = buf + buflen; + unsigned char *end_content_info = NULL; + size_t len = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if (p + len != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + /* Get version of signed data */ + ret = pkcs7_get_version(&p, end, &signed_data->version); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Get digest algorithm */ + ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm_set(&p, end, + &signed_data->digest_alg_identifiers); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&signed_data->digest_alg_identifiers, &md_alg); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG; + } + + mbedtls_pkcs7_buf content_type; + memset(&content_type, 0, sizeof(content_type)); + ret = pkcs7_get_content_info_type(&p, end, &end_content_info, &content_type); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA, &content_type)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO; + } + + if (p != end_content_info) { + /* Determine if valid content is present */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, + end_content_info, + &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret); + } + p += len; + if (p != end_content_info) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret); + } + /* Valid content is present - this is not supported */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + /* Look for certificates, there may or may not be any */ + mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&signed_data->certs); + ret = pkcs7_get_certificates(&p, end, &signed_data->certs); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + signed_data->no_of_certs = ret; + + /* + * Currently CRLs are not supported. If CRL exist, the parsing will fail + * at next step of getting signers info and return error as invalid + * signer info. + */ + + signed_data->no_of_crls = 0; + + /* Get signers info */ + ret = pkcs7_get_signers_info_set(&p, + end, + &signed_data->signers, + &signed_data->digest_alg_identifiers); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + signed_data->no_of_signers = ret; + + /* Don't permit trailing data */ + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs7_parse_der(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, const unsigned char *buf, + const size_t buflen) +{ + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *end; + size_t len = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (pkcs7 == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* make an internal copy of the buffer for parsing */ + pkcs7->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc(1, buflen); + if (pkcs7->raw.p == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto out; + } + memcpy(p, buf, buflen); + pkcs7->raw.len = buflen; + end = p + buflen; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + goto out; + } + + if ((size_t) (end - p) != len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto out; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + goto out; + } + p = pkcs7->raw.p; + len = buflen; + goto try_data; + } + + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA, p, len)) { + /* OID is not MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA, which is the only supported feature */ + if (!MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA, p, len) + || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA, p, len) + || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA, p, len) + || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_AND_ENVELOPED_DATA, p, len) + || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA, p, len)) { + /* OID is valid according to the spec, but unsupported */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } else { + /* OID is invalid according to the spec */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + goto out; + } + + p += len; + + ret = pkcs7_get_next_content_len(&p, end, &len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + /* ensure no extra/missing data */ + if (p + len != end) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto out; + } + +try_data: + ret = pkcs7_get_signed_data(p, len, &pkcs7->signed_data); + if (ret != 0) { + goto out; + } + + ret = MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA; + +out: + if (ret < 0) { + mbedtls_pkcs7_free(pkcs7); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t datalen, + const int is_data_hash) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *hash; + mbedtls_pk_context pk_cxt = cert->pk; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer; + + if (pkcs7->signed_data.no_of_signers == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT; + } + + if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(&cert->valid_to) || + mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(&cert->valid_from)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_CERT_DATE_INVALID; + } + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&pkcs7->signed_data.digest_alg_identifiers, &md_alg); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL; + } + + hash = mbedtls_calloc(mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info), 1); + if (hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + /* BEGIN must free hash before jumping out */ + if (is_data_hash) { + if (datalen != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL; + } else { + memcpy(hash, data, datalen); + } + } else { + ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, data, datalen, hash); + } + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(hash); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL; + } + + /* assume failure */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL; + + /* + * Potential TODOs + * Currently we iterate over all signers and return success if any of them + * verify. + * + * However, we could make this better by checking against the certificate's + * identification and SignerIdentifier fields first. That would also allow + * us to distinguish between 'no signature for key' and 'signature for key + * failed to validate'. + */ + for (signer = &pkcs7->signed_data.signers; signer; signer = signer->next) { + ret = mbedtls_pk_verify(&pk_cxt, md_alg, hash, + mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info), + signer->sig.p, signer->sig.len); + + if (ret == 0) { + break; + } + } + + mbedtls_free(hash); + /* END must free hash before jumping out */ + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t datalen) +{ + if (data == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify(pkcs7, cert, data, datalen, 0); +} + +int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_hash_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const unsigned char *hash, + size_t hashlen) +{ + if (hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify(pkcs7, cert, hash, hashlen, 1); +} + +/* + * Unallocate all pkcs7 data + */ +void mbedtls_pkcs7_free(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7) +{ + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer_cur; + mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer_prev; + + if (pkcs7 == NULL || pkcs7->raw.p == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_free(pkcs7->raw.p); + + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(&pkcs7->signed_data.certs); + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(&pkcs7->signed_data.crl); + + signer_cur = pkcs7->signed_data.signers.next; + pkcs7_free_signer_info(&pkcs7->signed_data.signers); + while (signer_cur != NULL) { + signer_prev = signer_cur; + signer_cur = signer_prev->next; + pkcs7_free_signer_info(signer_prev); + mbedtls_free(signer_prev); + } + + pkcs7->raw.p = NULL; +} + +#endif diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4f6ee139862 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/pkparse.c @@ -0,0 +1,1392 @@ +/* + * Public Key layer for parsing key files and structures + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +/* Key types */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "rsa_internal.h" +#endif + +/* Extended formats */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) +#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + +/*********************************************************************** + * + * Low-level ECC parsing: optional support for SpecifiedECDomain + * + * There are two functions here that are used by the rest of the code: + * - pk_ecc_tag_is_speficied_ec_domain() + * - pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified() + * + * All the other functions are internal to this section. + * + * The two "public" functions have a dummy variant provided + * in configs without MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED. This acts as an + * abstraction layer for this macro, which should not appear outside + * this section. + * + **********************************************************************/ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) +/* See the "real" version for documentation */ +static int pk_ecc_tag_is_specified_ec_domain(int tag) +{ + (void) tag; + return 0; +} + +/* See the "real" version for documentation */ +static int pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id) +{ + (void) params; + (void) grp_id; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */ +/* + * Tell if the passed tag might be the start of SpecifiedECDomain + * (that is, a sequence). + */ +static int pk_ecc_tag_is_specified_ec_domain(int tag) +{ + return tag == (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); +} + +/* + * Parse a SpecifiedECDomain (SEC 1 C.2) and (mostly) fill the group with it. + * WARNING: the resulting group should only be used with + * pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified(), since its base point may not be set correctly + * if it was encoded compressed. + * + * SpecifiedECDomain ::= SEQUENCE { + * version SpecifiedECDomainVersion(ecdpVer1 | ecdpVer2 | ecdpVer3, ...), + * fieldID FieldID {{FieldTypes}}, + * curve Curve, + * base ECPoint, + * order INTEGER, + * cofactor INTEGER OPTIONAL, + * hash HashAlgorithm OPTIONAL, + * ... + * } + * + * We only support prime-field as field type, and ignore hash and cofactor. + */ +static int pk_group_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = params->p; + const unsigned char *const end = params->p + params->len; + const unsigned char *end_field, *end_curve; + size_t len; + int ver; + + /* SpecifiedECDomainVersion ::= INTEGER { 1, 2, 3 } */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &ver)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if (ver < 1 || ver > 3) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + /* + * FieldID { FIELD-ID:IOSet } ::= SEQUENCE { -- Finite field + * fieldType FIELD-ID.&id({IOSet}), + * parameters FIELD-ID.&Type({IOSet}{@fieldType}) + * } + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + end_field = p + len; + + /* + * FIELD-ID ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER + * FieldTypes FIELD-ID ::= { + * { Prime-p IDENTIFIED BY prime-field } | + * { Characteristic-two IDENTIFIED BY characteristic-two-field } + * } + * prime-field OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-fieldType 1 } + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end_field, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (len != MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD) || + memcmp(p, MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD, len) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + p += len; + + /* Prime-p ::= INTEGER -- Field of size p. */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end_field, &grp->P)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P); + + if (p != end_field) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + /* + * Curve ::= SEQUENCE { + * a FieldElement, + * b FieldElement, + * seed BIT STRING OPTIONAL + * -- Shall be present if used in SpecifiedECDomain + * -- with version equal to ecdpVer2 or ecdpVer3 + * } + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + end_curve = p + len; + + /* + * FieldElement ::= OCTET STRING + * containing an integer in the case of a prime field + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&grp->A, p, len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + p += len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&grp->B, p, len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + p += len; + + /* Ignore seed BIT STRING OPTIONAL */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING)) == 0) { + p += len; + } + + if (p != end_curve) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + /* + * ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(grp, &grp->G, + (const unsigned char *) p, len)) != 0) { + /* + * If we can't read the point because it's compressed, cheat by + * reading only the X coordinate and the parity bit of Y. + */ + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE || + (p[0] != 0x02 && p[0] != 0x03) || + len != mbedtls_mpi_size(&grp->P) + 1 || + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&grp->G.X, p + 1, len - 1) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.Y, p[0] - 2) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.Z, 1) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + } + + p += len; + + /* + * order INTEGER + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end, &grp->N)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->N); + + /* + * Allow optional elements by purposefully not enforcing p == end here. + */ + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Find the group id associated with an (almost filled) group as generated by + * pk_group_from_specified(), or return an error if unknown. + */ +static int pk_group_id_from_group(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_ecp_group ref; + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *id; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&ref); + + for (id = mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list(); *id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; id++) { + /* Load the group associated to that id */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&ref); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ref, *id)); + + /* Compare to the group we were given, starting with easy tests */ + if (grp->pbits == ref.pbits && grp->nbits == ref.nbits && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&grp->P, &ref.P) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&grp->A, &ref.A) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&grp->B, &ref.B) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&grp->N, &ref.N) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&grp->G.X, &ref.G.X) == 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&grp->G.Z, &ref.G.Z) == 0 && + /* For Y we may only know the parity bit, so compare only that */ + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&grp->G.Y, 0) == mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ref.G.Y, 0)) { + break; + } + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&ref); + + *grp_id = *id; + + if (ret == 0 && *id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Parse a SpecifiedECDomain (SEC 1 C.2) and find the associated group ID + */ +static int pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp); + + if ((ret = pk_group_from_specified(params, &grp)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = pk_group_id_from_group(&grp, grp_id); + +cleanup: + /* The API respecting lifecycle for mbedtls_ecp_group struct is + * _init(), _load() and _free(). In pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified() the + * temporary grp breaks that flow and it's members are populated + * by pk_group_id_from_group(). As such mbedtls_ecp_group_free() + * which is assuming a group populated by _setup() may not clean-up + * properly -> Manually free it's members. + */ + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp.N); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp.P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp.A); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp.B); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&grp.G); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */ + +/*********************************************************************** + * + * Unsorted (yet!) from this point on until the next section header + * + **********************************************************************/ + +/* Minimally parse an ECParameters buffer to and mbedtls_asn1_buf + * + * ECParameters ::= CHOICE { + * namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- = SEQUENCE { ... } + * -- implicitCurve NULL + * } + */ +static int pk_get_ecparams(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_asn1_buf *params) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (end - *p < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA); + } + + /* Acceptable tags: OID for namedCurve, or specifiedECDomain */ + params->tag = **p; + if (params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID && + !pk_ecc_tag_is_specified_ec_domain(params->tag)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, ¶ms->len, params->tag)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + params->p = *p; + *p += params->len; + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Use EC parameters to initialise an EC group + * + * ECParameters ::= CHOICE { + * namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- = SEQUENCE { ... } + * -- implicitCurve NULL + */ +static int pk_use_ecparams(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + + if (params->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID) { + if (mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp(params, &grp_id) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE; + } + } else { + ret = pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified(params, &grp_id); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + return mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(pk, grp_id); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES) + +/* + * Load an RFC8410 EC key, which doesn't have any parameters + */ +static int pk_use_ecparams_rfc8410(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + if (params->tag != 0 || params->len != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + return mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(pk, grp_id); +} + +/* + * Parse an RFC 8410 encoded private EC key + * + * CurvePrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING + */ +static int pk_parse_key_rfc8410_der(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, const unsigned char *end, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&key, (key + keylen), &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if (key + len != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + /* + * Load the private key + */ + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(pk, key, len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der() only supports version 1 PKCS8 keys, + * which never contain a public key. As such, derive the public key + * unconditionally. */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(pk, key, len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +/* Get a PK algorithm identifier + * + * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } + */ +static int pk_get_pk_alg(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id *ec_grp_id) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_oid; + + memset(params, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf)); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(p, end, &alg_oid, params)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg(&alg_oid, pk_alg); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND) { + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp_algid(&alg_oid, ec_grp_id); + if (ret == 0) { + *pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY; + } + } +#else + (void) ec_grp_id; +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; + } + + /* + * No parameters with RSA (only for EC) + */ + if (*pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA && + ((params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL && params->tag != 0) || + params->len != 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_params; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + end = *p + len; + + if ((ret = pk_get_pk_alg(p, end, &pk_alg, &alg_params, &ec_grp_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(p, end, &len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); + } + + if (*p + len != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + if ((pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(pk_alg)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), *p, (size_t) (end - *p)); + if (ret == 0) { + /* On success all the input has been consumed by the parsing function. */ + *p += end - *p; + } else if ((ret <= MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA) && + (ret >= MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL)) { + /* In case of ASN1 error codes add MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY. */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); + } else { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES) + if (MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(ec_grp_id)) { + ret = pk_use_ecparams_rfc8410(&alg_params, ec_grp_id, pk); + } else +#endif + { + ret = pk_use_ecparams(&alg_params, pk); + } + if (ret == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(pk, *p, (size_t) (end - *p)); + *p += end - *p; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; + + if (ret == 0 && *p != end) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_pk_free(pk); + } + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +/* + * Parse a SEC1 encoded private EC key + */ +static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int version, pubkey_done; + size_t len, d_len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf params = { 0, 0, NULL }; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key; + unsigned char *d; + unsigned char *end = p + keylen; + unsigned char *end2; + + /* + * RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4 + * + * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1), + * privateKey OCTET STRING, + * parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL, + * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL + * } + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + end = p + len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if (version != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + /* Keep a reference to the position fo the private key. It will be used + * later in this function. */ + d = p; + d_len = len; + + p += len; + + pubkey_done = 0; + if (p != end) { + /* + * Is 'parameters' present? + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + 0)) == 0) { + if ((ret = pk_get_ecparams(&p, p + len, ¶ms)) != 0 || + (ret = pk_use_ecparams(¶ms, pk)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + } + + /* + * Load the private key + */ + ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(pk, d, d_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (p != end) { + /* + * Is 'publickey' present? If not, or if we can't read it (eg because it + * is compressed), create it from the private key. + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + 1)) == 0) { + end2 = p + len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(&p, end2, &len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if (p + len != end2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(pk, p, (size_t) (end2 - p))) == 0) { + pubkey_done = 1; + } else { + /* + * The only acceptable failure mode of mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey() above + * is if the point format is not recognized. + */ + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + } + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + } + + if (!pubkey_done) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(pk, d, d_len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +/*********************************************************************** + * + * PKCS#8 parsing functions + * + **********************************************************************/ + +/* + * Parse an unencrypted PKCS#8 encoded private key + * + * Notes: + * + * - This function does not own the key buffer. It is the + * responsibility of the caller to take care of zeroizing + * and freeing it after use. + * + * - The function is responsible for freeing the provided + * PK context on failure. + * + */ +static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret, version; + size_t len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf params; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key; + unsigned char *end = p + keylen; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; +#endif + + /* + * This function parses the PrivateKeyInfo object (PKCS#8 v1.2 = RFC 5208) + * + * PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * privateKeyAlgorithm PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier, + * privateKey PrivateKey, + * attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL } + * + * Version ::= INTEGER + * PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING + * + * The PrivateKey OCTET STRING is a SEC1 ECPrivateKey + */ + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + end = p + len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if (version != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION, ret); + } + + if ((ret = pk_get_pk_alg(&p, end, &pk_alg, ¶ms, &ec_grp_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if (len < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA); + } + + if ((pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(pk_alg)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), p, len)) != 0) { + mbedtls_pk_free(pk); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES) + if (MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(ec_grp_id)) { + if ((ret = + pk_use_ecparams_rfc8410(¶ms, ec_grp_id, pk)) != 0 || + (ret = + pk_parse_key_rfc8410_der(pk, p, len, end, f_rng, + p_rng)) != 0) { + mbedtls_pk_free(pk); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif + { + if ((ret = pk_use_ecparams(¶ms, pk)) != 0 || + (ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der(pk, p, len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + mbedtls_pk_free(pk); + return ret; + } + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; + + end = p + len; + if (end != (key + keylen)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse an encrypted PKCS#8 encoded private key + * + * To save space, the decryption happens in-place on the given key buffer. + * Also, while this function may modify the keybuffer, it doesn't own it, + * and instead it is the responsibility of the caller to zeroize and properly + * free it after use. + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret, decrypted = 0; + size_t len; + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char *p, *end; + mbedtls_asn1_buf pbe_alg_oid, pbe_params; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; +#endif + size_t outlen = 0; + + p = key; + end = p + keylen; + + if (pwdlen == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED; + } + + /* + * This function parses the EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo object (PKCS#8) + * + * EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * encryptionAlgorithm EncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, + * encryptedData EncryptedData + * } + * + * EncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * + * EncryptedData ::= OCTET STRING + * + * The EncryptedData OCTET STRING is a PKCS#8 PrivateKeyInfo + * + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + end = p + len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&p, end, &pbe_alg_oid, &pbe_params)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + buf = p; + + /* + * Decrypt EncryptedData with appropriate PBE + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + if (mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg(&pbe_alg_oid, &md_alg, &cipher_alg) == 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT, + cipher_alg, md_alg, + pwd, pwdlen, p, len, buf, len, &outlen)) != 0) { + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + } + + return ret; + } + + decrypted = 1; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2, &pbe_alg_oid) == 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT, pwd, pwdlen, + p, len, buf, len, &outlen)) != 0) { + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + } + + return ret; + } + + decrypted = 1; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + { + ((void) pwd); + } + + if (decrypted == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + return pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(pk, buf, outlen, f_rng, p_rng); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ + +/*********************************************************************** + * + * Top-level functions, with format auto-discovery + * + **********************************************************************/ + +/* + * Parse a private key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + size_t len; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; +#endif + + if (keylen == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_init(&pem); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if (key[keylen - 1] != '\0') { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, + PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA, PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA, + key, pwd, pwdlen, &len); + } + + if (ret == 0) { + pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA); + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), + pem.buf, pem.buflen)) != 0) { + mbedtls_pk_free(pk); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); + return ret; + } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED; + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if (key[keylen - 1] != '\0') { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, + PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC, + PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC, + key, pwd, pwdlen, &len); + } + if (ret == 0) { + pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info)) != 0 || + (ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der(pk, + pem.buf, pem.buflen, + f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + mbedtls_pk_free(pk); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); + return ret; + } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH; + } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED; + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if (key[keylen - 1] != '\0') { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, + PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8, PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8, + key, NULL, 0, &len); + } + if (ret == 0) { + if ((ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(pk, + pem.buf, pem.buflen, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + mbedtls_pk_free(pk); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); + return ret; + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) { + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if (key[keylen - 1] != '\0') { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, + PEM_BEGIN_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8, + PEM_END_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8, + key, NULL, 0, &len); + } + if (ret == 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(pk, pem.buf, pem.buflen, + pwd, pwdlen, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + mbedtls_pk_free(pk); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); + return ret; + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ +#else + ((void) pwd); + ((void) pwdlen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + + /* + * At this point we only know it's not a PEM formatted key. Could be any + * of the known DER encoded private key formats + * + * We try the different DER format parsers to see if one passes without + * error + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + if (pwdlen != 0) { + unsigned char *key_copy; + + if ((key_copy = mbedtls_calloc(1, keylen)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(key_copy, key, keylen); + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(pk, key_copy, keylen, + pwd, pwdlen, f_rng, p_rng); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(key_copy, keylen); + } + + if (ret == 0) { + return 0; + } + + mbedtls_pk_free(pk); + mbedtls_pk_init(pk); + + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C || MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ + + ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(pk, key, keylen, f_rng, p_rng); + if (ret == 0) { + return 0; + } + + mbedtls_pk_free(pk); + mbedtls_pk_init(pk); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + + pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA); + if (mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info) == 0 && + mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), key, keylen) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + mbedtls_pk_free(pk); + mbedtls_pk_init(pk); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY); + if (mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info) == 0 && + pk_parse_key_sec1_der(pk, + key, keylen, f_rng, p_rng) == 0) { + return 0; + } + mbedtls_pk_free(pk); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + + /* If MBEDTLS_RSA_C is defined but MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS isn't, + * it is ok to leave the PK context initialized but not + * freed: It is the caller's responsibility to call pk_init() + * before calling this function, and to call pk_free() + * when it fails. If MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS is defined but MBEDTLS_RSA_C + * isn't, this leads to mbedtls_pk_free() being called + * twice, once here and once by the caller, but this is + * also ok and in line with the mbedtls_pk_free() calls + * on failed PEM parsing attempts. */ + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; +} + +/* + * Parse a public key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + size_t len; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; +#endif + + if (keylen == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_pem_init(&pem); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if (key[keylen - 1] != '\0') { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, + PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA, PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA, + key, NULL, 0, &len); + } + + if (ret == 0) { + p = pem.buf; + if ((pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) == NULL) { + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(ctx, pk_info)) != 0) { + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), p, pem.buflen)) != 0) { + mbedtls_pk_free(ctx); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); + return ret; + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) { + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if (key[keylen - 1] != '\0') { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, + PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY, PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY, + key, NULL, 0, &len); + } + + if (ret == 0) { + /* + * Was PEM encoded + */ + p = pem.buf; + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&p, p + pem.buflen, ctx); + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); + return ret; + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) { + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); + return ret; + } + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if ((pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(ctx, pk_info)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + p = (unsigned char *) key; + ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), p, keylen); + if (ret == 0) { + return ret; + } + mbedtls_pk_free(ctx); + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + p = (unsigned char *) key; + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&p, p + keylen, ctx); + + return ret; +} + +/*********************************************************************** + * + * Top-level functions, with filesystem support + * + **********************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load all data from a file into a given buffer. + * + * The file is expected to contain either PEM or DER encoded data. + * A terminating null byte is always appended. It is included in the announced + * length only if the data looks like it is PEM encoded. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n) +{ + FILE *f; + long size; + + if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL); + + fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END); + if ((size = ftell(f)) == -1) { + fclose(f); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET); + + *n = (size_t) size; + + if (*n + 1 == 0 || + (*buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, *n + 1)) == NULL) { + fclose(f); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + if (fread(*buf, 1, *n, f) != *n) { + fclose(f); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(*buf, *n); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + + fclose(f); + + (*buf)[*n] = '\0'; + + if (strstr((const char *) *buf, "-----BEGIN ") != NULL) { + ++*n; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Load and parse a private key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, + const char *path, const char *pwd, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (pwd == NULL) { + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key(ctx, buf, n, NULL, 0, f_rng, p_rng); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_key(ctx, buf, n, + (const unsigned char *) pwd, strlen(pwd), f_rng, p_rng); + } + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Load and parse a public key + */ +int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(ctx, buf, n); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/library/pkwrite.c b/library/pkwrite.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..5e009c565ea --- /dev/null +++ b/library/pkwrite.c @@ -0,0 +1,621 @@ +/* + * Public Key layer for writing key files and structures + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +#include "pk_internal.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +#include "pkwrite.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "rsa_internal.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#endif +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +/* Helpers for properly sizing buffers aimed at holding public keys or + * key-pairs based on build symbols. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +#define PK_MAX_EC_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE +#define PK_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_SIZE MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#define PK_MAX_EC_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE +#define PK_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_SIZE MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH +#else +#define PK_MAX_EC_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN +#define PK_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES +#endif + +/****************************************************************************** + * Internal functions for RSA keys. + ******************************************************************************/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +static int pk_write_rsa_der(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *buf, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + uint8_t tmp[PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t len = 0, tmp_len = 0; + + if (psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &tmp_len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + *p -= tmp_len; + memcpy(*p, tmp, tmp_len); + len += tmp_len; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + + return (int) len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + return mbedtls_rsa_write_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), buf, p); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +/****************************************************************************** + * Internal functions for EC keys. + ******************************************************************************/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +static int pk_write_ec_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t len = 0; + uint8_t buf[PK_MAX_EC_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]; + + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + if (psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, buf, sizeof(buf), &len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } else { + len = pk->pub_raw_len; + memcpy(buf, pk->pub_raw, len); + } + + if (*p < start || (size_t) (*p - start) < len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + *p -= len; + memcpy(*p, buf, len); + + return (int) len; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +static int pk_write_ec_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t len = 0; + unsigned char buf[PK_MAX_EC_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE]; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + if (psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, buf, sizeof(buf), &len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + *p -= len; + memcpy(*p, buf, len); + return (int) len; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ec->grp, &ec->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &len, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + if (*p < start || (size_t) (*p - start) < len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + *p -= len; + memcpy(*p, buf, len); + + return (int) len; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + +/* + * privateKey OCTET STRING -- always of length ceil(log2(n)/8) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) +static int pk_write_ec_private(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t byte_length; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char tmp[PK_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_SIZE]; + psa_status_t status; + + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + status = psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &byte_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + return ret; + } + } else { + status = psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &byte_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(p, start, tmp, byte_length); +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + return ret; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +static int pk_write_ec_private(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t byte_length; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char tmp[PK_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_SIZE]; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status; + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + status = psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &byte_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk); + byte_length = (ec->grp.pbits + 7) / 8; + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(ec, &byte_length, tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(p, start, tmp, byte_length); +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + +/* + * ECParameters ::= CHOICE { + * namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * } + */ +static int pk_write_ec_param(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + const char *oid; + size_t oid_len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp(grp_id, &oid, &oid_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(p, start, oid, oid_len)); + + return (int) len; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES) +/* + * RFC8410 section 7 + * + * OneAsymmetricKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * privateKeyAlgorithm PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier, + * privateKey PrivateKey, + * attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL, + * ..., + * [[2: publicKey [1] IMPLICIT PublicKey OPTIONAL ]], + * ... + * } + * ... + * CurvePrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING + */ +static int pk_write_ec_rfc8410_der(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *buf, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + size_t oid_len = 0; + const char *oid; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + + /* privateKey */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_ec_private(p, buf, pk)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)); + + grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + /* privateKeyAlgorithm */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp_algid(grp_id, &oid, &oid_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(p, buf, oid, oid_len, 0, 0)); + + /* version */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(p, buf, 0)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES */ + +/* + * RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4 + * + * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1), + * privateKey OCTET STRING, + * parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL, + * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL + * } + */ +static int pk_write_ec_der(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *buf, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t len = 0; + int ret; + size_t pub_len = 0, par_len = 0; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + + /* publicKey */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, pk_write_ec_pubkey(p, buf, pk)); + + if (*p - buf < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + (*p)--; + **p = 0; + pub_len += 1; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, pub_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, pub_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1)); + len += pub_len; + + /* parameters */ + grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, pk_write_ec_param(p, buf, grp_id)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, par_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)); + len += par_len; + + /* privateKey */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_ec_private(p, buf, pk)); + + /* version */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(p, buf, 1)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +/****************************************************************************** + * Internal functions for Opaque keys. + ******************************************************************************/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int pk_write_opaque_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + size_t buffer_size; + size_t len = 0; + + if (*p < start) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + buffer_size = (size_t) (*p - start); + if (psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, start, buffer_size, + &len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + *p -= len; + memmove(*p, start, len); + + return (int) len; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/****************************************************************************** + * Generic helpers + ******************************************************************************/ + +/* Extend the public mbedtls_pk_get_type() by getting key type also in case of + * opaque keys. */ +static mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_get_type_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + psa_key_attributes_t opaque_attrs = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t opaque_key_type; + + if (psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &opaque_attrs) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + } + opaque_key_type = psa_get_key_type(&opaque_attrs); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&opaque_attrs); + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(opaque_key_type)) { + return MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY; + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(opaque_key_type)) { + return MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + } + } else +#endif + return pk_type; +} + +/****************************************************************************** + * Public functions for writing private/public DER keys. + ******************************************************************************/ +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_pk_context *key) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*key), start, p)); + } else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_ec_pubkey(p, start, key)); + } else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_opaque_pubkey(p, start, key)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + return (int) len; +} + +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(const mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *c; + int has_par = 1; + size_t len = 0, par_len = 0, oid_len = 0; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; + const char *oid = NULL; + + if (size == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + c = buf + size; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&c, buf, key)); + + if (c - buf < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } + */ + *--c = 0; + len += 1; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING)); + + pk_type = pk_get_type_ext(key); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (pk_get_type_ext(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { + mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(key); + if (MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(ec_grp_id)) { + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp_algid(ec_grp_id, &oid, &oid_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + has_par = 0; + } else { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(par_len, pk_write_ec_param(&c, buf, ec_grp_id)); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + + /* At this point oid_len is not null only for EC Montgomery keys. */ + if (oid_len == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg(pk_type, &oid, &oid_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(&c, buf, oid, oid_len, + par_len, has_par)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} + +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(const mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) +{ + unsigned char *c; + + if (size == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + c = buf + size; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if (pk_get_type_ext(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { + return pk_write_rsa_der(&c, buf, key); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (pk_get_type_ext(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES) + if (mbedtls_pk_is_rfc8410(key)) { + return pk_write_ec_rfc8410_der(&c, buf, key); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES */ + return pk_write_ec_der(&c, buf, key); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} + +/****************************************************************************** + * Public functions for wrinting private/public PEM keys. + ******************************************************************************/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + +#define PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES \ + (MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES > MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES : MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES) +#define PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES \ + (MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES > MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \ + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES : MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES) + +int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem(const mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *output_buf = NULL; + output_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES); + if (output_buf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + size_t olen = 0; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(key, output_buf, + PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES)) < 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY "\n", PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY "\n", + output_buf + PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES - ret, + ret, buf, size, &olen)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; +cleanup: + mbedtls_free(output_buf); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(const mbedtls_pk_context *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t size) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *output_buf = NULL; + output_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES); + if (output_buf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + const char *begin, *end; + size_t olen = 0; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(key, output_buf, PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES)) < 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if (pk_get_type_ext(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { + begin = PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "\n"; + end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "\n"; + } else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (pk_get_type_ext(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { + if (mbedtls_pk_is_rfc8410(key)) { + begin = PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "\n"; + end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "\n"; + } else { + begin = PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "\n"; + end = PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "\n"; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(begin, end, + output_buf + PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES - ret, + ret, buf, size, &olen)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = 0; +cleanup: + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(output_buf, PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/library/pkwrite.h b/library/pkwrite.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..01dc3d2f0ff --- /dev/null +++ b/library/pkwrite.h @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +/** + * \file pkwrite.h + * + * \brief Internal defines shared by the PK write module + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_H +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/* + * Max sizes of key per types. Shown as tag + len (+ content). + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +/* + * RSA public keys: + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, 1 + 1 (sequence) + * + 1 + 1 + 9 (rsa oid) + * + 1 + 1 (params null) + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } 1 + 3 + (1 + below) + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 + * modulus INTEGER, -- n 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * } + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES (38 + 2 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) + +/* + * RSA private keys: + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 3 + * version Version, 1 + 1 + 1 + * modulus INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * publicExponent INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * privateExponent INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX + 1 + * prime1 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * prime2 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * exponent1 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * exponent2 INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * coefficient INTEGER, 1 + 3 + MPI_MAX / 2 + 1 + * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL 0 (not supported) + * } + */ +#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE_2 (MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE / 2 + \ + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE % 2) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES (47 + 3 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE \ + + 5 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE_2) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 +#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + +/* Find the maximum number of bytes necessary to store an EC point. When USE_PSA + * is defined this means looking for the maximum between PSA and built-in + * supported curves. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_ECC_BYTES (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) > \ + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ? \ + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) : \ + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES) +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_ECC_BYTES MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/* + * EC public keys: + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 2 + * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, 1 + 1 (sequence) + * + 1 + 1 + 7 (ec oid) + * + 1 + 1 + 9 (namedCurve oid) + * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING 1 + 2 + 1 [1] + * + 1 (point format) [1] + * + 2 * ECP_MAX (coords) [1] + * } + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES (30 + 2 * MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_ECC_BYTES) + +/* + * EC private keys: + * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { 1 + 2 + * version INTEGER , 1 + 1 + 1 + * privateKey OCTET STRING, 1 + 1 + ECP_MAX + * parameters [0] ECParameters OPTIONAL, 1 + 1 + (1 + 1 + 9) + * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL 1 + 2 + [1] above + * } + */ +#define MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES (29 + 3 * MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_ECC_BYTES) + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +#define MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 +#define MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES 0 + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +/* Define the maximum available public key DER length based on the supported + * key types (EC and/or RSA). */ +#if (MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES > MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES) +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_PUBKEY_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_PUBKEY_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_PK_ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_H */ diff --git a/library/platform.c b/library/platform.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..890c4cbaba7 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/platform.c @@ -0,0 +1,402 @@ +/* + * Platform abstraction layer + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +/* The compile time configuration of memory allocation via the macros + * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE/CALLOC}_MACRO takes precedence over the runtime + * configuration via mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free(). So, omit everything + * related to the latter if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE/CALLOC}_MACRO are defined. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO)) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC) +static void *platform_calloc_uninit(size_t n, size_t size) +{ + ((void) n); + ((void) size); + return NULL; +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC platform_calloc_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE) +static void platform_free_uninit(void *ptr) +{ + ((void) ptr); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE platform_free_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE */ + +static void * (*mbedtls_calloc_func)(size_t, size_t) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC; +static void (*mbedtls_free_func)(void *) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE; + +void *mbedtls_calloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size) +{ + return (*mbedtls_calloc_func)(nmemb, size); +} + +void mbedtls_free(void *ptr) +{ + (*mbedtls_free_func)(ptr); +} + +int mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free(void *(*calloc_func)(size_t, size_t), + void (*free_func)(void *)) +{ + mbedtls_calloc_func = calloc_func; + mbedtls_free_func = free_func; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY && + !( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) && + defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) ) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF) +#include +int mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf(char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + va_list argp; + + va_start(argp, fmt); + ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf(s, n, fmt, argp); + va_end(argp); + + return ret; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_snprintf_uninit(char *s, size_t n, + const char *format, ...) +{ + ((void) s); + ((void) n); + ((void) format); + return 0; +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF platform_snprintf_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF */ + +int (*mbedtls_snprintf)(char *s, size_t n, + const char *format, + ...) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf(int (*snprintf_func)(char *s, size_t n, + const char *format, + ...)) +{ + mbedtls_snprintf = snprintf_func; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF) +#include +int mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf(char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, va_list arg) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Avoid calling the invalid parameter handler by checking ourselves */ + if (s == NULL || n == 0 || fmt == NULL) { + return -1; + } + +#if defined(_TRUNCATE) + ret = vsnprintf_s(s, n, _TRUNCATE, fmt, arg); +#else + ret = vsnprintf(s, n, fmt, arg); + if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret == n) { + s[n-1] = '\0'; + ret = -1; + } +#endif + + return ret; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_vsnprintf_uninit(char *s, size_t n, + const char *format, va_list arg) +{ + ((void) s); + ((void) n); + ((void) format); + ((void) arg); + return -1; +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF platform_vsnprintf_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF */ + +int (*mbedtls_vsnprintf)(char *s, size_t n, + const char *format, + va_list arg) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_vsnprintf(int (*vsnprintf_func)(char *s, size_t n, + const char *format, + va_list arg)) +{ + mbedtls_vsnprintf = vsnprintf_func; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_printf_uninit(const char *format, ...) +{ + ((void) format); + return 0; +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF platform_printf_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF */ + +int (*mbedtls_printf)(const char *, ...) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_printf(int (*printf_func)(const char *, ...)) +{ + mbedtls_printf = printf_func; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_fprintf_uninit(FILE *stream, const char *format, ...) +{ + ((void) stream); + ((void) format); + return 0; +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF platform_fprintf_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF */ + +int (*mbedtls_fprintf)(FILE *, const char *, ...) = + MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_fprintf(int (*fprintf_func)(FILE *, const char *, ...)) +{ + mbedtls_fprintf = fprintf_func; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static void platform_setbuf_uninit(FILE *stream, char *buf) +{ + ((void) stream); + ((void) buf); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF platform_setbuf_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF */ +void (*mbedtls_setbuf)(FILE *stream, char *buf) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_setbuf(void (*setbuf_func)(FILE *stream, char *buf)) +{ + mbedtls_setbuf = setbuf_func; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static void platform_exit_uninit(int status) +{ + ((void) status); +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT platform_exit_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT */ + +void (*mbedtls_exit)(int status) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_exit(void (*exit_func)(int status)) +{ + mbedtls_exit = exit_func; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static mbedtls_time_t platform_time_uninit(mbedtls_time_t *timer) +{ + ((void) timer); + return 0; +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME platform_time_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME */ + +mbedtls_time_t (*mbedtls_time)(mbedtls_time_t *timer) = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_time(mbedtls_time_t (*time_func)(mbedtls_time_t *timer)) +{ + mbedtls_time = time_func; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* Default implementations for the platform independent seed functions use + * standard libc file functions to read from and write to a pre-defined filename + */ +int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len) +{ + FILE *file; + size_t n; + + if ((file = fopen(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE, "rb")) == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(file, NULL); + + if ((n = fread(buf, 1, buf_len, file)) != buf_len) { + fclose(file); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, buf_len); + return -1; + } + + fclose(file); + return (int) n; +} + +int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len) +{ + FILE *file; + size_t n; + + if ((file = fopen(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE, "w")) == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(file, NULL); + + if ((n = fwrite(buf, 1, buf_len, file)) != buf_len) { + fclose(file); + return -1; + } + + fclose(file); + return (int) n; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_nv_seed_read_uninit(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len) +{ + ((void) buf); + ((void) buf_len); + return -1; +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ platform_nv_seed_read_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE) +/* + * Make dummy function to prevent NULL pointer dereferences + */ +static int platform_nv_seed_write_uninit(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len) +{ + ((void) buf); + ((void) buf_len); + return -1; +} + +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE platform_nv_seed_write_uninit +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE */ + +int (*mbedtls_nv_seed_read)(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len) = + MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ; +int (*mbedtls_nv_seed_write)(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len) = + MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE; + +int mbedtls_platform_set_nv_seed( + int (*nv_seed_read_func)(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len), + int (*nv_seed_write_func)(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len)) +{ + mbedtls_nv_seed_read = nv_seed_read_func; + mbedtls_nv_seed_write = nv_seed_write_func; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT) +/* + * Placeholder platform setup that does nothing by default + */ +int mbedtls_platform_setup(mbedtls_platform_context *ctx) +{ + (void) ctx; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Placeholder platform teardown that does nothing by default + */ +void mbedtls_platform_teardown(mbedtls_platform_context *ctx) +{ + (void) ctx; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ diff --git a/library/platform_util.c b/library/platform_util.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0741bf575e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/platform_util.c @@ -0,0 +1,263 @@ +/* + * Common and shared functions used by multiple modules in the Mbed TLS + * library. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be defined before + * mbedtls_config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms + * except OpenBSD, where it stops us accessing explicit_bzero. + */ +#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L +#endif + +#if !defined(_GNU_SOURCE) +/* Clang requires this to get support for explicit_bzero */ +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#endif + +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" + +#include + +#ifndef __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ +#define __STDC_WANT_LIB_EXT1__ 1 /* Ask for the C11 gmtime_s() and memset_s() if available */ +#endif +#include + +#if defined(_WIN32) +#include +#endif + +// Detect platforms known to support explicit_bzero() +#if defined(__GLIBC__) && (__GLIBC__ >= 2) && (__GLIBC_MINOR__ >= 25) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO 1 +#elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) && (__FreeBSD_version >= 1100037)) || defined(__OpenBSD__) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO 1 +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT) + +#undef HAVE_MEMORY_SANITIZER +#if defined(__has_feature) +#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) +#include +#define HAVE_MEMORY_SANITIZER +#endif +#endif + +/* + * Where possible, we try to detect the presence of a platform-provided + * secure memset, such as explicit_bzero(), that is safe against being optimized + * out, and use that. + * + * For other platforms, we provide an implementation that aims not to be + * optimized out by the compiler. + * + * This implementation for mbedtls_platform_zeroize() was inspired from Colin + * Percival's blog article at: + * + * http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-04-how-to-zero-a-buffer.html + * + * It uses a volatile function pointer to the standard memset(). Because the + * pointer is volatile the compiler expects it to change at + * any time and will not optimize out the call that could potentially perform + * other operations on the input buffer instead of just setting it to 0. + * Nevertheless, as pointed out by davidtgoldblatt on Hacker News + * (refer to http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2014-09-05-erratum.html for + * details), optimizations of the following form are still possible: + * + * if (memset_func != memset) + * memset_func(buf, 0, len); + * + * Note that it is extremely difficult to guarantee that + * the memset() call will not be optimized out by aggressive compilers + * in a portable way. For this reason, Mbed TLS also provides the configuration + * option MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT, which allows users to configure + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() to use a suitable implementation for their + * platform and needs. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO) && !(defined(__STDC_LIB_EXT1__) && \ + !defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)) \ + && !defined(_WIN32) +static void *(*const volatile memset_func)(void *, int, size_t) = memset; +#endif + +void mbedtls_platform_zeroize(void *buf, size_t len) +{ + if (len > 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO) + explicit_bzero(buf, len); +#if defined(HAVE_MEMORY_SANITIZER) + /* You'd think that Msan would recognize explicit_bzero() as + * equivalent to bzero(), but it actually doesn't on several + * platforms, including Linux (Ubuntu 20.04). + * https://github.com/google/sanitizers/issues/1507 + * https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/74433a19bb6f4cef607680fa4d1d7d81ca3826aa + */ + __msan_unpoison(buf, len); +#endif +#elif defined(__STDC_LIB_EXT1__) && !defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + memset_s(buf, len, 0, len); +#elif defined(_WIN32) + SecureZeroMemory(buf, len); +#else + memset_func(buf, 0, len); +#endif + +#if defined(__GNUC__) + /* For clang and recent gcc, pretend that we have some assembly that reads the + * zero'd memory as an additional protection against being optimised away. */ +#if defined(__clang__) || (__GNUC__ >= 10) +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang diagnostic push +#pragma clang diagnostic ignored "-Wvla" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) +#pragma GCC diagnostic push +#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wvla" +#endif + asm volatile ("" : : "m" (*(char (*)[len]) buf) :); +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang diagnostic pop +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) +#pragma GCC diagnostic pop +#endif +#endif +#endif + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT */ + +void mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(void *buf, size_t len) +{ + if (buf != NULL) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, len); + } + + mbedtls_free(buf); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) +#include +#if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \ + defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \ + defined(__MACH__)) || defined__midipix__) +#include +#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || + * (__APPLE__ && __MACH__) || __midipix__) */ + +#if !((defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L) || \ + (defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS) && \ + _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L)) +/* + * This is a convenience shorthand macro to avoid checking the long + * preprocessor conditions above. Ideally, we could expose this macro in + * platform_util.h and simply use it in platform_util.c, threading.c and + * threading.h. However, this macro is not part of the Mbed TLS public API, so + * we keep it private by only defining it in this file + */ +#if !(defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)) || \ + (defined(__MINGW32__) && !defined(__MINGW64_VERSION_MAJOR)) +#define PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME +#endif + +#endif /* !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ + ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ + _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L ) ) */ + +struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(const mbedtls_time_t *tt, + struct tm *tm_buf) +{ +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME) +#if defined(__STDC_LIB_EXT1__) + return (gmtime_s(tt, tm_buf) == 0) ? NULL : tm_buf; +#else + /* MSVC and mingw64 argument order and return value are inconsistent with the C11 standard */ + return (gmtime_s(tm_buf, tt) == 0) ? tm_buf : NULL; +#endif +#elif !defined(PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME) + return gmtime_r(tt, tm_buf); +#else + struct tm *lt; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex) != 0) { + return NULL; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + lt = gmtime(tt); + + if (lt != NULL) { + memcpy(tm_buf, lt, sizeof(struct tm)); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex) != 0) { + return NULL; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + return (lt == NULL) ? NULL : tm_buf; +#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +void (*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail)(const char *, int, const char *); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT) + +#include +#if !defined(_WIN32) && \ + (defined(unix) || defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || \ + (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)) || defined(__HAIKU__) || defined(__midipix__)) +#include +#endif \ + /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || (__APPLE__ && __MACH__) || __HAIKU__ || __midipix__) */ +#if (defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 199309L) || defined(__HAIKU__) +mbedtls_ms_time_t mbedtls_ms_time(void) +{ + int ret; + struct timespec tv; + mbedtls_ms_time_t current_ms; + +#if defined(__linux__) && defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME) || defined(__midipix__) + ret = clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &tv); +#else + ret = clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &tv); +#endif + if (ret) { + return time(NULL) * 1000; + } + + current_ms = tv.tv_sec; + + return current_ms*1000 + tv.tv_nsec / 1000000; +} +#elif defined(_WIN32) || defined(WIN32) || defined(__CYGWIN__) || \ + defined(__MINGW32__) || defined(_WIN64) +#include +mbedtls_ms_time_t mbedtls_ms_time(void) +{ + FILETIME ct; + mbedtls_ms_time_t current_ms; + + GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&ct); + current_ms = ((mbedtls_ms_time_t) ct.dwLowDateTime + + ((mbedtls_ms_time_t) (ct.dwHighDateTime) << 32LL))/10000; + return current_ms; +} +#else +#error "No mbedtls_ms_time available" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT */ diff --git a/library/poly1305.c b/library/poly1305.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c9ebe9e1daa --- /dev/null +++ b/library/poly1305.c @@ -0,0 +1,492 @@ +/** + * \file poly1305.c + * + * \brief Poly1305 authentication algorithm. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) + +#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) + +#define POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES (16U) + +/* + * Our implementation is tuned for 32-bit platforms with a 64-bit multiplier. + * However we provided an alternative for platforms without such a multiplier. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION) +static uint64_t mul64(uint32_t a, uint32_t b) +{ + /* a = al + 2**16 ah, b = bl + 2**16 bh */ + const uint16_t al = (uint16_t) a; + const uint16_t bl = (uint16_t) b; + const uint16_t ah = a >> 16; + const uint16_t bh = b >> 16; + + /* ab = al*bl + 2**16 (ah*bl + bl*bh) + 2**32 ah*bh */ + const uint32_t lo = (uint32_t) al * bl; + const uint64_t me = (uint64_t) ((uint32_t) ah * bl) + (uint32_t) al * bh; + const uint32_t hi = (uint32_t) ah * bh; + + return lo + (me << 16) + ((uint64_t) hi << 32); +} +#else +static inline uint64_t mul64(uint32_t a, uint32_t b) +{ + return (uint64_t) a * b; +} +#endif + + +/** + * \brief Process blocks with Poly1305. + * + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context. + * \param nblocks Number of blocks to process. Note that this + * function only processes full blocks. + * \param input Buffer containing the input block(s). + * \param needs_padding Set to 0 if the padding bit has already been + * applied to the input data before calling this + * function. Otherwise, set this parameter to 1. + */ +static void poly1305_process(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + size_t nblocks, + const unsigned char *input, + uint32_t needs_padding) +{ + uint64_t d0, d1, d2, d3; + uint32_t acc0, acc1, acc2, acc3, acc4; + uint32_t r0, r1, r2, r3; + uint32_t rs1, rs2, rs3; + size_t offset = 0U; + size_t i; + + r0 = ctx->r[0]; + r1 = ctx->r[1]; + r2 = ctx->r[2]; + r3 = ctx->r[3]; + + rs1 = r1 + (r1 >> 2U); + rs2 = r2 + (r2 >> 2U); + rs3 = r3 + (r3 >> 2U); + + acc0 = ctx->acc[0]; + acc1 = ctx->acc[1]; + acc2 = ctx->acc[2]; + acc3 = ctx->acc[3]; + acc4 = ctx->acc[4]; + + /* Process full blocks */ + for (i = 0U; i < nblocks; i++) { + /* The input block is treated as a 128-bit little-endian integer */ + d0 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, offset + 0); + d1 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, offset + 4); + d2 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, offset + 8); + d3 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, offset + 12); + + /* Compute: acc += (padded) block as a 130-bit integer */ + d0 += (uint64_t) acc0; + d1 += (uint64_t) acc1 + (d0 >> 32U); + d2 += (uint64_t) acc2 + (d1 >> 32U); + d3 += (uint64_t) acc3 + (d2 >> 32U); + acc0 = (uint32_t) d0; + acc1 = (uint32_t) d1; + acc2 = (uint32_t) d2; + acc3 = (uint32_t) d3; + acc4 += (uint32_t) (d3 >> 32U) + needs_padding; + + /* Compute: acc *= r */ + d0 = mul64(acc0, r0) + + mul64(acc1, rs3) + + mul64(acc2, rs2) + + mul64(acc3, rs1); + d1 = mul64(acc0, r1) + + mul64(acc1, r0) + + mul64(acc2, rs3) + + mul64(acc3, rs2) + + mul64(acc4, rs1); + d2 = mul64(acc0, r2) + + mul64(acc1, r1) + + mul64(acc2, r0) + + mul64(acc3, rs3) + + mul64(acc4, rs2); + d3 = mul64(acc0, r3) + + mul64(acc1, r2) + + mul64(acc2, r1) + + mul64(acc3, r0) + + mul64(acc4, rs3); + acc4 *= r0; + + /* Compute: acc %= (2^130 - 5) (partial remainder) */ + d1 += (d0 >> 32); + d2 += (d1 >> 32); + d3 += (d2 >> 32); + acc0 = (uint32_t) d0; + acc1 = (uint32_t) d1; + acc2 = (uint32_t) d2; + acc3 = (uint32_t) d3; + acc4 = (uint32_t) (d3 >> 32) + acc4; + + d0 = (uint64_t) acc0 + (acc4 >> 2) + (acc4 & 0xFFFFFFFCU); + acc4 &= 3U; + acc0 = (uint32_t) d0; + d0 = (uint64_t) acc1 + (d0 >> 32U); + acc1 = (uint32_t) d0; + d0 = (uint64_t) acc2 + (d0 >> 32U); + acc2 = (uint32_t) d0; + d0 = (uint64_t) acc3 + (d0 >> 32U); + acc3 = (uint32_t) d0; + d0 = (uint64_t) acc4 + (d0 >> 32U); + acc4 = (uint32_t) d0; + + offset += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + } + + ctx->acc[0] = acc0; + ctx->acc[1] = acc1; + ctx->acc[2] = acc2; + ctx->acc[3] = acc3; + ctx->acc[4] = acc4; +} + +/** + * \brief Compute the Poly1305 MAC + * + * \param ctx The Poly1305 context. + * \param mac The buffer to where the MAC is written. Must be + * big enough to contain the 16-byte MAC. + */ +static void poly1305_compute_mac(const mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + unsigned char mac[16]) +{ + uint64_t d; + uint32_t g0, g1, g2, g3, g4; + uint32_t acc0, acc1, acc2, acc3, acc4; + uint32_t mask; + uint32_t mask_inv; + + acc0 = ctx->acc[0]; + acc1 = ctx->acc[1]; + acc2 = ctx->acc[2]; + acc3 = ctx->acc[3]; + acc4 = ctx->acc[4]; + + /* Before adding 's' we ensure that the accumulator is mod 2^130 - 5. + * We do this by calculating acc - (2^130 - 5), then checking if + * the 131st bit is set. If it is, then reduce: acc -= (2^130 - 5) + */ + + /* Calculate acc + -(2^130 - 5) */ + d = ((uint64_t) acc0 + 5U); + g0 = (uint32_t) d; + d = ((uint64_t) acc1 + (d >> 32)); + g1 = (uint32_t) d; + d = ((uint64_t) acc2 + (d >> 32)); + g2 = (uint32_t) d; + d = ((uint64_t) acc3 + (d >> 32)); + g3 = (uint32_t) d; + g4 = acc4 + (uint32_t) (d >> 32U); + + /* mask == 0xFFFFFFFF if 131st bit is set, otherwise mask == 0 */ + mask = (uint32_t) 0U - (g4 >> 2U); + mask_inv = ~mask; + + /* If 131st bit is set then acc=g, otherwise, acc is unmodified */ + acc0 = (acc0 & mask_inv) | (g0 & mask); + acc1 = (acc1 & mask_inv) | (g1 & mask); + acc2 = (acc2 & mask_inv) | (g2 & mask); + acc3 = (acc3 & mask_inv) | (g3 & mask); + + /* Add 's' */ + d = (uint64_t) acc0 + ctx->s[0]; + acc0 = (uint32_t) d; + d = (uint64_t) acc1 + ctx->s[1] + (d >> 32U); + acc1 = (uint32_t) d; + d = (uint64_t) acc2 + ctx->s[2] + (d >> 32U); + acc2 = (uint32_t) d; + acc3 += ctx->s[3] + (uint32_t) (d >> 32U); + + /* Compute MAC (128 least significant bits of the accumulator) */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(acc0, mac, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(acc1, mac, 4); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(acc2, mac, 8); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(acc3, mac, 12); +} + +void mbedtls_poly1305_init(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_poly1305_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_poly1305_free(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_poly1305_context)); +} + +int mbedtls_poly1305_starts(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + const unsigned char key[32]) +{ + /* r &= 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */ + ctx->r[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 0) & 0x0FFFFFFFU; + ctx->r[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 4) & 0x0FFFFFFCU; + ctx->r[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 8) & 0x0FFFFFFCU; + ctx->r[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 12) & 0x0FFFFFFCU; + + ctx->s[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 16); + ctx->s[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 20); + ctx->s[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 24); + ctx->s[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 28); + + /* Initial accumulator state */ + ctx->acc[0] = 0U; + ctx->acc[1] = 0U; + ctx->acc[2] = 0U; + ctx->acc[3] = 0U; + ctx->acc[4] = 0U; + + /* Queue initially empty */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->queue, sizeof(ctx->queue)); + ctx->queue_len = 0U; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_poly1305_update(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen) +{ + size_t offset = 0U; + size_t remaining = ilen; + size_t queue_free_len; + size_t nblocks; + + if ((remaining > 0U) && (ctx->queue_len > 0U)) { + queue_free_len = (POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES - ctx->queue_len); + + if (ilen < queue_free_len) { + /* Not enough data to complete the block. + * Store this data with the other leftovers. + */ + memcpy(&ctx->queue[ctx->queue_len], + input, + ilen); + + ctx->queue_len += ilen; + + remaining = 0U; + } else { + /* Enough data to produce a complete block */ + memcpy(&ctx->queue[ctx->queue_len], + input, + queue_free_len); + + ctx->queue_len = 0U; + + poly1305_process(ctx, 1U, ctx->queue, 1U); /* add padding bit */ + + offset += queue_free_len; + remaining -= queue_free_len; + } + } + + if (remaining >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES) { + nblocks = remaining / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + + poly1305_process(ctx, nblocks, &input[offset], 1U); + + offset += nblocks * POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + remaining %= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES; + } + + if (remaining > 0U) { + /* Store partial block */ + ctx->queue_len = remaining; + memcpy(ctx->queue, &input[offset], remaining); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_poly1305_finish(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx, + unsigned char mac[16]) +{ + /* Process any leftover data */ + if (ctx->queue_len > 0U) { + /* Add padding bit */ + ctx->queue[ctx->queue_len] = 1U; + ctx->queue_len++; + + /* Pad with zeroes */ + memset(&ctx->queue[ctx->queue_len], + 0, + POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES - ctx->queue_len); + + poly1305_process(ctx, 1U, /* Process 1 block */ + ctx->queue, 0U); /* Already padded above */ + } + + poly1305_compute_mac(ctx, mac); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_poly1305_mac(const unsigned char key[32], + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char mac[16]) +{ + mbedtls_poly1305_context ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_poly1305_init(&ctx); + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_starts(&ctx, key); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_update(&ctx, input, ilen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_finish(&ctx, mac); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_poly1305_free(&ctx); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +static const unsigned char test_keys[2][32] = +{ + { + 0x85, 0xd6, 0xbe, 0x78, 0x57, 0x55, 0x6d, 0x33, + 0x7f, 0x44, 0x52, 0xfe, 0x42, 0xd5, 0x06, 0xa8, + 0x01, 0x03, 0x80, 0x8a, 0xfb, 0x0d, 0xb2, 0xfd, + 0x4a, 0xbf, 0xf6, 0xaf, 0x41, 0x49, 0xf5, 0x1b + }, + { + 0x1c, 0x92, 0x40, 0xa5, 0xeb, 0x55, 0xd3, 0x8a, + 0xf3, 0x33, 0x88, 0x86, 0x04, 0xf6, 0xb5, 0xf0, + 0x47, 0x39, 0x17, 0xc1, 0x40, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x09, + 0x9d, 0xca, 0x5c, 0xbc, 0x20, 0x70, 0x75, 0xc0 + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_data[2][127] = +{ + { + 0x43, 0x72, 0x79, 0x70, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x67, 0x72, + 0x61, 0x70, 0x68, 0x69, 0x63, 0x20, 0x46, 0x6f, + 0x72, 0x75, 0x6d, 0x20, 0x52, 0x65, 0x73, 0x65, + 0x61, 0x72, 0x63, 0x68, 0x20, 0x47, 0x72, 0x6f, + 0x75, 0x70 + }, + { + 0x27, 0x54, 0x77, 0x61, 0x73, 0x20, 0x62, 0x72, + 0x69, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x67, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x61, + 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, + 0x6c, 0x69, 0x74, 0x68, 0x79, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6f, + 0x76, 0x65, 0x73, 0x0a, 0x44, 0x69, 0x64, 0x20, + 0x67, 0x79, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x64, + 0x20, 0x67, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x62, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x20, + 0x69, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x77, + 0x61, 0x62, 0x65, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x41, 0x6c, 0x6c, + 0x20, 0x6d, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x73, 0x79, 0x20, 0x77, + 0x65, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, + 0x62, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x67, 0x6f, 0x76, 0x65, + 0x73, 0x2c, 0x0a, 0x41, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, + 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x20, + 0x72, 0x61, 0x74, 0x68, 0x73, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x75, + 0x74, 0x67, 0x72, 0x61, 0x62, 0x65, 0x2e + } +}; + +static const size_t test_data_len[2] = +{ + 34U, + 127U +}; + +static const unsigned char test_mac[2][16] = +{ + { + 0xa8, 0x06, 0x1d, 0xc1, 0x30, 0x51, 0x36, 0xc6, + 0xc2, 0x2b, 0x8b, 0xaf, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x27, 0xa9 + }, + { + 0x45, 0x41, 0x66, 0x9a, 0x7e, 0xaa, 0xee, 0x61, + 0xe7, 0x08, 0xdc, 0x7c, 0xbc, 0xc5, 0xeb, 0x62 + } +}; + +/* Make sure no other definition is already present. */ +#undef ASSERT + +#define ASSERT(cond, args) \ + do \ + { \ + if (!(cond)) \ + { \ + if (verbose != 0) \ + mbedtls_printf args; \ + \ + return -1; \ + } \ + } \ + while (0) + +int mbedtls_poly1305_self_test(int verbose) +{ + unsigned char mac[16]; + unsigned i; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + for (i = 0U; i < 2U; i++) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" Poly1305 test %u ", i); + } + + ret = mbedtls_poly1305_mac(test_keys[i], + test_data[i], + test_data_len[i], + mac); + ASSERT(0 == ret, ("error code: %i\n", ret)); + + ASSERT(0 == memcmp(mac, test_mac[i], 16U), ("failed (mac)\n")); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..969c695ac09 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -0,0 +1,9166 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core_common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) +#include "check_crypto_config.h" +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_values.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_invasive.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ffdh.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif +#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" +/* Include internal declarations that are useful for implementing persistently + * stored keys. */ +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" + +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/aes.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "mbedtls/camellia.h" +#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h" +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#include "mbedtls/cmac.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include "mbedtls/des.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h" +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "pk_wrap.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) +#define BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF 1 +#endif + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Global data, support functions and library management */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static int key_type_is_raw_bytes(psa_key_type_t type) +{ + return PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(type); +} + +/* Values for psa_global_data_t::rng_state */ +#define RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED 0 +#define RNG_INITIALIZED 1 +#define RNG_SEEDED 2 + +/* IDs for PSA crypto subsystems. Starts at 1 to catch potential uninitialized + * variables as arguments. */ +typedef enum { + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS = 1, + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS, + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_RNG, + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION, +} mbedtls_psa_crypto_subsystem; + +/* Initialization flags for global_data::initialized */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED 0x01 +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED 0x02 +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED 0x04 + +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_ALL_INITIALISED ( \ + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED | \ + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED | \ + PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED) + +typedef struct { + uint8_t initialized; + uint8_t rng_state; + mbedtls_psa_random_context_t rng; +} psa_global_data_t; + +static psa_global_data_t global_data; + +static uint8_t psa_get_initialized(void) +{ + uint8_t initialized; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + initialized = global_data.rng_state == RNG_SEEDED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + initialized = + (initialized && (global_data.initialized == PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_ALL_INITIALISED)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + return initialized; +} + +static uint8_t psa_get_drivers_initialized(void) +{ + uint8_t initialized; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + initialized = (global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED) != 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + return initialized; +} + +#define GUARD_MODULE_INITIALIZED \ + if (psa_get_initialized() == 0) \ + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) + +/* Declare a local copy of an input buffer and a variable that will be used + * to store a pointer to the start of the buffer. + * + * Note: This macro must be called before any operations which may jump to + * the exit label, so that the local input copy object is safe to be freed. + * + * Assumptions: + * - input is the name of a pointer to the buffer to be copied + * - The name LOCAL_INPUT_COPY_OF_input is unused in the current scope + * - input_copy_name is a name that is unused in the current scope + */ +#define LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input, input_copy_name) \ + psa_crypto_local_input_t LOCAL_INPUT_COPY_OF_##input = PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_INPUT_INIT; \ + const uint8_t *input_copy_name = NULL; + +/* Allocate a copy of the buffer input and set the pointer input_copy to + * point to the start of the copy. + * + * Assumptions: + * - psa_status_t status exists + * - An exit label is declared + * - input is the name of a pointer to the buffer to be copied + * - LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input, input_copy) has previously been called + */ +#define LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input, length, input_copy) \ + status = psa_crypto_local_input_alloc(input, length, \ + &LOCAL_INPUT_COPY_OF_##input); \ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + input_copy = LOCAL_INPUT_COPY_OF_##input.buffer; + +/* Free the local input copy allocated previously by LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC() + * + * Assumptions: + * - input_copy is the name of the input copy pointer set by LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC() + * - input is the name of the original buffer that was copied + */ +#define LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input, input_copy) \ + input_copy = NULL; \ + psa_crypto_local_input_free(&LOCAL_INPUT_COPY_OF_##input); + +/* Declare a local copy of an output buffer and a variable that will be used + * to store a pointer to the start of the buffer. + * + * Note: This macro must be called before any operations which may jump to + * the exit label, so that the local output copy object is safe to be freed. + * + * Assumptions: + * - output is the name of a pointer to the buffer to be copied + * - The name LOCAL_OUTPUT_COPY_OF_output is unused in the current scope + * - output_copy_name is a name that is unused in the current scope + */ +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output, output_copy_name) \ + psa_crypto_local_output_t LOCAL_OUTPUT_COPY_OF_##output = PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_OUTPUT_INIT; \ + uint8_t *output_copy_name = NULL; + +/* Allocate a copy of the buffer output and set the pointer output_copy to + * point to the start of the copy. + * + * Assumptions: + * - psa_status_t status exists + * - An exit label is declared + * - output is the name of a pointer to the buffer to be copied + * - LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output, output_copy) has previously been called + */ +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output, length, output_copy) \ + status = psa_crypto_local_output_alloc(output, length, \ + &LOCAL_OUTPUT_COPY_OF_##output); \ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + output_copy = LOCAL_OUTPUT_COPY_OF_##output.buffer; + +/* Free the local output copy allocated previously by LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC() + * after first copying back its contents to the original buffer. + * + * Assumptions: + * - psa_status_t status exists + * - output_copy is the name of the output copy pointer set by LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC() + * - output is the name of the original buffer that was copied + */ +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output, output_copy) \ + output_copy = NULL; \ + do { \ + psa_status_t local_output_status; \ + local_output_status = psa_crypto_local_output_free(&LOCAL_OUTPUT_COPY_OF_##output); \ + if (local_output_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + /* Since this error case is an internal error, it's more serious than \ + * any existing error code and so it's fine to overwrite the existing \ + * status. */ \ + status = local_output_status; \ + } \ + } while (0) +#else /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS */ +#define LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input, input_copy_name) \ + const uint8_t *input_copy_name = NULL; +#define LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input, length, input_copy) \ + input_copy = input; +#define LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input, input_copy) \ + input_copy = NULL; +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output, output_copy_name) \ + uint8_t *output_copy_name = NULL; +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output, length, output_copy) \ + output_copy = output; +#define LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output, output_copy) \ + output_copy = NULL; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS */ + + +int psa_can_do_hash(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg) +{ + (void) hash_alg; + return psa_get_drivers_initialized(); +} + +int psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type_t key_type, psa_algorithm_t cipher_alg) +{ + (void) key_type; + (void) cipher_alg; + return psa_get_drivers_initialized(); +} + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +static int psa_is_dh_key_size_valid(size_t bits) +{ + switch (bits) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) + case 2048: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) + case 3072: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) + case 4096: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) + case 6144: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) + case 8192: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY || + PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error(int ret) +{ + /* Mbed TLS error codes can combine a high-level error code and a + * low-level error code. The low-level error usually reflects the + * root cause better, so dispatch on that preferably. */ + int low_level_ret = -(-ret & 0x007f); + switch (low_level_ret != 0 ? low_level_ret : ret) { + case 0: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL: + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE: + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT: + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif + +#if !(defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE)) + /* Only check CTR_DRBG error codes if underlying mbedtls_xxx + * functions are passed a CTR_DRBG instance. */ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) + /* Only check HMAC_DRBG error codes if underlying mbedtls_xxx + * functions are passed a HMAC_DRBG instance. */ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR: + return PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE: + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS: + return PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE; +#endif +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + default: + return PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + } +} + +/** + * \brief For output buffers which contain "tags" + * (outputs that may be checked for validity like + * hashes, MACs and signatures), fill the unused + * part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on + * error, the trailing part on success) with + * something that isn't a valid tag (barring an + * attack on the tag and deliberately-crafted + * input), in case the caller doesn't check the + * return status properly. + * + * \param output_buffer Pointer to buffer to wipe. May not be NULL + * unless \p output_buffer_size is zero. + * \param status Status of function called to generate + * output_buffer originally + * \param output_buffer_size Size of output buffer. If zero, \p output_buffer + * could be NULL. + * \param output_buffer_length Length of data written to output_buffer, must be + * less than \p output_buffer_size + */ +static void psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(uint8_t *output_buffer, psa_status_t status, + size_t output_buffer_size, size_t output_buffer_length) +{ + size_t offset = 0; + + if (output_buffer_size == 0) { + /* If output_buffer_size is 0 then we have nothing to do. We must not + call memset because output_buffer may be NULL in this case */ + return; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + offset = output_buffer_length; + } + + memset(output_buffer + offset, '!', output_buffer_size - offset); +} + + +psa_status_t psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size(psa_key_type_t type, + size_t bits) +{ + /* Check that the bit size is acceptable for the key type */ + switch (type) { + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD: + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH: + break; +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES: + if (bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA: + if (bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA: + if (bits != 128 && bits != 192 && bits != 256) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES: + if (bits != 64 && bits != 128 && bits != 192) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20: + if (bits != 256) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif + default: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + if (bits % 8 != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Check whether a given key type is valid for use with a given MAC algorithm + * + * Upon successful return of this function, the behavior of #PSA_MAC_LENGTH + * when called with the validated \p algorithm and \p key_type is well-defined. + * + * \param[in] algorithm The specific MAC algorithm (can be wildcard). + * \param[in] key_type The key type of the key to be used with the + * \p algorithm. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The \p key_type is valid for use with the \p algorithm + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The \p key_type is not valid for use with the \p algorithm + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE psa_status_t psa_mac_key_can_do( + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_key_type_t key_type) +{ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(algorithm)) { + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + } + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(algorithm)) { + /* Check that we're calling PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH with a cipher + * key. */ + if ((key_type & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == + PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC) { + /* PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH returns 1 for stream ciphers and + * the block length (larger than 1) for block ciphers. */ + if (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) > 1) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + } + } + + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +} + +psa_status_t psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t buffer_length) +{ + if (slot->key.data != NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS; + } + + slot->key.data = mbedtls_calloc(1, buffer_length); + if (slot->key.data == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + slot->key.bytes = buffer_length; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_copy_key_material_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(slot, + data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + memcpy(slot->key.data, data, data_length); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->type; + + /* zero-length keys are never supported. */ + if (data_length == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (key_type_is_raw_bytes(type)) { + *bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(data_length); + + status = psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size(attributes->type, + *bits); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* Copy the key material. */ + memcpy(key_buffer, data, data_length); + *key_buffer_length = data_length; + (void) key_buffer_size; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type)) { + if (psa_is_dh_key_size_valid(PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(data_length)) == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + return mbedtls_psa_ffdh_import_key(attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type)) { + return mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key(attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) { + return mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key(attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits); + } +#endif /* (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + } + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +/** Calculate the intersection of two algorithm usage policies. + * + * Return 0 (which allows no operation) on incompatibility. + */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection( + psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_algorithm_t alg1, + psa_algorithm_t alg2) +{ + /* Common case: both sides actually specify the same policy. */ + if (alg1 == alg2) { + return alg1; + } + /* If the policies are from the same hash-and-sign family, check + * if one is a wildcard. If so the other has the specific algorithm. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg1) && + PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg2) && + (alg1 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == (alg2 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) { + if (PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg1) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) { + return alg2; + } + if (PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg2) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) { + return alg1; + } + } + /* If the policies are from the same AEAD family, check whether + * one of them is a minimum-tag-length wildcard. Calculate the most + * restrictive tag length. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg1) && PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg2) && + (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(alg1, 0) == + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(alg2, 0))) { + size_t alg1_len = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg1); + size_t alg2_len = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg2); + size_t restricted_len = alg1_len > alg2_len ? alg1_len : alg2_len; + + /* If both are wildcards, return most restrictive wildcard */ + if (((alg1 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0) && + ((alg2 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0)) { + return PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG( + alg1, restricted_len); + } + /* If only one is a wildcard, return specific algorithm if compatible. */ + if (((alg1 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0) && + (alg1_len <= alg2_len)) { + return alg2; + } + if (((alg2 & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0) && + (alg2_len <= alg1_len)) { + return alg1; + } + } + /* If the policies are from the same MAC family, check whether one + * of them is a minimum-MAC-length policy. Calculate the most + * restrictive tag length. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg1) && PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg2) && + (PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(alg1) == + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(alg2))) { + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm. Since the base + * algorithm of alg1 and alg2 are the same, we only need this once. */ + if (PSA_SUCCESS != psa_mac_key_can_do(alg1, key_type)) { + return 0; + } + + /* Get the (exact or at-least) output lengths for both sides of the + * requested intersection. None of the currently supported algorithms + * have an output length dependent on the actual key size, so setting it + * to a bogus value of 0 is currently OK. + * + * Note that for at-least-this-length wildcard algorithms, the output + * length is set to the shortest allowed length, which allows us to + * calculate the most restrictive tag length for the intersection. */ + size_t alg1_len = PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, 0, alg1); + size_t alg2_len = PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, 0, alg2); + size_t restricted_len = alg1_len > alg2_len ? alg1_len : alg2_len; + + /* If both are wildcards, return most restrictive wildcard */ + if (((alg1 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0) && + ((alg2 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0)) { + return PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(alg1, restricted_len); + } + + /* If only one is an at-least-this-length policy, the intersection would + * be the other (fixed-length) policy as long as said fixed length is + * equal to or larger than the shortest allowed length. */ + if ((alg1 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0) { + return (alg1_len <= alg2_len) ? alg2 : 0; + } + if ((alg2 & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0) { + return (alg2_len <= alg1_len) ? alg1 : 0; + } + + /* If none of them are wildcards, check whether they define the same tag + * length. This is still possible here when one is default-length and + * the other specific-length. Ensure to always return the + * specific-length version for the intersection. */ + if (alg1_len == alg2_len) { + return PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(alg1, alg1_len); + } + } + /* If the policies are incompatible, allow nothing. */ + return 0; +} + +static int psa_key_algorithm_permits(psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_algorithm_t policy_alg, + psa_algorithm_t requested_alg) +{ + /* Common case: the policy only allows requested_alg. */ + if (requested_alg == policy_alg) { + return 1; + } + /* If policy_alg is a hash-and-sign with a wildcard for the hash, + * and requested_alg is the same hash-and-sign family with any hash, + * then requested_alg is compliant with policy_alg. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(requested_alg) && + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(policy_alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) { + return (policy_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == + (requested_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK); + } + /* If policy_alg is a wildcard AEAD algorithm of the same base as + * the requested algorithm, check the requested tag length to be + * equal-length or longer than the wildcard-specified length. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(policy_alg) && + PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(requested_alg) && + (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(policy_alg, 0) == + PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(requested_alg, 0)) && + ((policy_alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0)) { + return PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(policy_alg) <= + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(requested_alg); + } + /* If policy_alg is a MAC algorithm of the same base as the requested + * algorithm, check whether their MAC lengths are compatible. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(policy_alg) && + PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(requested_alg) && + (PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(policy_alg) == + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(requested_alg))) { + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm. Since the policy + * and requested algorithms are the same, we only need this once. */ + if (PSA_SUCCESS != psa_mac_key_can_do(policy_alg, key_type)) { + return 0; + } + + /* Get both the requested output length for the algorithm which is to be + * verified, and the default output length for the base algorithm. + * Note that none of the currently supported algorithms have an output + * length dependent on actual key size, so setting it to a bogus value + * of 0 is currently OK. */ + size_t requested_output_length = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( + key_type, 0, requested_alg); + size_t default_output_length = PSA_MAC_LENGTH( + key_type, 0, + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(requested_alg)); + + /* If the policy is default-length, only allow an algorithm with + * a declared exact-length matching the default. */ + if (PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(policy_alg) == 0) { + return requested_output_length == default_output_length; + } + + /* If the requested algorithm is default-length, allow it if the policy + * length exactly matches the default length. */ + if (PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(requested_alg) == 0 && + PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(policy_alg) == default_output_length) { + return 1; + } + + /* If policy_alg is an at-least-this-length wildcard MAC algorithm, + * check for the requested MAC length to be equal to or longer than the + * minimum allowed length. */ + if ((policy_alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0) { + return PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(policy_alg) <= + requested_output_length; + } + } + /* If policy_alg is a generic key agreement operation, then using it for + * a key derivation with that key agreement should also be allowed. This + * behaviour is expected to be defined in a future specification version. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(policy_alg) && + PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(requested_alg)) { + return PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(requested_alg) == + policy_alg; + } + /* If it isn't explicitly permitted, it's forbidden. */ + return 0; +} + +/** Test whether a policy permits an algorithm. + * + * The caller must test usage flags separately. + * + * \note This function requires providing the key type for which the policy is + * being validated, since some algorithm policy definitions (e.g. MAC) + * have different properties depending on what kind of cipher it is + * combined with. + * + * \retval PSA_SUCCESS When \p alg is a specific algorithm + * allowed by the \p policy. + * \retval PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT When \p alg is not a specific algorithm + * \retval PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED When \p alg is a specific algorithm, but + * the \p policy does not allow it. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_policy_permits(const psa_key_policy_t *policy, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + /* '0' is not a valid algorithm */ + if (alg == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + /* A requested algorithm cannot be a wildcard. */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (psa_key_algorithm_permits(key_type, policy->alg, alg) || + psa_key_algorithm_permits(key_type, policy->alg2, alg)) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + } +} + +/** Restrict a key policy based on a constraint. + * + * \note This function requires providing the key type for which the policy is + * being restricted, since some algorithm policy definitions (e.g. MAC) + * have different properties depending on what kind of cipher it is + * combined with. + * + * \param[in] key_type The key type for which to restrict the policy + * \param[in,out] policy The policy to restrict. + * \param[in] constraint The policy constraint to apply. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \c *policy contains the intersection of the original value of + * \c *policy and \c *constraint. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \c key_type, \c *policy and \c *constraint are incompatible. + * \c *policy is unchanged. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_restrict_key_policy( + psa_key_type_t key_type, + psa_key_policy_t *policy, + const psa_key_policy_t *constraint) +{ + psa_algorithm_t intersection_alg = + psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection(key_type, policy->alg, + constraint->alg); + psa_algorithm_t intersection_alg2 = + psa_key_policy_algorithm_intersection(key_type, policy->alg2, + constraint->alg2); + if (intersection_alg == 0 && policy->alg != 0 && constraint->alg != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if (intersection_alg2 == 0 && policy->alg2 != 0 && constraint->alg2 != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + policy->usage &= constraint->usage; + policy->alg = intersection_alg; + policy->alg2 = intersection_alg2; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and policy constraints + * and lock it. + * + * The key must have allow all the usage flags set in \p usage. If \p alg is + * nonzero, the key must allow operations with this algorithm. If \p alg is + * zero, the algorithm is not checked. + * + * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key + * into a key slot if not already done. + * + * On success, the returned key slot has been registered for reading. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to then unregister + * once they have finished reading the contents of the slot. + * The caller unregisters by calling psa_unregister_read() or + * psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(). psa_unregister_read() must be called + * if and only if the caller already holds the global key slot mutex + * (when mutexes are enabled). psa_unregister_read_under_mutex() encapsulates + * the unregister with mutex lock and unlock operations. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(key, p_slot); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + slot = *p_slot; + + /* Enforce that usage policy for the key slot contains all the flags + * required by the usage parameter. There is one exception: public + * keys can always be exported, so we treat public key objects as + * if they had the export flag. */ + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(slot->attr.type)) { + usage &= ~PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT; + } + + if ((slot->attr.policy.usage & usage) != usage) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + goto error; + } + + /* Enforce that the usage policy permits the requested algorithm. */ + if (alg != 0) { + status = psa_key_policy_permits(&slot->attr.policy, + slot->attr.type, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +error: + *p_slot = NULL; + psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return status; +} + +/** Get a key slot containing a transparent key and lock it. + * + * A transparent key is a key for which the key material is directly + * available, as opposed to a key in a secure element and/or to be used + * by a secure element. + * + * This is a temporary function that may be used instead of + * psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy() when there is no opaque key support + * for a cryptographic operation. + * + * On success, the returned key slot has been registered for reading. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to then unregister + * once they have finished reading the contents of the slot. + * The caller unregisters by calling psa_unregister_read() or + * psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(). psa_unregister_read() must be called + * if and only if the caller already holds the global key slot mutex + * (when mutexes are enabled). psa_unregister_read_under_mutex() encapsulates + * psa_unregister_read() with mutex lock and unlock operations. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, p_slot, + usage, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (psa_key_lifetime_is_external((*p_slot)->attr.lifetime)) { + psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(*p_slot); + *p_slot = NULL; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + if (slot->key.data != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes); + } + + slot->key.data = NULL; + slot->key.bytes = 0; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy. + * Persistent storage is not affected. */ +psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(slot); + + /* + * As the return error code may not be handled in case of multiple errors, + * do our best to report an unexpected amount of registered readers or + * an unexpected state. + * Assert with MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that the slot is valid for + * wiping. + * if the MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS configuration option is enabled and the + * function is called as part of the execution of a test suite, the + * execution of the test suite is stopped in error if the assertion fails. + */ + switch (slot->state) { + case PSA_SLOT_FULL: + /* In this state psa_wipe_key_slot() must only be called if the + * caller is the last reader. */ + case PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION: + /* In this state psa_wipe_key_slot() must only be called if the + * caller is the last reader. */ + if (slot->registered_readers != 1) { + MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->registered_readers == 1); + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + break; + case PSA_SLOT_FILLING: + /* In this state registered_readers must be 0. */ + if (slot->registered_readers != 0) { + MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->registered_readers == 0); + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + break; + case PSA_SLOT_EMPTY: + /* The slot is already empty, it cannot be wiped. */ + MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->state != PSA_SLOT_EMPTY); + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + break; + default: + /* The slot's state is invalid. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + /* Multipart operations may still be using the key. This is safe + * because all multipart operation objects are independent from + * the key slot: if they need to access the key after the setup + * phase, they have a copy of the key. Note that this means that + * key material can linger until all operations are completed. */ + /* At this point, key material and other type-specific content has + * been wiped. Clear remaining metadata. We can call memset and not + * zeroize because the metadata is not particularly sensitive. + * This memset also sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. */ + memset(slot, 0, sizeof(*slot)); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +{ + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + psa_status_t status; /* status of the last operation */ + psa_status_t overall_status = PSA_SUCCESS; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(key)) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + /* + * Get the description of the key in a key slot, and register to read it. + * In the case of a persistent key, this will load the key description + * from persistent memory if not done yet. + * We cannot avoid this loading as without it we don't know if + * the key is operated by an SE or not and this information is needed by + * the current implementation. */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(key, &slot); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We cannot unlock between setting the state to PENDING_DELETION + * and destroying the key in storage, as otherwise another thread + * could load the key into a new slot and the key will not be + * fully destroyed. */ + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); + + if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION) { + /* Another thread has destroyed the key between us locking the slot + * and us gaining the mutex. Unregister from the slot, + * and report that the key does not exist. */ + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); + + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE : status; + } +#endif + /* Set the key slot containing the key description's state to + * PENDING_DELETION. This stops new operations from registering + * to read the slot. Current readers can safely continue to access + * the key within the slot; the last registered reader will + * automatically wipe the slot when they call psa_unregister_read(). + * If the key is persistent, we can now delete the copy of the key + * from memory. If the key is opaque, we require the driver to + * deal with the deletion. */ + overall_status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FULL, + PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION); + + if (overall_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(slot->attr.lifetime)) { + /* Refuse the destruction of a read-only key (which may or may not work + * if we attempt it, depending on whether the key is merely read-only + * by policy or actually physically read-only). + * Just do the best we can, which is to wipe the copy in memory + * (done in this function's cleanup code). */ + overall_status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + driver = psa_get_se_driver_entry(slot->attr.lifetime); + if (driver != NULL) { + /* For a key in a secure element, we need to do three things: + * remove the key file in internal storage, destroy the + * key inside the secure element, and update the driver's + * persistent data. Start a transaction that will encompass these + * three actions. */ + psa_crypto_prepare_transaction(PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY); + psa_crypto_transaction.key.lifetime = slot->attr.lifetime; + psa_crypto_transaction.key.slot = psa_key_slot_get_slot_number(slot); + psa_crypto_transaction.key.id = slot->attr.id; + status = psa_crypto_save_transaction(); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); + /* We should still try to destroy the key in the secure + * element and the key metadata in storage. This is especially + * important if the error is that the storage is full. + * But how to do it exactly without risking an inconsistent + * state after a reset? + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/215 + */ + overall_status = status; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_destroy_se_key(driver, + psa_key_slot_get_slot_number(slot)); + if (overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + overall_status = status; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) { + /* Destroy the copy of the persistent key from storage. + * The slot will still hold a copy of the key until the last reader + * unregisters. */ + status = psa_destroy_persistent_key(slot->attr.id); + if (overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + overall_status = status; + } + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if (driver != NULL) { + status = psa_save_se_persistent_data(driver); + if (overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + overall_status = status; + } + status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); + if (overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + overall_status = status; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +exit: + /* Unregister from reading the slot. If we are the last active reader + * then this will wipe the slot. */ + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); + /* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from unregistering over + * a storage error. */ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + overall_status = status; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Don't overwrite existing errors if the unlock fails. */ + status = overall_status; + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + + return overall_status; +} + +/** Retrieve all the publicly-accessible attributes of a key. + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + psa_reset_key_attributes(attributes); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, 0, 0); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + *attributes = slot->attr; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if (psa_get_se_driver_entry(slot->attr.lifetime) != NULL) { + psa_set_key_slot_number(attributes, + psa_key_slot_get_slot_number(slot)); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + return psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +psa_status_t psa_get_key_slot_number( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number) +{ + if (attributes->has_slot_number) { + *slot_number = attributes->slot_number; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +static psa_status_t psa_export_key_buffer_internal(const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length) +{ + if (key_buffer_size > data_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + memcpy(data, key_buffer, key_buffer_size); + memset(data + key_buffer_size, 0, + data_size - key_buffer_size); + *data_length = key_buffer_size; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->type; + + if (key_type_is_raw_bytes(type) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type)) { + return psa_export_key_buffer_internal( + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length); + } else { + /* This shouldn't happen in the reference implementation, but + it is valid for a special-purpose implementation to omit + support for exporting certain key types. */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data_external, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(data_external, data); + + /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a + * valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid + * pointer and we can do things like memset(data, ..., data_size). */ + if (data_size == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* Set the key to empty now, so that even when there are errors, we always + * set data_length to a value between 0 and data_size. On error, setting + * the key to empty is a good choice because an empty key representation is + * unlikely to be accepted anywhere. */ + *data_length = 0; + + /* Export requires the EXPORT flag. There is an exception for public keys, + * which don't require any flag, but + * psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy() takes care of this. + */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, 0); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(data_external, data_size, data); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_key(&slot->attr, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + data, data_size, data_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(data_external, data); + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->type; + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) && + (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) || PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type))) { + /* Exporting public -> public */ + return psa_export_key_buffer_internal( + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, data_length); + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + return mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key(attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length); +#else + /* We don't know how to convert a private RSA key to public. */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + return mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key(attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length); +#else + /* We don't know how to convert a private ECC key to public */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) + return mbedtls_psa_ffdh_export_public_key(attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, data_size, + data_length); +#else + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + } else { + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) data; + (void) data_size; + (void) data_length; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + uint8_t *data_external, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(data_external, data); + + /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a + * valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid + * pointer and we can do things like memset(data, ..., data_size). */ + if (data_size == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* Set the key to empty now, so that even when there are errors, we always + * set data_length to a value between 0 and data_size. On error, setting + * the key to empty is a good choice because an empty key representation is + * unlikely to be accepted anywhere. */ + *data_length = 0; + + /* Exporting a public key doesn't require a usage flag. */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, 0, 0); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(data_external, data_size, data); + + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(slot->attr.type)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + data, data_size, data_length); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(data_external, data); + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +/** Validate that a key policy is internally well-formed. + * + * This function only rejects invalid policies. It does not validate the + * consistency of the policy with respect to other attributes of the key + * such as the key type. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_policy(const psa_key_policy_t *policy) +{ + if ((policy->usage & ~(PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE)) != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Validate the internal consistency of key attributes. + * + * This function only rejects invalid attribute values. If does not + * validate the consistency of the attributes with any key data that may + * be involved in the creation of the key. + * + * Call this function early in the key creation process. + * + * \param[in] attributes Key attributes for the new key. + * \param[out] p_drv On any return, the driver for the key, if any. + * NULL for a transparent key. + * + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_attributes( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = psa_get_key_id(attributes); + + status = psa_validate_key_location(lifetime, p_drv); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_validate_key_persistence(lifetime); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime)) { + if (MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(key) != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } else { + if (!psa_is_valid_key_id(psa_get_key_id(attributes), 0)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } + + status = psa_validate_key_policy(&attributes->policy); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* Refuse to create overly large keys. + * Note that this doesn't trigger on import if the attributes don't + * explicitly specify a size (so psa_get_key_bits returns 0), so + * psa_import_key() needs its own checks. */ + if (psa_get_key_bits(attributes) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Prepare a key slot to receive key material. + * + * This function allocates a key slot and sets its metadata. + * + * If this function fails, call psa_fail_key_creation(). + * + * This function is intended to be used as follows: + * -# Call psa_start_key_creation() to allocate a key slot, prepare + * it with the specified attributes, and in case of a volatile key assign it + * a volatile key identifier. + * -# Populate the slot with the key material. + * -# Call psa_finish_key_creation() to finalize the creation of the slot. + * In case of failure at any step, stop the sequence and call + * psa_fail_key_creation(). + * + * On success, the key slot's state is PSA_SLOT_FILLING. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to change the slot's state to + * PSA_SLOT_EMPTY/FULL once key creation has finished. + * + * \param method An identification of the calling function. + * \param[in] attributes Key attributes for the new key. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, a pointer to the prepared slot. + * \param[out] p_drv On any return, the driver for the key, if any. + * NULL for a transparent key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key slot is ready to receive key material. + * \return If this function fails, the key slot is an invalid state. + * You must call psa_fail_key_creation() to wipe and free the slot. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation( + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + (void) method; + *p_drv = NULL; + + status = psa_validate_key_attributes(attributes, p_drv); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + status = psa_reserve_free_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + slot = *p_slot; + + /* We're storing the declared bit-size of the key. It's up to each + * creation mechanism to verify that this information is correct. + * It's automatically correct for mechanisms that use the bit-size as + * an input (generate, device) but not for those where the bit-size + * is optional (import, copy). In case of a volatile key, assign it the + * volatile key identifier associated to the slot returned to contain its + * definition. */ + + slot->attr = *attributes; + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + slot->attr.id = volatile_key_id; +#else + slot->attr.id.key_id = volatile_key_id; +#endif + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* For a key in a secure element, we need to do three things + * when creating or registering a persistent key: + * create the key file in internal storage, create the + * key inside the secure element, and update the driver's + * persistent data. This is done by starting a transaction that will + * encompass these three actions. + * For registering a volatile key, we just need to find an appropriate + * slot number inside the SE. Since the key is designated volatile, creating + * a transaction is not required. */ + /* The first thing to do is to find a slot number for the new key. + * We save the slot number in persistent storage as part of the + * transaction data. It will be needed to recover if the power + * fails during the key creation process, to clean up on the secure + * element side after restarting. Obtaining a slot number from the + * secure element driver updates its persistent state, but we do not yet + * save the driver's persistent state, so that if the power fails, + * we can roll back to a state where the key doesn't exist. */ + if (*p_drv != NULL) { + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number; + status = psa_find_se_slot_for_key(attributes, method, *p_drv, + &slot_number); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(attributes->lifetime)) { + psa_crypto_prepare_transaction(PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY); + psa_crypto_transaction.key.lifetime = slot->attr.lifetime; + psa_crypto_transaction.key.slot = slot_number; + psa_crypto_transaction.key.id = slot->attr.id; + status = psa_crypto_save_transaction(); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); + return status; + } + } + + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( + slot, (uint8_t *) (&slot_number), sizeof(slot_number)); + } + + if (*p_drv == NULL && method == PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER) { + /* Key registration only makes sense with a secure element. */ + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Finalize the creation of a key once its key material has been set. + * + * This entails writing the key to persistent storage. + * + * If this function fails, call psa_fail_key_creation(). + * See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use + * of this function. + * + * If the finalization succeeds, the function sets the key slot's state to + * PSA_SLOT_FULL, and the key slot can no longer be accessed as part of the + * key creation process. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material. + * \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key, + * or NULL for a transparent key. + * \param[out] key On success, identifier of the key. Note that the + * key identifier is also stored in the key slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully created. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * + * \return If this function fails, the key slot is an invalid state. + * You must call psa_fail_key_creation() to wipe and free the slot. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_finish_key_creation( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + (void) slot; + (void) driver; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if (driver != NULL) { + psa_se_key_data_storage_t data; + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number = + psa_key_slot_get_slot_number(slot); + + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(slot_number) == + sizeof(data.slot_number), + "Slot number size does not match psa_se_key_data_storage_t"); + + memcpy(&data.slot_number, &slot_number, sizeof(slot_number)); + status = psa_save_persistent_key(&slot->attr, + (uint8_t *) &data, + sizeof(data)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + { + /* Key material is saved in export representation in the slot, so + * just pass the slot buffer for storage. */ + status = psa_save_persistent_key(&slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes); + } + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Finish the transaction for a key creation. This does not + * happen when registering an existing key. Detect this case + * by checking whether a transaction is in progress (actual + * creation of a persistent key in a secure element requires a transaction, + * but registration or volatile key creation doesn't use one). */ + if (driver != NULL && + psa_crypto_transaction.unknown.type == PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY) { + status = psa_save_se_persistent_data(driver); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_destroy_persistent_key(slot->attr.id); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; + } + status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *key = slot->attr.id; + status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FILLING, + PSA_SLOT_FULL); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; +} + +/** Abort the creation of a key. + * + * You may call this function after calling psa_start_key_creation(), + * or after psa_finish_key_creation() fails. In other circumstances, this + * function may not clean up persistent storage. + * See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use + * of this function. Sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material. + * \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key, + * or NULL for a transparent key. + */ +static void psa_fail_key_creation(psa_key_slot_t *slot, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver) +{ + (void) driver; + + if (slot == NULL) { + return; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* If the lock operation fails we still wipe the slot. + * Operations will no longer work after a failed lock, + * but we still need to wipe the slot of confidential data. */ + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* TODO: If the key has already been created in the secure + * element, and the failure happened later (when saving metadata + * to internal storage), we need to destroy the key in the secure + * element. + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/217 + */ + + /* Abort the ongoing transaction if any (there may not be one if + * the creation process failed before starting one, or if the + * key creation is a registration of a key in a secure element). + * Earlier functions must already have done what it takes to undo any + * partial creation. All that's left is to update the transaction data + * itself. */ + (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); +#endif +} + +/** Validate optional attributes during key creation. + * + * Some key attributes are optional during key creation. If they are + * specified in the attributes structure, check that they are consistent + * with the data in the slot. + * + * This function should be called near the end of key creation, after + * the slot in memory is fully populated but before saving persistent data. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_optional_attributes( + const psa_key_slot_t *slot, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + if (attributes->type != 0) { + if (attributes->type != slot->attr.type) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } + + if (attributes->bits != 0) { + if (attributes->bits != slot->attr.bits) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data_external, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + psa_status_t status; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(data_external, data); + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + size_t bits; + size_t storage_size = data_length; + + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Reject zero-length symmetric keys (including raw data key objects). + * This also rejects any key which might be encoded as an empty string, + * which is never valid. */ + if (data_length == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + /* Ensure that the bytes-to-bits conversion cannot overflow. */ + if (data_length > SIZE_MAX / 8) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(data_external, data_length, data); + + status = psa_start_key_creation(PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT, attributes, + &slot, &driver); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* In the case of a transparent key or an opaque key stored in local + * storage ( thus not in the case of importing a key in a secure element + * with storage ( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C ) ),we have to allocate a + * buffer to hold the imported key material. */ + if (slot->key.data == NULL) { + if (psa_key_lifetime_is_external(attributes->lifetime)) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size_from_key_data( + attributes, data, data_length, &storage_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(slot, storage_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + bits = slot->attr.bits; + status = psa_driver_wrapper_import_key(attributes, + data, data_length, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &slot->key.bytes, &bits); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (slot->attr.bits == 0) { + slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; + } else if (bits != slot->attr.bits) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* Enforce a size limit, and in particular ensure that the bit + * size fits in its representation type.*/ + if (bits > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = psa_validate_optional_attributes(slot, attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_finish_key_creation(slot, driver, key); +exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(data_external, data); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_fail_key_creation(slot, driver); + } + + return status; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Leaving attributes unspecified is not currently supported. + * It could make sense to query the key type and size from the + * secure element, but not all secure elements support this + * and the driver HAL doesn't currently support it. */ + if (psa_get_key_type(attributes) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + if (psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + status = psa_start_key_creation(PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER, attributes, + &slot, &driver); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_finish_key_creation(slot, driver, &key); + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_fail_key_creation(slot, driver); + } + + /* Registration doesn't keep the key in RAM. */ + psa_close_key(key); + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +psa_status_t psa_copy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, + const psa_key_attributes_t *specified_attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *target_key) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *source_slot = NULL; + psa_key_slot_t *target_slot = NULL; + psa_key_attributes_t actual_attributes = *specified_attributes; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + size_t storage_size = 0; + + *target_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + source_key, &source_slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY, 0); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_validate_optional_attributes(source_slot, + specified_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* The target key type and number of bits have been validated by + * psa_validate_optional_attributes() to be either equal to zero or + * equal to the ones of the source key. So it is safe to inherit + * them from the source key now." + * */ + actual_attributes.bits = source_slot->attr.bits; + actual_attributes.type = source_slot->attr.type; + + + status = psa_restrict_key_policy(source_slot->attr.type, + &actual_attributes.policy, + &source_slot->attr.policy); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_start_key_creation(PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY, &actual_attributes, + &target_slot, &driver); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(target_slot->attr.lifetime) != + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(source_slot->attr.lifetime)) { + /* + * If the source and target keys are stored in different locations, + * the source key would need to be exported as plaintext and re-imported + * in the other location. This has security implications which have not + * been fully mapped. For now, this can be achieved through + * appropriate API invocations from the application, if needed. + * */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + /* + * When the source and target keys are within the same location, + * - For transparent keys it is a blind copy without any driver invocation, + * - For opaque keys this translates to an invocation of the drivers' + * copy_key entry point through the dispatch layer. + * */ + if (psa_key_lifetime_is_external(actual_attributes.lifetime)) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size(&actual_attributes, + &storage_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(target_slot, storage_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_copy_key(&actual_attributes, + source_slot->key.data, + source_slot->key.bytes, + target_slot->key.data, + target_slot->key.bytes, + &target_slot->key.bytes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } else { + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot(target_slot, + source_slot->key.data, + source_slot->key.bytes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + status = psa_finish_key_creation(target_slot, driver, target_key); +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_fail_key_creation(target_slot, driver); + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(source_slot); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Message digests */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_hash_abort(psa_hash_operation_t *operation) +{ + /* Aborting a non-active operation is allowed */ + if (operation->id == 0) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_abort(operation); + operation->id = 0; + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_setup(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if (operation->id != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* Ensure all of the context is zeroized, since PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT only + * directly zeroes the int-sized dummy member of the context union. */ + memset(&operation->ctx, 0, sizeof(operation->ctx)); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_setup(operation, alg); + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_hash_abort(operation); + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_update(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + /* Don't require hash implementations to behave correctly on a + * zero-length input, which may have an invalid pointer. */ + if (input_length == 0) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update(operation, input, input_length); + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_hash_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hash_finish_internal(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *hash_length = 0; + if (operation->id == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( + operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length); + psa_hash_abort(operation); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_finish(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash_external, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_size, hash); + status = psa_hash_finish_internal(operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_verify(psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *hash_external, + size_t hash_length) +{ + uint8_t actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t actual_hash_length; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + + status = psa_hash_finish_internal( + operation, + actual_hash, sizeof(actual_hash), + &actual_hash_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (actual_hash_length != hash_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length) != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(actual_hash, sizeof(actual_hash)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_hash_abort(operation); + } + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash_external, size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + + *hash_length = 0; + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_size, hash); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute(alg, input, input_length, + hash, hash_size, hash_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_compare(psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *hash_external, size_t hash_length) +{ + uint8_t actual_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t actual_hash_length; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + return status; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + alg, input, input_length, + actual_hash, sizeof(actual_hash), + &actual_hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + if (actual_hash_length != hash_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(hash, actual_hash, actual_hash_length) != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(actual_hash, sizeof(actual_hash)); + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_hash_clone(const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation) +{ + if (source_operation->id == 0 || + target_operation->id != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_clone(source_operation, + target_operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_hash_abort(target_operation); + } + + return status; +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* MAC */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_mac_abort(psa_mac_operation_t *operation) +{ + /* Aborting a non-active operation is allowed */ + if (operation->id == 0) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + psa_status_t status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort(operation); + operation->mac_size = 0; + operation->is_sign = 0; + operation->id = 0; + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *mac_size) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); + size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(attributes); + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + /* Validate the combination of key type and algorithm */ + status = psa_mac_key_can_do(alg, key_type); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* Get the output length for the algorithm and key combination */ + *mac_size = PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg); + + if (*mac_size < 4) { + /* A very short MAC is too short for security since it can be + * brute-forced. Ancient protocols with 32-bit MACs do exist, + * so we make this our minimum, even though 32 bits is still + * too small for security. */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (*mac_size > PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, + PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(alg))) { + /* It's impossible to "truncate" to a larger length than the full length + * of the algorithm. */ + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (*mac_size > PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE) { + /* PSA_MAC_LENGTH returns the correct length even for a MAC algorithm + * that is disabled in the compile-time configuration. The result can + * therefore be larger than PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE, which does take the + * configuration into account. In this case, force a return of + * PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED here. Otherwise psa_mac_verify(), or + * psa_mac_compute(mac_size=PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE), would return + * PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL for an unsupported algorithm whose MAC size + * is larger than PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE, which is misleading and which breaks + * systematically generated tests. */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + int is_sign) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if (operation->id != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, + &slot, + is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation(alg, &slot->attr, + &operation->mac_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + operation->is_sign = is_sign; + /* Dispatch the MAC setup call with validated input */ + if (is_sign) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup(operation, + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg); + } else { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup(operation, + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg); + } + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_mac_abort(operation); + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_mac_setup(operation, key, alg, 1); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_mac_setup(operation, key, alg, 0); +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_update(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + return status; + } + + /* Don't require hash implementations to behave correctly on a + * zero-length input, which may have an invalid pointer. */ + if (input_length == 0) { + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + return status; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update(operation, input, input_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_mac_abort(operation); + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac_external, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(mac_external, mac); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(mac_external, mac_size, mac); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (!operation->is_sign) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + /* Sanity check. This will guarantee that mac_size != 0 (and so mac != NULL) + * once all the error checks are done. */ + if (operation->mac_size == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (mac_size < operation->mac_size) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish(operation, + mac, operation->mac_size, + mac_length); + +exit: + /* In case of success, set the potential excess room in the output buffer + * to an invalid value, to avoid potentially leaking a longer MAC. + * In case of error, set the output length and content to a safe default, + * such that in case the caller misses an error check, the output would be + * an unachievable MAC. + */ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + *mac_length = mac_size; + operation->mac_size = 0; + } + + if (mac != NULL) { + psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(mac, status, mac_size, *mac_length); + } + + abort_status = psa_mac_abort(operation); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(mac_external, mac); + + return status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac_external, + size_t mac_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(mac_external, mac); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->is_sign) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->mac_size != mac_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(mac_external, mac_length, mac); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish(operation, + mac, mac_length); + +exit: + abort_status = psa_mac_abort(operation); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(mac_external, mac); + + return status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_compute_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length, + int is_sign) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + uint8_t operation_mac_size = 0; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, + &slot, + is_sign ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_finalize_alg_and_key_validation(alg, &slot->attr, + &operation_mac_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (mac_size < operation_mac_size) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, + input, input_length, + mac, operation_mac_size, mac_length); + +exit: + /* In case of success, set the potential excess room in the output buffer + * to an invalid value, to avoid potentially leaking a longer MAC. + * In case of error, set the output length and content to a safe default, + * such that in case the caller misses an error check, the output would be + * an unachievable MAC. + */ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + *mac_length = mac_size; + operation_mac_size = 0; + } + + psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(mac, status, mac_size, *mac_length); + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_compute(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac_external, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(mac_external, mac); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(mac_external, mac_size, mac); + status = psa_mac_compute_internal(key, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length, 1); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(mac_external, mac); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *mac_external, + size_t mac_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t actual_mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t actual_mac_length; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(mac_external, mac); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + status = psa_mac_compute_internal(key, alg, + input, input_length, + actual_mac, sizeof(actual_mac), + &actual_mac_length, 0); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (mac_length != actual_mac_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(mac_external, mac_length, mac); + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(mac, actual_mac, actual_mac_length) != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(actual_mac, sizeof(actual_mac)); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(mac_external, mac); + + return status; +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Asymmetric cryptography */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static psa_status_t psa_sign_verify_check_alg(int input_is_message, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + if (input_is_message) { + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)) { + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg))) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } + } else { + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_sign_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + int input_is_message, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + *signature_length = 0; + + status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg(input_is_message, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees + * that signature must be a valid pointer. (On the other hand, the input + * buffer can in principle be empty since it doesn't actually have + * to be a hash.) */ + if (signature_size == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, + input_is_message ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH, + alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(slot->attr.type)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if (input_is_message) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length); + } else { + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length); + } + + +exit: + psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(signature, status, signature_size, + *signature_length); + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_verify_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + int input_is_message, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg(input_is_message, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, + input_is_message ? PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH, + alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (input_is_message) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_length); + } else { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + signature, signature_length); + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; + +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)) { + size_t hash_length; + uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg), + input, input_length, + hash, sizeof(hash), &hash_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + return psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length); + } + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_message(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature_external, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_size, signature); + status = psa_sign_internal(key, 1, alg, input, input_length, signature, + signature_size, signature_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)) { + size_t hash_length; + uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg), + input, input_length, + hash, sizeof(hash), &hash_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + return psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length); + } + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_message(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature_external, + size_t signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_length, signature); + status = psa_verify_internal(key, 1, alg, input, input_length, signature, + signature_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length) +{ + if (attributes->type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + return mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(attributes->type)) { + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + return mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } + + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_length; + (void) signature; + (void) signature_size; + (void) signature_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash_external, + size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature_external, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_size, signature); + status = psa_sign_internal(key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length, signature, + signature_size, signature_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length) +{ + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(attributes->type)) { + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || + PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + return mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } else if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(attributes->type)) { + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + return mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } + + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_length; + (void) signature; + (void) signature_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash_external, + size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature_external, + size_t signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_length, signature); + status = psa_verify_internal(key, 0, alg, hash, hash_length, signature, + signature_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt_external, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(salt_external, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) salt; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + + *output_length = 0; + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) && salt_length != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + if (!(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(slot->attr.type) || + PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(slot->attr.type))) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(salt_external, salt_length, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_asymmetric_encrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, salt, salt_length, + output, output_size, output_length); +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(salt_external, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt_external, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(salt_external, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) salt; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + + *output_length = 0; + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) && salt_length != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(slot->attr.type)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(salt_external, salt_length, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_asymmetric_decrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, salt, salt_length, + output, output_size, output_length); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(salt_external, salt); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Asymmetric interruptible cryptography */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static uint32_t psa_interruptible_max_ops = PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED; + +void psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(uint32_t max_ops) +{ + psa_interruptible_max_ops = max_ops; +} + +uint32_t psa_interruptible_get_max_ops(void) +{ + return psa_interruptible_max_ops; +} + +uint32_t psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops( + const psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + return operation->num_ops; +} + +uint32_t psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops( + const psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + return operation->num_ops; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_abort_internal( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + if (operation->id == 0) { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not (yet) + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_abort(operation); + + operation->id = 0; + + /* Do not clear either the error_occurred or num_ops elements here as they + * only want to be cleared by the application calling abort, not by abort + * being called at completion of an operation. */ + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_start( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash_external, size_t hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + + /* Check that start has not been previously called, or operation has not + * previously errored. */ + if (operation->id != 0 || operation->error_occurred) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg(0, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + return status; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH, + alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(slot->attr.type)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + + /* Ensure ops count gets reset, in case of operation re-use. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_start(operation, &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, alg, + hash, hash_length); +exit: + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + psa_sign_hash_abort_internal(operation); + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + if (unlock_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + + +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_complete( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *signature_external, size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); + + *signature_length = 0; + + /* Check that start has been called first, and that operation has not + * previously errored. */ + if (operation->id == 0 || operation->error_occurred) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + /* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees that + * signature must be a valid pointer. */ + if (signature_size == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_size, signature); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_complete(operation, signature, + signature_size, + signature_length); + + /* Update ops count with work done. */ + operation->num_ops = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_get_num_ops(operation); + +exit: + + if (signature != NULL) { + psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(signature, status, signature_size, + *signature_length); + } + + if (status != PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE) { + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + } + + psa_sign_hash_abort_internal(operation); + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_abort( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_sign_hash_abort_internal(operation); + + /* We clear the number of ops done here, so that it is not cleared when + * the operation fails or succeeds, only on manual abort. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; + + /* Likewise, failure state. */ + operation->error_occurred = 0; + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_abort_internal( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + if (operation->id == 0) { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not (yet) + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_abort(operation); + + operation->id = 0; + + /* Do not clear either the error_occurred or num_ops elements here as they + * only want to be cleared by the application calling abort, not by abort + * being called at completion of an operation. */ + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_start( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash_external, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature_external, size_t signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(signature_external, signature); + + /* Check that start has not been previously called, or operation has not + * previously errored. */ + if (operation->id != 0 || operation->error_occurred) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + status = psa_sign_verify_check_alg(0, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + return status; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH, + alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + return status; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(hash_external, hash_length, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(signature_external, signature_length, signature); + + /* Ensure ops count gets reset, in case of operation re-use. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_start(operation, &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + psa_verify_hash_abort_internal(operation); + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + if (unlock_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(hash_external, hash); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(signature_external, signature); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_complete( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Check that start has been called first, and that operation has not + * previously errored. */ + if (operation->id == 0 || operation->error_occurred) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_complete(operation); + + /* Update ops count with work done. */ + operation->num_ops = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_get_num_ops( + operation); + +exit: + + if (status != PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE) { + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->error_occurred = 1; + } + + psa_verify_hash_abort_internal(operation); + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_abort( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_verify_hash_abort_internal(operation); + + /* We clear the number of ops done here, so that it is not cleared when + * the operation fails or succeeds, only on manual abort. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; + + /* Likewise, failure state. */ + operation->error_occurred = 0; + + return status; +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Asymmetric interruptible cryptography internal */ +/* implementations */ +/****************************************************************/ + +void mbedtls_psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(uint32_t max_ops) +{ + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + /* Internal implementation uses zero to indicate infinite number max ops, + * therefore avoid this value, and set to minimum possible. */ + if (max_ops == 0) { + max_ops = 1; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(max_ops); +#else + (void) max_ops; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +uint32_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops( + const mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + return operation->num_ops; +#else + (void) operation; + return 0; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +uint32_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops( + const mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + #if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + return operation->num_ops; +#else + (void) operation; + return 0; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_start( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t required_hash_length; + + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(attributes->type)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(&operation->restart_ctx); + + /* Ensure num_ops is zero'ed in case of context re-use. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->type, + attributes->bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &operation->ctx); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + operation->coordinate_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( + operation->ctx->grp.nbits); + + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg); + operation->md_alg = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(hash_alg); + operation->alg = alg; + + /* We only need to store the same length of hash as the private key size + * here, it would be truncated by the internal implementation anyway. */ + required_hash_length = (hash_length < operation->coordinate_bytes ? + hash_length : operation->coordinate_bytes); + + if (required_hash_length > sizeof(operation->hash)) { + /* Shouldn't happen, but better safe than sorry. */ + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + memcpy(operation->hash, hash, required_hash_length); + operation->hash_length = required_hash_length; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +#else + (void) operation; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_length; + (void) status; + (void) required_hash_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_complete( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length) +{ +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi r; + mbedtls_mpi s; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&s); + + /* Ensure max_ops is set to the current value (or default). */ + mbedtls_psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(psa_interruptible_get_max_ops()); + + if (signature_size < 2 * operation->coordinate_bytes) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + if (PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(operation->alg)) { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(&operation->ctx->grp, + &r, + &s, + &operation->ctx->d, + operation->hash, + operation->hash_length, + operation->md_alg, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + &operation->restart_ctx)); +#else /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + } else { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(&operation->ctx->grp, + &r, + &s, + &operation->ctx->d, + operation->hash, + operation->hash_length, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + &operation->restart_ctx)); + } + + /* Hide the fact that the restart context only holds a delta of number of + * ops done during the last operation, not an absolute value. */ + operation->num_ops += operation->restart_ctx.ecp.ops_done; + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&r, + signature, + operation->coordinate_bytes) + ); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&s, + signature + + operation->coordinate_bytes, + operation->coordinate_bytes) + ); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + *signature_length = operation->coordinate_bytes * 2; + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } + +exit: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&s); + return status; + + #else + + (void) operation; + (void) signature; + (void) signature_size; + (void) signature_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + if (operation->ctx) { + mbedtls_ecdsa_free(operation->ctx); + mbedtls_free(operation->ctx); + operation->ctx = NULL; + } + + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(&operation->restart_ctx); + + operation->num_ops = 0; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +#else + + (void) operation; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_start( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t coordinate_bytes = 0; + size_t required_hash_length = 0; + + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(attributes->type)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(&operation->restart_ctx); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&operation->r); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&operation->s); + + /* Ensure num_ops is zero'ed in case of context re-use. */ + operation->num_ops = 0; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->type, + attributes->bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &operation->ctx); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + coordinate_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(operation->ctx->grp.nbits); + + if (signature_length != 2 * coordinate_bytes) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&operation->r, + signature, + coordinate_bytes)); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&operation->s, + signature + + coordinate_bytes, + coordinate_bytes)); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_public_part(operation->ctx); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* We only need to store the same length of hash as the private key size + * here, it would be truncated by the internal implementation anyway. */ + required_hash_length = (hash_length < coordinate_bytes ? hash_length : + coordinate_bytes); + + if (required_hash_length > sizeof(operation->hash)) { + /* Shouldn't happen, but better safe than sorry. */ + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + memcpy(operation->hash, hash, required_hash_length); + operation->hash_length = required_hash_length; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#else + (void) operation; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_length; + (void) signature; + (void) signature_length; + (void) status; + (void) coordinate_bytes; + (void) required_hash_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_complete( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Ensure max_ops is set to the current value (or default). */ + mbedtls_psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(psa_interruptible_get_max_ops()); + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(&operation->ctx->grp, + operation->hash, + operation->hash_length, + &operation->ctx->Q, + &operation->r, + &operation->s, + &operation->restart_ctx)); + + /* Hide the fact that the restart context only holds a delta of number of + * ops done during the last operation, not an absolute value. */ + operation->num_ops += operation->restart_ctx.ecp.ops_done; + + return status; +#else + (void) operation; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation) +{ + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + + if (operation->ctx) { + mbedtls_ecdsa_free(operation->ctx); + mbedtls_free(operation->ctx); + operation->ctx = NULL; + } + + mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(&operation->restart_ctx); + + operation->num_ops = 0; + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&operation->r); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&operation->s); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +#else + (void) operation; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && + * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */ +} + +static psa_status_t psa_generate_random_internal(uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size) +{ + GUARD_MODULE_INITIALIZED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + + psa_status_t status; + size_t output_length = 0; + status = mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(&global_data.rng, + output, output_size, + &output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + /* Breaking up a request into smaller chunks is currently not supported + * for the external RNG interface. */ + if (output_length != output_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + + while (output_size > 0) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; + size_t request_size = + (output_size > MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST ? + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST : + output_size); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(&global_data.rng.drbg, output, request_size); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(&global_data.rng.drbg, output, request_size); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + output_size -= request_size; + output += request_size; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Symmetric cryptography */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static psa_status_t psa_cipher_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_operation_t cipher_operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_key_usage_t usage = (cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ? + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT : + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if (operation->id != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, usage, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Initialize the operation struct members, except for id. The id member + * is used to indicate to psa_cipher_abort that there are resources to free, + * so we only set it (in the driver wrapper) after resources have been + * allocated/initialized. */ + operation->iv_set = 0; + if (alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) { + operation->iv_required = 0; + } else { + operation->iv_required = 1; + } + operation->default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(slot->attr.type, alg); + + /* Try doing the operation through a driver before using software fallback. */ + if (cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup(operation, + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg); + } else { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup(operation, + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg); + } + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_cipher_abort(operation); + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_cipher_setup(operation, key, alg, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_cipher_setup(operation, key, alg, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT); +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *iv_external, + size_t iv_size, + size_t *iv_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t default_iv_length = 0; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(iv_external, iv); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->iv_set || !operation->iv_required) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + default_iv_length = operation->default_iv_length; + if (iv_size < default_iv_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + if (default_iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE) { + status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(iv_external, default_iv_length, iv); + + status = psa_generate_random_internal(iv, default_iv_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv(operation, + iv, default_iv_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *iv_length = default_iv_length; + operation->iv_set = 1; + } else { + *iv_length = 0; + psa_cipher_abort(operation); + if (iv != NULL) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(iv, default_iv_length); + } + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(iv_external, iv); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv_external, + size_t iv_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(iv_external, iv); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->iv_set || !operation->iv_required) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(iv_external, iv_length, iv); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv(operation, + iv, + iv_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->iv_set = 1; + } else { + psa_cipher_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(iv_external, iv); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_update(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->iv_required && !operation->iv_set) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update(operation, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length); + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_cipher_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_finish(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->iv_required && !operation->iv_set) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish(operation, + output, + output_size, + output_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = psa_cipher_abort(operation); + } else { + *output_length = 0; + (void) psa_cipher_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation) +{ + if (operation->id == 0) { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not (yet) + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort(operation); + + operation->id = 0; + operation->iv_set = 0; + operation->iv_required = 0; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + uint8_t local_iv[PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t default_iv_length = 0; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(slot->attr.type, alg); + if (default_iv_length > PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE) { + status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + if (default_iv_length > 0) { + if (output_size < default_iv_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_generate_random_internal(local_iv, default_iv_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, local_iv, default_iv_length, input, input_length, + psa_crypto_buffer_offset(output, default_iv_length), + output_size - default_iv_length, output_length); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = unlock_status; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + if (default_iv_length > 0) { + memcpy(output, local_iv, default_iv_length); + } + *output_length += default_iv_length; + } else { + *output_length = 0; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (alg == PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG && + input_length < PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(slot->attr.type)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } else if (input_length < PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(slot->attr.type, alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = unlock_status; + } + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + *output_length = 0; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* AEAD */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/* Helper function to get the base algorithm from its variants. */ +static psa_algorithm_t psa_aead_get_base_algorithm(psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(alg); +} + +/* Helper function to perform common nonce length checks. */ +static psa_status_t psa_aead_check_nonce_length(psa_algorithm_t alg, + size_t nonce_length) +{ + psa_algorithm_t base_alg = psa_aead_get_base_algorithm(alg); + + switch (base_alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_GCM: + /* Not checking max nonce size here as GCM spec allows almost + * arbitrarily large nonces. Please note that we do not generally + * recommend the usage of nonces of greater length than + * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE, as large nonces are hashed to a shorter + * size, which can then lead to collisions if you encrypt a very + * large number of messages.*/ + if (nonce_length != 0) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_CCM: + if (nonce_length >= 7 && nonce_length <= 13) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305: + if (nonce_length == 12) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else if (nonce_length == 8) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + default: + (void) nonce_length; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_aead_check_algorithm(psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce_external, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data_external, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext_external, + size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext_external, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(additional_data_external, additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + + *ciphertext_length = 0; + + status = psa_aead_check_algorithm(alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(nonce_external, nonce_length, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(additional_data_external, additional_data_length, additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(plaintext_external, plaintext_length, plaintext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(ciphertext_external, ciphertext_size, ciphertext); + + status = psa_aead_check_nonce_length(alg, nonce_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS && ciphertext_size != 0) { + memset(ciphertext, 0, ciphertext_size); + } + +exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(additional_data_external, additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + + psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce_external, + size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data_external, + size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext_external, + size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext_external, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(additional_data_external, additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + + *plaintext_length = 0; + + status = psa_aead_check_algorithm(alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(nonce_external, nonce_length, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(additional_data_external, additional_data_length, + additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(ciphertext_external, ciphertext_length, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(plaintext_external, plaintext_size, plaintext); + + status = psa_aead_check_nonce_length(alg, nonce_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( + &slot->attr, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS && plaintext_size != 0) { + memset(plaintext, 0, plaintext_size); + } + +exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(additional_data_external, additional_data); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + + psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_validate_tag_length(psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + const uint8_t tag_len = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg); + + switch (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(alg, 0)) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 0): + /* CCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16.*/ + if (tag_len < 4 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 0): + /* GCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. */ + if (tag_len != 4 && tag_len != 8 && (tag_len < 12 || tag_len > 16)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0): + /* We only support the default tag length. */ + if (tag_len != 16) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + + default: + (void) tag_len; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/* Set the key for a multipart authenticated operation. */ +static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + int is_encrypt, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_key_usage_t key_usage = 0; + + status = psa_aead_check_algorithm(alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->id != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->nonce_set || operation->lengths_set || + operation->ad_started || operation->body_started) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (is_encrypt) { + key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT; + } else { + key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(key, &slot, key_usage, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((status = psa_validate_tag_length(alg)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (is_encrypt) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt_setup(operation, + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg); + } else { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt_setup(operation, + &slot->attr, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + alg); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + operation->key_type = psa_get_key_type(&slot->attr); + +exit: + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = unlock_status; + operation->alg = psa_aead_get_base_algorithm(alg); + operation->is_encrypt = is_encrypt; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + return status; +} + +/* Set the key for a multipart authenticated encryption operation. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_aead_setup(operation, 1, key, alg); +} + +/* Set the key for a multipart authenticated decryption operation. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_aead_setup(operation, 0, key, alg); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_aead_set_nonce_internal(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->nonce_set) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_aead_check_nonce_length(operation->alg, nonce_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_nonce(operation, nonce, + nonce_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->nonce_set = 1; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + return status; +} + +/* Generate a random nonce / IV for multipart AEAD operation */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_generate_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *nonce_external, + size_t nonce_size, + size_t *nonce_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t local_nonce[PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t required_nonce_size = 0; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(nonce_external, nonce_size, nonce); + + *nonce_length = 0; + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->nonce_set || !operation->is_encrypt) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + /* For CCM, this size may not be correct according to the PSA + * specification. The PSA Crypto 1.0.1 specification states: + * + * CCM encodes the plaintext length pLen in L octets, with L the smallest + * integer >= 2 where pLen < 2^(8L). The nonce length is then 15 - L bytes. + * + * However this restriction that L has to be the smallest integer is not + * applied in practice, and it is not implementable here since the + * plaintext length may or may not be known at this time. */ + required_nonce_size = PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(operation->key_type, + operation->alg); + if (nonce_size < required_nonce_size) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_generate_random_internal(local_nonce, required_nonce_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_aead_set_nonce_internal(operation, local_nonce, + required_nonce_size); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + memcpy(nonce, local_nonce, required_nonce_size); + *nonce_length = required_nonce_size; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(nonce_external, nonce); + + return status; +} + +/* Set the nonce for a multipart authenticated encryption or decryption + operation.*/ +psa_status_t psa_aead_set_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce_external, + size_t nonce_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(nonce_external, nonce); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(nonce_external, nonce_length, nonce); + + status = psa_aead_set_nonce_internal(operation, nonce, nonce_length); + +/* Exit label is only needed for buffer copying, prevent unused warnings. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(nonce_external, nonce); + + return status; +} + +/* Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for multipart AEAD. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_set_lengths(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + size_t ad_length, + size_t plaintext_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->lengths_set || operation->ad_started || + operation->body_started) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_GCM: + /* Lengths can only be too large for GCM if size_t is bigger than 32 + * bits. Without the guard this code will generate warnings on 32bit + * builds. */ +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX + if (((uint64_t) ad_length) >> 61 != 0 || + ((uint64_t) plaintext_length) > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } +#endif + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_CCM: + if (ad_length > 0xFF00) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305: + /* No length restrictions for ChaChaPoly. */ + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + default: + break; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_lengths(operation, ad_length, + plaintext_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->ad_remaining = ad_length; + operation->body_remaining = plaintext_length; + operation->lengths_set = 1; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + return status; +} + +/* Pass additional data to an active multipart AEAD operation. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_update_ad(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (!operation->nonce_set || operation->body_started) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->lengths_set) { + if (operation->ad_remaining < input_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + operation->ad_remaining -= input_length; + } +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + else if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update_ad(operation, input, + input_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->ad_started = 1; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + + return status; +} + +/* Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active multipart AEAD + operation.*/ +psa_status_t psa_aead_update(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + *output_length = 0; + + if (operation->id == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (!operation->nonce_set) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->lengths_set) { + /* Additional data length was supplied, but not all the additional + data was supplied.*/ + if (operation->ad_remaining != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* Too much data provided. */ + if (operation->body_remaining < input_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + operation->body_remaining -= input_length; + } +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + else if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */ + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update(operation, input, input_length, + output, output_size, + output_length); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->body_started = 1; + } else { + psa_aead_abort(operation); + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_aead_final_checks(const psa_aead_operation_t *operation) +{ + if (operation->id == 0 || !operation->nonce_set) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (operation->lengths_set && (operation->ad_remaining != 0 || + operation->body_remaining != 0)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/* Finish encrypting a message in a multipart AEAD operation. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_finish(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *ciphertext_external, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *tag_external, + size_t tag_size, + size_t *tag_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(tag_external, tag); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(ciphertext_external, ciphertext_size, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(tag_external, tag_size, tag); + + *ciphertext_length = 0; + *tag_length = tag_size; + + status = psa_aead_final_checks(operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (!operation->is_encrypt) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_finish(operation, ciphertext, + ciphertext_size, + ciphertext_length, + tag, tag_size, tag_length); + +exit: + + + /* In case the operation fails and the user fails to check for failure or + * the zero tag size, make sure the tag is set to something implausible. + * Even if the operation succeeds, make sure we clear the rest of the + * buffer to prevent potential leakage of anything previously placed in + * the same buffer.*/ + psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(tag, status, tag_size, *tag_length); + + psa_aead_abort(operation); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(ciphertext_external, ciphertext); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(tag_external, tag); + + return status; +} + +/* Finish authenticating and decrypting a message in a multipart AEAD + operation.*/ +psa_status_t psa_aead_verify(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *plaintext_external, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length, + const uint8_t *tag_external, + size_t tag_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(tag_external, tag); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(plaintext_external, plaintext_size, plaintext); + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(tag_external, tag_length, tag); + + *plaintext_length = 0; + + status = psa_aead_final_checks(operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->is_encrypt) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_verify(operation, plaintext, + plaintext_size, + plaintext_length, + tag, tag_length); + +exit: + psa_aead_abort(operation); + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(plaintext_external, plaintext); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(tag_external, tag); + + return status; +} + +/* Abort an AEAD operation. */ +psa_status_t psa_aead_abort(psa_aead_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->id == 0) { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not (yet) + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_aead_abort(operation); + + memset(operation, 0, sizeof(*operation)); + + return status; +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Generators */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) || \ + defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) +#define AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF +#endif /* At least one builtin KDF */ + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_start_hmac( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const uint8_t *hmac_key, + size_t hmac_key_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(hmac_key_length)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); + + operation->is_sign = 1; + operation->mac_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup(operation, + &attributes, + hmac_key, hmac_key_length, + PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg)); + + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + return status; +} +#endif /* KDF algorithms reliant on HMAC */ + +#define HKDF_STATE_INIT 0 /* no input yet */ +#define HKDF_STATE_STARTED 1 /* got salt */ +#define HKDF_STATE_KEYED 2 /* got key */ +#define HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT 3 /* output started */ + +static psa_algorithm_t psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg( + const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation) +{ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(operation->alg)) { + return PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(operation->alg); + } else { + return operation->alg; + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg(operation); + if (kdf_alg == 0) { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + } else +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { + mbedtls_free(operation->ctx.hkdf.info); + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation->ctx.hkdf.hmac); + } else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) || + /* TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS KDF uses the same core as TLS-1.2 PRF */ + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { + if (operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret_length); + } + + if (operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed_length); + } + + if (operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label_length); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (operation->ctx.tls12_prf.other_secret != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->ctx.tls12_prf.other_secret, + operation->ctx.tls12_prf.other_secret_length); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + + /* We leave the fields Ai and output_block to be erased safely by the + * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() in the end of this function. */ + } else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->ctx.tls12_ecjpake_to_pms.data, + sizeof(operation->ctx.tls12_ecjpake_to_pms.data)); + } else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg)) { + if (operation->ctx.pbkdf2.salt != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->ctx.pbkdf2.salt, + operation->ctx.pbkdf2.salt_length); + } + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#endif /* defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation, sizeof(*operation)); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_get_capacity(const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t *capacity) +{ + if (operation->alg == 0) { + /* This is a blank key derivation operation. */ + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + *capacity = operation->capacity; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + size_t capacity) +{ + if (operation->alg == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + if (capacity > operation->capacity) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + operation->capacity = capacity; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) +/* Read some bytes from an HKDF-based operation. */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read(psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + size_t hmac_output_length; + psa_status_t status; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + const uint8_t last_block = PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg) ? 0 : 0xff; +#else + const uint8_t last_block = 0xff; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ + + if (hkdf->state < HKDF_STATE_KEYED || + (!hkdf->info_set +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + && !PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ + )) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT; + + while (output_length != 0) { + /* Copy what remains of the current block */ + uint8_t n = hash_length - hkdf->offset_in_block; + if (n > output_length) { + n = (uint8_t) output_length; + } + memcpy(output, hkdf->output_block + hkdf->offset_in_block, n); + output += n; + output_length -= n; + hkdf->offset_in_block += n; + if (output_length == 0) { + break; + } + /* We can't be wanting more output after the last block, otherwise + * the capacity check in psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() would have + * prevented this call. It could happen only if the operation + * object was corrupted or if this function is called directly + * inside the library. */ + if (hkdf->block_number == last_block) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + /* We need a new block */ + ++hkdf->block_number; + hkdf->offset_in_block = 0; + + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + hkdf->prk, + hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (hkdf->block_number != 1) { + status = psa_mac_update(&hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->output_block, + hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->info, + hkdf->info_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hkdf->hmac, + &hkdf->block_number, 1); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->output_block, + sizeof(hkdf->output_block), + &hmac_output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(alg); + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + psa_mac_operation_t hmac = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hmac_output_length; + psa_status_t status, cleanup_status; + + /* We can't be wanting more output after block 0xff, otherwise + * the capacity check in psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() would have + * prevented this call. It could happen only if the operation + * object was corrupted or if this function is called directly + * inside the library. */ + if (tls12_prf->block_number == 0xff) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + /* We need a new block */ + ++tls12_prf->block_number; + tls12_prf->left_in_block = hash_length; + + /* Recall the definition of the TLS-1.2-PRF from RFC 5246: + * + * PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_(secret, label + seed) + * + * P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) + + * HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) + + * HMAC_hash(secret, A(3) + seed) + ... + * + * A(0) = seed + * A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) + * + * The `psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation` structure saves the block + * `HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + seed)` from which the output + * is currently extracted as `output_block` and where i is + * `block_number`. + */ + + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hmac, + hash_alg, + tls12_prf->secret, + tls12_prf->secret_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Calculate A(i) where i = tls12_prf->block_number. */ + if (tls12_prf->block_number == 1) { + /* A(1) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(0)), where A(0) = seed. (The RFC overloads + * the variable seed and in this instance means it in the context of the + * P_hash function, where seed = label + seed.) */ + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, + tls12_prf->label, + tls12_prf->label_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, + tls12_prf->seed, + tls12_prf->seed_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + } else { + /* A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) */ + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + } + + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&hmac, + tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length, + &hmac_output_length); + if (hmac_output_length != hash_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Calculate HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + label + seed). */ + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hmac, + hash_alg, + tls12_prf->secret, + tls12_prf->secret_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, tls12_prf->label, tls12_prf->label_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hmac, tls12_prf->seed, tls12_prf->seed_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&hmac, + tls12_prf->output_block, hash_length, + &hmac_output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + +cleanup: + cleanup_status = psa_mac_abort(&hmac); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && cleanup_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = cleanup_status; + } + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH(alg); + uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t offset, length; + + switch (tls12_prf->state) { + case PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET: + tls12_prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT; + break; + case PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT: + break; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + while (output_length != 0) { + /* Check if we have fully processed the current block. */ + if (tls12_prf->left_in_block == 0) { + status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block(tls12_prf, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + continue; + } + + if (tls12_prf->left_in_block > output_length) { + length = (uint8_t) output_length; + } else { + length = tls12_prf->left_in_block; + } + + offset = hash_length - tls12_prf->left_in_block; + memcpy(output, tls12_prf->output_block + offset, length); + output += length; + output_length -= length; + tls12_prf->left_in_block -= length; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_read( + psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_t *ecjpake, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t output_size = 0; + + if (output_length != 32) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + status = psa_hash_compute(PSA_ALG_SHA_256, ecjpake->data, + PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE, output, output_length, + &output_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (output_size != output_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_pbkdf2_generate_block( + psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + psa_algorithm_t prf_alg, + uint8_t prf_output_length, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_mac_operation_t mac_operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t mac_output_length; + uint8_t U_i[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + uint8_t *U_accumulator = pbkdf2->output_block; + uint64_t i; + uint8_t block_counter[4]; + + mac_operation.is_sign = 1; + mac_operation.mac_size = prf_output_length; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(pbkdf2->block_number, block_counter, 0); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup(&mac_operation, + attributes, + pbkdf2->password, + pbkdf2->password_length, + prf_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&mac_operation, pbkdf2->salt, pbkdf2->salt_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&mac_operation, block_counter, sizeof(block_counter)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&mac_operation, U_i, sizeof(U_i), + &mac_output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (mac_output_length != prf_output_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + goto cleanup; + } + + memcpy(U_accumulator, U_i, prf_output_length); + + for (i = 1; i < pbkdf2->input_cost; i++) { + /* We are passing prf_output_length as mac_size because the driver + * function directly sets mac_output_length as mac_size upon success. + * See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/7801 */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute(attributes, + pbkdf2->password, + pbkdf2->password_length, + prf_alg, U_i, prf_output_length, + U_i, prf_output_length, + &mac_output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_xor(U_accumulator, U_accumulator, U_i, prf_output_length); + } + +cleanup: + /* Zeroise buffers to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(U_i, PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE); + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_pbkdf2_read( + psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t prf_alg; + uint8_t prf_output_length; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(pbkdf2->password_length)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE); + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg)) { + prf_alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_GET_HASH(kdf_alg)); + prf_output_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(prf_alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC); + } else if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { + prf_alg = PSA_ALG_CMAC; + prf_output_length = PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128U, PSA_ALG_CMAC); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES); + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + switch (pbkdf2->state) { + case PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_PASSWORD_SET: + /* Initially we need a new block so bytes_used is equal to block size*/ + pbkdf2->bytes_used = prf_output_length; + pbkdf2->state = PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_OUTPUT; + break; + case PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_OUTPUT: + break; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + while (output_length != 0) { + uint8_t n = prf_output_length - pbkdf2->bytes_used; + if (n > output_length) { + n = (uint8_t) output_length; + } + memcpy(output, pbkdf2->output_block + pbkdf2->bytes_used, n); + output += n; + output_length -= n; + pbkdf2->bytes_used += n; + + if (output_length == 0) { + break; + } + + /* We need a new block */ + pbkdf2->bytes_used = 0; + pbkdf2->block_number++; + + status = psa_key_derivation_pbkdf2_generate_block(pbkdf2, prf_alg, + prf_output_length, + &attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */ + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg(operation); + + if (operation->alg == 0) { + /* This is a blank operation. */ + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (output_length == 0 && operation->capacity == 0) { + /* Edge case: this is a finished operation, and 0 bytes + * were requested. The right error in this case could + * be either INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY or BAD_STATE. Return + * INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY, which is right for a finished + * operation, for consistency with the case when + * output_length > 0. */ + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA; + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_length, output); + if (output_length > operation->capacity) { + operation->capacity = 0; + /* Go through the error path to wipe all confidential data now + * that the operation object is useless. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA; + goto exit; + } + + operation->capacity -= output_length; + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read(&operation->ctx.hkdf, kdf_alg, + output, output_length); + } else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) || + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read(&operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + kdf_alg, output, + output_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_read( + &operation->ctx.tls12_ecjpake_to_pms, output, output_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_key_derivation_pbkdf2_read(&operation->ctx.pbkdf2, kdf_alg, + output, output_length); + } else +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */ + + { + (void) kdf_alg; + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + + return status; + } + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* Preserve the algorithm upon errors, but clear all sensitive state. + * This allows us to differentiate between exhausted operations and + * blank operations, so we can return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE on blank + * operations. */ + psa_algorithm_t alg = operation->alg; + psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); + operation->alg = alg; + if (output != NULL) { + memset(output, '!', output_length); + } + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + return status; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) +static void psa_des_set_key_parity(uint8_t *data, size_t data_size) +{ + if (data_size >= 8) { + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity(data); + } + if (data_size >= 16) { + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity(data + 8); + } + if (data_size >= 24) { + mbedtls_des_key_set_parity(data + 16); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + +/* + * ECC keys on a Weierstrass elliptic curve require the generation + * of a private key which is an integer + * in the range [1, N - 1], where N is the boundary of the private key domain: + * N is the prime p for Diffie-Hellman, or the order of the + * curve’s base point for ECC. + * + * Let m be the bit size of N, such that 2^m > N >= 2^(m-1). + * This function generates the private key using the following process: + * + * 1. Draw a byte string of length ceiling(m/8) bytes. + * 2. If m is not a multiple of 8, set the most significant + * (8 * ceiling(m/8) - m) bits of the first byte in the string to zero. + * 3. Convert the string to integer k by decoding it as a big-endian byte string. + * 4. If k > N - 2, discard the result and return to step 1. + * 5. Output k + 1 as the private key. + * + * This method allows compliance to NIST standards, specifically the methods titled + * Key-Pair Generation by Testing Candidates in the following publications: + * - NIST Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment + * Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography [SP800-56A] §5.6.1.1.4 for + * Diffie-Hellman keys. + * + * - [SP800-56A] §5.6.1.2.2 or FIPS Publication 186-4: Digital Signature + * Standard (DSS) [FIPS186-4] §B.4.2 for elliptic curve keys. + * + * Note: Function allocates memory for *data buffer, so given *data should be + * always NULL. + */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_weierstrass_helper( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t bits, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t **data + ) +{ + unsigned key_out_of_range = 1; + mbedtls_mpi k; + mbedtls_mpi diff_N_2; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t m; + size_t m_bytes; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&k); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&diff_N_2); + + psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( + slot->attr.type); + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = + mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, bits); + + if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_group ecp_group; + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&ecp_group); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ecp_group, grp_id)); + + /* N is the boundary of the private key domain (ecp_group.N). */ + /* Let m be the bit size of N. */ + m = ecp_group.nbits; + + m_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(m); + + /* Calculate N - 2 - it will be needed later. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&diff_N_2, &ecp_group.N, 2)); + + /* Note: This function is always called with *data == NULL and it + * allocates memory for the data buffer. */ + *data = mbedtls_calloc(1, m_bytes); + if (*data == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + while (key_out_of_range) { + /* 1. Draw a byte string of length ceiling(m/8) bytes. */ + if ((status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(operation, *data, m_bytes)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* 2. If m is not a multiple of 8 */ + if (m % 8 != 0) { + /* Set the most significant + * (8 * ceiling(m/8) - m) bits of the first byte in + * the string to zero. + */ + uint8_t clear_bit_mask = (1 << (m % 8)) - 1; + (*data)[0] &= clear_bit_mask; + } + + /* 3. Convert the string to integer k by decoding it as a + * big-endian byte string. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&k, *data, m_bytes)); + + /* 4. If k > N - 2, discard the result and return to step 1. + * Result of comparison is returned. When it indicates error + * then this function is called again. + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(&diff_N_2, &k, &key_out_of_range)); + } + + /* 5. Output k + 1 as the private key. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&k, &k, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&k, *data, m_bytes)); +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + mbedtls_free(*data); + *data = NULL; + } + mbedtls_mpi_free(&k); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&diff_N_2); + return status; +} + +/* ECC keys on a Montgomery elliptic curve draws a byte string whose length + * is determined by the curve, and sets the mandatory bits accordingly. That is: + * + * - Curve25519 (PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 255 bits): + * draw a 32-byte string and process it as specified in + * Elliptic Curves for Security [RFC7748] §5. + * + * - Curve448 (PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 448 bits): + * draw a 56-byte string and process it as specified in [RFC7748] §5. + * + * Note: Function allocates memory for *data buffer, so given *data should be + * always NULL. + */ + +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_montgomery_helper( + size_t bits, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t **data + ) +{ + size_t output_length; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch (bits) { + case 255: + output_length = 32; + break; + case 448: + output_length = 56; + break; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + + *data = mbedtls_calloc(1, output_length); + + if (*data == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(operation, *data, output_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + switch (bits) { + case 255: + (*data)[0] &= 248; + (*data)[31] &= 127; + (*data)[31] |= 64; + break; + case 448: + (*data)[0] &= 252; + (*data)[55] |= 128; + break; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + break; + } + + return status; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE */ +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_weierstrass_helper( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, size_t bits, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, uint8_t **data) +{ + (void) slot; + (void) bits; + (void) operation; + (void) data; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_montgomery_helper( + size_t bits, psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, uint8_t **data) +{ + (void) bits; + (void) operation; + (void) data; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE */ + +static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_key_internal( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t bits, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation) +{ + uint8_t *data = NULL; + size_t bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits); + size_t storage_size = bytes; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(slot->attr.type)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(slot->attr.type)) { + psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(slot->attr.type); + if (PSA_ECC_FAMILY_IS_WEIERSTRASS(curve)) { + /* Weierstrass elliptic curve */ + status = psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_weierstrass_helper(slot, bits, operation, &data); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } else { + /* Montgomery elliptic curve */ + status = psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_montgomery_helper(bits, operation, &data); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + } else +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) || + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) */ + if (key_type_is_raw_bytes(slot->attr.type)) { + if (bits % 8 != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + data = mbedtls_calloc(1, bytes); + if (data == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(operation, data, bytes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + if (slot->attr.type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES) { + psa_des_set_key_parity(data, bytes); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) */ + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits; + + if (psa_key_lifetime_is_external(slot->attr.lifetime)) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size(&slot->attr, + &storage_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(slot, storage_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_import_key(&slot->attr, + data, bytes, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes, + &slot->key.bytes, &bits); + if (bits != slot->attr.bits) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free(data); + return status; +} + +static const psa_key_production_parameters_t default_production_parameters = + PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT; + +int psa_key_production_parameters_are_default( + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length) +{ + if (params->flags != 0) { + return 0; + } + if (params_data_length != 0) { + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Reject any attempt to create a zero-length key so that we don't + * risk tripping up later, e.g. on a malloc(0) that returns NULL. */ + if (psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (!psa_key_production_parameters_are_default(params, params_data_length)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (!operation->can_output_key) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + } + + status = psa_start_key_creation(PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE, attributes, + &slot, &driver); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + if (driver != NULL) { + /* Deriving a key in a secure element is not implemented yet. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = psa_generate_derived_key_internal(slot, + attributes->bits, + operation); + } + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = psa_finish_key_creation(slot, driver, key); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_fail_key_creation(slot, driver); + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + return psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext(attributes, operation, + &default_production_parameters, 0, + key); +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key derivation */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) +static int is_kdf_alg_supported(psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { + return 1; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hash_try_support(psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_setup(&operation, alg); + psa_hash_abort(&operation); + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_maximum_capacity( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + operation->capacity = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { +#if (SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX) + operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * (size_t) PSA_MAC_LENGTH( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, + 128U, + PSA_ALG_CMAC); +#else + operation->capacity = SIZE_MAX; +#endif + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 */ + + /* After this point, if kdf_alg is not valid then value of hash_alg may be + * invalid or meaningless but it does not affect this function */ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); + size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + if (hash_size == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + /* Make sure that hash_alg is a supported hash algorithm. Otherwise + * we might fail later, which is somewhat unfriendly and potentially + * risk-prone. */ + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_try_support(hash_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { + operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { + operation->capacity = hash_size; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg)) { + operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) && + (hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384)) { + operation->capacity = SIZE_MAX; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg) && + (hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384)) { + /* Master Secret is always 48 bytes + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5246.html#section-8.1 */ + operation->capacity = 48U; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg)) { +#if (SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX) + operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * hash_size; +#else + operation->capacity = SIZE_MAX; +#endif + } else +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */ + { + (void) hash_size; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg) +{ + /* Make sure that operation->ctx is properly zero-initialised. (Macro + * initialisers for this union leave some bytes unspecified.) */ + memset(&operation->ctx, 0, sizeof(operation->ctx)); + + /* Make sure that kdf_alg is a supported key derivation algorithm. */ + if (!is_kdf_alg_supported(kdf_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + psa_status_t status = psa_key_derivation_set_maximum_capacity(operation, + kdf_alg); + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_try_support(psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if (alg == PSA_ALG_ECDH) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (alg == PSA_ALG_FFDH) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif + (void) alg; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +static int psa_key_derivation_allows_free_form_secret_input( + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + return 0; + } +#endif + (void) kdf_alg; + return 1; +} +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + if (operation->alg != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) { +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg); + psa_algorithm_t ka_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg); + status = psa_key_agreement_try_support(ka_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + if (!psa_key_derivation_allows_free_form_secret_input(kdf_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + status = psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf(operation, kdf_alg); +#else + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg)) { +#if defined(AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF) + status = psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf(operation, alg); +#else + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* AT_LEAST_ONE_BUILTIN_KDF */ + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->alg = alg; + } + return status; +} + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) +static psa_status_t psa_hkdf_input(psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); + psa_status_t status; + switch (step) { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */ + if (hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_INIT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } else { + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + data, data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg)) { + /* We shouldn't be in different state as HKDF_EXPAND only allows + * two inputs: SECRET (this case) and INFO which does not modify + * the state. It could happen only if the hkdf + * object was corrupted. */ + if (hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_INIT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + /* Allow only input that fits expected prk size */ + if (data_length != PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + memcpy(hkdf->prk, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */ + { + /* HKDF: If no salt was provided, use an empty salt. + * HKDF-EXTRACT: salt is mandatory. */ + if (hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ + status = psa_key_derivation_start_hmac(&hkdf->hmac, + hash_alg, + NULL, 0); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED; + } + if (hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_STARTED) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + status = psa_mac_update(&hkdf->hmac, + data, data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&hkdf->hmac, + hkdf->prk, + sizeof(hkdf->prk), + &data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_KEYED; + hkdf->block_number = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { + /* The only block of output is the PRK. */ + memcpy(hkdf->output_block, hkdf->prk, PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); + hkdf->offset_in_block = 0; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ + { + /* Block 0 is empty, and the next block will be + * generated by psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read(). */ + hkdf->offset_in_block = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg) && + hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ + if (hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + if (hkdf->info_set) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + hkdf->info_length = data_length; + if (data_length != 0) { + hkdf->info = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); + if (hkdf->info == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + memcpy(hkdf->info, data, data_length); + } + hkdf->info_set = 1; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +} +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_seed(psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_INIT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data_length != 0) { + prf->seed = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); + if (prf->seed == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + memcpy(prf->seed, data, data_length); + prf->seed_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_key(psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET && + prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OTHER_KEY_SET) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data_length != 0) { + prf->secret = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); + if (prf->secret == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + memcpy(prf->secret, data, data_length); + prf->secret_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_label(psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data_length != 0) { + prf->label = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); + if (prf->label == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + memcpy(prf->label, data, data_length); + prf->label_length = data_length; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_input(psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + switch (step) { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED: + return psa_tls12_prf_set_seed(prf, data, data_length); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + return psa_tls12_prf_set_key(prf, data, data_length); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL: + return psa_tls12_prf_set_label(prf, data, data_length); + default: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || + * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + const size_t pms_len = (prf->state == PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OTHER_KEY_SET ? + 4 + data_length + prf->other_secret_length : + 4 + 2 * data_length); + + if (data_length > PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + uint8_t *pms = mbedtls_calloc(1, pms_len); + if (pms == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + uint8_t *cur = pms; + + /* pure-PSK: + * Quoting RFC 4279, Section 2: + * + * The premaster secret is formed as follows: if the PSK is N octets + * long, concatenate a uint16 with the value N, N zero octets, a second + * uint16 with the value N, and the PSK itself. + * + * mixed-PSK: + * In a DHE-PSK, RSA-PSK, ECDHE-PSK the premaster secret is formed as + * follows: concatenate a uint16 with the length of the other secret, + * the other secret itself, uint16 with the length of PSK, and the + * PSK itself. + * For details please check: + * - RFC 4279, Section 4 for the definition of RSA-PSK, + * - RFC 4279, Section 3 for the definition of DHE-PSK, + * - RFC 5489 for the definition of ECDHE-PSK. + */ + + if (prf->state == PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OTHER_KEY_SET) { + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(prf->other_secret_length); + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(prf->other_secret_length); + if (prf->other_secret_length != 0) { + memcpy(cur, prf->other_secret, prf->other_secret_length); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(prf->other_secret, prf->other_secret_length); + cur += prf->other_secret_length; + } + } else { + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(data_length); + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(data_length); + memset(cur, 0, data_length); + cur += data_length; + } + + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(data_length); + *cur++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(data_length); + memcpy(cur, data, data_length); + cur += data_length; + + status = psa_tls12_prf_set_key(prf, pms, (size_t) (cur - pms)); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(pms, pms_len); + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_other_key( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data_length != 0) { + prf->other_secret = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length); + if (prf->other_secret == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + memcpy(prf->other_secret, data, data_length); + prf->other_secret_length = data_length; + } else { + prf->other_secret_length = 0; + } + + prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OTHER_KEY_SET; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input( + psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + switch (step) { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + return psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key(prf, + data, data_length); + break; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET: + return psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_other_key(prf, + data, + data_length); + break; + default: + return psa_tls12_prf_input(prf, step, data, data_length); + break; + + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) +static psa_status_t psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_input( + psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_t *ecjpake, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (data_length != PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_INPUT_SIZE || + step != PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + /* Check if the passed point is in an uncompressed form */ + if (data[0] != 0x04) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + /* Only K.X has to be extracted - bytes 1 to 32 inclusive. */ + memcpy(ecjpake->data, data + 1, PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */ + +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_set_input_cost( + psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + uint64_t data) +{ + if (step != PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (pbkdf2->state != PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_INIT) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data > PSA_VENDOR_PBKDF2_MAX_ITERATIONS) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (data == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + pbkdf2->input_cost = data; + pbkdf2->state = PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_INPUT_COST_SET; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_set_salt(psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + if (pbkdf2->state == PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_INPUT_COST_SET) { + pbkdf2->state = PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_SALT_SET; + } else if (pbkdf2->state == PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_SALT_SET) { + /* Appending to existing salt. No state change. */ + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (data_length == 0) { + /* Appending an empty string, nothing to do. */ + } else { + uint8_t *next_salt; + + next_salt = mbedtls_calloc(1, data_length + pbkdf2->salt_length); + if (next_salt == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + if (pbkdf2->salt_length != 0) { + memcpy(next_salt, pbkdf2->salt, pbkdf2->salt_length); + } + memcpy(next_salt + pbkdf2->salt_length, data, data_length); + pbkdf2->salt_length += data_length; + mbedtls_free(pbkdf2->salt); + pbkdf2->salt = next_salt; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_hmac_set_password(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_len, + uint8_t *output, + size_t *output_len) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + if (input_len > PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(hash_alg)) { + return psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, input, input_len, output, + PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE, output_len); + } else if (input_len > 0) { + memcpy(output, input, input_len); + } + *output_len = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(hash_alg); + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_cmac_set_password(const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_len, + uint8_t *output, + size_t *output_len) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + if (input_len != PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128U, PSA_ALG_CMAC)) { + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + uint8_t zeros[16] = { 0 }; + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(sizeof(zeros))); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE); + /* Passing PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128U, PSA_ALG_CMAC) as + * mac_size as the driver function sets mac_output_length = mac_size + * on success. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/7801 */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute(&attributes, + zeros, sizeof(zeros), + PSA_ALG_CMAC, input, input_len, + output, + PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, + 128U, + PSA_ALG_CMAC), + output_len); + } else { + memcpy(output, input, input_len); + *output_len = PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128U, PSA_ALG_CMAC); + } + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 */ + +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_set_password(psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + if (pbkdf2->state != PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_SALT_SET) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg)) { + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); + status = psa_pbkdf2_hmac_set_password(hash_alg, data, data_length, + pbkdf2->password, + &pbkdf2->password_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { + status = psa_pbkdf2_cmac_set_password(data, data_length, + pbkdf2->password, + &pbkdf2->password_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 */ + { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + pbkdf2->state = PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_PASSWORD_SET; + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_pbkdf2_input(psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t *pbkdf2, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + switch (step) { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: + return psa_pbkdf2_set_salt(pbkdf2, data, data_length); + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD: + return psa_pbkdf2_set_password(pbkdf2, kdf_alg, data, data_length); + default: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +} +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */ + +/** Check whether the given key type is acceptable for the given + * input step of a key derivation. + * + * Secret inputs must have the type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE. + * Non-secret inputs must have the type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA. + * Both secret and non-secret inputs can alternatively have the type + * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, which is never the type of a key object, meaning + * that the input was passed as a buffer rather than via a key object. + */ +static int psa_key_derivation_check_input_type( + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_type_t key_type) +{ + switch (step) { + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET: + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET: + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO: + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED: + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD: + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + } + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_internal( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg(operation); + + status = psa_key_derivation_check_input_type(step, key_type); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_hkdf_input(&operation->ctx.hkdf, kdf_alg, + step, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* BUILTIN_ALG_ANY_HKDF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_tls12_prf_input(&operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + step, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input(&operation->ctx.tls12_prf, + step, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + status = psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_input( + &operation->ctx.tls12_ecjpake_to_pms, step, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */ +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_pbkdf2_input(&operation->ctx.pbkdf2, kdf_alg, + step, data, data_length); + } else +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */ + { + /* This can't happen unless the operation object was not initialized */ + (void) data; + (void) data_length; + (void) kdf_alg; + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); + } + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_integer_internal( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + uint64_t value) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg = psa_key_derivation_get_kdf_alg(operation); + +#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg)) { + status = psa_pbkdf2_set_input_cost( + &operation->ctx.pbkdf2, step, value); + } else +#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */ + { + (void) step; + (void) value; + (void) kdf_alg; + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + const uint8_t *data_external, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(data_external, data); + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(data_external, data_length, data); + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal(operation, step, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, + data, data_length); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(data_external, data); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_integer( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + uint64_t value) +{ + return psa_key_derivation_input_integer_internal(operation, step, value); +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, operation->alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); + return status; + } + + /* Passing a key object as a SECRET or PASSWORD input unlocks the + * permission to output to a key object. */ + if (step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET || + step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD) { + operation->can_output_key = 1; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal(operation, + step, slot->attr.type, + slot->key.data, + slot->key.bytes); + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key agreement */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_builtin(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length) +{ + switch (alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) + case PSA_ALG_ECDH: + return mbedtls_psa_key_agreement_ecdh(attributes, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, alg, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH) + case PSA_ALG_FFDH: + return mbedtls_psa_ffdh_key_agreement(attributes, + peer_key, + peer_key_length, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH */ + + default: + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) peer_key; + (void) peer_key_length; + (void) shared_secret; + (void) shared_secret_size; + (void) shared_secret_length; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +} + +/** Internal function for raw key agreement + * Calls the driver wrapper which will hand off key agreement task + * to the driver's implementation if a driver is present. + * Fallback specified in the driver wrapper is built-in raw key agreement + * (psa_key_agreement_raw_builtin). + */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_internal(psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_slot_t *private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length) +{ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return psa_driver_wrapper_key_agreement(&private_key->attr, + private_key->key.data, + private_key->key.bytes, alg, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length); +} + +/* Note that if this function fails, you must call psa_key_derivation_abort() + * to potentially free embedded data structures and wipe confidential data. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_internal(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + psa_key_slot_t *private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + uint8_t shared_secret[PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 }; + size_t shared_secret_length = 0; + psa_algorithm_t ka_alg = PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(operation->alg); + + /* Step 1: run the secret agreement algorithm to generate the shared + * secret. */ + status = psa_key_agreement_raw_internal(ka_alg, + private_key, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + sizeof(shared_secret), + &shared_secret_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Step 2: set up the key derivation to generate key material from + * the shared secret. A shared secret is permitted wherever a key + * of type DERIVE is permitted. */ + status = psa_key_derivation_input_internal(operation, step, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_length); +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(shared_secret, shared_secret_length); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_step_t step, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key_external, + size_t peer_key_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(peer_key_external, peer_key); + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(operation->alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + private_key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, operation->alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(peer_key_external, peer_key_length, peer_key); + status = psa_key_agreement_internal(operation, step, + slot, + peer_key, peer_key_length); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(operation); + } else { + /* If a private key has been added as SECRET, we allow the derived + * key material to be used as a key in PSA Crypto. */ + if (step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET) { + operation->can_output_key = 1; + } + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(peer_key_external, peer_key); + + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_raw_key_agreement(psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key, + const uint8_t *peer_key_external, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + size_t expected_length; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(peer_key_external, peer_key); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + private_key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() is in general an upper bound + * for the output size. The PSA specification only guarantees that this + * function works if output_size >= PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(...), + * but it might be nice to allow smaller buffers if the output fits. + * At the time of writing this comment, with only ECDH implemented, + * PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() is exact so the point is moot. + * If FFDH is implemented, PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() can easily + * be exact for it as well. */ + expected_length = + PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(slot->attr.type, slot->attr.bits); + if (output_size < expected_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(peer_key_external, peer_key_length, peer_key); + status = psa_key_agreement_raw_internal(alg, slot, + peer_key, peer_key_length, + output, output_size, + output_length); + +exit: + /* Check for successful allocation of output, + * with an unsuccessful status. */ + if (output != NULL && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* If an error happens and is not handled properly, the output + * may be used as a key to protect sensitive data. Arrange for such + * a key to be random, which is likely to result in decryption or + * verification errors. This is better than filling the buffer with + * some constant data such as zeros, which would result in the data + * being protected with a reproducible, easily knowable key. + */ + psa_generate_random_internal(output, output_size); + *output_length = output_size; + } + + if (output == NULL) { + /* output allocation failed. */ + *output_length = 0; + } + + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(peer_key_external, peer_key); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Random generation */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +#include "entropy_poll.h" +#endif + +/** Initialize the PSA random generator. + * + * Note: the mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex should be held when calling + * this function if mutexes are enabled. + */ +static void mbedtls_psa_random_init(mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + memset(rng, 0, sizeof(*rng)); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + + /* Set default configuration if + * mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources() hasn't been called. */ + if (rng->entropy_init == NULL) { + rng->entropy_init = mbedtls_entropy_init; + } + if (rng->entropy_free == NULL) { + rng->entropy_free = mbedtls_entropy_free; + } + + rng->entropy_init(&rng->entropy); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) + /* The PSA entropy injection feature depends on using NV seed as an entropy + * source. Add NV seed as an entropy source for PSA entropy injection. */ + mbedtls_entropy_add_source(&rng->entropy, + mbedtls_nv_seed_poll, NULL, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, + MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG); +#endif + + mbedtls_psa_drbg_init(&rng->drbg); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +/** Deinitialize the PSA random generator. + * + * Note: the mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex should be held when calling + * this function if mutexes are enabled. + */ +static void mbedtls_psa_random_free(mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + memset(rng, 0, sizeof(*rng)); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + mbedtls_psa_drbg_free(&rng->drbg); + rng->entropy_free(&rng->entropy); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +/** Seed the PSA random generator. + */ +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_random_seed(mbedtls_psa_random_context_t *rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + /* Do nothing: the external RNG seeds itself. */ + (void) rng; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + const unsigned char drbg_seed[] = "PSA"; + int ret = mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed(&rng->drbg, &rng->entropy, + drbg_seed, sizeof(drbg_seed) - 1); + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_random(uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_generate_random_internal(output, output_size); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) +exit: +#endif + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + return status; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed, + size_t seed_size) +{ + if (psa_get_initialized()) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + } + + if (((seed_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM) || + (seed_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)) || + (seed_size > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + return mbedtls_psa_storage_inject_entropy(seed, seed_size); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + +/** Validate the key type and size for key generation + * + * \param type The key type + * \param bits The number of bits of the key + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key type and size are valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size in bits of the key is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of + * the two is not supported. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_type_and_size_for_key_generation( + psa_key_type_t type, size_t bits) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (key_type_is_raw_bytes(type)) { + status = psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size(type, bits); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } else +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + if (bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + if (bits < PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + /* Accept only byte-aligned keys, for the same reasons as + * in psa_import_rsa_key(). */ + if (bits % 8 != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + } else +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + /* To avoid empty block, return successfully here. */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + if (psa_is_dh_key_size_valid(bits) == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + } else +#endif /* defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, size_t params_data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->type; + + /* Only used for RSA */ + (void) params; + (void) params_data_length; + + if (key_type_is_raw_bytes(type)) { + status = psa_generate_random_internal(key_buffer, key_buffer_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + if (type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES) { + psa_des_set_key_parity(key_buffer, key_buffer_size); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES */ + } else + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + return mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key(attributes, + params, params_data_length, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length); + } else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + return mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key(attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length); + } else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) && PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + return mbedtls_psa_ffdh_generate_key(attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length); + } else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + { + (void) key_buffer_length; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_key_ext(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = NULL; + size_t key_buffer_size; + + *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + /* Reject any attempt to create a zero-length key so that we don't + * risk tripping up later, e.g. on a malloc(0) that returns NULL. */ + if (psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + /* Reject any attempt to create a public key. */ + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(attributes->type)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + if (attributes->type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + if (params->flags != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } else +#endif + if (!psa_key_production_parameters_are_default(params, params_data_length)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + status = psa_start_key_creation(PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE, attributes, + &slot, &driver); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* In the case of a transparent key or an opaque key stored in local + * storage ( thus not in the case of generating a key in a secure element + * with storage ( MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C ) ),we have to allocate a + * buffer to hold the generated key material. */ + if (slot->key.data == NULL) { + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(attributes->lifetime) == + PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE) { + status = psa_validate_key_type_and_size_for_key_generation( + attributes->type, attributes->bits); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + key_buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE( + attributes->type, + attributes->bits); + } else { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + attributes, &key_buffer_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(slot, key_buffer_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key(attributes, + params, params_data_length, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, + &slot->key.bytes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(slot); + } + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = psa_finish_key_creation(slot, driver, key); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_fail_key_creation(slot, driver); + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key) +{ + return psa_generate_key_ext(attributes, + &default_production_parameters, 0, + key); +} + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Module setup */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources( + void (* entropy_init)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx), + void (* entropy_free)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx)) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + if (global_data.rng_state != RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } else { + global_data.rng.entropy_init = entropy_init; + global_data.rng.entropy_free = entropy_free; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + return status; +} +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ + +void mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(void) +{ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + /* Nothing to do to free transaction. */ + if (global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED) { + global_data.initialized &= ~PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED; + } + + if (global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED) { + psa_wipe_all_key_slots(); + global_data.initialized &= ~PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + if (global_data.rng_state != RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED) { + mbedtls_psa_random_free(&global_data.rng); + } + global_data.rng_state = RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&global_data.rng, sizeof(global_data.rng)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + /* Terminate drivers */ + if (global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED) { + psa_driver_wrapper_free(); + global_data.initialized &= ~PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + +} + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) +/** Recover a transaction that was interrupted by a power failure. + * + * This function is called during initialization, before psa_crypto_init() + * returns. If this function returns a failure status, the initialization + * fails. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_recover_transaction( + const psa_crypto_transaction_t *transaction) +{ + switch (transaction->unknown.type) { + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY: + case PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY: + /* TODO - fall through to the failure case until this + * is implemented. + * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/218 + */ + default: + /* We found an unsupported transaction in the storage. + * We don't know what state the storage is in. Give up. */ + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } +} +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_init_subsystem(mbedtls_psa_crypto_subsystem subsystem) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + uint8_t driver_wrappers_initialized = 0; + + switch (subsystem) { + case PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + if (!(global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED)) { + /* Init drivers */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_init(); + + /* Drivers need shutdown regardless of startup errors. */ + global_data.initialized |= PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED; + + + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + break; + + case PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + if (!(global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED)) { + status = psa_initialize_key_slots(); + + /* Need to wipe keys even if initialization fails. */ + global_data.initialized |= PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS_INITIALIZED; + + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + break; + + case PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_RNG: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + driver_wrappers_initialized = + (global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_INITIALIZED); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + /* Need to use separate mutex here, as initialisation can require + * testing of init flags, which requires locking the global data + * mutex. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + /* Initialize and seed the random generator. */ + if (global_data.rng_state == RNG_NOT_INITIALIZED && driver_wrappers_initialized) { + mbedtls_psa_random_init(&global_data.rng); + global_data.rng_state = RNG_INITIALIZED; + + status = mbedtls_psa_random_seed(&global_data.rng); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + global_data.rng_state = RNG_SEEDED; + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + break; + + case PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + if (!(global_data.initialized & PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED)) { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) + status = psa_crypto_load_transaction(); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = psa_crypto_recover_transaction(&psa_crypto_transaction); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + global_data.initialized |= PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED; + } + status = psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); + } else if (status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + /* There's no transaction to complete. It's all good. */ + global_data.initialized |= PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#else /* defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) */ + global_data.initialized |= PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION_INITIALIZED; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) */ + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex)); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + break; + + default: + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + /* Exit label only required when using threading macros. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +exit: +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_init(void) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + /* Double initialization is explicitly allowed. Early out if everything is + * done. */ + if (psa_get_initialized()) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_crypto_init_subsystem(PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_DRIVER_WRAPPERS); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_crypto_init_subsystem(PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_KEY_SLOTS); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_crypto_init_subsystem(PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_RNG); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_crypto_init_subsystem(PSA_CRYPTO_SUBSYSTEM_TRANSACTION); + +exit: + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(); + } + + return status; +} + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SOME_PAKE) +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password_len( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + size_t *password_len) +{ + if (inputs->password_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + *password_len = inputs->password_len; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_size, size_t *buffer_length) +{ + if (inputs->password_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (buffer_size < inputs->password_len) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(buffer, inputs->password, inputs->password_len); + *buffer_length = inputs->password_len; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user_len( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + size_t *user_len) +{ + if (inputs->user_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + *user_len = inputs->user_len; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + uint8_t *user_id, size_t user_id_size, size_t *user_id_len) +{ + if (inputs->user_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (user_id_size < inputs->user_len) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(user_id, inputs->user, inputs->user_len); + *user_id_len = inputs->user_len; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer_len( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + size_t *peer_len) +{ + if (inputs->peer_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + *peer_len = inputs->peer_len; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + uint8_t *peer_id, size_t peer_id_size, size_t *peer_id_length) +{ + if (inputs->peer_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (peer_id_size < inputs->peer_len) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(peer_id, inputs->peer, inputs->peer_len); + *peer_id_length = inputs->peer_len; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_cipher_suite( + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs, + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + if (inputs->cipher_suite.algorithm == PSA_ALG_NONE) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + *cipher_suite = inputs->cipher_suite; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_setup( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_SETUP) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(cipher_suite->algorithm) == 0 || + PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(cipher_suite->hash) == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + memset(&operation->data.inputs, 0, sizeof(operation->data.inputs)); + + operation->alg = cipher_suite->algorithm; + operation->primitive = PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(cipher_suite->type, + cipher_suite->family, cipher_suite->bits); + operation->data.inputs.cipher_suite = *cipher_suite; + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + psa_jpake_computation_stage_t *computation_stage = + &operation->computation_stage.jpake; + + memset(computation_stage, 0, sizeof(*computation_stage)); + computation_stage->step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + } else +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + + operation->stage = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +exit: + psa_pake_abort(operation); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t password) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + psa_key_type_t type; + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(password, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, + operation->alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + type = psa_get_key_type(&slot->attr); + + if (type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD && + type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + operation->data.inputs.password = mbedtls_calloc(1, slot->key.bytes); + if (operation->data.inputs.password == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto exit; + } + + memcpy(operation->data.inputs.password, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes); + operation->data.inputs.password_len = slot->key.bytes; + operation->data.inputs.attributes = slot->attr; + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_pake_abort(operation); + } + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_user( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *user_id_external, + size_t user_id_len) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(user_id_external, user_id); + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (user_id_len == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->data.inputs.user_len != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + operation->data.inputs.user = mbedtls_calloc(1, user_id_len); + if (operation->data.inputs.user == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(user_id_external, user_id_len, user_id); + + memcpy(operation->data.inputs.user, user_id, user_id_len); + operation->data.inputs.user_len = user_id_len; + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + +exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(user_id_external, user_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_pake_abort(operation); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_peer( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *peer_id_external, + size_t peer_id_len) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(peer_id_external, peer_id); + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (peer_id_len == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if (operation->data.inputs.peer_len != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + operation->data.inputs.peer = mbedtls_calloc(1, peer_id_len); + if (operation->data.inputs.peer == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(peer_id_external, peer_id_len, peer_id); + + memcpy(operation->data.inputs.peer, peer_id, peer_id_len); + operation->data.inputs.peer_len = peer_id_len; + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + +exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(peer_id_external, peer_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_pake_abort(operation); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_set_role( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_role_t role) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + case PSA_ALG_JPAKE: + if (role == PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; +#endif + default: + (void) role; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } +exit: + psa_pake_abort(operation); + return status; +} + +/* Auxiliary function to convert core computation stage to single driver step. */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) +static psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t convert_jpake_computation_stage_to_driver_step( + psa_jpake_computation_stage_t *stage) +{ + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t key_share_step; + if (stage->round == PSA_JPAKE_FIRST) { + int is_x1; + + if (stage->io_mode == PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT) { + is_x1 = (stage->outputs < 1); + } else { + is_x1 = (stage->inputs < 1); + } + + key_share_step = is_x1 ? + PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE : + PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + } else if (stage->round == PSA_JPAKE_SECOND) { + key_share_step = (stage->io_mode == PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT) ? + PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE : + PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + } else { + return PSA_JPAKE_STEP_INVALID; + } + return (psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t) (key_share_step + stage->step - PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE); +} +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + +static psa_status_t psa_pake_complete_inputs( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* Create copy of the inputs on stack as inputs share memory + with the driver context which will be setup by the driver. */ + psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t inputs = operation->data.inputs; + + if (inputs.password_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + if (inputs.user_len == 0 || inputs.peer_len == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + } + + /* Clear driver context */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&operation->data, sizeof(operation->data)); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_pake_setup(operation, &inputs); + + /* Driver is responsible for creating its own copy of the password. */ + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(inputs.password, inputs.password_len); + + /* User and peer are translated to role. */ + mbedtls_free(inputs.user); + mbedtls_free(inputs.peer); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + operation->stage = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION; + } else +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + } + return status; +} + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) +static psa_status_t psa_jpake_prologue( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_step_t step, + psa_jpake_io_mode_t io_mode) +{ + if (step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE && + step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC && + step != PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + psa_jpake_computation_stage_t *computation_stage = + &operation->computation_stage.jpake; + + if (computation_stage->round != PSA_JPAKE_FIRST && + computation_stage->round != PSA_JPAKE_SECOND) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + /* Check that the step we are given is the one we were expecting */ + if (step != computation_stage->step) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + if (step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE && + computation_stage->inputs == 0 && + computation_stage->outputs == 0) { + /* Start of the round, so function decides whether we are inputting + * or outputting */ + computation_stage->io_mode = io_mode; + } else if (computation_stage->io_mode != io_mode) { + /* Middle of the round so the mode we are in must match the function + * called by the user */ + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_jpake_epilogue( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_jpake_io_mode_t io_mode) +{ + psa_jpake_computation_stage_t *stage = + &operation->computation_stage.jpake; + + if (stage->step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) { + /* End of an input/output */ + if (io_mode == PSA_JPAKE_INPUT) { + stage->inputs++; + if (stage->inputs == PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_INPUTS(stage->round)) { + stage->io_mode = PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT; + } + } + if (io_mode == PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT) { + stage->outputs++; + if (stage->outputs == PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_OUTPUTS(stage->round)) { + stage->io_mode = PSA_JPAKE_INPUT; + } + } + if (stage->inputs == PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_INPUTS(stage->round) && + stage->outputs == PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_OUTPUTS(stage->round)) { + /* End of a round, move to the next round */ + stage->inputs = 0; + stage->outputs = 0; + stage->round++; + } + stage->step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + } else { + stage->step++; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + +psa_status_t psa_pake_output( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output_external, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t driver_step = PSA_JPAKE_STEP_INVALID; + LOCAL_OUTPUT_DECLARE(output_external, output); + *output_length = 0; + + if (operation->stage == PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = psa_pake_complete_inputs(operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (output_size == 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + case PSA_ALG_JPAKE: + status = psa_jpake_prologue(operation, step, PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + driver_step = convert_jpake_computation_stage_to_driver_step( + &operation->computation_stage.jpake); + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + default: + (void) step; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_OUTPUT_ALLOC(output_external, output_size, output); + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_pake_output(operation, driver_step, + output, output_size, output_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + case PSA_ALG_JPAKE: + status = psa_jpake_epilogue(operation, PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + default: + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + LOCAL_OUTPUT_FREE(output_external, output); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_pake_abort(operation); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_input( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input_external, + size_t input_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t driver_step = PSA_JPAKE_STEP_INVALID; + const size_t max_input_length = (size_t) PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(operation->alg, + operation->primitive, + step); + LOCAL_INPUT_DECLARE(input_external, input); + + if (operation->stage == PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + status = psa_pake_complete_inputs(operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + + if (input_length == 0 || input_length > max_input_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + case PSA_ALG_JPAKE: + status = psa_jpake_prologue(operation, step, PSA_JPAKE_INPUT); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + driver_step = convert_jpake_computation_stage_to_driver_step( + &operation->computation_stage.jpake); + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + default: + (void) step; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + + LOCAL_INPUT_ALLOC(input_external, input_length, input); + status = psa_driver_wrapper_pake_input(operation, driver_step, + input, input_length); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + case PSA_ALG_JPAKE: + status = psa_jpake_epilogue(operation, PSA_JPAKE_INPUT); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + default: + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + LOCAL_INPUT_FREE(input_external, input); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_pake_abort(operation); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_get_implicit_key( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *output) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t shared_key[MBEDTLS_PSA_JPAKE_BUFFER_SIZE]; + size_t shared_key_len = 0; + + if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + psa_jpake_computation_stage_t *computation_stage = + &operation->computation_stage.jpake; + if (computation_stage->round != PSA_JPAKE_FINISHED) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto exit; + } + } else +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_pake_get_implicit_key(operation, + shared_key, + sizeof(shared_key), + &shared_key_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(output, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + shared_key, + shared_key_len); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(shared_key, sizeof(shared_key)); +exit: + abort_status = psa_pake_abort(operation); + return status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_pake_abort( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + + if (operation->stage == PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION) { + status = psa_driver_wrapper_pake_abort(operation); + } + + if (operation->stage == PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) { + if (operation->data.inputs.password != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->data.inputs.password, + operation->data.inputs.password_len); + } + if (operation->data.inputs.user != NULL) { + mbedtls_free(operation->data.inputs.user); + } + if (operation->data.inputs.peer != NULL) { + mbedtls_free(operation->data.inputs.peer); + } + } + memset(operation, 0, sizeof(psa_pake_operation_t)); + + return status; +} +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SOME_PAKE */ + +/* Memory copying test hooks. These are called before input copy, after input + * copy, before output copy and after output copy, respectively. + * They are used by memory-poisoning tests to temporarily unpoison buffers + * while they are copied. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +void (*psa_input_pre_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len) = NULL; +void (*psa_input_post_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len) = NULL; +void (*psa_output_pre_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *output, size_t output_len) = NULL; +void (*psa_output_post_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *output, size_t output_len) = NULL; +#endif + +/** Copy from an input buffer to a local copy. + * + * \param[in] input Pointer to input buffer. + * \param[in] input_len Length of the input buffer. + * \param[out] input_copy Pointer to a local copy in which to store the input data. + * \param[out] input_copy_len Length of the local copy buffer. + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS, if the buffer was successfully + * copied. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED, if the local + * copy is too small to hold contents of the + * input buffer. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +psa_status_t psa_crypto_copy_input(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len, + uint8_t *input_copy, size_t input_copy_len) +{ + if (input_len > input_copy_len) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if (psa_input_pre_copy_hook != NULL) { + psa_input_pre_copy_hook(input, input_len); + } +#endif + + if (input_len > 0) { + memcpy(input_copy, input, input_len); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if (psa_input_post_copy_hook != NULL) { + psa_input_post_copy_hook(input, input_len); + } +#endif + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Copy from a local output buffer into a user-supplied one. + * + * \param[in] output_copy Pointer to a local buffer containing the output. + * \param[in] output_copy_len Length of the local buffer. + * \param[out] output Pointer to user-supplied output buffer. + * \param[out] output_len Length of the user-supplied output buffer. + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS, if the buffer was successfully + * copied. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, if the + * user-supplied output buffer is too small to + * hold the contents of the local buffer. + */ +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +psa_status_t psa_crypto_copy_output(const uint8_t *output_copy, size_t output_copy_len, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_len) +{ + if (output_len < output_copy_len) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if (psa_output_pre_copy_hook != NULL) { + psa_output_pre_copy_hook(output, output_len); + } +#endif + + if (output_copy_len > 0) { + memcpy(output, output_copy, output_copy_len); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + if (psa_output_post_copy_hook != NULL) { + psa_output_post_copy_hook(output, output_len); + } +#endif + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_input_alloc(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len, + psa_crypto_local_input_t *local_input) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + *local_input = PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_INPUT_INIT; + + if (input_len == 0) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + local_input->buffer = mbedtls_calloc(input_len, 1); + if (local_input->buffer == NULL) { + /* Since we dealt with the zero-length case above, we know that + * a NULL return value means a failure of allocation. */ + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + /* From now on, we must free local_input->buffer on error. */ + + local_input->length = input_len; + + status = psa_crypto_copy_input(input, input_len, + local_input->buffer, local_input->length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +error: + mbedtls_free(local_input->buffer); + local_input->buffer = NULL; + local_input->length = 0; + return status; +} + +void psa_crypto_local_input_free(psa_crypto_local_input_t *local_input) +{ + mbedtls_free(local_input->buffer); + local_input->buffer = NULL; + local_input->length = 0; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_output_alloc(uint8_t *output, size_t output_len, + psa_crypto_local_output_t *local_output) +{ + *local_output = PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_OUTPUT_INIT; + + if (output_len == 0) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + local_output->buffer = mbedtls_calloc(output_len, 1); + if (local_output->buffer == NULL) { + /* Since we dealt with the zero-length case above, we know that + * a NULL return value means a failure of allocation. */ + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + local_output->length = output_len; + local_output->original = output; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_output_free(psa_crypto_local_output_t *local_output) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + if (local_output->buffer == NULL) { + local_output->length = 0; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if (local_output->original == NULL) { + /* We have an internal copy but nothing to copy back to. */ + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + status = psa_crypto_copy_output(local_output->buffer, local_output->length, + local_output->original, local_output->length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + mbedtls_free(local_output->buffer); + local_output->buffer = NULL; + local_output->length = 0; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_aead.c b/library/psa_crypto_aead.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a201985b4f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_aead.c @@ -0,0 +1,649 @@ +/* + * PSA AEAD entry points + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include "psa_crypto_aead.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" + +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ccm.h" +#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/gcm.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id; + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + size_t key_bits = attributes->bits; + (void) key_buffer_size; + + status = mbedtls_cipher_values_from_psa(alg, attributes->type, + &key_bits, &mode, &cipher_id); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + switch (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(alg, 0)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 0): + operation->alg = PSA_ALG_CCM; + /* CCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16. + * The call to mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag or + * mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt will validate the tag length. */ + if (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(attributes->type) != 16) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + mbedtls_ccm_init(&operation->ctx.ccm); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_setkey(&operation->ctx.ccm, cipher_id, + key_buffer, (unsigned int) key_bits)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 0): + operation->alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + /* GCM allows the following tag lengths: 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. + * The call to mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag or + * mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt will validate the tag length. */ + if (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(attributes->type) != 16) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + mbedtls_gcm_init(&operation->ctx.gcm); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&operation->ctx.gcm, cipher_id, + key_buffer, (unsigned int) key_bits)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0): + operation->alg = PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305; + /* We only support the default tag length. */ + if (alg != PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + mbedtls_chachapoly_init(&operation->ctx.chachapoly); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(&operation->ctx.chachapoly, + key_buffer)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + + default: + (void) status; + (void) key_buffer; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + operation->key_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); + + operation->tag_length = PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + uint8_t *tag; + + status = psa_aead_setup(&operation, attributes, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* For all currently supported modes, the tag is at the end of the + * ciphertext. */ + if (ciphertext_size < (plaintext_length + operation.tag_length)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + tag = ciphertext + plaintext_length; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(&operation.ctx.ccm, + plaintext_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + plaintext, ciphertext, + tag, operation.tag_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(&operation.ctx.gcm, + MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT, + plaintext_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, ciphertext, + operation.tag_length, tag)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + if (operation.tag_length != 16) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag(&operation.ctx.chachapoly, + plaintext_length, + nonce, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + plaintext, + ciphertext, + tag)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) tag; + (void) nonce; + (void) nonce_length; + (void) additional_data; + (void) additional_data_length; + (void) plaintext; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *ciphertext_length = plaintext_length + operation.tag_length; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(&operation); + + return status; +} + +/* Locate the tag in a ciphertext buffer containing the encrypted data + * followed by the tag. Return the length of the part preceding the tag in + * *plaintext_length. This is the size of the plaintext in modes where + * the encrypted data has the same size as the plaintext, such as + * CCM and GCM. */ +static psa_status_t psa_aead_unpadded_locate_tag(size_t tag_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_length, + size_t plaintext_size, + const uint8_t **p_tag) +{ + size_t payload_length; + if (tag_length > ciphertext_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + payload_length = ciphertext_length - tag_length; + if (payload_length > plaintext_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + *p_tag = ciphertext + payload_length; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; + const uint8_t *tag = NULL; + + status = psa_aead_setup(&operation, attributes, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_aead_unpadded_locate_tag(operation.tag_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext_size, &tag); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(&operation.ctx.ccm, + ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + ciphertext, plaintext, + tag, operation.tag_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(&operation.ctx.gcm, + ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + tag, operation.tag_length, + ciphertext, plaintext)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if (operation.alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + if (operation.tag_length != 16) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(&operation.ctx.chachapoly, + ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length, + nonce, + additional_data, + additional_data_length, + tag, + ciphertext, + plaintext)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) nonce; + (void) nonce_length; + (void) additional_data; + (void) additional_data_length; + (void) plaintext; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *plaintext_length = ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(&operation); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *plaintext_length = ciphertext_length - operation.tag_length; + } + return status; +} + +/* Set the key and algorithm for a multipart authenticated encryption + * operation. */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_aead_setup(operation, attributes, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, alg); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->is_encrypt = 1; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Set the key and algorithm for a multipart authenticated decryption + * operation. */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_aead_setup(operation, attributes, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, alg); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + operation->is_encrypt = 0; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Set a nonce for the multipart AEAD operation*/ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_starts(&operation->ctx.gcm, + operation->is_encrypt ? + MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, + nonce, + nonce_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_starts(&operation->ctx.ccm, + operation->is_encrypt ? + MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT : MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT, + nonce, + nonce_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + /* Note - ChaChaPoly allows an 8 byte nonce, but we would have to + * allocate a buffer in the operation, copy the nonce to it and pad + * it, so for now check the nonce is 12 bytes, as + * mbedtls_chachapoly_starts() assumes it can read 12 bytes from the + * passed in buffer. */ + if (nonce_length != 12) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_starts(&operation->ctx.chachapoly, + nonce, + operation->is_encrypt ? + MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT : + MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) operation; + (void) nonce; + (void) nonce_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD. */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + size_t ad_length, + size_t plaintext_length) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + return mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(&operation->ctx.ccm, + ad_length, + plaintext_length, + operation->tag_length)); + + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ + (void) operation; + (void) ad_length; + (void) plaintext_length; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/* Pass additional data to an active multipart AEAD operation. */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&operation->ctx.gcm, input, input_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(&operation->ctx.ccm, input, input_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad(&operation->ctx.chachapoly, + input, + input_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) operation; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active multipart AEAD + * operation.*/ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + size_t update_output_length; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + update_output_length = input_length; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_update(&operation->ctx.gcm, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, + &update_output_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + if (output_size < input_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_update(&operation->ctx.ccm, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, + &update_output_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + if (output_size < input_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_update(&operation->ctx.chachapoly, + input_length, + input, + output)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) operation; + (void) input; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *output_length = update_output_length; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Finish encrypting a message in a multipart AEAD operation. */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_finish( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_size, + size_t *tag_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t finish_output_size = 0; + + if (tag_size < operation->tag_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_GCM) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_gcm_finish(&operation->ctx.gcm, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length, + tag, operation->tag_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CCM) { + /* tag must be big enough to store a tag of size passed into set + * lengths. */ + if (tag_size < operation->tag_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ccm_finish(&operation->ctx.ccm, + tag, operation->tag_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) { + /* Belt and braces. Although the above tag_size check should have + * already done this, if we later start supporting smaller tag sizes + * for chachapoly, then passing a tag buffer smaller than 16 into here + * could cause a buffer overflow, so better safe than sorry. */ + if (tag_size < 16) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(&operation->ctx.chachapoly, + tag)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + { + (void) ciphertext; + (void) ciphertext_size; + (void) ciphertext_length; + (void) tag; + (void) tag_size; + (void) tag_length; + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* This will be zero for all supported algorithms currently, but left + * here for future support. */ + *ciphertext_length = finish_output_size; + *tag_length = operation->tag_length; + } + + return status; +} + +/* Abort an AEAD operation */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_abort( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation) +{ + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_CCM: + mbedtls_ccm_free(&operation->ctx.ccm); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_GCM: + mbedtls_gcm_free(&operation->ctx.gcm); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305: + mbedtls_chachapoly_free(&operation->ctx.chachapoly); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */ + } + + operation->is_encrypt = 0; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_aead.h b/library/psa_crypto_aead.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a3392199f61 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_aead.h @@ -0,0 +1,499 @@ +/* + * PSA AEAD driver entry points + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD_H + +#include + +/** + * \brief Process an authenticated encryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_encrypt entry point. This function behaves as an aead_encrypt + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute. + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce buffer in bytes. This must + * be appropriate for the selected algorithm. + * The default nonce size is + * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) where + * key_type is the type of key. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that will be authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] plaintext Data that will be authenticated and encrypted. + * \param plaintext_length Size of plaintext in bytes. + * \param[out] ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and + * encrypted data. The additional data is not + * part of this output. For algorithms where the + * encrypted data and the authentication tag are + * defined as separate outputs, the + * authentication tag is appended to the + * encrypted data. + * \param ciphertext_size Size of the ciphertext buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected algorithm + * and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, + * plaintext_length) where key_type is the type + * of key. + * - PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( + * plaintext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * ciphertext size of any supported AEAD + * encryption. + * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output in the + * ciphertext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * ciphertext_size is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length); + +/** + * \brief Process an authenticated decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_decrypt entry point. This function behaves as an aead_decrypt + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute. + * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce buffer in bytes. This must + * be appropriate for the selected algorithm. + * The default nonce size is + * PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) where + * key_type is the type of key. + * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that has been authenticated + * but not encrypted. + * \param additional_data_length Size of additional_data in bytes. + * \param[in] ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and + * encrypted. For algorithms where the encrypted + * data and the authentication tag are defined + * as separate inputs, the buffer contains + * encrypted data followed by the authentication + * tag. + * \param ciphertext_length Size of ciphertext in bytes. + * \param[out] plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data. + * \param plaintext_size Size of the plaintext buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected algorithm + * and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, + * ciphertext_length) where key_type is the + * type of key. + * - PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE( + * ciphertext_length) evaluates to the maximum + * plaintext size of any supported AEAD + * decryption. + * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the size of the output in the + * plaintext buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The cipher is not authentic. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * plaintext_size is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length); + +/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated encryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_encrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as an + * aead_encrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to + * mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), the operation is reset by the PSA core by a + * call to mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). The PSA core may call + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation has been + * initialized, and is required to when the operation is no longer needed. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in + * use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + It must be consistent with the size in bits + recorded in \p attributes. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * An invalid block length was supplied. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * Failed to allocate memory for key material + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_decrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as an + * aead_decrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to + * mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), the PSA core resets the operation by a + * call to mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). The PSA core may call + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation has been + * initialized, and is required to when the operation is no longer needed. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized as per the documentation for + * #mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in + * use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + It must be consistent with the size in bits + recorded in \p attributes. + * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * An invalid block length was supplied. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * Failed to allocate memory for key material + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set the nonce for an authenticated encryption or decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver aead_set_nonce + * entry point. This function behaves as an aead_set_nonce entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * This function sets the nonce for the authenticated + * encryption or decryption operation. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or + * mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core will call + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] nonce Buffer containing the nonce to use. + * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p nonce is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Algorithm previously set is not supported in this configuration of + * the library. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length); + +/** Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver aead_set_lengths + * entry point. This function behaves as an aead_set_lengths entry point + * as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls this function before calling mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad() + * or mbedtls_psa_aead_update() if the algorithm for the operation requires it. + * If the algorithm does not require it, calling this function is optional, but + * if this function is called then the implementation must enforce the lengths. + * + * The PSA core may call this function before or after setting the nonce with + * mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce(). + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_CCM, calling this function is required. + * - For the other AEAD algorithms defined in this specification, calling + * this function is not required. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core calls + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param ad_length Size of the non-encrypted additional + * authenticated data in bytes. + * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext to encrypt in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * At least one of the lengths is not acceptable for the chosen + * algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Algorithm previously set is not supported in this configuration of + * the library. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + size_t ad_length, + size_t plaintext_length); + +/** Pass additional data to an active AEAD operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_update_ad entry point. This function behaves as an aead_update_ad + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * Additional data is authenticated, but not encrypted. + * + * The PSA core can call this function multiple times to pass successive + * fragments of the additional data. It will not call this function after + * passing data to encrypt or decrypt with mbedtls_psa_aead_update(). + * + * Before calling this function, the PSA core will: + * 1. Call either mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or + * mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). + * 2. Set the nonce with mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce(). + * + * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core will call + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the fragment of + * additional data. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Algorithm previously set is not supported in this configuration of + * the library. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active AEAD operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_update entry point. This function behaves as an aead_update entry + * point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * Before calling this function, the PSA core will: + * 1. Call either mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or + * mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). The choice of setup function + * determines whether this function encrypts or decrypts its input. + * 2. Set the nonce with mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce(). + * 3. Call mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad() to pass all the additional data. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core will call + * mbedtls_psa_aead_abort(). + * + * This function does not require the input to be aligned to any + * particular block boundary. If the implementation can only process + * a whole block at a time, it must consume all the input provided, but + * it may delay the end of the corresponding output until a subsequent + * call to mbedtls_psa_aead_update(), mbedtls_psa_aead_finish() provides + * sufficient input. The amount of data that can be delayed in this way is + * bounded by #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to + * encrypt or decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg, \p input_length) where + * \c key_type is the type of key and \c alg is + * the algorithm that were used to set up the + * operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p + * input_length) evaluates to the maximum + * output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg, \p input_length) or + * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length) can be used to + * determine the required buffer size. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_update( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Finish encrypting a message in an AEAD operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_finish entry point. This function behaves as an aead_finish entry + * point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * The operation must have been set up by the PSA core with + * mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup(). + * + * This function finishes the authentication of the additional data + * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to + * mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad() with the plaintext formed by concatenating the + * inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_aead_update(). + * + * This function has two output buffers: + * - \p ciphertext contains trailing ciphertext that was buffered from + * preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_aead_update(). + * - \p tag contains the authentication tag. + * + * Whether or not this function returns successfully, the PSA core subsequently + * calls mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() to deactivate the operation. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation. + * \param[out] ciphertext Buffer where the last part of the ciphertext + * is to be written. + * \param ciphertext_size Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - A sufficient output size is + * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, + * \c alg) where \c key_type is the type of key + * and \c alg is the algorithm that were used to + * set up the operation. + * - #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to + * the maximum output size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the number of bytes of + * returned ciphertext. + * \param[out] tag Buffer where the authentication tag is + * to be written. + * \param tag_size Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes. + * This must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key: + * - The exact tag size is #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c + * key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg) where + * \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and + * bit-size of the key, and \c alg are the + * algorithm that were used in the call to + * mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup(). + * - #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the + * maximum tag size of any supported AEAD + * algorithm. + * \param[out] tag_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned tag. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p tag buffer is too small. + * #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c key_type, key_bits, \c alg) or + * #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the required \p tag + * buffer size. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_finish( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_size, + size_t *tag_length); + +/** Abort an AEAD operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * aead_abort entry point. This function behaves as an aead_abort entry + * point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by the PSA core by it calling + * mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup() again. + * + * The PSA core may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized as described in #mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to mbedtls_psa_aead_abort() or + * mbedtls_psa_aead_finish() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized AEAD operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_aead_abort( + mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t *operation); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_AEAD_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c b/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..881d673cc08 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_cipher.c @@ -0,0 +1,724 @@ +/* + * PSA cipher driver entry points + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" + +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +/* mbedtls_cipher_values_from_psa() below only checks if the proper build symbols + * are enabled, but it does not provide any compatibility check between them + * (i.e. if the specified key works with the specified algorithm). This helper + * function is meant to provide this support. + * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa() might be used for the same purpose, but it + * requires CIPHER_C to be enabled. + */ +static psa_status_t mbedtls_cipher_validate_values( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_type_t key_type) +{ + /* Reduce code size - hinting to the compiler about what it can assume allows the compiler to + eliminate bits of the logic below. */ +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 0)); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 0)); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0)); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CTR); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CFB); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_OFB); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_XTS) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_XTS); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7); +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) + MBEDTLS_ASSUME(alg != PSA_ALG_CMAC); +#endif + + if (alg == PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER || + alg == PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0)) { + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + } + + if (alg == PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 0) || + alg == PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 0) || + alg == PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) { + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES || + key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA || + key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + } + + if (alg == PSA_ALG_CTR || + alg == PSA_ALG_CFB || + alg == PSA_ALG_OFB || + alg == PSA_ALG_XTS || + alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING || + alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || + alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 || + alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC) { + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES || + key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA || + key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES || + key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + } + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_cipher_values_from_psa( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + size_t *key_bits, + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t *mode, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t *cipher_id) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id_tmp; + /* Only DES modifies key_bits */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + (void) key_bits; +#endif + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg)) { + alg = PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(alg, 0); + } + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg)) { + switch (alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) + case PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER: + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR) + case PSA_ALG_CTR: + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB) + case PSA_ALG_CFB: + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB) + case PSA_ALG_OFB: + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) + case PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING: + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) + case PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING: + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) + case PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7: + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) + case PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG: + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 0): + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, 0): + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) + case PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, 0): + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY; + break; +#endif + default: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + } else if (alg == PSA_ALG_CMAC) { + *mode = MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB; + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + switch (key_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES: + /* key_bits is 64 for Single-DES, 128 for two-key Triple-DES, + * and 192 for three-key Triple-DES. */ + if (*key_bits == 64) { + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES; + } else { + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES; + } + /* mbedtls doesn't recognize two-key Triple-DES as an algorithm, + * but two-key Triple-DES is functionally three-key Triple-DES + * with K1=K3, so that's how we present it to mbedtls. */ + if (*key_bits == 128) { + *key_bits = 192; + } + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) + case PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20: + cipher_id_tmp = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20; + break; +#endif + default: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + if (cipher_id != NULL) { + *cipher_id = cipher_id_tmp; + } + + return mbedtls_cipher_validate_values(alg, key_type); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + psa_key_type_t key_type, + size_t key_bits, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t *cipher_id) +{ + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id_tmp; + + status = mbedtls_cipher_values_from_psa(alg, key_type, &key_bits, &mode, &cipher_id_tmp); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return NULL; + } + if (cipher_id != NULL) { + *cipher_id = cipher_id_tmp; + } + + return mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher_id_tmp, (int) key_bits, mode); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + +static psa_status_t psa_cipher_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_operation_t cipher_operation) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t key_bits; + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info = NULL; + psa_key_type_t key_type = attributes->type; + + (void) key_buffer_size; + + mbedtls_cipher_init(&operation->ctx.cipher); + + operation->alg = alg; + key_bits = attributes->bits; + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa(alg, key_type, + key_bits, NULL); + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&operation->ctx.cipher, cipher_info); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES) + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES && key_bits == 128) { + /* Two-key Triple-DES is 3-key Triple-DES with K1=K3 */ + uint8_t keys[24]; + memcpy(keys, key_buffer, 16); + memcpy(keys + 16, key_buffer, 8); + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&operation->ctx.cipher, + keys, + 192, cipher_operation); + } else +#endif + { + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&operation->ctx.cipher, key_buffer, + (int) key_bits, cipher_operation); + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) + switch (alg) { + case PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING: + ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&operation->ctx.cipher, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE); + break; + case PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7: + ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&operation->ctx.cipher, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7); + break; + default: + /* The algorithm doesn't involve padding. */ + ret = 0; + break; + } + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 */ + + operation->block_length = (PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(alg) ? 1 : + PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type)); + operation->iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg); + +exit: + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_cipher_setup(operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_cipher_setup(operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, MBEDTLS_DECRYPT); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length) +{ + if (iv_length != operation->iv_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + return mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(&operation->ctx.cipher, + iv, iv_length)); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) +/** Process input for which the algorithm is set to ECB mode. + * + * This requires manual processing, since the PSA API is defined as being + * able to process arbitrary-length calls to psa_cipher_update() with ECB mode, + * but the underlying mbedtls_cipher_update only takes full blocks. + * + * \param ctx The mbedtls cipher context to use. It must have been + * set up for ECB. + * \param[in] input The input plaintext or ciphertext to process. + * \param input_length The number of bytes to process from \p input. + * This does not need to be aligned to a block boundary. + * If there is a partial block at the end of the input, + * it is stored in \p ctx for future processing. + * \param output The buffer where the output is written. It must be + * at least `BS * floor((p + input_length) / BS)` bytes + * long, where `p` is the number of bytes in the + * unprocessed partial block in \p ctx (with + * `0 <= p <= BS - 1`) and `BS` is the block size. + * \param output_length On success, the number of bytes written to \p output. + * \c 0 on error. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS or an error from a hardware accelerator + */ +static psa_status_t psa_cipher_update_ecb( + mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(ctx->cipher_info); + size_t internal_output_length = 0; + *output_length = 0; + + if (input_length == 0) { + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + goto exit; + } + + if (ctx->unprocessed_len > 0) { + /* Fill up to block size, and run the block if there's a full one. */ + size_t bytes_to_copy = block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len; + + if (input_length < bytes_to_copy) { + bytes_to_copy = input_length; + } + + memcpy(&(ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len]), + input, bytes_to_copy); + input_length -= bytes_to_copy; + input += bytes_to_copy; + ctx->unprocessed_len += bytes_to_copy; + + if (ctx->unprocessed_len == block_size) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, + ctx->unprocessed_data, + block_size, + output, &internal_output_length)); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + output += internal_output_length; + *output_length += internal_output_length; + ctx->unprocessed_len = 0; + } + } + + while (input_length >= block_size) { + /* Run all full blocks we have, one by one */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, input, + block_size, + output, &internal_output_length)); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + input_length -= block_size; + input += block_size; + + output += internal_output_length; + *output_length += internal_output_length; + } + + if (input_length > 0) { + /* Save unprocessed bytes for later processing */ + memcpy(&(ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len]), + input, input_length); + ctx->unprocessed_len += input_length; + } + + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + +exit: + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t expected_output_size; + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(operation->alg)) { + /* Take the unprocessed partial block left over from previous + * update calls, if any, plus the input to this call. Remove + * the last partial block, if any. You get the data that will be + * output in this call. */ + expected_output_size = + (operation->ctx.cipher.unprocessed_len + input_length) + / operation->block_length * operation->block_length; + } else { + expected_output_size = input_length; + } + + if (output_size < expected_output_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) { + /* mbedtls_cipher_update has an API inconsistency: it will only + * process a single block at a time in ECB mode. Abstract away that + * inconsistency here to match the PSA API behaviour. */ + status = psa_cipher_update_ecb(&operation->ctx.cipher, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING */ + if (input_length == 0) { + /* There is no input, nothing to be done */ + *output_length = 0; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } else { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_update(&operation->ctx.cipher, input, + input_length, output, output_length)); + + if (*output_length > output_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + uint8_t temp_output_buffer[MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + + if (operation->ctx.cipher.unprocessed_len != 0) { + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING || + operation->alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_finish(&operation->ctx.cipher, + temp_output_buffer, + output_length)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (*output_length == 0) { + ; /* Nothing to copy. Note that output may be NULL in this case. */ + } else if (output_size >= *output_length) { + memcpy(output, temp_output_buffer, *output_length); + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(temp_output_buffer, + sizeof(temp_output_buffer)); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation) +{ + /* Sanity check (shouldn't happen: operation->alg should + * always have been initialized to a valid value). */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(operation->alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + mbedtls_cipher_free(&operation->ctx.cipher); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t update_output_length, finish_output_length; + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(&operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (iv_length > 0) { + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv(&operation, iv, iv_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_update(&operation, input, input_length, + output, output_size, + &update_output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( + &operation, + mbedtls_buffer_offset(output, update_output_length), + output_size - update_output_length, &finish_output_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + *output_length = update_output_length + finish_output_length; + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort(&operation); + } else { + mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort(&operation); + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t olength, accumulated_length; + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(&operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (operation.iv_length > 0) { + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv(&operation, + input, operation.iv_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( + &operation, + mbedtls_buffer_offset_const(input, operation.iv_length), + input_length - operation.iv_length, + output, output_size, &olength); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + accumulated_length = olength; + + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( + &operation, + mbedtls_buffer_offset(output, accumulated_length), + output_size - accumulated_length, &olength); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + *output_length = accumulated_length + olength; + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort(&operation); + } else { + mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort(&operation); + } + + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h b/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..cc565851cc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_cipher.h @@ -0,0 +1,316 @@ +/* + * PSA cipher driver entry points and associated auxiliary functions + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CIPHER_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CIPHER_H + +#include +#include + +/** Get Mbed TLS cipher information given the cipher algorithm PSA identifier + * as well as the PSA type and size of the key to be used with the cipher + * algorithm. + * + * \param[in] alg PSA cipher algorithm identifier + * \param[in] key_type PSA key type + * \param[in,out] key_bits Size of the key in bits. The value provided in input + * might be updated if necessary. + * \param[out] mode Mbed TLS cipher mode + * \param[out] cipher_id Mbed TLS cipher algorithm identifier + * + * \return On success \c PSA_SUCCESS is returned and key_bits, mode and cipher_id + * are properly updated. + * \c PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED is returned if the cipher algorithm is not + * supported. + */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_cipher_values_from_psa(psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_type_t key_type, + size_t *key_bits, mbedtls_cipher_mode_t *mode, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t *cipher_id); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) +/** Get Mbed TLS cipher information given the cipher algorithm PSA identifier + * as well as the PSA type and size of the key to be used with the cipher + * algorithm. + * + * \param alg PSA cipher algorithm identifier + * \param key_type PSA key type + * \param key_bits Size of the key in bits + * \param[out] cipher_id Mbed TLS cipher algorithm identifier + * + * \return The Mbed TLS cipher information of the cipher algorithm. + * \c NULL if the PSA cipher algorithm is not supported. + */ +const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_type_t key_type, size_t key_bits, + mbedtls_cipher_id_t *cipher_id); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ + +/** + * \brief Set the key for a multipart symmetric encryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_encrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_encrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It has been + * initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** + * \brief Set the key for a multipart symmetric decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_decrypt_setup entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_decrypt_setup entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It has been + * initialized as per the documentation for + * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set the IV for a symmetric encryption or decryption operation. + * + * This function sets the IV (initialization vector), nonce + * or initial counter value for the encryption or decryption operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_set_iv entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_set_iv entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] iv Buffer containing the IV to use. + * \param[in] iv_length Size of the IV in bytes. It is guaranteed by + * the core to be less or equal to + * PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_length); + +/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active cipher operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_update entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_update entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to + * encrypt or decrypt. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + +/** Finish encrypting or decrypting a message in a cipher operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_finish entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_finish entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( + mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length); + +/** Abort a cipher operation. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_abort entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_abort entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized cipher operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort(mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t *operation); + +/** Encrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_encrypt entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_encrypt entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] iv Buffer containing the IV for encryption. The + * IV has been generated by the core. + * \param[in] iv_length Size of the \p iv in bytes. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to encrypt. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in,out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned output. Initialized to zero + * by the core. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size \p iv_length is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Decrypt a message using a symmetric cipher. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * cipher_decrypt entry point. This function behaves as a + * cipher_decrypt entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg The cipher algorithm to compute + * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that + * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the iv and the ciphertext. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written. + * \param[in] output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned output. Initialized to zero + * by the core. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm, + * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV. + * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for + * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based + * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the + * total input size is not a multiple of the block size. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING + * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes + * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CIPHER_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_client.c b/library/psa_crypto_client.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..72f671d63d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto client code + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +void psa_reset_key_attributes(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + memset(attributes, 0, sizeof(*attributes)); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9462d2e8bec --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -0,0 +1,957 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto core internal interfaces + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H + +/* + * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not + * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which + * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the + * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and + * configuration. + */ +#include "psa/build_info.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +/** + * Tell if PSA is ready for this hash. + * + * \note For now, only checks the state of the driver subsystem, + * not the algorithm. Might do more in the future. + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm (ignored for now). + * + * \return 1 if the driver subsytem is ready, 0 otherwise. + */ +int psa_can_do_hash(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg); + +/** + * Tell if PSA is ready for this cipher. + * + * \note For now, only checks the state of the driver subsystem, + * not the algorithm. Might do more in the future. + * + * \param cipher_alg The cipher algorithm (ignored for now). + * + * \return 1 if the driver subsytem is ready, 0 otherwise. + */ +int psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type_t key_type, psa_algorithm_t cipher_alg); + +typedef enum { + PSA_SLOT_EMPTY = 0, + PSA_SLOT_FILLING, + PSA_SLOT_FULL, + PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, +} psa_key_slot_state_t; + +/** The data structure representing a key slot, containing key material + * and metadata for one key. + */ +typedef struct { + psa_key_attributes_t attr; + + /* + * The current state of the key slot, as described in + * docs/architecture/psa-thread-safety/psa-thread-safety.md. + * + * Library functions can modify the state of a key slot by calling + * psa_key_slot_state_transition. + * + * The state variable is used to help determine whether library functions + * which operate on the slot succeed. For example, psa_finish_key_creation, + * which transfers the state of a slot from PSA_SLOT_FILLING to + * PSA_SLOT_FULL, must fail with error code PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * if the state of the slot is not PSA_SLOT_FILLING. + * + * Library functions which traverse the array of key slots only consider + * slots that are in a suitable state for the function. + * For example, psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory, which finds a slot + * containing a given key ID, will only check slots whose state variable is + * PSA_SLOT_FULL. */ + psa_key_slot_state_t state; + + /* + * Number of functions registered as reading the material in the key slot. + * + * Library functions must not write directly to registered_readers + * + * A function must call psa_register_read(slot) before reading the current + * contents of the slot for an operation. + * They then must call psa_unregister_read(slot) once they have finished + * reading the current contents of the slot. If the key slot mutex is not + * held (when mutexes are enabled), this call must be done via a call to + * psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot). + * A function must call psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot) to check if + * the slot is in use for reading. + * + * This counter is used to prevent resetting the key slot while the library + * may access it. For example, such control is needed in the following + * scenarios: + * . In case of key slot starvation, all key slots contain the description + * of a key, and the library asks for the description of a persistent + * key not present in the key slots, the key slots currently accessed by + * the library cannot be reclaimed to free a key slot to load the + * persistent key. + * . In case of a multi-threaded application where one thread asks to close + * or purge or destroy a key while it is in use by the library through + * another thread. */ + size_t registered_readers; + + /* Dynamically allocated key data buffer. + * Format as specified in psa_export_key(). */ + struct key_data { + uint8_t *data; + size_t bytes; + } key; +} psa_key_slot_t; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + +/** Perform a mutex operation and return immediately upon failure. + * + * Returns PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE if the operation fails + * and status was PSA_SUCCESS. + * + * Assumptions: + * psa_status_t status exists. + * f is a mutex operation which returns 0 upon success. + */ +#define PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(f) \ + do \ + { \ + if ((f) != 0) { \ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + return PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \ + } \ + return status; \ + } \ + } while (0); + +/** Perform a mutex operation and goto exit on failure. + * + * Sets status to PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE if status was PSA_SUCCESS. + * + * Assumptions: + * psa_status_t status exists. + * Label exit: exists. + * f is a mutex operation which returns 0 upon success. + */ +#define PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(f) \ + do \ + { \ + if ((f) != 0) { \ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + status = PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \ + } \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + } while (0); +#endif + +/** Test whether a key slot has any registered readers. + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot to test. + * + * \return 1 if the slot has any registered readers, 0 otherwise. + */ +static inline int psa_key_slot_has_readers(const psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + return slot->registered_readers > 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/** Get the SE slot number of a key from the key slot storing its description. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot to query. This must be a key slot storing + * the description of a key of a dynamically registered + * secure element, otherwise the behaviour is undefined. + */ +static inline psa_key_slot_number_t psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( + const psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + return *((psa_key_slot_number_t *) (slot->key.data)); +} +#endif + +/** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy. + * + * Persistent storage is not affected. + * Sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * + * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to wipe. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The slot has been successfully wiped. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The slot's state was PSA_SLOT_FULL or PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, and + * the amount of registered readers was not equal to 1. Or, + * the slot's state was PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. Or, + * the slot's state was PSA_SLOT_FILLING, and the amount + * of registered readers was not equal to 0. + */ +psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot); + +/** Try to allocate a buffer to an empty key slot. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Key slot to attach buffer to. + * \param[in] buffer_length Requested size of the buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The buffer has been successfully allocated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * Not enough memory was available for allocation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * Trying to allocate a buffer to a non-empty key slot. + */ +psa_status_t psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot, + size_t buffer_length); + +/** Wipe key data from a slot. Preserves metadata such as the policy. */ +psa_status_t psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(psa_key_slot_t *slot); + +/** Copy key data (in export format) into an empty key slot. + * + * This function assumes that the slot does not contain + * any key material yet. On failure, the slot content is unchanged. + * + * \param[in,out] slot Key slot to copy the key into. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key material. + * \param data_length Size of the key buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key has been copied successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * Not enough memory was available for allocation of the + * copy buffer. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS + * There was other key material already present in the slot. + */ +psa_status_t psa_copy_key_material_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length); + +/** Convert an Mbed TLS error code to a PSA error code + * + * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of + * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. + * + * \param ret An Mbed TLS-thrown error code + * + * \return The corresponding PSA error code + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_to_psa_error(int ret); + +/** Import a key in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * import_key entry point. This function behaves as an import_key + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer to contain the key data in output + * format upon successful return. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The key was imported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key data is not correctly formatted. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits); + +/** Export a key in binary format + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver export_key + * entry point. This function behaves as an export_key entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); + +/** Export a public key or the public part of a key pair in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * export_public_key entry point. This function behaves as an + * export_public_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_export_public_key_internal( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); + +/** Whether a key production parameters structure is the default. + * + * Calls to a key generation driver with non-default production parameters + * require a driver supporting custom production parameters. + * + * \param[in] params The key production parameters to check. + * \param params_data_length Size of `params->data` in bytes. + */ +int psa_key_production_parameters_are_default( + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length); + +/** + * \brief Generate a key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to generate. + * \param[in] params The production parameters from + * psa_generate_key_ext(). + * \param params_data_length The size of `params->data` in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was generated successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key size in bits or type not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +psa_status_t psa_generate_key_internal(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, + size_t params_data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length); + +/** Sign a message with a private key. For hash-and-sign algorithms, + * this includes the hashing step. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_message entry point. This function behaves as a sign_message + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \note This function will call the driver for psa_sign_hash + * and go through driver dispatch again. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] input The input message to sign. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of the key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length); + +/** Verify the signature of a message with a public key, using + * a hash-and-sign verification algorithm. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_message entry point. This function behaves as a verify_message + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \note This function will call the driver for psa_verify_hash + * and go through driver dispatch again. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] input The message whose signature is to be verified. + * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_message_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); + +/** Sign an already-calculated hash with a private key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of the key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Verify the signature a hash or short message using a public key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Validate the key bit size for unstructured keys. + * + * \note Check that the bit size is acceptable for a given key type for + * unstructured keys. + * + * \param[in] type The key type + * \param[in] bits The number of bits of the key + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key type and size are valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The size in bits of the key is not valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of + * the two is not supported. + */ +psa_status_t psa_validate_unstructured_key_bit_size(psa_key_type_t type, + size_t bits); + +/** Perform a key agreement and return the raw shared secret, using + built-in raw key agreement functions. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * key_agreement entry point. This function behaves as a key_agreement + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the private key + * context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[in] alg A key agreement algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of the key. + * \param[in] peer_key The buffer containing the key context + * of the peer's public key. + * \param[in] peer_key_length Size of the \p peer_key buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret The buffer to which the shared secret + * is to be written. + * \param[in] shared_secret_size Size of the \p shared_secret buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret_length On success, the number of bytes that make + * up the returned shared secret. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. Shared secret successfully calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm, or + * \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg, + * or \p peer_key is not valid for \p alg or not compatible with + * \p private_key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p shared_secret_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_raw_builtin( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length); + +/** + * \brief Set the maximum number of ops allowed to be executed by an + * interruptible function in a single call. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * interruptible_set_max_ops entry point. This function behaves as an + * interruptible_set_max_ops entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] max_ops The maximum number of ops to be executed in a + * single call, this can be a number from 0 to + * #PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED, where 0 + * is obviously the least amount of work done per + * call. + */ +void mbedtls_psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(uint32_t max_ops); + +/** + * \brief Get the maximum number of ops allowed to be executed by an + * interruptible function in a single call. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * interruptible_get_max_ops entry point. This function behaves as an + * interruptible_get_max_ops entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \return Maximum number of ops allowed to be executed + * by an interruptible function in a single call. + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_psa_interruptible_get_max_ops(void); + +/** + * \brief Get the number of ops that a hash signing operation has taken for the + * previous call. If no call or work has taken place, this will return + * zero. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash_get_num_ops entry point. This function behaves as an + * sign_hash_get_num_ops entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \return Number of ops that were completed + * in the last call to \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_complete(). + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops( + const mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Get the number of ops that a hash verification operation has taken for + * the previous call. If no call or work has taken place, this will + * return zero. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash_get_num_ops entry point. This function behaves as an + * verify_hash_get_num_ops entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \return Number of ops that were completed + * in the last call to \c + * mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_complete(). + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops( + const mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Start signing a hash or short message with a private key, in an + * interruptible manner. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash_start entry point. This function behaves as a + * sign_hash_start entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation started successfully - call \c psa_sign_hash_complete() + * with the same context to complete the operation + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * An unsupported, incorrectly formatted or incorrect type of key was + * used. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED Either no internal interruptible operations + * are currently supported, or the key type is currently unsupported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * There was insufficient memory to load the key representation. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_start( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length); + +/** + * \brief Continue and eventually complete the action of signing a hash or + * short message with a private key, in an interruptible manner. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash_complete entry point. This function behaves as a + * sign_hash_complete entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. This + * must be appropriate for the selected + * algorithm and key. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up + * the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Operation completed successfully + * + * \retval #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE + * Operation was interrupted due to the setting of \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(), there is still work to be done, + * please call this function again with the same operation object. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_complete( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Abort a sign hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver sign_hash_abort + * entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash_abort entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to abort. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation was aborted successfully. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Start reading and verifying a hash or short message, in an + * interruptible manner. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash_start entry point. This function behaves as a + * verify_hash_start entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * the type of the key. + * \param[in] hash The hash whose signature is to be verified. + * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation started successfully - call \c psa_sign_hash_complete() + * with the same context to complete the operation + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * An unsupported or incorrect type of key was used. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Either no internal interruptible operations are currently supported, + * or the key type is currently unsupported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * There was insufficient memory either to load the key representation, + * or to prepare the operation. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_start( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Continue and eventually complete the action of signing a hash or + * short message with a private key, in an interruptible manner. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash_complete entry point. This function behaves as a + * sign_hash_complete entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to use. This must be initialized first. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Operation completed successfully, and the passed signature is valid. + * + * \retval #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE + * Operation was interrupted due to the setting of \c + * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(), there is still work to be done, + * please call this function again with the same operation object. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_complete( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +/** + * \brief Abort a verify signed hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash_abort entry point. This function behaves as a + * verify_hash_abort entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] operation The \c + * mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t + * to abort. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The operation was aborted successfully. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation); + +typedef struct psa_crypto_local_input_s { + uint8_t *buffer; + size_t length; +} psa_crypto_local_input_t; + +#define PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_INPUT_INIT ((psa_crypto_local_input_t) { NULL, 0 }) + +/** Allocate a local copy of an input buffer and copy the contents into it. + * + * \param[in] input Pointer to input buffer. + * \param[in] input_len Length of the input buffer. + * \param[out] local_input Pointer to a psa_crypto_local_input_t struct + * containing a local input copy. + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS, if the buffer was successfully + * copied. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, if a copy of + * the buffer cannot be allocated. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_input_alloc(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len, + psa_crypto_local_input_t *local_input); + +/** Free a local copy of an input buffer. + * + * \param[in] local_input Pointer to a psa_crypto_local_input_t struct + * populated by a previous call to + * psa_crypto_local_input_alloc(). + */ +void psa_crypto_local_input_free(psa_crypto_local_input_t *local_input); + +typedef struct psa_crypto_local_output_s { + uint8_t *original; + uint8_t *buffer; + size_t length; +} psa_crypto_local_output_t; + +#define PSA_CRYPTO_LOCAL_OUTPUT_INIT ((psa_crypto_local_output_t) { NULL, NULL, 0 }) + +/** Allocate a local copy of an output buffer. + * + * \note This does not copy any data from the original + * output buffer but only allocates a buffer + * whose contents will be copied back to the + * original in a future call to + * psa_crypto_local_output_free(). + * + * \param[in] output Pointer to output buffer. + * \param[in] output_len Length of the output buffer. + * \param[out] local_output Pointer to a psa_crypto_local_output_t struct to + * populate with the local output copy. + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS, if the buffer was successfully + * copied. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, if a copy of + * the buffer cannot be allocated. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_output_alloc(uint8_t *output, size_t output_len, + psa_crypto_local_output_t *local_output); + +/** Copy from a local copy of an output buffer back to the original, then + * free the local copy. + * + * \param[in] local_output Pointer to a psa_crypto_local_output_t struct + * populated by a previous call to + * psa_crypto_local_output_alloc(). + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS, if the local output was + * successfully copied back to the original. + * \return #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED, if the output + * could not be copied back to the original. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_output_free(psa_crypto_local_output_t *local_output); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core_common.h b/library/psa_crypto_core_common.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..98fce2cca4e --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_core_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/** + * \file psa_crypto_core_common.h + * + * \brief Utility macros for internal use in the PSA cryptography core. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_COMMON_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_COMMON_H + +/** Return an offset into a buffer. + * + * This is just the addition of an offset to a pointer, except that this + * function also accepts an offset of 0 into a buffer whose pointer is null. + * (`p + n` has undefined behavior when `p` is null, even when `n == 0`. + * A null pointer is a valid buffer pointer when the size is 0, for example + * as the result of `malloc(0)` on some platforms.) + * + * \param p Pointer to a buffer of at least n bytes. + * This may be \p NULL if \p n is zero. + * \param n An offset in bytes. + * \return Pointer to offset \p n in the buffer \p p. + * Note that this is only a valid pointer if the size of the + * buffer is at least \p n + 1. + */ +static inline unsigned char *psa_crypto_buffer_offset( + unsigned char *p, size_t n) +{ + return p == NULL ? NULL : p + n; +} + +/** Return an offset into a read-only buffer. + * + * Similar to mbedtls_buffer_offset(), but for const pointers. + * + * \param p Pointer to a buffer of at least n bytes. + * This may be \p NULL if \p n is zero. + * \param n An offset in bytes. + * \return Pointer to offset \p n in the buffer \p p. + * Note that this is only a valid pointer if the size of the + * buffer is at least \p n + 1. + */ +static inline const unsigned char *psa_crypto_buffer_offset_const( + const unsigned char *p, size_t n) +{ + return p == NULL ? NULL : p + n; +} + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CORE_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ea6aee32eb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h @@ -0,0 +1,2897 @@ +/* + * Functions to delegate cryptographic operations to an available + * and appropriate accelerator. + * Warning: This file is now auto-generated. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + + +/* BEGIN-common headers */ +#include "common.h" +#include "psa_crypto_aead.h" +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" +#include "psa_crypto_pake.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +/* END-common headers */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +/* BEGIN-driver headers */ +/* Headers for mbedtls_test opaque driver */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" + +#endif +/* Headers for mbedtls_test transparent driver */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" + +#endif +/* Headers for p256 transparent driver */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) +#include "../3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.h" + +#endif + +/* END-driver headers */ + +/* Auto-generated values depending on which drivers are registered. + * ID 0 is reserved for unallocated operations. + * ID 1 is reserved for the Mbed TLS software driver. */ +/* BEGIN-driver id definition */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID (1) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID (2) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID (3) +#define P256_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID (4) + +/* END-driver id */ + +/* BEGIN-Common Macro definitions */ + +/* END-Common Macro definitions */ + +/* Support the 'old' SE interface when asked to */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT is defined when either a new-style or old-style + * SE driver is present, to avoid unused argument errors at compile time. */ +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#endif +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_init( void ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + status = psa_init_all_se_drivers( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_init( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_init( ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); +#endif + + (void) status; + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); +} + +static inline void psa_driver_wrapper_free( void ) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Unregister all secure element drivers, so that we restart from + * a pristine state. */ + psa_unregister_all_se_drivers( ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + mbedtls_test_transparent_free( ); + mbedtls_test_opaque_free( ); +#endif +} + +/* Start delegation functions */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + break; + } + + return( psa_sign_message_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_message( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *signature, + size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_message( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + break; + } + + return( psa_verify_message_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length ) +{ + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->asymmetric == NULL || + drv->asymmetric->p_sign == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined in SE, but we have no way to exercise it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->asymmetric->p_sign( + drv_context, *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_size, signature_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_sign_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#if defined (MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( psa_get_key_type(attributes) ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && + !PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC( alg ) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(psa_get_key_type(attributes)) == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 && + psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 256 ) + { + status = p256_transparent_sign_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_sign_hash_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_sign_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_size, + signature_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->asymmetric == NULL || + drv->asymmetric->p_verify == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined in SE, but we have no way to exercise it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->asymmetric->p_verify( + drv_context, *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_signature_verify_hash( + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#if defined (MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( psa_get_key_type(attributes) ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && + !PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC( alg ) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(psa_get_key_type(attributes)) == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 && + psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 256 ) + { + status = p256_transparent_verify_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + return( psa_verify_hash_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_signature_verify_hash( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + hash, + hash_length, + signature, + signature_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline uint32_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_get_num_ops( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + /* If uninitialised, return 0, as no work can have been done. */ + case 0: + return 0; + + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return(mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx)); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + /* Can't happen (see discussion in #8271) */ + return 0; +} + +static inline uint32_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_get_num_ops( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + /* If uninitialised, return 0, as no work can have been done. */ + case 0: + return 0; + + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return (mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops(&operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx)); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + } + + /* Can't happen (see discussion in #8271) */ + return 0; +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_start( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + + /* Add test driver tests here */ + + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_start( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length ); + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + + return( status ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_complete( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, + size_t *signature_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_complete( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + signature, signature_size, + signature_length ) ); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + ( void ) signature; + ( void ) signature_size; + ( void ) signature_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash_abort( + psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_start( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + + /* Add test driver tests here */ + + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_start( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, hash, hash_length, + signature, signature_length ); + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + + return( status ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_complete( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_complete( + &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx + ) ); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash_abort( + psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx + ) ); + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + /* Add test driver tests here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +/** Calculate the key buffer size required to store the key material of a key + * associated with an opaque driver from input key data. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attributes + * \param[in] data The input key data. + * \param[in] data_length The input data length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_size Minimum buffer size to contain the key material. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size_from_key_data( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + size_t *key_buffer_size ) +{ + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); + + *key_buffer_size = 0; + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + *key_buffer_size = mbedtls_test_opaque_size_function( key_type, + PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( data_length ) ); + return( ( *key_buffer_size != 0 ) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + + default: + (void)key_type; + (void)data; + (void)data_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, size_t params_data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes)); + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) + int is_default_production = + psa_key_production_parameters_are_default(params, params_data_length); + if( location != PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE && !is_default_production ) + { + /* We don't support passing custom production parameters + * to drivers yet. */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +#else + int is_default_production = 1; + (void) is_default_production; +#endif + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + size_t pubkey_length = 0; /* We don't support this feature yet */ + if( drv->key_management == NULL || + drv->key_management->p_generate == NULL ) + { + /* Key is defined as being in SE, but we have no way to generate it */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + return( drv->key_management->p_generate( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + attributes, NULL, 0, &pubkey_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + /* Transparent drivers are limited to generating asymmetric keys. */ + /* We don't support passing custom production parameters + * to drivers yet. */ + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC( psa_get_key_type(attributes) ) && + is_default_production ) + { + /* Cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_generate_key( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( psa_get_key_type(attributes) ) && + psa_get_key_type(attributes) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1) && + psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 256 ) + { + status = p256_transparent_generate_key( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + break; + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED */ + } +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Software fallback */ + status = psa_generate_key_internal( + attributes, params, params_data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length ); + break; + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_generate_key( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_buffer_length ); + break; +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + break; + } + + return( status ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, + size_t *bits ) +{ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( drv->key_management == NULL || + drv->key_management->p_import == NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* The driver should set the number of key bits, however in + * case it doesn't, we initialize bits to an invalid value. */ + *bits = PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS + 1; + status = drv->key_management->p_import( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + attributes, data, data_length, bits ); + + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + if( (*bits) > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS ) + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_import_key + (attributes, + data, + data_length, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits + ); + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) ) + status = p256_transparent_import_key + (attributes, + data, + data_length, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits + ); + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_import_key_into_slot( attributes, + data, data_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, bits ) ); + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + case 0x7fffff: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_import_key + (attributes, + data, + data_length, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length, + bits + )); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } + +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) + +{ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( ( drv->key_management == NULL ) || + ( drv->key_management->p_export == NULL ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( drv->key_management->p_export( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + return( psa_export_key_internal( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + case 0x7fffff: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_export_key + (attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length + )); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + return( status ); + } + +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_copy_key( + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *source_key, size_t source_key_length, + uint8_t *target_key_buffer, size_t target_key_buffer_size, + size_t *target_key_buffer_length ) +{ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + /* Copying to a secure element is not implemented yet. */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + case 0x7fffff: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_copy_key + (attributes, + source_key, + source_key_length, + target_key_buffer, + target_key_buffer_size, + target_key_buffer_length + )); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void)source_key; + (void)source_key_length; + (void)target_key_buffer; + (void)target_key_buffer_size; + (void)target_key_buffer_length; + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + return( status ); + +} + +/* + * Cipher functions + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + iv, + iv_length, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + iv, + iv_length, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + iv, + iv_length, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)iv; + (void)iv_length; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#else + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_encrypt_setup( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_encrypt_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)operation; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_decrypt_setup( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_cipher_decrypt_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)operation; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_set_iv( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *iv, + size_t iv_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_set_iv( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + iv, + iv_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_set_iv( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + iv, iv_length ) ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_set_iv( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + iv, iv_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)iv; + (void)iv_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_update( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, + input_length, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_update( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_update( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_finish( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + output, + output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_cipher_abort( + psa_cipher_operation_t *operation ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_cipher_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_abort( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + sizeof( operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); + return( status ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_cipher_abort( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + sizeof( operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ) ); + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +/* + * Hashing functions + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Try accelerators first */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_compute( + alg, input, input_length, hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + + /* If software fallback is compiled in, try fallback */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( alg, input, input_length, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + (void) status; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) hash; + (void) hash_size; + (void) hash_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_setup( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Try setup on accelerators first */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_setup( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + + /* If software fallback is compiled in, try fallback */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + /* Nothing left to try if we fall through here */ + (void) status; + (void) operation; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_clone( + const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation ) +{ + switch( source_operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + target_operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( &source_operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + &target_operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + target_operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_clone( + &source_operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + &target_operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) target_operation; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_update( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_update( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_finish( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_finish( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx, + hash, hash_size, hash_length ) ); +#endif + default: + (void) hash; + (void) hash_size; + (void) hash_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_hash_abort( + psa_hash_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_abort( + &operation->ctx.test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, + uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t *ciphertext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_encrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + plaintext, plaintext_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, ciphertext_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *nonce, size_t nonce_length, + const uint8_t *additional_data, size_t additional_data_length, + const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_size, size_t *plaintext_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_decrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg, + nonce, nonce_length, + additional_data, additional_data_length, + ciphertext, ciphertext_length, + plaintext, plaintext_size, plaintext_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_encrypt_setup( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_psa_aead_encrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + return( status ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_decrypt_setup( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + status = mbedtls_psa_aead_decrypt_setup( + &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + return( status ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_nonce( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *nonce, + size_t nonce_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_set_nonce( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + nonce, + nonce_length ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_set_nonce( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + nonce, nonce_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)nonce; + (void)nonce_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_set_lengths( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + size_t ad_length, + size_t plaintext_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_set_lengths( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + ad_length, + plaintext_length ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_set_lengths( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + ad_length, plaintext_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)ad_length; + (void)plaintext_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update_ad( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_update_ad( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, + input_length ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_update_ad( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_update( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, input_length, + output, output_size, + output_length ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_update( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length, output, output_size, + output_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_finish( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *ciphertext, + size_t ciphertext_size, + size_t *ciphertext_length, + uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_size, + size_t *tag_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + ciphertext, + ciphertext_size, + ciphertext_length, tag, + tag_size, tag_length ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + ciphertext, ciphertext_size, + ciphertext_length, tag, tag_size, tag_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)ciphertext; + (void)ciphertext_size; + (void)ciphertext_length; + (void)tag; + (void)tag_size; + (void)tag_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_verify( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *plaintext, + size_t plaintext_size, + size_t *plaintext_length, + const uint8_t *tag, + size_t tag_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + { + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t check_tag[PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t check_tag_length; + + status = mbedtls_psa_aead_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + plaintext, + plaintext_size, + plaintext_length, + check_tag, + sizeof( check_tag ), + &check_tag_length ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + { + if( tag_length != check_tag_length || + mbedtls_ct_memcmp( tag, check_tag, tag_length ) + != 0 ) + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( check_tag, sizeof( check_tag ) ); + + return( status ); + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_verify( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + plaintext, plaintext_size, + plaintext_length, tag, tag_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + (void)plaintext; + (void)plaintext_size; + (void)plaintext_length; + (void)tag; + (void)tag_length; + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_aead_abort( + psa_aead_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_aead_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_abort( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + } + + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); +} + +/* + * MAC functions + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_compute( + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, + input, input_length, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ); + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + (void) status; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) status; + (void) operation; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_setup( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_setup( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_setup( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg ); + + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID; + + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void) status; + (void) operation; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) alg; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_update( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_update( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_update( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_update( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_finish( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_sign_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_size, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + (void) mac_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_verify_finish( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_finish( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); + + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_verify_finish( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx, + mac, mac_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) mac; + (void) mac_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_mac_abort( + psa_mac_operation_t *operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( &operation->ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_abort( + &operation->ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); + case MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_mac_abort( + &operation->ctx.opaque_test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +/* + * Asymmetric cryptography + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_asymmetric_encrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_asymmetric_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + return( mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, output_length ) + ); + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_asymmetric_encrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, output_length ) + ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)salt; + (void)salt_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_asymmetric_decrypt( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_asymmetric_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, + output_length ); + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + return( mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg,input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, + output_length ) ); + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_asymmetric_decrypt( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, input, input_length, + salt, salt_length, output, output_size, + output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)status; + (void)key_buffer; + (void)key_buffer_size; + (void)alg; + (void)input; + (void)input_length; + (void)salt; + (void)salt_length; + (void)output; + (void)output_size; + (void)output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_key_agreement( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length + ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = + mbedtls_test_transparent_key_agreement( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, peer_key, + peer_key_length, shared_secret, shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) + if( PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC( psa_get_key_type(attributes) ) && + PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(psa_get_key_type(attributes)) == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 && + psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 256 ) + { + status = p256_transparent_key_agreement( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + peer_key, + peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length ); + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) + return( status ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + /* Software Fallback */ + status = psa_key_agreement_raw_builtin( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + alg, + peer_key, + peer_key_length, + shared_secret, + shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length ); + return( status ); +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_key_agreement( attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg, peer_key, + peer_key_length, shared_secret, shared_secret_size, + shared_secret_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + + default: + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) peer_key; + (void) peer_key_length; + (void) shared_secret; + (void) shared_secret_size; + (void) shared_secret_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_pake_setup( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs ) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + psa_key_location_t location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime( &inputs->attributes ) ); + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_pake_setup( + &operation->data.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + inputs ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID; + /* Declared with fallback == true */ + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) + status = mbedtls_psa_pake_setup( &operation->data.ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + inputs ); + if( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) + operation->id = PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID; +#endif + return status; + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + (void)operation; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_pake_output( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_pake_output( &operation->data.ctx.mbedtls_ctx, step, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_pake_output( + &operation->data.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + step, output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) step; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_pake_input( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_pake_input( &operation->data.ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + step, input, + input_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_pake_input( + &operation->data.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + step, + input, input_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) step; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_pake_get_implicit_key( + psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &operation->data.ctx.mbedtls_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_pake_get_implicit_key( + &operation->data.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx, + output, output_size, output_length ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +static inline psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_pake_abort( + psa_pake_operation_t * operation ) +{ + switch( operation->id ) + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) + case PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_psa_pake_abort( &operation->data.ctx.mbedtls_ctx ) ); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID: + return( mbedtls_test_transparent_pake_abort( + &operation->data.ctx.transparent_test_driver_ctx ) ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..de8a5269b34 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c @@ -0,0 +1,256 @@ +/* + * Functions to delegate cryptographic operations to an available + * and appropriate accelerator. + * Warning: This file is now auto-generated. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + + +/* BEGIN-common headers */ +#include "common.h" +#include "psa_crypto_aead.h" +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" +#include "psa_crypto_pake.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +/* END-common headers */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +/* BEGIN-driver headers */ +/* Headers for mbedtls_test opaque driver */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" + +#endif +/* Headers for mbedtls_test transparent driver */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) +#include "test/drivers/test_driver.h" + +#endif +/* Headers for p256 transparent driver */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) +#include "../3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_entrypoints.h" + +#endif + +/* END-driver headers */ + +/* Auto-generated values depending on which drivers are registered. + * ID 0 is reserved for unallocated operations. + * ID 1 is reserved for the Mbed TLS software driver. */ +/* BEGIN-driver id definition */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MBED_TLS_DRIVER_ID (1) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_OPAQUE_DRIVER_ID (2) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID (3) +#define P256_TRANSPARENT_DRIVER_ID (4) + +/* END-driver id */ + +/* BEGIN-Common Macro definitions */ + +/* END-Common Macro definitions */ + +/* Support the 'old' SE interface when asked to */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT is defined when either a new-style or old-style + * SE driver is present, to avoid unused argument errors at compile time. */ +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_PRESENT +#endif +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif + +/** Get the key buffer size required to store the key material of a key + * associated with an opaque driver. + * + * \param[in] attributes The key attributes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_size Minimum buffer size to contain the key material + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The minimum size for a buffer to contain the key material has been + * returned successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The type and/or the size in bits of the key or the combination of + * the two is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key is declared with a lifetime not known to us. + */ +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t *key_buffer_size ) +{ + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes); + size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(attributes); + + *key_buffer_size = 0; + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) + case PSA_CRYPTO_TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + /* Emulate property 'builtin_key_size' */ + if( psa_key_id_is_builtin( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID( + psa_get_key_id( attributes ) ) ) ) + { + *key_buffer_size = sizeof( psa_drv_slot_number_t ); + return( PSA_SUCCESS ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + *key_buffer_size = mbedtls_test_opaque_size_function( key_type, + key_bits ); + return( ( *key_buffer_size != 0 ) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */ + + default: + (void)key_type; + (void)key_bits; + return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length ) + +{ + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( + psa_get_key_lifetime( attributes ) ); + + /* Try dynamically-registered SE interface first */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + + if( psa_get_se_driver( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes), &drv, &drv_context ) ) + { + if( ( drv->key_management == NULL ) || + ( drv->key_management->p_export_public == NULL ) ) + { + return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ); + } + + return( drv->key_management->p_export_public( + drv_context, + *( (psa_key_slot_number_t *)key_buffer ), + data, data_size, data_length ) ); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + switch( location ) + { + case PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE: + /* Key is stored in the slot in export representation, so + * cycle through all known transparent accelerators */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + status = mbedtls_test_transparent_export_public_key + (attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length + ); + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) ) + status = p256_transparent_export_public_key + (attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length + ); + + if( status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ) + return( status ); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + /* Fell through, meaning no accelerator supports this operation */ + return( psa_export_public_key_internal( attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length ) ); + + /* Add cases for opaque driver here */ +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + case 0x7fffff: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_export_public_key + (attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + data, + data_size, + data_length + )); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + /* Key is declared with a lifetime not known to us */ + return( status ); + } + +} + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length ) +{ + + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes) ); + switch( location ) + { +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT) + +#if (defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST) ) + case 0x7fffff: + return( mbedtls_test_opaque_get_builtin_key + (slot_number, + attributes, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length + )); +#endif + + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ACCELERATOR_DRIVER_PRESENT */ + default: + (void) slot_number; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) key_buffer_length; + return( PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ); + } + +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..cd617f60ee6 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/* + * Function signatures for functionality that can be provided by + * cryptographic accelerators. + */ +/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_NO_STATIC_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_NO_STATIC_H + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h" + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + size_t *key_buffer_size); + +psa_status_t psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_WRAPPERS_NO_STATIC_H */ + +/* End of automatically generated file. */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..95baff6a0fa --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c @@ -0,0 +1,596 @@ +/* + * PSA ECP layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) +/* Helper function to verify if the provided EC's family and key bit size are valid. + * + * Note: "bits" parameter is used both as input and output and it might be updated + * in case provided input value is not multiple of 8 ("sloppy" bits). + */ +static int check_ecc_parameters(psa_ecc_family_t family, size_t *bits) +{ + switch (family) { + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: + switch (*bits) { + case 192: + case 224: + case 256: + case 384: + case 521: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + case 528: + *bits = 521; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: + switch (*bits) { + case 256: + case 384: + case 512: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY: + switch (*bits) { + case 448: + case 255: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + case 256: + *bits = 255; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: + switch (*bits) { + case 192: + /* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */ + case 256: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + } + + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + psa_key_type_t type, size_t curve_bits, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair **p_ecp) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + size_t curve_bytes = data_length; + int explicit_bits = (curve_bits != 0); + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) && + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type) != PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY) { + /* A Weierstrass public key is represented as: + * - The byte 0x04; + * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian; + * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian. + * So its data length is 2m+1 where m is the curve size in bits. + */ + if ((data_length & 1) == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + curve_bytes = data_length / 2; + + /* Montgomery public keys are represented in compressed format, meaning + * their curve_bytes is equal to the amount of input. */ + + /* Private keys are represented in uncompressed private random integer + * format, meaning their curve_bytes is equal to the amount of input. */ + } + + if (explicit_bits) { + /* With an explicit bit-size, the data must have the matching length. */ + if (curve_bytes != PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } else { + /* We need to infer the bit-size from the data. Since the only + * information we have is the length in bytes, the value of curve_bits + * at this stage is rounded up to the nearest multiple of 8. */ + curve_bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(curve_bytes); + } + + /* Allocate and initialize a key representation. */ + ecp = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecp_keypair)); + if (ecp == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ecp); + + status = check_ecc_parameters(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type), &curve_bits); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Load the group. */ + grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type), + curve_bits); + if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ecp->grp, grp_id)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Load the key material. */ + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type)) { + /* Load the public value. */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, + data, + data_length)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Check that the point is on the curve. */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(&ecp->grp, &ecp->Q)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } else { + /* Load and validate the secret value. */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_read_key(ecp->grp.id, + ecp, + data, + data_length)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + *p_ecp = ecp; +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ecp); + mbedtls_free(ecp); + } + + return status; +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + + /* Parse input */ + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->type, + attributes->bits, + data, + data_length, + &ecp); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(attributes->type) == + PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY) { + *bits = ecp->grp.nbits + 1; + } else { + *bits = ecp->grp.nbits; + } + + /* Re-export the data to PSA export format. There is currently no support + * for other input formats then the export format, so this is a 1-1 + * copy operation. */ + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key(attributes->type, + ecp, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length); +exit: + /* Always free the PK object (will also free contained ECP context) */ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ecp); + mbedtls_free(ecp); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key(psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type)) { + /* Check whether the public part is loaded */ + if (mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(&ecp->Q)) { + /* Calculate the public key */ + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, &ecp->d, &ecp->grp.G, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + data_length, + data, + data_size)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + memset(data, 0, data_size); + } + + return status; + } else { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(ecp, data_length, data, data_size)); + return status; + } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + attributes->type, attributes->bits, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &ecp); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(attributes->type)), + ecp, data, data_size, data_length); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ecp); + mbedtls_free(ecp); + + return status; +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( + attributes->type); + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = + mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, attributes->bits); + + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(grp_id); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair ecp; + + if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE || curve_info == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ecp); + ret = mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(grp_id, &ecp, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ecp); + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(&ecp, key_buffer_length, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size)); + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ecp); + + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ + +/****************************************************************/ +/* ECDSA sign/verify */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t curve_bytes; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->type, + attributes->bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &ecp); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(ecp->grp.pbits); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&s); + + if (signature_size < 2 * curve_bytes) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg); + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(hash_alg); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext( + &ecp->grp, &r, &s, + &ecp->d, hash, + hash_length, md_alg, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE)); +#else + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + } else { + (void) alg; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(&ecp->grp, &r, &s, &ecp->d, + hash, hash_length, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE)); + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&r, + signature, + curve_bytes)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&s, + signature + curve_bytes, + curve_bytes)); +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&s); + if (ret == 0) { + *signature_length = 2 * curve_bytes; + } + + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ecp); + mbedtls_free(ecp); + + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_public_part(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp) +{ + int ret = 0; + + /* Check whether the public part is loaded. If not, load it. */ + if (mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(&ecp->Q)) { + ret = mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ecp->grp, &ecp->Q, + &ecp->d, &ecp->grp.G, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); + } + + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + size_t curve_bytes; + mbedtls_mpi r, s; + + (void) alg; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(attributes->type, + attributes->bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &ecp); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(ecp->grp.pbits); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&s); + + if (signature_length != 2 * curve_bytes) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto cleanup; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&r, + signature, + curve_bytes)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&s, + signature + curve_bytes, + curve_bytes)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_public_part(ecp); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(&ecp->grp, hash, + hash_length, &ecp->Q, + &r, &s)); +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&r); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&s); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ecp); + mbedtls_free(ecp); + + return status; +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) */ + +/****************************************************************/ +/* ECDH Key Agreement */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_key_agreement_ecdh( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *peer_key, size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(attributes->type) || + !PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + attributes->type, + attributes->bits, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &ecp); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *their_key = NULL; + mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh; + size_t bits = 0; + psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ecp->grp.id, &bits); + mbedtls_ecdh_init(&ecdh); + + status = mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve), + bits, + peer_key, + peer_key_length, + &their_key); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ecdh, their_key, MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ecdh, ecp, MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ecdh, + shared_secret_length, + shared_secret, shared_secret_size, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + if (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) != *shared_secret_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(shared_secret, shared_secret_size); + } + mbedtls_ecdh_free(&ecdh); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(their_key); + mbedtls_free(their_key); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ecp); + mbedtls_free(ecp); + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH */ + + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a9f5d59de48 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.h @@ -0,0 +1,267 @@ +/* + * PSA ECP layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H + +#include +#include + +/** Load the contents of a key buffer into an internal ECP representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key contained in \p data. + * \param[in] curve_bits The nominal bit-size of the curve. + * It must be consistent with the representation + * passed in \p data. + * This can be 0, in which case the bit-size + * is inferred from \p data_length (which is possible + * for all key types and representation formats + * formats that are currently supported or will + * be in the foreseeable future). + * \param[in] data The buffer from which to load the representation. + * \param[in] data_length The size in bytes of \p data. + * \param[out] p_ecp Returns a pointer to an ECP context on success. + * The caller is responsible for freeing both the + * contents of the context and the context itself + * when done. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(psa_key_type_t type, + size_t curve_bits, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair **p_ecp); + +/** Load the public part of an internal ECP, if required. + * + * \param ecp The ECP context to load the public part for. + * + * \return PSA_SUCCESS on success, otherwise an MPI error. + */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_public_part(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp); + +/** Import an ECP key in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * import_key entry point. This function behaves as an import_key + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer containing the key data in output + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The ECP key was imported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key data is not correctly formatted. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits); + +/** Export an ECP key to export representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key (public/private) to export + * \param[in] ecp The internal ECP representation from which to export + * \param[out] data The buffer to export to + * \param[in] data_size The length of the buffer to export to + * \param[out] data_length The amount of bytes written to \p data + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_key(psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + +/** Export an ECP public key or the public part of an ECP key pair in binary + * format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * export_public_key entry point. This function behaves as an + * export_public_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The ECP public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); + +/** + * \brief Generate an ECP key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the ECP key to generate. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully generated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key length or type not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length); + +/** Sign an already-calculated hash with ECDSA. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the ECC key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the ECC key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg Randomized or deterministic ECDSA algorithm. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR, \c key_bits, + * \p alg) where \c key_bits is the bit-size of the ECC key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Verify an ECDSA hash or short message signature. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the ECC key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the ECC key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg Randomized or deterministic ECDSA algorithm. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecdsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); + + +/** Perform a key agreement and return the raw ECDH shared secret. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * key_agreement entry point. This function behaves as a key_agreement + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the private key + * context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[in] alg A key agreement algorithm that is + * compatible with the type of the key. + * \param[in] peer_key The buffer containing the key context + * of the peer's public key. + * \param[in] peer_key_length Size of the \p peer_key buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret The buffer to which the shared secret + * is to be written. + * \param[in] shared_secret_size Size of the \p shared_secret buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret_length On success, the number of bytes that make + * up the returned shared secret. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. Shared secret successfully calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm, or + * \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg, + * or \p peer_key is not valid for \p alg or not compatible with + * \p private_key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p shared_secret_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_key_agreement_ecdh( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *peer_key, size_t peer_key_length, + uint8_t *shared_secret, size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length); +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ECP_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c b/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ae38f6d7c6d --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c @@ -0,0 +1,321 @@ +/* + * PSA FFDH layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +/* This header is only needed because it defines + * MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHEXXXX_[P|G]_BIN symbols that are used in + * mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(). Apart from that, this module + * only uses bignum functions for arithmetic. */ +#include + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_ffdh.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH) +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(size_t key_size, + mbedtls_mpi *P, + mbedtls_mpi *G) +{ + const unsigned char *dhm_P = NULL; + const unsigned char *dhm_G = NULL; + size_t dhm_size_P = 0; + size_t dhm_size_G = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (P == NULL && G == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_2048[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_P_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_G_2048[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_3072[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_P_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_G_3072[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_4096[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_P_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_G_4096[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_6144[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_P_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_G_6144[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_8192[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_P_BIN; + static const unsigned char dhm_G_8192[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ + + switch (key_size) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048) + case sizeof(dhm_P_2048): + dhm_P = dhm_P_2048; + dhm_G = dhm_G_2048; + dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_2048); + dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_2048); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072) + case sizeof(dhm_P_3072): + dhm_P = dhm_P_3072; + dhm_G = dhm_G_3072; + dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_3072); + dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_3072); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096) + case sizeof(dhm_P_4096): + dhm_P = dhm_P_4096; + dhm_G = dhm_G_4096; + dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_4096); + dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_4096); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144) + case sizeof(dhm_P_6144): + dhm_P = dhm_P_6144; + dhm_G = dhm_G_6144; + dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_6144); + dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_6144); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192) + case sizeof(dhm_P_8192): + dhm_P = dhm_P_8192; + dhm_G = dhm_G_8192; + dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_8192); + dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_8192); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ + default: + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (P != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(P, dhm_P, + dhm_size_P)); + } + if (G != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(G, dhm_G, + dhm_size_G)); + } + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi GX, G, X, P; + psa_key_type_t type = attributes->type; + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type)) { + if (key_buffer_size > data_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + memcpy(data, key_buffer, key_buffer_size); + memset(data + key_buffer_size, 0, + data_size - key_buffer_size); + *data_length = key_buffer_size; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&GX); mbedtls_mpi_init(&G); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); mbedtls_mpi_init(&P); + + size_t key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(attributes->bits); + + status = mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(key_len, &P, &G); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&X, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&GX, &G, &X, &P, NULL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&GX, data, key_len)); + + *data_length = key_len; + + ret = 0; +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&P); mbedtls_mpi_free(&G); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); mbedtls_mpi_free(&GX); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && ret != 0) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT || + MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length) +{ + mbedtls_mpi X, P; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&P); mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); + (void) attributes; + + status = mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(key_buffer_size, &P, NULL); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* RFC7919: Traditional finite field Diffie-Hellman has each peer choose their + secret exponent from the range [2, P-2]. + Select random value in range [3, P-1] and decrease it by 1. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_random(&X, 3, &P, mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&X, &X, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&X, key_buffer, key_buffer_size)); + *key_buffer_length = key_buffer_size; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&P); mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits) +{ + (void) attributes; + + if (key_buffer_size < data_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + memcpy(key_buffer, data, data_length); + *key_buffer_length = data_length; + *bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(data_length); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_key_agreement( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi P, G, X, GY, K; + const size_t calculated_shared_secret_size = peer_key_length; + + if (peer_key_length != key_buffer_size || + calculated_shared_secret_size > shared_secret_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(psa_get_key_type(attributes))) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&P); mbedtls_mpi_init(&G); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); mbedtls_mpi_init(&GY); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&K); + + status = mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator( + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(attributes->bits), &P, &G); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&X, key_buffer, + key_buffer_size)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&GY, peer_key, + peer_key_length)); + + /* Calculate shared secret public key: K = G^(XY) mod P = GY^X mod P */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&K, &GY, &X, &P, NULL)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&K, shared_secret, + calculated_shared_secret_size)); + + *shared_secret_length = calculated_shared_secret_size; + + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&P); mbedtls_mpi_free(&G); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); mbedtls_mpi_free(&GY); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&K); + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && ret != 0) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h b/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..79accd15ac8 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +/* + * PSA FFDH layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_FFDH_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_FFDH_H + +#include + +/** Perform a key agreement and return the FFDH shared secret. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] peer_key The buffer containing the key context + * of the peer's public key. + * \param[in] peer_key_length Size of the \p peer_key buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the private key + * context. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret The buffer to which the shared secret + * is to be written. + * \param[in] shared_secret_size Size of the \p shared_secret buffer in + * bytes. + * \param[out] shared_secret_length On success, the number of bytes that make + * up the returned shared secret. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. Shared secret successfully calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * \p key_buffer_size, \p peer_key_length, \p shared_secret_size + * do not match + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_key_agreement( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *peer_key, + size_t peer_key_length, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *shared_secret, + size_t shared_secret_size, + size_t *shared_secret_length); + +/** Export a public key or the public part of a DH key pair in binary format. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + +/** + * \brief Generate DH key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to generate. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was generated successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key size in bits is invalid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length); + +/** + * \brief Import DH key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver import_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer containing the key data in output + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was generated successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_FFDH_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_hash.c b/library/psa_crypto_hash.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..eeb7666c1cb --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_hash.c @@ -0,0 +1,470 @@ +/* + * PSA hashing layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation) +{ + switch (operation->alg) { + case 0: + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + break; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_free(&operation->ctx.md5); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_free(&operation->ctx.ripemd160); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + mbedtls_sha1_free(&operation->ctx.sha1); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + mbedtls_sha256_free(&operation->ctx.sha256); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + mbedtls_sha256_free(&operation->ctx.sha256); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + mbedtls_sha512_free(&operation->ctx.sha512); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + mbedtls_sha512_free(&operation->ctx.sha512); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + mbedtls_sha3_free(&operation->ctx.sha3); + break; +#endif + default: + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + operation->alg = 0; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if (operation->alg != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + switch (alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_init(&operation->ctx.md5); + ret = mbedtls_md5_starts(&operation->ctx.md5); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_init(&operation->ctx.ripemd160); + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(&operation->ctx.ripemd160); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + mbedtls_sha1_init(&operation->ctx.sha1); + ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts(&operation->ctx.sha1); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + mbedtls_sha256_init(&operation->ctx.sha256); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts(&operation->ctx.sha256, 1); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + mbedtls_sha256_init(&operation->ctx.sha256); + ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts(&operation->ctx.sha256, 0); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + mbedtls_sha512_init(&operation->ctx.sha512); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts(&operation->ctx.sha512, 1); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + mbedtls_sha512_init(&operation->ctx.sha512); + ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts(&operation->ctx.sha512, 0); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: + mbedtls_sha3_init(&operation->ctx.sha3); + ret = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&operation->ctx.sha3, MBEDTLS_SHA3_224); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: + mbedtls_sha3_init(&operation->ctx.sha3); + ret = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&operation->ctx.sha3, MBEDTLS_SHA3_256); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: + mbedtls_sha3_init(&operation->ctx.sha3); + ret = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&operation->ctx.sha3, MBEDTLS_SHA3_384); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: + mbedtls_sha3_init(&operation->ctx.sha3); + ret = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&operation->ctx.sha3, MBEDTLS_SHA3_512); + break; +#endif + default: + return PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) ? + PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED : + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if (ret == 0) { + operation->alg = alg; + } else { + mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(operation); + } + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( + const mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation) +{ + switch (source_operation->alg) { + case 0: + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + mbedtls_md5_clone(&target_operation->ctx.md5, + &source_operation->ctx.md5); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + mbedtls_ripemd160_clone(&target_operation->ctx.ripemd160, + &source_operation->ctx.ripemd160); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + mbedtls_sha1_clone(&target_operation->ctx.sha1, + &source_operation->ctx.sha1); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + mbedtls_sha256_clone(&target_operation->ctx.sha256, + &source_operation->ctx.sha256); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + mbedtls_sha256_clone(&target_operation->ctx.sha256, + &source_operation->ctx.sha256); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + mbedtls_sha512_clone(&target_operation->ctx.sha512, + &source_operation->ctx.sha512); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + mbedtls_sha512_clone(&target_operation->ctx.sha512, + &source_operation->ctx.sha512); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + mbedtls_sha3_clone(&target_operation->ctx.sha3, + &source_operation->ctx.sha3); + break; +#endif + default: + (void) source_operation; + (void) target_operation; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + target_operation->alg = source_operation->alg; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_update( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + ret = mbedtls_md5_update(&operation->ctx.md5, + input, input_length); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update(&operation->ctx.ripemd160, + input, input_length); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update(&operation->ctx.sha1, + input, input_length); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update(&operation->ctx.sha256, + input, input_length); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update(&operation->ctx.sha256, + input, input_length); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update(&operation->ctx.sha512, + input, input_length); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update(&operation->ctx.sha512, + input, input_length); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + ret = mbedtls_sha3_update(&operation->ctx.sha3, + input, input_length); + break; +#endif + default: + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t actual_hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(operation->alg); + + /* Fill the output buffer with something that isn't a valid hash + * (barring an attack on the hash and deliberately-crafted input), + * in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */ + *hash_length = hash_size; + /* If hash_size is 0 then hash may be NULL and then the + * call to memset would have undefined behavior. */ + if (hash_size != 0) { + memset(hash, '!', hash_size); + } + + if (hash_size < actual_hash_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + switch (operation->alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + ret = mbedtls_md5_finish(&operation->ctx.md5, hash); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(&operation->ctx.ripemd160, hash); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish(&operation->ctx.sha1, hash); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish(&operation->ctx.sha256, hash); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish(&operation->ctx.sha256, hash); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish(&operation->ctx.sha512, hash); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish(&operation->ctx.sha512, hash); + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512) + ret = mbedtls_sha3_finish(&operation->ctx.sha3, hash, hash_size); + break; +#endif + default: + (void) hash; + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + +exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *hash_length = actual_hash_length; + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length) +{ + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *hash_length = hash_size; + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_setup(&operation, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_update(&operation, input, input_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_psa_hash_finish(&operation, hash, hash_size, hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + abort_status = mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(&operation); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + return abort_status; + } else { + return status; + } + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_hash.h b/library/psa_crypto_hash.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0a7be805520 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_hash.h @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +/* + * PSA hashing layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_HASH_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_HASH_H + +#include + +/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message using Mbed TLS routines. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_compute + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_compute entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\p alg). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p hash_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_compute( + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +/** Set up a multipart hash operation using Mbed TLS routines. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_setup + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_setup entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * If an error occurs at any step after a call to mbedtls_psa_hash_setup(), the + * operation will need to be reset by a call to mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). The + * core may call mbedtls_psa_hash_abort() at any time after the operation + * has been initialized. + * + * After a successful call to mbedtls_psa_hash_setup(), the core must + * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an + * operation: + * - A successful call to mbedtls_psa_hash_finish() or mbedtls_psa_hash_verify(). + * - A call to mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized to all-zero and not yet be in use. + * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_setup( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Clone an Mbed TLS hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_clone + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_clone entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * This function copies the state of an ongoing hash operation to + * a new operation object. In other words, this function is equivalent + * to calling mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() on \p target_operation with the same + * algorithm that \p source_operation was set up for, then + * mbedtls_psa_hash_update() on \p target_operation with the same input that + * that was passed to \p source_operation. After this function returns, the + * two objects are independent, i.e. subsequent calls involving one of + * the objects do not affect the other object. + * + * \param[in] source_operation The active hash operation to clone. + * \param[in,out] target_operation The operation object to set up. + * It must be initialized but not active. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The \p source_operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The \p target_operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_clone( + const mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation, + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart Mbed TLS hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_update + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_update entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The application must call mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to hash. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_update( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the Mbed TLS-calculated hash of a message. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_finish + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_finish entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The application must call mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_hash_update(). + * + * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. + * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error + * state and must be aborted by calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation. + * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written. + * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the hash value. This is always + * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where \c alg is the + * hash algorithm that is calculated. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p hash buffer is too small. You can determine a + * sufficient buffer size by calling #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) + * where \c alg is the hash algorithm that is calculated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_finish( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *hash, + size_t hash_size, + size_t *hash_length); + +/** Abort an Mbed TLS hash operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver hash_abort + * entry point. This function behaves as a hash_abort entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * mbedtls_psa_hash_setup() again. + * + * You may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_hash_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to mbedtls_psa_hash_abort(), mbedtls_psa_hash_finish() or + * mbedtls_psa_hash_verify() is safe and has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized hash operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_abort( + mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t *operation); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_HASH_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h b/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..51c90c64a4d --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/** + * \file psa_crypto_invasive.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: invasive interfaces for test only. + * + * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only. + * They MUST NOT be made available to clients over IPC in integrations + * with isolation, and they SHOULD NOT be made available in library + * integrations except when building the library for testing. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H + +/* + * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not + * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which + * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the + * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and + * configuration. + */ +#include "psa/build_info.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "common.h" + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) +/** \brief Configure entropy sources. + * + * This function may only be called before a call to psa_crypto_init(), + * or after a call to mbedtls_psa_crypto_free() and before any + * subsequent call to psa_crypto_init(). + * + * This function is only intended for test purposes. The functionality + * it provides is also useful for system integrators, but + * system integrators should configure entropy drivers instead of + * breaking through to the Mbed TLS API. + * + * \param entropy_init Function to initialize the entropy context + * and set up the desired entropy sources. + * It is called by psa_crypto_init(). + * By default this is mbedtls_entropy_init(). + * This function cannot report failures directly. + * To indicate a failure, set the entropy context + * to a state where mbedtls_entropy_func() will + * return an error. + * \param entropy_free Function to free the entropy context + * and associated resources. + * It is called by mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(). + * By default this is mbedtls_entropy_free(). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The caller does not have the permission to configure + * entropy sources. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has already been initialized. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_crypto_configure_entropy_sources( + void (* entropy_init)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx), + void (* entropy_free)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx)); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +psa_status_t psa_mac_key_can_do( + psa_algorithm_t algorithm, + psa_key_type_t key_type); + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_copy_input(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len, + uint8_t *input_copy, size_t input_copy_len); + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_copy_output(const uint8_t *output_copy, size_t output_copy_len, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_len); + +/* + * Test hooks to use for memory unpoisoning/poisoning in copy functions. + */ +extern void (*psa_input_pre_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len); +extern void (*psa_input_post_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *input, size_t input_len); +extern void (*psa_output_pre_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *output, size_t output_len); +extern void (*psa_output_post_copy_hook)(const uint8_t *output, size_t output_len); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_its.h b/library/psa_crypto_its.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..877063b8786 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_its.h @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +/** \file psa_crypto_its.h + * \brief Interface of trusted storage that crypto is built on. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_H + +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/** \brief Flags used when creating a data entry + */ +typedef uint32_t psa_storage_create_flags_t; + +/** \brief A type for UIDs used for identifying data + */ +typedef uint64_t psa_storage_uid_t; + +#define PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_NONE 0 /**< No flags to pass */ +#define PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_WRITE_ONCE (1 << 0) /**< The data associated with the uid will not be able to be modified or deleted. Intended to be used to set bits in `psa_storage_create_flags_t`*/ + +/** + * \brief A container for metadata associated with a specific uid + */ +struct psa_storage_info_t { + uint32_t size; /**< The size of the data associated with a uid **/ + psa_storage_create_flags_t flags; /**< The flags set when the uid was created **/ +}; + +/** Flag indicating that \ref psa_storage_create and \ref psa_storage_set_extended are supported */ +#define PSA_STORAGE_SUPPORT_SET_EXTENDED (1 << 0) + +#define PSA_ITS_API_VERSION_MAJOR 1 /**< The major version number of the PSA ITS API. It will be incremented on significant updates that may include breaking changes */ +#define PSA_ITS_API_VERSION_MINOR 1 /**< The minor version number of the PSA ITS API. It will be incremented in small updates that are unlikely to include breaking changes */ + +/** + * \brief create a new or modify an existing uid/value pair + * + * \param[in] uid the identifier for the data + * \param[in] data_length The size in bytes of the data in `p_data` + * \param[in] p_data A buffer containing the data + * \param[in] create_flags The flags that the data will be stored with + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The operation failed because the provided `uid` value was already created with PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_WRITE_ONCE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The operation failed because one or more of the flags provided in `create_flags` is not supported or is not valid + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE The operation failed because there was insufficient space on the storage medium + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE The operation failed because the physical storage has failed (Fatal error) + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The operation failed because one of the provided pointers(`p_data`) + * is invalid, for example is `NULL` or references memory the caller cannot access + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_set(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_length, + const void *p_data, + psa_storage_create_flags_t create_flags); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the value associated with a provided uid + * + * \param[in] uid The uid value + * \param[in] data_offset The starting offset of the data requested + * \param[in] data_length the amount of data requested (and the minimum allocated size of the `p_data` buffer) + * \param[out] p_data The buffer where the data will be placed upon successful completion + * \param[out] p_data_length The amount of data returned in the p_data buffer + * + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST The operation failed because the provided `uid` value was not found in the storage + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE The operation failed because the physical storage has failed (Fatal error) + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT The operation failed because stored data has been corrupted + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The operation failed because one of the provided pointers(`p_data`, `p_data_length`) + * is invalid. For example is `NULL` or references memory the caller cannot access. + * In addition, this can also happen if an invalid offset was provided. + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_get(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_offset, + uint32_t data_length, + void *p_data, + size_t *p_data_length); + +/** + * \brief Retrieve the metadata about the provided uid + * + * \param[in] uid The uid value + * \param[out] p_info A pointer to the `psa_storage_info_t` struct that will be populated with the metadata + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST The operation failed because the provided uid value was not found in the storage + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT The operation failed because stored data has been corrupted + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The operation failed because one of the provided pointers(`p_info`) + * is invalid, for example is `NULL` or references memory the caller cannot access + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_get_info(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + struct psa_storage_info_t *p_info); + +/** + * \brief Remove the provided key and its associated data from the storage + * + * \param[in] uid The uid value + * + * \return A status indicating the success/failure of the operation + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The operation completed successfully + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST The operation failed because the provided key value was not found in the storage + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The operation failed because the provided key value was created with PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_WRITE_ONCE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE The operation failed because the physical storage has failed (Fatal error) + */ +psa_status_t psa_its_remove(psa_storage_uid_t uid); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_mac.c b/library/psa_crypto_mac.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..8fe6218118b --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_mac.c @@ -0,0 +1,496 @@ +/* + * PSA MAC layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_cipher.h" +#include "psa_crypto_mac.h" +#include + +#include +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_abort_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac) +{ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hmac->opad, sizeof(hmac->opad)); + return psa_hash_abort(&hmac->hash_ctx); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_setup_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac, + const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_length, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg) +{ + uint8_t ipad[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; + size_t i; + size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + size_t block_size = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(hash_alg); + psa_status_t status; + + hmac->alg = hash_alg; + + /* Sanity checks on block_size, to guarantee that there won't be a buffer + * overflow below. This should never trigger if the hash algorithm + * is implemented correctly. */ + /* The size checks against the ipad and opad buffers cannot be written + * `block_size > sizeof( ipad ) || block_size > sizeof( hmac->opad )` + * because that triggers -Wlogical-op on GCC 7.3. */ + if (block_size > sizeof(ipad)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + if (block_size > sizeof(hmac->opad)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + if (block_size < hash_size) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (key_length > block_size) { + status = psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, key, key_length, + ipad, sizeof(ipad), &key_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + } + /* A 0-length key is not commonly used in HMAC when used as a MAC, + * but it is permitted. It is common when HMAC is used in HKDF, for + * example. Don't call `memcpy` in the 0-length because `key` could be + * an invalid pointer which would make the behavior undefined. */ + else if (key_length != 0) { + memcpy(ipad, key, key_length); + } + + /* ipad contains the key followed by garbage. Xor and fill with 0x36 + * to create the ipad value. */ + for (i = 0; i < key_length; i++) { + ipad[i] ^= 0x36; + } + memset(ipad + key_length, 0x36, block_size - key_length); + + /* Copy the key material from ipad to opad, flipping the requisite bits, + * and filling the rest of opad with the requisite constant. */ + for (i = 0; i < key_length; i++) { + hmac->opad[i] = ipad[i] ^ 0x36 ^ 0x5C; + } + memset(hmac->opad + key_length, 0x5C, block_size - key_length); + + status = psa_hash_setup(&hmac->hash_ctx, hash_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&hmac->hash_ctx, ipad, block_size); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ipad, sizeof(ipad)); + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_update_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + return psa_hash_update(&hmac->hash_ctx, data, data_length); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_hmac_finish_internal( + mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t *hmac, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size) +{ + uint8_t tmp[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = hmac->alg; + size_t hash_size = 0; + size_t block_size = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(hash_alg); + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_hash_finish(&hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &hash_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + /* From here on, tmp needs to be wiped. */ + + status = psa_hash_setup(&hmac->hash_ctx, hash_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&hmac->hash_ctx, hmac->opad, block_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_update(&hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, hash_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&hmac->hash_ctx, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &hash_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + memcpy(mac, tmp, mac_size); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, hash_size); + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) +static psa_status_t cmac_setup(mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES) + /* Mbed TLS CMAC does not accept 3DES with only two keys, nor does it accept + * to do CMAC with pure DES, so return NOT_SUPPORTED here. */ + if (psa_get_key_type(attributes) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES && + (psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 64 || + psa_get_key_bits(attributes) == 128)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +#endif + + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info = + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa( + PSA_ALG_CMAC, + psa_get_key_type(attributes), + psa_get_key_bits(attributes), + NULL); + + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&operation->ctx.cmac, cipher_info); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts(&operation->ctx.cmac, + key_buffer, + psa_get_key_bits(attributes)); +exit: + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + +/* Initialize this driver's MAC operation structure. Once this function has been + * called, mbedtls_psa_mac_abort can run and will do the right thing. */ +static psa_status_t mac_init( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + operation->alg = alg; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(operation->alg) == PSA_ALG_CMAC) { + mbedtls_cipher_init(&operation->ctx.cmac); + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(operation->alg)) { + /* We'll set up the hash operation later in psa_hmac_setup_internal. */ + operation->ctx.hmac.alg = 0; + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + (void) operation; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + memset(operation, 0, sizeof(*operation)); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation) +{ + if (operation->alg == 0) { + /* The object has (apparently) been initialized but it is not + * in use. It's ok to call abort on such an object, and there's + * nothing to do. */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(operation->alg) == PSA_ALG_CMAC) { + mbedtls_cipher_free(&operation->ctx.cmac); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(operation->alg)) { + psa_hmac_abort_internal(&operation->ctx.hmac); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + /* Sanity check (shouldn't happen: operation->alg should + * always have been initialized to a valid value). */ + goto bad_state; + } + + operation->alg = 0; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +bad_state: + /* If abort is called on an uninitialized object, we can't trust + * anything. Wipe the object in case it contains confidential data. + * This may result in a memory leak if a pointer gets overwritten, + * but it's too late to do anything about this. */ + memset(operation, 0, sizeof(*operation)); + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup(mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */ + if (operation->alg != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + status = mac_init(operation, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(alg) == PSA_ALG_CMAC) { + /* Key buffer size for CMAC is dictated by the key bits set on the + * attributes, and previously validated by the core on key import. */ + (void) key_buffer_size; + status = cmac_setup(operation, attributes, key_buffer); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg)) { + status = psa_hmac_setup_internal(&operation->ctx.hmac, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + (void) attributes; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(operation); + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_mac_setup(operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ + return psa_mac_setup(operation, attributes, + key_buffer, key_buffer_size, alg); +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_update( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + if (operation->alg == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(operation->alg) == PSA_ALG_CMAC) { + return mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(&operation->ctx.cmac, + input, input_length)); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(operation->alg)) { + return psa_hmac_update_internal(&operation->ctx.hmac, + input, input_length); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + /* This shouldn't happen if `operation` was initialized by + * a setup function. */ + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } +} + +static psa_status_t psa_mac_finish_internal( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, size_t mac_size) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(operation->alg) == PSA_ALG_CMAC) { + uint8_t tmp[PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE]; + int ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(&operation->ctx.cmac, tmp); + if (ret == 0) { + memcpy(mac, tmp, mac_size); + } + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(operation->alg)) { + return psa_hmac_finish_internal(&operation->ctx.hmac, + mac, mac_size); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */ + { + /* This shouldn't happen if `operation` was initialized by + * a setup function. */ + (void) operation; + (void) mac; + (void) mac_size; + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->alg == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + status = psa_mac_finish_internal(operation, mac, mac_size); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *mac_length = mac_size; + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length) +{ + uint8_t actual_mac[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (operation->alg == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + + /* Consistency check: requested MAC length fits our local buffer */ + if (mac_length > sizeof(actual_mac)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + status = psa_mac_finish_internal(operation, actual_mac, mac_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(mac, actual_mac, mac_length) != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(actual_mac, sizeof(actual_mac)); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t operation = MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + + status = psa_mac_setup(&operation, + attributes, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (input_length > 0) { + status = mbedtls_psa_mac_update(&operation, input, input_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + } + + status = psa_mac_finish_internal(&operation, mac, mac_size); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *mac_length = mac_size; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(&operation); + + return status; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC || MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_mac.h b/library/psa_crypto_mac.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2f614bcc6e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_mac.h @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +/* + * PSA MAC layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H + +#include + +/** Calculate the MAC (message authentication code) of a message using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_compute + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_compute entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for + * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key + * in export representation as defined by + * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes). + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the MAC value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * \p mac_size is too small + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_compute( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC calculation operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_sign_setup + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_sign_setup entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for + * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key + * in export representation as defined by + * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes). + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Set up a multipart MAC verification operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_verify_setup + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_verify_setup entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized and not yet in use. + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the key to use for + * computing the MAC. This buffer contains the key + * in export representation as defined by + * psa_export_key() (i.e. the raw key bytes). + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param alg The MAC algorithm to use (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value + * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \p alg is not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive). + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg); + +/** Add a message fragment to a multipart MAC operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_update + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_update entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() or + * mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this function. + * + * If this function returns an error status, the PSA core aborts the + * operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to add to + * the MAC calculation. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be active). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_update( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver mac_sign_finish + * entry point. This function behaves as a mac_sign_finish entry point as + * defined in the PSA driver interface specification for transparent + * drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() before calling this function. + * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating + * the inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_mac_update(). + * + * Whether this function returns successfully or not, the PSA core subsequently + * aborts the operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. + * \param mac_size Output size requested for the MAC algorithm. The PSA + * core guarantees this is a valid MAC length for the + * algorithm and key combination passed to + * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup(). It also guarantees the + * \p mac buffer is large enough to contain the + * requested output size. + * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes output to buffer + * \p mac, which will be equal to the requested length + * \p mac_size. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac sign + * operation). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. A sufficient buffer size + * can be determined by calling PSA_MAC_LENGTH(). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_size, + size_t *mac_length); + +/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message and compare it with + * an expected value using Mbed TLS. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * mac_verify_finish entry point. This function behaves as a + * mac_verify_finish entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification for transparent drivers. + * + * The PSA core calls mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this + * function. This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by + * concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to + * mbedtls_psa_mac_update(). It then compares the calculated MAC with the + * expected MAC passed as a parameter to this function. + * + * Whether this function returns successfully or not, the PSA core subsequently + * aborts the operation by calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(). + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation. + * \param[in] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value. + * \param mac_length Length in bytes of the expected MAC value. The PSA + * core guarantees that this length is a valid MAC + * length for the algorithm and key combination passed + * to mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup(). + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the message. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it + * differs from the expected MAC. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac verify + * operation). + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation, + const uint8_t *mac, + size_t mac_length); + +/** Abort a MAC operation using Mbed TLS. + * + * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the + * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object + * can be reused for another operation by calling + * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_setup() or mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_setup() again. + * + * The PSA core may call this function any time after the operation object has + * been initialized by one of the methods described in + * #mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t. + * + * In particular, calling mbedtls_psa_mac_abort() after the operation has been + * terminated by a call to mbedtls_psa_mac_abort(), + * mbedtls_psa_mac_sign_finish() or mbedtls_psa_mac_verify_finish() is safe and + * has no effect. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Initialized MAC operation. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_mac_abort( + mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t *operation); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_MAC_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_pake.c b/library/psa_crypto_pake.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9ac2e8c486e --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_pake.c @@ -0,0 +1,571 @@ +/* + * PSA PAKE layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_pake.h" +#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" + +#include +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#include +#include +#include + +/* + * State sequence: + * + * psa_pake_setup() + * | + * |-- In any order: + * | | psa_pake_set_password_key() + * | | psa_pake_set_user() + * | | psa_pake_set_peer() + * | | psa_pake_set_role() + * | + * |--- In any order: (First round input before or after first round output) + * | | + * | |------ In Order + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | + * | |------ In Order: + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | + * |--- In any order: (Second round input before or after second round output) + * | | + * | |------ In Order + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | psa_pake_output(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | + * | |------ In Order: + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | psa_pake_input(PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | + * psa_pake_get_implicit_key() + * psa_pake_abort() + */ + +/* + * Possible sequence of calls to implementation: + * + * |--- In any order: + * | | + * | |------ In Order + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | + * | |------ In Order: + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | + * |--- In any order: + * | | + * | |------ In Order + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | | mbedtls_psa_pake_output(PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + * | | + * | |------ In Order: + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_KEY_SHARE) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC) + * | | mbedtls_psa_pake_input(PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PROOF) + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) +static psa_status_t mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(int ret) +{ + switch (ret) { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED: + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + } +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) +static psa_status_t psa_pake_ecjpake_setup(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_ecjpake_init(&operation->ctx.jpake); + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(&operation->ctx.jpake, + operation->role, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + operation->password, + operation->password_len); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->password, operation->password_len); + + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif + +/* The only two JPAKE user/peer identifiers supported in built-in implementation. */ +static const uint8_t jpake_server_id[] = { 's', 'e', 'r', 'v', 'e', 'r' }; +static const uint8_t jpake_client_id[] = { 'c', 'l', 'i', 'e', 'n', 't' }; + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_setup(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t user_len = 0, peer_len = 0, password_len = 0; + uint8_t *peer = NULL, *user = NULL; + size_t actual_user_len = 0, actual_peer_len = 0, actual_password_len = 0; + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(); + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password_len(inputs, &password_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user_len(inputs, &user_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer_len(inputs, &peer_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_cipher_suite(inputs, &cipher_suite); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + operation->password = mbedtls_calloc(1, password_len); + if (operation->password == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto error; + } + + user = mbedtls_calloc(1, user_len); + if (user == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto error; + } + + peer = mbedtls_calloc(1, peer_len); + if (peer == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto error; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password(inputs, operation->password, + password_len, &actual_password_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user(inputs, user, + user_len, &actual_user_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + + status = psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer(inputs, peer, + peer_len, &actual_peer_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + + operation->password_len = actual_password_len; + operation->alg = cipher_suite.algorithm; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + if (cipher_suite.algorithm == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + if (cipher_suite.type != PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC || + cipher_suite.family != PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 || + cipher_suite.bits != 256 || + cipher_suite.hash != PSA_ALG_SHA_256) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto error; + } + + const size_t user_peer_len = sizeof(jpake_client_id); // client and server have the same length + if (actual_user_len != user_peer_len || + actual_peer_len != user_peer_len) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto error; + } + + if (memcmp(user, jpake_client_id, actual_user_len) == 0 && + memcmp(peer, jpake_server_id, actual_peer_len) == 0) { + operation->role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT; + } else + if (memcmp(user, jpake_server_id, actual_user_len) == 0 && + memcmp(peer, jpake_client_id, actual_peer_len) == 0) { + operation->role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER; + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto error; + } + + operation->buffer_length = 0; + operation->buffer_offset = 0; + + status = psa_pake_ecjpake_setup(operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + + /* Role has been set, release user/peer buffers. */ + mbedtls_free(user); mbedtls_free(peer); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#else + (void) operation; + (void) inputs; +#endif + { status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } + +error: + mbedtls_free(user); mbedtls_free(peer); + /* In case of failure of the setup of a multipart operation, the PSA driver interface + * specifies that the core does not call any other driver entry point thus does not + * call mbedtls_psa_pake_abort(). Therefore call it here to do the needed clean + * up like freeing the memory that may have been allocated to store the password. + */ + mbedtls_psa_pake_abort(operation); + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_output_internal( + mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t length; + (void) step; // Unused parameter + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + /* + * The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and Mbed TLS JPAKE API have a different + * handling of output sequencing. + * + * The Mbed TLS JPAKE API outputs the whole X1+X2 and X2S steps data + * at once, on the other side the PSA CRYPTO PAKE api requires + * the KEY_SHARE/ZP_PUBLIC/ZK_PROOF parts of X1, X2 & X2S to be + * retrieved in sequence. + * + * In order to achieve API compatibility, the whole X1+X2 or X2S steps + * data is stored in an intermediate buffer at first step output call, + * and data is sliced down by parsing the ECPoint records in order + * to return the right parts on each step. + */ + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + /* Initialize & write round on KEY_SHARE sequences */ + if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE) { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&operation->ctx.jpake, + operation->buffer, + sizeof(operation->buffer), + &operation->buffer_length, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + operation->buffer_offset = 0; + } else if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE) { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(&operation->ctx.jpake, + operation->buffer, + sizeof(operation->buffer), + &operation->buffer_length, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + operation->buffer_offset = 0; + } + + /* + * mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_xxx() outputs thing in the format + * defined by draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01 section 7. The summary is + * that the data for each step is prepended with a length byte, and + * then they're concatenated. Additionally, the server's second round + * output is prepended with a 3-bytes ECParameters structure. + * + * In PSA, we output each step separately, and don't prepend the + * output with a length byte, even less a curve identifier, as that + * information is already available. + */ + if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE && + operation->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER) { + /* Skip ECParameters, with is 3 bytes (RFC 8422) */ + operation->buffer_offset += 3; + } + + /* Read the length byte then move past it to the data */ + length = operation->buffer[operation->buffer_offset]; + operation->buffer_offset += 1; + + if (operation->buffer_offset + length > operation->buffer_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT; + } + + if (output_size < length) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(output, + operation->buffer + operation->buffer_offset, + length); + *output_length = length; + + operation->buffer_offset += length; + + /* Reset buffer after ZK_PROOF sequence */ + if ((step == PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF) || + (step == PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PROOF)) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->buffer, sizeof(operation->buffer)); + operation->buffer_length = 0; + operation->buffer_offset = 0; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#else + (void) step; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; +#endif + { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_output(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_pake_output_internal( + operation, step, output, output_size, output_length); + + return status; +} + +static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_input_internal( + mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + (void) step; // Unused parameter + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + /* + * The PSA CRYPTO PAKE and Mbed TLS JPAKE API have a different + * handling of input sequencing. + * + * The Mbed TLS JPAKE API takes the whole X1+X2 or X4S steps data + * at once as input, on the other side the PSA CRYPTO PAKE api requires + * the KEY_SHARE/ZP_PUBLIC/ZK_PROOF parts of X1, X2 & X4S to be + * given in sequence. + * + * In order to achieve API compatibility, each X1+X2 or X4S step data + * is stored sequentially in an intermediate buffer and given to the + * Mbed TLS JPAKE API on the last step. + * + * This causes any input error to be only detected on the last step. + */ + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + /* + * Copy input to local buffer and format it as the Mbed TLS API + * expects, i.e. as defined by draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01 section 7. + * The summary is that the data for each step is prepended with a + * length byte, and then they're concatenated. Additionally, the + * server's second round output is prepended with a 3-bytes + * ECParameters structure - which means we have to prepend that when + * we're a client. + */ + if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_KEY_SHARE && + operation->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT) { + /* We only support secp256r1. */ + /* This is the ECParameters structure defined by RFC 8422. */ + unsigned char ecparameters[3] = { + 3, /* named_curve */ + 0, 23 /* secp256r1 */ + }; + + if (operation->buffer_length + sizeof(ecparameters) > + sizeof(operation->buffer)) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(operation->buffer + operation->buffer_length, + ecparameters, sizeof(ecparameters)); + operation->buffer_length += sizeof(ecparameters); + } + + /* + * The core checks that input_length is smaller than + * PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * Thus no risk of integer overflow here. + */ + if (operation->buffer_length + input_length + 1 > sizeof(operation->buffer)) { + return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* Write the length byte */ + operation->buffer[operation->buffer_length] = (uint8_t) input_length; + operation->buffer_length += 1; + + /* Finally copy the data */ + memcpy(operation->buffer + operation->buffer_length, + input, input_length); + operation->buffer_length += input_length; + + /* Load buffer at each last round ZK_PROOF */ + if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF) { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&operation->ctx.jpake, + operation->buffer, + operation->buffer_length); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->buffer, sizeof(operation->buffer)); + operation->buffer_length = 0; + + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + } else if (step == PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PROOF) { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&operation->ctx.jpake, + operation->buffer, + operation->buffer_length); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->buffer, sizeof(operation->buffer)); + operation->buffer_length = 0; + + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#else + (void) step; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; +#endif + { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_input(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = mbedtls_psa_pake_input_internal( + operation, step, input, input_length); + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_get_implicit_key( + mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(&operation->ctx.jpake, + output, + output_size, + output_length, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE); + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else +#else + (void) output; +#endif + { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_abort(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation) +{ + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(operation->password, operation->password_len); + operation->password = NULL; + operation->password_len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE) + if (operation->alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE) { + operation->role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_NONE; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(operation->buffer, sizeof(operation->buffer)); + operation->buffer_length = 0; + operation->buffer_offset = 0; + mbedtls_ecjpake_free(&operation->ctx.jpake); + } +#endif + + operation->alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_pake.h b/library/psa_crypto_pake.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3d3ee0cc9af --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_pake.h @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +/* + * PSA PAKE layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_PAKE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_PAKE_H + +#include + +/** Set the session information for a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * pake_setup entry point. This function behaves as a pake_setup + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have + * been initialized but not set up yet. + * \param[in] inputs Inputs required for PAKE operation (role, password, + * key lifetime, cipher suite) + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * The algorithm in \p cipher_suite is not a supported PAKE algorithm, + * or the PAKE primitive in \p cipher_suite is not supported or not + * compatible with the PAKE algorithm, or the hash algorithm in + * \p cipher_suite is not supported or not compatible with the PAKE + * algorithm and primitive. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_setup(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs); + + +/** Get output for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * pake_output entry point. This function behaves as a pake_output + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param step The step of the algorithm for which the output is + * requested. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written in the + * format appropriate for this driver \p step. Refer to + * the documentation of psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t for + * more information. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. This must + * be at least #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p + * primitive, \p step) where \p alg and + * \p primitive are the PAKE algorithm and primitive + * in the operation's cipher suite, and \p step is + * the output step. + * + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes of the returned + * output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_output(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Provide input for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * pake_input entry point. This function behaves as a pake_input + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \note The core checks that input_length is smaller than PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param step The driver step for which the input is provided. + * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input in the format + * appropriate for this \p step. Refer to the + * documentation of psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t + * for more information. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The verification fails for a zero-knowledge input step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * the \p input is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm, cipher suite + * or \p step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * the \p input is not supported for the \p operation's algorithm, cipher + * suite or \p step. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_input(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t step, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length); + +/** Get implicitly confirmed shared secret from a PAKE. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * pake_get_implicit_key entry point. This function behaves as a + * pake_get_implicit_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver + * interface specification for transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation. + * \param[out] output Output buffer for implicit key. + * \param output_size Size of the output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes of the implicit key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Input from a PAKE is not supported by the algorithm in the \p output + * key derivation operation. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_get_implicit_key( + mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** Abort a PAKE operation. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * pake_abort entry point. This function behaves as a pake_abort + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in,out] operation The operation to abort. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_pake_abort(mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t *operation); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_PAKE_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h b/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..533fb2e9404 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +/** \file psa_crypto_random_impl.h + * + * \brief PSA crypto random generator implementation abstraction. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_RANDOM_IMPL_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_RANDOM_IMPL_H + +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + +typedef mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t mbedtls_psa_random_context_t; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#include "mbedtls/entropy.h" + +/* Choose a DRBG based on configuration and availability */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE) + +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" + +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#include +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xffffffff +/* Looks like a 64-bit system, so prefer SHA-512. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 +#else +/* Looks like a 32-bit system, so prefer SHA-256. */ +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#endif +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#else +#error "No hash algorithm available for HMAC_DBRG." +#endif + +#else /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE && !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C*/ + +#error "No DRBG module available for the psa_crypto module." + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE && !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h" +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ + +/* The maximum number of bytes that mbedtls_psa_get_random() is expected to return. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_MAX_REQUEST MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +typedef mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) +typedef mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ + +typedef struct { + void (* entropy_init)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx); + void (* entropy_free)(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx); + mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; + mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t drbg; +} mbedtls_psa_random_context_t; + +/** Initialize the PSA DRBG. + * + * \param p_rng Pointer to the Mbed TLS DRBG state. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_psa_drbg_init(mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *p_rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(p_rng); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(p_rng); +#endif +} + +/** Deinitialize the PSA DRBG. + * + * \param p_rng Pointer to the Mbed TLS DRBG state. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_psa_drbg_free(mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *p_rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(p_rng); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(p_rng); +#endif +} + +/** Seed the PSA DRBG. + * + * \param entropy An entropy context to read the seed from. + * \param custom The personalization string. + * This can be \c NULL, in which case the personalization + * string is empty regardless of the value of \p len. + * \param len The length of the personalization string. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return An Mbed TLS error code (\c MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx) on failure. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_psa_drbg_seed(mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *drbg_ctx, + mbedtls_entropy_context *entropy, + const unsigned char *custom, size_t len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + return mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(drbg_ctx, mbedtls_entropy_func, entropy, custom, len); +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE); + return mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(drbg_ctx, md_info, mbedtls_entropy_func, entropy, custom, len); +#endif +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_RANDOM_IMPL_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2f613b32dac --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,706 @@ +/* + * PSA RSA layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include +#include "psa/crypto_values.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" +#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" +#include "psa_crypto_hash.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include +#include +#include "rsa_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) + +/* Mbed TLS doesn't support non-byte-aligned key sizes (i.e. key sizes + * that are not a multiple of 8) well. For example, there is only + * mbedtls_rsa_get_len(), which returns a number of bytes, and no + * way to return the exact bit size of a key. + * To keep things simple, reject non-byte-aligned key sizes. */ +static psa_status_t psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned( + const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa) +{ + mbedtls_mpi n; + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&n); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &n, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&n) % 8 != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + } + mbedtls_mpi_free(&n); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( + psa_key_type_t type, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + mbedtls_rsa_context **p_rsa) +{ + psa_status_t status; + size_t bits; + + *p_rsa = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context)); + if (*p_rsa == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + mbedtls_rsa_init(*p_rsa); + + /* Parse the data. */ + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(*p_rsa, data, data_length)); + } else { + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(*p_rsa, data, data_length)); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* The size of an RSA key doesn't have to be a multiple of 8. Mbed TLS + * supports non-byte-aligned key sizes, but not well. For example, + * mbedtls_rsa_get_len() returns the key size in bytes, not in bits. */ + bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(*p_rsa)); + if (bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned(*p_rsa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + return status; +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + + /* Parse input */ + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->type, + data, + data_length, + &rsa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + *bits = (psa_key_bits_t) PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)); + + /* Re-export the data to PSA export format, such that we can store export + * representation in the key slot. Export representation in case of RSA is + * the smallest representation that's allowed as input, so a straight-up + * allocation of the same size as the input buffer will be large enough. */ + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(attributes->type, + rsa, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length); +exit: + /* Always free the RSA object */ + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + mbedtls_free(rsa); + + return status; +} +#endif /* (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length) +{ + int ret; + uint8_t *end = data + data_size; + + /* PSA Crypto API defines the format of an RSA key as a DER-encoded + * representation of the non-encrypted PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey for a + * private key and of the RFC3279 RSAPublicKey for a public key. */ + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(rsa, data, &end); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa, data, &end); + } + + if (ret < 0) { + /* Clean up in case pk_write failed halfway through. */ + memset(data, 0, data_size); + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + /* The mbedtls_pk_xxx functions write to the end of the buffer. + * Move the data to the beginning and erase remaining data + * at the original location. */ + if (2 * (size_t) ret <= data_size) { + memcpy(data, data + data_size - ret, ret); + memset(data + data_size - ret, 0, ret); + } else if ((size_t) ret < data_size) { + memmove(data, data + data_size - ret, ret); + memset(data + ret, 0, data_size - ret); + } + + *data_length = ret; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( + attributes->type, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &rsa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY, + rsa, + data, + data_size, + data_length); + + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + mbedtls_free(rsa); + + return status; +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +static psa_status_t psa_rsa_read_exponent(const uint8_t *e_bytes, + size_t e_length, + int *exponent) +{ + size_t i; + uint32_t acc = 0; + + /* Mbed TLS encodes the public exponent as an int. For simplicity, only + * support values that fit in a 32-bit integer, which is larger than + * int on just about every platform anyway. */ + if (e_length > sizeof(acc)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + for (i = 0; i < e_length; i++) { + acc = (acc << 8) | e_bytes[i]; + } + if (acc > INT_MAX) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + *exponent = acc; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, size_t params_data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int exponent = 65537; + + if (params_data_length != 0) { + status = psa_rsa_read_exponent(params->data, params_data_length, + &exponent); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(&rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + (unsigned int) attributes->bits, + exponent); + if (ret != 0) { + return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + } + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(attributes->type, + &rsa, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, + key_buffer_length); + mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa); + + return status; +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) */ + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Sign/verify hashes */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + +/* Decode the hash algorithm from alg and store the mbedtls encoding in + * md_alg. Verify that the hash length is acceptable. */ +static psa_status_t psa_rsa_decode_md_type(psa_algorithm_t alg, + size_t hash_length, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg); + *md_alg = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(hash_alg); + + /* The Mbed TLS RSA module uses an unsigned int for hash length + * parameters. Validate that it fits so that we don't risk an + * overflow later. */ +#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX + if (hash_length > UINT_MAX) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +#endif + + /* For signatures using a hash, the hash length must be correct. */ + if (alg != PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) { + if (*md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + if (mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(*md_alg) != hash_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->type, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &rsa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_rsa_decode_md_type(alg, hash_length, &md_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (signature_size < mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg)) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature); + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg); + + if (ret == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature); + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + if (ret == 0) { + *signature_length = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + +exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + mbedtls_free(rsa); + + return status; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) +static int rsa_pss_expected_salt_len(psa_algorithm_t alg, + const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + size_t hash_length) +{ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY; + } + /* Otherwise: standard salt length, i.e. largest possible salt length + * up to the hash length. */ + int klen = (int) mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); // known to fit + int hlen = (int) hash_length; // known to fit + int room = klen - 2 - hlen; + if (room < 0) { + return 0; // there is no valid signature in this case anyway + } else if (room > hlen) { + return hlen; + } else { + return room; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->type, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &rsa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_rsa_decode_md_type(alg, hash_length, &md_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (signature_length != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg)) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, + MBEDTLS_MD_NONE); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(rsa, + md_alg, + (unsigned int) hash_length, + hash, + signature); + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg); + if (ret == 0) { + int slen = rsa_pss_expected_salt_len(alg, rsa, hash_length); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(rsa, + md_alg, + (unsigned) hash_length, + hash, + md_alg, + slen, + signature); + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto exit; + } + + /* Mbed TLS distinguishes "invalid padding" from "valid padding but + * the rest of the signature is invalid". This has little use in + * practice and PSA doesn't report this distinction. */ + status = (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING) ? + PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE : + mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret); + +exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + mbedtls_free(rsa); + + return status; +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS) */ + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Asymmetric cryptography */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +static int psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode(psa_algorithm_t alg, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa) +{ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg); + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(hash_alg); + + /* Just to get the error status right, as rsa_set_padding() doesn't + * distinguish between "bad RSA algorithm" and "unknown hash". */ + if (mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg) == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_alg); +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_encrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) salt; + (void) salt_length; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; + + if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(attributes->type)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->type, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &rsa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto rsa_exit; + } + + if (output_size < mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto rsa_exit; + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + if (alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + input_length, + input, + output)); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ + } else + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode(alg, rsa)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto rsa_exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + salt, salt_length, + input_length, + input, + output)); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +rsa_exit: + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *output_length = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); + } + + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + mbedtls_free(rsa); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_decrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + (void) key_buffer; + (void) key_buffer_size; + (void) input; + (void) input_length; + (void) salt; + (void) salt_length; + (void) output; + (void) output_size; + (void) output_length; + + *output_length = 0; + + if (attributes->type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = NULL; + status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(attributes->type, + key_buffer, + key_buffer_size, + &rsa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto rsa_exit; + } + + if (input_length != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto rsa_exit; + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + + if (alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + output_length, + input, + output, + output_size)); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */ + } else + if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + psa_rsa_oaep_set_padding_mode(alg, rsa)); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto rsa_exit; + } + + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( + mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(rsa, + mbedtls_psa_get_random, + MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, + salt, salt_length, + output_length, + input, + output, + output_size)); +#else + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP */ + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) +rsa_exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + mbedtls_free(rsa); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || + * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) */ + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return status; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..ffeef26be1e --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h @@ -0,0 +1,327 @@ +/* + * PSA RSA layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H + +#include +#include + +/** Load the contents of a key buffer into an internal RSA representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key contained in \p data. + * \param[in] data The buffer from which to load the representation. + * \param[in] data_length The size in bytes of \p data. + * \param[out] p_rsa Returns a pointer to an RSA context on success. + * The caller is responsible for freeing both the + * contents of the context and the context itself + * when done. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(psa_key_type_t type, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length, + mbedtls_rsa_context **p_rsa); + +/** Import an RSA key in binary format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * import_key entry point. This function behaves as an import_key + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param[in] data The buffer containing the key data in import + * format. + * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer The buffer containing the key data in output + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. This + * size is greater or equal to \p data_length. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length The length of the data written in \p + * key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] bits The key size in number of bits. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The RSA key was imported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + * The key data is not correctly formatted. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_import_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + size_t *key_buffer_length, size_t *bits); + +/** Export an RSA key to export representation + * + * \param[in] type The type of key (public/private) to export + * \param[in] rsa The internal RSA representation from which to export + * \param[out] data The buffer to export to + * \param[in] data_size The length of the buffer to export to + * \param[out] data_length The amount of bytes written to \p data + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(psa_key_type_t type, + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + uint8_t *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_length); + +/** Export a public RSA key or the public part of an RSA key pair in binary + * format. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * export_public_key entry point. This function behaves as an + * export_public_key entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface + * specification. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer Material or context of the key to export. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The RSA public key was exported successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length); + +/** + * \brief Generate an RSA key. + * + * \note The signature of the function is that of a PSA driver generate_key + * entry point. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the RSA key to generate. + * \param[in] params Production parameters for the key + * generation. This function only uses + * `params->data`, + * which contains the public exponent. + * This can be a null pointer if + * \c params_data_length is 0. + * \param params_data_length Length of `params->data` in bytes. + * This can be 0, in which case the + * public exponent will be 65537. + * \param[out] key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of \p key_buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] key_buffer_length On success, the number of bytes written in + * \p key_buffer. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully generated. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * Key length or type not supported. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of \p key_buffer is too small. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params, size_t params_data_length, + uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length); + +/** Sign an already-calculated hash with an RSA private key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * sign_hash entry point. This function behaves as a sign_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the RSA key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the RSA key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * an RSA key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written. + * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned signature value. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR, \c key_bits, + * \p alg) where \c key_bits is the bit-size of the RSA key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, size_t *signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Verify the signature a hash or short message using a public RSA key. + * + * \note The signature of this function is that of a PSA driver + * verify_hash entry point. This function behaves as a verify_hash + * entry point as defined in the PSA driver interface specification for + * transparent drivers. + * + * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the RSA key to use for the + * operation. + * \param[in] key_buffer The buffer containing the RSA key context. + * format. + * \param[in] key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with + * an RSA key. + * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be + * verified. + * \param[in] hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify. + * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The signature is valid. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE + * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed + * signature is not a valid signature. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length, + const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length); + +/** + * \brief Encrypt a short message with a public key. + * + * \param attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass \c NULL. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass \c NULL. + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes. + * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the encrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_encrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +/** + * \brief Decrypt a short message with a private key. + * + * \param attributes The attributes for the key to import. + * \param key_buffer Buffer where the key data is to be written. + * \param key_buffer_size Size of the \p key_buffer buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] input The message to decrypt. + * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes. + * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the + * encryption algorithm. + * If the algorithm does not support a + * salt, pass \c NULL. + * If the algorithm supports an optional + * salt and you do not want to pass a salt, + * pass \c NULL. + * + * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is + * supported. + * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes. + * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0. + * \param[out] output Buffer where the decrypted message is to + * be written. + * \param output_size Size of the \c output buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes + * that make up the returned output. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL + * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can + * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling + * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg) + * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size + * respectively of \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). + * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize + * results in this error code. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_decrypt(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + const uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t input_length, + const uint8_t *salt, + size_t salt_length, + uint8_t *output, + size_t output_size, + size_t *output_length); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_RSA_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_se.c b/library/psa_crypto_se.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7a36a4f3a5f --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_se.c @@ -0,0 +1,373 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto support for secure element drivers + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + +#include +#include + +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_its.h" +#else /* Native ITS implementation */ +#include "psa/error.h" +#include "psa/internal_trusted_storage.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Driver lookup */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/* This structure is identical to psa_drv_se_context_t declared in + * `crypto_se_driver.h`, except that some parts are writable here + * (non-const, or pointer to non-const). */ +typedef struct { + void *persistent_data; + size_t persistent_data_size; + uintptr_t transient_data; +} psa_drv_se_internal_context_t; + +struct psa_se_drv_table_entry_s { + psa_key_location_t location; + const psa_drv_se_t *methods; + union { + psa_drv_se_internal_context_t internal; + psa_drv_se_context_t context; + } u; +}; + +static psa_se_drv_table_entry_t driver_table[PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS]; + +psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *psa_get_se_driver_entry( + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime) +{ + size_t i; + psa_key_location_t location = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime); + /* In the driver table, location=0 means an entry that isn't used. + * No driver has a location of 0 because it's a reserved value + * (which designates transparent keys). Make sure we never return + * a driver entry for location 0. */ + if (location == 0) { + return NULL; + } + for (i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++) { + if (driver_table[i].location == location) { + return &driver_table[i]; + } + } + return NULL; +} + +const psa_drv_se_t *psa_get_se_driver_methods( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver) +{ + return driver->methods; +} + +psa_drv_se_context_t *psa_get_se_driver_context( + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver) +{ + return &driver->u.context; +} + +int psa_get_se_driver(psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + const psa_drv_se_t **p_methods, + psa_drv_se_context_t **p_drv_context) +{ + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = psa_get_se_driver_entry(lifetime); + if (p_methods != NULL) { + *p_methods = (driver ? driver->methods : NULL); + } + if (p_drv_context != NULL) { + *p_drv_context = (driver ? &driver->u.context : NULL); + } + return driver != NULL; +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Persistent data management */ +/****************************************************************/ + +static psa_status_t psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_storage_uid_t *uid) +{ + if (driver->location > PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + /* ITS file sizes are limited to 32 bits. */ + if (driver->u.internal.persistent_data_size > UINT32_MAX) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + /* See the documentation of PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE. */ + *uid = PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE + driver->location; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_load_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t uid; + size_t length; + + status = psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid(driver, &uid); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* Read the amount of persistent data that the driver requests. + * If the data in storage is larger, it is truncated. If the data + * in storage is smaller, silently keep what is already at the end + * of the output buffer. */ + /* psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid ensures that the size_t + * persistent_data_size is in range, but compilers don't know that, + * so cast to reassure them. */ + return psa_its_get(uid, 0, + (uint32_t) driver->u.internal.persistent_data_size, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + &length); +} + +psa_status_t psa_save_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t uid; + + status = psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid(driver, &uid); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* psa_get_se_driver_its_file_uid ensures that the size_t + * persistent_data_size is in range, but compilers don't know that, + * so cast to reassure them. */ + return psa_its_set(uid, + (uint32_t) driver->u.internal.persistent_data_size, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + 0); +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_persistent_data(psa_key_location_t location) +{ + psa_storage_uid_t uid; + if (location > PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + uid = PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE + location; + return psa_its_remove(uid); +} + +psa_status_t psa_find_se_slot_for_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_location_t key_location = + PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes)); + + /* If the location is wrong, it's a bug in the library. */ + if (driver->location != key_location) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + /* If the driver doesn't support key creation in any way, give up now. */ + if (driver->methods->key_management == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + if (psa_get_key_slot_number(attributes, slot_number) == PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* The application wants to use a specific slot. Allow it if + * the driver supports it. On a system with isolation, + * the crypto service must check that the application is + * permitted to request this slot. */ + psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t p_validate_slot_number = + driver->methods->key_management->p_validate_slot_number; + if (p_validate_slot_number == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + status = p_validate_slot_number(&driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + attributes, method, + *slot_number); + } else if (method == PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER) { + /* The application didn't specify a slot number. This doesn't + * make sense when registering a slot. */ + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } else { + /* The application didn't tell us which slot to use. Let the driver + * choose. This is the normal case. */ + psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t p_allocate = + driver->methods->key_management->p_allocate; + if (p_allocate == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + status = p_allocate(&driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + attributes, method, + slot_number); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_key(psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t storage_status; + /* Normally a missing method would mean that the action is not + * supported. But psa_destroy_key() is not supposed to return + * PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: if you can create a key, you should + * be able to destroy it. The only use case for a driver that + * does not have a way to destroy keys at all is if the keys are + * locked in a read-only state: we can use the keys but not + * destroy them. Hence, if the driver doesn't support destroying + * keys, it's really a lack of permission. */ + if (driver->methods->key_management == NULL || + driver->methods->key_management->p_destroy == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + } + status = driver->methods->key_management->p_destroy( + &driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + slot_number); + storage_status = psa_save_se_persistent_data(driver); + return status == PSA_SUCCESS ? storage_status : status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_init_all_se_drivers(void) +{ + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++) { + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = &driver_table[i]; + if (driver->location == 0) { + continue; /* skipping unused entry */ + } + const psa_drv_se_t *methods = psa_get_se_driver_methods(driver); + if (methods->p_init != NULL) { + psa_status_t status = methods->p_init( + &driver->u.context, + driver->u.internal.persistent_data, + driver->location); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + status = psa_save_se_persistent_data(driver); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Driver registration */ +/****************************************************************/ + +psa_status_t psa_register_se_driver( + psa_key_location_t location, + const psa_drv_se_t *methods) +{ + size_t i; + psa_status_t status; + + if (methods->hal_version != PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + /* Driver table entries are 0-initialized. 0 is not a valid driver + * location because it means a transparent key. */ + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE == 0, + "Secure element support requires 0 to mean a local key"); + + if (location == PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if (location > PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + for (i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++) { + if (driver_table[i].location == 0) { + break; + } + /* Check that location isn't already in use up to the first free + * entry. Since entries are created in order and never deleted, + * there can't be a used entry after the first free entry. */ + if (driver_table[i].location == location) { + return PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS; + } + } + if (i == PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + driver_table[i].location = location; + driver_table[i].methods = methods; + driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data_size = + methods->persistent_data_size; + + if (methods->persistent_data_size != 0) { + driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data = + mbedtls_calloc(1, methods->persistent_data_size); + if (driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data == NULL) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + goto error; + } + /* Load the driver's persistent data. On first use, the persistent + * data does not exist in storage, and is initialized to + * all-bits-zero by the calloc call just above. */ + status = psa_load_se_persistent_data(&driver_table[i]); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS && status != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + goto error; + } + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + +error: + memset(&driver_table[i], 0, sizeof(driver_table[i])); + return status; +} + +void psa_unregister_all_se_drivers(void) +{ + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS; i++) { + if (driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data != NULL) { + mbedtls_free(driver_table[i].u.internal.persistent_data); + } + } + memset(driver_table, 0, sizeof(driver_table)); +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* The end */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_se.h b/library/psa_crypto_se.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e0bd5acfb3a --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_se.h @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto support for secure element drivers + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_H + +/* + * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not + * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which + * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the + * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and + * configuration. + */ +#include "psa/build_info.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +/** The maximum location value that this implementation supports + * for a secure element. + * + * This is not a characteristic that each PSA implementation has, but a + * limitation of the current implementation due to the constraints imposed + * by storage. See #PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE. + * + * The minimum location value for a secure element is 1, like on any + * PSA implementation (0 means a transparent key). + */ +#define PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION 255 + +/** The base of the range of ITS file identifiers for secure element + * driver persistent data. + * + * We use a slice of the implementation reserved range 0xffff0000..0xffffffff, + * specifically the range 0xfffffe00..0xfffffeff. The length of this range + * drives the value of #PSA_MAX_SE_LOCATION. The identifier 0xfffffe00 is + * actually not used since it corresponds to #PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE + * which doesn't have a driver. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_ITS_UID_BASE ((psa_key_id_t) 0xfffffe00) + +/** The maximum number of registered secure element driver locations. */ +#define PSA_MAX_SE_DRIVERS 4 + +/** Unregister all secure element drivers. + * + * \warning Do not call this function while the library is in the initialized + * state. This function is only intended to be called at the end + * of mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(). + */ +void psa_unregister_all_se_drivers(void); + +/** Initialize all secure element drivers. + * + * Called from psa_crypto_init(). + */ +psa_status_t psa_init_all_se_drivers(void); + +/** A structure that describes a registered secure element driver. + * + * A secure element driver table entry contains a pointer to the + * driver's method table as well as the driver context structure. + */ +typedef struct psa_se_drv_table_entry_s psa_se_drv_table_entry_t; + +/** Return the secure element driver information for a lifetime value. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query. + * \param[out] p_methods On output, if there is a driver, + * \c *methods points to its method table. + * Otherwise \c *methods is \c NULL. + * \param[out] p_drv_context On output, if there is a driver, + * \c *drv_context points to its context + * structure. + * Otherwise \c *drv_context is \c NULL. + * + * \retval 1 + * \p lifetime corresponds to a registered driver. + * \retval 0 + * \p lifetime does not correspond to a registered driver. + */ +int psa_get_se_driver(psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + const psa_drv_se_t **p_methods, + psa_drv_se_context_t **p_drv_context); + +/** Return the secure element driver table entry for a lifetime value. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query. + * + * \return The driver table entry for \p lifetime, or + * \p NULL if \p lifetime does not correspond to a registered driver. + */ +psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *psa_get_se_driver_entry( + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime); + +/** Return the method table for a secure element driver. + * + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry to access, or \c NULL. + * + * \return The driver's method table. + * \c NULL if \p driver is \c NULL. + */ +const psa_drv_se_t *psa_get_se_driver_methods( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver); + +/** Return the context of a secure element driver. + * + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry to access, or \c NULL. + * + * \return A pointer to the driver context. + * \c NULL if \p driver is \c NULL. + */ +psa_drv_se_context_t *psa_get_se_driver_context( + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver); + +/** Find a free slot for a key that is to be created. + * + * This function calls the relevant method in the driver to find a suitable + * slot for a key with the given attributes. + * + * \param[in] attributes Metadata about the key that is about to be created. + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry to query. + * \param[out] slot_number On success, a slot number that is free in this + * secure element. + */ +psa_status_t psa_find_se_slot_for_key( + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + psa_key_creation_method_t method, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number); + +/** Destroy a key in a secure element. + * + * This function calls the relevant driver method to destroy a key + * and updates the driver's persistent data. + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_key(psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver, + psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number); + +/** Load the persistent data of a secure element driver. + * + * \param driver The driver table entry containing the persistent + * data to load from storage. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * \return #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + */ +psa_status_t psa_load_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver); + +/** Save the persistent data of a secure element driver. + * + * \param[in] driver The driver table entry containing the persistent + * data to save to storage. + * + * \return #PSA_SUCCESS + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + */ +psa_status_t psa_save_se_persistent_data( + const psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver); + +/** Destroy the persistent data of a secure element driver. + * + * This is currently only used for testing. + * + * \param[in] location The location identifier for the driver whose + * persistent data is to be erased. + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_se_persistent_data(psa_key_location_t location); + + +/** The storage representation of a key whose data is in a secure element. + */ +typedef struct { + uint8_t slot_number[sizeof(psa_key_slot_number_t)]; +} psa_se_key_data_storage_t; + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b184ed08c9f --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -0,0 +1,685 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.h" +#include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h" +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" +#endif + +#include +#include +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +typedef struct { + psa_key_slot_t key_slots[MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT]; + uint8_t key_slots_initialized; +} psa_global_data_t; + +static psa_global_data_t global_data; + +static uint8_t psa_get_key_slots_initialized(void) +{ + uint8_t initialized; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + initialized = global_data.key_slots_initialized; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) */ + + return initialized; +} + +int psa_is_valid_key_id(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, int vendor_ok) +{ + psa_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(key); + + if ((PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN <= key_id) && + (key_id <= PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX)) { + return 1; + } + + if (vendor_ok && + (PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN <= key_id) && + (key_id <= PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX)) { + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** Get the description in memory of a key given its identifier and lock it. + * + * The descriptions of volatile keys and loaded persistent keys are + * stored in key slots. This function returns a pointer to the key slot + * containing the description of a key given its identifier. + * + * The function searches the key slots containing the description of the key + * with \p key identifier. The function does only read accesses to the key + * slots. The function does not load any persistent key thus does not access + * any storage. + * + * For volatile key identifiers, only one key slot is queried as a volatile + * key with identifier key_id can only be stored in slot of index + * ( key_id - #PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN ). + * + * On success, the function locks the key slot. It is the responsibility of + * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * + * \param key Key identifier to query. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, `*p_slot` contains a pointer to the + * key slot containing the description of the key + * identified by \p key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The pointer to the key slot containing the description of the key + * identified by \p key was returned. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p key is not a valid key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no key with key identifier \p key in the key slots. + */ +static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_slot_t **p_slot) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(key); + size_t slot_idx; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; + + if (psa_key_id_is_volatile(key_id)) { + slot = &global_data.key_slots[key_id - PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN]; + + /* Check if both the PSA key identifier key_id and the owner + * identifier of key match those of the key slot. */ + if ((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) && + (mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key, slot->attr.id))) { + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + } else { + status = PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + } else { + if (!psa_is_valid_key_id(key, 1)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) { + slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx]; + /* Only consider slots which are in a full state. */ + if ((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) && + (mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key, slot->attr.id))) { + break; + } + } + status = (slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT) ? + PSA_SUCCESS : PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = psa_register_read(slot); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + *p_slot = slot; + } + } + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots(void) +{ + /* Nothing to do: program startup and psa_wipe_all_key_slots() both + * guarantee that the key slots are initialized to all-zero, which + * means that all the key slots are in a valid, empty state. The global + * data mutex is already held when calling this function, so no need to + * lock it here, to set the flag. */ + global_data.key_slots_initialized = 1; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void) +{ + size_t slot_idx; + + for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) { + psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx]; + slot->registered_readers = 1; + slot->state = PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION; + (void) psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + } + /* The global data mutex is already held when calling this function. */ + global_data.key_slots_initialized = 0; +} + +psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t slot_idx; + psa_key_slot_t *selected_slot, *unused_persistent_key_slot; + + if (!psa_get_key_slots_initialized()) { + status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + goto error; + } + + selected_slot = unused_persistent_key_slot = NULL; + for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) { + psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx]; + if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_EMPTY) { + selected_slot = slot; + break; + } + + if ((unused_persistent_key_slot == NULL) && + (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) && + (!psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) && + (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime))) { + unused_persistent_key_slot = slot; + } + } + + /* + * If there is no unused key slot and there is at least one unlocked key + * slot containing the description of a persistent key, recycle the first + * such key slot we encountered. If we later need to operate on the + * persistent key we are evicting now, we will reload its description from + * storage. + */ + if ((selected_slot == NULL) && + (unused_persistent_key_slot != NULL)) { + selected_slot = unused_persistent_key_slot; + psa_register_read(selected_slot); + status = psa_wipe_key_slot(selected_slot); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + } + + if (selected_slot != NULL) { + status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(selected_slot, PSA_SLOT_EMPTY, + PSA_SLOT_FILLING); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } + + *volatile_key_id = PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + + ((psa_key_id_t) (selected_slot - global_data.key_slots)); + *p_slot = selected_slot; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + +error: + *p_slot = NULL; + *volatile_key_id = 0; + + return status; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) +static psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + uint8_t *key_data = NULL; + size_t key_data_length = 0; + + status = psa_load_persistent_key(&slot->attr, + &key_data, &key_data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Special handling is required for loading keys associated with a + * dynamically registered SE interface. */ + const psa_drv_se_t *drv; + psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context; + if (psa_get_se_driver(slot->attr.lifetime, &drv, &drv_context)) { + psa_se_key_data_storage_t *data; + + if (key_data_length != sizeof(*data)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + goto exit; + } + data = (psa_se_key_data_storage_t *) key_data; + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot( + slot, data->slot_number, sizeof(data->slot_number)); + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + status = psa_copy_key_material_into_slot(slot, key_data, key_data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + psa_free_persistent_key_data(key_data, key_data_length); + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + +static psa_status_t psa_load_builtin_key_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE; + psa_drv_slot_number_t slot_number = 0; + size_t key_buffer_size = 0; + size_t key_buffer_length = 0; + + if (!psa_key_id_is_builtin( + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(slot->attr.id))) { + return PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + + /* Check the platform function to see whether this key actually exists */ + status = mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key( + slot->attr.id, &lifetime, &slot_number); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* Set required key attributes to ensure get_builtin_key can retrieve the + * full attributes. */ + psa_set_key_id(&attributes, slot->attr.id); + psa_set_key_lifetime(&attributes, lifetime); + + /* Get the full key attributes from the driver in order to be able to + * calculate the required buffer size. */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + slot_number, &attributes, + NULL, 0, NULL); + if (status != PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + /* Builtin keys cannot be defined by the attributes alone */ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + return status; + } + + /* If the key should exist according to the platform, then ask the driver + * what its expected size is. */ + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_key_buffer_size(&attributes, + &key_buffer_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + /* Allocate a buffer of the required size and load the builtin key directly + * into the (now properly sized) slot buffer. */ + status = psa_allocate_buffer_to_slot(slot, key_buffer_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_driver_wrapper_get_builtin_key( + slot_number, &attributes, + slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, &key_buffer_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Copy actual key length and core attributes into the slot on success */ + slot->key.bytes = key_buffer_length; + slot->attr = attributes; +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(slot); + } + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *p_slot = NULL; + if (!psa_get_key_slots_initialized()) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We need to set status as success, otherwise CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * would be returned if the lock fails. */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + /* If the key is persistent and not loaded, we cannot unlock the mutex + * between checking if the key is loaded and setting the slot as FULL, + * as otherwise another thread may load and then destroy the key + * in the meantime. */ + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + /* + * On success, the pointer to the slot is passed directly to the caller + * thus no need to unlock the key slot here. + */ + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory(key, p_slot); + if (status != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; + } + + /* Loading keys from storage requires support for such a mechanism */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id; + + status = psa_reserve_free_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; + } + + (*p_slot)->attr.id = key; + (*p_slot)->attr.lifetime = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT; + + status = PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + /* Load keys in the 'builtin' range through their own interface */ + status = psa_load_builtin_key_into_slot(*p_slot); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if (status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + status = psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot(*p_slot); + } +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_wipe_key_slot(*p_slot); + + if (status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + } else { + /* Add implicit usage flags. */ + psa_extend_key_usage_flags(&(*p_slot)->attr.policy.usage); + + psa_key_slot_state_transition((*p_slot), PSA_SLOT_FILLING, + PSA_SLOT_FULL); + status = psa_register_read(*p_slot); + } + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_unregister_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + if (slot == NULL) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + if ((slot->state != PSA_SLOT_FULL) && + (slot->state != PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION)) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + /* If we are the last reader and the slot is marked for deletion, + * we must wipe the slot here. */ + if ((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION) && + (slot->registered_readers == 1)) { + return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + } + + if (psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) { + slot->registered_readers--; + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + /* + * As the return error code may not be handled in case of multiple errors, + * do our best to report if there are no registered readers. Assert with + * MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that there are registered readers: + * if the MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS configuration option is enabled and + * the function is called as part of the execution of a test suite, the + * execution of the test suite is stopped in error if the assertion fails. + */ + MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)); + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +} + +psa_status_t psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We need to set status as success, otherwise CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * would be returned if the lock fails. */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_location(psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv) +{ + if (psa_key_lifetime_is_external(lifetime)) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + /* Check whether a driver is registered against this lifetime */ + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t *driver = psa_get_se_driver_entry(lifetime); + if (driver != NULL) { + if (p_drv != NULL) { + *p_drv = driver; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + (void) p_drv; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + + /* Key location for external keys gets checked by the wrapper */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else { + /* Local/internal keys are always valid */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_persistence(psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime) +{ + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime)) { + /* Volatile keys are always supported */ + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } else { + /* Persistent keys require storage support */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(lifetime)) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } else { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ + } +} + +psa_status_t psa_open_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_handle_t *handle) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + psa_status_t status; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(key, &slot); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + *handle = PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT; + if (status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE) { + status = PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + + return status; + } + + *handle = key; + + return psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(slot); + +#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ + (void) key; + *handle = PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ +} + +psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + + if (psa_key_handle_is_null(handle)) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We need to set status as success, otherwise CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * would be returned if the lock fails. */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory(handle, &slot); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + if (status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; + } + + if (slot->registered_readers == 1) { + status = psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + } else { + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_slot_t *slot; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We need to set status as success, otherwise CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * would be returned if the lock fails. */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory(key, &slot); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; + } + + if ((!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) && + (slot->registered_readers == 1)) { + status = psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + } else { + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + + return status; +} + +void mbedtls_psa_get_stats(mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats) +{ + size_t slot_idx; + + memset(stats, 0, sizeof(*stats)); + + for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) { + const psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx]; + if (psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) { + ++stats->locked_slots; + } + if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_EMPTY) { + ++stats->empty_slots; + continue; + } + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) { + ++stats->volatile_slots; + } else { + psa_key_id_t id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(slot->attr.id); + ++stats->persistent_slots; + if (id > stats->max_open_internal_key_id) { + stats->max_open_internal_key_id = id; + } + } + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(slot->attr.lifetime) != + PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE) { + psa_key_id_t id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(slot->attr.id); + ++stats->external_slots; + if (id > stats->max_open_external_key_id) { + stats->max_open_external_key_id = id; + } + } + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..bcfc9d8adc7 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h @@ -0,0 +1,285 @@ +/* + * PSA crypto layer on top of Mbed TLS crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_core.h" +#include "psa_crypto_se.h" + +/** Range of volatile key identifiers. + * + * The last #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT identifiers of the implementation + * range of key identifiers are reserved for volatile key identifiers. + * A volatile key identifier is equal to #PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN plus the + * index of the key slot containing the volatile key definition. + */ + +/** The minimum value for a volatile key identifier. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN (PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX - \ + MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT + 1) + +/** The maximum value for a volatile key identifier. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX + +/** Test whether a key identifier is a volatile key identifier. + * + * \param key_id Key identifier to test. + * + * \retval 1 + * The key identifier is a volatile key identifier. + * \retval 0 + * The key identifier is not a volatile key identifier. + */ +static inline int psa_key_id_is_volatile(psa_key_id_t key_id) +{ + return (key_id >= PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN) && + (key_id <= PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX); +} + +/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and lock it. + * + * The descriptions of volatile keys and loaded persistent keys are stored in + * key slots. This function returns a pointer to the key slot containing the + * description of a key given its identifier. + * + * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key + * into a key slot if not already done. + * + * On success, the returned key slot has been registered for reading. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to call psa_unregister_read(slot) + * when they have finished reading the contents of the slot. + * + * \param key Key identifier to query. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, `*p_slot` contains a pointer to the + * key slot containing the description of the key + * identified by \p key. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p *p_slot contains a pointer to the key slot containing the + * description of the key identified by \p key. + * The key slot counter has been incremented. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The library has not been initialized. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE + * \p key is not a valid key identifier. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * \p key is a persistent key identifier. The implementation does not + * have sufficient resources to load the persistent key. This can be + * due to a lack of empty key slot, or available memory. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no key with key identifier \p key. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot); + +/** Initialize the key slot structures. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Currently this function always succeeds. + */ +psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots(void); + +/** Delete all data from key slots in memory. + * This function is not thread safe, it wipes every key slot regardless of + * state and reader count. It should only be called when no slot is in use. + * + * This does not affect persistent storage. */ +void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void); + +/** Find a free key slot and reserve it to be filled with a key. + * + * This function finds a key slot that is free, + * sets its state to PSA_SLOT_FILLING and then returns the slot. + * + * On success, the key slot's state is PSA_SLOT_FILLING. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to change the slot's state to + * PSA_SLOT_EMPTY/FULL once key creation has finished. + * + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * + * \param[out] volatile_key_id On success, volatile key identifier + * associated to the returned slot. + * \param[out] p_slot On success, a pointer to the slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * There were no free key slots. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * This function attempted to operate on a key slot which was in an + * unexpected state. + */ +psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot); + +/** Change the state of a key slot. + * + * This function changes the state of the key slot from expected_state to + * new state. If the state of the slot was not expected_state, the state is + * unchanged. + * + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * \param[in] expected_state The current state of the slot. + * \param[in] new_state The new state of the slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + The key slot's state variable is new_state. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The slot's state was not expected_state. + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_key_slot_state_transition( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, psa_key_slot_state_t expected_state, + psa_key_slot_state_t new_state) +{ + if (slot->state != expected_state) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + slot->state = new_state; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Register as a reader of a key slot. + * + * This function increments the key slot registered reader counter by one. + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + The key slot registered reader counter was incremented. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The reader counter already reached its maximum value and was not + * increased, or the slot's state was not PSA_SLOT_FULL. + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_register_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +{ + if ((slot->state != PSA_SLOT_FULL) || + (slot->registered_readers >= SIZE_MAX)) { + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + slot->registered_readers++; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** Unregister from reading a key slot. + * + * This function decrements the key slot registered reader counter by one. + * If the state of the slot is PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, + * and there is only one registered reader (the caller), + * this function will call psa_wipe_key_slot(). + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * + * \note To ease the handling of errors in retrieving a key slot + * a NULL input pointer is valid, and the function returns + * successfully without doing anything in that case. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p slot is NULL or the key slot reader counter has been + * decremented (and potentially wiped) successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The slot's state was neither PSA_SLOT_FULL nor + * PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. + * Or a wipe was attempted and the slot's state was not + * PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. + * Or registered_readers was equal to 0. + */ +psa_status_t psa_unregister_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot); + +/** Wrap a call to psa_unregister_read in the global key slot mutex. + * + * If threading is disabled, this simply calls psa_unregister_read. + * + * \note To ease the handling of errors in retrieving a key slot + * a NULL input pointer is valid, and the function returns + * successfully without doing anything in that case. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * \p slot is NULL or the key slot reader counter has been + * decremented (and potentially wiped) successfully. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The slot's state was neither PSA_SLOT_FULL nor + * PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. + * Or a wipe was attempted and the slot's state was not + * PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. + * Or registered_readers was equal to 0. + */ +psa_status_t psa_unregister_read_under_mutex(psa_key_slot_t *slot); + +/** Test whether a lifetime designates a key in an external cryptoprocessor. + * + * \param lifetime The lifetime to test. + * + * \retval 1 + * The lifetime designates an external key. There should be a + * registered driver for this lifetime, otherwise the key cannot + * be created or manipulated. + * \retval 0 + * The lifetime designates a key that is volatile or in internal + * storage. + */ +static inline int psa_key_lifetime_is_external(psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime) +{ + return PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime) + != PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE; +} + +/** Validate a key's location. + * + * This function checks whether the key's attributes point to a location that + * is known to the PSA Core, and returns the driver function table if the key + * is to be found in an external location. + * + * \param[in] lifetime The key lifetime attribute. + * \param[out] p_drv On success, when a key is located in external + * storage, returns a pointer to the driver table + * associated with the key's storage location. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_location(psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime, + psa_se_drv_table_entry_t **p_drv); + +/** Validate the persistence of a key. + * + * \param[in] lifetime The key lifetime attribute. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The key is persistent but persistent keys + * are not supported. + */ +psa_status_t psa_validate_key_persistence(psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime); + +/** Validate a key identifier. + * + * \param[in] key The key identifier. + * \param[in] vendor_ok Non-zero to indicate that key identifiers in the + * vendor range are allowed, volatile key identifiers + * excepted \c 0 otherwise. + * + * \retval <> 0 if the key identifier is valid, 0 otherwise. + */ +int psa_is_valid_key_id(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, int vendor_ok); + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SLOT_MANAGEMENT_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_storage.c b/library/psa_crypto_storage.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7d1317b45a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_storage.c @@ -0,0 +1,481 @@ +/* + * PSA persistent key storage + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + +#include +#include + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_crypto_storage.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) +#include "psa_crypto_its.h" +#else /* Native ITS implementation */ +#include "psa/error.h" +#include "psa/internal_trusted_storage.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key storage */ +/****************************************************************/ + +/* Determine a file name (ITS file identifier) for the given key identifier. + * The file name must be distinct from any file that is used for a purpose + * other than storing a key. Currently, the only such file is the random seed + * file whose name is PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID and whose value is + * 0xFFFFFF52. */ +static psa_storage_uid_t psa_its_identifier_of_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + /* Encode the owner in the upper 32 bits. This means that if + * owner values are nonzero (as they are on a PSA platform), + * no key file will ever have a value less than 0x100000000, so + * the whole range 0..0xffffffff is available for non-key files. */ + uint32_t unsigned_owner_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(key); + return ((uint64_t) unsigned_owner_id << 32) | + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(key); +#else + /* Use the key id directly as a file name. + * psa_is_key_id_valid() in psa_crypto_slot_management.c + * is responsible for ensuring that key identifiers do not have a + * value that is reserved for non-key files. */ + return key; +#endif +} + +/** + * \brief Load persistent data for the given key slot number. + * + * This function reads data from a storage backend and returns the data in a + * buffer. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier of the key to be loaded. This + * should be an occupied storage location. + * \param[out] data Buffer where the data is to be written. + * \param data_size Size of the \c data buffer in bytes. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST \emptydescription + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_load( + const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, uint8_t *data, size_t data_size) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot(key); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + size_t data_length = 0; + + status = psa_its_get_info(data_identifier, &data_identifier_info); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_its_get(data_identifier, 0, (uint32_t) data_size, data, &data_length); + if (data_size != data_length) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + + return status; +} + +int psa_is_key_present_in_storage(const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +{ + psa_status_t ret; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot(key); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + ret = psa_its_get_info(data_identifier, &data_identifier_info); + + if (ret == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +/** + * \brief Store persistent data for the given key slot number. + * + * This function stores the given data buffer to a persistent storage. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier of the key to be stored. This + * should be an unoccupied storage location. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the data to be stored. + * \param data_length The number of bytes + * that make up the data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_store(const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + const uint8_t *data, + size_t data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot(key); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + if (psa_is_key_present_in_storage(key) == 1) { + return PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS; + } + + status = psa_its_set(data_identifier, (uint32_t) data_length, data, 0); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + + status = psa_its_get_info(data_identifier, &data_identifier_info); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + if (data_identifier_info.size != data_length) { + status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + goto exit; + } + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* Remove the file in case we managed to create it but something + * went wrong. It's ok if the file doesn't exist. If the file exists + * but the removal fails, we're already reporting an error so there's + * nothing else we can do. */ + (void) psa_its_remove(data_identifier); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_destroy_persistent_key(const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) +{ + psa_status_t ret; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot(key); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + ret = psa_its_get_info(data_identifier, &data_identifier_info); + if (ret == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + + if (psa_its_remove(data_identifier) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + + ret = psa_its_get_info(data_identifier, &data_identifier_info); + if (ret != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + * \brief Get data length for given key slot number. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier whose stored data length + * is to be obtained. + * \param[out] data_length The number of bytes that make up the data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + */ +static psa_status_t psa_crypto_storage_get_data_length( + const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_storage_uid_t data_identifier = psa_its_identifier_of_slot(key); + struct psa_storage_info_t data_identifier_info; + + status = psa_its_get_info(data_identifier, &data_identifier_info); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + *data_length = (size_t) data_identifier_info.size; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +/** + * Persistent key storage magic header. + */ +#define PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER "PSA\0KEY" +#define PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH (sizeof(PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER)) + +typedef struct { + uint8_t magic[PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH]; + uint8_t version[4]; + uint8_t lifetime[sizeof(psa_key_lifetime_t)]; + uint8_t type[2]; + uint8_t bits[2]; + uint8_t policy[sizeof(psa_key_policy_t)]; + uint8_t data_len[4]; + uint8_t key_data[]; +} psa_persistent_key_storage_format; + +void psa_format_key_data_for_storage(const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t *storage_data) +{ + psa_persistent_key_storage_format *storage_format = + (psa_persistent_key_storage_format *) storage_data; + + memcpy(storage_format->magic, PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER, + PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(0, storage_format->version, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(attr->lifetime, storage_format->lifetime, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE((uint16_t) attr->type, storage_format->type, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE((uint16_t) attr->bits, storage_format->bits, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(attr->policy.usage, storage_format->policy, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(attr->policy.alg, storage_format->policy, sizeof(uint32_t)); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(attr->policy.alg2, storage_format->policy, 2 * sizeof(uint32_t)); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(data_length, storage_format->data_len, 0); + memcpy(storage_format->key_data, data, data_length); +} + +static psa_status_t check_magic_header(const uint8_t *data) +{ + if (memcmp(data, PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER, + PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH) != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_parse_key_data_from_storage(const uint8_t *storage_data, + size_t storage_data_length, + uint8_t **key_data, + size_t *key_data_length, + psa_key_attributes_t *attr) +{ + psa_status_t status; + const psa_persistent_key_storage_format *storage_format = + (const psa_persistent_key_storage_format *) storage_data; + uint32_t version; + + if (storage_data_length < sizeof(*storage_format)) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + + status = check_magic_header(storage_data); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + version = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(storage_format->version, 0); + if (version != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + + *key_data_length = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(storage_format->data_len, 0); + if (*key_data_length > (storage_data_length - sizeof(*storage_format)) || + *key_data_length > PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + + if (*key_data_length == 0) { + *key_data = NULL; + } else { + *key_data = mbedtls_calloc(1, *key_data_length); + if (*key_data == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + memcpy(*key_data, storage_format->key_data, *key_data_length); + } + + attr->lifetime = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(storage_format->lifetime, 0); + attr->type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE(storage_format->type, 0); + attr->bits = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE(storage_format->bits, 0); + attr->policy.usage = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(storage_format->policy, 0); + attr->policy.alg = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(storage_format->policy, sizeof(uint32_t)); + attr->policy.alg2 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(storage_format->policy, 2 * sizeof(uint32_t)); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attr, + const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length) +{ + size_t storage_data_length; + uint8_t *storage_data; + psa_status_t status; + + /* All keys saved to persistent storage always have a key context */ + if (data == NULL || data_length == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + if (data_length > PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE; + } + storage_data_length = data_length + sizeof(psa_persistent_key_storage_format); + + storage_data = mbedtls_calloc(1, storage_data_length); + if (storage_data == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + psa_format_key_data_for_storage(data, data_length, attr, storage_data); + + status = psa_crypto_storage_store(attr->id, + storage_data, storage_data_length); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(storage_data, storage_data_length); + + return status; +} + +void psa_free_persistent_key_data(uint8_t *key_data, size_t key_data_length) +{ + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(key_data, key_data_length); +} + +psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key(psa_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t **data, + size_t *data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + uint8_t *loaded_data; + size_t storage_data_length = 0; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = attr->id; + + status = psa_crypto_storage_get_data_length(key, &storage_data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + loaded_data = mbedtls_calloc(1, storage_data_length); + + if (loaded_data == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + + status = psa_crypto_storage_load(key, loaded_data, storage_data_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_parse_key_data_from_storage(loaded_data, storage_data_length, + data, data_length, attr); + + /* All keys saved to persistent storage always have a key context */ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && + (*data == NULL || *data_length == 0)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(loaded_data, storage_data_length); + return status; +} + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Transactions */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) + +psa_crypto_transaction_t psa_crypto_transaction; + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_save_transaction(void) +{ + struct psa_storage_info_t p_info; + psa_status_t status; + status = psa_its_get_info(PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID, &p_info); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* This shouldn't happen: we're trying to start a transaction while + * there is still a transaction that hasn't been replayed. */ + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } else if (status != PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { + return status; + } + return psa_its_set(PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID, + sizeof(psa_crypto_transaction), + &psa_crypto_transaction, + 0); +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_load_transaction(void) +{ + psa_status_t status; + size_t length; + status = psa_its_get(PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID, 0, + sizeof(psa_crypto_transaction), + &psa_crypto_transaction, &length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + if (length != sizeof(psa_crypto_transaction)) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_crypto_stop_transaction(void) +{ + psa_status_t status = psa_its_remove(PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID); + /* Whether or not updating the storage succeeded, the transaction is + * finished now. It's too late to go back, so zero out the in-memory + * data. */ + memset(&psa_crypto_transaction, 0, sizeof(psa_crypto_transaction)); + return status; +} + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Random generator state */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_storage_inject_entropy(const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size) +{ + psa_status_t status; + struct psa_storage_info_t p_info; + + status = psa_its_get_info(PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID, &p_info); + + if (PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST == status) { /* No seed exists */ + status = psa_its_set(PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID, seed_size, seed, 0); + } else if (PSA_SUCCESS == status) { + /* You should not be here. Seed needs to be injected only once */ + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED; + } + return status; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + + + +/****************************************************************/ +/* The end */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_storage.h b/library/psa_crypto_storage.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d7f5b189539 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_crypto_storage.h @@ -0,0 +1,385 @@ +/** + * \file psa_crypto_storage.h + * + * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS key storage + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H +#define PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" + +#include +#include + +/* Limit the maximum key size in storage. This should have no effect + * since the key size is limited in memory. */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)) +/* Sanity check: a file size must fit in 32 bits. Allow a generous + * 64kB of metadata. */ +#if PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE > 0xffff0000 +#error "PSA_CRYPTO_MAX_STORAGE_SIZE > 0xffff0000" +#endif + +/** The maximum permitted persistent slot number. + * + * In Mbed Crypto 0.1.0b: + * - Using the file backend, all key ids are ok except 0. + * - Using the ITS backend, all key ids are ok except 0xFFFFFF52 + * (#PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID) for which the file contains the + * device's random seed (if this feature is enabled). + * - Only key ids from 1 to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT are actually used. + * + * Since we need to preserve the random seed, avoid using that key slot. + * Reserve a whole range of key slots just in case something else comes up. + * + * This limitation will probably become moot when we implement client + * separation for key storage. + */ +#define PSA_MAX_PERSISTENT_KEY_IDENTIFIER PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX + +/** + * \brief Checks if persistent data is stored for the given key slot number + * + * This function checks if any key data or metadata exists for the key slot in + * the persistent storage. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier to check. + * + * \retval 0 + * No persistent data present for slot number + * \retval 1 + * Persistent data present for slot number + */ +int psa_is_key_present_in_storage(const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); + +/** + * \brief Format key data and metadata and save to a location for given key + * slot. + * + * This function formats the key data and metadata and saves it to a + * persistent storage backend. The storage location corresponding to the + * key slot must be empty, otherwise this function will fail. This function + * should be called after loading the key into an internal slot to ensure the + * persistent key is not saved into a storage location corresponding to an + * already occupied non-persistent key, as well as ensuring the key data is + * validated. + * + * Note: This function will only succeed for key buffers which are not + * empty. If passed a NULL pointer or zero-length, the function will fail + * with #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. + * + * \param[in] attr The attributes of the key to save. + * The key identifier field in the attributes + * determines the key's location. + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. + * \param data_length The number of bytes that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_save_persistent_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attr, + const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length); + +/** + * \brief Parses key data and metadata and load persistent key for given + * key slot number. + * + * This function reads from a storage backend, parses the key data and + * metadata and writes them to the appropriate output parameters. + * + * Note: This function allocates a buffer and returns a pointer to it through + * the data parameter. On successful return, the pointer is guaranteed to be + * valid and the buffer contains at least one byte of data. + * psa_free_persistent_key_data() must be called on the data buffer + * afterwards to zeroize and free this buffer. + * + * \param[in,out] attr On input, the key identifier field identifies + * the key to load. Other fields are ignored. + * On success, the attribute structure contains + * the key metadata that was loaded from storage. + * \param[out] data Pointer to an allocated key data buffer on return. + * \param[out] data_length The number of bytes that make up the key data. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key(psa_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t **data, + size_t *data_length); + +/** + * \brief Remove persistent data for the given key slot number. + * + * \param key Persistent identifier of the key to remove + * from persistent storage. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The key was successfully removed, + * or the key did not exist. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_destroy_persistent_key(const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); + +/** + * \brief Free the temporary buffer allocated by psa_load_persistent_key(). + * + * This function must be called at some point after psa_load_persistent_key() + * to zeroize and free the memory allocated to the buffer in that function. + * + * \param key_data Buffer for the key data. + * \param key_data_length Size of the key data buffer. + * + */ +void psa_free_persistent_key_data(uint8_t *key_data, size_t key_data_length); + +/** + * \brief Formats key data and metadata for persistent storage + * + * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. + * \param data_length Length of the key data buffer. + * \param[in] attr The core attributes of the key. + * \param[out] storage_data Output buffer for the formatted data. + * + */ +void psa_format_key_data_for_storage(const uint8_t *data, + const size_t data_length, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attr, + uint8_t *storage_data); + +/** + * \brief Parses persistent storage data into key data and metadata + * + * \param[in] storage_data Buffer for the storage data. + * \param storage_data_length Length of the storage data buffer + * \param[out] key_data On output, pointer to a newly allocated buffer + * containing the key data. This must be freed + * using psa_free_persistent_key_data() + * \param[out] key_data_length Length of the key data buffer + * \param[out] attr On success, the attribute structure is filled + * with the loaded key metadata. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_parse_key_data_from_storage(const uint8_t *storage_data, + size_t storage_data_length, + uint8_t **key_data, + size_t *key_data_length, + psa_key_attributes_t *attr); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) +/** This symbol is defined if transaction support is required. */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS 1 +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS) + +/** The type of transaction that is in progress. + */ +/* This is an integer type rather than an enum for two reasons: to support + * unknown values when loading a transaction file, and to ensure that the + * type has a known size. + */ +typedef uint16_t psa_crypto_transaction_type_t; + +/** No transaction is in progress. + * + * This has the value 0, so zero-initialization sets a transaction's type to + * this value. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_NONE ((psa_crypto_transaction_type_t) 0x0000) + +/** A key creation transaction. + * + * This is only used for keys in an external cryptoprocessor (secure element). + * Keys in RAM or in internal storage are created atomically in storage + * (simple file creation), so they do not need a transaction mechanism. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY ((psa_crypto_transaction_type_t) 0x0001) + +/** A key destruction transaction. + * + * This is only used for keys in an external cryptoprocessor (secure element). + * Keys in RAM or in internal storage are destroyed atomically in storage + * (simple file deletion), so they do not need a transaction mechanism. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY ((psa_crypto_transaction_type_t) 0x0002) + +/** Transaction data. + * + * This type is designed to be serialized by writing the memory representation + * and reading it back on the same device. + * + * \note The transaction mechanism is not thread-safe. There can only be one + * single active transaction at a time. + * The transaction object is #psa_crypto_transaction. + * + * \note If an API call starts a transaction, it must complete this transaction + * before returning to the application. + * + * The lifetime of a transaction is the following (note that only one + * transaction may be active at a time): + * + * -# Call psa_crypto_prepare_transaction() to initialize the transaction + * object in memory and declare the type of transaction that is starting. + * -# Fill in the type-specific fields of #psa_crypto_transaction. + * -# Call psa_crypto_save_transaction() to start the transaction. This + * saves the transaction data to internal storage. + * -# Perform the work of the transaction by modifying files, contacting + * external entities, or whatever needs doing. Note that the transaction + * may be interrupted by a power failure, so you need to have a way + * recover from interruptions either by undoing what has been done + * so far or by resuming where you left off. + * -# If there are intermediate stages in the transaction, update + * the fields of #psa_crypto_transaction and call + * psa_crypto_save_transaction() again when each stage is reached. + * -# When the transaction is over, call psa_crypto_stop_transaction() to + * remove the transaction data in storage and in memory. + * + * If the system crashes while a transaction is in progress, psa_crypto_init() + * calls psa_crypto_load_transaction() and takes care of completing or + * rewinding the transaction. This is done in psa_crypto_recover_transaction() + * in psa_crypto.c. If you add a new type of transaction, be + * sure to add code for it in psa_crypto_recover_transaction(). + */ +typedef union { + /* Each element of this union must have the following properties + * to facilitate serialization and deserialization: + * + * - The element is a struct. + * - The first field of the struct is `psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type`. + * - Elements of the struct are arranged such a way that there is + * no padding. + */ + struct psa_crypto_transaction_unknown_s { + psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type; + uint16_t unused1; + uint32_t unused2; + uint64_t unused3; + uint64_t unused4; + } unknown; + /* ::type is #PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_CREATE_KEY or + * #PSA_CRYPTO_TRANSACTION_DESTROY_KEY. */ + struct psa_crypto_transaction_key_s { + psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type; + uint16_t unused1; + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime; + psa_key_slot_number_t slot; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id; + } key; +} psa_crypto_transaction_t; + +/** The single active transaction. + */ +extern psa_crypto_transaction_t psa_crypto_transaction; + +/** Prepare for a transaction. + * + * There must not be an ongoing transaction. + * + * \param type The type of transaction to start. + */ +static inline void psa_crypto_prepare_transaction( + psa_crypto_transaction_type_t type) +{ + psa_crypto_transaction.unknown.type = type; +} + +/** Save the transaction data to storage. + * + * You may call this function multiple times during a transaction to + * atomically update the transaction state. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_save_transaction(void); + +/** Load the transaction data from storage, if any. + * + * This function is meant to be called from psa_crypto_init() to recover + * in case a transaction was interrupted by a system crash. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * The data about the ongoing transaction has been loaded to + * #psa_crypto_transaction. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There is no ongoing transaction. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_load_transaction(void); + +/** Indicate that the current transaction is finished. + * + * Call this function at the very end of transaction processing. + * This function does not "commit" or "abort" the transaction: the storage + * subsystem has no concept of "commit" and "abort", just saving and + * removing the transaction information in storage. + * + * This function erases the transaction data in storage (if any) and + * resets the transaction data in memory. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * There was transaction data in storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST + * There was no transaction data in storage. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE + * It was impossible to determine whether there was transaction data + * in storage, or the transaction data could not be erased. + */ +psa_status_t psa_crypto_stop_transaction(void); + +/** The ITS file identifier for the transaction data. + * + * 0xffffffNN = special file; 0x74 = 't' for transaction. + */ +#define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_TRANSACTION_UID ((psa_key_id_t) 0xffffff74) + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_HAS_TRANSACTIONS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) +/** Backend side of mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(). + * + * This function stores the supplied data into the entropy seed file. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + * Success + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED + * The entropy seed file already exists. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_storage_inject_entropy(const unsigned char *seed, + size_t seed_size); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_its_file.c b/library/psa_its_file.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..95671374837 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_its_file.c @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +/* + * PSA ITS simulator over stdio files. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(_WIN32) +#include +#endif + +#include "psa_crypto_its.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if !defined(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX) +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "" +#endif + +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_PATTERN "%08x%08x" +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX ".psa_its" +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH \ + (sizeof(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX) - 1 + /*prefix without terminating 0*/ \ + 16 + /*UID (64-bit number in hex)*/ \ + sizeof(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX) - 1 + /*suffix without terminating 0*/ \ + 1 /*terminating null byte*/) +#define PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP \ + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX "tempfile" PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX + +/* The maximum value of psa_storage_info_t.size */ +#define PSA_ITS_MAX_SIZE 0xffffffff + +#define PSA_ITS_MAGIC_STRING "PSA\0ITS\0" +#define PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH 8 + +/* As rename fails on Windows if the new filepath already exists, + * use MoveFileExA with the MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING flag instead. + * Returns 0 on success, nonzero on failure. */ +#if defined(_WIN32) +#define rename_replace_existing(oldpath, newpath) \ + (!MoveFileExA(oldpath, newpath, MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING)) +#else +#define rename_replace_existing(oldpath, newpath) rename(oldpath, newpath) +#endif + +typedef struct { + uint8_t magic[PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH]; + uint8_t size[sizeof(uint32_t)]; + uint8_t flags[sizeof(psa_storage_create_flags_t)]; +} psa_its_file_header_t; + +static void psa_its_fill_filename(psa_storage_uid_t uid, char *filename) +{ + /* Break up the UID into two 32-bit pieces so as not to rely on + * long long support in snprintf. */ + mbedtls_snprintf(filename, PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH, + "%s" PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_PATTERN "%s", + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_PREFIX, + (unsigned) (uid >> 32), + (unsigned) (uid & 0xffffffff), + PSA_ITS_STORAGE_SUFFIX); +} + +static psa_status_t psa_its_read_file(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + struct psa_storage_info_t *p_info, + FILE **p_stream) +{ + char filename[PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH]; + psa_its_file_header_t header; + size_t n; + + *p_stream = NULL; + psa_its_fill_filename(uid, filename); + *p_stream = fopen(filename, "rb"); + if (*p_stream == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(*p_stream, NULL); + + n = fread(&header, 1, sizeof(header), *p_stream); + if (n != sizeof(header)) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT; + } + if (memcmp(header.magic, PSA_ITS_MAGIC_STRING, + PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH) != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT; + } + + p_info->size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(header.size, 0); + p_info->flags = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(header.flags, 0); + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_get_info(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + struct psa_storage_info_t *p_info) +{ + psa_status_t status; + FILE *stream = NULL; + status = psa_its_read_file(uid, p_info, &stream); + if (stream != NULL) { + fclose(stream); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_get(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_offset, + uint32_t data_length, + void *p_data, + size_t *p_data_length) +{ + psa_status_t status; + FILE *stream = NULL; + size_t n; + struct psa_storage_info_t info; + + status = psa_its_read_file(uid, &info, &stream); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (data_offset + data_length < data_offset) { + goto exit; + } +#if SIZE_MAX < 0xffffffff + if (data_offset + data_length > SIZE_MAX) { + goto exit; + } +#endif + if (data_offset + data_length > info.size) { + goto exit; + } + + status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; +#if LONG_MAX < 0xffffffff + while (data_offset > LONG_MAX) { + if (fseek(stream, LONG_MAX, SEEK_CUR) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + data_offset -= LONG_MAX; + } +#endif + if (fseek(stream, data_offset, SEEK_CUR) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + n = fread(p_data, 1, data_length, stream); + if (n != data_length) { + goto exit; + } + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + if (p_data_length != NULL) { + *p_data_length = n; + } + +exit: + if (stream != NULL) { + fclose(stream); + } + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_set(psa_storage_uid_t uid, + uint32_t data_length, + const void *p_data, + psa_storage_create_flags_t create_flags) +{ + if (uid == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; + } + + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; + char filename[PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH]; + FILE *stream = NULL; + psa_its_file_header_t header; + size_t n; + + memcpy(header.magic, PSA_ITS_MAGIC_STRING, PSA_ITS_MAGIC_LENGTH); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(data_length, header.size, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(create_flags, header.flags, 0); + + psa_its_fill_filename(uid, filename); + stream = fopen(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP, "wb"); + + if (stream == NULL) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */ + mbedtls_setbuf(stream, NULL); + + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE; + n = fwrite(&header, 1, sizeof(header), stream); + if (n != sizeof(header)) { + goto exit; + } + if (data_length != 0) { + n = fwrite(p_data, 1, data_length, stream); + if (n != data_length) { + goto exit; + } + } + status = PSA_SUCCESS; + +exit: + if (stream != NULL) { + int ret = fclose(stream); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && ret != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE; + } + } + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + if (rename_replace_existing(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP, filename) != 0) { + status = PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; + } + } + /* The temporary file may still exist, but only in failure cases where + * we're already reporting an error. So there's nothing we can do on + * failure. If the function succeeded, and in some error cases, the + * temporary file doesn't exist and so remove() is expected to fail. + * Thus we just ignore the return status of remove(). */ + (void) remove(PSA_ITS_STORAGE_TEMP); + return status; +} + +psa_status_t psa_its_remove(psa_storage_uid_t uid) +{ + char filename[PSA_ITS_STORAGE_FILENAME_LENGTH]; + FILE *stream; + psa_its_fill_filename(uid, filename); + stream = fopen(filename, "rb"); + if (stream == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST; + } + fclose(stream); + if (remove(filename) != 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C */ diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4ccc5b05d8c --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -0,0 +1,602 @@ +/* + * PSA hashing layer on top of Mbed TLS software crypto + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +/* This is needed for MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX macros */ +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) +#include +#include +#endif + +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) +#include +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) +#include +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)) +#include +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#include +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#include +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +#include +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) +#include +#endif +#include + +/* PSA_SUCCESS is kept at the top of each error table since + * it's the most common status when everything functions properly. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_md_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED } +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_cipher_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED } +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_lms_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA } +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_ssl_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED }, + { PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR }, + { PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL } +}; +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_pk_rsa_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE }, + { PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING } +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_pk_ecdsa_errors[] = +{ + { PSA_SUCCESS, 0 }, + { PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE }, + { PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL }, + { PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED }, + { PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED } +}; +#endif + +int psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status) +{ + switch (status) { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + return 0; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED; + case PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + case PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE: + case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED: + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + } +} + +int psa_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status, + const mbedtls_error_pair_t *local_translations, + size_t local_errors_num, + int (*fallback_f)(psa_status_t)) +{ + for (size_t i = 0; i < local_errors_num; i++) { + if (status == local_translations[i].psa_status) { + return local_translations[i].mbedtls_error; + } + } + return fallback_f(status); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +int psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status) +{ + switch (status) { + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; + case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + case PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT: + case PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID: + case PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR; + default: + return psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ + +/****************************************************************/ +/* Key management */ +/****************************************************************/ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, + size_t *bits) +{ + switch (grpid) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1: + *bits = 192; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1: + *bits = 224; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1: + *bits = 256; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1: + *bits = 384; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1: + *bits = 521; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1: + *bits = 256; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1: + *bits = 384; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1: + *bits = 512; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: + *bits = 255; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1: + *bits = 192; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1) + /* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: + *bits = 256; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448) + case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: + *bits = 448; + return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY; +#endif + default: + *bits = 0; + return 0; + } +} + +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family, + size_t bits) +{ + switch (family) { + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: + switch (bits) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) + case 192: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) + case 224: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) + case 256: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) + case 384: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) + case 521: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1; +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: + switch (bits) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) + case 256: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) + case 384: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) + case 512: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1; +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY: + switch (bits) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) + case 255: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) + case 448: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448; +#endif + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: + switch (bits) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) + case 192: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) + /* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */ +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) + case 256: + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1; +#endif + } + break; + } + + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; +} +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +/* Wrapper function allowing the classic API to use the PSA RNG. + * + * `mbedtls_psa_get_random(MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE, ...)` calls + * `psa_generate_random(...)`. The state parameter is ignored since the + * PSA API doesn't support passing an explicit state. + */ +int mbedtls_psa_get_random(void *p_rng, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_size) +{ + /* This function takes a pointer to the RNG state because that's what + * classic mbedtls functions using an RNG expect. The PSA RNG manages + * its own state internally and doesn't let the caller access that state. + * So we just ignore the state parameter, and in practice we'll pass + * NULL. */ + (void) p_rng; + psa_status_t status = psa_generate_random(output, output_size); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + return 0; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED; + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) + +/** + * \brief Convert a single raw coordinate to DER ASN.1 format. The output der + * buffer is filled backward (i.e. starting from its end). + * + * \param raw_buf Buffer containing the raw coordinate to be + * converted. + * \param raw_len Length of raw_buf in bytes. This must be > 0. + * \param der_buf_start Pointer to the beginning of the buffer which + * will be filled with the DER converted data. + * \param der_buf_end End of the buffer used to store the DER output. + * + * \return On success, the amount of data (in bytes) written to + * the DER buffer. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL if the provided der + * buffer is too small to contain all the converted data. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA if the input raw + * coordinate is null (i.e. all zeros). + * + * \warning Raw and der buffer must not be overlapping. + */ +static int convert_raw_to_der_single_int(const unsigned char *raw_buf, size_t raw_len, + unsigned char *der_buf_start, + unsigned char *der_buf_end) +{ + unsigned char *p = der_buf_end; + int len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s. + * Provided input MPIs should not be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still + * detect that and return error in case. */ + while (*raw_buf == 0x00) { + ++raw_buf; + --raw_len; + if (raw_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + } + len = (int) raw_len; + + /* Copy the raw coordinate to the end of der_buf. */ + if ((p - der_buf_start) < len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + p -= len; + memcpy(p, raw_buf, len); + + /* If MSb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0. */ + if (*p & 0x80) { + if ((p - der_buf_start) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + --p; + *p = 0x00; + ++len; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, der_buf_start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, der_buf_start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)); + + return len; +} + +int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, + unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len) +{ + unsigned char r[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + unsigned char s[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + const size_t coordinate_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits); + size_t len = 0; + unsigned char *p = der + der_size; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (raw_len != (2 * coordinate_len)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + + /* Since raw and der buffers might overlap, dump r and s before starting + * the conversion. */ + memcpy(r, raw, coordinate_len); + memcpy(s, raw + coordinate_len, coordinate_len); + + /* der buffer will initially be written starting from its end so we pick s + * first and then r. */ + ret = convert_raw_to_der_single_int(s, coordinate_len, der, p); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + p -= ret; + len += ret; + + ret = convert_raw_to_der_single_int(r, coordinate_len, der, p); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + p -= ret; + len += ret; + + /* Add ASN.1 header (len + tag). */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, der, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, der, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + /* memmove the content of der buffer to its beginnig. */ + memmove(der, p, len); + *der_len = len; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * \brief Convert a single integer from ASN.1 DER format to raw. + * + * \param der Buffer containing the DER integer value to be + * converted. + * \param der_len Length of the der buffer in bytes. + * \param raw Output buffer that will be filled with the + * converted data. This should be at least + * coordinate_size bytes and it must be zeroed before + * calling this function. + * \param coordinate_size Size (in bytes) of a single coordinate in raw + * format. + * + * \return On success, the amount of DER data parsed from the + * provided der buffer. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the integer tag + * is missing in the der buffer. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the integer + * is null (i.e. all zeros) or if the output raw buffer + * is too small to contain the converted raw value. + * + * \warning Der and raw buffers must not be overlapping. + */ +static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *raw, size_t coordinate_size) +{ + unsigned char *p = der; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t unpadded_len, padding_len = 0; + + /* Get the length of ASN.1 element (i.e. the integer we need to parse). */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, p + der_len, &unpadded_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* It's invalid to have: + * - unpadded_len == 0. + * - MSb set without a leading 0x00 (leading 0x00 is checked below). */ + if (((unpadded_len == 0) || (*p & 0x80) != 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + + /* Skip possible leading zero */ + if (*p == 0x00) { + p++; + unpadded_len--; + /* It is not allowed to have more than 1 leading zero. + * Ignore the case in which unpadded_len = 0 because that's a 0 encoded + * in ASN.1 format (i.e. 020100). */ + if ((unpadded_len > 0) && (*p == 0x00)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + } + + if (unpadded_len > coordinate_size) { + /* Parsed number is longer than the maximum expected value. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + padding_len = coordinate_size - unpadded_len; + /* raw buffer was already zeroed by the calling function so zero-padding + * operation is skipped here. */ + memcpy(raw + padding_len, p, unpadded_len); + p += unpadded_len; + + return (int) (p - der); +} + +int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(size_t bits, const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len) +{ + unsigned char raw_tmp[PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) der; + size_t data_len; + size_t coordinate_size = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits); + int ret; + + /* The output raw buffer should be at least twice the size of a raw + * coordinate in order to store r and s. */ + if (raw_size < coordinate_size * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* Check that the provided input DER buffer has the right header. */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, der + der_len, &data_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + memset(raw_tmp, 0, 2 * coordinate_size); + + /* Extract r */ + ret = convert_der_to_raw_single_int(p, data_len, raw_tmp, coordinate_size); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ret; + data_len -= ret; + + /* Extract s */ + ret = convert_der_to_raw_single_int(p, data_len, raw_tmp + coordinate_size, + coordinate_size); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ret; + data_len -= ret; + + /* Check that we consumed all the input der data. */ + if ((size_t) (p - der) != der_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + memcpy(raw, raw_tmp, 2 * coordinate_size); + *raw_len = 2 * coordinate_size; + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ diff --git a/library/psa_util_internal.h b/library/psa_util_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..70a08a02cd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/psa_util_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +/** + * \file psa_util_internal.h + * + * \brief Internal utility functions for use of PSA Crypto. + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_INTERNAL_H + +/* Include the public header so that users only need one include. */ +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + +/************************************************************************* + * FFDH + ************************************************************************/ + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_FFDH_PUBKEY_LENGTH \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) + +/************************************************************************* + * ECC + ************************************************************************/ + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) + +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) + +/************************************************************************* + * Error translation + ************************************************************************/ + +typedef struct { + /* Error codes used by PSA crypto are in -255..-128, fitting in 16 bits. */ + int16_t psa_status; + /* Error codes used by Mbed TLS are in one of the ranges + * -127..-1 (low-level) or -32767..-4096 (high-level with a low-level + * code optionally added), fitting in 16 bits. */ + int16_t mbedtls_error; +} mbedtls_error_pair_t; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_md_errors[4]; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_cipher_errors[4]; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_lms_errors[3]; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_ssl_errors[7]; +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_pk_rsa_errors[8]; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_pk_ecdsa_errors[7]; +#endif + +/* Generic fallback function for error translation, + * when the received state was not module-specific. */ +int psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status); + +/* This function iterates over provided local error translations, + * and if no match was found - calls the fallback error translation function. */ +int psa_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status, + const mbedtls_error_pair_t *local_translations, + size_t local_errors_num, + int (*fallback_f)(psa_status_t)); + +/* The second out of three-stage error handling functions of the pk module, + * acts as a fallback after RSA / ECDSA error translation, and if no match + * is found, it itself calls psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls. */ +int psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status); + +/* Utility macro to shorten the defines of error translator in modules. */ +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, error_list, fallback_f) \ + psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, error_list, \ + sizeof(error_list)/sizeof(error_list[0]), \ + fallback_f) + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/library/ripemd160.c b/library/ripemd160.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b4fc3cdba1f --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ripemd160.c @@ -0,0 +1,490 @@ +/* + * RIPE MD-160 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * The RIPEMD-160 algorithm was designed by RIPE in 1996 + * http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/mbedtls_ripemd160.html + * http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/wiki/RIPEMD-160 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT) + +void mbedtls_ripemd160_init(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ripemd160_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_ripemd160_free(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_ripemd160_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_ripemd160_clone(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *dst, + const mbedtls_ripemd160_context *src) +{ + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * RIPEMD-160 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; + ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; + ctx->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0; + + return 0; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT) +/* + * Process one block + */ +int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64]) +{ + struct { + uint32_t A, B, C, D, E, Ap, Bp, Cp, Dp, Ep, X[16]; + } local; + + local.X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 0); + local.X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 4); + local.X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 8); + local.X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 12); + local.X[4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 16); + local.X[5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 20); + local.X[6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 24); + local.X[7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 28); + local.X[8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 32); + local.X[9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 36); + local.X[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 40); + local.X[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 44); + local.X[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 48); + local.X[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 52); + local.X[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 56); + local.X[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 60); + + local.A = local.Ap = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = local.Bp = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = local.Cp = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = local.Dp = ctx->state[3]; + local.E = local.Ep = ctx->state[4]; + +#define F1(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) +#define F2(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | (~(x) & (z))) +#define F3(x, y, z) (((x) | ~(y)) ^ (z)) +#define F4(x, y, z) (((x) & (z)) | ((y) & ~(z))) +#define F5(x, y, z) ((x) ^ ((y) | ~(z))) + +#define S(x, n) (((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32 - (n)))) + +#define P(a, b, c, d, e, r, s, f, k) \ + do \ + { \ + (a) += f((b), (c), (d)) + local.X[r] + (k); \ + (a) = S((a), (s)) + (e); \ + (c) = S((c), 10); \ + } while (0) + +#define P2(a, b, c, d, e, r, s, rp, sp) \ + do \ + { \ + P((a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (r), (s), F, K); \ + P(a ## p, b ## p, c ## p, d ## p, e ## p, \ + (rp), (sp), Fp, Kp); \ + } while (0) + +#define F F1 +#define K 0x00000000 +#define Fp F5 +#define Kp 0x50A28BE6 + P2(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 0, 11, 5, 8); + P2(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 1, 14, 14, 9); + P2(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 2, 15, 7, 9); + P2(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 3, 12, 0, 11); + P2(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 4, 5, 9, 13); + P2(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 5, 8, 2, 15); + P2(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 6, 7, 11, 15); + P2(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 7, 9, 4, 5); + P2(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 8, 11, 13, 7); + P2(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 9, 13, 6, 7); + P2(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 10, 14, 15, 8); + P2(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 11, 15, 8, 11); + P2(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 12, 6, 1, 14); + P2(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 13, 7, 10, 14); + P2(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 14, 9, 3, 12); + P2(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 15, 8, 12, 6); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + +#define F F2 +#define K 0x5A827999 +#define Fp F4 +#define Kp 0x5C4DD124 + P2(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 7, 7, 6, 9); + P2(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 4, 6, 11, 13); + P2(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 13, 8, 3, 15); + P2(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 1, 13, 7, 7); + P2(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 10, 11, 0, 12); + P2(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 6, 9, 13, 8); + P2(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 15, 7, 5, 9); + P2(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 3, 15, 10, 11); + P2(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 12, 7, 14, 7); + P2(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 0, 12, 15, 7); + P2(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 15, 8, 12); + P2(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 5, 9, 12, 7); + P2(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 2, 11, 4, 6); + P2(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 14, 7, 9, 15); + P2(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 11, 13, 1, 13); + P2(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 8, 12, 2, 11); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + +#define F F3 +#define K 0x6ED9EBA1 +#define Fp F3 +#define Kp 0x6D703EF3 + P2(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 3, 11, 15, 9); + P2(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 10, 13, 5, 7); + P2(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 14, 6, 1, 15); + P2(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 4, 7, 3, 11); + P2(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 14, 7, 8); + P2(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 15, 9, 14, 6); + P2(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 8, 13, 6, 6); + P2(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 1, 15, 9, 14); + P2(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 2, 14, 11, 12); + P2(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 7, 8, 8, 13); + P2(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 0, 13, 12, 5); + P2(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 6, 6, 2, 14); + P2(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 13, 5, 10, 13); + P2(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 11, 12, 0, 13); + P2(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 7, 4, 7); + P2(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 12, 5, 13, 5); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + +#define F F4 +#define K 0x8F1BBCDC +#define Fp F2 +#define Kp 0x7A6D76E9 + P2(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 1, 11, 8, 15); + P2(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 9, 12, 6, 5); + P2(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 11, 14, 4, 8); + P2(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 10, 15, 1, 11); + P2(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 0, 14, 3, 14); + P2(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 8, 15, 11, 14); + P2(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 12, 9, 15, 6); + P2(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 4, 8, 0, 14); + P2(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 13, 9, 5, 6); + P2(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 3, 14, 12, 9); + P2(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 7, 5, 2, 12); + P2(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 15, 6, 13, 9); + P2(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 14, 8, 9, 12); + P2(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 6, 7, 5); + P2(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 6, 5, 10, 15); + P2(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 2, 12, 14, 8); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + +#define F F5 +#define K 0xA953FD4E +#define Fp F1 +#define Kp 0x00000000 + P2(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 4, 9, 12, 8); + P2(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 0, 15, 15, 5); + P2(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 5, 10, 12); + P2(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 9, 11, 4, 9); + P2(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 7, 6, 1, 12); + P2(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 12, 8, 5, 5); + P2(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 2, 13, 8, 14); + P2(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 10, 12, 7, 6); + P2(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 14, 5, 6, 8); + P2(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 1, 12, 2, 13); + P2(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 3, 13, 13, 6); + P2(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, 8, 14, 14, 5); + P2(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 11, 11, 0, 15); + P2(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, 6, 8, 3, 13); + P2(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, 15, 5, 9, 11); + P2(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, 13, 6, 11, 11); +#undef F +#undef K +#undef Fp +#undef Kp + + local.C = ctx->state[1] + local.C + local.Dp; + ctx->state[1] = ctx->state[2] + local.D + local.Ep; + ctx->state[2] = ctx->state[3] + local.E + local.Ap; + ctx->state[3] = ctx->state[4] + local.A + local.Bp; + ctx->state[4] = ctx->state[0] + local.B + local.Cp; + ctx->state[0] = local.C; + + /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&local, sizeof(local)); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * RIPEMD-160 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_update(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + uint32_t left; + + if (ilen == 0) { + return 0; + } + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if (ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen) { + ctx->total[1]++; + } + + if (left && ilen >= fill) { + memcpy((void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while (ilen >= 64) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process(ctx, input)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if (ilen > 0) { + memcpy((void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen); + } + + return 0; +} + +static const unsigned char ripemd160_padding[64] = +{ + 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 +}; + +/* + * RIPEMD-160 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20]) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t last, padn; + uint32_t high, low; + unsigned char msglen[8]; + + high = (ctx->total[0] >> 29) + | (ctx->total[1] << 3); + low = (ctx->total[0] << 3); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(low, msglen, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(high, msglen, 4); + + last = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + padn = (last < 56) ? (56 - last) : (120 - last); + + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update(ctx, ripemd160_padding, padn); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update(ctx, msglen, 8); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[0], output, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[1], output, 4); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[2], output, 8); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[4], output, 16); + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_ripemd160_free(ctx); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ + +/* + * output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20]) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ripemd160_context ctx; + + mbedtls_ripemd160_init(&ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(&ctx)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ripemd160_free(&ctx); + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * Test vectors from the RIPEMD-160 paper and + * http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/mbedtls_ripemd160.html#HMAC + */ +#define TESTS 8 +static const unsigned char ripemd160_test_str[TESTS][81] = +{ + { "" }, + { "a" }, + { "abc" }, + { "message digest" }, + { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" }, + { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }, + { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" }, + { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" }, +}; + +static const size_t ripemd160_test_strlen[TESTS] = +{ + 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 56, 62, 80 +}; + +static const unsigned char ripemd160_test_md[TESTS][20] = +{ + { 0x9c, 0x11, 0x85, 0xa5, 0xc5, 0xe9, 0xfc, 0x54, 0x61, 0x28, + 0x08, 0x97, 0x7e, 0xe8, 0xf5, 0x48, 0xb2, 0x25, 0x8d, 0x31 }, + { 0x0b, 0xdc, 0x9d, 0x2d, 0x25, 0x6b, 0x3e, 0xe9, 0xda, 0xae, + 0x34, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0xf4, 0xdc, 0x83, 0x5a, 0x46, 0x7f, 0xfe }, + { 0x8e, 0xb2, 0x08, 0xf7, 0xe0, 0x5d, 0x98, 0x7a, 0x9b, 0x04, + 0x4a, 0x8e, 0x98, 0xc6, 0xb0, 0x87, 0xf1, 0x5a, 0x0b, 0xfc }, + { 0x5d, 0x06, 0x89, 0xef, 0x49, 0xd2, 0xfa, 0xe5, 0x72, 0xb8, + 0x81, 0xb1, 0x23, 0xa8, 0x5f, 0xfa, 0x21, 0x59, 0x5f, 0x36 }, + { 0xf7, 0x1c, 0x27, 0x10, 0x9c, 0x69, 0x2c, 0x1b, 0x56, 0xbb, + 0xdc, 0xeb, 0x5b, 0x9d, 0x28, 0x65, 0xb3, 0x70, 0x8d, 0xbc }, + { 0x12, 0xa0, 0x53, 0x38, 0x4a, 0x9c, 0x0c, 0x88, 0xe4, 0x05, + 0xa0, 0x6c, 0x27, 0xdc, 0xf4, 0x9a, 0xda, 0x62, 0xeb, 0x2b }, + { 0xb0, 0xe2, 0x0b, 0x6e, 0x31, 0x16, 0x64, 0x02, 0x86, 0xed, + 0x3a, 0x87, 0xa5, 0x71, 0x30, 0x79, 0xb2, 0x1f, 0x51, 0x89 }, + { 0x9b, 0x75, 0x2e, 0x45, 0x57, 0x3d, 0x4b, 0x39, 0xf4, 0xdb, + 0xd3, 0x32, 0x3c, 0xab, 0x82, 0xbf, 0x63, 0x32, 0x6b, 0xfb }, +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + unsigned char output[20]; + + memset(output, 0, sizeof(output)); + + for (i = 0; i < TESTS; i++) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" RIPEMD-160 test #%d: ", i + 1); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ripemd160(ripemd160_test_str[i], + ripemd160_test_strlen[i], output); + if (ret != 0) { + goto fail; + } + + if (memcmp(output, ripemd160_test_md[i], 20) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return 0; + +fail: + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7eb4a259ea8 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,3065 @@ +/* + * The RSA public-key cryptosystem + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation + * of the RSA algorithm: + * + * [1] A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems + * R Rivest, A Shamir, and L Adleman + * http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs.html#RSA78 + * + * [2] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 8 + * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone + * + * [3] Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks + * Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice and + * Stefan Mangard + * https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.08719v2 + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "bignum_core.h" +#include "rsa_alt_helpers.h" +#include "rsa_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include "md_psa.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__) +#include +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +/* + * Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero. + * + * The value zero is: + * - never a valid value for an RSA parameter + * - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete(). + * + * Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to + * rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early. + */ +static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(p, end, X); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, 0) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) +{ + int ret, version; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end; + + mbedtls_mpi T; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + p = (unsigned char *) key; + end = p + keylen; + + /* + * This function parses the RSAPrivateKey (PKCS#1) + * + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d + * prime1 INTEGER, -- p + * prime2 INTEGER, -- q + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) + * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p + * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL + * } + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (end != p + len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (version != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Import N */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import E */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import D */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + &T, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import P */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import Q */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + /* + * The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in + * that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by + * parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid + * recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading + * RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which + * can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q + * are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a + * description of one such attack. + */ + + /* Import DP */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DP, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import DQ */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DQ, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import QP */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->QP, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + +#else + /* Verify existence of the CRT params */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } +#endif + + /* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default + * implementation but is still called: + * - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to + * pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors) + * - as is also sanity-checks the key + * + * Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with + * mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example. + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (p != end) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) +{ + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key; + unsigned char *end = (unsigned char *) (key + keylen); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (end != p + len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Import N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + p += len; + + /* Import E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, p, len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + p += len; + + if (mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa) != 0 || + mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_write_key(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p) +{ + size_t len = 0; + int ret; + + mbedtls_mpi T; /* Temporary holding the exported parameters */ + + /* + * Export the parameters one after another to avoid simultaneous copies. + */ + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + /* Export QP */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export DQ */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export DP */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export Q */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export P */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export D */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + +end_of_export: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(p, start, 0)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} + +/* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_mpi T; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + /* Export E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + +end_of_export: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +/** This function performs the unpadding part of a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption + * operation (EME-PKCS1-v1_5 decoding). + * + * \note The return value from this function is a sensitive value + * (this is unusual). #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE shouldn't happen + * in a well-written application, but 0 vs #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + * is often a situation that an attacker can provoke and leaking which + * one is the result is precisely the information the attacker wants. + * + * \param input The input buffer which is the payload inside PKCS#1v1.5 + * encryption padding, called the "encoded message EM" + * by the terminology. + * \param ilen The length of the payload in the \p input buffer. + * \param output The buffer for the payload, called "message M" by the + * PKCS#1 terminology. This must be a writable buffer of + * length \p output_max_len bytes. + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the payload. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param output_max_len The length in bytes of the output buffer \p output. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE + * The output buffer is too small for the unpadded payload. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING + * The input doesn't contain properly formatted padding. + */ +static int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, plaintext_max_size; + + /* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must + * not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than + * the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise + * this would open the execution of the function to + * side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle + * attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory + * access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access + * to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to + * an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared + * branch predictor). */ + size_t pad_count = 0; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t pad_done; + size_t plaintext_size = 0; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t output_too_large; + + plaintext_max_size = (output_max_len > ilen - 11) ? ilen - 11 + : output_max_len; + + /* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant + * memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool(input[0]); + + + /* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 + * where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[1], MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT)); + + /* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find + * the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */ + pad_done = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE; + for (i = 2; i < ilen; i++) { + mbedtls_ct_condition_t found = mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(input[i], 0); + pad_done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(pad_done, found); + pad_count += mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_bool_not(pad_done), 1); + } + + /* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool_not(pad_done)); + + /* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(8, pad_count)); + + /* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of + * remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding + * is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the + * output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output + * buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding + * validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the + * size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */ + plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if( + bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, + (unsigned) (ilen - pad_count - 3)); + + /* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output + * buffer and to 1 otherwise. */ + output_too_large = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(plaintext_size, + plaintext_max_size); + + /* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return: + * - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0). + * - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted + * plaintext does not fit in the output buffer. + * - 0 if the padding is correct. */ + ret = mbedtls_ct_error_if( + bad, + MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING, + mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(output_too_large, MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE) + ); + + /* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the + * data that we're about to copy to the output buffer. + * We need to copy the same amount of data + * from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to + * avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or + * through memory or cache access patterns. */ + mbedtls_ct_zeroize_if(mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, output_too_large), input + 11, ilen - 11); + + /* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size. + * Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because + * revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity + * for a Bleichenbacher attack. */ + plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large, + (unsigned) plaintext_max_size, + (unsigned) plaintext_size); + + /* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in + * the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from + * the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that + * does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the + * starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive + * information. */ + mbedtls_ct_memmove_left(input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, + plaintext_max_size, + plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size); + + /* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros into the output + * buffer. If output_max_len is 0, then output may be an invalid pointer + * and the result of memcpy() would be undefined; prevent undefined + * behavior making sure to depend only on output_max_len (the size of the + * user-provided output buffer), which is independent from plaintext + * length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other + * secrets. */ + if (output_max_len != 0) { + memcpy(output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size); + } + + /* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case + * of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen + * when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent + * to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */ + *olen = plaintext_size; + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + +int mbedtls_rsa_import(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *N, + const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((N != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->N, N)) != 0) || + (P != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->P, P)) != 0) || + (Q != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->Q, Q)) != 0) || + (D != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->D, D)) != 0) || + (E != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->E, E)) != 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret); + } + + if (N != NULL) { + ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + unsigned char const *N, size_t N_len, + unsigned char const *P, size_t P_len, + unsigned char const *Q, size_t Q_len, + unsigned char const *D, size_t D_len, + unsigned char const *E, size_t E_len) +{ + int ret = 0; + + if (N != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->N, N, N_len)); + ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N); + } + + if (P != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->P, P, P_len)); + } + + if (Q != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->Q, Q, Q_len)); + } + + if (D != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->D, D, D_len)); + } + + if (E != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->E, E, E_len)); + } + +cleanup: + + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Checks whether the context fields are set in such a way + * that the RSA primitives will be able to execute without error. + * It does *not* make guarantees for consistency of the parameters. + */ +static int rsa_check_context(mbedtls_rsa_context const *ctx, int is_priv, + int blinding_needed) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* blinding_needed is only used for NO_CRT to decide whether + * P,Q need to be present or not. */ + ((void) blinding_needed); +#endif + + if (ctx->len != mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N) || + ctx->len > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * 1. Modular exponentiation needs positive, odd moduli. + */ + + /* Modular exponentiation wrt. N is always used for + * RSA public key operations. */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->N, 0) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* Modular exponentiation for P and Q is only + * used for private key operations and if CRT + * is used. */ + if (is_priv && + (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->P, 0) == 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->Q, 0) == 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + /* + * 2. Exponents must be positive + */ + + /* Always need E for public key operations */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) <= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* For private key operations, use D or DP & DQ + * as (unblinded) exponents. */ + if (is_priv && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) <= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#else + if (is_priv && + (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DP, 0) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DQ, 0) <= 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + /* Blinding shouldn't make exponents negative either, + * so check that P, Q >= 1 if that hasn't yet been + * done as part of 1. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + if (is_priv && blinding_needed && + (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) <= 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + + /* It wouldn't lead to an error if it wasn't satisfied, + * but check for QP >= 1 nonetheless. */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + if (is_priv && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->QP, 0) <= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_complete(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + int ret = 0; + int have_N, have_P, have_Q, have_D, have_E; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + int have_DP, have_DQ, have_QP; +#endif + int n_missing, pq_missing, d_missing, is_pub, is_priv; + + have_N = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0); + have_P = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0); + have_Q = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0); + have_D = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0); + have_E = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + have_DP = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DP, 0) != 0); + have_DQ = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->DQ, 0) != 0); + have_QP = (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->QP, 0) != 0); +#endif + + /* + * Check whether provided parameters are enough + * to deduce all others. The following incomplete + * parameter sets for private keys are supported: + * + * (1) P, Q missing. + * (2) D and potentially N missing. + * + */ + + n_missing = have_P && have_Q && have_D && have_E; + pq_missing = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && have_D && have_E; + d_missing = have_P && have_Q && !have_D && have_E; + is_pub = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && !have_D && have_E; + + /* These three alternatives are mutually exclusive */ + is_priv = n_missing || pq_missing || d_missing; + + if (!is_priv && !is_pub) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * Step 1: Deduce N if P, Q are provided. + */ + + if (!have_N && have_P && have_Q) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->N, &ctx->P, + &ctx->Q)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret); + } + + ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N); + } + + /* + * Step 2: Deduce and verify all remaining core parameters. + */ + + if (pq_missing) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes(&ctx->N, &ctx->E, &ctx->D, + &ctx->P, &ctx->Q); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret); + } + + } else if (d_missing) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent(&ctx->P, + &ctx->Q, + &ctx->E, + &ctx->D)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret); + } + } + + /* + * Step 3: Deduce all additional parameters specific + * to our current RSA implementation. + */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + if (is_priv && !(have_DP && have_DQ && have_QP)) { + ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, + &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + /* + * Step 3: Basic sanity checks + */ + + return rsa_check_context(ctx, is_priv, 1); +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + unsigned char *N, size_t N_len, + unsigned char *P, size_t P_len, + unsigned char *Q, size_t Q_len, + unsigned char *D, size_t D_len, + unsigned char *E, size_t E_len) +{ + int ret = 0; + int is_priv; + + /* Check if key is private or public */ + is_priv = + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0; + + if (!is_priv) { + /* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key, + * something must be wrong. */ + if (P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + } + + if (N != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->N, N, N_len)); + } + + if (P != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->P, P, P_len)); + } + + if (Q != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->Q, Q, Q_len)); + } + + if (D != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->D, D, D_len)); + } + + if (E != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->E, E, E_len)); + } + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_export(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q, + mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *E) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int is_priv; + + /* Check if key is private or public */ + is_priv = + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0; + + if (!is_priv) { + /* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key, + * something must be wrong. */ + if (P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + } + + /* Export all requested core parameters. */ + + if ((N != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(N, &ctx->N)) != 0) || + (P != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(P, &ctx->P)) != 0) || + (Q != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(Q, &ctx->Q)) != 0) || + (D != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(D, &ctx->D)) != 0) || + (E != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(E, &ctx->E)) != 0)) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Export CRT parameters + * This must also be implemented if CRT is not used, for being able to + * write DER encoded RSA keys. The helper function mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt + * can be used in this case. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int is_priv; + + /* Check if key is private or public */ + is_priv = + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->N, 0) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Q, 0) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->D, 0) != 0 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->E, 0) != 0; + + if (!is_priv) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* Export all requested blinding parameters. */ + if ((DP != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(DP, &ctx->DP)) != 0) || + (DQ != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(DQ, &ctx->DQ)) != 0) || + (QP != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(QP, &ctx->QP)) != 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret); + } +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, + DP, DQ, QP)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA, ret); + } +#endif + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Initialize an RSA context + */ +void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context)); + + ctx->padding = MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15; + ctx->hash_id = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Set ctx->ver to nonzero to indicate that the mutex has been + * initialized and will need to be freed. */ + ctx->ver = 1; + mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex); +#endif +} + +/* + * Set padding for an existing RSA context + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id) +{ + switch (padding) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: + break; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + if ((padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) && + (hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE)) { + /* Just make sure this hash is supported in this build. */ + if (mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash_id) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + + ctx->padding = padding; + ctx->hash_id = hash_id; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Get padding mode of initialized RSA context + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + return ctx->padding; +} + +/* + * Get hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + return ctx->hash_id; +} + +/* + * Get length in bits of RSA modulus + */ +size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N); +} + +/* + * Get length in bytes of RSA modulus + */ +size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + return ctx->len; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + +/* + * Generate an RSA keypair + * + * This generation method follows the RSA key pair generation procedure of + * FIPS 186-4 if 2^16 < exponent < 2^256 and nbits = 2048 or nbits = 3072. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + unsigned int nbits, int exponent) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_mpi H, G, L; + int prime_quality = 0; + + /* + * If the modulus is 1024 bit long or shorter, then the security strength of + * the RSA algorithm is less than or equal to 80 bits and therefore an error + * rate of 2^-80 is sufficient. + */ + if (nbits > 1024) { + prime_quality = MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&H); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&G); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&L); + + if (exponent < 3 || nbits % 2 != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (nbits < MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * find primes P and Q with Q < P so that: + * 1. |P-Q| > 2^( nbits / 2 - 100 ) + * 2. GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1 + * 3. E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) > 2^( nbits / 2 ) + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&ctx->E, exponent)); + + do { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(&ctx->P, nbits >> 1, + prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(&ctx->Q, nbits >> 1, + prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng)); + + /* make sure the difference between p and q is not too small (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.3 step 5.4) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q)); + if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&H) <= ((nbits >= 200) ? ((nbits >> 1) - 99) : 0)) { + continue; + } + + /* not required by any standards, but some users rely on the fact that P > Q */ + if (H.s < 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_swap(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q); + } + + /* Temporarily replace P,Q by P-1, Q-1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q)); + + /* check GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1 (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 2(a)) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&G, &ctx->E, &H)); + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&G, 1) != 0) { + continue; + } + + /* compute smallest possible D = E^-1 mod LCM(P-1, Q-1) (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 3(b)) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&G, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(&L, NULL, &H, &G)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&ctx->D, &ctx->E, &L)); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->D) <= ((nbits + 1) / 2)) { // (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.1 criterion 3(a)) + continue; + } + + break; + } while (1); + + /* Restore P,Q */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&ctx->P, &ctx->P, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&ctx->Q, &ctx->Q, 1)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q)); + + ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->N); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* + * DP = D mod (P - 1) + * DQ = D mod (Q - 1) + * QP = Q^-1 mod P + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, + &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + /* Double-check */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(ctx)); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&H); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&G); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&L); + + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_rsa_free(ctx); + + if ((-ret & ~0x7f) == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED, ret); + } + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ + +/* + * Check a public RSA key + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) < 128) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ctx->E, 0) == 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->E) < 2 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&ctx->E, &ctx->N) >= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Check for the consistency of all fields in an RSA private key context + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(ctx) != 0 || + rsa_check_context(ctx, 1 /* private */, 1 /* blinding */) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + + if (mbedtls_rsa_validate_params(&ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q, + &ctx->D, &ctx->E, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + else if (mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt(&ctx->P, &ctx->Q, &ctx->D, + &ctx->DP, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->QP) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } +#endif + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Check if contexts holding a public and private key match + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub, + const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv) +{ + if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(pub) != 0 || + mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(prv) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->N, &prv->N) != 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->E, &prv->E) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Do an RSA public key operation + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_public(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; + mbedtls_mpi T; + + if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&T, input, ctx->len)); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&T, &ctx->N) >= 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + olen = ctx->len; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen)); + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } +#endif + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Generate or update blinding values, see section 10 of: + * KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, + * DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer + * Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113. + */ +static int rsa_prepare_blinding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng) +{ + int ret, count = 0; + mbedtls_mpi R; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&R); + + if (ctx->Vf.p != NULL) { + /* We already have blinding values, just update them by squaring */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N)); + + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Unblinding value: Vf = random number, invertible mod N */ + do { + if (count++ > 10) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&ctx->Vf, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng)); + + /* Compute Vf^-1 as R * (R Vf)^-1 to avoid leaks from inv_mod. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N)); + + /* At this point, Vi is invertible mod N if and only if both Vf and R + * are invertible mod N. If one of them isn't, we don't need to know + * which one, we just loop and choose new values for both of them. + * (Each iteration succeeds with overwhelming probability.) */ + ret = mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N); + if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) { + goto cleanup; + } + + } while (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE); + + /* Finish the computation of Vf^-1 = R * (R Vf)^-1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N)); + + /* Blinding value: Vi = Vf^(-e) mod N + * (Vi already contains Vf^-1 at this point) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); + + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&R); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Unblind + * T = T * Vf mod N + */ +static int rsa_unblind(mbedtls_mpi *T, mbedtls_mpi *Vf, const mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p); + const size_t nlimbs = N->n; + const size_t tlimbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(nlimbs); + mbedtls_mpi RR, M_T; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&M_T); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&M_T, tlimbs)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(T, nlimbs)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(Vf, nlimbs)); + + /* T = T * Vf mod N + * Reminder: montmul(A, B, N) = A * B * R^-1 mod N + * Usually both operands are multiplied by R mod N beforehand (by calling + * `to_mont_rep()` on them), yielding a result that's also * R mod N (aka + * "in the Montgomery domain"). Here we only multiply one operand by R mod + * N, so the result is directly what we want - no need to call + * `from_mont_rep()` on it. */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(T->p, T->p, N->p, nlimbs, mm, RR.p, M_T.p); + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(T->p, T->p, Vf->p, nlimbs, N->p, nlimbs, mm, M_T.p); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&RR); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&M_T); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Exponent blinding supposed to prevent side-channel attacks using multiple + * traces of measurements to recover the RSA key. The more collisions are there, + * the more bits of the key can be recovered. See [3]. + * + * Collecting n collisions with m bit long blinding value requires 2^(m-m/n) + * observations on average. + * + * For example with 28 byte blinding to achieve 2 collisions the adversary has + * to make 2^112 observations on average. + * + * (With the currently (as of 2017 April) known best algorithms breaking 2048 + * bit RSA requires approximately as much time as trying out 2^112 random keys. + * Thus in this sense with 28 byte blinding the security is not reduced by + * side-channel attacks like the one in [3]) + * + * This countermeasure does not help if the key recovery is possible with a + * single trace. + */ +#define RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING 28 + +/* + * Do an RSA private key operation + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; + + /* Temporary holding the result */ + mbedtls_mpi T; + + /* Temporaries holding P-1, Q-1 and the + * exponent blinding factor, respectively. */ + mbedtls_mpi P1, Q1, R; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* Temporaries holding the results mod p resp. mod q. */ + mbedtls_mpi TP, TQ; + + /* Temporaries holding the blinded exponents for + * the mod p resp. mod q computation (if used). */ + mbedtls_mpi DP_blind, DQ_blind; +#else + /* Temporary holding the blinded exponent (if used). */ + mbedtls_mpi D_blind; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + /* Temporaries holding the initial input and the double + * checked result; should be the same in the end. */ + mbedtls_mpi input_blinded, check_result_blinded; + + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (rsa_check_context(ctx, 1 /* private key checks */, + 1 /* blinding on */) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + /* MPI Initialization */ + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&P1); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&Q1); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&R); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi_init(&D_blind); +#else + mbedtls_mpi_init(&DP_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&DQ_blind); +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi_init(&TP); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TQ); +#endif + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&input_blinded); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&check_result_blinded); + + /* End of MPI initialization */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&T, input, ctx->len)); + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&T, &ctx->N) >= 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Blinding + * T = T * Vi mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_prepare_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vi)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&input_blinded, &T)); + + /* + * Exponent blinding + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&P1, &ctx->P, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&Q1, &ctx->Q, 1)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + /* + * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &P1, &Q1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D)); +#else + /* + * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DP_blind, &P1, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DP_blind, &DP_blind, + &ctx->DP)); + + /* + * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, + f_rng, p_rng)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DQ_blind, &Q1, &R)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, + &ctx->DQ)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, &D_blind, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); +#else + /* + * Faster decryption using the CRT + * + * TP = input ^ dP mod P + * TQ = input ^ dQ mod Q + */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TP, &T, &DP_blind, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TQ, &T, &DQ_blind, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ)); + + /* + * T = (TP - TQ) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&T, &TP, &TQ)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&TP, &T, &ctx->QP)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &TP, &ctx->P)); + + /* + * T = TQ + T * Q + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&TP, &T, &ctx->Q)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&T, &TQ, &TP)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + + /* Verify the result to prevent glitching attacks. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&check_result_blinded, &T, &ctx->E, + &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&check_result_blinded, &input_blinded) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Unblind + * T = T * Vf mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_unblind(&T, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N)); + + olen = ctx->len; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen)); + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } +#endif + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&P1); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&Q1); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&R); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi_free(&D_blind); +#else + mbedtls_mpi_free(&DP_blind); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&DQ_blind); +#endif + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi_free(&TP); mbedtls_mpi_free(&TQ); +#endif + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&check_result_blinded); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&input_blinded); + + if (ret != 0 && ret >= -0x007f) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED, ret); + } + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +/** + * Generate and apply the MGF1 operation (from PKCS#1 v2.1) to a buffer. + * + * \param dst buffer to mask + * \param dlen length of destination buffer + * \param src source of the mask generation + * \param slen length of the source buffer + * \param md_alg message digest to use + */ +static int mgf_mask(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, + size_t slen, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) +{ + unsigned char counter[4]; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned int hlen; + size_t i, use_len; + unsigned char mask[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + int ret = 0; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + + memset(mask, 0, sizeof(mask)); + memset(counter, 0, 4); + + /* Generate and apply dbMask */ + p = dst; + + while (dlen > 0) { + use_len = hlen; + if (dlen < hlen) { + use_len = dlen; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, src, slen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, counter, 4)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, mask)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + for (i = 0; i < use_len; ++i) { + *p++ ^= mask[i]; + } + + counter[3]++; + + dlen -= use_len; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mask, sizeof(mask)); + mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + + return ret; +} + +/** + * Generate Hash(M') as in RFC 8017 page 43 points 5 and 6. + * + * \param hash the input hash + * \param hlen length of the input hash + * \param salt the input salt + * \param slen length of the input salt + * \param out the output buffer - must be large enough for \p md_alg + * \param md_alg message digest to use + */ +static int hash_mprime(const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen, + const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen, + unsigned char *out, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) +{ + const unsigned char zeros[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; + + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, zeros, sizeof(zeros))) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, hash, hlen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt, slen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, out)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + + return ret; +} + +/** + * Compute a hash. + * + * \param md_alg algorithm to use + * \param input input message to hash + * \param ilen input length + * \param output the output buffer - must be large enough for \p md_alg + */ +static int compute_hash(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output) +{ + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return mbedtls_md(md_info, input, ilen, output); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + size_t ilen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + size_t olen; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = output; + unsigned int hlen; + + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id); + if (hlen == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + olen = ctx->len; + + /* first comparison checks for overflow */ + if (ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 < ilen || olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memset(output, 0, olen); + + *p++ = 0; + + /* Generate a random octet string seed */ + if ((ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, hlen)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret); + } + + p += hlen; + + /* Construct DB */ + ret = compute_hash((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id, label, label_len, p); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += hlen; + p += olen - 2 * hlen - 2 - ilen; + *p++ = 1; + if (ilen != 0) { + memcpy(p, input, ilen); + } + + /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */ + if ((ret = mgf_mask(output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen, + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* maskedSeed: Apply seedMask to seed */ + if ((ret = mgf_mask(output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, size_t ilen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + size_t nb_pad, olen; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = output; + + olen = ctx->len; + + /* first comparison checks for overflow */ + if (ilen + 11 < ilen || olen < ilen + 11) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen; + + *p++ = 0; + + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; + + while (nb_pad-- > 0) { + int rng_dl = 100; + + do { + ret = f_rng(p_rng, p, 1); + } while (*p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0); + + /* Check if RNG failed to generate data */ + if (rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret); + } + + p++; + } + + *p++ = 0; + if (ilen != 0) { + memcpy(p, input, ilen); + } + + return mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, output, output); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +/* + * Add the message padding, then do an RSA operation + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + size_t ilen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output) +{ + switch (ctx->padding) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, + ilen, input, output); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0, + ilen, input, output); +#endif + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t ilen, i, pad_len; + unsigned char *p; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad, in_padding; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char lhash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned int hlen; + + /* + * Parameters sanity checks + */ + if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ilen = ctx->len; + + if (ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof(buf)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id); + if (hlen == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + // checking for integer underflow + if (2 * hlen + 2 > ilen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * RSA operation + */ + ret = mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf); + + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Unmask data and generate lHash + */ + /* seed: Apply seedMask to maskedSeed */ + if ((ret = mgf_mask(buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0 || + /* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */ + (ret = mgf_mask(buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen, + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Generate lHash */ + ret = compute_hash((mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id, + label, label_len, lhash); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Check contents, in "constant-time" + */ + p = buf; + + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool(*p++); /* First byte must be 0 */ + + p += hlen; /* Skip seed */ + + /* Check lHash */ + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool(mbedtls_ct_memcmp(lhash, p, hlen))); + p += hlen; + + /* Get zero-padding len, but always read till end of buffer + * (minus one, for the 01 byte) */ + pad_len = 0; + in_padding = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE; + for (i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++) { + in_padding = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(p[i], 0)); + pad_len += mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(in_padding, 1); + } + + p += pad_len; + bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(*p++, 0x01)); + + /* + * The only information "leaked" is whether the padding was correct or not + * (eg, no data is copied if it was not correct). This meets the + * recommendations in PKCS#1 v2.2: an opponent cannot distinguish between + * the different error conditions. + */ + if (bad != MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (ilen - ((size_t) (p - buf)) > output_max_len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; + goto cleanup; + } + + *olen = ilen - ((size_t) (p - buf)); + if (*olen != 0) { + memcpy(output, p, *olen); + } + ret = 0; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(lhash, sizeof(lhash)); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t ilen; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; + + ilen = ctx->len; + + if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof(buf)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf); + + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(buf, ilen, + output, output_max_len, olen); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +/* + * Do an RSA operation, then remove the message padding + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + size_t *olen, + const unsigned char *input, + unsigned char *output, + size_t output_max_len) +{ + switch (ctx->padding) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, olen, + input, output, output_max_len); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, NULL, 0, + olen, input, output, + output_max_len); +#endif + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig) +{ + size_t olen; + unsigned char *p = sig; + unsigned char *salt = NULL; + size_t slen, min_slen, hlen, offset = 0; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t msb; + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id; + + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + olen = ctx->len; + + if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + /* Gather length of hash to sign */ + size_t exp_hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + if (exp_hashlen == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (hashlen != exp_hashlen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + + hash_id = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id; + if (hash_id == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + hash_id = md_alg; + } + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(hash_id); + if (hlen == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (saltlen == MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY) { + /* Calculate the largest possible salt length, up to the hash size. + * Normally this is the hash length, which is the maximum salt length + * according to FIPS 185-4 §5.5 (e) and common practice. If there is not + * enough room, use the maximum salt length that fits. The constraint is + * that the hash length plus the salt length plus 2 bytes must be at most + * the key length. This complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017 + * (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. */ + min_slen = hlen - 2; + if (olen < hlen + min_slen + 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } else if (olen >= hlen + hlen + 2) { + slen = hlen; + } else { + slen = olen - hlen - 2; + } + } else if ((saltlen < 0) || (saltlen + hlen + 2 > olen)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } else { + slen = (size_t) saltlen; + } + + memset(sig, 0, olen); + + /* Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits */ + msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1; + p += olen - hlen - slen - 2; + *p++ = 0x01; + + /* Generate salt of length slen in place in the encoded message */ + salt = p; + if ((ret = f_rng(p_rng, salt, slen)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED, ret); + } + + p += slen; + + /* Generate H = Hash( M' ) */ + ret = hash_mprime(hash, hashlen, salt, slen, p, hash_id); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */ + if (msb % 8 == 0) { + offset = 1; + } + + /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */ + ret = mgf_mask(sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen, hash_id); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1; + sig[0] &= 0xFF >> (olen * 8 - msb); + + p += hlen; + *p++ = 0xBC; + + return mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig); +} + +static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig) +{ + if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if ((ctx->hash_id == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) && (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, hashlen, hash, saltlen, + sig); +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig) +{ + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig); +} + +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function with + * the option to pass in the salt length. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + int saltlen, + unsigned char *sig) +{ + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, saltlen, sig); +} + +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig) +{ + return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, sig); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN function + */ + +/* Construct a PKCS v1.5 encoding of a hashed message + * + * This is used both for signature generation and verification. + * + * Parameters: + * - md_alg: Identifies the hash algorithm used to generate the given hash; + * MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if raw data is signed. + * - hashlen: Length of hash. Must match md_alg if that's not NONE. + * - hash: Buffer containing the hashed message or the raw data. + * - dst_len: Length of the encoded message. + * - dst: Buffer to hold the encoded message. + * + * Assumptions: + * - hash has size hashlen. + * - dst points to a buffer of size at least dst_len. + * + */ +static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + size_t dst_len, + unsigned char *dst) +{ + size_t oid_size = 0; + size_t nb_pad = dst_len; + unsigned char *p = dst; + const char *oid = NULL; + + /* Are we signing hashed or raw data? */ + if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + unsigned char md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + if (md_size == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md(md_alg, &oid, &oid_size) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (hashlen != md_size) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Double-check that 8 + hashlen + oid_size can be used as a + * 1-byte ASN.1 length encoding and that there's no overflow. */ + if (8 + hashlen + oid_size >= 0x80 || + 10 + hashlen < hashlen || + 10 + hashlen + oid_size < 10 + hashlen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * Static bounds check: + * - Need 10 bytes for five tag-length pairs. + * (Insist on 1-byte length encodings to protect against variants of + * Bleichenbacher's forgery attack against lax PKCS#1v1.5 verification) + * - Need hashlen bytes for hash + * - Need oid_size bytes for hash alg OID. + */ + if (nb_pad < 10 + hashlen + oid_size) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + nb_pad -= 10 + hashlen + oid_size; + } else { + if (nb_pad < hashlen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + nb_pad -= hashlen; + } + + /* Need space for signature header and padding delimiter (3 bytes), + * and 8 bytes for the minimal padding */ + if (nb_pad < 3 + 8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + nb_pad -= 3; + + /* Now nb_pad is the amount of memory to be filled + * with padding, and at least 8 bytes long. */ + + /* Write signature header and padding */ + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; + memset(p, 0xFF, nb_pad); + p += nb_pad; + *p++ = 0; + + /* Are we signing raw data? */ + if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + memcpy(p, hash, hashlen); + return 0; + } + + /* Signing hashed data, add corresponding ASN.1 structure + * + * DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, + * digest Digest } + * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * Digest ::= OCTET STRING + * + * Schematic: + * TAG-SEQ + LEN [ TAG-SEQ + LEN [ TAG-OID + LEN [ OID ] + * TAG-NULL + LEN [ NULL ] ] + * TAG-OCTET + LEN [ HASH ] ] + */ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; + *p++ = (unsigned char) (0x08 + oid_size + hashlen); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; + *p++ = (unsigned char) (0x04 + oid_size); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + *p++ = (unsigned char) oid_size; + memcpy(p, oid, oid_size); + p += oid_size; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL; + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + *p++ = (unsigned char) hashlen; + memcpy(p, hash, hashlen); + p += hashlen; + + /* Just a sanity-check, should be automatic + * after the initial bounds check. */ + if (p != dst + dst_len) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(dst, dst_len); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL; + + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * Prepare PKCS1-v1.5 encoding (padding and hash identifier) + */ + + if ((ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(md_alg, hashlen, hash, + ctx->len, sig)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Private key operation + * + * In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a + * temporary buffer and check it before returning it. + */ + + sig_try = mbedtls_calloc(1, ctx->len); + if (sig_try == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + verif = mbedtls_calloc(1, ctx->len); + if (verif == NULL) { + mbedtls_free(sig_try); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_private(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig_try, verif)); + + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(verif, sig, ctx->len) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + memcpy(sig, sig_try, ctx->len); + +cleanup: + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(sig_try, ctx->len); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(verif, ctx->len); + + if (ret != 0) { + memset(sig, '!', ctx->len); + } + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +/* + * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig) +{ + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + switch (ctx->padding) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, + md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, sig); +#endif + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id, + int expected_salt_len, + const unsigned char *sig) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t siglen; + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *hash_start; + unsigned char result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned int hlen; + size_t observed_salt_len, msb; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 }; + + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + siglen = ctx->len; + + if (siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof(buf)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, buf); + + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + p = buf; + + if (buf[siglen - 1] != 0xBC) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + } + + if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + /* Gather length of hash to sign */ + size_t exp_hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + if (exp_hashlen == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (hashlen != exp_hashlen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + + hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(mgf1_hash_id); + if (hlen == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * Note: EMSA-PSS verification is over the length of N - 1 bits + */ + msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N) - 1; + + if (buf[0] >> (8 - siglen * 8 + msb)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */ + if (msb % 8 == 0) { + p++; + siglen -= 1; + } + + if (siglen < hlen + 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + hash_start = p + siglen - hlen - 1; + + ret = mgf_mask(p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, mgf1_hash_id); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + buf[0] &= 0xFF >> (siglen * 8 - msb); + + while (p < hash_start - 1 && *p == 0) { + p++; + } + + if (*p++ != 0x01) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + } + + observed_salt_len = (size_t) (hash_start - p); + + if (expected_salt_len != MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY && + observed_salt_len != (size_t) expected_salt_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + } + + /* + * Generate H = Hash( M' ) + */ + ret = hash_mprime(hash, hashlen, p, observed_salt_len, + result, mgf1_hash_id); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (memcmp(hash_start, result, hlen) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Simplified PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *sig) +{ + mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id; + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mgf1_hash_id = (ctx->hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) + ? (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id + : md_alg; + + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(ctx, + md_alg, hashlen, hash, + mgf1_hash_id, + MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, + sig); + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +/* + * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *sig) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t sig_len; + unsigned char *encoded = NULL, *encoded_expected = NULL; + + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + sig_len = ctx->len; + + /* + * Prepare expected PKCS1 v1.5 encoding of hash. + */ + + if ((encoded = mbedtls_calloc(1, sig_len)) == NULL || + (encoded_expected = mbedtls_calloc(1, sig_len)) == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode(md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig_len, + encoded_expected)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Apply RSA primitive to get what should be PKCS1 encoded hash. + */ + + ret = mbedtls_rsa_public(ctx, sig, encoded); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Compare + */ + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(encoded, encoded_expected, + sig_len)) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + + if (encoded != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(encoded, sig_len); + } + + if (encoded_expected != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(encoded_expected, sig_len); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +/* + * Do an RSA operation and check the message digest + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *sig) +{ + if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hashlen != 0) && hash == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + switch (ctx->padding) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(ctx, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, sig); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: + return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(ctx, md_alg, + hashlen, hash, sig); +#endif + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; + } +} + +/* + * Copy the components of an RSA key + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_copy(mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + dst->len = src->len; + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->N, &src->N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->E, &src->E)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->D, &src->D)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->P, &src->P)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Q, &src->Q)); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->DP, &src->DP)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->DQ, &src->DQ)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->QP, &src->QP)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RP, &src->RP)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RQ, &src->RQ)); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->RN, &src->RN)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Vi, &src->Vi)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dst->Vf, &src->Vf)); + + dst->padding = src->padding; + dst->hash_id = src->hash_id; + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_rsa_free(dst); + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Free the components of an RSA key + */ +void mbedtls_rsa_free(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vi); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vf); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RN); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->D); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Q); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->E); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->N); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RQ); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RP); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->QP); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->DQ); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->DP); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Free the mutex, but only if it hasn't been freed already. */ + if (ctx->ver != 0) { + mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex); + ctx->ver = 0; + } +#endif +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + + +/* + * Example RSA-1024 keypair, for test purposes + */ +#define KEY_LEN 128 + +#define RSA_N "9292758453063D803DD603D5E777D788" \ + "8ED1D5BF35786190FA2F23EBC0848AEA" \ + "DDA92CA6C3D80B32C4D109BE0F36D6AE" \ + "7130B9CED7ACDF54CFC7555AC14EEBAB" \ + "93A89813FBF3C4F8066D2D800F7C38A8" \ + "1AE31942917403FF4946B0A83D3D3E05" \ + "EE57C6F5F5606FB5D4BC6CD34EE0801A" \ + "5E94BB77B07507233A0BC7BAC8F90F79" + +#define RSA_E "10001" + +#define RSA_D "24BF6185468786FDD303083D25E64EFC" \ + "66CA472BC44D253102F8B4A9D3BFA750" \ + "91386C0077937FE33FA3252D28855837" \ + "AE1B484A8A9A45F7EE8C0C634F99E8CD" \ + "DF79C5CE07EE72C7F123142198164234" \ + "CABB724CF78B8173B9F880FC86322407" \ + "AF1FEDFDDE2BEB674CA15F3E81A1521E" \ + "071513A1E85B5DFA031F21ECAE91A34D" + +#define RSA_P "C36D0EB7FCD285223CFB5AABA5BDA3D8" \ + "2C01CAD19EA484A87EA4377637E75500" \ + "FCB2005C5C7DD6EC4AC023CDA285D796" \ + "C3D9E75E1EFC42488BB4F1D13AC30A57" + +#define RSA_Q "C000DF51A7C77AE8D7C7370C1FF55B69" \ + "E211C2B9E5DB1ED0BF61D0D9899620F4" \ + "910E4168387E3C30AA1E00C339A79508" \ + "8452DD96A9A5EA5D9DCA68DA636032AF" + +#define PT_LEN 24 +#define RSA_PT "\xAA\xBB\xCC\x03\x02\x01\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF" \ + "\x11\x22\x33\x0A\x0B\x0C\xCC\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +static int myrand(void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len) +{ +#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(__NetBSD__) + size_t i; + + if (rng_state != NULL) { + rng_state = NULL; + } + + for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { + output[i] = rand(); + } +#else + if (rng_state != NULL) { + rng_state = NULL; + } + + arc4random_buf(output, len); +#endif /* !OpenBSD && !NetBSD */ + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int ret = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + size_t len; + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; + unsigned char rsa_plaintext[PT_LEN]; + unsigned char rsa_decrypted[PT_LEN]; + unsigned char rsa_ciphertext[KEY_LEN]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + unsigned char sha1sum[20]; +#endif + + mbedtls_mpi K; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&K); + mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_P)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_Q)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_D)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&K, 16, RSA_E)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_rsa_complete(&rsa)); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" RSA key validation: "); + } + + if (mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(&rsa) != 0 || + mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(&rsa) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 encryption : "); + } + + memcpy(rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN); + + if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, + PT_LEN, rsa_plaintext, + rsa_ciphertext) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 decryption : "); + } + + if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(&rsa, myrand, NULL, + &len, rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted, + sizeof(rsa_decrypted)) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (memcmp(rsa_decrypted, rsa_plaintext, len) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" PKCS#1 data sign : "); + } + + if (mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1), + rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + return 1; + } + + if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&rsa, myrand, NULL, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, + sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n PKCS#1 sig. verify: "); + } + + if (mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(&rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, + sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext) != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + + ret = 1; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&K); + mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa); +#else /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + ((void) verbose); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ diff --git a/library/rsa_alt_helpers.c b/library/rsa_alt_helpers.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..5c265a9921b --- /dev/null +++ b/library/rsa_alt_helpers.c @@ -0,0 +1,447 @@ +/* + * Helper functions for the RSA module + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" +#include "rsa_alt_helpers.h" + +/* + * Compute RSA prime factors from public and private exponents + * + * Summary of algorithm: + * Setting F := lcm(P-1,Q-1), the idea is as follows: + * + * (a) For any 1 <= X < N with gcd(X,N)=1, we have X^F = 1 modulo N, so X^(F/2) + * is a square root of 1 in Z/NZ. Since Z/NZ ~= Z/PZ x Z/QZ by CRT and the + * square roots of 1 in Z/PZ and Z/QZ are +1 and -1, this leaves the four + * possibilities X^(F/2) = (+-1, +-1). If it happens that X^(F/2) = (-1,+1) + * or (+1,-1), then gcd(X^(F/2) + 1, N) will be equal to one of the prime + * factors of N. + * + * (b) If we don't know F/2 but (F/2) * K for some odd (!) K, then the same + * construction still applies since (-)^K is the identity on the set of + * roots of 1 in Z/NZ. + * + * The public and private key primitives (-)^E and (-)^D are mutually inverse + * bijections on Z/NZ if and only if (-)^(DE) is the identity on Z/NZ, i.e. + * if and only if DE - 1 is a multiple of F, say DE - 1 = F * L. + * Splitting L = 2^t * K with K odd, we have + * + * DE - 1 = FL = (F/2) * (2^(t+1)) * K, + * + * so (F / 2) * K is among the numbers + * + * (DE - 1) >> 1, (DE - 1) >> 2, ..., (DE - 1) >> ord + * + * where ord is the order of 2 in (DE - 1). + * We can therefore iterate through these numbers apply the construction + * of (a) and (b) above to attempt to factor N. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes(mbedtls_mpi const *N, + mbedtls_mpi const *E, mbedtls_mpi const *D, + mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q) +{ + int ret = 0; + + uint16_t attempt; /* Number of current attempt */ + uint16_t iter; /* Number of squares computed in the current attempt */ + + uint16_t order; /* Order of 2 in DE - 1 */ + + mbedtls_mpi T; /* Holds largest odd divisor of DE - 1 */ + mbedtls_mpi K; /* Temporary holding the current candidate */ + + const unsigned char primes[] = { 2, + 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, + 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, + 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, + 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, + 139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179, + 181, 191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 223, 227, + 229, 233, 239, 241, 251 }; + + const size_t num_primes = sizeof(primes) / sizeof(*primes); + + if (P == NULL || Q == NULL || P->p != NULL || Q->p != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 0) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(D, 1) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(D, N) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(E, 1) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(E, N) >= 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * Initializations and temporary changes + */ + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&K); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + /* T := DE - 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, D, E)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&T, &T, 1)); + + if ((order = (uint16_t) mbedtls_mpi_lsb(&T)) == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* After this operation, T holds the largest odd divisor of DE - 1. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&T, order)); + + /* + * Actual work + */ + + /* Skip trying 2 if N == 1 mod 8 */ + attempt = 0; + if (N->p[0] % 8 == 1) { + attempt = 1; + } + + for (; attempt < num_primes; ++attempt) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&K, primes[attempt])); + + /* Check if gcd(K,N) = 1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(P, &K, N)); + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(P, 1) != 0) { + continue; + } + + /* Go through K^T + 1, K^(2T) + 1, K^(4T) + 1, ... + * and check whether they have nontrivial GCD with N. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&K, &K, &T, N, + Q /* temporarily use Q for storing Montgomery + * multiplication helper values */)); + + for (iter = 1; iter <= order; ++iter) { + /* If we reach 1 prematurely, there's no point + * in continuing to square K */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 1) == 0) { + break; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&K, &K, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(P, &K, N)); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(P, 1) == 1 && + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(P, N) == -1) { + /* + * Have found a nontrivial divisor P of N. + * Set Q := N / P. + */ + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(Q, NULL, N, P)); + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, &K, &K)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, N)); + } + + /* + * If we get here, then either we prematurely aborted the loop because + * we reached 1, or K holds primes[attempt]^(DE - 1) mod N, which must + * be 1 if D,E,N were consistent. + * Check if that's the case and abort if not, to avoid very long, + * yet eventually failing, computations if N,D,E were not sane. + */ + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 1) != 0) { + break; + } + } + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&K); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Given P, Q and the public exponent E, deduce D. + * This is essentially a modular inversion. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent(mbedtls_mpi const *P, + mbedtls_mpi const *Q, + mbedtls_mpi const *E, + mbedtls_mpi *D) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_mpi K, L; + + if (D == NULL || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(D, 0) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(P, 1) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(Q, 1) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(E, 0) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&K); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&L); + + /* Temporarily put K := P-1 and L := Q-1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, P, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&L, Q, 1)); + + /* Temporarily put D := gcd(P-1, Q-1) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(D, &K, &L)); + + /* K := LCM(P-1, Q-1) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, &K, &L)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(&K, NULL, &K, D)); + + /* Compute modular inverse of E in LCM(P-1, Q-1) */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(D, E, &K)); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&K); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&L); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP, + mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_mpi K; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&K); + + /* DP = D mod P-1 */ + if (DP != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, P, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(DP, D, &K)); + } + + /* DQ = D mod Q-1 */ + if (DQ != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, Q, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(DQ, D, &K)); + } + + /* QP = Q^{-1} mod P */ + if (QP != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(QP, Q, P)); + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&K); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Check that core RSA parameters are sane. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params(const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *D, + const mbedtls_mpi *E, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_mpi K, L; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&K); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&L); + + /* + * Step 1: If PRNG provided, check that P and Q are prime + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + /* + * When generating keys, the strongest security we support aims for an error + * rate of at most 2^-100 and we are aiming for the same certainty here as + * well. + */ + if (f_rng != NULL && P != NULL && + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(P, 50, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (f_rng != NULL && Q != NULL && + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(Q, 50, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } +#else + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ + + /* + * Step 2: Check that 1 < N = P * Q + */ + + if (P != NULL && Q != NULL && N != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, P, Q)); + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 1) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&K, N) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* + * Step 3: Check and 1 < D, E < N if present. + */ + + if (N != NULL && D != NULL && E != NULL) { + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(D, 1) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(E, 1) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(D, N) >= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(E, N) >= 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* + * Step 4: Check that D, E are inverse modulo P-1 and Q-1 + */ + + if (P != NULL && Q != NULL && D != NULL && E != NULL) { + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(P, 1) <= 0 || + mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(Q, 1) <= 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Compute DE-1 mod P-1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, D, E)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&L, P, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, &L)); + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 0) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Compute DE-1 mod Q-1 */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, D, E)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&L, Q, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, &L)); + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 0) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&K); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&L); + + /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */ + if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED) { + ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Check that RSA CRT parameters are in accordance with core parameters. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *DP, + const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP) +{ + int ret = 0; + + mbedtls_mpi K, L; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&K); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&L); + + /* Check that DP - D == 0 mod P - 1 */ + if (DP != NULL) { + if (P == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, P, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&L, DP, D)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&L, &L, &K)); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&L, 0) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* Check that DQ - D == 0 mod Q - 1 */ + if (DQ != NULL) { + if (Q == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, Q, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&L, DQ, D)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&L, &L, &K)); + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&L, 0) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + /* Check that QP * Q - 1 == 0 mod P */ + if (QP != NULL) { + if (P == NULL || Q == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&K, QP, Q)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&K, &K, 1)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&K, &K, P)); + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&K, 0) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + +cleanup: + + /* Wrap MPI error codes by RSA check failure error code */ + if (ret != 0 && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED && + ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) { + ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&K); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&L); + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ diff --git a/library/rsa_alt_helpers.h b/library/rsa_alt_helpers.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..052b02491e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/rsa_alt_helpers.h @@ -0,0 +1,206 @@ +/** + * \file rsa_alt_helpers.h + * + * \brief Context-independent RSA helper functions + * + * This module declares some RSA-related helper functions useful when + * implementing the RSA interface. These functions are provided in a separate + * compilation unit in order to make it easy for designers of alternative RSA + * implementations to use them in their own code, as it is conceived that the + * functionality they provide will be necessary for most complete + * implementations. + * + * End-users of Mbed TLS who are not providing their own alternative RSA + * implementations should not use these functions directly, and should instead + * use only the functions declared in rsa.h. + * + * The interface provided by this module will be maintained through LTS (Long + * Term Support) branches of Mbed TLS, but may otherwise be subject to change, + * and must be considered an internal interface of the library. + * + * There are two classes of helper functions: + * + * (1) Parameter-generating helpers. These are: + * - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes + * - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent + * - mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt + * Each of these functions takes a set of core RSA parameters and + * generates some other, or CRT related parameters. + * + * (2) Parameter-checking helpers. These are: + * - mbedtls_rsa_validate_params + * - mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt + * They take a set of core or CRT related RSA parameters and check their + * validity. + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT_HELPERS_H +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT_HELPERS_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/bignum.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + + +/** + * \brief Compute RSA prime moduli P, Q from public modulus N=PQ + * and a pair of private and public key. + * + * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on + * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not + * overwrite it. + * + * \param N RSA modulus N = PQ, with P, Q to be found + * \param E RSA public exponent + * \param D RSA private exponent + * \param P Pointer to MPI holding first prime factor of N on success + * \param Q Pointer to MPI holding second prime factor of N on success + * + * \return + * - 0 if successful. In this case, P and Q constitute a + * factorization of N. + * - A non-zero error code otherwise. + * + * \note It is neither checked that P, Q are prime nor that + * D, E are modular inverses wrt. P-1 and Q-1. For that, + * use the helper function \c mbedtls_rsa_validate_params. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes(mbedtls_mpi const *N, mbedtls_mpi const *E, + mbedtls_mpi const *D, + mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q); + +/** + * \brief Compute RSA private exponent from + * prime moduli and public key. + * + * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on + * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not + * overwrite it. + * + * \param P First prime factor of RSA modulus + * \param Q Second prime factor of RSA modulus + * \param E RSA public exponent + * \param D Pointer to MPI holding the private exponent on success. + * + * \return + * - 0 if successful. In this case, D is set to a simultaneous + * modular inverse of E modulo both P-1 and Q-1. + * - A non-zero error code otherwise. + * + * \note This function does not check whether P and Q are primes. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent(mbedtls_mpi const *P, + mbedtls_mpi const *Q, + mbedtls_mpi const *E, + mbedtls_mpi *D); + + +/** + * \brief Generate RSA-CRT parameters + * + * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on + * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not + * overwrite it. + * + * \param P First prime factor of N + * \param Q Second prime factor of N + * \param D RSA private exponent + * \param DP Output variable for D modulo P-1 + * \param DQ Output variable for D modulo Q-1 + * \param QP Output variable for the modular inverse of Q modulo P. + * + * \return 0 on success, non-zero error code otherwise. + * + * \note This function does not check whether P, Q are + * prime and whether D is a valid private exponent. + * + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *DP, + mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP); + + +/** + * \brief Check validity of core RSA parameters + * + * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on + * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not + * overwrite it. + * + * \param N RSA modulus N = PQ + * \param P First prime factor of N + * \param Q Second prime factor of N + * \param D RSA private exponent + * \param E RSA public exponent + * \param f_rng PRNG to be used for primality check, or NULL + * \param p_rng PRNG context for f_rng, or NULL + * + * \return + * - 0 if the following conditions are satisfied + * if all relevant parameters are provided: + * - P prime if f_rng != NULL (%) + * - Q prime if f_rng != NULL (%) + * - 1 < N = P * Q + * - 1 < D, E < N + * - D and E are modular inverses modulo P-1 and Q-1 + * (%) This is only done if MBEDTLS_GENPRIME is defined. + * - A non-zero error code otherwise. + * + * \note The function can be used with a restricted set of arguments + * to perform specific checks only. E.g., calling it with + * (-,P,-,-,-) and a PRNG amounts to a primality check for P. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params(const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P, + const mbedtls_mpi *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *D, + const mbedtls_mpi *E, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); + +/** + * \brief Check validity of RSA CRT parameters + * + * \note This is a 'static' helper function not operating on + * an RSA context. Alternative implementations need not + * overwrite it. + * + * \param P First prime factor of RSA modulus + * \param Q Second prime factor of RSA modulus + * \param D RSA private exponent + * \param DP MPI to check for D modulo P-1 + * \param DQ MPI to check for D modulo P-1 + * \param QP MPI to check for the modular inverse of Q modulo P. + * + * \return + * - 0 if the following conditions are satisfied: + * - D = DP mod P-1 if P, D, DP != NULL + * - Q = DQ mod P-1 if P, D, DQ != NULL + * - QP = Q^-1 mod P if P, Q, QP != NULL + * - \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED if check failed, + * potentially including \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX if some + * MPI calculations failed. + * - \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if insufficient + * data was provided to check DP, DQ or QP. + * + * \note The function can be used with a restricted set of arguments + * to perform specific checks only. E.g., calling it with the + * parameters (P, -, D, DP, -, -) will check DP = D mod P-1. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt(const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, + const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *DP, + const mbedtls_mpi *DQ, const mbedtls_mpi *QP); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* rsa_alt_helpers.h */ diff --git a/library/rsa_internal.h b/library/rsa_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f79c3b71228 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/rsa_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +/** + * \file rsa_internal.h + * + * \brief Internal-only RSA public-key cryptosystem API. + * + * This file declares RSA-related functions that are to be used + * only from within the Mbed TLS library itself. + * + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" + +/** + * \brief Parse a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded private RSA key. + * + * \param rsa The RSA context where parsed data will be stored. + * \param key The buffer that contains the key. + * \param keylen The length of the key buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of ASN.1 parsing errors. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_xxx in case of RSA internal failures while + * parsing data. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED if validity checks on the + * provided key fail. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); + +/** + * \brief Parse a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded public RSA key. + * + * \param rsa The RSA context where parsed data will be stored. + * \param key The buffer that contains the key. + * \param keylen The length of the key buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of ASN.1 parsing errors. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_xxx in case of RSA internal failures while + * parsing data. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED if validity checks on the + * provided key fail. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); + +/** + * \brief Write a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded private RSA key. + * + * \param rsa The RSA context which contains the data to be written. + * \param start Beginning of the buffer that will be filled with the + * private key. + * \param p End of the buffer that will be filled with the private key. + * On successful return, the referenced pointer will be + * updated in order to point to the beginning of written data. + * + * \return On success, the number of bytes written to the output buffer + * (i.e. a value > 0). + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the RSA context does not + * contain a valid key pair. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of failure while writing to the + * output buffer. + * + * \note The output buffer is filled backward, i.e. starting from its + * end and moving toward its start. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_write_key(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p); + +/** + * \brief Parse a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded public RSA key. + * + * \param rsa The RSA context which contains the data to be written. + * \param start Beginning of the buffer that will be filled with the + * private key. + * \param p End of the buffer that will be filled with the private key. + * On successful return, the referenced pointer will be + * updated in order to point to the beginning of written data. + * + * \return On success, the number of bytes written to the output buffer + * (i.e. a value > 0). + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the RSA context does not + * contain a valid public key. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of failure while writing to the + * output buffer. + * + * \note The output buffer is filled backward, i.e. starting from its + * end and moving toward its start. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +/** + * \brief This function is analogue to \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(). + * The only difference between them is that this function is more flexible + * on the parameters of \p ctx that are set with \c mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(). + * + * \note Compared to its counterpart, this function: + * - does not check the padding setting of \p ctx. + * - allows the hash_id of \p ctx to be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, + * in which case it uses \p md_alg as the hash_id. + * + * \note Refer to \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign() for a description + * of the functioning and parameters of this function. + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + unsigned int hashlen, + const unsigned char *hash, + unsigned char *sig); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + +#endif /* rsa_internal.h */ diff --git a/library/sha1.c b/library/sha1.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..dfbe481f39a --- /dev/null +++ b/library/sha1.c @@ -0,0 +1,480 @@ +/* + * FIPS-180-1 compliant SHA-1 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * The SHA-1 standard was published by NIST in 1993. + * + * http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip180-1.htm + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) + +void mbedtls_sha1_init(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_sha1_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_sha1_free(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_sha1_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_sha1_clone(mbedtls_sha1_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha1_context *src) +{ + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * SHA-1 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_starts(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx) +{ + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301; + ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89; + ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE; + ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476; + ctx->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0; + + return 0; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT) +int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[64]) +{ + struct { + uint32_t temp, W[16], A, B, C, D, E; + } local; + + local.W[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 0); + local.W[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 4); + local.W[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 8); + local.W[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 12); + local.W[4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 16); + local.W[5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 20); + local.W[6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 24); + local.W[7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 28); + local.W[8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 32); + local.W[9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 36); + local.W[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 40); + local.W[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 44); + local.W[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 48); + local.W[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 52); + local.W[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 56); + local.W[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 60); + +#define S(x, n) (((x) << (n)) | (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - (n)))) + +#define R(t) \ + ( \ + local.temp = local.W[((t) - 3) & 0x0F] ^ \ + local.W[((t) - 8) & 0x0F] ^ \ + local.W[((t) - 14) & 0x0F] ^ \ + local.W[(t) & 0x0F], \ + (local.W[(t) & 0x0F] = S(local.temp, 1)) \ + ) + +#define P(a, b, c, d, e, x) \ + do \ + { \ + (e) += S((a), 5) + F((b), (c), (d)) + K + (x); \ + (b) = S((b), 30); \ + } while (0) + + local.A = ctx->state[0]; + local.B = ctx->state[1]; + local.C = ctx->state[2]; + local.D = ctx->state[3]; + local.E = ctx->state[4]; + +#define F(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) +#define K 0x5A827999 + + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[0]); + P(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.W[1]); + P(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.W[2]); + P(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.W[3]); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.W[4]); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[5]); + P(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.W[6]); + P(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.W[7]); + P(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.W[8]); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.W[9]); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[10]); + P(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.W[11]); + P(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.W[12]); + P(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.W[13]); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.W[14]); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.W[15]); + P(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(16)); + P(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(17)); + P(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(18)); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(19)); + +#undef K +#undef F + +#define F(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) +#define K 0x6ED9EBA1 + + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(20)); + P(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(21)); + P(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(22)); + P(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(23)); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(24)); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(25)); + P(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(26)); + P(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(27)); + P(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(28)); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(29)); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(30)); + P(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(31)); + P(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(32)); + P(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(33)); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(34)); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(35)); + P(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(36)); + P(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(37)); + P(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(38)); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(39)); + +#undef K +#undef F + +#define F(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) +#define K 0x8F1BBCDC + + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(40)); + P(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(41)); + P(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(42)); + P(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(43)); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(44)); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(45)); + P(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(46)); + P(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(47)); + P(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(48)); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(49)); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(50)); + P(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(51)); + P(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(52)); + P(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(53)); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(54)); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(55)); + P(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(56)); + P(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(57)); + P(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(58)); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(59)); + +#undef K +#undef F + +#define F(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) +#define K 0xCA62C1D6 + + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(60)); + P(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(61)); + P(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(62)); + P(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(63)); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(64)); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(65)); + P(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(66)); + P(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(67)); + P(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(68)); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(69)); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(70)); + P(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(71)); + P(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(72)); + P(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(73)); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(74)); + P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, R(75)); + P(local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, R(76)); + P(local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, local.C, R(77)); + P(local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, local.B, R(78)); + P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.E, local.A, R(79)); + +#undef K +#undef F + + ctx->state[0] += local.A; + ctx->state[1] += local.B; + ctx->state[2] += local.C; + ctx->state[3] += local.D; + ctx->state[4] += local.E; + + /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&local, sizeof(local)); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT */ + +/* + * SHA-1 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_update(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + uint32_t left; + + if (ilen == 0) { + return 0; + } + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = 64 - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if (ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen) { + ctx->total[1]++; + } + + if (left && ilen >= fill) { + memcpy((void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while (ilen >= 64) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(ctx, input)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + input += 64; + ilen -= 64; + } + + if (ilen > 0) { + memcpy((void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * SHA-1 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_finish(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx, + unsigned char output[20]) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t used; + uint32_t high, low; + + /* + * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length + */ + used = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + + ctx->buffer[used++] = 0x80; + + if (used <= 56) { + /* Enough room for padding + length in current block */ + memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 56 - used); + } else { + /* We'll need an extra block */ + memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + memset(ctx->buffer, 0, 56); + } + + /* + * Add message length + */ + high = (ctx->total[0] >> 29) + | (ctx->total[1] << 3); + low = (ctx->total[0] << 3); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(high, ctx->buffer, 56); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(low, ctx->buffer, 60); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Output final state + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[0], output, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[1], output, 4); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[2], output, 8); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[4], output, 16); + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_sha1_free(ctx); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ + +/* + * output = SHA-1( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_sha1(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char output[20]) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_sha1_context ctx; + + mbedtls_sha1_init(&ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts(&ctx)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_sha1_free(&ctx); + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * FIPS-180-1 test vectors + */ +static const unsigned char sha1_test_buf[3][57] = +{ + { "abc" }, + { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }, + { "" } +}; + +static const size_t sha1_test_buflen[3] = +{ + 3, 56, 1000 +}; + +static const unsigned char sha1_test_sum[3][20] = +{ + { 0xA9, 0x99, 0x3E, 0x36, 0x47, 0x06, 0x81, 0x6A, 0xBA, 0x3E, + 0x25, 0x71, 0x78, 0x50, 0xC2, 0x6C, 0x9C, 0xD0, 0xD8, 0x9D }, + { 0x84, 0x98, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x1C, 0x3B, 0xD2, 0x6E, 0xBA, 0xAE, + 0x4A, 0xA1, 0xF9, 0x51, 0x29, 0xE5, 0xE5, 0x46, 0x70, 0xF1 }, + { 0x34, 0xAA, 0x97, 0x3C, 0xD4, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xA4, 0xF6, 0x1E, + 0xEB, 0x2B, 0xDB, 0xAD, 0x27, 0x31, 0x65, 0x34, 0x01, 0x6F } +}; + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +int mbedtls_sha1_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int i, j, buflen, ret = 0; + unsigned char buf[1024]; + unsigned char sha1sum[20]; + mbedtls_sha1_context ctx; + + mbedtls_sha1_init(&ctx); + + /* + * SHA-1 + */ + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" SHA-1 test #%d: ", i + 1); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_starts(&ctx)) != 0) { + goto fail; + } + + if (i == 2) { + memset(buf, 'a', buflen = 1000); + + for (j = 0; j < 1000; j++) { + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update(&ctx, buf, buflen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto fail; + } + } + } else { + ret = mbedtls_sha1_update(&ctx, sha1_test_buf[i], + sha1_test_buflen[i]); + if (ret != 0) { + goto fail; + } + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1_finish(&ctx, sha1sum)) != 0) { + goto fail; + } + + if (memcmp(sha1sum, sha1_test_sum[i], 20) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + goto exit; + +fail: + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_sha1_free(&ctx); + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ diff --git a/library/sha256.c b/library/sha256.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..87889817a4e --- /dev/null +++ b/library/sha256.c @@ -0,0 +1,976 @@ +/* + * FIPS-180-2 compliant SHA-256 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * The SHA-256 Secure Hash Standard was published by NIST in 2002. + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf + */ + +#if defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 4) + +/* Ideally, we would simply use MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A in the following #if, + * but that is defined by build_info.h, and we need this block to happen first. */ +#if defined(__ARM_ARCH) && (__ARM_ARCH_PROFILE == 'A') +#if __ARM_ARCH >= 8 +#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO) +/* TODO: Re-consider above after https://reviews.llvm.org/D131064 merged. + * + * The intrinsic declaration are guarded by predefined ACLE macros in clang: + * these are normally only enabled by the -march option on the command line. + * By defining the macros ourselves we gain access to those declarations without + * requiring -march on the command line. + * + * `arm_neon.h` is included by common.h, so we put these defines + * at the top of this file, before any includes. + */ +#define __ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO 1 +/* See: https://arm-software.github.io/acle/main/acle.html#cryptographic-extensions + * + * `__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO` is deprecated, but we need to continue to specify it + * for older compilers. + */ +#define __ARM_FEATURE_SHA2 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG +#endif + +#endif /* defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 4) */ + +/* Ensure that SIG_SETMASK is defined when -std=c99 is used. */ +#define _GNU_SOURCE + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) + +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) +# if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS) +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +# warning "Target does not support NEON instructions" +# undef MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT +# else +# error "Target does not support NEON instructions" +# endif +# endif +# endif + +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) +/* *INDENT-OFF* */ + +# if !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG) +# if defined(__ARMCOMPILER_VERSION) +# if __ARMCOMPILER_VERSION <= 6090000 +# error "Must use minimum -march=armv8-a+crypto for MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*" +# endif +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("sha2"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# elif defined(__clang__) +# if __clang_major__ < 4 +# error "A more recent Clang is required for MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*" +# endif +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("crypto"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# elif defined(__GNUC__) + /* FIXME: GCC 5 claims to support Armv8 Crypto Extensions, but some + * intrinsics are missing. Missing intrinsics could be worked around. + */ +# if __GNUC__ < 6 +# error "A more recent GCC is required for MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*" +# else +# pragma GCC push_options +# pragma GCC target ("arch=armv8-a+crypto") +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# endif +# else +# error "Only GCC and Clang supported for MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*" +# endif +# endif +/* *INDENT-ON* */ + +# endif +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +# if defined(__unix__) +# if defined(__linux__) +/* Our preferred method of detection is getauxval() */ +# include +/* These are not always defined via sys/auxv.h */ +# if !defined(HWCAP_SHA2) +# define HWCAP_SHA2 (1 << 6) +# endif +# if !defined(HWCAP2_SHA2) +# define HWCAP2_SHA2 (1 << 3) +# endif +# endif +/* Use SIGILL on Unix, and fall back to it on Linux */ +# include +# endif +# endif +#elif !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +# undef MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY +# undef MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * Capability detection code comes early, so we can disable + * MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT if no detection mechanism found + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) && defined(HWCAP_SHA2) +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(void) +{ + return (getauxval(AT_HWCAP) & HWCAP_SHA2) ? 1 : 0; +} +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) && defined(HWCAP2_SHA2) +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(void) +{ + return (getauxval(AT_HWCAP2) & HWCAP2_SHA2) ? 1 : 0; +} +#elif defined(__APPLE__) +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(void) +{ + return 1; +} +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN +#include +#include + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(void) +{ + return IsProcessorFeaturePresent(PF_ARM_V8_CRYPTO_INSTRUCTIONS_AVAILABLE) ? + 1 : 0; +} +#elif defined(__unix__) && defined(SIG_SETMASK) +/* Detection with SIGILL, setjmp() and longjmp() */ +#include +#include + +static jmp_buf return_from_sigill; + +/* + * Armv8-A SHA256 support detection via SIGILL + */ +static void sigill_handler(int signal) +{ + (void) signal; + longjmp(return_from_sigill, 1); +} + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(void) +{ + struct sigaction old_action, new_action; + + sigset_t old_mask; + if (sigprocmask(0, NULL, &old_mask)) { + return 0; + } + + sigemptyset(&new_action.sa_mask); + new_action.sa_flags = 0; + new_action.sa_handler = sigill_handler; + + sigaction(SIGILL, &new_action, &old_action); + + static int ret = 0; + + if (setjmp(return_from_sigill) == 0) { /* First return only */ + /* If this traps, we will return a second time from setjmp() with 1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) + asm volatile ("sha256h q0, q0, v0.4s" : : : "v0"); +#else + asm volatile ("sha256h.32 q0, q0, q0" : : : "q0"); +#endif + ret = 1; + } + + sigaction(SIGILL, &old_action, NULL); + sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &old_mask, NULL); + + return ret; +} +#else +#warning "No mechanism to detect ARMV8_CRYPTO found, using C code only" +#undef MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT +#endif /* HWCAP_SHA2, __APPLE__, __unix__ && SIG_SETMASK */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) + +#define SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE 64 + +void mbedtls_sha256_init(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_sha256_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_sha256_free(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_sha256_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_sha256_clone(mbedtls_sha256_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha256_context *src) +{ + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * SHA-256 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_starts(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if (is224 != 0 && is224 != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if (is224 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#else /* defined MBEDTLS_SHA224_C only */ + if (is224 == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + if (is224 == 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + ctx->state[0] = 0x6A09E667; + ctx->state[1] = 0xBB67AE85; + ctx->state[2] = 0x3C6EF372; + ctx->state[3] = 0xA54FF53A; + ctx->state[4] = 0x510E527F; + ctx->state[5] = 0x9B05688C; + ctx->state[6] = 0x1F83D9AB; + ctx->state[7] = 0x5BE0CD19; +#endif + } else { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + ctx->state[0] = 0xC1059ED8; + ctx->state[1] = 0x367CD507; + ctx->state[2] = 0x3070DD17; + ctx->state[3] = 0xF70E5939; + ctx->state[4] = 0xFFC00B31; + ctx->state[5] = 0x68581511; + ctx->state[6] = 0x64F98FA7; + ctx->state[7] = 0xBEFA4FA4; +#endif + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + ctx->is224 = is224; +#endif + + return 0; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) +static const uint32_t K[] = +{ + 0x428A2F98, 0x71374491, 0xB5C0FBCF, 0xE9B5DBA5, + 0x3956C25B, 0x59F111F1, 0x923F82A4, 0xAB1C5ED5, + 0xD807AA98, 0x12835B01, 0x243185BE, 0x550C7DC3, + 0x72BE5D74, 0x80DEB1FE, 0x9BDC06A7, 0xC19BF174, + 0xE49B69C1, 0xEFBE4786, 0x0FC19DC6, 0x240CA1CC, + 0x2DE92C6F, 0x4A7484AA, 0x5CB0A9DC, 0x76F988DA, + 0x983E5152, 0xA831C66D, 0xB00327C8, 0xBF597FC7, + 0xC6E00BF3, 0xD5A79147, 0x06CA6351, 0x14292967, + 0x27B70A85, 0x2E1B2138, 0x4D2C6DFC, 0x53380D13, + 0x650A7354, 0x766A0ABB, 0x81C2C92E, 0x92722C85, + 0xA2BFE8A1, 0xA81A664B, 0xC24B8B70, 0xC76C51A3, + 0xD192E819, 0xD6990624, 0xF40E3585, 0x106AA070, + 0x19A4C116, 0x1E376C08, 0x2748774C, 0x34B0BCB5, + 0x391C0CB3, 0x4ED8AA4A, 0x5B9CCA4F, 0x682E6FF3, + 0x748F82EE, 0x78A5636F, 0x84C87814, 0x8CC70208, + 0x90BEFFFA, 0xA4506CEB, 0xBEF9A3F7, 0xC67178F2, +}; + +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) +# define mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_a64_crypto mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many +# define mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_a64_crypto mbedtls_internal_sha256_process +#endif + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_a64_crypto( + mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, const uint8_t *msg, size_t len) +{ + uint32x4_t abcd = vld1q_u32(&ctx->state[0]); + uint32x4_t efgh = vld1q_u32(&ctx->state[4]); + + size_t processed = 0; + + for (; + len >= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE; + processed += SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE, + msg += SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE, + len -= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) { + uint32x4_t tmp, abcd_prev; + + uint32x4_t abcd_orig = abcd; + uint32x4_t efgh_orig = efgh; + + uint32x4_t sched0 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 0)); + uint32x4_t sched1 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 1)); + uint32x4_t sched2 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 2)); + uint32x4_t sched3 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 3)); + +#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ /* Will be true if not defined */ + /* Untested on BE */ + sched0 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vrev32q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u32(sched0))); + sched1 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vrev32q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u32(sched1))); + sched2 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vrev32q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u32(sched2))); + sched3 = vreinterpretq_u32_u8(vrev32q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u32(sched3))); +#endif + + /* Rounds 0 to 3 */ + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched0, vld1q_u32(&K[0])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds 4 to 7 */ + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched1, vld1q_u32(&K[4])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds 8 to 11 */ + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched2, vld1q_u32(&K[8])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds 12 to 15 */ + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched3, vld1q_u32(&K[12])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + for (int t = 16; t < 64; t += 16) { + /* Rounds t to t + 3 */ + sched0 = vsha256su1q_u32(vsha256su0q_u32(sched0, sched1), sched2, sched3); + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched0, vld1q_u32(&K[t])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds t + 4 to t + 7 */ + sched1 = vsha256su1q_u32(vsha256su0q_u32(sched1, sched2), sched3, sched0); + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched1, vld1q_u32(&K[t + 4])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds t + 8 to t + 11 */ + sched2 = vsha256su1q_u32(vsha256su0q_u32(sched2, sched3), sched0, sched1); + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched2, vld1q_u32(&K[t + 8])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + + /* Rounds t + 12 to t + 15 */ + sched3 = vsha256su1q_u32(vsha256su0q_u32(sched3, sched0), sched1, sched2); + tmp = vaddq_u32(sched3, vld1q_u32(&K[t + 12])); + abcd_prev = abcd; + abcd = vsha256hq_u32(abcd_prev, efgh, tmp); + efgh = vsha256h2q_u32(efgh, abcd_prev, tmp); + } + + abcd = vaddq_u32(abcd, abcd_orig); + efgh = vaddq_u32(efgh, efgh_orig); + } + + vst1q_u32(&ctx->state[0], abcd); + vst1q_u32(&ctx->state[4], efgh); + + return processed; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * This function is for internal use only if we are building both C and Armv8-A + * versions, otherwise it is renamed to be the public mbedtls_internal_sha256_process() + */ +static +#endif +int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_a64_crypto(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + return (mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_a64_crypto(ctx, data, + SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) == + SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) ? 0 : -1; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT || MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA) +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang attribute pop +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +#pragma GCC pop_options +#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +#define mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_c mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many +#define mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_c mbedtls_internal_sha256_process +#endif + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) + +#define SHR(x, n) (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (n)) +#define ROTR(x, n) (SHR(x, n) | ((x) << (32 - (n)))) + +#define S0(x) (ROTR(x, 7) ^ ROTR(x, 18) ^ SHR(x, 3)) +#define S1(x) (ROTR(x, 17) ^ ROTR(x, 19) ^ SHR(x, 10)) + +#define S2(x) (ROTR(x, 2) ^ ROTR(x, 13) ^ ROTR(x, 22)) +#define S3(x) (ROTR(x, 6) ^ ROTR(x, 11) ^ ROTR(x, 25)) + +#define F0(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) +#define F1(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) + +#define R(t) \ + ( \ + local.W[t] = S1(local.W[(t) - 2]) + local.W[(t) - 7] + \ + S0(local.W[(t) - 15]) + local.W[(t) - 16] \ + ) + +#define P(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, x, K) \ + do \ + { \ + local.temp1 = (h) + S3(e) + F1((e), (f), (g)) + (K) + (x); \ + local.temp2 = S2(a) + F0((a), (b), (c)); \ + (d) += local.temp1; (h) = local.temp1 + local.temp2; \ + } while (0) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * This function is for internal use only if we are building both C and Armv8 + * versions, otherwise it is renamed to be the public mbedtls_internal_sha256_process() + */ +static +#endif +int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_c(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + struct { + uint32_t temp1, temp2, W[64]; + uint32_t A[8]; + } local; + + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + local.A[i] = ctx->state[i]; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER) + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { + if (i < 16) { + local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 4 * i); + } else { + R(i); + } + + P(local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i]); + + local.temp1 = local.A[7]; local.A[7] = local.A[6]; + local.A[6] = local.A[5]; local.A[5] = local.A[4]; + local.A[4] = local.A[3]; local.A[3] = local.A[2]; + local.A[2] = local.A[1]; local.A[1] = local.A[0]; + local.A[0] = local.temp1; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, 4 * i); + } + + for (i = 0; i < 16; i += 8) { + P(local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i+0], K[i+0]); + P(local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], + local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.W[i+1], K[i+1]); + P(local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], + local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.W[i+2], K[i+2]); + P(local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], + local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.W[i+3], K[i+3]); + P(local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], + local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.W[i+4], K[i+4]); + P(local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], + local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.W[i+5], K[i+5]); + P(local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], + local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.W[i+6], K[i+6]); + P(local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], + local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.W[i+7], K[i+7]); + } + + for (i = 16; i < 64; i += 8) { + P(local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], R(i+0), K[i+0]); + P(local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], + local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], R(i+1), K[i+1]); + P(local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], + local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], R(i+2), K[i+2]); + P(local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], + local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], R(i+3), K[i+3]); + P(local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], + local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], R(i+4), K[i+4]); + P(local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], + local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], R(i+5), K[i+5]); + P(local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], + local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], R(i+6), K[i+6]); + P(local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], + local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], R(i+7), K[i+7]); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ + + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + ctx->state[i] += local.A[i]; + } + + /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&local, sizeof(local)); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT && !MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_c( + mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) +{ + size_t processed = 0; + + while (len >= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) { + if (mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_c(ctx, data) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + data += SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE; + len -= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE; + + processed += SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + + return processed; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_has_support(void) +{ + static int done = 0; + static int supported = 0; + + if (!done) { + supported = mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_determine_support(); + done = 1; + } + + return supported; +} + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const uint8_t *msg, size_t len) +{ + if (mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_has_support()) { + return mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_a64_crypto(ctx, msg, len); + } else { + return mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many_c(ctx, msg, len); + } +} + +int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + if (mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha256_has_support()) { + return mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_a64_crypto(ctx, data); + } else { + return mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_c(ctx, data); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ + + +/* + * SHA-256 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_update(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + uint32_t left; + + if (ilen == 0) { + return 0; + } + + left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + fill = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen; + ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF; + + if (ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen) { + ctx->total[1]++; + } + + if (left && ilen >= fill) { + memcpy((void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while (ilen >= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) { + size_t processed = + mbedtls_internal_sha256_process_many(ctx, input, ilen); + if (processed < SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + } + + input += processed; + ilen -= processed; + } + + if (ilen > 0) { + memcpy((void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * SHA-256 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_sha256_finish(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t used; + uint32_t high, low; + int truncated = 0; + + /* + * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length + */ + used = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F; + + ctx->buffer[used++] = 0x80; + + if (used <= 56) { + /* Enough room for padding + length in current block */ + memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 56 - used); + } else { + /* We'll need an extra block */ + memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE - used); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + memset(ctx->buffer, 0, 56); + } + + /* + * Add message length + */ + high = (ctx->total[0] >> 29) + | (ctx->total[1] << 3); + low = (ctx->total[0] << 3); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(high, ctx->buffer, 56); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(low, ctx->buffer, 60); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Output final state + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[0], output, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[1], output, 4); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[2], output, 8); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[3], output, 12); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[4], output, 16); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[5], output, 20); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[6], output, 24); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + truncated = ctx->is224; +#endif + if (!truncated) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->state[7], output, 28); + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_sha256_free(ctx); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ + +/* + * output = SHA-256( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_sha256(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + int is224) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_sha256_context ctx; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if (is224 != 0 && is224 != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + if (is224 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#else /* defined MBEDTLS_SHA224_C only */ + if (is224 == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + + mbedtls_sha256_init(&ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts(&ctx, is224)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_sha256_free(&ctx); + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +/* + * FIPS-180-2 test vectors + */ +static const unsigned char sha_test_buf[3][57] = +{ + { "abc" }, + { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq" }, + { "" } +}; + +static const size_t sha_test_buflen[3] = +{ + 3, 56, 1000 +}; + +typedef const unsigned char (sha_test_sum_t)[32]; + +/* + * SHA-224 test vectors + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) +static sha_test_sum_t sha224_test_sum[] = +{ + { 0x23, 0x09, 0x7D, 0x22, 0x34, 0x05, 0xD8, 0x22, + 0x86, 0x42, 0xA4, 0x77, 0xBD, 0xA2, 0x55, 0xB3, + 0x2A, 0xAD, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0xBD, 0xA0, 0xB3, 0xF7, + 0xE3, 0x6C, 0x9D, 0xA7 }, + { 0x75, 0x38, 0x8B, 0x16, 0x51, 0x27, 0x76, 0xCC, + 0x5D, 0xBA, 0x5D, 0xA1, 0xFD, 0x89, 0x01, 0x50, + 0xB0, 0xC6, 0x45, 0x5C, 0xB4, 0xF5, 0x8B, 0x19, + 0x52, 0x52, 0x25, 0x25 }, + { 0x20, 0x79, 0x46, 0x55, 0x98, 0x0C, 0x91, 0xD8, + 0xBB, 0xB4, 0xC1, 0xEA, 0x97, 0x61, 0x8A, 0x4B, + 0xF0, 0x3F, 0x42, 0x58, 0x19, 0x48, 0xB2, 0xEE, + 0x4E, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x67 } +}; +#endif + +/* + * SHA-256 test vectors + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +static sha_test_sum_t sha256_test_sum[] = +{ + { 0xBA, 0x78, 0x16, 0xBF, 0x8F, 0x01, 0xCF, 0xEA, + 0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xDE, 0x5D, 0xAE, 0x22, 0x23, + 0xB0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xA3, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7A, 0x9C, + 0xB4, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x61, 0xF2, 0x00, 0x15, 0xAD }, + { 0x24, 0x8D, 0x6A, 0x61, 0xD2, 0x06, 0x38, 0xB8, + 0xE5, 0xC0, 0x26, 0x93, 0x0C, 0x3E, 0x60, 0x39, + 0xA3, 0x3C, 0xE4, 0x59, 0x64, 0xFF, 0x21, 0x67, + 0xF6, 0xEC, 0xED, 0xD4, 0x19, 0xDB, 0x06, 0xC1 }, + { 0xCD, 0xC7, 0x6E, 0x5C, 0x99, 0x14, 0xFB, 0x92, + 0x81, 0xA1, 0xC7, 0xE2, 0x84, 0xD7, 0x3E, 0x67, + 0xF1, 0x80, 0x9A, 0x48, 0xA4, 0x97, 0x20, 0x0E, + 0x04, 0x6D, 0x39, 0xCC, 0xC7, 0x11, 0x2C, 0xD0 } +}; +#endif + +/* + * Checkup routine + */ +static int mbedtls_sha256_common_self_test(int verbose, int is224) +{ + int i, buflen, ret = 0; + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char sha256sum[32]; + mbedtls_sha256_context ctx; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = (is224) ? sha224_test_sum : sha256_test_sum; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = sha256_test_sum; +#else + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = sha224_test_sum; +#endif + + buf = mbedtls_calloc(1024, sizeof(unsigned char)); + if (NULL == buf) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("Buffer allocation failed\n"); + } + + return 1; + } + + mbedtls_sha256_init(&ctx); + + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" SHA-%d test #%d: ", 256 - is224 * 32, i + 1); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_starts(&ctx, is224)) != 0) { + goto fail; + } + + if (i == 2) { + memset(buf, 'a', buflen = 1000); + + for (int j = 0; j < 1000; j++) { + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update(&ctx, buf, buflen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto fail; + } + } + + } else { + ret = mbedtls_sha256_update(&ctx, sha_test_buf[i], + sha_test_buflen[i]); + if (ret != 0) { + goto fail; + } + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256_finish(&ctx, sha256sum)) != 0) { + goto fail; + } + + + if (memcmp(sha256sum, sha_test_sum[i], 32 - is224 * 4) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + goto exit; + +fail: + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_sha256_free(&ctx); + mbedtls_free(buf); + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) +int mbedtls_sha256_self_test(int verbose) +{ + return mbedtls_sha256_common_self_test(verbose, 0); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) +int mbedtls_sha224_self_test(int verbose) +{ + return mbedtls_sha256_common_self_test(verbose, 1); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA224_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C || MBEDTLS_SHA224_C */ diff --git a/library/sha3.c b/library/sha3.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..57385595f56 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/sha3.c @@ -0,0 +1,721 @@ +/* + * FIPS-202 compliant SHA3 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * The SHA-3 Secure Hash Standard was published by NIST in 2015. + * + * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.202.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + +/* + * These macros select manually unrolled implementations of parts of the main permutation function. + * + * Unrolling has a major impact on both performance and code size. gcc performance benefits a lot + * from manually unrolling at higher optimisation levels. + * + * Depending on your size/perf priorities, compiler and target, it may be beneficial to adjust + * these; the defaults here should give sensible trade-offs for gcc and clang on aarch64 and + * x86-64. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_THETA_UNROLL) + #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_THETA_UNROLL 0 //no-check-names +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL) + #if defined(__OPTIMIZE_SIZE__) + #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL 0 //no-check-names + #else + #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL 1 //no-check-names + #endif +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_PI_UNROLL) + #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_PI_UNROLL 1 //no-check-names +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_RHO_UNROLL) + #define MBEDTLS_SHA3_RHO_UNROLL 1 //no-check-names +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/sha3.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#define XOR_BYTE 0x6 + +/* Precomputed masks for the iota transform. + * + * Each round uses a 64-bit mask value. In each mask values, only + * bits whose position is of the form 2^k-1 can be set, thus only + * 7 of 64 bits of the mask need to be known for each mask value. + * + * We use a compressed encoding of the mask where bits 63, 31 and 15 + * are moved to bits 4-6. This allows us to make each mask value + * 1 byte rather than 8 bytes, saving 7*24 = 168 bytes of data (with + * perhaps a little variation due to alignment). Decompressing this + * requires a little code, but much less than the savings on the table. + * + * The impact on performance depends on the platform and compiler. + * There's a bit more computation, but less memory bandwidth. A quick + * benchmark on x86_64 shows a 7% speed improvement with GCC and a + * 5% speed penalty with Clang, compared to the naive uint64_t[24] table. + * YMMV. + */ +/* Helper macro to set the values of the higher bits in unused low positions */ +#define H(b63, b31, b15) (b63 << 6 | b31 << 5 | b15 << 4) +static const uint8_t iota_r_packed[24] = { + H(0, 0, 0) | 0x01, H(0, 0, 1) | 0x82, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x8a, H(1, 1, 1) | 0x00, + H(0, 0, 1) | 0x8b, H(0, 1, 0) | 0x01, H(1, 1, 1) | 0x81, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x09, + H(0, 0, 0) | 0x8a, H(0, 0, 0) | 0x88, H(0, 1, 1) | 0x09, H(0, 1, 0) | 0x0a, + H(0, 1, 1) | 0x8b, H(1, 0, 0) | 0x8b, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x89, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x03, + H(1, 0, 1) | 0x02, H(1, 0, 0) | 0x80, H(0, 0, 1) | 0x0a, H(1, 1, 0) | 0x0a, + H(1, 1, 1) | 0x81, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x80, H(0, 1, 0) | 0x01, H(1, 1, 1) | 0x08, +}; +#undef H + +static const uint32_t rho[6] = { + 0x3f022425, 0x1c143a09, 0x2c3d3615, 0x27191713, 0x312b382e, 0x3e030832 +}; + +static const uint32_t pi[6] = { + 0x110b070a, 0x10050312, 0x04181508, 0x0d13170f, 0x0e14020c, 0x01060916 +}; + +#define ROTR64(x, y) (((x) << (64U - (y))) | ((x) >> (y))) // 64-bit rotate right +#define ABSORB(ctx, idx, v) do { ctx->state[(idx) >> 3] ^= ((uint64_t) (v)) << (((idx) & 0x7) << 3); \ +} while (0) +#define SQUEEZE(ctx, idx) ((uint8_t) (ctx->state[(idx) >> 3] >> (((idx) & 0x7) << 3))) +#define SWAP(x, y) do { uint64_t tmp = (x); (x) = (y); (y) = tmp; } while (0) + +/* The permutation function. */ +static void keccak_f1600(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx) +{ + uint64_t lane[5]; + uint64_t *s = ctx->state; + int i; + + for (int round = 0; round < 24; round++) { + uint64_t t; + + /* Theta */ +#if MBEDTLS_SHA3_THETA_UNROLL == 0 //no-check-names + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { + lane[i] = s[i] ^ s[i + 5] ^ s[i + 10] ^ s[i + 15] ^ s[i + 20]; + } + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { + t = lane[(i + 4) % 5] ^ ROTR64(lane[(i + 1) % 5], 63); + s[i] ^= t; s[i + 5] ^= t; s[i + 10] ^= t; s[i + 15] ^= t; s[i + 20] ^= t; + } +#else + lane[0] = s[0] ^ s[5] ^ s[10] ^ s[15] ^ s[20]; + lane[1] = s[1] ^ s[6] ^ s[11] ^ s[16] ^ s[21]; + lane[2] = s[2] ^ s[7] ^ s[12] ^ s[17] ^ s[22]; + lane[3] = s[3] ^ s[8] ^ s[13] ^ s[18] ^ s[23]; + lane[4] = s[4] ^ s[9] ^ s[14] ^ s[19] ^ s[24]; + + t = lane[4] ^ ROTR64(lane[1], 63); + s[0] ^= t; s[5] ^= t; s[10] ^= t; s[15] ^= t; s[20] ^= t; + + t = lane[0] ^ ROTR64(lane[2], 63); + s[1] ^= t; s[6] ^= t; s[11] ^= t; s[16] ^= t; s[21] ^= t; + + t = lane[1] ^ ROTR64(lane[3], 63); + s[2] ^= t; s[7] ^= t; s[12] ^= t; s[17] ^= t; s[22] ^= t; + + t = lane[2] ^ ROTR64(lane[4], 63); + s[3] ^= t; s[8] ^= t; s[13] ^= t; s[18] ^= t; s[23] ^= t; + + t = lane[3] ^ ROTR64(lane[0], 63); + s[4] ^= t; s[9] ^= t; s[14] ^= t; s[19] ^= t; s[24] ^= t; +#endif + + /* Rho */ + for (i = 1; i < 25; i += 4) { + uint32_t r = rho[(i - 1) >> 2]; +#if MBEDTLS_SHA3_RHO_UNROLL == 0 + for (int j = i; j < i + 4; j++) { + uint8_t r8 = (uint8_t) (r >> 24); + r <<= 8; + s[j] = ROTR64(s[j], r8); + } +#else + s[i + 0] = ROTR64(s[i + 0], MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(r)); + s[i + 1] = ROTR64(s[i + 1], MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(r)); + s[i + 2] = ROTR64(s[i + 2], MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(r)); + s[i + 3] = ROTR64(s[i + 3], MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(r)); +#endif + } + + /* Pi */ + t = s[1]; +#if MBEDTLS_SHA3_PI_UNROLL == 0 + for (i = 0; i < 24; i += 4) { + uint32_t p = pi[i >> 2]; + for (unsigned j = 0; j < 4; j++) { + SWAP(s[p & 0xff], t); + p >>= 8; + } + } +#else + uint32_t p = pi[0]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); + p = pi[1]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); + p = pi[2]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); + p = pi[3]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); + p = pi[4]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); + p = pi[5]; + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(p)], t); + SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(p)], t); SWAP(s[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(p)], t); +#endif + + /* Chi */ +#if MBEDTLS_SHA3_CHI_UNROLL == 0 //no-check-names + for (i = 0; i <= 20; i += 5) { + lane[0] = s[i]; lane[1] = s[i + 1]; lane[2] = s[i + 2]; + lane[3] = s[i + 3]; lane[4] = s[i + 4]; + s[i + 0] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[i + 1] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[i + 2] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[i + 3] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[i + 4] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; + } +#else + lane[0] = s[0]; lane[1] = s[1]; lane[2] = s[2]; lane[3] = s[3]; lane[4] = s[4]; + s[0] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[1] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[2] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[3] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[4] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; + + lane[0] = s[5]; lane[1] = s[6]; lane[2] = s[7]; lane[3] = s[8]; lane[4] = s[9]; + s[5] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[6] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[7] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[8] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[9] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; + + lane[0] = s[10]; lane[1] = s[11]; lane[2] = s[12]; lane[3] = s[13]; lane[4] = s[14]; + s[10] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[11] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[12] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[13] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[14] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; + + lane[0] = s[15]; lane[1] = s[16]; lane[2] = s[17]; lane[3] = s[18]; lane[4] = s[19]; + s[15] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[16] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[17] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[18] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[19] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; + + lane[0] = s[20]; lane[1] = s[21]; lane[2] = s[22]; lane[3] = s[23]; lane[4] = s[24]; + s[20] ^= (~lane[1]) & lane[2]; + s[21] ^= (~lane[2]) & lane[3]; + s[22] ^= (~lane[3]) & lane[4]; + s[23] ^= (~lane[4]) & lane[0]; + s[24] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; +#endif + + /* Iota */ + /* Decompress the round masks (see definition of rc) */ + s[0] ^= ((iota_r_packed[round] & 0x40ull) << 57 | + (iota_r_packed[round] & 0x20ull) << 26 | + (iota_r_packed[round] & 0x10ull) << 11 | + (iota_r_packed[round] & 0x8f)); + } +} + +void mbedtls_sha3_init(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_sha3_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_sha3_free(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_sha3_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_sha3_clone(mbedtls_sha3_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha3_context *src) +{ + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * SHA-3 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_sha3_starts(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, mbedtls_sha3_id id) +{ + switch (id) { + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_224: + ctx->olen = 224 / 8; + ctx->max_block_size = 1152 / 8; + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_256: + ctx->olen = 256 / 8; + ctx->max_block_size = 1088 / 8; + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_384: + ctx->olen = 384 / 8; + ctx->max_block_size = 832 / 8; + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_512: + ctx->olen = 512 / 8; + ctx->max_block_size = 576 / 8; + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA3_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memset(ctx->state, 0, sizeof(ctx->state)); + ctx->index = 0; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * SHA-3 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_sha3_update(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, + const uint8_t *input, + size_t ilen) +{ + if (ilen >= 8) { + // 8-byte align index + int align_bytes = 8 - (ctx->index % 8); + if (align_bytes) { + for (; align_bytes > 0; align_bytes--) { + ABSORB(ctx, ctx->index, *input++); + ilen--; + ctx->index++; + } + if ((ctx->index = ctx->index % ctx->max_block_size) == 0) { + keccak_f1600(ctx); + } + } + + // process input in 8-byte chunks + while (ilen >= 8) { + ABSORB(ctx, ctx->index, MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE(input, 0)); + input += 8; + ilen -= 8; + if ((ctx->index = (ctx->index + 8) % ctx->max_block_size) == 0) { + keccak_f1600(ctx); + } + } + } + + // handle remaining bytes + while (ilen-- > 0) { + ABSORB(ctx, ctx->index, *input++); + if ((ctx->index = (ctx->index + 1) % ctx->max_block_size) == 0) { + keccak_f1600(ctx); + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_sha3_finish(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, + uint8_t *output, size_t olen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Catch SHA-3 families, with fixed output length */ + if (ctx->olen > 0) { + if (ctx->olen > olen) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA3_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto exit; + } + olen = ctx->olen; + } + + ABSORB(ctx, ctx->index, XOR_BYTE); + ABSORB(ctx, ctx->max_block_size - 1, 0x80); + keccak_f1600(ctx); + ctx->index = 0; + + while (olen-- > 0) { + *output++ = SQUEEZE(ctx, ctx->index); + + if ((ctx->index = (ctx->index + 1) % ctx->max_block_size) == 0) { + keccak_f1600(ctx); + } + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_sha3_free(ctx); + return ret; +} + +/* + * output = SHA-3( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_sha3(mbedtls_sha3_id id, const uint8_t *input, + size_t ilen, uint8_t *output, size_t olen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_sha3_context ctx; + + mbedtls_sha3_init(&ctx); + + /* Sanity checks are performed in every mbedtls_sha3_xxx() */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&ctx, id)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha3_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha3_finish(&ctx, output, olen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_sha3_free(&ctx); + + return ret; +} + +/**************** Self-tests ****************/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +static const unsigned char test_data[2][4] = +{ + "", + "abc", +}; + +static const size_t test_data_len[2] = +{ + 0, /* "" */ + 3 /* "abc" */ +}; + +static const unsigned char test_hash_sha3_224[2][28] = +{ + { /* "" */ + 0x6B, 0x4E, 0x03, 0x42, 0x36, 0x67, 0xDB, 0xB7, + 0x3B, 0x6E, 0x15, 0x45, 0x4F, 0x0E, 0xB1, 0xAB, + 0xD4, 0x59, 0x7F, 0x9A, 0x1B, 0x07, 0x8E, 0x3F, + 0x5B, 0x5A, 0x6B, 0xC7 + }, + { /* "abc" */ + 0xE6, 0x42, 0x82, 0x4C, 0x3F, 0x8C, 0xF2, 0x4A, + 0xD0, 0x92, 0x34, 0xEE, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x76, 0x6F, + 0xC9, 0xA3, 0xA5, 0x16, 0x8D, 0x0C, 0x94, 0xAD, + 0x73, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xDF + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_hash_sha3_256[2][32] = +{ + { /* "" */ + 0xA7, 0xFF, 0xC6, 0xF8, 0xBF, 0x1E, 0xD7, 0x66, + 0x51, 0xC1, 0x47, 0x56, 0xA0, 0x61, 0xD6, 0x62, + 0xF5, 0x80, 0xFF, 0x4D, 0xE4, 0x3B, 0x49, 0xFA, + 0x82, 0xD8, 0x0A, 0x4B, 0x80, 0xF8, 0x43, 0x4A + }, + { /* "abc" */ + 0x3A, 0x98, 0x5D, 0xA7, 0x4F, 0xE2, 0x25, 0xB2, + 0x04, 0x5C, 0x17, 0x2D, 0x6B, 0xD3, 0x90, 0xBD, + 0x85, 0x5F, 0x08, 0x6E, 0x3E, 0x9D, 0x52, 0x5B, + 0x46, 0xBF, 0xE2, 0x45, 0x11, 0x43, 0x15, 0x32 + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_hash_sha3_384[2][48] = +{ + { /* "" */ + 0x0C, 0x63, 0xA7, 0x5B, 0x84, 0x5E, 0x4F, 0x7D, + 0x01, 0x10, 0x7D, 0x85, 0x2E, 0x4C, 0x24, 0x85, + 0xC5, 0x1A, 0x50, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x61, + 0x99, 0x5E, 0x71, 0xBB, 0xEE, 0x98, 0x3A, 0x2A, + 0xC3, 0x71, 0x38, 0x31, 0x26, 0x4A, 0xDB, 0x47, + 0xFB, 0x6B, 0xD1, 0xE0, 0x58, 0xD5, 0xF0, 0x04 + }, + { /* "abc" */ + 0xEC, 0x01, 0x49, 0x82, 0x88, 0x51, 0x6F, 0xC9, + 0x26, 0x45, 0x9F, 0x58, 0xE2, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0x8D, + 0xF9, 0xB4, 0x73, 0xCB, 0x0F, 0xC0, 0x8C, 0x25, + 0x96, 0xDA, 0x7C, 0xF0, 0xE4, 0x9B, 0xE4, 0xB2, + 0x98, 0xD8, 0x8C, 0xEA, 0x92, 0x7A, 0xC7, 0xF5, + 0x39, 0xF1, 0xED, 0xF2, 0x28, 0x37, 0x6D, 0x25 + } +}; + +static const unsigned char test_hash_sha3_512[2][64] = +{ + { /* "" */ + 0xA6, 0x9F, 0x73, 0xCC, 0xA2, 0x3A, 0x9A, 0xC5, + 0xC8, 0xB5, 0x67, 0xDC, 0x18, 0x5A, 0x75, 0x6E, + 0x97, 0xC9, 0x82, 0x16, 0x4F, 0xE2, 0x58, 0x59, + 0xE0, 0xD1, 0xDC, 0xC1, 0x47, 0x5C, 0x80, 0xA6, + 0x15, 0xB2, 0x12, 0x3A, 0xF1, 0xF5, 0xF9, 0x4C, + 0x11, 0xE3, 0xE9, 0x40, 0x2C, 0x3A, 0xC5, 0x58, + 0xF5, 0x00, 0x19, 0x9D, 0x95, 0xB6, 0xD3, 0xE3, + 0x01, 0x75, 0x85, 0x86, 0x28, 0x1D, 0xCD, 0x26 + }, + { /* "abc" */ + 0xB7, 0x51, 0x85, 0x0B, 0x1A, 0x57, 0x16, 0x8A, + 0x56, 0x93, 0xCD, 0x92, 0x4B, 0x6B, 0x09, 0x6E, + 0x08, 0xF6, 0x21, 0x82, 0x74, 0x44, 0xF7, 0x0D, + 0x88, 0x4F, 0x5D, 0x02, 0x40, 0xD2, 0x71, 0x2E, + 0x10, 0xE1, 0x16, 0xE9, 0x19, 0x2A, 0xF3, 0xC9, + 0x1A, 0x7E, 0xC5, 0x76, 0x47, 0xE3, 0x93, 0x40, + 0x57, 0x34, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0xF4, 0x08, 0xD5, 0xA5, + 0x65, 0x92, 0xF8, 0x27, 0x4E, 0xEC, 0x53, 0xF0 + } +}; + +static const unsigned char long_kat_hash_sha3_224[28] = +{ + 0xD6, 0x93, 0x35, 0xB9, 0x33, 0x25, 0x19, 0x2E, + 0x51, 0x6A, 0x91, 0x2E, 0x6D, 0x19, 0xA1, 0x5C, + 0xB5, 0x1C, 0x6E, 0xD5, 0xC1, 0x52, 0x43, 0xE7, + 0xA7, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x3C +}; + +static const unsigned char long_kat_hash_sha3_256[32] = +{ + 0x5C, 0x88, 0x75, 0xAE, 0x47, 0x4A, 0x36, 0x34, + 0xBA, 0x4F, 0xD5, 0x5E, 0xC8, 0x5B, 0xFF, 0xD6, + 0x61, 0xF3, 0x2A, 0xCA, 0x75, 0xC6, 0xD6, 0x99, + 0xD0, 0xCD, 0xCB, 0x6C, 0x11, 0x58, 0x91, 0xC1 +}; + +static const unsigned char long_kat_hash_sha3_384[48] = +{ + 0xEE, 0xE9, 0xE2, 0x4D, 0x78, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x53, + 0x37, 0x98, 0x34, 0x51, 0xDF, 0x97, 0xC8, 0xAD, + 0x9E, 0xED, 0xF2, 0x56, 0xC6, 0x33, 0x4F, 0x8E, + 0x94, 0x8D, 0x25, 0x2D, 0x5E, 0x0E, 0x76, 0x84, + 0x7A, 0xA0, 0x77, 0x4D, 0xDB, 0x90, 0xA8, 0x42, + 0x19, 0x0D, 0x2C, 0x55, 0x8B, 0x4B, 0x83, 0x40 +}; + +static const unsigned char long_kat_hash_sha3_512[64] = +{ + 0x3C, 0x3A, 0x87, 0x6D, 0xA1, 0x40, 0x34, 0xAB, + 0x60, 0x62, 0x7C, 0x07, 0x7B, 0xB9, 0x8F, 0x7E, + 0x12, 0x0A, 0x2A, 0x53, 0x70, 0x21, 0x2D, 0xFF, + 0xB3, 0x38, 0x5A, 0x18, 0xD4, 0xF3, 0x88, 0x59, + 0xED, 0x31, 0x1D, 0x0A, 0x9D, 0x51, 0x41, 0xCE, + 0x9C, 0xC5, 0xC6, 0x6E, 0xE6, 0x89, 0xB2, 0x66, + 0xA8, 0xAA, 0x18, 0xAC, 0xE8, 0x28, 0x2A, 0x0E, + 0x0D, 0xB5, 0x96, 0xC9, 0x0B, 0x0A, 0x7B, 0x87 +}; + +static int mbedtls_sha3_kat_test(int verbose, + const char *type_name, + mbedtls_sha3_id id, + int test_num) +{ + uint8_t hash[64]; + int result; + + result = mbedtls_sha3(id, + test_data[test_num], test_data_len[test_num], + hash, sizeof(hash)); + if (result != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" %s test %d error code: %d\n", + type_name, test_num, result); + } + + return result; + } + + switch (id) { + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_224: + result = memcmp(hash, test_hash_sha3_224[test_num], 28); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_256: + result = memcmp(hash, test_hash_sha3_256[test_num], 32); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_384: + result = memcmp(hash, test_hash_sha3_384[test_num], 48); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_512: + result = memcmp(hash, test_hash_sha3_512[test_num], 64); + break; + default: + break; + } + + if (0 != result) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" %s test %d failed\n", type_name, test_num); + } + + return -1; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" %s test %d passed\n", type_name, test_num); + } + + return 0; +} + +static int mbedtls_sha3_long_kat_test(int verbose, + const char *type_name, + mbedtls_sha3_id id) +{ + mbedtls_sha3_context ctx; + unsigned char buffer[1000]; + unsigned char hash[64]; + int result = 0; + + memset(buffer, 'a', 1000); + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" %s long KAT test ", type_name); + } + + mbedtls_sha3_init(&ctx); + + result = mbedtls_sha3_starts(&ctx, id); + if (result != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("setup failed\n "); + } + } + + /* Process 1,000,000 (one million) 'a' characters */ + for (int i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { + result = mbedtls_sha3_update(&ctx, buffer, 1000); + if (result != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("update error code: %i\n", result); + } + + goto cleanup; + } + } + + result = mbedtls_sha3_finish(&ctx, hash, sizeof(hash)); + if (result != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("finish error code: %d\n", result); + } + + goto cleanup; + } + + switch (id) { + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_224: + result = memcmp(hash, long_kat_hash_sha3_224, 28); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_256: + result = memcmp(hash, long_kat_hash_sha3_256, 32); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_384: + result = memcmp(hash, long_kat_hash_sha3_384, 48); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_512: + result = memcmp(hash, long_kat_hash_sha3_512, 64); + break; + default: + break; + } + + if (result != 0) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_sha3_free(&ctx); + return result; +} + +int mbedtls_sha3_self_test(int verbose) +{ + int i; + + /* SHA-3 Known Answer Tests (KAT) */ + for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-224", MBEDTLS_SHA3_224, i)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-256", MBEDTLS_SHA3_256, i)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-384", MBEDTLS_SHA3_384, i)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-512", MBEDTLS_SHA3_512, i)) { + return 1; + } + } + + /* SHA-3 long KAT tests */ + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_long_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-224", MBEDTLS_SHA3_224)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_long_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-256", MBEDTLS_SHA3_256)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_long_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-384", MBEDTLS_SHA3_384)) { + return 1; + } + + if (0 != mbedtls_sha3_long_kat_test(verbose, + "SHA3-512", MBEDTLS_SHA3_512)) { + return 1; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA3_C */ diff --git a/library/sha512.c b/library/sha512.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..6dcea8da5d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/sha512.c @@ -0,0 +1,1112 @@ +/* + * FIPS-180-2 compliant SHA-384/512 implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * The SHA-512 Secure Hash Standard was published by NIST in 2002. + * + * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-2/fips180-2.pdf + */ + +#if defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_SHA512) && \ + defined(__clang__) && __clang_major__ >= 7 +/* TODO: Re-consider above after https://reviews.llvm.org/D131064 merged. + * + * The intrinsic declaration are guarded by predefined ACLE macros in clang: + * these are normally only enabled by the -march option on the command line. + * By defining the macros ourselves we gain access to those declarations without + * requiring -march on the command line. + * + * `arm_neon.h` is included by common.h, so we put these defines + * at the top of this file, before any includes. + */ +#define __ARM_FEATURE_SHA512 1 +#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_SHA3_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG +#endif + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__WATCOMC__) + #define UL64(x) x##ui64 +#else + #define UL64(x) x##ULL +#endif + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(__aarch64__) +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) +/* *INDENT-OFF* */ +# if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS) +# error "Target does not support NEON instructions" +# endif +/* + * Best performance comes from most recent compilers, with intrinsics and -O3. + * Must compile with -march=armv8.2-a+sha3, but we can't detect armv8.2-a, and + * can't always detect __ARM_FEATURE_SHA512 (notably clang 7-12). + * + * GCC < 8 won't work at all (lacks the sha512 instructions) + * GCC >= 8 uses intrinsics, sets __ARM_FEATURE_SHA512 + * + * Clang < 7 won't work at all (lacks the sha512 instructions) + * Clang 7-12 don't have intrinsics (but we work around that with inline + * assembler) or __ARM_FEATURE_SHA512 + * Clang == 13.0.0 same as clang 12 (only seen on macOS) + * Clang >= 13.0.1 has __ARM_FEATURE_SHA512 and intrinsics + */ +# if !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_SHA512) || defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_SHA3_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG) + /* Test Clang first, as it defines __GNUC__ */ +# if defined(__ARMCOMPILER_VERSION) +# if __ARMCOMPILER_VERSION < 6090000 +# error "A more recent armclang is required for MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +# elif __ARMCOMPILER_VERSION == 6090000 +# error "Must use minimum -march=armv8.2-a+sha3 for MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +# else +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("sha3"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# endif +# elif defined(__clang__) +# if __clang_major__ < 7 +# error "A more recent Clang is required for MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +# else +# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("sha3"))), apply_to=function) +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# endif +# elif defined(__GNUC__) +# if __GNUC__ < 8 +# error "A more recent GCC is required for MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +# else +# pragma GCC push_options +# pragma GCC target ("arch=armv8.2-a+sha3") +# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +# endif +# else +# error "Only GCC and Clang supported for MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*" +# endif +# endif +/* *INDENT-ON* */ +# endif +# if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +# if defined(__unix__) +# if defined(__linux__) +/* Our preferred method of detection is getauxval() */ +# include +# if !defined(HWCAP_SHA512) +/* The same header that declares getauxval() should provide the HWCAP_xxx + * constants to analyze its return value. However, the libc may be too + * old to have the constant that we need. So if it's missing, assume that + * the value is the same one used by the Linux kernel ABI. + */ +# define HWCAP_SHA512 (1 << 21) +# endif +# endif +/* Use SIGILL on Unix, and fall back to it on Linux */ +# include +# endif +# endif +#elif !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +# undef MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY +# undef MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * Capability detection code comes early, so we can disable + * MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT if no detection mechanism found + */ +#if defined(HWCAP_SHA512) +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_determine_support(void) +{ + return (getauxval(AT_HWCAP) & HWCAP_SHA512) ? 1 : 0; +} +#elif defined(__APPLE__) +#include +#include + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_determine_support(void) +{ + int value = 0; + size_t value_len = sizeof(value); + + int ret = sysctlbyname("hw.optional.armv8_2_sha512", &value, &value_len, + NULL, 0); + return ret == 0 && value != 0; +} +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) +/* + * As of March 2022, there don't appear to be any PF_ARM_V8_* flags + * available to pass to IsProcessorFeaturePresent() to check for + * SHA-512 support. So we fall back to the C code only. + */ +#if defined(_MSC_VER) +#pragma message "No mechanism to detect A64_CRYPTO found, using C code only" +#else +#warning "No mechanism to detect A64_CRYPTO found, using C code only" +#endif +#elif defined(__unix__) && defined(SIG_SETMASK) +/* Detection with SIGILL, setjmp() and longjmp() */ +#include +#include + +static jmp_buf return_from_sigill; + +/* + * A64 SHA512 support detection via SIGILL + */ +static void sigill_handler(int signal) +{ + (void) signal; + longjmp(return_from_sigill, 1); +} + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_determine_support(void) +{ + struct sigaction old_action, new_action; + + sigset_t old_mask; + if (sigprocmask(0, NULL, &old_mask)) { + return 0; + } + + sigemptyset(&new_action.sa_mask); + new_action.sa_flags = 0; + new_action.sa_handler = sigill_handler; + + sigaction(SIGILL, &new_action, &old_action); + + static int ret = 0; + + if (setjmp(return_from_sigill) == 0) { /* First return only */ + /* If this traps, we will return a second time from setjmp() with 1 */ + asm ("sha512h q0, q0, v0.2d" : : : "v0"); + ret = 1; + } + + sigaction(SIGILL, &old_action, NULL); + sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &old_mask, NULL); + + return ret; +} +#else +#warning "No mechanism to detect A64_CRYPTO found, using C code only" +#undef MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT +#endif /* HWCAP_SHA512, __APPLE__, __unix__ && SIG_SETMASK */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) + +#define SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE 128 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) +static void sha512_put_uint64_be(uint64_t n, unsigned char *b, uint8_t i) +{ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(n, b, i); +} +#else +#define sha512_put_uint64_be MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ + +void mbedtls_sha512_init(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_sha512_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_sha512_free(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_sha512_context)); +} + +void mbedtls_sha512_clone(mbedtls_sha512_context *dst, + const mbedtls_sha512_context *src) +{ + *dst = *src; +} + +/* + * SHA-512 context setup + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_starts(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if (is384 != 0 && is384 != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if (is384 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#else /* defined MBEDTLS_SHA384_C only */ + if (is384 == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + + ctx->total[0] = 0; + ctx->total[1] = 0; + + if (is384 == 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + ctx->state[0] = UL64(0x6A09E667F3BCC908); + ctx->state[1] = UL64(0xBB67AE8584CAA73B); + ctx->state[2] = UL64(0x3C6EF372FE94F82B); + ctx->state[3] = UL64(0xA54FF53A5F1D36F1); + ctx->state[4] = UL64(0x510E527FADE682D1); + ctx->state[5] = UL64(0x9B05688C2B3E6C1F); + ctx->state[6] = UL64(0x1F83D9ABFB41BD6B); + ctx->state[7] = UL64(0x5BE0CD19137E2179); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ + } else { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + ctx->state[0] = UL64(0xCBBB9D5DC1059ED8); + ctx->state[1] = UL64(0x629A292A367CD507); + ctx->state[2] = UL64(0x9159015A3070DD17); + ctx->state[3] = UL64(0x152FECD8F70E5939); + ctx->state[4] = UL64(0x67332667FFC00B31); + ctx->state[5] = UL64(0x8EB44A8768581511); + ctx->state[6] = UL64(0xDB0C2E0D64F98FA7); + ctx->state[7] = UL64(0x47B5481DBEFA4FA4); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + ctx->is384 = is384; +#endif + + return 0; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) + +/* + * Round constants + */ +static const uint64_t K[80] = +{ + UL64(0x428A2F98D728AE22), UL64(0x7137449123EF65CD), + UL64(0xB5C0FBCFEC4D3B2F), UL64(0xE9B5DBA58189DBBC), + UL64(0x3956C25BF348B538), UL64(0x59F111F1B605D019), + UL64(0x923F82A4AF194F9B), UL64(0xAB1C5ED5DA6D8118), + UL64(0xD807AA98A3030242), UL64(0x12835B0145706FBE), + UL64(0x243185BE4EE4B28C), UL64(0x550C7DC3D5FFB4E2), + UL64(0x72BE5D74F27B896F), UL64(0x80DEB1FE3B1696B1), + UL64(0x9BDC06A725C71235), UL64(0xC19BF174CF692694), + UL64(0xE49B69C19EF14AD2), UL64(0xEFBE4786384F25E3), + UL64(0x0FC19DC68B8CD5B5), UL64(0x240CA1CC77AC9C65), + UL64(0x2DE92C6F592B0275), UL64(0x4A7484AA6EA6E483), + UL64(0x5CB0A9DCBD41FBD4), UL64(0x76F988DA831153B5), + UL64(0x983E5152EE66DFAB), UL64(0xA831C66D2DB43210), + UL64(0xB00327C898FB213F), UL64(0xBF597FC7BEEF0EE4), + UL64(0xC6E00BF33DA88FC2), UL64(0xD5A79147930AA725), + UL64(0x06CA6351E003826F), UL64(0x142929670A0E6E70), + UL64(0x27B70A8546D22FFC), UL64(0x2E1B21385C26C926), + UL64(0x4D2C6DFC5AC42AED), UL64(0x53380D139D95B3DF), + UL64(0x650A73548BAF63DE), UL64(0x766A0ABB3C77B2A8), + UL64(0x81C2C92E47EDAEE6), UL64(0x92722C851482353B), + UL64(0xA2BFE8A14CF10364), UL64(0xA81A664BBC423001), + UL64(0xC24B8B70D0F89791), UL64(0xC76C51A30654BE30), + UL64(0xD192E819D6EF5218), UL64(0xD69906245565A910), + UL64(0xF40E35855771202A), UL64(0x106AA07032BBD1B8), + UL64(0x19A4C116B8D2D0C8), UL64(0x1E376C085141AB53), + UL64(0x2748774CDF8EEB99), UL64(0x34B0BCB5E19B48A8), + UL64(0x391C0CB3C5C95A63), UL64(0x4ED8AA4AE3418ACB), + UL64(0x5B9CCA4F7763E373), UL64(0x682E6FF3D6B2B8A3), + UL64(0x748F82EE5DEFB2FC), UL64(0x78A5636F43172F60), + UL64(0x84C87814A1F0AB72), UL64(0x8CC702081A6439EC), + UL64(0x90BEFFFA23631E28), UL64(0xA4506CEBDE82BDE9), + UL64(0xBEF9A3F7B2C67915), UL64(0xC67178F2E372532B), + UL64(0xCA273ECEEA26619C), UL64(0xD186B8C721C0C207), + UL64(0xEADA7DD6CDE0EB1E), UL64(0xF57D4F7FEE6ED178), + UL64(0x06F067AA72176FBA), UL64(0x0A637DC5A2C898A6), + UL64(0x113F9804BEF90DAE), UL64(0x1B710B35131C471B), + UL64(0x28DB77F523047D84), UL64(0x32CAAB7B40C72493), + UL64(0x3C9EBE0A15C9BEBC), UL64(0x431D67C49C100D4C), + UL64(0x4CC5D4BECB3E42B6), UL64(0x597F299CFC657E2A), + UL64(0x5FCB6FAB3AD6FAEC), UL64(0x6C44198C4A475817) +}; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) +# define mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_a64_crypto mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many +# define mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_a64_crypto mbedtls_internal_sha512_process +#endif + +/* Accelerated SHA-512 implementation originally written by Simon Tatham for PuTTY, + * under the MIT licence; dual-licensed as Apache 2 with his kind permission. + */ + +#if defined(__clang__) && \ + (__clang_major__ < 13 || \ + (__clang_major__ == 13 && __clang_minor__ == 0 && __clang_patchlevel__ == 0)) +static inline uint64x2_t vsha512su0q_u64(uint64x2_t x, uint64x2_t y) +{ + asm ("sha512su0 %0.2D,%1.2D" : "+w" (x) : "w" (y)); + return x; +} +static inline uint64x2_t vsha512su1q_u64(uint64x2_t x, uint64x2_t y, uint64x2_t z) +{ + asm ("sha512su1 %0.2D,%1.2D,%2.2D" : "+w" (x) : "w" (y), "w" (z)); + return x; +} +static inline uint64x2_t vsha512hq_u64(uint64x2_t x, uint64x2_t y, uint64x2_t z) +{ + asm ("sha512h %0,%1,%2.2D" : "+w" (x) : "w" (y), "w" (z)); + return x; +} +static inline uint64x2_t vsha512h2q_u64(uint64x2_t x, uint64x2_t y, uint64x2_t z) +{ + asm ("sha512h2 %0,%1,%2.2D" : "+w" (x) : "w" (y), "w" (z)); + return x; +} +#endif /* __clang__ etc */ + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_a64_crypto( + mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, const uint8_t *msg, size_t len) +{ + uint64x2_t ab = vld1q_u64(&ctx->state[0]); + uint64x2_t cd = vld1q_u64(&ctx->state[2]); + uint64x2_t ef = vld1q_u64(&ctx->state[4]); + uint64x2_t gh = vld1q_u64(&ctx->state[6]); + + size_t processed = 0; + + for (; + len >= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE; + processed += SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE, + msg += SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE, + len -= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) { + uint64x2_t initial_sum, sum, intermed; + + uint64x2_t ab_orig = ab; + uint64x2_t cd_orig = cd; + uint64x2_t ef_orig = ef; + uint64x2_t gh_orig = gh; + + uint64x2_t s0 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 0); + uint64x2_t s1 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 1); + uint64x2_t s2 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 2); + uint64x2_t s3 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 3); + uint64x2_t s4 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 4); + uint64x2_t s5 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 5); + uint64x2_t s6 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 6); + uint64x2_t s7 = (uint64x2_t) vld1q_u8(msg + 16 * 7); + +#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__ /* assume LE if these not defined; untested on BE */ + s0 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s0))); + s1 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s1))); + s2 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s2))); + s3 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s3))); + s4 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s4))); + s5 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s5))); + s6 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s6))); + s7 = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vrev64q_u8(vreinterpretq_u8_u64(s7))); +#endif + + /* Rounds 0 and 1 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s0, vld1q_u64(&K[0])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), gh); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1), vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1)); + gh = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, cd, ab); + cd = vaddq_u64(cd, intermed); + + /* Rounds 2 and 3 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s1, vld1q_u64(&K[2])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ef); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1), vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1)); + ef = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ab, gh); + ab = vaddq_u64(ab, intermed); + + /* Rounds 4 and 5 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s2, vld1q_u64(&K[4])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), cd); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1), vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1)); + cd = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, gh, ef); + gh = vaddq_u64(gh, intermed); + + /* Rounds 6 and 7 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s3, vld1q_u64(&K[6])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ab); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1), vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1)); + ab = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ef, cd); + ef = vaddq_u64(ef, intermed); + + /* Rounds 8 and 9 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s4, vld1q_u64(&K[8])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), gh); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1), vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1)); + gh = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, cd, ab); + cd = vaddq_u64(cd, intermed); + + /* Rounds 10 and 11 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s5, vld1q_u64(&K[10])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ef); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1), vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1)); + ef = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ab, gh); + ab = vaddq_u64(ab, intermed); + + /* Rounds 12 and 13 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s6, vld1q_u64(&K[12])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), cd); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1), vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1)); + cd = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, gh, ef); + gh = vaddq_u64(gh, intermed); + + /* Rounds 14 and 15 */ + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s7, vld1q_u64(&K[14])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ab); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1), vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1)); + ab = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ef, cd); + ef = vaddq_u64(ef, intermed); + + for (unsigned int t = 16; t < 80; t += 16) { + /* Rounds t and t + 1 */ + s0 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s0, s1), s7, vextq_u64(s4, s5, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s0, vld1q_u64(&K[t])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), gh); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1), vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1)); + gh = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, cd, ab); + cd = vaddq_u64(cd, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 2 and t + 3 */ + s1 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s1, s2), s0, vextq_u64(s5, s6, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s1, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 2])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ef); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1), vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1)); + ef = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ab, gh); + ab = vaddq_u64(ab, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 4 and t + 5 */ + s2 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s2, s3), s1, vextq_u64(s6, s7, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s2, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 4])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), cd); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1), vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1)); + cd = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, gh, ef); + gh = vaddq_u64(gh, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 6 and t + 7 */ + s3 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s3, s4), s2, vextq_u64(s7, s0, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s3, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 6])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ab); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1), vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1)); + ab = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ef, cd); + ef = vaddq_u64(ef, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 8 and t + 9 */ + s4 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s4, s5), s3, vextq_u64(s0, s1, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s4, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 8])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), gh); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1), vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1)); + gh = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, cd, ab); + cd = vaddq_u64(cd, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 10 and t + 11 */ + s5 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s5, s6), s4, vextq_u64(s1, s2, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s5, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 10])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ef); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(cd, ef, 1), vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1)); + ef = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ab, gh); + ab = vaddq_u64(ab, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 12 and t + 13 */ + s6 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s6, s7), s5, vextq_u64(s2, s3, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s6, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 12])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), cd); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(ab, cd, 1), vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1)); + cd = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, gh, ef); + gh = vaddq_u64(gh, intermed); + + /* Rounds t + 14 and t + 15 */ + s7 = vsha512su1q_u64(vsha512su0q_u64(s7, s0), s6, vextq_u64(s3, s4, 1)); + initial_sum = vaddq_u64(s7, vld1q_u64(&K[t + 14])); + sum = vaddq_u64(vextq_u64(initial_sum, initial_sum, 1), ab); + intermed = vsha512hq_u64(sum, vextq_u64(gh, ab, 1), vextq_u64(ef, gh, 1)); + ab = vsha512h2q_u64(intermed, ef, cd); + ef = vaddq_u64(ef, intermed); + } + + ab = vaddq_u64(ab, ab_orig); + cd = vaddq_u64(cd, cd_orig); + ef = vaddq_u64(ef, ef_orig); + gh = vaddq_u64(gh, gh_orig); + } + + vst1q_u64(&ctx->state[0], ab); + vst1q_u64(&ctx->state[2], cd); + vst1q_u64(&ctx->state[4], ef); + vst1q_u64(&ctx->state[6], gh); + + return processed; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * This function is for internal use only if we are building both C and A64 + * versions, otherwise it is renamed to be the public mbedtls_internal_sha512_process() + */ +static +#endif +int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_a64_crypto(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + return (mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_a64_crypto(ctx, data, + SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) == + SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) ? 0 : -1; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT || MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA) +#if defined(__clang__) +#pragma clang attribute pop +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +#pragma GCC pop_options +#endif +#undef MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA +#endif + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +#define mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_c mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many +#define mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_c mbedtls_internal_sha512_process +#endif + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) +/* + * This function is for internal use only if we are building both C and A64 + * versions, otherwise it is renamed to be the public mbedtls_internal_sha512_process() + */ +static +#endif +int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_c(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + int i; + struct { + uint64_t temp1, temp2, W[80]; + uint64_t A[8]; + } local; + +#define SHR(x, n) ((x) >> (n)) +#define ROTR(x, n) (SHR((x), (n)) | ((x) << (64 - (n)))) + +#define S0(x) (ROTR(x, 1) ^ ROTR(x, 8) ^ SHR(x, 7)) +#define S1(x) (ROTR(x, 19) ^ ROTR(x, 61) ^ SHR(x, 6)) + +#define S2(x) (ROTR(x, 28) ^ ROTR(x, 34) ^ ROTR(x, 39)) +#define S3(x) (ROTR(x, 14) ^ ROTR(x, 18) ^ ROTR(x, 41)) + +#define F0(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((z) & ((x) | (y)))) +#define F1(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z)))) + +#define P(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, x, K) \ + do \ + { \ + local.temp1 = (h) + S3(e) + F1((e), (f), (g)) + (K) + (x); \ + local.temp2 = S2(a) + F0((a), (b), (c)); \ + (d) += local.temp1; (h) = local.temp1 + local.temp2; \ + } while (0) + + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + local.A[i] = ctx->state[i]; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) + for (i = 0; i < 80; i++) { + if (i < 16) { + local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(data, i << 3); + } else { + local.W[i] = S1(local.W[i - 2]) + local.W[i - 7] + + S0(local.W[i - 15]) + local.W[i - 16]; + } + + P(local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i]); + + local.temp1 = local.A[7]; local.A[7] = local.A[6]; + local.A[6] = local.A[5]; local.A[5] = local.A[4]; + local.A[4] = local.A[3]; local.A[3] = local.A[2]; + local.A[2] = local.A[1]; local.A[1] = local.A[0]; + local.A[0] = local.temp1; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ + for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { + local.W[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(data, i << 3); + } + + for (; i < 80; i++) { + local.W[i] = S1(local.W[i - 2]) + local.W[i - 7] + + S0(local.W[i - 15]) + local.W[i - 16]; + } + + i = 0; + do { + P(local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], + local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.W[i], K[i]); i++; + P(local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], + local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.W[i], K[i]); i++; + P(local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], + local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.W[i], K[i]); i++; + P(local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], + local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.W[i], K[i]); i++; + P(local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], + local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.W[i], K[i]); i++; + P(local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], local.A[7], + local.A[0], local.A[1], local.A[2], local.W[i], K[i]); i++; + P(local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], local.A[6], + local.A[7], local.A[0], local.A[1], local.W[i], K[i]); i++; + P(local.A[1], local.A[2], local.A[3], local.A[4], local.A[5], + local.A[6], local.A[7], local.A[0], local.W[i], K[i]); i++; + } while (i < 80); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ + + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + ctx->state[i] += local.A[i]; + } + + /* Zeroise buffers and variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&local, sizeof(local)); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT && !MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_c( + mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) +{ + size_t processed = 0; + + while (len >= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) { + if (mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_c(ctx, data) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + data += SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE; + len -= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE; + + processed += SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE; + } + + return processed; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */ + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) + +static int mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_has_support(void) +{ + static int done = 0; + static int supported = 0; + + if (!done) { + supported = mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_determine_support(); + done = 1; + } + + return supported; +} + +static size_t mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const uint8_t *msg, size_t len) +{ + if (mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_has_support()) { + return mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_a64_crypto(ctx, msg, len); + } else { + return mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many_c(ctx, msg, len); + } +} + +int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char data[SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + if (mbedtls_a64_crypto_sha512_has_support()) { + return mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_a64_crypto(ctx, data); + } else { + return mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_c(ctx, data); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ + +/* + * SHA-512 process buffer + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_update(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t fill; + unsigned int left; + + if (ilen == 0) { + return 0; + } + + left = (unsigned int) (ctx->total[0] & 0x7F); + fill = SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE - left; + + ctx->total[0] += (uint64_t) ilen; + + if (ctx->total[0] < (uint64_t) ilen) { + ctx->total[1]++; + } + + if (left && ilen >= fill) { + memcpy((void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + input += fill; + ilen -= fill; + left = 0; + } + + while (ilen >= SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) { + size_t processed = + mbedtls_internal_sha512_process_many(ctx, input, ilen); + if (processed < SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + } + + input += processed; + ilen -= processed; + } + + if (ilen > 0) { + memcpy((void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * SHA-512 final digest + */ +int mbedtls_sha512_finish(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, + unsigned char *output) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned used; + uint64_t high, low; + int truncated = 0; + + /* + * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 16 bytes remain for the length + */ + used = ctx->total[0] & 0x7F; + + ctx->buffer[used++] = 0x80; + + if (used <= 112) { + /* Enough room for padding + length in current block */ + memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 112 - used); + } else { + /* We'll need an extra block */ + memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE - used); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + memset(ctx->buffer, 0, 112); + } + + /* + * Add message length + */ + high = (ctx->total[0] >> 61) + | (ctx->total[1] << 3); + low = (ctx->total[0] << 3); + + sha512_put_uint64_be(high, ctx->buffer, 112); + sha512_put_uint64_be(low, ctx->buffer, 120); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* + * Output final state + */ + sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[0], output, 0); + sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[1], output, 8); + sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[2], output, 16); + sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[3], output, 24); + sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[4], output, 32); + sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[5], output, 40); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + truncated = ctx->is384; +#endif + if (!truncated) { + sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[6], output, 48); + sha512_put_uint64_be(ctx->state[7], output, 56); + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: + mbedtls_sha512_free(ctx); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ + +/* + * output = SHA-512( input buffer ) + */ +int mbedtls_sha512(const unsigned char *input, + size_t ilen, + unsigned char *output, + int is384) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_sha512_context ctx; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if (is384 != 0 && is384 != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + if (is384 != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#else /* defined MBEDTLS_SHA384_C only */ + if (is384 == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + + mbedtls_sha512_init(&ctx); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts(&ctx, is384)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_sha512_free(&ctx); + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + +/* + * FIPS-180-2 test vectors + */ +static const unsigned char sha_test_buf[3][113] = +{ + { "abc" }, + { + "abcdefghbcdefghicdefghijdefghijkefghijklfghijklmghijklmnhijklmnoijklmnopjklmnopqklmnopqrlmnopqrsmnopqrstnopqrstu" + }, + { "" } +}; + +static const size_t sha_test_buflen[3] = +{ + 3, 112, 1000 +}; + +typedef const unsigned char (sha_test_sum_t)[64]; + +/* + * SHA-384 test vectors + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +static sha_test_sum_t sha384_test_sum[] = +{ + { 0xCB, 0x00, 0x75, 0x3F, 0x45, 0xA3, 0x5E, 0x8B, + 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x3D, 0x69, 0x9A, 0xC6, 0x50, 0x07, + 0x27, 0x2C, 0x32, 0xAB, 0x0E, 0xDE, 0xD1, 0x63, + 0x1A, 0x8B, 0x60, 0x5A, 0x43, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0xED, + 0x80, 0x86, 0x07, 0x2B, 0xA1, 0xE7, 0xCC, 0x23, + 0x58, 0xBA, 0xEC, 0xA1, 0x34, 0xC8, 0x25, 0xA7 }, + { 0x09, 0x33, 0x0C, 0x33, 0xF7, 0x11, 0x47, 0xE8, + 0x3D, 0x19, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x82, 0xCD, 0x1B, 0x47, + 0x53, 0x11, 0x1B, 0x17, 0x3B, 0x3B, 0x05, 0xD2, + 0x2F, 0xA0, 0x80, 0x86, 0xE3, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0x12, + 0xFC, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0x1A, 0x55, 0x7E, 0x2D, 0xB9, + 0x66, 0xC3, 0xE9, 0xFA, 0x91, 0x74, 0x60, 0x39 }, + { 0x9D, 0x0E, 0x18, 0x09, 0x71, 0x64, 0x74, 0xCB, + 0x08, 0x6E, 0x83, 0x4E, 0x31, 0x0A, 0x4A, 0x1C, + 0xED, 0x14, 0x9E, 0x9C, 0x00, 0xF2, 0x48, 0x52, + 0x79, 0x72, 0xCE, 0xC5, 0x70, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0x5B, + 0x07, 0xB8, 0xB3, 0xDC, 0x38, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xEB, + 0xAE, 0x97, 0xDD, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x3D, 0x89, 0x85 } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ + +/* + * SHA-512 test vectors + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +static sha_test_sum_t sha512_test_sum[] = +{ + { 0xDD, 0xAF, 0x35, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x61, 0x7A, 0xBA, + 0xCC, 0x41, 0x73, 0x49, 0xAE, 0x20, 0x41, 0x31, + 0x12, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0x4E, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x7E, 0xA2, + 0x0A, 0x9E, 0xEE, 0xE6, 0x4B, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, + 0x21, 0x92, 0x99, 0x2A, 0x27, 0x4F, 0xC1, 0xA8, + 0x36, 0xBA, 0x3C, 0x23, 0xA3, 0xFE, 0xEB, 0xBD, + 0x45, 0x4D, 0x44, 0x23, 0x64, 0x3C, 0xE8, 0x0E, + 0x2A, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0x4F, 0xA5, 0x4C, 0xA4, 0x9F }, + { 0x8E, 0x95, 0x9B, 0x75, 0xDA, 0xE3, 0x13, 0xDA, + 0x8C, 0xF4, 0xF7, 0x28, 0x14, 0xFC, 0x14, 0x3F, + 0x8F, 0x77, 0x79, 0xC6, 0xEB, 0x9F, 0x7F, 0xA1, + 0x72, 0x99, 0xAE, 0xAD, 0xB6, 0x88, 0x90, 0x18, + 0x50, 0x1D, 0x28, 0x9E, 0x49, 0x00, 0xF7, 0xE4, + 0x33, 0x1B, 0x99, 0xDE, 0xC4, 0xB5, 0x43, 0x3A, + 0xC7, 0xD3, 0x29, 0xEE, 0xB6, 0xDD, 0x26, 0x54, + 0x5E, 0x96, 0xE5, 0x5B, 0x87, 0x4B, 0xE9, 0x09 }, + { 0xE7, 0x18, 0x48, 0x3D, 0x0C, 0xE7, 0x69, 0x64, + 0x4E, 0x2E, 0x42, 0xC7, 0xBC, 0x15, 0xB4, 0x63, + 0x8E, 0x1F, 0x98, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0x20, 0x44, 0x28, + 0x56, 0x32, 0xA8, 0x03, 0xAF, 0xA9, 0x73, 0xEB, + 0xDE, 0x0F, 0xF2, 0x44, 0x87, 0x7E, 0xA6, 0x0A, + 0x4C, 0xB0, 0x43, 0x2C, 0xE5, 0x77, 0xC3, 0x1B, + 0xEB, 0x00, 0x9C, 0x5C, 0x2C, 0x49, 0xAA, 0x2E, + 0x4E, 0xAD, 0xB2, 0x17, 0xAD, 0x8C, 0xC0, 0x9B } +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ + +static int mbedtls_sha512_common_self_test(int verbose, int is384) +{ + int i, buflen, ret = 0; + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char sha512sum[64]; + mbedtls_sha512_context ctx; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = (is384) ? sha384_test_sum : sha512_test_sum; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = sha512_test_sum; +#else + sha_test_sum_t *sha_test_sum = sha384_test_sum; +#endif + + buf = mbedtls_calloc(1024, sizeof(unsigned char)); + if (NULL == buf) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("Buffer allocation failed\n"); + } + + return 1; + } + + mbedtls_sha512_init(&ctx); + + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" SHA-%d test #%d: ", 512 - is384 * 128, i + 1); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_starts(&ctx, is384)) != 0) { + goto fail; + } + + if (i == 2) { + memset(buf, 'a', buflen = 1000); + + for (int j = 0; j < 1000; j++) { + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update(&ctx, buf, buflen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto fail; + } + } + } else { + ret = mbedtls_sha512_update(&ctx, sha_test_buf[i], + sha_test_buflen[i]); + if (ret != 0) { + goto fail; + } + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha512_finish(&ctx, sha512sum)) != 0) { + goto fail; + } + + if (memcmp(sha512sum, sha_test_sum[i], 64 - is384 * 16) != 0) { + ret = 1; + goto fail; + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); + } + } + + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("\n"); + } + + goto exit; + +fail: + if (verbose != 0) { + mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_sha512_free(&ctx); + mbedtls_free(buf); + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) +int mbedtls_sha512_self_test(int verbose) +{ + return mbedtls_sha512_common_self_test(verbose, 0); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) +int mbedtls_sha384_self_test(int verbose) +{ + return mbedtls_sha512_common_self_test(verbose, 1); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ + +#undef ARRAY_LENGTH + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C || MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ diff --git a/library/ssl_cache.c b/library/ssl_cache.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..772cb8fdfe6 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_cache.c @@ -0,0 +1,410 @@ +/* + * SSL session cache implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * These session callbacks use a simple chained list + * to store and retrieve the session information. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cache.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include + +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_init(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache) +{ + memset(cache, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context)); + + cache->timeout = MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT; + cache->max_entries = MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init(&cache->mutex); +#endif +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cache_find_entry(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry **dst) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t t = mbedtls_time(NULL); +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur; + + for (cur = cache->chain; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if (cache->timeout != 0 && + (int) (t - cur->timestamp) > cache->timeout) { + continue; + } +#endif + + if (session_id_len != cur->session_id_len || + memcmp(session_id, cur->session_id, + cur->session_id_len) != 0) { + continue; + } + + break; + } + + if (cur != NULL) { + *dst = cur; + ret = 0; + } + + return ret; +} + + +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *entry; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&cache->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + ret = ssl_cache_find_entry(cache, session_id, session_id_len, &entry); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_load(session, + entry->session, + entry->session_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = 0; + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&cache->mutex) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } +#endif + + return ret; +} + +/* zeroize a cache entry */ +static void ssl_cache_entry_zeroize(mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *entry) +{ + if (entry == NULL) { + return; + } + + /* zeroize and free session structure */ + if (entry->session != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(entry->session, entry->session_len); + } + + /* zeroize the whole entry structure */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(entry, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry)); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cache_pick_writing_slot(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry **dst) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t t = mbedtls_time(NULL), oldest = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *old = NULL; + int count = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *last; + + /* Check 1: Is there already an entry with the given session ID? + * + * If yes, overwrite it. + * + * If not, `count` will hold the size of the session cache + * at the end of this loop, and `last` will point to the last + * entry, both of which will be used later. */ + + last = NULL; + for (cur = cache->chain; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + count++; + if (session_id_len == cur->session_id_len && + memcmp(session_id, cur->session_id, cur->session_id_len) == 0) { + goto found; + } + last = cur; + } + + /* Check 2: Is there an outdated entry in the cache? + * + * If so, overwrite it. + * + * If not, remember the oldest entry in `old` for later. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + for (cur = cache->chain; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + if (cache->timeout != 0 && + (int) (t - cur->timestamp) > cache->timeout) { + goto found; + } + + if (oldest == 0 || cur->timestamp < oldest) { + oldest = cur->timestamp; + old = cur; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* Check 3: Is there free space in the cache? */ + + if (count < cache->max_entries) { + /* Create new entry */ + cur = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry)); + if (cur == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + /* Append to the end of the linked list. */ + if (last == NULL) { + cache->chain = cur; + } else { + last->next = cur; + } + + goto found; + } + + /* Last resort: The cache is full and doesn't contain any outdated + * elements. In this case, we evict the oldest one, judged by timestamp + * (if present) or cache-order. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if (old == NULL) { + /* This should only happen on an ill-configured cache + * with max_entries == 0. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + /* Reuse first entry in chain, but move to last place. */ + if (cache->chain == NULL) { + /* This should never happen */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + old = cache->chain; + cache->chain = old->next; + old->next = NULL; + last->next = old; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* Now `old` points to the oldest entry to be overwritten. */ + cur = old; + +found: + + /* If we're reusing an entry, free it first. */ + if (cur->session != NULL) { + /* `ssl_cache_entry_zeroize` would break the chain, + * so we reuse `old` to record `next` temporarily. */ + old = cur->next; + ssl_cache_entry_zeroize(cur); + cur->next = old; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + cur->timestamp = t; +#endif + + *dst = cur; + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur; + + size_t session_serialized_len = 0; + unsigned char *session_serialized = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&cache->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + ret = ssl_cache_pick_writing_slot(cache, + session_id, session_id_len, + &cur); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Check how much space we need to serialize the session + * and allocate a sufficiently large buffer. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save(session, NULL, 0, &session_serialized_len); + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + goto exit; + } + + session_serialized = mbedtls_calloc(1, session_serialized_len); + if (session_serialized == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + /* Now serialize the session into the allocated buffer. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save(session, + session_serialized, + session_serialized_len, + &session_serialized_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (session_id_len > sizeof(cur->session_id)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto exit; + } + cur->session_id_len = session_id_len; + memcpy(cur->session_id, session_id, session_id_len); + + cur->session = session_serialized; + cur->session_len = session_serialized_len; + session_serialized = NULL; + + ret = 0; + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&cache->mutex) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } +#endif + + if (session_serialized != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(session_serialized, session_serialized_len); + session_serialized = NULL; + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_cache_remove(void *data, + unsigned char const *session_id, + size_t session_id_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache = (mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *) data; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *entry; + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *prev; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&cache->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + ret = ssl_cache_find_entry(cache, session_id, session_id_len, &entry); + /* No valid entry found, exit with success */ + if (ret != 0) { + ret = 0; + goto exit; + } + + /* Now we remove the entry from the chain */ + if (entry == cache->chain) { + cache->chain = entry->next; + goto free; + } + for (prev = cache->chain; prev->next != NULL; prev = prev->next) { + if (prev->next == entry) { + prev->next = entry->next; + break; + } + } + +free: + ssl_cache_entry_zeroize(entry); + mbedtls_free(entry); + ret = 0; + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&cache->mutex) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } +#endif + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int timeout) +{ + if (timeout < 0) { + timeout = 0; + } + + cache->timeout = timeout; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int max) +{ + if (max < 0) { + max = 0; + } + + cache->max_entries = max; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_cache_free(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *cur, *prv; + + cur = cache->chain; + + while (cur != NULL) { + prv = cur; + cur = cur->next; + + ssl_cache_entry_zeroize(prv); + mbedtls_free(prv); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free(&cache->mutex); +#endif + cache->chain = NULL; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C */ diff --git a/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c b/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..23619a26c88 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c @@ -0,0 +1,2050 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_ciphersuites.c + * + * \brief SSL ciphersuites for Mbed TLS + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif + +#include + +/* + * Ordered from most preferred to least preferred in terms of security. + * + * Current rule (except weak and null which come last): + * 1. By key exchange: + * Forward-secure non-PSK > forward-secure PSK > ECJPAKE > other non-PSK > other PSK + * 2. By key length and cipher: + * ChaCha > AES-256 > Camellia-256 > ARIA-256 > AES-128 > Camellia-128 > ARIA-128 + * 3. By cipher mode when relevant GCM > CCM > CBC > CCM_8 + * 4. By hash function used when relevant + * 5. By key exchange/auth again: EC > non-EC + */ +static const int ciphersuite_preference[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES) + MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES, +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* TLS 1.3 ciphersuites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + /* Chacha-Poly ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + + /* All AES-256 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, + + /* All CAMELLIA-256 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + + /* All ARIA-256 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + /* All AES-128 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + + /* All CAMELLIA-128 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + + /* All ARIA-128 ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* The PSK ephemeral suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* The ECJPAKE suite */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + + /* All AES-256 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, + + /* All CAMELLIA-256 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + /* All ARIA-256 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + /* All AES-128 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + + /* All CAMELLIA-128 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* All ARIA-128 suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* The RSA PSK suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* The PSK suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + + /* NULL suites */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, + + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES */ + 0 +}; + +static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t ciphersuite_definitions[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, "TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, "TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */ + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 && MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, /* Key exchange not part of ciphersuite in TLS 1.3 */ + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY && + MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 && + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 && MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 && MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, + + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-AES-256-CBC-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-CAMELLIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, "TLS-ECJPAKE-WITH-AES-128-CCM-8", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-MD5", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-WITH-NULL-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-NULL-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-RSA-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDH-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-ECDH-ECDSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, + "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-GCM-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384, + "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-256-CBC-SHA384", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-GCM-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) + { MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256, + "TLS-DHE-PSK-WITH-ARIA-128-CBC-SHA256", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK, + 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 }, +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA */ + + + { 0, "", + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE, + 0, 0, 0 } +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES) +const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(void) +{ + return ciphersuite_preference; +} +#else +#define MAX_CIPHERSUITES sizeof(ciphersuite_definitions) / \ + sizeof(ciphersuite_definitions[0]) +static int supported_ciphersuites[MAX_CIPHERSUITES]; +static int supported_init = 0; + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ciphersuite_is_removed(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cs_info) +{ + (void) cs_info; + + return 0; +} + +const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(void) +{ + /* + * On initial call filter out all ciphersuites not supported by current + * build based on presence in the ciphersuite_definitions. + */ + if (supported_init == 0) { + const int *p; + int *q; + + for (p = ciphersuite_preference, q = supported_ciphersuites; + *p != 0 && q < supported_ciphersuites + MAX_CIPHERSUITES - 1; + p++) { + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cs_info; + if ((cs_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(*p)) != NULL && + !ciphersuite_is_removed(cs_info)) { + *(q++) = *p; + } + } + *q = 0; + + supported_init = 1; + } + + return supported_ciphersuites; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES */ + +const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string( + const char *ciphersuite_name) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cur = ciphersuite_definitions; + + if (NULL == ciphersuite_name) { + return NULL; + } + + while (cur->id != 0) { + if (0 == strcmp(cur->name, ciphersuite_name)) { + return cur; + } + + cur++; + } + + return NULL; +} + +const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(int ciphersuite) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cur = ciphersuite_definitions; + + while (cur->id != 0) { + if (cur->id == ciphersuite) { + return cur; + } + + cur++; + } + + return NULL; +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(const int ciphersuite_id) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cur; + + cur = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite_id); + + if (cur == NULL) { + return "unknown"; + } + + return cur->name; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id(const char *ciphersuite_name) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *cur; + + cur = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string(ciphersuite_name); + + if (cur == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return cur->id; +} + +size_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_cipher_key_bitlen(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + size_t key_bits; + + status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) info->cipher, + info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16, + &alg, &key_type, &key_bits); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return 0; + } + + return key_bits; +#else + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t * const cipher_info = + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) info->cipher); + + return mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->key_exchange) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + return MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + return MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY; + + default: + return MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->key_exchange) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT; + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( + mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) info->mac)); + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) info->mac)); + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + return PSA_ALG_ECDH; + + default: + return PSA_ALG_NONE; + } +} + +psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->key_exchange) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + return PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT; + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH; + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + return PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->key_exchange) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + return MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + + default: + return MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->key_exchange) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + * MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || + * MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->key_exchange) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h b/library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..27ff72106ef --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h + * + * \brief Internal part of the public "ssl_ciphersuites.h". + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_has_pfs(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/library/ssl_client.c b/library/ssl_client.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..345e6089382 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,1017 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.2 and 1.3 client-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +#include + +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "ssl_client.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hostname_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t hostname_len; + + *olen = 0; + + if (ssl->hostname == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, adding server name extension: %s", + ssl->hostname)); + + hostname_len = strlen(ssl->hostname); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, hostname_len + 9); + + /* + * Sect. 3, RFC 6066 (TLS Extensions Definitions) + * + * In order to provide any of the server names, clients MAY include an + * extension of type "server_name" in the (extended) client hello. The + * "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain + * "ServerNameList" where: + * + * struct { + * NameType name_type; + * select (name_type) { + * case host_name: HostName; + * } name; + * } ServerName; + * + * enum { + * host_name(0), (255) + * } NameType; + * + * opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>; + * + * struct { + * ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> + * } ServerNameList; + * + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME, p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len + 5, p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len + 3, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + + memcpy(p, ssl->hostname, hostname_len); + + *olen = hostname_len + 9; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +/* + * ssl_write_alpn_ext() + * + * Structure of the application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension in + * ClientHello: + * + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + *out_len = 0; + + if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding alpn extension")); + + + /* Check we have enough space for the extension type (2 bytes), the + * extension length (2 bytes) and the protocol_name_list length (2 bytes). + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, p, 0); + /* Skip writing extension and list length for now */ + p += 6; + + /* + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + */ + for (const char **cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++) { + /* + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_alpn_protocols() checked that the length of + * protocol names is less than 255. + */ + size_t protocol_name_len = strlen(*cur); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 1 + protocol_name_len); + *p++ = (unsigned char) protocol_name_len; + memcpy(p, *cur, protocol_name_len); + p += protocol_name_len; + } + + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); + + /* List length = *out_len - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) - 2 (list_len) */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*out_len - 6, buf, 4); + + /* Extension length = *out_len - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*out_len - 4, buf, 2); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * Function for writing a supported groups (TLS 1.3) or supported elliptic + * curves (TLS 1.2) extension. + * + * The "extension_data" field of a supported groups extension contains a + * "NamedGroupList" value (TLS 1.3 RFC8446): + * enum { + * secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019), + * x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E), + * ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102), + * ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104), + * ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF), + * ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF), + * (0xFFFF) + * } NamedGroup; + * struct { + * NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>; + * } NamedGroupList; + * + * The "extension_data" field of a supported elliptic curves extension contains + * a "NamedCurveList" value (TLS 1.2 RFC 8422): + * enum { + * deprecated(1..22), + * secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25), + * x25519(29), x448(30), + * reserved (0xFE00..0xFEFF), + * deprecated(0xFF01..0xFF02), + * (0xFFFF) + * } NamedCurve; + * struct { + * NamedCurve named_curve_list<2..2^16-1> + * } NamedCurveList; + * + * The TLS 1.3 supported groups extension was defined to be a compatible + * generalization of the TLS 1.2 supported elliptic curves extension. They both + * share the same extension identifier. + * + */ +#define SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_2_FLAG 1 +#define SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_3_FLAG 2 + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_supported_groups_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + int flags, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *named_group_list; /* Start of named_group_list */ + size_t named_group_list_len; /* Length of named_group_list */ + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding supported_groups extension")); + + /* Check if we have space for header and length fields: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - named_group_list_length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + p += 6; + + named_group_list = p; + + if (group_list == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { + int propose_group = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got supported group(%04x)", *group_list)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (flags & SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_3_FLAG) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(*group_list) && + (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*group_list) != + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE)) { + propose_group = 1; + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(*group_list)) { + propose_group = 1; + } +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC) + if ((flags & SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_2_FLAG) && + mbedtls_ssl_tls12_named_group_is_ecdhe(*group_list) && + (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*group_list) != + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE)) { + propose_group = 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC */ + + if (propose_group) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*group_list, p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("NamedGroup: %s ( %x )", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(*group_list), + *group_list)); + } + } + + /* Length of named_group_list */ + named_group_list_len = (size_t) (p - named_group_list); + if (named_group_list_len == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No group available.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Write extension_type */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, buf, 0); + /* Write extension_data_length */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(named_group_list_len + 2, buf, 2); + /* Write length of named_group_list */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(named_group_list_len, buf, 4); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Supported groups extension", + buf + 4, named_group_list_len + 2); + + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC || + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_client_hello_cipher_suites( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + int *tls12_uses_ec, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + const int *ciphersuite_list; + unsigned char *cipher_suites; /* Start of the cipher_suites list */ + size_t cipher_suites_len; + + *tls12_uses_ec = 0; + *out_len = 0; + + /* + * Ciphersuite list + * + * This is a list of the symmetric cipher options supported by + * the client, specifically the record protection algorithm + * ( including secret key length ) and a hash to be used with + * HKDF, in descending order of client preference. + */ + ciphersuite_list = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list; + + /* Check there is space for the cipher suite list length (2 bytes). */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p += 2; + + /* Write cipher_suites + * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>; + */ + cipher_suites = p; + for (size_t i = 0; ciphersuite_list[i] != 0; i++) { + int cipher_suite = ciphersuite_list[i]; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(cipher_suite); + + if (mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite(ssl, ciphersuite_info, + ssl->handshake->min_tls_version, + ssl->tls_version) != 0) { + continue; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)) + *tls12_uses_ec |= mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(ciphersuite_info); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, add ciphersuite: %04x, %s", + (unsigned int) cipher_suite, + ciphersuite_info->name)); + + /* Check there is space for the cipher suite identifier (2 bytes). */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(cipher_suite, p, 0); + p += 2; + } + + /* + * Add TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV + */ + int renegotiating = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + renegotiating = (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE); +#endif + if (!renegotiating) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0); + p += 2; + } + + /* Write the cipher_suites length in number of bytes */ + cipher_suites_len = (size_t) (p - cipher_suites); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(cipher_suites_len, buf, 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, got %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " cipher suites", + cipher_suites_len/2)); + + /* Output the total length of cipher_suites field. */ + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Structure of the TLS 1.3 ClientHello message: + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS v1.2 + * Random random; + * opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>; + * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>; + * opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>; + * Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>; + * } ClientHello; + * + * Structure of the (D)TLS 1.2 ClientHello message: + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion client_version; + * Random random; + * SessionID session_id; + * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; // DTLS 1.2 ONLY + * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>; + * CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1>; + * select (extensions_present) { + * case false: + * struct {}; + * case true: + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * }; + * } ClientHello; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_client_hello_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len, + size_t *binders_len) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *p_extensions_len; /* Pointer to extensions length */ + size_t output_len; /* Length of buffer used by function */ + size_t extensions_len; /* Length of the list of extensions*/ + int tls12_uses_ec = 0; + + *out_len = 0; + *binders_len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + unsigned char propose_tls12 = + (handshake->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) + && + (MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 <= ssl->tls_version); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + unsigned char propose_tls13 = + (handshake->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) + && + (MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 <= ssl->tls_version); +#endif + + /* + * Write client_version (TLS 1.2) or legacy_version (TLS 1.3) + * + * In all cases this is the TLS 1.2 version. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2); + p += 2; + + /* ... + * Random random; + * ... + * + * The random bytes have been prepared by ssl_prepare_client_hello() into + * the handshake->randbytes buffer and are copied here into the output + * buffer. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + memcpy(p, handshake->randbytes, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, random bytes", + p, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + p += MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN; + + /* TLS 1.2: + * ... + * SessionID session_id; + * ... + * with + * opaque SessionID<0..32>; + * + * TLS 1.3: + * ... + * opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>; + * ... + * + * The (legacy) session identifier bytes have been prepared by + * ssl_prepare_client_hello() into the ssl->session_negotiate->id buffer + * and are copied here into the output buffer. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len + 1); + *p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + memcpy(p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "session id", ssl->session_negotiate->id, + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + + /* DTLS 1.2 ONLY + * ... + * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; + * ... + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint8_t cookie_len = 0; +#else + uint16_t cookie_len = 0; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + if (handshake->cookie != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie", + handshake->cookie, + handshake->cookie_len); + cookie_len = handshake->cookie_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, cookie_len + 1); + *p++ = (unsigned char) cookie_len; + if (cookie_len > 0) { + memcpy(p, handshake->cookie, cookie_len); + p += cookie_len; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Write cipher_suites */ + ret = ssl_write_client_hello_cipher_suites(ssl, p, end, + &tls12_uses_ec, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + + /* Write legacy_compression_methods (TLS 1.3) or + * compression_methods (TLS 1.2) + * + * For every TLS 1.3 ClientHello, this vector MUST contain exactly + * one byte set to zero, which corresponds to the 'null' compression + * method in prior versions of TLS. + * + * For TLS 1.2 ClientHello, for security reasons we do not support + * compression anymore, thus also just the 'null' compression method. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; + + /* Write extensions */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* Keeping track of the included extensions */ + handshake->sent_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; +#endif + + /* First write extensions, then the total length */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p_extensions_len = p; + p += 2; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + /* Write server name extension */ + ret = ssl_write_hostname_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + ret = ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (propose_tls13) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(ssl, p, end, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + { + int ssl_write_supported_groups_ext_flags = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (propose_tls13 && mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + ssl_write_supported_groups_ext_flags |= + SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_3_FLAG; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC) + if (propose_tls12 && tls12_uses_ec) { + ssl_write_supported_groups_ext_flags |= + SSL_WRITE_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXT_TLS1_2_FLAG; + } +#endif + if (ssl_write_supported_groups_ext_flags != 0) { + ret = ssl_write_supported_groups_ext(ssl, p, end, + ssl_write_supported_groups_ext_flags, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC || + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + int write_sig_alg_ext = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + write_sig_alg_ext = write_sig_alg_ext || + (propose_tls13 && mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + write_sig_alg_ext = write_sig_alg_ext || propose_tls12; +#endif + + if (write_sig_alg_ext) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_sig_alg_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (propose_tls12) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls12_write_client_hello_exts(ssl, p, end, + tls12_uses_ec, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /* The "pre_shared_key" extension (RFC 8446 Section 4.2.11) + * MUST be the last extension in the ClientHello. + */ + if (propose_tls13 && mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_psk_enabled(ssl)) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_identities_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + ssl, p, end, &output_len, binders_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + + /* Write the length of the list of extensions. */ + extensions_len = (size_t) (p - p_extensions_len) - 2; + + if (extensions_len == 0) { + p = p_extensions_len; + } else { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(extensions_len, p_extensions_len, 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, total extension length: %" \ + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, extensions_len)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello extensions", + p_extensions_len, extensions_len); + } + + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_generate_random(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *randbytes = ssl->handshake->randbytes; + size_t gmt_unix_time_len = 0; + + /* + * Generate the random bytes + * + * TLS 1.2 case: + * struct { + * uint32 gmt_unix_time; + * opaque random_bytes[28]; + * } Random; + * + * TLS 1.3 case: + * opaque Random[32]; + */ + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t gmt_unix_time = mbedtls_time(NULL); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(gmt_unix_time, randbytes, 0); + gmt_unix_time_len = 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG, + (long long) gmt_unix_time)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + } + + ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, + randbytes + gmt_unix_time_len, + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN - gmt_unix_time_len); + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_prepare_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + size_t session_id_len; + mbedtls_ssl_session *session_negotiate = ssl->session_negotiate; + + if (session_negotiate == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + + /* Check if a tls13 ticket has been configured. */ + if (ssl->handshake->resume != 0 && + session_negotiate->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + session_negotiate->ticket != NULL) { + mbedtls_ms_time_t now = mbedtls_ms_time(); + mbedtls_ms_time_t age = now - session_negotiate->ticket_reception_time; + if (age < 0 || + age > (mbedtls_ms_time_t) session_negotiate->ticket_lifetime * 1000) { + /* Without valid ticket, disable session resumption.*/ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("Ticket expired, disable session resumption")); + ssl->handshake->resume = 0; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && + MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* Bet on the highest configured version if we are not in a TLS 1.2 + * renegotiation or session resumption. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { + ssl->handshake->min_tls_version = ssl->tls_version; + } else +#endif + { + if (ssl->handshake->resume) { + ssl->tls_version = session_negotiate->tls_version; + ssl->handshake->min_tls_version = ssl->tls_version; + } else { + ssl->handshake->min_tls_version = ssl->conf->min_tls_version; + } + } + + /* + * Generate the random bytes, except when responding to a verify request + * where we MUST reuse the previously generated random bytes + * (RFC 6347 4.2.1). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || + (ssl->handshake->cookie == NULL)) +#endif + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (!ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_flag) +#endif + { + ret = ssl_generate_random(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "Random bytes generation failed", ret); + return ret; + } + } + } + + /* + * Prepare session identifier. At that point, the length of the session + * identifier in the SSL context `ssl->session_negotiate->id_len` is equal + * to zero, except in the case of a TLS 1.2 session renegotiation or + * session resumption. + */ + session_id_len = session_negotiate->id_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + if (session_id_len < 16 || session_id_len > 32 || +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE || +#endif + ssl->handshake->resume == 0) { + session_id_len = 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + /* + * RFC 5077 section 3.4: "When presenting a ticket, the client MAY + * generate and include a Session ID in the TLS ClientHello." + */ + int renegotiating = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { + renegotiating = 1; + } +#endif + if (!renegotiating) { + if ((session_negotiate->ticket != NULL) && + (session_negotiate->ticket_len != 0)) { + session_id_len = 32; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + /* + * Create a legacy session identifier for the purpose of middlebox + * compatibility only if one has not been created already, which is + * the case if we are here for the TLS 1.3 second ClientHello. + * + * Versions of TLS before TLS 1.3 supported a "session resumption" + * feature which has been merged with pre-shared keys in TLS 1.3 + * version. A client which has a cached session ID set by a pre-TLS 1.3 + * server SHOULD set this field to that value. In compatibility mode, + * this field MUST be non-empty, so a client not offering a pre-TLS 1.3 + * session MUST generate a new 32-byte value. This value need not be + * random but SHOULD be unpredictable to avoid implementations fixating + * on a specific value (also known as ossification). Otherwise, it MUST + * be set as a zero-length vector ( i.e., a zero-valued single byte + * length field ). + */ + session_id_len = 32; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + + if (session_id_len != session_negotiate->id_len) { + session_negotiate->id_len = session_id_len; + if (session_id_len > 0) { + ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, + session_negotiate->id, + session_id_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "creating session id failed", ret); + return ret; + } + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + ssl->handshake->resume) { + int hostname_mismatch = ssl->hostname != NULL || + session_negotiate->hostname != NULL; + if (ssl->hostname != NULL && session_negotiate->hostname != NULL) { + hostname_mismatch = strcmp( + ssl->hostname, session_negotiate->hostname) != 0; + } + + if (hostname_mismatch) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Hostname mismatch the session ticket, " + "disable session resumption.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } else { + return mbedtls_ssl_session_set_hostname(session_negotiate, + ssl->hostname); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + + return 0; +} +/* + * Write ClientHello handshake message. + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len, binders_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write client hello")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_prepare_client_hello(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_write_client_hello_body(ssl, buf, + buf + buf_len, + &msg_len, + &binders_len)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + ssl->out_msglen = msg_len + 4; + mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(ssl); + + /* + * The two functions below may try to send data on the network and + * can return with the MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ error code when they + * fail to do so and the transmission has to be retried later. In that + * case as in fatal error cases, we return immediately. But we must have + * set the handshake state to the next state at that point to ensure + * that we will not write and send again a ClientHello when we + * eventually succeed in sending the pending data. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + msg_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, msg_len - binders_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (binders_len > 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_binders_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + ssl, buf + msg_len - binders_len, buf + msg_len)); + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf + msg_len - binders_len, + binders_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(ssl, + buf_len, + msg_len)); + + /* + * Set next state. Note that if TLS 1.3 is proposed, this may be + * overwritten by mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(). + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->handshake->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 <= ssl->tls_version) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(ssl); + } +#endif + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); +#endif + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write client hello")); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ diff --git a/library/ssl_client.h b/library/ssl_client.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..05ee7e4cc31 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_client.h @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/** + * TLS 1.2 and 1.3 client-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#endif + +#include + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_H */ diff --git a/library/ssl_cookie.c b/library/ssl_cookie.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2772cac4beb --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_cookie.c @@ -0,0 +1,380 @@ +/* + * DTLS cookie callbacks implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * These session callbacks use a simple chained list + * to store and retrieve the session information. + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + +/* + * If DTLS is in use, then at least one of SHA-256 or SHA-384 is + * available. Try SHA-256 first as 384 wastes resources + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 +#define COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN 32 +#define COOKIE_HMAC_LEN 28 +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#define COOKIE_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 +#define COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN 48 +#define COOKIE_HMAC_LEN 28 +#else +#error "DTLS hello verify needs SHA-256 or SHA-384" +#endif + +/* + * Cookies are formed of a 4-bytes timestamp (or serial number) and + * an HMAC of timestamp and client ID. + */ +#define COOKIE_LEN (4 + COOKIE_HMAC_LEN) + +void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ctx->psa_hmac_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else + mbedtls_md_init(&ctx->hmac_ctx); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ctx->serial = 0; +#endif + ctx->timeout = MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex); +#endif +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, unsigned long delay) +{ + ctx->timeout = delay; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key(ctx->psa_hmac_key); +#else + mbedtls_md_free(&ctx->hmac_ctx); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex); +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx)); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + + (void) f_rng; + (void) p_rng; + + alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(COOKIE_MD); + if (alg == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->psa_hmac_alg = PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(PSA_ALG_HMAC(alg), + COOKIE_HMAC_LEN); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, ctx->psa_hmac_alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN)); + + if ((status = psa_generate_key(&attributes, + &ctx->psa_hmac_key)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char key[COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN]; + + if ((ret = f_rng(p_rng, key, sizeof(key))) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx->hmac_ctx, mbedtls_md_info_from_type(COOKIE_MD), 1); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&ctx->hmac_ctx, key, sizeof(key)); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key, sizeof(key)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + return 0; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* + * Generate the HMAC part of a cookie + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cookie_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *hmac_ctx, + const unsigned char time[4], + unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len) +{ + unsigned char hmac_out[COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(*p, end, COOKIE_HMAC_LEN); + + if (mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(hmac_ctx) != 0 || + mbedtls_md_hmac_update(hmac_ctx, time, 4) != 0 || + mbedtls_md_hmac_update(hmac_ctx, cli_id, cli_id_len) != 0 || + mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(hmac_ctx, hmac_out) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + memcpy(*p, hmac_out, COOKIE_HMAC_LEN); + *p += COOKIE_HMAC_LEN; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/* + * Generate cookie for DTLS ClientHello verification + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write(void *p_ctx, + unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t sign_mac_length = 0; +#endif + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx = (mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *) p_ctx; + unsigned long t; + + if (ctx == NULL || cli_id == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(*p, end, COOKIE_LEN); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + t = (unsigned long) mbedtls_time(NULL); +#else + t = ctx->serial++; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(t, *p, 0); + *p += 4; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_sign_setup(&operation, ctx->psa_hmac_key, + ctx->psa_hmac_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, *p - 4, 4); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, cli_id, cli_id_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&operation, *p, COOKIE_MD_OUTLEN, + &sign_mac_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + *p += COOKIE_HMAC_LEN; + + ret = 0; +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret); + } +#endif + + ret = ssl_cookie_hmac(&ctx->hmac_ctx, *p - 4, + p, end, cli_id, cli_id_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR); + } +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +exit: + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + return ret; +} + +/* + * Check a cookie + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check(void *p_ctx, + const unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#else + unsigned char ref_hmac[COOKIE_HMAC_LEN]; + unsigned char *p = ref_hmac; +#endif + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx = (mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *) p_ctx; + unsigned long cur_time, cookie_time; + + if (ctx == NULL || cli_id == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (cookie_len != COOKIE_LEN) { + return -1; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_verify_setup(&operation, ctx->psa_hmac_key, + ctx->psa_hmac_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, cookie, 4); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, cli_id, + cli_id_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_verify_finish(&operation, cookie + 4, + COOKIE_HMAC_LEN); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + ret = 0; +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret); + } +#endif + + if (ssl_cookie_hmac(&ctx->hmac_ctx, cookie, + &p, p + sizeof(ref_hmac), + cli_id, cli_id_len) != 0) { + ret = -1; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR); + } +#endif + + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(cookie + 4, ref_hmac, sizeof(ref_hmac)) != 0) { + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + cur_time = (unsigned long) mbedtls_time(NULL); +#else + cur_time = ctx->serial; +#endif + + cookie_time = (unsigned long) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(cookie, 0); + + if (ctx->timeout != 0 && cur_time - cookie_time > ctx->timeout) { + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#else + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ref_hmac, sizeof(ref_hmac)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C */ diff --git a/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h b/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4889e77e04b --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_debug_helpers.h + * + * \brief Automatically generated helper functions for debugging + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_HELPERS_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_HELPERS_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" + + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_states_str(mbedtls_ssl_states in); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +const char *mbedtls_ssl_early_data_status_str(mbedtls_ssl_early_data_status in); +const char *mbedtls_ssl_early_data_state_str(mbedtls_ssl_early_data_state in); +#endif + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version_str(mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version in); + +const char *mbedtls_tls_prf_types_str(mbedtls_tls_prf_types in); + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type_str(mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type in); + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(uint16_t in); + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(uint16_t in); + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_name(unsigned int extension_type); + +void mbedtls_ssl_print_extensions(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + int hs_msg_type, uint32_t extensions_mask, + const char *extra); + +void mbedtls_ssl_print_extension(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + int hs_msg_type, unsigned int extension_type, + const char *extra_msg0, const char *extra_msg1); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +void mbedtls_ssl_print_ticket_flags(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + unsigned int flags); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(level, hs_msg_type, extensions_mask) \ + mbedtls_ssl_print_extensions(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, \ + hs_msg_type, extensions_mask, NULL) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT(level, hs_msg_type, extension_type, extra) \ + mbedtls_ssl_print_extension(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, \ + hs_msg_type, extension_type, \ + extra, NULL) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_TICKET_FLAGS(level, flags) \ + mbedtls_ssl_print_ticket_flags(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, flags) +#endif + +#else + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(level, hs_msg_type, extension_mask) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT(level, hs_msg_type, extension_type, extra) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_TICKET_FLAGS(level, flags) +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_HELPERS_H */ diff --git a/library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c b/library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f8b4448c86e --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +/* Automatically generated by generate_ssl_debug_helpers.py. DO NOT EDIT. */ + +/** + * \file ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c + * + * \brief Automatically generated helper functions for debugging + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + * + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" + + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str( uint16_t in ) +{ + switch( in ) + { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1: + return "secp192k1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1: + return "secp192r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1: + return "secp224k1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1: + return "secp224r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1: + return "secp256k1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1: + return "secp256r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1: + return "secp384r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1: + return "secp521r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1: + return "bp256r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1: + return "bp384r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1: + return "bp512r1"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519: + return "x25519"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448: + return "x448"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048: + return "ffdhe2048"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072: + return "ffdhe3072"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096: + return "ffdhe4096"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144: + return "ffdhe6144"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192: + return "ffdhe8192"; + }; + + return "UNKOWN"; +} +const char *mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str( uint16_t in ) +{ + switch( in ) + { + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256: + return "rsa_pkcs1_sha256"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384: + return "rsa_pkcs1_sha384"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512: + return "rsa_pkcs1_sha512"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256: + return "ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384: + return "ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512: + return "ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: + return "rsa_pss_rsae_sha256"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: + return "rsa_pss_rsae_sha384"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512: + return "rsa_pss_rsae_sha512"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED25519: + return "ed25519"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED448: + return "ed448"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256: + return "rsa_pss_pss_sha256"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384: + return "rsa_pss_pss_sha384"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512: + return "rsa_pss_pss_sha512"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1: + return "rsa_pkcs1_sha1"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SHA1: + return "ecdsa_sha1"; + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE: + return "none"; + }; + + return "UNKNOWN"; +} +const char *mbedtls_ssl_states_str( mbedtls_ssl_states in ) +{ + switch (in) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN_VALUE"; + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +const char *mbedtls_ssl_early_data_status_str( mbedtls_ssl_early_data_status in ) +{ + switch (in) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN_VALUE"; + } +} + +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) */ +const char *mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version_str( mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version in ) +{ + switch (in) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN_VALUE"; + } +} + +const char *mbedtls_tls_prf_types_str( mbedtls_tls_prf_types in ) +{ + switch (in) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA384: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA384"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA256: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA256"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN_VALUE"; + } +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type_str( mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type in ) +{ + switch (in) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET"; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET: + return "MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET"; +#endif + default: + return "UNKNOWN_VALUE"; + } +} + + + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ +/* End of automatically generated file. */ + diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a8807f67c63 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_misc.h @@ -0,0 +1,2983 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_misc.h + * + * \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "mbedtls/cipher.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) +#include "mbedtls/md5.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) +#include "mbedtls/sha512.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" +#include "common.h" + +/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */ + +/* Faked handshake message identity for HelloRetryRequest. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST (-MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO) + +/* + * Internal identity of handshake extensions + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_UNRECOGNIZED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_STATUS_REQUEST 3 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_GROUPS 4 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES 4 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG 5 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_USE_SRTP 6 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_HEARTBEAT 7 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ALPN 8 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SCT 9 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CLI_CERT_TYPE 10 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERV_CERT_TYPE 11 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PADDING 12 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PRE_SHARED_KEY 13 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EARLY_DATA 14 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS 15 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_COOKIE 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES 17 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CERT_AUTH 18 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_OID_FILTERS 19 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH 20 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG_CERT 21 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_KEY_SHARE 22 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_TRUNCATED_HMAC 23 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS 24 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 25 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 26 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SESSION_TICKET 27 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT 28 + +/* Utility for translating IANA extension type. */ +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_id(unsigned int extension_type); +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(unsigned int extension_type); +/* Macros used to define mask constants */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(id) (1ULL << (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_##id)) +/* Reset value of extension mask */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE 0 + +/* In messages containing extension requests, we should ignore unrecognized + * extensions. In messages containing extension responses, unrecognized + * extensions should result in handshake abortion. Messages containing + * extension requests include ClientHello, CertificateRequest and + * NewSessionTicket. Messages containing extension responses include + * ServerHello, HelloRetryRequest, EncryptedExtensions and Certificate. + * + * RFC 8446 section 4.1.3 + * + * The ServerHello MUST only include extensions which are required to establish + * the cryptographic context and negotiate the protocol version. + * + * RFC 8446 section 4.2 + * + * If an implementation receives an extension which it recognizes and which is + * not specified for the message in which it appears, it MUST abort the handshake + * with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + +/* Extensions that are not recognized by TLS 1.3 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SESSION_TICKET) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(TRUNCATED_HMAC) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(UNRECOGNIZED)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for ClientHello */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CH \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERVERNAME) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(USE_SRTP) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(HEARTBEAT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ALPN) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CLI_CERT_TYPE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERV_CERT_TYPE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PADDING) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(COOKIE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CERT_AUTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG_CERT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for EncryptedExtensions */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_EE \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERVERNAME) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(USE_SRTP) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(HEARTBEAT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ALPN) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CLI_CERT_TYPE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERV_CERT_TYPE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for CertificateRequest */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CR \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CERT_AUTH) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(OID_FILTERS) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG_CERT) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for Certificate */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CT \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for ServerHello */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_SH \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for HelloRetryRequest */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_HRR \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(COOKIE) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS)) + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for NewSessionTicket */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_NST \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED) + +/* + * Helper macros for function call with return check. + */ +/* + * Exit when return non-zero value + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(f) \ + do { \ + ret = (f); \ + if (ret != 0) \ + { \ + goto cleanup; \ + } \ + } while (0) +/* + * Exit when return negative value + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(f) \ + do { \ + ret = (f); \ + if (ret < 0) \ + { \ + goto cleanup; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +/* + * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4 + * + * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends, + * but is distinct for resends. + * + * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3 + +/* + * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead: + * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256). + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +/* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA)) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite using a + * stream cipher can be used. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.2 is supported. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC +#endif + +/* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite uses Encrypt-then-MAC with CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) +/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */ +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */ +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */ +#endif +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ +/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0 +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0 +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD (MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \ + ) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)) + +/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4 + +/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for + RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes + (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \ + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ + ? (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \ + : (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) \ + ) + +/* Maximum size in bytes of list in signature algorithms ext., RFC 5246/8446 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534 + +/* Minimum size in bytes of list in signature algorithms ext., RFC 5246/8446 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN 2 + +/* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535 + +#define MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE 20 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(sig, hash) ((hash << 8) | sig) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(alg) (alg & 0xFF) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_HASH_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(alg) (alg >> 8) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds + */ + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 +#error "Bad configuration - incoming record content too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > 16384 +#error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 +#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large." +#endif + +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + 2048 +#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large." +#endif + +/* Calculate buffer sizes */ + +/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes + long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the + implicit sequence number. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13 + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN) \ + + (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX)) +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN)) +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \ + ((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN) \ + + (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX)) +#endif + +#define MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32 +#define MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +/** + * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for + * the output buffer. For the client, this is the configured + * value. For the server, it is the minimum of two - the + * configured value and the negotiated one. + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for + * the input buffer. This is the negotiated maximum fragment + * length, or, if there is none, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN. + * If it is not defined either, the value is 2^14. This function + * works as its predecessor, \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len(). + * + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len() + * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload() + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) +/** + * \brief Get the size limit in bytes for the protected outgoing records + * as defined in RFC 8449 + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * + * \return The size limit in bytes for the protected outgoing + * records as defined in RFC 8449. + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_record_size_limit(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ctx) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX; +#else + return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ctx) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; +#endif +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(ctx) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX; +#else + return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(ctx) + + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD; +#endif +} +#endif + +/* + * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content + * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because + * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required) + */ +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0) +#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1) + +/** + * \brief This function checks if the remaining size in a buffer is + * greater or equal than a needed space. + * + * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. + * \param need Needed space in bytes. + * + * \return Zero if the needed space is available in the buffer, non-zero + * otherwise. + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr(const uint8_t *cur, + const uint8_t *end, size_t need) +{ + return (cur > end) || (need > (size_t) (end - cur)); +} +#else +typedef struct { + const uint8_t *cur; + const uint8_t *end; + size_t need; +} mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args; + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args( + const uint8_t *cur, const uint8_t *end, size_t need); +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(void); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_cmp_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args *args); + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr(const uint8_t *cur, + const uint8_t *end, size_t need) +{ + if ((cur > end) || (need > (size_t) (end - cur))) { + mbedtls_ssl_set_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(cur, end, need); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +/** + * \brief This macro checks if the remaining size in a buffer is + * greater or equal than a needed space. If it is not the case, + * it returns an SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL error. + * + * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. + * \param need Needed space in bytes. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(cur, end, need) \ + do { \ + if (mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr((cur), (end), (need)) != 0) \ + { \ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +/** + * \brief This macro checks if the remaining length in an input buffer is + * greater or equal than a needed length. If it is not the case, it + * returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR error and pends a + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR alert message. + * + * This is a function-like macro. It is guaranteed to evaluate each + * argument exactly once. + * + * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer. + * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer. + * \param need Needed length in bytes. + * + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(cur, end, need) \ + do { \ + if (mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr((cur), (end), (need)) != 0) \ + { \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, \ + ("missing input data in %s", __func__)); \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, \ + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); \ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); + +/* cipher.h exports the maximum IV, key and block length from + * all ciphers enabled in the config, regardless of whether those + * ciphers are actually usable in SSL/TLS. Notably, XTS is enabled + * in the default configuration and uses 64 Byte keys, but it is + * not used for record protection in SSL/TLS. + * + * In order to prevent unnecessary inflation of key structures, + * we introduce SSL-specific variants of the max-{key,block,IV} + * macros here which are meant to only take those ciphers into + * account which can be negotiated in SSL/TLS. + * + * Since the current definitions of MBEDTLS_MAX_{KEY|BLOCK|IV}_LENGTH + * in cipher.h are rough overapproximations of the real maxima, here + * we content ourselves with replicating those overapproximations + * for the maximum block and IV length, and excluding XTS from the + * computation of the maximum key length. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32 + +/** + * \brief The data structure holding the cryptographic material (key and IV) + * used for record protection in TLS 1.3. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set { + /*! The key for client->server records. */ + unsigned char client_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; + /*! The key for server->client records. */ + unsigned char server_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; + /*! The IV for client->server records. */ + unsigned char client_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + /*! The IV for server->client records. */ + unsigned char server_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + + size_t key_len; /*!< The length of client_write_key and + * server_write_key, in Bytes. */ + size_t iv_len; /*!< The length of client_write_iv and + * server_write_iv, in Bytes. */ +}; +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set; + +typedef struct { + unsigned char binder_key[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char client_early_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets; + +typedef struct { + unsigned char client_handshake_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char server_handshake_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets; + +/* + * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake. + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params { + /* Frequently-used boolean or byte fields (placed early to take + * advantage of smaller code size for indirect access on Arm Thumb) */ + uint8_t resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/ + uint8_t cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + uint8_t sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* Flag indicating if a CertificateRequest message has been sent + * to the client or not. */ + uint8_t certificate_request_sent; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + /* Flag indicating if the server has accepted early data or not. */ + uint8_t early_data_accepted; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + uint8_t new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + /** Minimum TLS version to be negotiated. + * + * It is set up in the ClientHello writing preparation stage and used + * throughout the ClientHello writing. Not relevant anymore as soon as + * the protocol version has been negotiated thus as soon as the + * ServerHello is received. + * For a fresh handshake not linked to any previous handshake, it is + * equal to the configured minimum minor version to be negotiated. When + * renegotiating or resuming a session, it is equal to the previously + * negotiated minor version. + * + * There is no maximum TLS version field in this handshake context. + * From the start of the handshake, we need to define a current protocol + * version for the record layer which we define as the maximum TLS + * version to be negotiated. The `tls_version` field of the SSL context is + * used to store this maximum value until it contains the actual + * negotiated value. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version min_tls_version; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + uint8_t extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + uint8_t async_in_progress; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + unsigned char group_list_heap_allocated; + unsigned char sig_algs_heap_allocated; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + uint8_t ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */ + enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */ + ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */ + ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */ + ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */ + ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */ + ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */ + } ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */ + size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */ +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL + int (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL + int (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); + MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL + int (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); + mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf; + + /* + * Handshake specific crypto variables + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint8_t key_exchange_mode; /*!< Selected key exchange mode */ + + /** + * Flag indicating if, in the course of the current handshake, an + * HelloRetryRequest message has been sent by the server or received by + * the client (<> 0) or not (0). + */ + uint8_t hello_retry_request_flag; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + /** + * Flag indicating if, in the course of the current handshake, a dummy + * change_cipher_spec (CCS) record has already been sent. Used to send only + * one CCS per handshake while not complicating the handshake state + * transitions for that purpose. + */ + uint8_t ccs_sent; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + uint8_t tls13_kex_modes; /*!< Key exchange modes supported by the client */ +#endif + /** selected_group of key_share extension in HelloRetryRequest message. */ + uint16_t hrr_selected_group; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + uint16_t new_session_tickets_count; /*!< number of session tickets */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + uint16_t received_sig_algs[MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE]; +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + const uint16_t *group_list; + const uint16_t *sig_algs; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */ +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED) + psa_key_type_t xxdh_psa_type; + size_t xxdh_psa_bits; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t xxdh_psa_privkey; + uint8_t xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external; + unsigned char xxdh_psa_peerkey[PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t xxdh_psa_peerkey_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_pake_password; + uint8_t psa_pake_ctx_is_ok; +#else + mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */ + size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + uint16_t *curves_tls_id; /*!< List of TLS IDs of supported elliptic curves */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */ + uint8_t psk_opaque_is_internal; +#else + unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */ + size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + uint16_t selected_identity; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */ + mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */ + mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + struct { + size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated + * buffers used for message buffering. */ + + uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has + * been seen in the current flight. */ + + struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer { + unsigned is_valid : 1; + unsigned is_fragmented : 1; + unsigned is_complete : 1; + unsigned char *data; + size_t data_len; + } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS]; + + struct { + unsigned char *data; + size_t len; + unsigned epoch; + } future_record; + + } buffering; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)) + unsigned char *cookie; /*!< HelloVerifyRequest cookie for DTLS + * HelloRetryRequest cookie for TLS 1.3 */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* RFC 6347 page 15 + ... + opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; + ... + */ + uint8_t cookie_len; +#else + /* RFC 8446 page 39 + ... + opaque cookie<0..2^16-1>; + ... + If TLS1_3 is enabled, the max length is 2^16 - 1 + */ + uint16_t cookie_len; /*!< DTLS: HelloVerifyRequest cookie length + * TLS1_3: HelloRetryRequest cookie length */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS || + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 ) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + unsigned char cookie_verify_result; /*!< Srv: flag for sending a cookie */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */ + unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */ + + uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */ + unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */ + unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the + flight being received */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for + resending messages */ + unsigned char alt_out_ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter + for resending messages */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */ + + uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension + * has been negotiated. Possible values are + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ + unsigned char peer_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; /*! The peer's CID */ + uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of + * \c peer_cid. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* + * Checksum contexts + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa; +#else + mbedtls_md_context_t fin_sha256; +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa; +#else + mbedtls_md_context_t fin_sha384; +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint16_t offered_group_id; /* The NamedGroup value for the group + * that is being used for ephemeral + * key exchange. + * + * On the client: Defaults to the first + * entry in the client's group list, + * but can be overwritten by the HRR. */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + uint8_t client_auth; /*!< used to check if CertificateRequest has been + received from server side. If CertificateRequest + has been received, Certificate and CertificateVerify + should be sent to server */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + /* + * State-local variables used during the processing + * of a specific handshake state. + */ + union { + /* Outgoing Finished message */ + struct { + uint8_t preparation_done; + + /* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to + * but excluding the outgoing finished message. */ + unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t digest_len; + } finished_out; + + /* Incoming Finished message */ + struct { + uint8_t preparation_done; + + /* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to but + * excluding the peer's incoming finished message. */ + unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t digest_len; + } finished_in; + + } state_local; + + /* End of state-local variables. */ + + unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; + /*!< random bytes */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE]; + /*!< premaster secret */ + size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint32_t sent_extensions; /*!< extensions sent by endpoint */ + uint32_t received_extensions; /*!< extensions received by endpoint */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + unsigned char certificate_request_context_len; + unsigned char *certificate_request_context; +#endif + + /** TLS 1.3 transform for encrypted handshake messages. */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_handshake; + union { + unsigned char early[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char handshake[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char app[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + } tls13_master_secrets; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets tls13_hs_secrets; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + /** TLS 1.3 transform for early data and handshake messages. */ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_earlydata; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the + * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start, + * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_decrypt_start, + * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel). + * The library does not use it internally. */ + void *user_async_ctx; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + const unsigned char *sni_name; /*!< raw SNI */ + size_t sni_name_len; /*!< raw SNI len */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + const mbedtls_x509_crt *dn_hints; /*!< acceptable client cert issuers */ +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +}; + +typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer; + +/* + * Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records + * + * There are the following general types of record transformations: + * - Stream transformations (TLS versions == 1.2 only) + * Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher + * to the authenticated message. + * - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only) + * For TLS 1.2, no IV is generated at key extraction time, but every + * encrypted record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was + * encrypted. + * - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only) + * These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one + * used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second + * one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3. + * In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained + * as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte + * record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number + * to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation + * the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction + * time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the + * latter to the encrypted record. + * + * Additionally, DTLS 1.2 + CID as well as TLS 1.3 use an inner plaintext + * which allows to add flexible length padding and to hide a record's true + * content type. + * + * In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant: + * - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used. + * - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher. + * - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used. + * - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest. + * - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit, + * random initialization vector placed in encrypted records. + * - For some transformations (currently AEAD) an implicit IV. It is static + * and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation- + * -dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3). + * - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC. + * - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version. + * - The length of the authentication tag. + * + * The struct below refines this abstract view as follows: + * - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in + * cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the + * same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines + * the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if + * the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM + * then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD. + * - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but + * are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}. + * - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts + * used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts + * are unused for AEAD transformations. + * - For stream/CBC transformations, the MAC keys are not stored explicitly + * but maintained within md_ctx_{enc/dec}. + * - The mac_enc and mac_dec fields are unused for EAD transformations. + * - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within + * the transformation context, its contents are stored within + * iv_{enc/dec}. + * - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV. + * This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations + * which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the + * IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be + * different from the underlying cipher's block length + * in this case. + * - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only + * and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is + * constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in + * the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays. + * - tls_version denotes the 2-byte TLS version + * - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the + * authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0. + * - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the + * authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0. + * - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the + * order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused + * in other transformations. + * + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_transform { + /* + * Session specific crypto layer + */ + size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */ + size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */ + size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */ + size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */ + size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */ + + unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */ + unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_mac_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_mac_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ + psa_algorithm_t psa_mac_alg; /*!< psa MAC algorithm */ +#else + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */ + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */ +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_enc; /*!< psa encryption key */ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_dec; /*!< psa decryption key */ + psa_algorithm_t psa_alg; /*!< psa algorithm */ +#else + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */ + mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + uint8_t in_cid_len; + uint8_t out_cid_len; + unsigned char in_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; + unsigned char out_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the + * Master Secret and other session info, + * see ssl_tls12_populate_transform() */ + unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; + /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ +}; + +/* + * Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise. + * Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead( + const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + return transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0; +#else + (void) transform; + return 1; +#endif +} + +/* + * Internal representation of record frames + * + * Instances come in two flavors: + * (1) Encrypted + * These always have data_offset = 0 + * (2) Unencrypted + * These have data_offset set to the amount of + * pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely, + * this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV + * used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used + * (e.g. for stream ciphers). + * + * The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case + * is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to + * an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the + * encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to + * make space for the fixed IV. + * + */ +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX +#else +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX +#endif + +typedef struct { + uint8_t ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number. + * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by + * the 6-byte sequence number. + * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array + * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely + * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do + * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of + * MAC computations. */ + uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */ + uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire. + * Convert to internal presentation of versions + * using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and + * mbedtls_ssl_write_version(). + * Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */ + + unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */ + size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */ + size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */ + size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */ + unsigned char cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX]; /* The CID */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +} mbedtls_record; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/* + * List of certificate + private key pairs + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert { + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */ + mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +/* + * List of handshake messages kept around for resending + */ +struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item { + unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */ + size_t len; /*!< length of p */ + unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */ +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +/** + * \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS + * 1.2 specific extensions of the ClientHello message. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the extensions + * \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the extensions + * \param uses_ec Whether one proposed ciphersuite uses an elliptic curve + * (<> 0) or not ( 0 ). + * \param[out] out_len Length of the data written into the buffer \p buf + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + int uses_ec, + size_t *out_len); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +/** + * \brief Find the preferred hash for a given signature algorithm. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] sig_alg A signature algorithm identifier as defined in the + * TLS 1.2 SignatureAlgorithm enumeration. + * + * \return The preferred hash algorithm for \p sig_alg. It is a hash algorithm + * identifier as defined in the TLS 1.2 HashAlgorithm enumeration. + */ +unsigned int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned int sig_alg); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear + * memory + * + * \param transform SSL transform context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); + +/** + * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear + * memory + * + * \param ssl SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/* set inbound transform of ssl context */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); + +/* set outbound transform of ssl context */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_states state) +{ + ssl->state = (int) state; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Update record layer + * + * This function roughly separates the implementation + * of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation + * of the secure transport. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to use. + * \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest + * should be automatically updated in case + * a handshake message is found. + * + * \return 0 or non-zero error code. + * + * \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here + * is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible: + * + * The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying + * transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into + * a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which + * conceptually provides the following: + * + * (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports + * for handshake, alert and CCS messages. + * (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport + * for application data. + * (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform + * securing the contents. + * + * The interface to this functionality is given as follows: + * + * a Updating + * [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record] + * + * Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending: + * Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application + * data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers + * provide access to the data for the user to process it. + * Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically + * on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers + * for previous datagrams, while consumption of application + * data (2) is user-controlled. + * + * b Reading of application data + * [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer] + * + * As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data + * is different from the automatic consumption of control + * datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream. + * + * c Tracking availability of application data + * [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen] + * + * For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for + * application data in case of DTLS, the record layer + * provides functionality for checking how much application + * data is still available in the internal buffer. + * + * d Changing the transformation securing the communication. + * + * Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the + * above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic + * of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything + * about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g. + * in all the handshake handling functions, and in the + * application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read. + * + * \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the + * record layer, but the current implementation deviates + * from it in some places. For example, our implementation of + * the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record + * discards datagrams depending on the current state, which + * wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility + * following the above definition. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_read_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned update_hs_digest); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want); + +/* + * Write handshake message header + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char hs_type, + unsigned char **buf, size_t *buf_len); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int update_checksum, + int force_flush); +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext(ssl, 1 /* update checksum */, 1 /* force flush */); +} + +/* + * Write handshake message tail + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t buf_len, size_t msg_len); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int force_flush); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info); + +/* + * Update checksum of handshake messages. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + unsigned char const *msg, + size_t msg_len); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + size_t total_hs_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/** + * Get the first defined opaque PSK by order of precedence: + * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in the PSK + * callback + * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque() + * Return an opaque PSK + */ +static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { + return ssl->handshake->psk_opaque; + } + + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->conf->psk_opaque)) { + return ssl->conf->psk_opaque; + } + + return MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +} +#else +/** + * Get the first defined PSK by order of precedence: + * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback + * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() + * Return a code and update the pair (PSK, PSK length) passed to this function + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_psk(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char **psk, size_t *psk_len) +{ + if (ssl->handshake->psk != NULL && ssl->handshake->psk_len > 0) { + *psk = ssl->handshake->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len; + } else if (ssl->conf->psk != NULL && ssl->conf->psk_len > 0) { + *psk = ssl->conf->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len; + } else { + *psk = NULL; + *psk_len = 0; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_pk_context *pk); +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t type); +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(unsigned char sig); +#endif + +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(unsigned char hash); +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(int md); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md); +#endif + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t tls_id); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +/** + * \brief Return PSA EC info for the specified TLS ID. + * + * \param tls_id The TLS ID to look for + * \param type If the TLD ID is supported, then proper \c psa_key_type_t + * value is returned here. Can be NULL. + * \param bits If the TLD ID is supported, then proper bit size is returned + * here. Can be NULL. + * \return PSA_SUCCESS if the TLS ID is supported, + * PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED otherwise + * + * \note If either \c family or \c bits parameters are NULL, then + * the corresponding value is not returned. + * The function can be called with both parameters as NULL + * simply to check if a specific TLS ID is supported. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id, + psa_key_type_t *type, + size_t *bits); + +/** + * \brief Return \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id for the specified TLS ID. + * + * \param tls_id The TLS ID to look for + * \return Proper \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id if the TLS ID is supported, + * or MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE otherwise + */ +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id); + +/** + * \brief Return TLS ID for the specified \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id. + * + * \param grp_id The \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id ID to look for + * \return Proper TLS ID if the \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id is supported, + * or 0 otherwise + */ +uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) +/** + * \brief Return EC's name for the specified TLS ID. + * + * \param tls_id The TLS ID to look for + * \return A pointer to a const string with the proper name. If TLS + * ID is not supported, a NULL pointer is returned instead. + */ +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +static inline mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value + (const uint16_t srtp_profile_value) +{ + switch (srtp_profile_value) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80: + case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32: + return srtp_profile_value; + default: break; + } + return MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; + + if (ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL) { + key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; + } else { + key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; + } + + return key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key; +} + +static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; + + if (ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL) { + key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert; + } else { + key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert; + } + + return key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert; +} + +/* + * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions: + * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later). + * + * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we + * check a cert we received from them)! + * + * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, + int cert_endpoint, + uint32_t *flags); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_write_version(unsigned char version[2], int transport, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version); +uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_read_version(const unsigned char version[2], + int transport); + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ((void) ssl); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return 13; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + return 5; + } +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return (size_t) (ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_hdr); +} + +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return 12; + } +#else + ((void) ssl); +#endif + return 4; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_resend(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif + +/* Visible for testing purposes only */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *src); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +/* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec); + +/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */ +static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return 2; + } +#else + ((void) ssl); +#endif + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); +void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial); +void mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int partial); + +/* + * Send pending alert + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/* + * Set pending fatal alert flag. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char alert_type, + int alert_reason); + +/* Alias of mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(type, user_return_value) \ + mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert(ssl, type, user_return_value) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free(mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +/** + * ssl utils functions for checking configuration. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_only(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 && + conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_enabled(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + return conf->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + conf->max_tls_version >= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; +#else + ((void) conf); + return 0; +#endif +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_enabled(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + return conf->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 && + conf->max_tls_version >= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; +#else + ((void) conf); + return 0; +#endif +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_hybrid_tls12_tls13(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 && + conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +extern const uint8_t mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic[ + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS + * 1.3 specific extensions of the ClientHello message. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the extensions + * \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the extensions + * \param[out] out_len Length of the data written into the buffer \p buf + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len); + +/** + * \brief TLS 1.3 client side state machine entry + * + * \param ssl SSL context + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief TLS 1.3 server side state machine entry + * + * \param ssl SSL context + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + + +/* + * Helper functions around key exchange modes. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int kex_mode_mask) +{ + return (ssl->conf->tls13_kex_modes & kex_mode_mask) != 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_ephemeral_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_psk_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/** + * Given a list of key exchange modes, check if at least one of them is + * supported by peer. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param kex_modes_mask Mask of the key exchange modes to check + * + * \return Non-zero if at least one of the key exchange modes is supported by + * the peer, otherwise \c 0. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int kex_modes_mask) +{ + return (ssl->handshake->tls13_kex_modes & kex_modes_mask) != 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_supported( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_ephemeral_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_some_psk_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Helper functions for extensions checking. + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int hs_msg_type, + unsigned int received_extension_type, + uint32_t hs_msg_allowed_extensions_mask); + +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned int extension_type) +{ + ssl->handshake->sent_extensions |= + mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(extension_type); +} + +/* + * Helper functions to check the selected key exchange mode. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_check( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int kex_mask) +{ + return (ssl->handshake->key_exchange_mode & kex_mask) != 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_check(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_ephemeral( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_check(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL); +} + +/* + * Fetch TLS 1.3 handshake message header + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + unsigned char **buf, + size_t *buf_len); + +/** + * \brief Detect if a list of extensions contains a supported_versions + * extension or not. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Address of the first byte of the extensions vector. + * \param[in] end End of the buffer containing the list of extensions. + * \param[out] supported_versions_data If the extension is present, address of + * its first byte of data, NULL otherwise. + * \param[out] supported_versions_data_end If the extension is present, address + * of the first byte immediately + * following the extension data, NULL + * otherwise. + * \return 0 if the list of extensions does not contain a supported_versions + * extension. + * \return 1 if the list of extensions contains a supported_versions + * extension. + * \return A negative value if an error occurred while parsing the + * extensions. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char **supported_versions_data, + const unsigned char **supported_versions_data_end); + +/* + * Handler of TLS 1.3 server certificate message + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * Handler of TLS 1.3 write Certificate message + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/* + * Handler of TLS 1.3 write Certificate Verify message + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Generic handler of Certificate Verify + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/* + * Write of dummy-CCS's for middlebox compatibility + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t named_group, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len); +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int in_new_session_ticket, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len); + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t early_data_len); + +typedef enum { +/* + * The client has not sent the first ClientHello yet, the negotiation of early + * data has not started yet. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE, + +/* + * In its ClientHello, the client has not included an early data indication + * extension. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT, + +/* + * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first + * ClientHello, it has not received the response (ServerHello or + * HelloRetryRequest) from the server yet. The transform to protect early data + * is not set either as for middlebox compatibility a dummy CCS may have to be + * sent in clear. Early data cannot be sent to the server yet. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT, + +/* + * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first + * ClientHello, it has not received the response (ServerHello or + * HelloRetryRequest) from the server yet. The transform to protect early data + * has been set and early data can be written now. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE, + +/* + * The client has indicated the use of early data and the server has accepted + * it. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED, + +/* + * The client has indicated the use of early data but the server has rejected + * it. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED, + +/* + * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first + * ClientHello, the server has accepted them and the client has received the + * server Finished message. It cannot send early data to the server anymore. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED, + +} mbedtls_ssl_early_data_state; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* + * Write Signature Algorithm extension + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_sig_alg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len); +/* + * Parse TLS Signature Algorithm extension + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/* Get handshake transcript */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_md_type_t md, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *olen); + +/* + * Return supported groups. + * + * In future, invocations can be changed to ssl->conf->group_list + * when mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() is deleted. + * + * ssl->handshake->group_list is either a translation of curve_list to IANA TLS group + * identifiers when mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() has been used, or a pointer to + * ssl->conf->group_list when mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups() has been more recently invoked. + * + */ +static inline const void *mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + return ssl->conf->group_list; + #else + if ((ssl->handshake != NULL) && (ssl->handshake->group_list != NULL)) { + return ssl->handshake->group_list; + } else { + return ssl->conf->group_list; + } + #endif +} + +/* + * Helper functions for NamedGroup. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_named_group_is_ecdhe(uint16_t named_group) +{ + /* + * RFC 8422 section 5.1.1 + */ + return named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448 || + /* Below deprecated curves should be removed with notice to users */ + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(uint16_t named_group) +{ + return named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1 || + named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(uint16_t named_group) +{ + return named_group >= MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048 && + named_group <= MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_offered( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t named_group) +{ + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); + + if (group_list == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { + if (*group_list == named_group) { + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_supported(uint16_t named_group) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(named_group)) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(named_group) != + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + return 1; + } + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(named_group)) { + return 1; + } +#endif +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + (void) named_group; +#endif + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return supported signature algorithms. + * + * In future, invocations can be changed to ssl->conf->sig_algs when + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes() is deleted. + * + * ssl->handshake->sig_algs is either a translation of sig_hashes to IANA TLS + * signature algorithm identifiers when mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes() has been + * used, or a pointer to ssl->conf->sig_algs when mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs() has + * been more recently invoked. + * + */ +static inline const void *mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->handshake->sig_algs_heap_allocated == 1 && + ssl->handshake->sig_algs != NULL) { + return ssl->handshake->sig_algs; + } +#endif + return ssl->conf->sig_algs; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + + ((void) ssl); + return NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t own_sig_alg) +{ + const uint16_t *sig_alg = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; + if (sig_alg == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + if (*sig_alg == own_sig_alg) { + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported( + const uint16_t sig_alg) +{ + switch (sig_alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) && defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) && defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) && defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 && MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512: + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + default: + return 0; + } + return 1; + +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_supported( + const uint16_t sig_alg) +{ + switch (sig_alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256: + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384: + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512: + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ + default: + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported( + sig_alg); + } + return 1; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match(uint16_t sig_alg, + mbedtls_pk_context *key); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t proposed_sig_alg) +{ + const uint16_t *sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs(ssl); + if (sig_alg == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + if (*sig_alg == proposed_sig_alg) { + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg( + uint16_t sig_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_type, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg) +{ + *pk_type = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(sig_alg & 0xff); + *md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash((sig_alg >> 8) & 0xff); + + if (*pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && *md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + return 0; + } + + switch (sig_alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: + *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; + *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: + *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; + *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512: + *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512; + *pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_sig_alg_is_supported( + const uint16_t sig_alg) +{ + /* High byte is hash */ + unsigned char hash = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(sig_alg); + unsigned char sig = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(sig_alg); + + switch (hash) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512: + break; +#endif + + default: + return 0; + } + + switch (sig) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA: + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA: + break; +#endif + + default: + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const uint16_t sig_alg) +{ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + return mbedtls_ssl_tls12_sig_alg_is_supported(sig_alg); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_supported(sig_alg); + } +#endif + ((void) ssl); + ((void) sig_alg); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +/* Corresponding PSA algorithm for MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL. + * Same value is used for PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER, hence it is + * guaranteed to not be a valid PSA algorithm identifier. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER 0x04000000 + +/** + * \brief Translate mbedtls cipher type/taglen pair to psa: + * algorithm, key type and key size. + * + * \param mbedtls_cipher_type [in] given mbedtls cipher type + * \param taglen [in] given tag length + * 0 - default tag length + * \param alg [out] corresponding PSA alg + * There is no corresponding PSA + * alg for MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, so + * in this case MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER + * is returned via this parameter + * \param key_type [out] corresponding PSA key type + * \param key_size [out] corresponding PSA key size + * + * \return PSA_SUCCESS on success or PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED if + * conversion is not supported. + */ +psa_status_t mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_type, + size_t taglen, + psa_algorithm_t *alg, + psa_key_type_t *key_type, + size_t *key_size); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/** + * \brief Convert given PSA status to mbedtls error code. + * + * \param status [in] given PSA status + * + * \return corresponding mbedtls error code + */ +static inline MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status) +{ + switch (status) { + case PSA_SUCCESS: + return 0; + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO +} mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t; + +/** + * \brief Parse the provided input buffer for getting the first round + * of key exchange. This code is common between server and client + * + * \param pake_ctx [in] the PAKE's operation/context structure + * \param buf [in] input buffer to parse + * \param len [in] length of the input buffer + * \param round [in] either MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE or + * MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO + * + * \return 0 on success or a negative error code in case of failure + */ +int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round); + +/** + * \brief Write the first round of key exchange into the provided output + * buffer. This code is common between server and client + * + * \param pake_ctx [in] the PAKE's operation/context structure + * \param buf [out] the output buffer in which data will be written to + * \param len [in] length of the output buffer + * \param olen [out] the length of the data really written on the buffer + * \param round [in] either MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE or + * MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO + * + * \return 0 on success or a negative error code in case of failure + */ +int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round( + psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, size_t *olen, + mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round); + +#endif //MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + +/** + * \brief TLS record protection modes + */ +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM = 0, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD +} mbedtls_ssl_mode_t; + +mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_transform( + const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) +mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( + int encrypt_then_mac, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite); +#else +mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_xxdhe_share(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len); + +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int cipher_suite) +{ + const int *ciphersuite_list = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list; + + /* Check whether we have offered this ciphersuite */ + for (size_t i = 0; ciphersuite_list[i] != 0; i++) { + if (ciphersuite_list[i] == cipher_suite) { + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * \brief Validate cipher suite against config in SSL context. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param suite_info Cipher suite to validate + * \param min_tls_version Minimal TLS version to accept a cipher suite + * \param max_tls_version Maximal TLS version to accept a cipher suite + * + * \return 0 if valid, negative value otherwise. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version min_tls_version, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version max_tls_version); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_EXTENSION_DATA_LENGTH (2) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN (64) /* As defined in RFC 8449 */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end); + + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS + * 1.3 specific Pre-Shared key extension. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the extension + * \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the extension + * \param[out] out_len Length in bytes of the Pre-Shared key extension: data + * written into the buffer \p buf by this function plus + * the length of the binders to be written. + * \param[out] binders_len Length of the binders to be written at the end of + * the extension. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_identities_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len, size_t *binders_len); + +/** + * \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS + * 1.3 specific Pre-Shared key extension binders at the end of the + * ClientHello. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the binders + * \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the binders + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_binders_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_session_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const char *hostname); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const char *alpn); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_MAX_ALLOWED_TICKET_LIFETIME (604800) + +static inline unsigned int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_get_ticket_flags( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags) +{ + return session->ticket_flags & + (flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); +} + +/** + * Check if at least one of the given flags is set in + * the session ticket. See the definition of + * `MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK` to get all + * permitted flags. + */ +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_has_flags( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_get_ticket_flags(session, flags) != 0; +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_psk( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_has_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_RESUMPTION); +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_psk_ephemeral( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_has_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_EPHEMERAL_RESUMPTION); +} + +static inline unsigned int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_early_data( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_has_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA); +} + +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_set_ticket_flags( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags) +{ + session->ticket_flags |= (flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); +} + +static inline void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_clear_ticket_flags( + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags) +{ + session->ticket_flags &= ~(flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + +/** Compute the HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow. + * + * This function computes the HMAC of the concatenation of \p add_data and \p + * data, and does with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not + * depend on \p data_len_secret, but only on \p min_data_len and \p + * max_data_len. In particular, this function always reads exactly \p + * max_data_len bytes from \p data. + * + * \param ctx The HMAC context. It must have keys configured + * with mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and use one of the + * following hashes: SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1 or MD-5. + * It is reset using mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() after + * the computation is complete to prepare for the + * next computation. + * \param add_data The first part of the message whose HMAC is being + * calculated. This must point to a readable buffer + * of \p add_data_len bytes. + * \param add_data_len The length of \p add_data in bytes. + * \param data The buffer containing the second part of the + * message. This must point to a readable buffer + * of \p max_data_len bytes. + * \param data_len_secret The length of the data to process in \p data. + * This must be no less than \p min_data_len and no + * greater than \p max_data_len. + * \param min_data_len The minimal length of the second part of the + * message, read from \p data. + * \param max_data_len The maximal length of the second part of the + * message, read from \p data. + * \param output The HMAC will be written here. This must point to + * a writable buffer of sufficient size to hold the + * HMAC value. + * + * \retval 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED + * The hardware accelerator failed. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t mac_alg, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output); +#else +int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output); +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) */ + +#endif /* ssl_misc.h */ diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b07cd96f1bc --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -0,0 +1,6368 @@ +/* + * Generic SSL/TLS messaging layer functions + * (record layer + retransmission state machine) + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/version.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) +#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_384) +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) +#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) +#else /* See check_config.h */ +#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_1) +#endif + +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t mac_alg, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output) +{ + /* + * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses psa_hash_clone() + * extension in order to get constant-flow behaviour. + * + * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means + * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit + * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2). + * + * We'll first compute ikey/okey, then inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by + * hashing up to minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up + * to maxlen finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the + * correct result. + * + * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done. + */ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(mac_alg); + const size_t block_size = PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(hash_alg); + unsigned char key_buf[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH]; + const size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hash_length; + + unsigned char aux_out[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + psa_hash_operation_t aux_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t offset; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + size_t mac_key_length; + size_t i; + +#define PSA_CHK(func_call) \ + do { \ + status = (func_call); \ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) \ + goto cleanup; \ + } while (0) + + /* Export MAC key + * We assume key length is always exactly the output size + * which is never more than the block size, thus we use block_size + * as the key buffer size. + */ + PSA_CHK(psa_export_key(key, key_buf, block_size, &mac_key_length)); + + /* Calculate ikey */ + for (i = 0; i < mac_key_length; i++) { + key_buf[i] = (unsigned char) (key_buf[i] ^ 0x36); + } + for (; i < block_size; ++i) { + key_buf[i] = 0x36; + } + + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_setup(&operation, hash_alg)); + + /* Now compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) */ + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, key_buf, block_size)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, add_data, add_data_len)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, data, min_data_len)); + + /* Fill the hash buffer in advance with something that is + * not a valid hash (barring an attack on the hash and + * deliberately-crafted input), in case the caller doesn't + * check the return status properly. */ + memset(output, '!', hash_size); + + /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */ + for (offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++) { + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_clone(&operation, &aux_operation)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_finish(&aux_operation, aux_out, + PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE, &hash_length)); + /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */ + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(offset, data_len_secret), + output, aux_out, NULL, hash_size); + + if (offset < max_data_len) { + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, data + offset, 1)); + } + } + + /* Abort current operation to prepare for final operation */ + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_abort(&operation)); + + /* Calculate okey */ + for (i = 0; i < mac_key_length; i++) { + key_buf[i] = (unsigned char) ((key_buf[i] ^ 0x36) ^ 0x5C); + } + for (; i < block_size; ++i) { + key_buf[i] = 0x5C; + } + + /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */ + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_setup(&operation, hash_alg)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, key_buf, block_size)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_update(&operation, output, hash_size)); + PSA_CHK(psa_hash_finish(&operation, output, hash_size, &hash_length)); + +#undef PSA_CHK + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_buf, MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(aux_out, PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE); + + psa_hash_abort(&operation); + psa_hash_abort(&aux_operation); + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +#undef MAX_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH + +#else +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, + const unsigned char *add_data, + size_t add_data_len, + const unsigned char *data, + size_t data_len_secret, + size_t min_data_len, + size_t max_data_len, + unsigned char *output) +{ + /* + * This function breaks the HMAC abstraction and uses the md_clone() + * extension to the MD API in order to get constant-flow behaviour. + * + * HMAC(msg) is defined as HASH(okey + HASH(ikey + msg)) where + means + * concatenation, and okey/ikey are the XOR of the key with some fixed bit + * patterns (see RFC 2104, sec. 2), which are stored in ctx->hmac_ctx. + * + * We'll first compute inner_hash = HASH(ikey + msg) by hashing up to + * minlen, then cloning the context, and for each byte up to maxlen + * finishing up the hash computation, keeping only the correct result. + * + * Then we only need to compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) and we're done. + */ + const mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_md_get_type(ctx->md_info); + /* TLS 1.2 only supports SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1, MD-5, + * all of which have the same block size except SHA-384. */ + const size_t block_size = md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ? 128 : 64; + const unsigned char * const ikey = ctx->hmac_ctx; + const unsigned char * const okey = ikey + block_size; + const size_t hash_size = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_info); + + unsigned char aux_out[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + mbedtls_md_context_t aux; + size_t offset; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md_init(&aux); + +#define MD_CHK(func_call) \ + do { \ + ret = (func_call); \ + if (ret != 0) \ + goto cleanup; \ + } while (0) + + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_setup(&aux, ctx->md_info, 0)); + + /* After hmac_start() of hmac_reset(), ikey has already been hashed, + * so we can start directly with the message */ + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, add_data, add_data_len)); + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, data, min_data_len)); + + /* Fill the hash buffer in advance with something that is + * not a valid hash (barring an attack on the hash and + * deliberately-crafted input), in case the caller doesn't + * check the return status properly. */ + memset(output, '!', hash_size); + + /* For each possible length, compute the hash up to that point */ + for (offset = min_data_len; offset <= max_data_len; offset++) { + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_clone(&aux, ctx)); + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(&aux, aux_out)); + /* Keep only the correct inner_hash in the output buffer */ + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(offset, data_len_secret), + output, aux_out, NULL, hash_size); + + if (offset < max_data_len) { + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, data + offset, 1)); + } + } + + /* The context needs to finish() before it starts() again */ + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, aux_out)); + + /* Now compute HASH(okey + inner_hash) */ + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_starts(ctx)); + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, okey, block_size)); + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_update(ctx, output, hash_size)); + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, output)); + + /* Done, get ready for next time */ + MD_CHK(mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(ctx)); + +#undef MD_CHK + +cleanup: + mbedtls_md_free(&aux); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl); + +/* + * Start a timer. + * Passing millisecs = 0 cancels a running timer. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs) +{ + if (ssl->f_set_timer == NULL) { + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("set_timer to %d ms", (int) millisecs)); + ssl->f_set_timer(ssl->p_timer, millisecs / 4, millisecs); +} + +/* + * Return -1 is timer is expired, 0 if it isn't. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl->f_get_timer == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + if (ssl->f_get_timer(ssl->p_timer) == 2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("timer expired")); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + mbedtls_record *rec); + +int mbedtls_ssl_check_record(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen) +{ + int ret = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_check_record")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "record buffer", buf, buflen); + + /* We don't support record checking in TLS because + * there doesn't seem to be a usecase for it. + */ + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto exit; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + else { + mbedtls_record rec; + + ret = ssl_parse_record_header(ssl, buf, buflen, &rec); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(3, "ssl_parse_record_header", ret); + goto exit; + } + + if (ssl->transform_in != NULL) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(ssl, ssl->transform_in, &rec); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(3, "mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf", ret); + goto exit; + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +exit: + /* On success, we have decrypted the buffer in-place, so make + * sure we don't leak any plaintext data. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, buflen); + + /* For the purpose of this API, treat messages with unexpected CID + * as well as such from future epochs as unexpected. */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_check_record")); + return ret; +} + +#define SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH 0 +#define SSL_FORCE_FLUSH 1 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +/* Forward declarations for functions related to message buffering. */ +static void ssl_buffering_free_slot(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint8_t slot); +static void ssl_free_buffered_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_load_buffered_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_load_buffered_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_buffer_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_buffer_future_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_record const *rec); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +static size_t ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) +{ + size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(ssl); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + if (mtu != 0 && mtu < out_buf_len) { + return mtu; + } + + return out_buf_len; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) +{ + size_t const bytes_written = ssl->out_left; + size_t const mtu = ssl_get_maximum_datagram_size(ssl); + + /* Double-check that the write-index hasn't gone + * past what we can transmit in a single datagram. */ + if (bytes_written > mtu) { + /* Should never happen... */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + return (int) (mtu - bytes_written); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t remaining, expansion; + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ssl); + + if (max_len > mfl) { + max_len = mfl; + } + + /* By the standard (RFC 6066 Sect. 4), the MFL extension + * only limits the maximum record payload size, so in theory + * we would be allowed to pack multiple records of payload size + * MFL into a single datagram. However, this would mean that there's + * no way to explicitly communicate MTU restrictions to the peer. + * + * The following reduction of max_len makes sure that we never + * write datagrams larger than MFL + Record Expansion Overhead. + */ + if (max_len <= ssl->out_left) { + return 0; + } + + max_len -= ssl->out_left; +#endif + + ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram(ssl); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + remaining = (size_t) ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(ssl); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + expansion = (size_t) ret; + + if (remaining <= expansion) { + return 0; + } + + remaining -= expansion; + if (remaining >= max_len) { + remaining = max_len; + } + + return (int) remaining; +} + +/* + * Double the retransmit timeout value, within the allowed range, + * returning -1 if the maximum value has already been reached. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_double_retransmit_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + uint32_t new_timeout; + + if (ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout >= ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max) { + return -1; + } + + /* Implement the final paragraph of RFC 6347 section 4.1.1.1 + * in the following way: after the initial transmission and a first + * retransmission, back off to a temporary estimated MTU of 508 bytes. + * This value is guaranteed to be deliverable (if not guaranteed to be + * delivered) of any compliant IPv4 (and IPv6) network, and should work + * on most non-IP stacks too. */ + if (ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout != ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min) { + ssl->handshake->mtu = 508; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("mtu autoreduction to %d bytes", ssl->handshake->mtu)); + } + + new_timeout = 2 * ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout; + + /* Avoid arithmetic overflow and range overflow */ + if (new_timeout < ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout || + new_timeout > ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max) { + new_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max; + } + + ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = new_timeout; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("update timeout value to %lu millisecs", + (unsigned long) ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout)); + + return 0; +} + +static void ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("update timeout value to %lu millisecs", + (unsigned long) ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout)); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +/* + * Encryption/decryption functions + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +static size_t ssl_compute_padding_length(size_t len, + size_t granularity) +{ + return (granularity - (len + 1) % granularity) % granularity; +} + +/* This functions transforms a (D)TLS plaintext fragment and a record content + * type into an instance of the (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. This is used + * in DTLS 1.2 + CID and within TLS 1.3 to allow flexible padding and to protect + * a record's content type. + * + * struct { + * opaque content[DTLSPlaintext.length]; + * ContentType real_type; + * uint8 zeros[length_of_padding]; + * } (D)TLSInnerPlaintext; + * + * Input: + * - `content`: The beginning of the buffer holding the + * plaintext to be wrapped. + * - `*content_size`: The length of the plaintext in Bytes. + * - `max_len`: The number of Bytes available starting from + * `content`. This must be `>= *content_size`. + * - `rec_type`: The desired record content type. + * + * Output: + * - `content`: The beginning of the resulting (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * - `*content_size`: The length of the resulting (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * + * Returns: + * - `0` on success. + * - A negative error code if `max_len` didn't offer enough space + * for the expansion. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_build_inner_plaintext(unsigned char *content, + size_t *content_size, + size_t remaining, + uint8_t rec_type, + size_t pad) +{ + size_t len = *content_size; + + /* Write real content type */ + if (remaining == 0) { + return -1; + } + content[len] = rec_type; + len++; + remaining--; + + if (remaining < pad) { + return -1; + } + memset(content + len, 0, pad); + len += pad; + remaining -= pad; + + *content_size = len; + return 0; +} + +/* This function parses a (D)TLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for details. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_inner_plaintext(unsigned char const *content, + size_t *content_size, + uint8_t *rec_type) +{ + size_t remaining = *content_size; + + /* Determine length of padding by skipping zeroes from the back. */ + do { + if (remaining == 0) { + return -1; + } + remaining--; + } while (content[remaining] == 0); + + *content_size = remaining; + *rec_type = content[remaining]; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +/* The size of the `add_data` structure depends on various + * factors, namely + * + * 1) CID functionality disabled + * + * additional_data = + * 8: seq_num + + * 1: type + + * 2: version + + * 2: length of inner plaintext + + * + * size = 13 bytes + * + * 2) CID functionality based on RFC 9146 enabled + * + * size = 8 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 2 + 6 + 2 + CID-length + * = 23 + CID-length + * + * 3) CID functionality based on legacy CID version + according to draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 + * + * size = 13 + 1 + CID-length + * + * More information about the CID usage: + * + * Per Section 5.3 of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 the + * size of the additional data structure is calculated as: + * + * additional_data = + * 8: seq_num + + * 1: tls12_cid + + * 2: DTLSCipherText.version + + * n: cid + + * 1: cid_length + + * 2: length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext + * + * Per RFC 9146 the size of the add_data structure is calculated as: + * + * additional_data = + * 8: seq_num_placeholder + + * 1: tls12_cid + + * 1: cid_length + + * 1: tls12_cid + + * 2: DTLSCiphertext.version + + * 2: epoch + + * 6: sequence_number + + * n: cid + + * 2: length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext + * + */ +static void ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(unsigned char *add_data, + size_t *add_data_len, + mbedtls_record *rec, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version + tls_version, + size_t taglen) +{ + /* Several types of ciphers have been defined for use with TLS and DTLS, + * and the MAC calculations for those ciphers differ slightly. Further + * variants were added when the CID functionality was added with RFC 9146. + * This implementations also considers the use of a legacy version of the + * CID specification published in draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05, + * which is used in deployments. + * + * We will distinguish between the non-CID and the CID cases below. + * + * --- Non-CID cases --- + * + * Quoting RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2): + * + * additional_data = seq_num + TLSCompressed.type + + * TLSCompressed.version + TLSCompressed.length; + * + * For TLS 1.3, the record sequence number is dropped from the AAD + * and encoded within the nonce of the AEAD operation instead. + * Moreover, the additional data involves the length of the TLS + * ciphertext, not the TLS plaintext as in earlier versions. + * Quoting RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3): + * + * additional_data = TLSCiphertext.opaque_type || + * TLSCiphertext.legacy_record_version || + * TLSCiphertext.length + * + * We pass the tag length to this function in order to compute the + * ciphertext length from the inner plaintext length rec->data_len via + * + * TLSCiphertext.length = TLSInnerPlaintext.length + taglen. + * + * --- CID cases --- + * + * RFC 9146 uses a common pattern when constructing the data + * passed into a MAC / AEAD cipher. + * + * Data concatenation for MACs used with block ciphers with + * Encrypt-then-MAC Processing (with CID): + * + * data = seq_num_placeholder + + * tls12_cid + + * cid_length + + * tls12_cid + + * DTLSCiphertext.version + + * epoch + + * sequence_number + + * cid + + * DTLSCiphertext.length + + * IV + + * ENC(content + padding + padding_length) + * + * Data concatenation for MACs used with block ciphers (with CID): + * + * data = seq_num_placeholder + + * tls12_cid + + * cid_length + + * tls12_cid + + * DTLSCiphertext.version + + * epoch + + * sequence_number + + * cid + + * length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext + + * DTLSInnerPlaintext.content + + * DTLSInnerPlaintext.real_type + + * DTLSInnerPlaintext.zeros + * + * AEAD ciphers use the following additional data calculation (with CIDs): + * + * additional_data = seq_num_placeholder + + * tls12_cid + + * cid_length + + * tls12_cid + + * DTLSCiphertext.version + + * epoch + + * sequence_number + + * cid + + * length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext + * + * Section 5.3 of draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 (for legacy CID use) + * defines the additional data calculation as follows: + * + * additional_data = seq_num + + * tls12_cid + + * DTLSCipherText.version + + * cid + + * cid_length + + * length_of_DTLSInnerPlaintext + */ + + unsigned char *cur = add_data; + size_t ad_len_field = rec->data_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0 + const unsigned char seq_num_placeholder[] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff }; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + /* In TLS 1.3, the AAD contains the length of the TLSCiphertext, + * which differs from the length of the TLSInnerPlaintext + * by the length of the authentication tag. */ + ad_len_field += taglen; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + { + ((void) tls_version); + ((void) taglen); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0 + if (rec->cid_len != 0) { + // seq_num_placeholder + memcpy(cur, seq_num_placeholder, sizeof(seq_num_placeholder)); + cur += sizeof(seq_num_placeholder); + + // tls12_cid type + *cur = rec->type; + cur++; + + // cid_length + *cur = rec->cid_len; + cur++; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + { + // epoch + sequence number + memcpy(cur, rec->ctr, sizeof(rec->ctr)); + cur += sizeof(rec->ctr); + } + } + + // type + *cur = rec->type; + cur++; + + // version + memcpy(cur, rec->ver, sizeof(rec->ver)); + cur += sizeof(rec->ver); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 1 + + if (rec->cid_len != 0) { + // CID + memcpy(cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len); + cur += rec->cid_len; + + // cid_length + *cur = rec->cid_len; + cur++; + + // length of inner plaintext + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ad_len_field, cur, 0); + cur += 2; + } else +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0 + + if (rec->cid_len != 0) { + // epoch + sequence number + memcpy(cur, rec->ctr, sizeof(rec->ctr)); + cur += sizeof(rec->ctr); + + // CID + memcpy(cur, rec->cid, rec->cid_len); + cur += rec->cid_len; + + // length of inner plaintext + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ad_len_field, cur, 0); + cur += 2; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ad_len_field, cur, 0); + cur += 2; + } + + *add_data_len = (size_t) (cur - add_data); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit( + mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform) +{ + return transform->ivlen != transform->fixed_ivlen; +} + +/* Compute IV := ( fixed_iv || 0 ) XOR ( 0 || dynamic_IV ) + * + * Concretely, this occurs in two variants: + * + * a) Fixed and dynamic IV lengths add up to total IV length, giving + * IV = fixed_iv || dynamic_iv + * + * This variant is used in TLS 1.2 when used with GCM or CCM. + * + * b) Fixed IV lengths matches total IV length, giving + * IV = fixed_iv XOR ( 0 || dynamic_iv ) + * + * This variant occurs in TLS 1.3 and for TLS 1.2 when using ChaChaPoly. + * + * See also the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_transform. + * + * This function has the precondition that + * + * dst_iv_len >= max( fixed_iv_len, dynamic_iv_len ) + * + * which has to be ensured by the caller. If this precondition + * violated, the behavior of this function is undefined. + */ +static void ssl_build_record_nonce(unsigned char *dst_iv, + size_t dst_iv_len, + unsigned char const *fixed_iv, + size_t fixed_iv_len, + unsigned char const *dynamic_iv, + size_t dynamic_iv_len) +{ + /* Start with Fixed IV || 0 */ + memset(dst_iv, 0, dst_iv_len); + memcpy(dst_iv, fixed_iv, fixed_iv_len); + + dst_iv += dst_iv_len - dynamic_iv_len; + mbedtls_xor(dst_iv, dst_iv, dynamic_iv, dynamic_iv_len); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode; + int auth_done = 0; + unsigned char *data; + /* For an explanation of the additional data length see + * the description of ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + unsigned char add_data[23 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; +#else + unsigned char add_data[13]; +#endif + size_t add_data_len; + size_t post_avail; + + /* The SSL context is only used for debugging purposes! */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */ + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + /* The PRNG is used for dynamic IV generation that's used + * for CBC transformations in TLS 1.2. */ +#if !(defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) + ((void) f_rng); + ((void) p_rng); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> encrypt buf")); + + if (transform == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no transform provided to encrypt_buf")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + if (rec == NULL + || rec->buf == NULL + || rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset + || rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + || rec->cid_len != 0 +#endif + ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad record structure provided to encrypt_buf")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ssl_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_transform(transform); + + data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset; + post_avail = rec->buf_len - (rec->data_len + rec->data_offset); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "before encrypt: output payload", + data, rec->data_len); + + if (rec->data_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Record content %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " too large, maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + rec->data_len, + (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* The following two code paths implement the (D)TLSInnerPlaintext + * structure present in TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.2 + CID. + * + * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information. + * + * Note that this changes `rec->data_len`, and hence + * `post_avail` needs to be recalculated afterwards. + * + * Note also that the two code paths cannot occur simultaneously + * since they apply to different versions of the protocol. There + * is hence no risk of double-addition of the inner plaintext. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (transform->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + size_t padding = + ssl_compute_padding_length(rec->data_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY); + if (ssl_build_inner_plaintext(data, + &rec->data_len, + post_avail, + rec->type, + padding) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* + * Add CID information + */ + rec->cid_len = transform->out_cid_len; + memcpy(rec->cid, transform->out_cid, transform->out_cid_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "CID", rec->cid, rec->cid_len); + + if (rec->cid_len != 0) { + size_t padding = + ssl_compute_padding_length(rec->data_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY); + /* + * Wrap plaintext into DTLSInnerPlaintext structure. + * See ssl_build_inner_plaintext() for more information. + * + * Note that this changes `rec->data_len`, and hence + * `post_avail` needs to be recalculated afterwards. + */ + if (ssl_build_inner_plaintext(data, + &rec->data_len, + post_avail, + rec->type, + padding) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + rec->type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + post_avail = rec->buf_len - (rec->data_len + rec->data_offset); + + /* + * Add MAC before if needed + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM || + ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC) { + if (post_avail < transform->maclen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t sign_mac_length = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_sign_setup(&operation, transform->psa_mac_enc, + transform->psa_mac_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, add_data, add_data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, data, rec->data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&operation, mac, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD, + &sign_mac_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data, + add_data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, data, rec->data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&transform->md_ctx_enc, mac); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&transform->md_ctx_enc); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + memcpy(data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "computed mac", data + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen); + + rec->data_len += transform->maclen; + post_avail -= transform->maclen; + auth_done++; + +hmac_failed_etm_disabled: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mac, transform->maclen); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_hmac_xxx", ret); + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + + /* + * Encrypt + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "including %d bytes of padding", + rec->data_len, 0)); + + /* The only supported stream cipher is "NULL", + * so there's nothing to do here.*/ + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD) { + unsigned char iv[12]; + unsigned char *dynamic_iv; + size_t dynamic_iv_len; + int dynamic_iv_is_explicit = + ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit(transform); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */ + if (post_avail < transform->taglen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* + * Build nonce for AEAD encryption. + * + * Note: In the case of CCM and GCM in TLS 1.2, the dynamic + * part of the IV is prepended to the ciphertext and + * can be chosen freely - in particular, it need not + * agree with the record sequence number. + * However, since ChaChaPoly as well as all AEAD modes + * in TLS 1.3 use the record sequence number as the + * dynamic part of the nonce, we uniformly use the + * record sequence number here in all cases. + */ + dynamic_iv = rec->ctr; + dynamic_iv_len = sizeof(rec->ctr); + + ssl_build_record_nonce(iv, sizeof(iv), + transform->iv_enc, + transform->fixed_ivlen, + dynamic_iv, + dynamic_iv_len); + + /* + * Build additional data for AEAD encryption. + * This depends on the TLS version. + */ + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "IV used (internal)", + iv, transform->ivlen); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "IV used (transmitted)", + dynamic_iv, + dynamic_iv_is_explicit ? dynamic_iv_len : 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "additional data used for AEAD", + add_data, add_data_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "including 0 bytes of padding", + rec->data_len)); + + /* + * Encrypt and authenticate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_aead_encrypt(transform->psa_key_enc, + transform->psa_alg, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, + data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), + &rec->data_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf", ret); + return ret; + } +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, /* src */ + data, rec->buf_len - (size_t) (data - rec->buf), /* dst */ + &rec->data_len, + transform->taglen)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "after encrypt: tag", + data + rec->data_len - transform->taglen, + transform->taglen); + /* Account for authentication tag. */ + post_avail -= transform->taglen; + + /* + * Prefix record content with dynamic IV in case it is explicit. + */ + if (dynamic_iv_is_explicit != 0) { + if (rec->data_offset < dynamic_iv_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(data - dynamic_iv_len, dynamic_iv, dynamic_iv_len); + rec->data_offset -= dynamic_iv_len; + rec->data_len += dynamic_iv_len; + } + + auth_done++; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC || + ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t padlen, i; + size_t olen; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t part_len; + psa_cipher_operation_t cipher_op = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* Currently we're always using minimal padding + * (up to 255 bytes would be allowed). */ + padlen = transform->ivlen - (rec->data_len + 1) % transform->ivlen; + if (padlen == transform->ivlen) { + padlen = 0; + } + + /* Check there's enough space in the buffer for the padding. */ + if (post_avail < padlen + 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + for (i = 0; i <= padlen; i++) { + data[rec->data_len + i] = (unsigned char) padlen; + } + + rec->data_len += padlen + 1; + post_avail -= padlen + 1; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* + * Prepend per-record IV for block cipher in TLS v1.2 as per + * Method 1 (6.2.3.2. in RFC4346 and RFC5246) + */ + if (f_rng == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No PRNG provided to encrypt_record routine")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + if (rec->data_offset < transform->ivlen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* + * Generate IV + */ + ret = f_rng(p_rng, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + memcpy(data - transform->ivlen, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("before encrypt: msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", " + "including %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes of IV and %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes of padding", + rec->data_len, transform->ivlen, + padlen + 1)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(&cipher_op, + transform->psa_key_enc, transform->psa_alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_encrypt_setup", ret); + return ret; + } + + status = psa_cipher_set_iv(&cipher_op, transform->iv_enc, transform->ivlen); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_set_iv", ret); + return ret; + + } + + status = psa_cipher_update(&cipher_op, + data, rec->data_len, + data, rec->data_len, &olen); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_update", ret); + return ret; + + } + + status = psa_cipher_finish(&cipher_op, + data + olen, rec->data_len - olen, + &part_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_finish", ret); + return ret; + + } + + olen += part_len; +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + transform->iv_enc, + transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, + data, &olen)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if (rec->data_len != olen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + data -= transform->ivlen; + rec->data_offset -= transform->ivlen; + rec->data_len += transform->ivlen; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if (auth_done == 0) { + unsigned char mac[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t sign_mac_length = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* MAC(MAC_write_key, add_data, IV, ENC(content + padding + padding_length)) + */ + + if (post_avail < transform->maclen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Buffer provided for encrypted record not large enough")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, + rec, transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("using encrypt then mac")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data, + add_data_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_sign_setup(&operation, transform->psa_mac_enc, + transform->psa_mac_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, add_data, add_data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, data, rec->data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_sign_finish(&operation, mac, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD, + &sign_mac_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } +#else + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, add_data, + add_data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_enc, + data, rec->data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&transform->md_ctx_enc, mac); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&transform->md_ctx_enc); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + memcpy(data + rec->data_len, mac, transform->maclen); + + rec->data_len += transform->maclen; + post_avail -= transform->maclen; + auth_done++; + +hmac_failed_etm_enabled: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mac, transform->maclen); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "HMAC calculation failed", ret); + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */ + if (auth_done != 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= encrypt buf")); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + mbedtls_record *rec) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD) + size_t olen; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC || MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD */ + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode; + int ret; + + int auth_done = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + size_t padlen = 0; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t correct = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE; +#endif + unsigned char *data; + /* For an explanation of the additional data length see + * the description of ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + unsigned char add_data[23 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX]; +#else + unsigned char add_data[13]; +#endif + size_t add_data_len; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */ + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> decrypt buf")); + if (rec == NULL || + rec->buf == NULL || + rec->buf_len < rec->data_offset || + rec->buf_len - rec->data_offset < rec->data_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad record structure provided to decrypt_buf")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + data = rec->buf + rec->data_offset; + ssl_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_transform(transform); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* + * Match record's CID with incoming CID. + */ + if (rec->cid_len != transform->in_cid_len || + memcmp(rec->cid, transform->in_cid, rec->cid_len) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM) { + if (rec->data_len < transform->maclen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("Record too short for MAC:" + " %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " < %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + rec->data_len, transform->maclen)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + } + + /* The only supported stream cipher is "NULL", + * so there's no encryption to do here.*/ + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD) { + unsigned char iv[12]; + unsigned char *dynamic_iv; + size_t dynamic_iv_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* + * Extract dynamic part of nonce for AEAD decryption. + * + * Note: In the case of CCM and GCM in TLS 1.2, the dynamic + * part of the IV is prepended to the ciphertext and + * can be chosen freely - in particular, it need not + * agree with the record sequence number. + */ + dynamic_iv_len = sizeof(rec->ctr); + if (ssl_transform_aead_dynamic_iv_is_explicit(transform) == 1) { + if (rec->data_len < dynamic_iv_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " ) < explicit_iv_len (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ", + rec->data_len, + dynamic_iv_len)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + } + dynamic_iv = data; + + data += dynamic_iv_len; + rec->data_offset += dynamic_iv_len; + rec->data_len -= dynamic_iv_len; + } else { + dynamic_iv = rec->ctr; + } + + /* Check that there's space for the authentication tag. */ + if (rec->data_len < transform->taglen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") < taglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") ", + rec->data_len, + transform->taglen)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + } + rec->data_len -= transform->taglen; + + /* + * Prepare nonce from dynamic and static parts. + */ + ssl_build_record_nonce(iv, sizeof(iv), + transform->iv_dec, + transform->fixed_ivlen, + dynamic_iv, + dynamic_iv_len); + + /* + * Build additional data for AEAD encryption. + * This depends on the TLS version. + */ + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "additional data used for AEAD", + add_data, add_data_len); + + /* Because of the check above, we know that there are + * explicit_iv_len Bytes preceding data, and taglen + * bytes following data + data_len. This justifies + * the debug message and the invocation of + * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() below. */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "IV used", iv, transform->ivlen); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "TAG used", data + rec->data_len, + transform->taglen); + + /* + * Decrypt and authenticate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_aead_decrypt(transform->psa_key_dec, + transform->psa_alg, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len + transform->taglen, + data, rec->buf_len - (data - rec->buf), + &olen); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_aead_decrypt", ret); + return ret; + } +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext + (&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + iv, transform->ivlen, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len + transform->taglen, /* src */ + data, rec->buf_len - (size_t) (data - rec->buf), &olen, /* dst */ + transform->taglen)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext", ret); + + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + } + + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + auth_done++; + + /* Double-check that AEAD decryption doesn't change content length. */ + if (olen != rec->data_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC || + ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { + size_t minlen = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t part_len; + psa_cipher_operation_t cipher_op = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* + * Check immediate ciphertext sanity + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* The ciphertext is prefixed with the CBC IV. */ + minlen += transform->ivlen; +#endif + + /* Size considerations: + * + * - The CBC cipher text must not be empty and hence + * at least of size transform->ivlen. + * + * Together with the potential IV-prefix, this explains + * the first of the two checks below. + * + * - The record must contain a MAC, either in plain or + * encrypted, depending on whether Encrypt-then-MAC + * is used or not. + * - If it is, the message contains the IV-prefix, + * the CBC ciphertext, and the MAC. + * - If it is not, the padded plaintext, and hence + * the CBC ciphertext, has at least length maclen + 1 + * because there is at least the padding length byte. + * + * As the CBC ciphertext is not empty, both cases give the + * lower bound minlen + maclen + 1 on the record size, which + * we test for in the second check below. + */ + if (rec->data_len < minlen + transform->ivlen || + rec->data_len < minlen + transform->maclen + 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") < max( ivlen(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + "), maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") " + "+ 1 ) ( + expl IV )", + rec->data_len, + transform->ivlen, + transform->maclen)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + } + + /* + * Authenticate before decrypt if enabled + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; +#else + unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("using encrypt then mac")); + + /* Update data_len in tandem with add_data. + * + * The subtraction is safe because of the previous check + * data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1. + * + * Afterwards, we know that data + data_len is followed by at + * least maclen Bytes, which justifies the call to + * mbedtls_ct_memcmp() below. + * + * Further, we still know that data_len > minlen */ + rec->data_len -= transform->maclen; + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); + + /* Calculate expected MAC. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "MAC'd meta-data", add_data, + add_data_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_mac_verify_setup(&operation, transform->psa_mac_dec, + transform->psa_mac_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, add_data, add_data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + status = psa_mac_update(&operation, data, rec->data_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + /* Compare expected MAC with MAC at the end of the record. */ + status = psa_mac_verify_finish(&operation, data + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_dec, add_data, + add_data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&transform->md_ctx_dec, + data, rec->data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_expect); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&transform->md_ctx_dec); + if (ret != 0) { + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "message mac", data + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "expected mac", mac_expect, + transform->maclen); + + /* Compare expected MAC with MAC at the end of the record. */ + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(data + rec->data_len, mac_expect, + transform->maclen) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("message mac does not match")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + goto hmac_failed_etm_enabled; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + auth_done++; + +hmac_failed_etm_enabled: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + status = psa_mac_abort(&operation); + if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#else + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mac_expect, transform->maclen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (ret != 0) { + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_hmac_xxx", ret); + } + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + + /* + * Check length sanity + */ + + /* We know from above that data_len > minlen >= 0, + * so the following check in particular implies that + * data_len >= minlen + ivlen ( = minlen or 2 * minlen ). */ + if (rec->data_len % transform->ivlen != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") %% ivlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ") != 0", + rec->data_len, transform->ivlen)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* + * Initialize for prepended IV for block cipher in TLS v1.2 + */ + /* Safe because data_len >= minlen + ivlen = 2 * ivlen. */ + memcpy(transform->iv_dec, data, transform->ivlen); + + data += transform->ivlen; + rec->data_offset += transform->ivlen; + rec->data_len -= transform->ivlen; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + /* We still have data_len % ivlen == 0 and data_len >= ivlen here. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(&cipher_op, + transform->psa_key_dec, transform->psa_alg); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_decrypt_setup", ret); + return ret; + } + + status = psa_cipher_set_iv(&cipher_op, transform->iv_dec, transform->ivlen); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_set_iv", ret); + return ret; + } + + status = psa_cipher_update(&cipher_op, + data, rec->data_len, + data, rec->data_len, &olen); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_update", ret); + return ret; + } + + status = psa_cipher_finish(&cipher_op, + data + olen, rec->data_len - olen, + &part_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_cipher_finish", ret); + return ret; + } + + olen += part_len; +#else + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + transform->iv_dec, transform->ivlen, + data, rec->data_len, data, &olen)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_crypt", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* Double-check that length hasn't changed during decryption. */ + if (rec->data_len != olen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Safe since data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1, so after having + * subtracted at most minlen and maclen up to this point, + * data_len > 0 (because of data_len % ivlen == 0, it's actually + * >= ivlen ). */ + padlen = data[rec->data_len - 1]; + + if (auth_done == 1) { + const mbedtls_ct_condition_t ge = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge( + rec->data_len, + padlen + 1); + correct = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(ge, correct); + padlen = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(ge, padlen); + } else { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + if (rec->data_len < transform->maclen + padlen + 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("msglen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") < maclen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") + padlen (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ")", + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen, + padlen + 1)); + } +#endif + const mbedtls_ct_condition_t ge = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge( + rec->data_len, + transform->maclen + padlen + 1); + correct = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(ge, correct); + padlen = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(ge, padlen); + } + + padlen++; + + /* Regardless of the validity of the padding, + * we have data_len >= padlen here. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* The padding check involves a series of up to 256 + * consecutive memory reads at the end of the record + * plaintext buffer. In order to hide the length and + * validity of the padding, always perform exactly + * `min(256,plaintext_len)` reads (but take into account + * only the last `padlen` bytes for the padding check). */ + size_t pad_count = 0; + volatile unsigned char * const check = data; + + /* Index of first padding byte; it has been ensured above + * that the subtraction is safe. */ + size_t const padding_idx = rec->data_len - padlen; + size_t const num_checks = rec->data_len <= 256 ? rec->data_len : 256; + size_t const start_idx = rec->data_len - num_checks; + size_t idx; + + for (idx = start_idx; idx < rec->data_len; idx++) { + /* pad_count += (idx >= padding_idx) && + * (check[idx] == padlen - 1); + */ + const mbedtls_ct_condition_t a = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(idx, padding_idx); + size_t increment = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(a, 1); + const mbedtls_ct_condition_t b = mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(check[idx], padlen - 1); + increment = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(b, increment); + pad_count += increment; + } + correct = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(pad_count, padlen), correct); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + if (padlen > 0 && correct == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad padding byte detected")); + } +#endif + padlen = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(correct, padlen); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + /* If the padding was found to be invalid, padlen == 0 + * and the subtraction is safe. If the padding was found valid, + * padlen hasn't been changed and the previous assertion + * data_len >= padlen still holds. */ + rec->data_len -= padlen; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "raw buffer after decryption", + data, rec->data_len); +#endif + + /* + * Authenticate if not done yet. + * Compute the MAC regardless of the padding result (RFC4346, CBCTIME). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + if (auth_done == 0) { + unsigned char mac_expect[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD] = { 0 }; + unsigned char mac_peer[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD] = { 0 }; + + /* For CBC+MAC, If the initial value of padlen was such that + * data_len < maclen + padlen + 1, then padlen + * got reset to 1, and the initial check + * data_len >= minlen + maclen + 1 + * guarantees that at this point we still + * have at least data_len >= maclen. + * + * If the initial value of padlen was such that + * data_len >= maclen + padlen + 1, then we have + * subtracted either padlen + 1 (if the padding was correct) + * or 0 (if the padding was incorrect) since then, + * hence data_len >= maclen in any case. + * + * For stream ciphers, we checked above that + * data_len >= maclen. + */ + rec->data_len -= transform->maclen; + ssl_extract_add_data_from_record(add_data, &add_data_len, rec, + transform->tls_version, + transform->taglen); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* + * The next two sizes are the minimum and maximum values of + * data_len over all padlen values. + * + * They're independent of padlen, since we previously did + * data_len -= padlen. + * + * Note that max_len + maclen is never more than the buffer + * length, as we previously did in_msglen -= maclen too. + */ + const size_t max_len = rec->data_len + padlen; + const size_t min_len = (max_len > 256) ? max_len - 256 : 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = mbedtls_ct_hmac(transform->psa_mac_dec, + transform->psa_mac_alg, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len, + mac_expect); +#else + ret = mbedtls_ct_hmac(&transform->md_ctx_dec, + add_data, add_data_len, + data, rec->data_len, min_len, max_len, + mac_expect); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ct_hmac", ret); + goto hmac_failed_etm_disabled; + } + + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset(mac_peer, data, + rec->data_len, + min_len, max_len, + transform->maclen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "expected mac", mac_expect, transform->maclen); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "message mac", mac_peer, transform->maclen); +#endif + + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(mac_peer, mac_expect, + transform->maclen) != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("message mac does not match")); +#endif + correct = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE; + } + auth_done++; + +hmac_failed_etm_disabled: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mac_peer, transform->maclen); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(mac_expect, transform->maclen); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + /* + * Finally check the correct flag + */ + if (correct == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + + /* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */ + if (auth_done != 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (transform->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + /* Remove inner padding and infer true content type. */ + ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext(data, &rec->data_len, + &rec->type); + + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if (rec->cid_len != 0) { + ret = ssl_parse_inner_plaintext(data, &rec->data_len, + &rec->type); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= decrypt buf")); + + return 0; +} + +#undef MAC_NONE +#undef MAC_PLAINTEXT +#undef MAC_CIPHERTEXT + +/* + * Fill the input message buffer by appending data to it. + * The amount of data already fetched is in ssl->in_left. + * + * If we return 0, is it guaranteed that (at least) nb_want bytes are + * available (from this read and/or a previous one). Otherwise, an error code + * is returned (possibly EOF or WANT_READ). + * + * With stream transport (TLS) on success ssl->in_left == nb_want, but + * with datagram transport (DTLS) on success ssl->in_left >= nb_want, + * since we always read a whole datagram at once. + * + * For DTLS, it is up to the caller to set ssl->next_record_offset when + * they're done reading a record. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> fetch input")); + + if (ssl->f_recv == NULL && ssl->f_recv_timeout == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() ")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (nb_want > in_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("requesting more data than fits")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + uint32_t timeout; + + /* + * The point is, we need to always read a full datagram at once, so we + * sometimes read more then requested, and handle the additional data. + * It could be the rest of the current record (while fetching the + * header) and/or some other records in the same datagram. + */ + + /* + * Move to the next record in the already read datagram if applicable + */ + if (ssl->next_record_offset != 0) { + if (ssl->in_left < ssl->next_record_offset) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ssl->in_left -= ssl->next_record_offset; + + if (ssl->in_left != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("next record in same datagram, offset: %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->next_record_offset)); + memmove(ssl->in_hdr, + ssl->in_hdr + ssl->next_record_offset, + ssl->in_left); + } + + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_left, nb_want)); + + /* + * Done if we already have enough data. + */ + if (nb_want <= ssl->in_left) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= fetch input")); + return 0; + } + + /* + * A record can't be split across datagrams. If we need to read but + * are not at the beginning of a new record, the caller did something + * wrong. + */ + if (ssl->in_left != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* + * Don't even try to read if time's out already. + * This avoids by-passing the timer when repeatedly receiving messages + * that will end up being dropped. + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_timer(ssl) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("timer has expired")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; + } else { + len = in_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf); + + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0) { + timeout = ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout; + } else { + timeout = ssl->conf->read_timeout; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("f_recv_timeout: %lu ms", (unsigned long) timeout)); + + if (ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL) { + ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout(ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len, + timeout); + } else { + ret = ssl->f_recv(ssl->p_bio, ssl->in_hdr, len); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret); + + if (ret == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF; + } + } + + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("timeout")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); + + if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + if (ssl_double_retransmit_timeout(ssl) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("handshake timeout")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret); + return ret; + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + else if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request", + ret); + return ret; + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + } + + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + ssl->in_left = ret; + } else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_left, nb_want)); + + while (ssl->in_left < nb_want) { + len = nb_want - ssl->in_left; + + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_timer(ssl) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT; + } else { + if (ssl->f_recv_timeout != NULL) { + ret = ssl->f_recv_timeout(ssl->p_bio, + ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len, + ssl->conf->read_timeout); + } else { + ret = ssl->f_recv(ssl->p_bio, + ssl->in_hdr + ssl->in_left, len); + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("in_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", nb_want: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_left, nb_want)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl->f_recv(_timeout)", ret); + + if (ret == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF; + } + + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((size_t) ret > len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("f_recv returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " were requested", + ret, len)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ssl->in_left += ret; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= fetch input")); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Flush any data not yet written + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> flush output")); + + if (ssl->f_send == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Bad usage of mbedtls_ssl_set_bio() ")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Avoid incrementing counter if data is flushed */ + if (ssl->out_left == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= flush output")); + return 0; + } + + while (ssl->out_left > 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("message length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", out_left: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len(ssl) + ssl->out_msglen, ssl->out_left)); + + buf = ssl->out_hdr - ssl->out_left; + ret = ssl->f_send(ssl->p_bio, buf, ssl->out_left); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl->f_send", ret); + + if (ret <= 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((size_t) ret > ssl->out_left) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("f_send returned %d bytes but only %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes were sent", + ret, ssl->out_left)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ssl->out_left -= ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf; + } else +#endif + { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8; + } + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform_out); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= flush output")); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Functions to handle the DTLS retransmission state machine + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +/* + * Append current handshake message to current outgoing flight + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_flight_append(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *msg; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_flight_append")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "message appended to flight", + ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen); + + /* Allocate space for current message */ + if ((msg = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_flight_item))) == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed", + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_flight_item))); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + if ((msg->p = mbedtls_calloc(1, ssl->out_msglen)) == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes failed", + ssl->out_msglen)); + mbedtls_free(msg); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + /* Copy current handshake message with headers */ + memcpy(msg->p, ssl->out_msg, ssl->out_msglen); + msg->len = ssl->out_msglen; + msg->type = ssl->out_msgtype; + msg->next = NULL; + + /* Append to the current flight */ + if (ssl->handshake->flight == NULL) { + ssl->handshake->flight = msg; + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = ssl->handshake->flight; + while (cur->next != NULL) { + cur = cur->next; + } + cur->next = msg; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_flight_append")); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Free the current flight of handshake messages + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free(mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur = flight; + mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; + + while (cur != NULL) { + next = cur->next; + + mbedtls_free(cur->p); + mbedtls_free(cur); + + cur = next; + } +} + +/* + * Swap transform_out and out_ctr with the alternative ones + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_swap_epochs(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_transform *tmp_transform; + unsigned char tmp_out_ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; + + if (ssl->transform_out == ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip swap epochs")); + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("swap epochs")); + + /* Swap transforms */ + tmp_transform = ssl->transform_out; + ssl->transform_out = ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out; + ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = tmp_transform; + + /* Swap epoch + sequence_number */ + memcpy(tmp_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, sizeof(tmp_out_ctr)); + memcpy(ssl->cur_out_ctr, ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, + sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)); + memcpy(ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, tmp_out_ctr, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr)); + + /* Adjust to the newly activated transform */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform_out); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Retransmit the current flight of messages. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_resend(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_resend")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_resend")); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Transmit or retransmit the current flight of messages. + * + * Need to remember the current message in case flush_output returns + * WANT_WRITE, causing us to exit this function and come back later. + * This function must be called until state is no longer SENDING. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit")); + + if (ssl->handshake->retransmit_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("initialise flight transmission")); + + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = ssl->handshake->flight; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = ssl->handshake->flight->p + 12; + ret = ssl_swap_epochs(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING; + } + + while (ssl->handshake->cur_msg != NULL) { + size_t max_frag_len; + const mbedtls_ssl_flight_item * const cur = ssl->handshake->cur_msg; + + int const is_finished = + (cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + cur->p[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED); + + int const force_flush = ssl->disable_datagram_packing == 1 ? + SSL_FORCE_FLUSH : SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH; + + /* Swap epochs before sending Finished: we can't do it after + * sending ChangeCipherSpec, in case write returns WANT_READ. + * Must be done before copying, may change out_msg pointer */ + if (is_finished && ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p == (cur->p + 12)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("swap epochs to send finished message")); + ret = ssl_swap_epochs(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram(ssl); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + max_frag_len = (size_t) ret; + + /* CCS is copied as is, while HS messages may need fragmentation */ + if (cur->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + if (max_frag_len == 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + continue; + } + + memcpy(ssl->out_msg, cur->p, cur->len); + ssl->out_msglen = cur->len; + ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type; + + /* Update position inside current message */ + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur->len; + } else { + const unsigned char * const p = ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p; + const size_t hs_len = cur->len - 12; + const size_t frag_off = (size_t) (p - (cur->p + 12)); + const size_t rem_len = hs_len - frag_off; + size_t cur_hs_frag_len, max_hs_frag_len; + + if ((max_frag_len < 12) || (max_frag_len == 12 && hs_len != 0)) { + if (is_finished) { + ret = ssl_swap_epochs(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + continue; + } + max_hs_frag_len = max_frag_len - 12; + + cur_hs_frag_len = rem_len > max_hs_frag_len ? + max_hs_frag_len : rem_len; + + if (frag_off == 0 && cur_hs_frag_len != hs_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("fragmenting handshake message (%u > %u)", + (unsigned) cur_hs_frag_len, + (unsigned) max_hs_frag_len)); + } + + /* Messages are stored with handshake headers as if not fragmented, + * copy beginning of headers then fill fragmentation fields. + * Handshake headers: type(1) len(3) seq(2) f_off(3) f_len(3) */ + memcpy(ssl->out_msg, cur->p, 6); + + ssl->out_msg[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(frag_off); + ssl->out_msg[7] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(frag_off); + ssl->out_msg[8] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(frag_off); + + ssl->out_msg[9] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(cur_hs_frag_len); + ssl->out_msg[10] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(cur_hs_frag_len); + ssl->out_msg[11] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(cur_hs_frag_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "handshake header", ssl->out_msg, 12); + + /* Copy the handshake message content and set records fields */ + memcpy(ssl->out_msg + 12, p, cur_hs_frag_len); + ssl->out_msglen = cur_hs_frag_len + 12; + ssl->out_msgtype = cur->type; + + /* Update position inside current message */ + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p += cur_hs_frag_len; + } + + /* If done with the current message move to the next one if any */ + if (ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p >= cur->p + cur->len) { + if (cur->next != NULL) { + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = cur->next; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = cur->next->p + 12; + } else { + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg_p = NULL; + } + } + + /* Actually send the message out */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, force_flush)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret); + return ret; + } + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Update state and set timer */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1) { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; + } else { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit")); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * To be called when the last message of an incoming flight is received. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + /* We won't need to resend that one any more */ + mbedtls_ssl_flight_free(ssl->handshake->flight); + ssl->handshake->flight = NULL; + ssl->handshake->cur_msg = NULL; + + /* The next incoming flight will start with this msg_seq */ + ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq = ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq; + + /* We don't want to remember CCS's across flight boundaries. */ + ssl->handshake->buffering.seen_ccs = 0; + + /* Clear future message buffering structure. */ + mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(ssl); + + /* Cancel timer */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); + + if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED) { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; + } else { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING; + } +} + +/* + * To be called when the last message of an outgoing flight is send. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + ssl_reset_retransmit_timeout(ssl); + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout); + + if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED) { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED; + } else { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +/* + * Handshake layer functions + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char hs_type, + unsigned char **buf, size_t *buf_len) +{ + /* + * Reserve 4 bytes for handshake header. ( Section 4,RFC 8446 ) + * ... + * HandshakeType msg_type; + * uint24 length; + * ... + */ + *buf = ssl->out_msg + 4; + *buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 4; + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = hs_type; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Write (DTLS: or queue) current handshake (including CCS) message. + * + * - fill in handshake headers + * - update handshake checksum + * - DTLS: save message for resending + * - then pass to the record layer + * + * DTLS: except for HelloRequest, messages are only queued, and will only be + * actually sent when calling flight_transmit() or resend(). + * + * Inputs: + * - ssl->out_msglen: 4 + actual handshake message len + * (4 is the size of handshake headers for TLS) + * - ssl->out_msg[0]: the handshake type (ClientHello, ServerHello, etc) + * - ssl->out_msg + 4: the handshake message body + * + * Outputs, ie state before passing to flight_append() or write_record(): + * - ssl->out_msglen: the length of the record contents + * (including handshake headers but excluding record headers) + * - ssl->out_msg: the record contents (handshake headers + content) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int update_checksum, + int force_flush) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const size_t hs_len = ssl->out_msglen - 4; + const unsigned char hs_type = ssl->out_msg[0]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write handshake message")); + + /* + * Sanity checks + */ + if (ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->out_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Whenever we send anything different from a + * HelloRequest we should be in a handshake - double check. */ + if (!(ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST) && + ssl->handshake == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } +#endif + + /* Double-check that we did not exceed the bounds + * of the outgoing record buffer. + * This should never fail as the various message + * writing functions must obey the bounds of the + * outgoing record buffer, but better be safe. + * + * Note: We deliberately do not check for the MTU or MFL here. + */ + if (ssl->out_msglen > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Record too large: " + "size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", maximum %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->out_msglen, + (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* + * Fill handshake headers + */ + if (ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + ssl->out_msg[1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(hs_len); + ssl->out_msg[2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(hs_len); + ssl->out_msg[3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(hs_len); + + /* + * DTLS has additional fields in the Handshake layer, + * between the length field and the actual payload: + * uint16 message_seq; + * uint24 fragment_offset; + * uint24 fragment_length; + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + /* Make room for the additional DTLS fields */ + if (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen < 8) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DTLS handshake message too large: " + "size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", maximum %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + hs_len, + (size_t) (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 12))); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memmove(ssl->out_msg + 12, ssl->out_msg + 4, hs_len); + ssl->out_msglen += 8; + + /* Write message_seq and update it, except for HelloRequest */ + if (hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq, ssl->out_msg, 4); + ++(ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq); + } else { + ssl->out_msg[4] = 0; + ssl->out_msg[5] = 0; + } + + /* Handshake hashes are computed without fragmentation, + * so set frag_offset = 0 and frag_len = hs_len for now */ + memset(ssl->out_msg + 6, 0x00, 3); + memcpy(ssl->out_msg + 9, ssl->out_msg + 1, 3); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Update running hashes of handshake messages seen */ + if (hs_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST && update_checksum != 0) { + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, ssl->out_msg, + ssl->out_msglen); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } + } + } + + /* Either send now, or just save to be sent (and resent) later */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + !(ssl->out_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + hs_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST)) { + if ((ret = ssl_flight_append(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_flight_append", ret); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif + { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, force_flush)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_record", ret); + return ret; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write handshake message")); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t buf_len, size_t msg_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t msg_with_header_len; + ((void) buf_len); + + /* Add reserved 4 bytes for handshake header */ + msg_with_header_len = msg_len + 4; + ssl->out_msglen = msg_with_header_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext(ssl, 0, 0)); + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Record layer functions + */ + +/* + * Write current record. + * + * Uses: + * - ssl->out_msgtype: type of the message (AppData, Handshake, Alert, CCS) + * - ssl->out_msglen: length of the record content (excl headers) + * - ssl->out_msg: record content + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int force_flush) +{ + int ret, done = 0; + size_t len = ssl->out_msglen; + int flush = force_flush; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write record")); + + if (!done) { + unsigned i; + size_t protected_record_size; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + /* Skip writing the record content type to after the encryption, + * as it may change when using the CID extension. */ + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_ver = ssl->tls_version; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* TLS 1.3 still uses the TLS 1.2 version identifier + * for backwards compatibility. */ + if (tls_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + tls_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ssl->out_hdr + 1, ssl->conf->transport, + tls_ver); + + memcpy(ssl->out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(len, ssl->out_len, 0); + + if (ssl->transform_out != NULL) { + mbedtls_record rec; + + rec.buf = ssl->out_iv; + rec.buf_len = out_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_buf); + rec.data_len = ssl->out_msglen; + rec.data_offset = (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - rec.buf); + + memcpy(&rec.ctr[0], ssl->out_ctr, sizeof(rec.ctr)); + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(rec.ver, ssl->conf->transport, tls_ver); + rec.type = ssl->out_msgtype; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* The CID is set by mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(). */ + rec.cid_len = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(ssl, ssl->transform_out, &rec, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_encrypt_buf", ret); + return ret; + } + + if (rec.data_offset != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Update the record content type and CID. */ + ssl->out_msgtype = rec.type; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + memcpy(ssl->out_cid, rec.cid, rec.cid_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->out_msglen = len = rec.data_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(rec.data_len, ssl->out_len, 0); + } + + protected_record_size = len + mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len(ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + /* In case of DTLS, double-check that we don't exceed + * the remaining space in the datagram. */ + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + ret = ssl_get_remaining_space_in_datagram(ssl); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (protected_record_size > (size_t) ret) { + /* Should never happen */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Now write the potentially updated record content type. */ + ssl->out_hdr[0] = (unsigned char) ssl->out_msgtype; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("output record: msgtype = %u, " + "version = [%u:%u], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->out_hdr[0], ssl->out_hdr[1], + ssl->out_hdr[2], len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "output record sent to network", + ssl->out_hdr, protected_record_size); + + ssl->out_left += protected_record_size; + ssl->out_hdr += protected_record_size; + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform_out); + + for (i = 8; i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(ssl); i--) { + if (++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0) { + break; + } + } + + /* The loop goes to its end if the counter is wrapping */ + if (i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("outgoing message counter would wrap")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING; + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + flush == SSL_DONT_FORCE_FLUSH) { + size_t remaining; + ret = ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram(ssl); + if (ret < 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram", + ret); + return ret; + } + + remaining = (size_t) ret; + if (remaining == 0) { + flush = SSL_FORCE_FLUSH; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("Still %u bytes available in current datagram", + (unsigned) remaining)); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + if ((flush == SSL_FORCE_FLUSH) && + (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write record")); + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen || + memcmp(ssl->in_msg + 6, "\0\0\0", 3) != 0 || + memcmp(ssl->in_msg + 9, ssl->in_msg + 1, 3) != 0) { + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_len(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) +{ + return MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 9); +} + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_frag_off(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) +{ + return MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 6); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_hs_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) +{ + uint32_t msg_len, frag_off, frag_len; + + msg_len = ssl_get_hs_total_len(ssl); + frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off(ssl); + frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len(ssl); + + if (frag_off > msg_len) { + return -1; + } + + if (frag_len > msg_len - frag_off) { + return -1; + } + + if (frag_len + 12 > ssl->in_msglen) { + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Mark bits in bitmask (used for DTLS HS reassembly) + */ +static void ssl_bitmask_set(unsigned char *mask, size_t offset, size_t len) +{ + unsigned int start_bits, end_bits; + + start_bits = 8 - (offset % 8); + if (start_bits != 8) { + size_t first_byte_idx = offset / 8; + + /* Special case */ + if (len <= start_bits) { + for (; len != 0; len--) { + mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << (start_bits - len); + } + + /* Avoid potential issues with offset or len becoming invalid */ + return; + } + + offset += start_bits; /* Now offset % 8 == 0 */ + len -= start_bits; + + for (; start_bits != 0; start_bits--) { + mask[first_byte_idx] |= 1 << (start_bits - 1); + } + } + + end_bits = len % 8; + if (end_bits != 0) { + size_t last_byte_idx = (offset + len) / 8; + + len -= end_bits; /* Now len % 8 == 0 */ + + for (; end_bits != 0; end_bits--) { + mask[last_byte_idx] |= 1 << (8 - end_bits); + } + } + + memset(mask + offset / 8, 0xFF, len / 8); +} + +/* + * Check that bitmask is full + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_bitmask_check(unsigned char *mask, size_t len) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < len / 8; i++) { + if (mask[i] != 0xFF) { + return -1; + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < len % 8; i++) { + if ((mask[len / 8] & (1 << (7 - i))) == 0) { + return -1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* msg_len does not include the handshake header */ +static size_t ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size(size_t msg_len, + unsigned add_bitmap) +{ + size_t alloc_len; + + alloc_len = 12; /* Handshake header */ + alloc_len += msg_len; /* Content buffer */ + + if (add_bitmap) { + alloc_len += msg_len / 8 + (msg_len % 8 != 0); /* Bitmap */ + + } + return alloc_len; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +static uint32_t ssl_get_hs_total_len(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) +{ + return MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 1); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl->in_msglen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("handshake message too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; + } + + ssl->in_hslen = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + ssl_get_hs_total_len(ssl); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("handshake message: msglen =" + " %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET ", type = %u, hslen = %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen, ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_hslen)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned int recv_msg_seq = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, 4); + + if (ssl_check_hs_header(ssl) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid handshake header")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; + } + + if (ssl->handshake != NULL && + ((mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0 && + recv_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq) || + (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1 && + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO))) { + if (recv_msg_seq > ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ( + "received future handshake message of sequence number %u (next %u)", + recv_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE; + } + + /* Retransmit only on last message from previous flight, to avoid + * too many retransmissions. + * Besides, No sane server ever retransmits HelloVerifyRequest */ + if (recv_msg_seq == ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq - 1 && + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("received message from last flight, " + "message_seq = %u, start_of_flight = %u", + recv_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_flight_start_seq)); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend", ret); + return ret; + } + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("dropping out-of-sequence message: " + "message_seq = %u, expected = %u", + recv_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq)); + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } + /* Wait until message completion to increment in_msg_seq */ + + /* Message reassembly is handled alongside buffering of future + * messages; the commonality is that both handshake fragments and + * future messages cannot be forwarded immediately to the + * handshake logic layer. */ + if (ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment(ssl) == 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("found fragmented DTLS handshake message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + /* With TLS we don't handle fragmentation (for now) */ + if (ssl->in_msglen < ssl->in_hslen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("TLS handshake fragmentation not supported")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0 && hs != NULL) { + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_hslen); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } + } + + /* Handshake message is complete, increment counter */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake != NULL) { + unsigned offset; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf; + + /* Increment handshake sequence number */ + hs->in_msg_seq++; + + /* + * Clear up handshake buffering and reassembly structure. + */ + + /* Free first entry */ + ssl_buffering_free_slot(ssl, 0); + + /* Shift all other entries */ + for (offset = 0, hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0]; + offset + 1 < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; + offset++, hs_buf++) { + *hs_buf = *(hs_buf + 1); + } + + /* Create a fresh last entry */ + memset(hs_buf, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer)); + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +/* + * DTLS anti-replay: RFC 6347 4.1.2.6 + * + * in_window is a field of bits numbered from 0 (lsb) to 63 (msb). + * Bit n is set iff record number in_window_top - n has been seen. + * + * Usually, in_window_top is the last record number seen and the lsb of + * in_window is set. The only exception is the initial state (record number 0 + * not seen yet). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + ssl->in_window_top = 0; + ssl->in_window = 0; +} + +static inline uint64_t ssl_load_six_bytes(unsigned char *buf) +{ + return ((uint64_t) buf[0] << 40) | + ((uint64_t) buf[1] << 32) | + ((uint64_t) buf[2] << 24) | + ((uint64_t) buf[3] << 16) | + ((uint64_t) buf[4] << 8) | + ((uint64_t) buf[5]); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t *record_in_ctr) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *original_in_ctr; + + // save original in_ctr + original_in_ctr = ssl->in_ctr; + + // use counter from record + ssl->in_ctr = record_in_ctr; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check((mbedtls_ssl_context const *) ssl); + + // restore the counter + ssl->in_ctr = original_in_ctr; + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Return 0 if sequence number is acceptable, -1 otherwise + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl) +{ + uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes(ssl->in_ctr + 2); + uint64_t bit; + + if (ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED) { + return 0; + } + + if (rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top) { + return 0; + } + + bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum; + + if (bit >= 64) { + return -1; + } + + if ((ssl->in_window & ((uint64_t) 1 << bit)) != 0) { + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Update replay window on new validated record + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + uint64_t rec_seqnum = ssl_load_six_bytes(ssl->in_ctr + 2); + + if (ssl->conf->anti_replay == MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED) { + return; + } + + if (rec_seqnum > ssl->in_window_top) { + /* Update window_top and the contents of the window */ + uint64_t shift = rec_seqnum - ssl->in_window_top; + + if (shift >= 64) { + ssl->in_window = 1; + } else { + ssl->in_window <<= shift; + ssl->in_window |= 1; + } + + ssl->in_window_top = rec_seqnum; + } else { + /* Mark that number as seen in the current window */ + uint64_t bit = ssl->in_window_top - rec_seqnum; + + if (bit < 64) { /* Always true, but be extra sure */ + ssl->in_window |= (uint64_t) 1 << bit; + } + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* + * Check if a datagram looks like a ClientHello with a valid cookie, + * and if it doesn't, generate a HelloVerifyRequest message. + * Both input and output include full DTLS headers. + * + * - if cookie is valid, return 0 + * - if ClientHello looks superficially valid but cookie is not, + * fill obuf and set olen, then + * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED + * - otherwise return a specific error code + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len, + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen) +{ + size_t sid_len, cookie_len, epoch, fragment_offset; + unsigned char *p; + + /* + * Structure of ClientHello with record and handshake headers, + * and expected values. We don't need to check a lot, more checks will be + * done when actually parsing the ClientHello - skipping those checks + * avoids code duplication and does not make cookie forging any easier. + * + * 0-0 ContentType type; copied, must be handshake + * 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied + * 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied, must be 0 + * 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied + * 11-12 uint16 length; (ignored) + * + * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; (ignored) + * 14-16 uint24 length; (ignored) + * 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied + * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied, must be 0 + * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; (ignored) + * + * 25-26 ProtocolVersion client_version; (ignored) + * 27-58 Random random; (ignored) + * 59-xx SessionID session_id; 1 byte len + sid_len content + * 60+ opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; 1 byte len + content + * ... + * + * Minimum length is 61 bytes. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("check cookie: in_len=%u", + (unsigned) in_len)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "cli_id", cli_id, cli_id_len); + if (in_len < 61) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("check cookie: record too short")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + epoch = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(in, 3); + fragment_offset = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(in, 19); + + if (in[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || epoch != 0 || + fragment_offset != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("check cookie: not a good ClientHello")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, (" type=%u epoch=%u fragment_offset=%u", + in[0], (unsigned) epoch, + (unsigned) fragment_offset)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + sid_len = in[59]; + if (59 + 1 + sid_len + 1 > in_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("check cookie: sid_len=%u > %u", + (unsigned) sid_len, + (unsigned) in_len - 61)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "sid received from network", + in + 60, sid_len); + + cookie_len = in[60 + sid_len]; + if (59 + 1 + sid_len + 1 + cookie_len > in_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("check cookie: cookie_len=%u > %u", + (unsigned) cookie_len, + (unsigned) (in_len - sid_len - 61))); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "cookie received from network", + in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len); + if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_check(ssl->conf->p_cookie, + in + sid_len + 61, cookie_len, + cli_id, cli_id_len) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("check cookie: valid")); + return 0; + } + + /* + * If we get here, we've got an invalid cookie, let's prepare HVR. + * + * 0-0 ContentType type; copied + * 1-2 ProtocolVersion version; copied + * 3-4 uint16 epoch; copied + * 5-10 uint48 sequence_number; copied + * 11-12 uint16 length; olen - 13 + * + * 13-13 HandshakeType msg_type; hello_verify_request + * 14-16 uint24 length; olen - 25 + * 17-18 uint16 message_seq; copied + * 19-21 uint24 fragment_offset; copied + * 22-24 uint24 fragment_length; olen - 25 + * + * 25-26 ProtocolVersion server_version; 0xfe 0xff + * 27-27 opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; cookie_len = olen - 27, cookie + * + * Minimum length is 28. + */ + if (buf_len < 28) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* Copy most fields and adapt others */ + memcpy(obuf, in, 25); + obuf[13] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; + obuf[25] = 0xfe; + obuf[26] = 0xff; + + /* Generate and write actual cookie */ + p = obuf + 28; + if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_write(ssl->conf->p_cookie, + &p, obuf + buf_len, + cli_id, cli_id_len) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + *olen = (size_t) (p - obuf); + + /* Go back and fill length fields */ + obuf[27] = (unsigned char) (*olen - 28); + + obuf[14] = obuf[22] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(*olen - 25); + obuf[15] = obuf[23] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*olen - 25); + obuf[16] = obuf[24] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(*olen - 25); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*olen - 13, obuf, 11); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED; +} + +/* + * Handle possible client reconnect with the same UDP quadruplet + * (RFC 6347 Section 4.2.8). + * + * Called by ssl_parse_record_header() in case we receive an epoch 0 record + * that looks like a ClientHello. + * + * - if the input looks like a ClientHello without cookies, + * send back HelloVerifyRequest, then return 0 + * - if the input looks like a ClientHello with a valid cookie, + * reset the session of the current context, and + * return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT + * - if anything goes wrong, return a specific error code + * + * This function is called (through ssl_check_client_reconnect()) when an + * unexpected record is found in ssl_get_next_record(), which will discard the + * record if we return 0, and bubble up the return value otherwise (this + * includes the case of MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT and of unexpected + * errors, and is the right thing to do in both cases). + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_handle_possible_reconnect(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL || + ssl->conf->f_cookie_check == NULL) { + /* If we can't use cookies to verify reachability of the peer, + * drop the record. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no cookie callbacks, " + "can't check reconnect validity")); + return 0; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie( + ssl, + ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len, + ssl->in_buf, ssl->in_left, + ssl->out_buf, MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, &len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie", ret); + + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED) { + int send_ret; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("sending HelloVerifyRequest")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "output record sent to network", + ssl->out_buf, len); + /* Don't check write errors as we can't do anything here. + * If the error is permanent we'll catch it later, + * if it's not, then hopefully it'll work next time. */ + send_ret = ssl->f_send(ssl->p_bio, ssl->out_buf, len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl->f_send", send_ret); + (void) send_ret; + + return 0; + } + + if (ret == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cookie is valid, resetting context")); + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(ssl, 1)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "reset", ret); + return ret; + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT; + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_record_type(uint8_t record_type) +{ + if (record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT && + record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && + record_type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * ContentType type; + * ProtocolVersion version; + * uint16 epoch; // DTLS only + * uint48 sequence_number; // DTLS only + * uint16 length; + * + * Return 0 if header looks sane (and, for DTLS, the record is expected) + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD if the header looks bad, + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD (DTLS only) if sane but unexpected. + * + * With DTLS, mbedtls_ssl_read_record() will: + * 1. proceed with the record if this function returns 0 + * 2. drop only the current record if this function returns UNEXPECTED_RECORD + * 3. return CLIENT_RECONNECT if this function return that value + * 4. drop the whole datagram if this function returns anything else. + * Point 2 is needed when the peer is resending, and we have already received + * the first record from a datagram but are still waiting for the others. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_record_header(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, + mbedtls_record *rec) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version; + + size_t const rec_hdr_type_offset = 0; + size_t const rec_hdr_type_len = 1; + + size_t const rec_hdr_version_offset = rec_hdr_type_offset + + rec_hdr_type_len; + size_t const rec_hdr_version_len = 2; + + size_t const rec_hdr_ctr_len = 8; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + uint32_t rec_epoch; + size_t const rec_hdr_ctr_offset = rec_hdr_version_offset + + rec_hdr_version_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + size_t const rec_hdr_cid_offset = rec_hdr_ctr_offset + + rec_hdr_ctr_len; + size_t rec_hdr_cid_len = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + size_t rec_hdr_len_offset; /* To be determined */ + size_t const rec_hdr_len_len = 2; + + /* + * Check minimum lengths for record header. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + rec_hdr_len_offset = rec_hdr_ctr_offset + rec_hdr_ctr_len; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + rec_hdr_len_offset = rec_hdr_version_offset + rec_hdr_version_len; + } + + if (len < rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ( + "datagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header of length %u", + (unsigned) len, + (unsigned) (rec_hdr_len_len + rec_hdr_len_len))); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; + } + + /* + * Parse and validate record content type + */ + + rec->type = buf[rec_hdr_type_offset]; + + /* Check record content type */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + rec->cid_len = 0; + + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->conf->cid_len != 0 && + rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID) { + /* Shift pointers to account for record header including CID + * struct { + * ContentType outer_type = tls12_cid; + * ProtocolVersion version; + * uint16 epoch; + * uint48 sequence_number; + * opaque cid[cid_length]; // Additional field compared to + * // default DTLS record format + * uint16 length; + * opaque enc_content[DTLSCiphertext.length]; + * } DTLSCiphertext; + */ + + /* So far, we only support static CID lengths + * fixed in the configuration. */ + rec_hdr_cid_len = ssl->conf->cid_len; + rec_hdr_len_offset += rec_hdr_cid_len; + + if (len < rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ( + "datagram of length %u too small to hold DTLS record header including CID, length %u", + (unsigned) len, + (unsigned) (rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len))); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; + } + + /* configured CID len is guaranteed at most 255, see + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX in check_config.h */ + rec->cid_len = (uint8_t) rec_hdr_cid_len; + memcpy(rec->cid, buf + rec_hdr_cid_offset, rec_hdr_cid_len); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + { + if (ssl_check_record_type(rec->type)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("unknown record type %u", + (unsigned) rec->type)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; + } + } + + /* + * Parse and validate record version + */ + rec->ver[0] = buf[rec_hdr_version_offset + 0]; + rec->ver[1] = buf[rec_hdr_version_offset + 1]; + tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) mbedtls_ssl_read_version( + buf + rec_hdr_version_offset, + ssl->conf->transport); + + if (tls_version > ssl->conf->max_tls_version) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("TLS version mismatch: got %u, expected max %u", + (unsigned) tls_version, + (unsigned) ssl->conf->max_tls_version)); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; + } + /* + * Parse/Copy record sequence number. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + /* Copy explicit record sequence number from input buffer. */ + memcpy(&rec->ctr[0], buf + rec_hdr_ctr_offset, + rec_hdr_ctr_len); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + /* Copy implicit record sequence number from SSL context structure. */ + memcpy(&rec->ctr[0], ssl->in_ctr, rec_hdr_ctr_len); + } + + /* + * Parse record length. + */ + + rec->data_offset = rec_hdr_len_offset + rec_hdr_len_len; + rec->data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, rec_hdr_len_offset); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "input record header", buf, rec->data_offset); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("input record: msgtype = %u, " + "version = [0x%x], msglen = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + rec->type, (unsigned) tls_version, rec->data_len)); + + rec->buf = buf; + rec->buf_len = rec->data_offset + rec->data_len; + + if (rec->data_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; + } + + /* + * DTLS-related tests. + * Check epoch before checking length constraint because + * the latter varies with the epoch. E.g., if a ChangeCipherSpec + * message gets duplicated before the corresponding Finished message, + * the second ChangeCipherSpec should be discarded because it belongs + * to an old epoch, but not because its length is shorter than + * the minimum record length for packets using the new record transform. + * Note that these two kinds of failures are handled differently, + * as an unexpected record is silently skipped but an invalid + * record leads to the entire datagram being dropped. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + rec_epoch = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(rec->ctr, 0); + + /* Check that the datagram is large enough to contain a record + * of the advertised length. */ + if (len < rec->data_offset + rec->data_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ( + "Datagram of length %u too small to contain record of advertised length %u.", + (unsigned) len, + (unsigned) (rec->data_offset + rec->data_len))); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; + } + + /* Records from other, non-matching epochs are silently discarded. + * (The case of same-port Client reconnects must be considered in + * the caller). */ + if (rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("record from another epoch: " + "expected %u, received %lu", + ssl->in_epoch, (unsigned long) rec_epoch)); + + /* Records from the next epoch are considered for buffering + * (concretely: early Finished messages). */ + if (rec_epoch == (unsigned) ssl->in_epoch + 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Consider record for buffering")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE; + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + /* For records from the correct epoch, check whether their + * sequence number has been seen before. */ + else if (mbedtls_ssl_dtls_record_replay_check((mbedtls_ssl_context *) ssl, + &rec->ctr[0]) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("replayed record")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD; + } +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + return 0; +} + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_client_reconnect(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + unsigned int rec_epoch = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_ctr, 0); + + /* + * Check for an epoch 0 ClientHello. We can't use in_msg here to + * access the first byte of record content (handshake type), as we + * have an active transform (possibly iv_len != 0), so use the + * fact that the record header len is 13 instead. + */ + if (rec_epoch == 0 && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1 && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_left > 13 && + ssl->in_buf[13] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("possible client reconnect " + "from the same port")); + return ssl_handle_possible_reconnect(ssl); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* + * If applicable, decrypt record content + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_record *rec) +{ + int ret, done = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "input record from network", + rec->buf, rec->buf_len); + + /* + * In TLS 1.3, always treat ChangeCipherSpec records + * as unencrypted. The only thing we do with them is + * check the length and content and ignore them. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->transform_in != NULL && + ssl->transform_in->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + if (rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + done = 1; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + if (!done && ssl->transform_in != NULL) { + unsigned char const old_msg_type = rec->type; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(ssl, ssl->transform_in, + rec)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_decrypt_buf", ret); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* + * Although the server rejected early data, it might receive early + * data as long as it has not received the client Finished message. + * It is encrypted with early keys and should be ignored as stated + * in section 4.2.10 of RFC 8446: + * + * "Ignore the extension and return a regular 1-RTT response. The + * server then skips past early data by attempting to deprotect + * received records using the handshake traffic key, discarding + * records which fail deprotection (up to the configured + * max_early_data_size). Once a record is deprotected successfully, + * it is treated as the start of the client's second flight and the + * server proceeds as with an ordinary 1-RTT handshake." + */ + if ((old_msg_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) && + (ssl->discard_early_data_record == + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("EarlyData: deprotect and discard app data records.")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(ssl, rec->data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID && + ssl->conf->ignore_unexpected_cid + == MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ignoring unexpected CID")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* + * The decryption of the record failed, no reason to ignore it, + * return in error with the decryption error code. + */ + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* + * If the server were discarding protected records that it fails to + * deprotect because it has rejected early data, as we have just + * deprotected successfully a record, the server has to resume normal + * operation and fail the connection if the deprotection of a record + * fails. + */ + if (ssl->discard_early_data_record == + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD) { + ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + if (old_msg_type != rec->type) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("record type after decrypt (before %d): %d", + old_msg_type, rec->type)); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "input payload after decrypt", + rec->buf + rec->data_offset, rec->data_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* We have already checked the record content type + * in ssl_parse_record_header(), failing or silently + * dropping the record in the case of an unknown type. + * + * Since with the use of CIDs, the record content type + * might change during decryption, re-check the record + * content type, but treat a failure as fatal this time. */ + if (ssl_check_record_type(rec->type)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("unknown record type")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + if (rec->data_len == 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 + && rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) { + /* TLS v1.2 explicitly disallows zero-length messages which are not application data */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid zero-length message type: %d", ssl->in_msgtype)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + ssl->nb_zero++; + + /* + * Three or more empty messages may be a DoS attack + * (excessive CPU consumption). + */ + if (ssl->nb_zero > 3) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("received four consecutive empty " + "messages, possible DoS attack")); + /* Treat the records as if they were not properly authenticated, + * thereby failing the connection if we see more than allowed + * by the configured bad MAC threshold. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + } + } else { + ssl->nb_zero = 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + ; /* in_ctr read from peer, not maintained internally */ + } else +#endif + { + unsigned i; + for (i = MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; + i > mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(ssl); i--) { + if (++ssl->in_ctr[i - 1] != 0) { + break; + } + } + + /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ + if (i == mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("incoming message counter would wrap")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING; + } + } + + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* + * Although the server rejected early data because it needed to send an + * HelloRetryRequest message, it might receive early data as long as it has + * not received the client Finished message. + * The early data is encrypted with early keys and should be ignored as + * stated in section 4.2.10 of RFC 8446 (second case): + * + * "The server then ignores early data by skipping all records with an + * external content type of "application_data" (indicating that they are + * encrypted), up to the configured max_early_data_size. Ignore application + * data message before 2nd ClientHello when early_data was received in 1st + * ClientHello." + */ + if (ssl->discard_early_data_record == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD) { + if (rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) { + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(ssl, rec->data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("EarlyData: Ignore application message before 2nd ClientHello")); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } else if (rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(ssl); + } +#endif + + /* Check actual (decrypted) record content length against + * configured maximum. */ + if (rec->data_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad message length")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Read a record. + * + * Silently ignore non-fatal alert (and for DTLS, invalid records as well, + * RFC 6347 4.1.2.7) and continue reading until a valid record is found. + * + */ + +/* Helper functions for mbedtls_ssl_read_record(). */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_consume_current_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_next_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_record_is_in_progress(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +int mbedtls_ssl_read_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned update_hs_digest) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> read record")); + + if (ssl->keep_current_message == 0) { + do { + + ret = ssl_consume_current_message(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (ssl_record_is_in_progress(ssl) == 0) { + int dtls_have_buffered = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + + /* We only check for buffered messages if the + * current datagram is fully consumed. */ + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram(ssl) == 0) { + if (ssl_load_buffered_message(ssl) == 0) { + dtls_have_buffered = 1; + } + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + if (dtls_have_buffered == 0) { + ret = ssl_get_next_record(ssl); + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING) { + continue; + } + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_get_next_record"), ret); + return ret; + } + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE) { + /* Buffer future message */ + ret = ssl_buffer_message(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + } while (MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL == ret || + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING == ret); + + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type"), ret); + return ret; + } + + if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + update_hs_digest == 1) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status"), ret); + return ret; + } + } + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("reuse previously read message")); + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= read record")); + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset) { + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_load_buffered_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf; + int ret = 0; + + if (hs == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_load_buffered_message")); + + if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + /* Check if we have seen a ChangeCipherSpec before. + * If yes, synthesize a CCS record. */ + if (!hs->buffering.seen_ccs) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("CCS not seen in the current flight")); + ret = -1; + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Injecting buffered CCS message")); + ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + ssl->in_msglen = 1; + ssl->in_msg[0] = 1; + + /* As long as they are equal, the exact value doesn't matter. */ + ssl->in_left = 0; + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + + hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 0; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + /* Debug only */ + { + unsigned offset; + for (offset = 1; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++) { + hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[offset]; + if (hs_buf->is_valid == 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Future message with sequence number %u %s buffered.", + hs->in_msg_seq + offset, + hs_buf->is_complete ? "fully" : "partially")); + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + + /* Check if we have buffered and/or fully reassembled the + * next handshake message. */ + hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[0]; + if ((hs_buf->is_valid == 1) && (hs_buf->is_complete == 1)) { + /* Synthesize a record containing the buffered HS message. */ + size_t msg_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(hs_buf->data, 1); + + /* Double-check that we haven't accidentally buffered + * a message that doesn't fit into the input buffer. */ + if (msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Next handshake message has been buffered - load")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Buffered handshake message (incl. header)", + hs_buf->data, msg_len + 12); + + ssl->in_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->in_hslen = msg_len + 12; + ssl->in_msglen = msg_len + 12; + memcpy(ssl->in_msg, hs_buf->data, ssl->in_hslen); + + ret = 0; + goto exit; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Next handshake message %u not or only partially bufffered", + hs->in_msg_seq)); + } + + ret = -1; + +exit: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_load_buffered_message")); + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_buffer_make_space(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t desired) +{ + int offset; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Attempt to free buffered messages to have %u bytes available", + (unsigned) desired)); + + /* Get rid of future records epoch first, if such exist. */ + ssl_free_buffered_record(ssl); + + /* Check if we have enough space available now. */ + if (desired <= (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Enough space available after freeing future epoch record")); + return 0; + } + + /* We don't have enough space to buffer the next expected handshake + * message. Remove buffers used for future messages to gain space, + * starting with the most distant one. */ + for (offset = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - 1; + offset >= 0; offset--) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ( + "Free buffering slot %d to make space for reassembly of next handshake message", + offset)); + + ssl_buffering_free_slot(ssl, (uint8_t) offset); + + /* Check if we have enough space available now. */ + if (desired <= (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Enough space available after freeing buffered HS messages")); + return 0; + } + } + + return -1; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_buffer_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + if (hs == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_buffer_message")); + + switch (ssl->in_msgtype) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Remember CCS message")); + + hs->buffering.seen_ccs = 1; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE: + { + unsigned recv_msg_seq_offset; + unsigned recv_msg_seq = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, 4); + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer *hs_buf; + size_t msg_len = ssl->in_hslen - 12; + + /* We should never receive an old handshake + * message - double-check nonetheless. */ + if (recv_msg_seq < ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + recv_msg_seq_offset = recv_msg_seq - ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq; + if (recv_msg_seq_offset >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS) { + /* Silently ignore -- message too far in the future */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("Ignore future HS message with sequence number %u, " + "buffering window %u - %u", + recv_msg_seq, ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS - + 1)); + + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Buffering HS message with sequence number %u, offset %u ", + recv_msg_seq, recv_msg_seq_offset)); + + hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[recv_msg_seq_offset]; + + /* Check if the buffering for this seq nr has already commenced. */ + if (!hs_buf->is_valid) { + size_t reassembly_buf_sz; + + hs_buf->is_fragmented = + (ssl_hs_is_proper_fragment(ssl) == 1); + + /* We copy the message back into the input buffer + * after reassembly, so check that it's not too large. + * This is an implementation-specific limitation + * and not one from the standard, hence it is not + * checked in ssl_check_hs_header(). */ + if (msg_len + 12 > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) { + /* Ignore message */ + goto exit; + } + + /* Check if we have enough space to buffer the message. */ + if (hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered > + MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + reassembly_buf_sz = ssl_get_reassembly_buffer_size(msg_len, + hs_buf->is_fragmented); + + if (reassembly_buf_sz > (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered)) { + if (recv_msg_seq_offset > 0) { + /* If we can't buffer a future message because + * of space limitations -- ignore. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("Buffering of future message of size %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " would exceed the compile-time limit %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- ignore\n", + msg_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered)); + goto exit; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("Buffering of future message of size %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " would exceed the compile-time limit %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- attempt to make space by freeing buffered future messages\n", + msg_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered)); + } + + if (ssl_buffer_make_space(ssl, reassembly_buf_sz) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("Reassembly of next message of size %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " with bitmap) would exceed" + " the compile-time limit %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- fail\n", + msg_len, + reassembly_buf_sz, + (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered)); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("initialize reassembly, total length = %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + msg_len)); + + hs_buf->data = mbedtls_calloc(1, reassembly_buf_sz); + if (hs_buf->data == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + hs_buf->data_len = reassembly_buf_sz; + + /* Prepare final header: copy msg_type, length and message_seq, + * then add standardised fragment_offset and fragment_length */ + memcpy(hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 6); + memset(hs_buf->data + 6, 0, 3); + memcpy(hs_buf->data + 9, hs_buf->data + 1, 3); + + hs_buf->is_valid = 1; + + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += reassembly_buf_sz; + } else { + /* Make sure msg_type and length are consistent */ + if (memcmp(hs_buf->data, ssl->in_msg, 4) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Fragment header mismatch - ignore")); + /* Ignore */ + goto exit; + } + } + + if (!hs_buf->is_complete) { + size_t frag_len, frag_off; + unsigned char * const msg = hs_buf->data + 12; + + /* + * Check and copy current fragment + */ + + /* Validation of header fields already done in + * mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(). */ + frag_off = ssl_get_hs_frag_off(ssl); + frag_len = ssl_get_hs_frag_len(ssl); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("adding fragment, offset = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ", length = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + frag_off, frag_len)); + memcpy(msg + frag_off, ssl->in_msg + 12, frag_len); + + if (hs_buf->is_fragmented) { + unsigned char * const bitmask = msg + msg_len; + ssl_bitmask_set(bitmask, frag_off, frag_len); + hs_buf->is_complete = (ssl_bitmask_check(bitmask, + msg_len) == 0); + } else { + hs_buf->is_complete = 1; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("message %scomplete", + hs_buf->is_complete ? "" : "not yet ")); + } + + break; + } + + default: + /* We don't buffer other types of messages. */ + break; + } + +exit: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_buffer_message")); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_consume_current_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + /* + * Consume last content-layer message and potentially + * update in_msglen which keeps track of the contents' + * consumption state. + * + * (1) Handshake messages: + * Remove last handshake message, move content + * and adapt in_msglen. + * + * (2) Alert messages: + * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0. + * + * (3) Change cipher spec: + * Consume whole record content, in_msglen = 0. + * + * (4) Application data: + * Don't do anything - the record layer provides + * the application data as a stream transport + * and consumes through mbedtls_ssl_read only. + * + */ + + /* Case (1): Handshake messages */ + if (ssl->in_hslen != 0) { + /* Hard assertion to be sure that no application data + * is in flight, as corrupting ssl->in_msglen during + * ssl->in_offt != NULL is fatal. */ + if (ssl->in_offt != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* + * Get next Handshake message in the current record + */ + + /* Notes: + * (1) in_hslen is not necessarily the size of the + * current handshake content: If DTLS handshake + * fragmentation is used, that's the fragment + * size instead. Using the total handshake message + * size here is faulty and should be changed at + * some point. + * (2) While it doesn't seem to cause problems, one + * has to be very careful not to assume that in_hslen + * is always <= in_msglen in a sensible communication. + * Again, it's wrong for DTLS handshake fragmentation. + * The following check is therefore mandatory, and + * should not be treated as a silently corrected assertion. + * Additionally, ssl->in_hslen might be arbitrarily out of + * bounds after handling a DTLS message with an unexpected + * sequence number, see mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record. + */ + if (ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen) { + ssl->in_msglen -= ssl->in_hslen; + memmove(ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen, + ssl->in_msglen); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "remaining content in record", + ssl->in_msg, ssl->in_msglen); + } else { + ssl->in_msglen = 0; + } + + ssl->in_hslen = 0; + } + /* Case (4): Application data */ + else if (ssl->in_offt != NULL) { + return 0; + } + /* Everything else (CCS & Alerts) */ + else { + ssl->in_msglen = 0; + } + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_record_is_in_progress(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl->in_msglen > 0) { + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +static void ssl_free_buffered_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + if (hs == NULL) { + return; + } + + if (hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL) { + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= + hs->buffering.future_record.len; + + mbedtls_free(hs->buffering.future_record.data); + hs->buffering.future_record.data = NULL; + } +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_load_buffered_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + unsigned char *rec; + size_t rec_len; + unsigned rec_epoch; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return 0; + } + + if (hs == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + rec = hs->buffering.future_record.data; + rec_len = hs->buffering.future_record.len; + rec_epoch = hs->buffering.future_record.epoch; + + if (rec == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + /* Only consider loading future records if the + * input buffer is empty. */ + if (ssl_next_record_is_in_datagram(ssl) == 1) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_load_buffered_record")); + + if (rec_epoch != ssl->in_epoch) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Buffered record not from current epoch.")); + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Found buffered record from current epoch - load")); + + /* Double-check that the record is not too large */ + if (rec_len > in_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->in_hdr - ssl->in_buf)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + memcpy(ssl->in_hdr, rec, rec_len); + ssl->in_left = rec_len; + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + + ssl_free_buffered_record(ssl); + +exit: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_load_buffered_record")); + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_buffer_future_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_record const *rec) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + /* Don't buffer future records outside handshakes. */ + if (hs == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + /* Only buffer handshake records (we are only interested + * in Finished messages). */ + if (rec->type != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + return 0; + } + + /* Don't buffer more than one future epoch record. */ + if (hs->buffering.future_record.data != NULL) { + return 0; + } + + /* Don't buffer record if there's not enough buffering space remaining. */ + if (rec->buf_len > (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING - + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Buffering of future epoch record of size %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " would exceed the compile-time limit %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " (already %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " bytes buffered) -- ignore\n", + rec->buf_len, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING, + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered)); + return 0; + } + + /* Buffer record */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Buffer record from epoch %u", + ssl->in_epoch + 1U)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Buffered record", rec->buf, rec->buf_len); + + /* ssl_parse_record_header() only considers records + * of the next epoch as candidates for buffering. */ + hs->buffering.future_record.epoch = ssl->in_epoch + 1; + hs->buffering.future_record.len = rec->buf_len; + + hs->buffering.future_record.data = + mbedtls_calloc(1, hs->buffering.future_record.len); + if (hs->buffering.future_record.data == NULL) { + /* If we run out of RAM trying to buffer a + * record from the next epoch, just ignore. */ + return 0; + } + + memcpy(hs->buffering.future_record.data, rec->buf, rec->buf_len); + + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered += rec->buf_len; + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_next_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_record rec; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + /* We might have buffered a future record; if so, + * and if the epoch matches now, load it. + * On success, this call will set ssl->in_left to + * the length of the buffered record, so that + * the calls to ssl_fetch_input() below will + * essentially be no-ops. */ + ret = ssl_load_buffered_record(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* Ensure that we have enough space available for the default form + * of TLS / DTLS record headers (5 Bytes for TLS, 13 Bytes for DTLS, + * with no space for CIDs counted in). */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl)); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = ssl_parse_record_header(ssl, ssl->in_hdr, ssl->in_left, &rec); + if (ret != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE) { + ret = ssl_buffer_future_record(ssl, &rec); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Fall through to handling of unexpected records */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD; + } + + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* Reset in pointers to default state for TLS/DTLS records, + * assuming no CID and no offset between record content and + * record plaintext. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl); + + /* Setup internal message pointers from record structure. */ + ssl->in_msgtype = rec.type; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid + rec.cid_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_len + 2; + ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len; + + ret = ssl_check_client_reconnect(ssl); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl_check_client_reconnect", ret); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + /* Skip unexpected record (but not whole datagram) */ + ssl->next_record_offset = rec.buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("discarding unexpected record " + "(header)")); + } else { + /* Skip invalid record and the rest of the datagram */ + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_left = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("discarding invalid record " + "(header)")); + } + + /* Get next record */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } else +#endif + { + return ret; + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + /* Remember offset of next record within datagram. */ + ssl->next_record_offset = rec.buf_len; + if (ssl->next_record_offset < ssl->in_left) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("more than one record within datagram")); + } + } else +#endif + { + /* + * Fetch record contents from underlying transport. + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, rec.buf_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret); + return ret; + } + + ssl->in_left = 0; + } + + /* + * Decrypt record contents. + */ + + if ((ret = ssl_prepare_record_content(ssl, &rec)) != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + /* Silently discard invalid records */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) { + /* Except when waiting for Finished as a bad mac here + * probably means something went wrong in the handshake + * (eg wrong psk used, mitm downgrade attempt, etc.) */ + if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC); + } +#endif + return ret; + } + + if (ssl->conf->badmac_limit != 0 && + ++ssl->badmac_seen >= ssl->conf->badmac_limit) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("too many records with bad MAC")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + } + + /* As above, invalid records cause + * dismissal of the whole datagram. */ + + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_left = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("discarding invalid record (mac)")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } + + return ret; + } else +#endif + { + /* Error out (and send alert) on invalid records */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC); + } +#endif + return ret; + } + } + + + /* Reset in pointers to default state for TLS/DTLS records, + * assuming no CID and no offset between record content and + * record plaintext. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid + rec.cid_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2; + + /* The record content type may change during decryption, + * so re-read it. */ + ssl->in_msgtype = rec.type; + /* Also update the input buffer, because unfortunately + * the server-side ssl_parse_client_hello() reparses the + * record header when receiving a ClientHello initiating + * a renegotiation. */ + ssl->in_hdr[0] = rec.type; + ssl->in_msg = rec.buf + rec.data_offset; + ssl->in_msglen = rec.data_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(rec.data_len, ssl->in_len, 0); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * Handle particular types of records + */ + if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + if (ssl->in_msglen != 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid CCS message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; + } + + if (ssl->in_msg[0] != 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid CCS message, content: %02x", + ssl->in_msg[0])); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && + ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + if (ssl->handshake == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("dropping ChangeCipherSpec outside handshake")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("received out-of-order ChangeCipherSpec - remember")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("Ignore ChangeCipherSpec in TLS 1.3 compatibility mode")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; +#else + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("ChangeCipherSpec invalid in TLS 1.3 without compatibility mode")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + } + + if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT) { + if (ssl->in_msglen != 2) { + /* Note: Standard allows for more than one 2 byte alert + to be packed in a single message, but Mbed TLS doesn't + currently support this. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid alert message, len: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ssl->in_msglen)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("got an alert message, type: [%u:%u]", + ssl->in_msg[0], ssl->in_msg[1])); + + /* + * Ignore non-fatal alerts, except close_notify and no_renegotiation + */ + if (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("is a fatal alert message (msg %d)", + ssl->in_msg[1])); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE; + } + + if (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && + ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("is a close notify message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED) + if (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING && + ssl->in_msg[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("is a no renegotiation alert")); + /* Will be handled when trying to parse ServerHello */ + return 0; + } +#endif + /* Silently ignore: fetch new message */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + /* Drop unexpected ApplicationData records, + * except at the beginning of renegotiations */ + if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA && + mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0 +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + && !(ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO) +#endif + ) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("dropping unexpected ApplicationData")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL; + } + + if (ssl->handshake != NULL && + mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(ssl); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char level, + unsigned char message) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ssl->out_left != 0) { + return mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> send alert message")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("send alert level=%u message=%u", level, message)); + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT; + ssl->out_msglen = 2; + ssl->out_msg[0] = level; + ssl->out_msg[1] = message; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= send alert message")); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write change cipher spec")); + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + ssl->out_msglen = 1; + ssl->out_msg[0] = 1; + + ssl->state++; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write change cipher spec")); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse change cipher spec")); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + return ret; + } + + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad change cipher spec message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + /* CCS records are only accepted if they have length 1 and content '1', + * so we don't need to check this here. */ + + /* + * Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for inbound + * data. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("switching to new transform spec for inbound data")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform_negotiate; +#endif + ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset(ssl); +#endif + + /* Increment epoch */ + if (++ssl->in_epoch == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DTLS epoch would wrap")); + /* This is highly unlikely to happen for legitimate reasons, so + treat it as an attack and don't send an alert. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + memset(ssl->in_ctr, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN); + + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl); + + ssl->state++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse change cipher spec")); + + return 0; +} + +/* Once ssl->out_hdr as the address of the beginning of the + * next outgoing record is set, deduce the other pointers. + * + * Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number + * (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->out_hdr, + * and the caller has to make sure there's space for this. + */ + +static size_t ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len( + mbedtls_ssl_transform const *transform) +{ + return transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_ctr + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_cid; + if (transform != NULL) { + ssl->out_len += transform->out_cid_len; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_ctr + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_len + 2; + } else +#endif + { + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->out_cid = ssl->out_len; +#endif + ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_hdr + 5; + } + + ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_iv; + /* Adjust out_msg to make space for explicit IV, if used. */ + if (transform != NULL) { + ssl->out_msg += ssl_transform_get_explicit_iv_len(transform); + } +} + +/* Once ssl->in_hdr as the address of the beginning of the + * next incoming record is set, deduce the other pointers. + * + * Note: For TLS, we save the implicit record sequence number + * (entering MAC computation) in the 8 bytes before ssl->in_hdr, + * and the caller has to make sure there's space for this. + */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + /* This function sets the pointers to match the case + * of unprotected TLS/DTLS records, with both ssl->in_iv + * and ssl->in_msg pointing to the beginning of the record + * content. + * + * When decrypting a protected record, ssl->in_msg + * will be shifted to point to the beginning of the + * record plaintext. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + /* This sets the header pointers to match records + * without CID. When we receive a record containing + * a CID, the fields are shifted accordingly in + * ssl_parse_record_header(). */ + ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_ctr + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_cid; /* Default: no CID */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_ctr + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_len + 2; + } else +#endif + { + ssl->in_ctr = ssl->in_hdr - MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_hdr + 3; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl->in_cid = ssl->in_len; +#endif + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_hdr + 5; + } + + /* This will be adjusted at record decryption time. */ + ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_iv; +} + +/* + * Setup an SSL context + */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + /* Set the incoming and outgoing record pointers. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf; + ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + { + ssl->out_ctr = ssl->out_buf; + ssl->out_hdr = ssl->out_buf + 8; + ssl->in_hdr = ssl->in_buf + 8; + } + + /* Derive other internal pointers. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, NULL /* no transform enabled */); + mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(ssl); +} + +/* + * SSL get accessors + */ +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl->in_offt == NULL ? 0 : ssl->in_msglen; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_check_pending(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + /* + * Case A: We're currently holding back + * a message for further processing. + */ + + if (ssl->keep_current_message == 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ssl_check_pending: record held back for processing")); + return 1; + } + + /* + * Case B: Further records are pending in the current datagram. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->in_left > ssl->next_record_offset) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ssl_check_pending: more records within current datagram")); + return 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + /* + * Case C: A handshake message is being processed. + */ + + if (ssl->in_hslen > 0 && ssl->in_hslen < ssl->in_msglen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("ssl_check_pending: more handshake messages within current record")); + return 1; + } + + /* + * Case D: An application data message is being processed + */ + if (ssl->in_offt != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ssl_check_pending: application data record is being processed")); + return 1; + } + + /* + * In all other cases, the rest of the message can be dropped. + * As in ssl_get_next_record, this needs to be adapted if + * we implement support for multiple alerts in single records. + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ssl_check_pending: nothing pending")); + return 0; +} + + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + size_t transform_expansion = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform = ssl->transform_out; + unsigned block_size; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_attributes_t attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_type_t key_type; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + size_t out_hdr_len = mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len(ssl); + + if (transform == NULL) { + return (int) out_hdr_len; + } + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_GCM || + transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_CCM || + transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, 8) || + transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 || + transform->psa_alg == MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER) { + transform_expansion = transform->minlen; + } else if (transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) { + (void) psa_get_key_attributes(transform->psa_key_enc, &attr); + key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attr); + + block_size = PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type); + + /* Expansion due to the addition of the MAC. */ + transform_expansion += transform->maclen; + + /* Expansion due to the addition of CBC padding; + * Theoretically up to 256 bytes, but we never use + * more than the block size of the underlying cipher. */ + transform_expansion += block_size; + + /* For TLS 1.2 or higher, an explicit IV is added + * after the record header. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + transform_expansion += block_size; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("Unsupported psa_alg spotted in mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion()")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } +#else + switch (mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc)) { + case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM: + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM: + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY: + case MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM: + transform_expansion = transform->minlen; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC: + + block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( + &transform->cipher_ctx_enc); + + /* Expansion due to the addition of the MAC. */ + transform_expansion += transform->maclen; + + /* Expansion due to the addition of CBC padding; + * Theoretically up to 256 bytes, but we never use + * more than the block size of the underlying cipher. */ + transform_expansion += block_size; + + /* For TLS 1.2 or higher, an explicit IV is added + * after the record header. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + transform_expansion += block_size; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + break; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if (transform->out_cid_len != 0) { + transform_expansion += MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + return (int) (out_hdr_len + transform_expansion); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +/* + * Check record counters and renegotiate if they're above the limit. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + size_t ep_len = mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(ssl); + int in_ctr_cmp; + int out_ctr_cmp; + + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0 || + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING || + ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED) { + return 0; + } + + in_ctr_cmp = memcmp(ssl->in_ctr + ep_len, + &ssl->conf->renego_period[ep_len], + MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN - ep_len); + out_ctr_cmp = memcmp(&ssl->cur_out_ctr[ep_len], + &ssl->conf->renego_period[ep_len], + sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr) - ep_len); + + if (in_ctr_cmp <= 0 && out_ctr_cmp <= 0) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("record counter limit reached: renegotiate")); + return mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(ssl); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_check_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + + if ((ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) || + (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET)) { + return 0; + } + + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("NewSessionTicket received")); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("received post-handshake message")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + int ret = ssl_tls13_check_new_session_ticket(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* Fail in all other cases. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +/* This function is called from mbedtls_ssl_read() when a handshake message is + * received after the initial handshake. In this context, handshake messages + * may only be sent for the purpose of initiating renegotiations. + * + * This function is introduced as a separate helper since the handling + * of post-handshake handshake messages changes significantly in TLS 1.3, + * and having a helper function allows to distinguish between TLS <= 1.2 and + * TLS 1.3 in the future without bloating the logic of mbedtls_ssl_read(). + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls12_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * - For client-side, expect SERVER_HELLO_REQUEST. + * - For server-side, expect CLIENT_HELLO. + * - Fail (TLS) or silently drop record (DTLS) in other cases. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST || + ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl))) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("handshake received (not HelloRequest)")); + + /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return 0; + } +#endif + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("handshake received (not ClientHello)")); + + /* With DTLS, drop the packet (probably from last handshake) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return 0; + } +#endif + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + /* Determine whether renegotiation attempt should be accepted */ + if (!(ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || + (ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == + MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION))) { + /* + * Accept renegotiation request + */ + + /* DTLS clients need to know renego is server-initiated */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; + } +#endif + ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(ssl); + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", + ret); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + { + /* + * Refuse renegotiation + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("refusing renegotiation, sending alert")); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + /* Check protocol version and dispatch accordingly. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + return ssl_tls13_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(ssl); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + return ssl_tls12_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(ssl); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + /* Should never happen */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} + +/* + * brief Read at most 'len' application data bytes from the input + * buffer. + * + * param ssl SSL context: + * - First byte of application data not read yet in the input + * buffer located at address `in_offt`. + * - The number of bytes of data not read yet is `in_msglen`. + * param buf buffer that will hold the data + * param len maximum number of bytes to read + * + * note The function updates the fields `in_offt` and `in_msglen` + * according to the number of bytes read. + * + * return The number of bytes read. + */ +static int ssl_read_application_data( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + size_t n = (len < ssl->in_msglen) ? len : ssl->in_msglen; + + if (len != 0) { + memcpy(buf, ssl->in_offt, n); + ssl->in_msglen -= n; + } + + /* Zeroising the plaintext buffer to erase unused application data + from the memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->in_offt, n); + + if (ssl->in_msglen == 0) { + /* all bytes consumed */ + ssl->in_offt = NULL; + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + } else { + /* more data available */ + ssl->in_offt += n; + } + + return (int) n; +} + +/* + * Receive application data decrypted from the SSL layer + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> read")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (ssl->handshake != NULL && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + } +#endif + + /* + * Check if renegotiation is necessary and/or handshake is + * in process. If yes, perform/continue, and fall through + * if an unexpected packet is received while the client + * is waiting for the ServerHello. + * + * (There is no equivalent to the last condition on + * the server-side as it is not treated as within + * a handshake while waiting for the ClientHello + * after a renegotiation request.) + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate(ssl); + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif + + if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl); + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO && + ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret); + return ret; + } + } + + /* Loop as long as no application data record is available */ + while (ssl->in_offt == NULL) { + /* Start timer if not already running */ + if (ssl->f_get_timer != NULL && + ssl->f_get_timer(ssl->p_timer) == -1) { + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, ssl->conf->read_timeout); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + return ret; + } + + if (ssl->in_msglen == 0 && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) { + /* + * OpenSSL sends empty messages to randomize the IV + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + return ret; + } + } + + if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + ret = ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake", + ret); + return ret; + } + + /* At this point, we don't know whether the renegotiation triggered + * by the post-handshake message has been completed or not. The cases + * to consider are the following: + * 1) The renegotiation is complete. In this case, no new record + * has been read yet. + * 2) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received + * an application data record while awaiting the ServerHello. + * 3) The renegotiation is incomplete because the client received + * a non-handshake, non-application data message while awaiting + * the ServerHello. + * + * In each of these cases, looping will be the proper action: + * - For 1), the next iteration will read a new record and check + * if it's application data. + * - For 2), the loop condition isn't satisfied as application data + * is present, hence continue is the same as break + * - For 3), the loop condition is satisfied and read_record + * will re-deliver the message that was held back by the client + * when expecting the ServerHello. + */ + + continue; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING) { + if (ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0) { + if (++ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("renegotiation requested, " + "but not honored by client")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + /* Fatal and closure alerts handled by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */ + if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ignoring non-fatal non-closure alert")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ; + } + + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad application data message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg; + + /* We're going to return something now, cancel timer, + * except if handshake (renegotiation) is in progress */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1) { + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + /* If we requested renego but received AppData, resend HelloRequest. + * Do it now, after setting in_offt, to avoid taking this branch + * again if ssl_write_hello_request() returns WANT_WRITE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request", + ret); + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + } + + ret = ssl_read_application_data(ssl, buf, len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= read")); + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +int mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + if (ssl == NULL || (ssl->conf == NULL)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * The server may receive early data only while waiting for the End of + * Early Data handshake message. + */ + if ((ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) || + (ssl->in_offt == NULL)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA; + } + + return ssl_read_application_data(ssl, buf, len); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +/* + * Send application data to be encrypted by the SSL layer, taking care of max + * fragment length and buffer size. + * + * According to RFC 5246 Section 6.2.1: + * + * Zero-length fragments of Application data MAY be sent as they are + * potentially useful as a traffic analysis countermeasure. + * + * Therefore, it is possible that the input message length is 0 and the + * corresponding return code is 0 on success. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_real(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload(ssl); + const size_t max_len = (size_t) ret; + + if (ret < 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload", ret); + return ret; + } + + if (len > max_len) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("fragment larger than the (negotiated) " + "maximum fragment length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + len, max_len)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } else +#endif + len = max_len; + } + + if (ssl->out_left != 0) { + /* + * The user has previously tried to send the data and + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE or the message was only partially + * written. In this case, we expect the high-level write function + * (e.g. mbedtls_ssl_write()) to be called with the same parameters + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret); + return ret; + } + } else { + /* + * The user is trying to send a message the first time, so we need to + * copy the data into the internal buffers and setup the data structure + * to keep track of partial writes + */ + ssl->out_msglen = len; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; + if (len > 0) { + memcpy(ssl->out_msg, buf, len); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, SSL_FORCE_FLUSH)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret); + return ret; + } + } + + return (int) len; +} + +/* + * Write application data (public-facing wrapper) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write")); + + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if ((ret = ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_check_ctr_renegotiate", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif + + if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret); + return ret; + } + } + + ret = ssl_write_real(ssl, buf, len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write")); + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const struct mbedtls_ssl_config *conf; + uint32_t remaining; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write early_data")); + + if (ssl == NULL || (conf = ssl->conf) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((!mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_enabled(conf)) || + (conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || + (conf->early_data_enabled != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA; + } + + if (ssl->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA; + } + + /* + * If we are at the beginning of the handshake, the early data state being + * equal to MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT advance the handshake just + * enough to be able to send early data if possible. That way, we can + * guarantee that when starting the handshake with this function we will + * send at least one record of early data. Note that when the state is + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT and not yet + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE, we cannot send early data + * as the early data outbound transform has not been set as we may have to + * first send a dummy CCS in clear. + */ + if ((ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE) || + (ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT)) { + while ((ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE) || + (ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT)) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step", ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flush_output", ret); + return ret; + } + } + remaining = ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size; + } else { + /* + * If we are past the point where we can send early data or we have + * already reached the maximum early data size, return immediatly. + * Otherwise, progress the handshake as much as possible to not delay + * it too much. If we reach a point where we can still send early data, + * then we will send some. + */ + if ((ssl->early_data_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE) && + (ssl->early_data_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA; + } + + remaining = ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size - + ssl->total_early_data_size; + + if (remaining == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl); + if ((ret != 0) && (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret); + return ret; + } + } + + if (((ssl->early_data_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE) && + (ssl->early_data_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED)) + || (remaining == 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA; + } + + if (len > remaining) { + len = remaining; + } + + ret = ssl_write_real(ssl, buf, len); + if (ret >= 0) { + ssl->total_early_data_size += ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write early_data, ret=%d", ret)); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +/* + * Notify the peer that the connection is being closed + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write close notify")); + + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 1) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message", ret); + return ret; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write close notify")); + + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +{ + if (transform == NULL) { + return; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key(transform->psa_key_enc); + psa_destroy_key(transform->psa_key_dec); +#else + mbedtls_cipher_free(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc); + mbedtls_cipher_free(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key(transform->psa_mac_enc); + psa_destroy_key(transform->psa_mac_dec); +#else + mbedtls_md_free(&transform->md_ctx_enc); + mbedtls_md_free(&transform->md_ctx_dec); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transform, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +{ + ssl->transform_in = transform; + memset(ssl->in_ctr, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +{ + ssl->transform_out = transform; + memset(ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + unsigned offset; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + + if (hs == NULL) { + return; + } + + ssl_free_buffered_record(ssl); + + for (offset = 0; offset < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS; offset++) { + ssl_buffering_free_slot(ssl, offset); + } +} + +static void ssl_buffering_free_slot(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint8_t slot) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params * const hs = ssl->handshake; + mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer * const hs_buf = &hs->buffering.hs[slot]; + + if (slot >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS) { + return; + } + + if (hs_buf->is_valid == 1) { + hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= hs_buf->data_len; + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(hs_buf->data, hs_buf->data_len); + memset(hs_buf, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer)); + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +/* + * Convert version numbers to/from wire format + * and, for DTLS, to/from TLS equivalent. + * + * For TLS this is the identity. + * For DTLS, map as follows, then use 1's complement (v -> ~v): + * 1.x <-> 3.x+1 for x != 0 (DTLS 1.2 based on TLS 1.2) + * DTLS 1.0 is stored as TLS 1.1 internally + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_write_version(unsigned char version[2], int transport, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version) +{ + uint16_t tls_version_formatted; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + tls_version_formatted = + ~(tls_version - (tls_version == 0x0302 ? 0x0202 : 0x0201)); + } else +#else + ((void) transport); +#endif + { + tls_version_formatted = (uint16_t) tls_version; + } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tls_version_formatted, version, 0); +} + +uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_read_version(const unsigned char version[2], + int transport) +{ + uint16_t tls_version = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(version, 0); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + tls_version = + ~(tls_version - (tls_version == 0xfeff ? 0x0202 : 0x0201)); + } +#else + ((void) transport); +#endif + return tls_version; +} + +/* + * Send pending fatal alert. + * 0, No alert message. + * !0, if mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message() returned in error, the error code it + * returned, ssl->alert_reason otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + /* No pending alert, return success*/ + if (ssl->send_alert == 0) { + return 0; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + ssl->alert_type); + + /* If mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message() returned with MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, + * do not clear the alert to be able to send it later. + */ + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE) { + ssl->send_alert = 0; + } + + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return ssl->alert_reason; +} + +/* + * Set pending fatal alert flag. + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char alert_type, + int alert_reason) +{ + ssl->send_alert = 1; + ssl->alert_type = alert_type; + ssl->alert_reason = alert_reason; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/library/ssl_ticket.c b/library/ssl_ticket.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..6a31b0bee69 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_ticket.c @@ -0,0 +1,552 @@ +/* + * TLS server tickets callbacks implementation + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + +/* + * Initialize context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex); +#endif +} + +#define MAX_KEY_BYTES MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_MAX_KEY_BYTES + +#define TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES +#define TICKET_IV_BYTES 12 +#define TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES 2 +#define TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES 16 + +#define TICKET_MIN_LEN (TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES + \ + TICKET_IV_BYTES + \ + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES + \ + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES) +#define TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN (TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES + \ + TICKET_IV_BYTES + \ + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES) + +/* + * Generate/update a key + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_ticket_gen_key(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, + unsigned char index) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_BYTES] = { 0 }; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key = ctx->keys + index; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + key->generation_time = mbedtls_time(NULL); +#endif + /* The lifetime of a key is the configured lifetime of the tickets when + * the key is created. + */ + key->lifetime = ctx->ticket_lifetime; + + if ((ret = ctx->f_rng(ctx->p_rng, key->name, sizeof(key->name))) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = ctx->f_rng(ctx->p_rng, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) { + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, key->alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key->key_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, key->key_bits); + + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR( + psa_import_key(&attributes, buf, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key->key_bits), + &key->key)); +#else + /* With GCM and CCM, same context can encrypt & decrypt */ + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&key->ctx, buf, + mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen(&key->ctx), + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Rotate/generate keys if necessary + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_ticket_update_keys(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ((void) ctx); +#else + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key * const key = ctx->keys + ctx->active; + if (key->lifetime != 0) { + mbedtls_time_t current_time = mbedtls_time(NULL); + mbedtls_time_t key_time = key->generation_time; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif + + if (current_time >= key_time && + (uint64_t) (current_time - key_time) < key->lifetime) { + return 0; + } + + ctx->active = 1 - ctx->active; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((status = psa_destroy_key(ctx->keys[ctx->active].key)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + return ssl_ticket_gen_key(ctx, ctx->active); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + return 0; +} + +/* + * Rotate active session ticket encryption key + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_rotate(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, + const unsigned char *name, size_t nlength, + const unsigned char *k, size_t klength, + uint32_t lifetime) +{ + const unsigned char idx = 1 - ctx->active; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key * const key = ctx->keys + idx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + const size_t bitlen = key->key_bits; +#else + const int bitlen = mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen(&key->ctx); +#endif + + if (nlength < TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES || klength * 8 < (size_t) bitlen) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((status = psa_destroy_key(key->key)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + return ret; + } + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, key->alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key->key_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, key->key_bits); + + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, k, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key->key_bits), + &key->key)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + return ret; + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&key->ctx, k, bitlen, MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + ctx->active = idx; + ctx->ticket_lifetime = lifetime; + memcpy(key->name, name, TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + key->generation_time = mbedtls_time(NULL); +#endif + key->lifetime = lifetime; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Setup context for actual use + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng, + mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher, + uint32_t lifetime) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t key_bits; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_type_t key_type; +#else + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(cipher, TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES, + &alg, &key_type, &key_bits) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#else + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher); + + if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher_info) != MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM && + mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher_info) != MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM && + mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher_info) != MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + key_bits = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if (key_bits > 8 * MAX_KEY_BYTES) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->f_rng = f_rng; + ctx->p_rng = p_rng; + + ctx->ticket_lifetime = lifetime; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ctx->keys[0].alg = alg; + ctx->keys[0].key_type = key_type; + ctx->keys[0].key_bits = key_bits; + + ctx->keys[1].alg = alg; + ctx->keys[1].key_type = key_type; + ctx->keys[1].key_bits = key_bits; +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx->keys[0].ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx->keys[1].ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if ((ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key(ctx, 0)) != 0 || + (ret = ssl_ticket_gen_key(ctx, 1)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Create session ticket, with the following structure: + * + * struct { + * opaque key_name[4]; + * opaque iv[12]; + * opaque encrypted_state<0..2^16-1>; + * opaque tag[16]; + * } ticket; + * + * The key_name, iv, and length of encrypted_state are the additional + * authenticated data. + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write(void *p_ticket, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *start, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *tlen, + uint32_t *ticket_lifetime) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key; + unsigned char *key_name = start; + unsigned char *iv = start + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES; + unsigned char *state_len_bytes = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES; + unsigned char *state = state_len_bytes + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; + size_t clear_len, ciph_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif + + *tlen = 0; + + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* We need at least 4 bytes for key_name, 12 for IV, 2 for len 16 for tag, + * in addition to session itself, that will be checked when writing it. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(start, end, TICKET_MIN_LEN); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + if ((ret = ssl_ticket_update_keys(ctx)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + key = &ctx->keys[ctx->active]; + + *ticket_lifetime = key->lifetime; + + memcpy(key_name, key->name, TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES); + + if ((ret = ctx->f_rng(ctx->p_rng, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Dump session state */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save(session, + state, (size_t) (end - state), + &clear_len)) != 0 || + (unsigned long) clear_len > 65535) { + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(clear_len, state_len_bytes, 0); + + /* Encrypt and authenticate */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((status = psa_aead_encrypt(key->key, key->alg, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, + key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, + state, clear_len, + state, end - state, + &ciph_len)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(&key->ctx, + iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, + /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ + key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, + state, clear_len, + state, (size_t) (end - state), &ciph_len, + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if (ciph_len != clear_len + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + *tlen = TICKET_MIN_LEN + ciph_len - TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES; + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } +#endif + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Select key based on name + */ +static mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *ssl_ticket_select_key( + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx, + const unsigned char name[4]) +{ + unsigned char i; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ctx->keys) / sizeof(*ctx->keys); i++) { + if (memcmp(name, ctx->keys[i].name, 4) == 0) { + return &ctx->keys[i]; + } + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Load session ticket (see mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write for structure) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx = p_ticket; + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key *key; + unsigned char *key_name = buf; + unsigned char *iv = buf + TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES; + unsigned char *enc_len_p = iv + TICKET_IV_BYTES; + unsigned char *ticket = enc_len_p + TICKET_CRYPT_LEN_BYTES; + size_t enc_len, clear_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif + + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->f_rng == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (len < TICKET_MIN_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + + if ((ret = ssl_ticket_update_keys(ctx)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + enc_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(enc_len_p, 0); + + if (len != TICKET_MIN_LEN + enc_len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Select key */ + if ((key = ssl_ticket_select_key(ctx, key_name)) == NULL) { + /* We can't know for sure but this is a likely option unless we're + * under attack - this is only informative anyway */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Decrypt and authenticate */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((status = psa_aead_decrypt(key->key, key->alg, iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, + key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, + ticket, enc_len + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES, + ticket, enc_len, &clear_len)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto cleanup; + } +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(&key->ctx, + iv, TICKET_IV_BYTES, + /* Additional data: key name, IV and length */ + key_name, TICKET_ADD_DATA_LEN, + ticket, enc_len + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES, + ticket, enc_len, &clear_len, + TICKET_AUTH_TAG_BYTES)) != 0) { + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; + } + + goto cleanup; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if (clear_len != enc_len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Actually load session */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_load(session, ticket, clear_len)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_ms_time_t ticket_creation_time, ticket_age; + mbedtls_ms_time_t ticket_lifetime = + (mbedtls_ms_time_t) key->lifetime * 1000; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ticket_creation_time(session, + &ticket_creation_time); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + ticket_age = mbedtls_ms_time() - ticket_creation_time; + if (ticket_age < 0 || ticket_age > ticket_lifetime) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED; + goto cleanup; + } +#endif + +cleanup: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } +#endif + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Free context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_destroy_key(ctx->keys[0].key); + psa_destroy_key(ctx->keys[1].key); +#else + mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->keys[0].ctx); + mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->keys[1].ctx); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context)); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c5e06491c11 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -0,0 +1,9922 @@ +/* + * TLS shared functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "ssl_client.h" +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" + +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/version.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "md_psa.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Define local translating functions to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +static mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args chk_buf_ptr_fail_args; + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args( + const uint8_t *cur, const uint8_t *end, size_t need) +{ + chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.cur = cur; + chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.end = end; + chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.need = need; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_reset_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(void) +{ + memset(&chk_buf_ptr_fail_args, 0, sizeof(chk_buf_ptr_fail_args)); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_cmp_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args *args) +{ + return (chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.cur != args->cur) || + (chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.end != args->end) || + (chk_buf_ptr_fail_args.need != args->need); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +/* Top-level Connection ID API */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + size_t len, + int ignore_other_cid) +{ + if (len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ignore_other_cid != MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL && + ignore_other_cid != MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + conf->ignore_unexpected_cid = ignore_other_cid; + conf->cid_len = len; + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int enable, + unsigned char const *own_cid, + size_t own_cid_len) +{ + if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ssl->negotiate_cid = enable; + if (enable == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Disable use of CID extension.")); + return 0; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Enable use of CID extension.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Own CID", own_cid, own_cid_len); + + if (own_cid_len != ssl->conf->cid_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("CID length %u does not match CID length %u in config", + (unsigned) own_cid_len, + (unsigned) ssl->conf->cid_len)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memcpy(ssl->own_cid, own_cid, own_cid_len); + /* Truncation is not an issue here because + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX at most 255. */ + ssl->own_cid_len = (uint8_t) own_cid_len; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_own_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int *enabled, + unsigned char own_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX], + size_t *own_cid_len) +{ + *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED; + + if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* We report MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED in case the CID length is + * zero as this is indistinguishable from not requesting to use + * the CID extension. */ + if (ssl->own_cid_len == 0 || ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) { + return 0; + } + + if (own_cid_len != NULL) { + *own_cid_len = ssl->own_cid_len; + if (own_cid != NULL) { + memcpy(own_cid, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len); + } + } + + *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int *enabled, + unsigned char peer_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX], + size_t *peer_cid_len) +{ + *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED; + + if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* We report MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED in case the CID extensions + * were used, but client and server requested the empty CID. + * This is indistinguishable from not using the CID extension + * in the first place. */ + if (ssl->transform_in->in_cid_len == 0 && + ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len == 0) { + return 0; + } + + if (peer_cid_len != NULL) { + *peer_cid_len = ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len; + if (peer_cid != NULL) { + memcpy(peer_cid, ssl->transform_in->out_cid, + ssl->transform_in->out_cid_len); + } + } + + *enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +/* + * Convert max_fragment_length codes to length. + * RFC 6066 says: + * enum{ + * 2^9(1), 2^10(2), 2^11(3), 2^12(4), (255) + * } MaxFragmentLength; + * and we add 0 -> extension unused + */ +static unsigned int ssl_mfl_code_to_length(int mfl) +{ + switch (mfl) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE: + return MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512: + return 512; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024: + return 1024; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048: + return 2048; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096: + return 4096; + default: + return MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *src) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(dst); + memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + dst->ticket = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + dst->hostname = NULL; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + dst->ticket_alpn = NULL; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if (src->peer_cert != NULL) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + dst->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt)); + if (dst->peer_cert == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init(dst->peer_cert); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(dst->peer_cert, src->peer_cert->raw.p, + src->peer_cert->raw.len)) != 0) { + mbedtls_free(dst->peer_cert); + dst->peer_cert = NULL; + return ret; + } + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if (src->peer_cert_digest != NULL) { + dst->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc(1, src->peer_cert_digest_len); + if (dst->peer_cert_digest == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(dst->peer_cert_digest, src->peer_cert_digest, + src->peer_cert_digest_len); + dst->peer_cert_digest_type = src->peer_cert_digest_type; + dst->peer_cert_digest_len = src->peer_cert_digest_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + { + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(dst, src->ticket_alpn); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN && MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (src->ticket != NULL) { + dst->ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, src->ticket_len); + if (dst->ticket == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(dst->ticket, src->ticket, src->ticket_len); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (src->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_set_hostname(dst, src->hostname); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int resize_buffer(unsigned char **buffer, size_t len_new, size_t *len_old) +{ + unsigned char *resized_buffer = mbedtls_calloc(1, len_new); + if (resized_buffer == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + /* We want to copy len_new bytes when downsizing the buffer, and + * len_old bytes when upsizing, so we choose the smaller of two sizes, + * to fit one buffer into another. Size checks, ensuring that no data is + * lost, are done outside of this function. */ + memcpy(resized_buffer, *buffer, + (len_new < *len_old) ? len_new : *len_old); + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(*buffer, *len_old); + + *buffer = resized_buffer; + *len_old = len_new; + + return 0; +} + +static void handle_buffer_resizing(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int downsizing, + size_t in_buf_new_len, + size_t out_buf_new_len) +{ + int modified = 0; + size_t written_in = 0, iv_offset_in = 0, len_offset_in = 0; + size_t written_out = 0, iv_offset_out = 0, len_offset_out = 0; + if (ssl->in_buf != NULL) { + written_in = ssl->in_msg - ssl->in_buf; + iv_offset_in = ssl->in_iv - ssl->in_buf; + len_offset_in = ssl->in_len - ssl->in_buf; + if (downsizing ? + ssl->in_buf_len > in_buf_new_len && ssl->in_left < in_buf_new_len : + ssl->in_buf_len < in_buf_new_len) { + if (resize_buffer(&ssl->in_buf, in_buf_new_len, &ssl->in_buf_len) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("input buffer resizing failed - out of memory")); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Reallocating in_buf to %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + in_buf_new_len)); + modified = 1; + } + } + } + + if (ssl->out_buf != NULL) { + written_out = ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf; + iv_offset_out = ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_buf; + len_offset_out = ssl->out_len - ssl->out_buf; + if (downsizing ? + ssl->out_buf_len > out_buf_new_len && ssl->out_left < out_buf_new_len : + ssl->out_buf_len < out_buf_new_len) { + if (resize_buffer(&ssl->out_buf, out_buf_new_len, &ssl->out_buf_len) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("output buffer resizing failed - out of memory")); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Reallocating out_buf to %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + out_buf_new_len)); + modified = 1; + } + } + } + if (modified) { + /* Update pointers here to avoid doing it twice. */ + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(ssl); + /* Fields below might not be properly updated with record + * splitting or with CID, so they are manually updated here. */ + ssl->out_msg = ssl->out_buf + written_out; + ssl->out_len = ssl->out_buf + len_offset_out; + ssl->out_iv = ssl->out_buf + iv_offset_out; + + ssl->in_msg = ssl->in_buf + written_in; + ssl->in_len = ssl->in_buf + len_offset_in; + ssl->in_iv = ssl->in_buf + iv_offset_in; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) +typedef int (*tls_prf_fn)(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); + +static tls_prf_fn ssl_tls12prf_from_cs(int ciphersuite_id); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ + +/* Type for the TLS PRF */ +typedef int ssl_tls_prf_t(const unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, + const unsigned char *, size_t, + unsigned char *, size_t); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls12_populate_transform(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + int ciphersuite, + const unsigned char master[48], +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + int encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + ssl_tls_prf_t tls_prf, + const unsigned char randbytes[64], + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version, + unsigned endpoint, + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_sha256(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); +static int ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); +static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_sha384(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen); + +static int ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *); +static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls12_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +static int ssl_update_checksum_start(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +static int ssl_update_checksum_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +static int ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf(const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf = NULL; + + switch (prf) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384: + tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256: + tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + return tls_prf(secret, slen, label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +static void ssl_clear_peer_cert(mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if (session->peer_cert != NULL) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(session->peer_cert); + mbedtls_free(session->peer_cert); + session->peer_cert = NULL; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if (session->peer_cert_digest != NULL) { + /* Zeroization is not necessary. */ + mbedtls_free(session->peer_cert_digest); + session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; + session->peer_cert_digest_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + session->peer_cert_digest_len = 0; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_id(unsigned int extension_type) +{ + switch (extension_type) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_STATUS_REQUEST; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_GROUPS; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_USE_SRTP; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_HEARTBEAT; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ALPN; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SCT: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SCT; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CLI_CERT_TYPE: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CLI_CERT_TYPE; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERV_CERT_TYPE: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERV_CERT_TYPE; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PADDING: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PADDING; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PRE_SHARED_KEY; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EARLY_DATA; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_COOKIE; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CERT_AUTH: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CERT_AUTH; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_OID_FILTERS: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_OID_FILTERS; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG_CERT: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG_CERT; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_KEY_SHARE; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_TRUNCATED_HMAC; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SESSION_TICKET; + + } + + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_UNRECOGNIZED; +} + +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(unsigned int extension_type) +{ + return 1 << mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_id(extension_type); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) +static const char *extension_name_table[] = { + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_UNRECOGNIZED] = "unrecognized", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME] = "server_name", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH] = "max_fragment_length", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_STATUS_REQUEST] = "status_request", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_GROUPS] = "supported_groups", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG] = "signature_algorithms", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_USE_SRTP] = "use_srtp", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_HEARTBEAT] = "heartbeat", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ALPN] = "application_layer_protocol_negotiation", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SCT] = "signed_certificate_timestamp", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CLI_CERT_TYPE] = "client_certificate_type", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERV_CERT_TYPE] = "server_certificate_type", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PADDING] = "padding", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PRE_SHARED_KEY] = "pre_shared_key", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EARLY_DATA] = "early_data", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS] = "supported_versions", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_COOKIE] = "cookie", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES] = "psk_key_exchange_modes", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CERT_AUTH] = "certificate_authorities", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_OID_FILTERS] = "oid_filters", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH] = "post_handshake_auth", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG_CERT] = "signature_algorithms_cert", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_KEY_SHARE] = "key_share", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_TRUNCATED_HMAC] = "truncated_hmac", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS] = "supported_point_formats", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC] = "encrypt_then_mac", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET] = "extended_master_secret", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SESSION_TICKET] = "session_ticket", + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT] = "record_size_limit" +}; + +static const unsigned int extension_type_table[] = { + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_UNRECOGNIZED] = 0xff, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_STATUS_REQUEST] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_GROUPS] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_USE_SRTP] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_HEARTBEAT] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ALPN] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SCT] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SCT, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CLI_CERT_TYPE] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CLI_CERT_TYPE, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERV_CERT_TYPE] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERV_CERT_TYPE, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PADDING] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PADDING, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PRE_SHARED_KEY] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EARLY_DATA] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_COOKIE] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CERT_AUTH] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CERT_AUTH, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_OID_FILTERS] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_OID_FILTERS, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG_CERT] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG_CERT, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_KEY_SHARE] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_TRUNCATED_HMAC] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SESSION_TICKET] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, + [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT +}; + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_name(unsigned int extension_type) +{ + return extension_name_table[ + mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_id(extension_type)]; +} + +static const char *ssl_tls13_get_hs_msg_name(int hs_msg_type) +{ + switch (hs_msg_type) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO: + return "ClientHello"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO: + return "ServerHello"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + return "HelloRetryRequest"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + return "NewSessionTicket"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + return "EncryptedExtensions"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE: + return "Certificate"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + return "CertificateRequest"; + } + return "Unknown"; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_print_extension(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + int hs_msg_type, unsigned int extension_type, + const char *extra_msg0, const char *extra_msg1) +{ + const char *extra_msg; + if (extra_msg0 && extra_msg1) { + mbedtls_debug_print_msg( + ssl, level, file, line, + "%s: %s(%u) extension %s %s.", + ssl_tls13_get_hs_msg_name(hs_msg_type), + mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_name(extension_type), + extension_type, + extra_msg0, extra_msg1); + return; + } + + extra_msg = extra_msg0 ? extra_msg0 : extra_msg1; + if (extra_msg) { + mbedtls_debug_print_msg( + ssl, level, file, line, + "%s: %s(%u) extension %s.", ssl_tls13_get_hs_msg_name(hs_msg_type), + mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_name(extension_type), extension_type, + extra_msg); + return; + } + + mbedtls_debug_print_msg( + ssl, level, file, line, + "%s: %s(%u) extension.", ssl_tls13_get_hs_msg_name(hs_msg_type), + mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_name(extension_type), extension_type); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_print_extensions(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + int hs_msg_type, uint32_t extensions_mask, + const char *extra) +{ + + for (unsigned i = 0; + i < sizeof(extension_name_table) / sizeof(extension_name_table[0]); + i++) { + mbedtls_ssl_print_extension( + ssl, level, file, line, hs_msg_type, extension_type_table[i], + extensions_mask & (1 << i) ? "exists" : "does not exist", extra); + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +static const char *ticket_flag_name_table[] = +{ + [0] = "ALLOW_PSK_RESUMPTION", + [2] = "ALLOW_PSK_EPHEMERAL_RESUMPTION", + [3] = "ALLOW_EARLY_DATA", +}; + +void mbedtls_ssl_print_ticket_flags(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int level, const char *file, int line, + unsigned int flags) +{ + size_t i; + + mbedtls_debug_print_msg(ssl, level, file, line, + "print ticket_flags (0x%02x)", flags); + + flags = flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(ticket_flag_name_table); i++) { + if ((flags & (1 << i))) { + mbedtls_debug_print_msg(ssl, level, file, line, "- %s is set.", + ticket_flag_name_table[i]); + } + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info) +{ + ((void) ciphersuite_info); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + if (ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha384; + } else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + if (ciphersuite_info->mac != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + ssl->handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_sha256; + } else +#endif + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return; + } +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + size_t total_hs_len) +{ + unsigned char hs_hdr[4]; + + /* Build HS header for checksum update. */ + hs_hdr[0] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(hs_type); + hs_hdr[1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(total_hs_len); + hs_hdr[2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(total_hs_len); + hs_hdr[3] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(total_hs_len); + + return ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, hs_hdr, sizeof(hs_hdr)); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + unsigned char const *msg, + size_t msg_len) +{ + int ret; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(ssl, hs_type, msg_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + return ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, msg, msg_len); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status; +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif +#else /* SHA-256 or SHA-384 */ + ((void) ssl); +#endif /* SHA-256 or SHA-384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_hash_abort(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } + status = psa_hash_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } +#else + mbedtls_md_free(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256); + mbedtls_md_init(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256); + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), + 0); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_hash_abort(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } + status = psa_hash_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } +#else + mbedtls_md_free(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384); + mbedtls_md_init(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384); + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif +#endif + return 0; +} + +static int ssl_update_checksum_start(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status; +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif +#else /* SHA-256 or SHA-384 */ + ((void) ssl); + (void) buf; + (void) len; +#endif /* SHA-256 or SHA-384 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_hash_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, buf, len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif +#endif + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +static int ssl_update_checksum_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(psa_hash_update( + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, buf, len)); +#else + return mbedtls_md_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, buf, len); +#endif +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +static int ssl_update_checksum_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(psa_hash_update( + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, buf, len)); +#else + return mbedtls_md_update(&ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, buf, len); +#endif +} +#endif + +static void ssl_handshake_params_init(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake) +{ + memset(handshake, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + handshake->fin_sha256_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); +#else + mbedtls_md_init(&handshake->fin_sha256); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + handshake->fin_sha384_psa = psa_hash_operation_init(); +#else + mbedtls_md_init(&handshake->fin_sha384); +#endif +#endif + + handshake->update_checksum = ssl_update_checksum_start; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_init(&handshake->dhm_ctx); +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecdh_init(&handshake->ecdh_ctx); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + handshake->psa_pake_ctx = psa_pake_operation_init(); + handshake->psa_pake_password = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else + mbedtls_ecjpake_init(&handshake->ecjpake_ctx); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; + handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init(&handshake->ecrs_ctx); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + handshake->sni_authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_init(&handshake->peer_pubkey); +#endif +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +{ + memset(transform, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->psa_key_enc = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + transform->psa_key_dec = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else + mbedtls_cipher_init(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc); + mbedtls_cipher_init(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->psa_mac_enc = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + transform->psa_mac_dec = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else + mbedtls_md_init(&transform->md_ctx_enc); + mbedtls_md_init(&transform->md_ctx_dec); +#endif +#endif +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_session_init(mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + memset(session, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_handshake_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Clear old handshake information if present */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->transform_negotiate) { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session_negotiate); + } + if (ssl->handshake) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* + * Either the pointers are now NULL or cleared properly and can be freed. + * Now allocate missing structures. + */ + if (ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL) { + ssl->transform_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + if (ssl->session_negotiate == NULL) { + ssl->session_negotiate = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); + } + + if (ssl->handshake == NULL) { + ssl->handshake = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params)); + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + /* If the buffers are too small - reallocate */ + + handle_buffer_resizing(ssl, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN); +#endif + + /* All pointers should exist and can be directly freed without issue */ + if (ssl->handshake == NULL || +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + ssl->transform_negotiate == NULL || +#endif + ssl->session_negotiate == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc() of ssl sub-contexts failed")); + + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); + ssl->handshake = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; +#endif + + mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate); + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD; +#endif + ssl->total_early_data_size = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + + /* Initialize structures */ + mbedtls_ssl_session_init(ssl->session_negotiate); + ssl_handshake_params_init(ssl->handshake); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(ssl->transform_negotiate); +#endif + + /* Setup handshake checksums */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + ssl->handshake->new_session_tickets_count = + ssl->conf->new_session_tickets_count; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; + + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING; + } else { + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); + } +#endif + +/* + * curve_list is translated to IANA TLS group identifiers here because + * mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves returns void and so can't return + * any error codes. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + /* Heap allocate and translate curve_list from internal to IANA group ids */ + if (ssl->conf->curve_list != NULL) { + size_t length; + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list = ssl->conf->curve_list; + + for (length = 0; (curve_list[length] != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE); length++) { + } + + /* Leave room for zero termination */ + uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_calloc(length + 1, sizeof(uint16_t)); + if (group_list == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + for (size_t i = 0; i < length; i++) { + uint16_t tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id( + curve_list[i]); + if (tls_id == 0) { + mbedtls_free(group_list); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + group_list[i] = tls_id; + } + + group_list[length] = 0; + + ssl->handshake->group_list = group_list; + ssl->handshake->group_list_heap_allocated = 1; + } else { + ssl->handshake->group_list = ssl->conf->group_list; + ssl->handshake->group_list_heap_allocated = 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* Heap allocate and translate sig_hashes from internal hash identifiers to + signature algorithms IANA identifiers. */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only(ssl->conf) && + ssl->conf->sig_hashes != NULL) { + const int *md; + const int *sig_hashes = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; + size_t sig_algs_len = 0; + uint16_t *p; + + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN + <= (SIZE_MAX - (2 * sizeof(uint16_t))), + "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN too big"); + + for (md = sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(*md) == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE) { + continue; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + sig_algs_len += sizeof(uint16_t); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + sig_algs_len += sizeof(uint16_t); +#endif + if (sig_algs_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + } + + if (sig_algs_len < MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + + ssl->handshake->sig_algs = mbedtls_calloc(1, sig_algs_len + + sizeof(uint16_t)); + if (ssl->handshake->sig_algs == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + p = (uint16_t *) ssl->handshake->sig_algs; + for (md = sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++) { + unsigned char hash = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(*md); + if (hash == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE) { + continue; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + *p = ((hash << 8) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA); + p++; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + *p = ((hash << 8) | MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA); + p++; +#endif + } + *p = MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; + ssl->handshake->sig_algs_heap_allocated = 1; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + { + ssl->handshake->sig_algs_heap_allocated = 0; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* Dummy cookie callbacks for defaults */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cookie_write_dummy(void *ctx, + unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len) +{ + ((void) ctx); + ((void) p); + ((void) end); + ((void) cli_id); + ((void) cli_id_len); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_cookie_check_dummy(void *ctx, + const unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len, + const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len) +{ + ((void) ctx); + ((void) cookie); + ((void) cookie_len); + ((void) cli_id); + ((void) cli_id_len); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* + * Initialize an SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + memset(ssl, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_context)); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_conf_version_check(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf = ssl->conf; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_only(conf)) { + if (conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DTLS 1.3 is not yet supported.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("The SSL configuration is tls13 only.")); + return 0; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only(conf)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("The SSL configuration is tls12 only.")); + return 0; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_hybrid_tls12_tls13(conf)) { + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DTLS not yet supported in Hybrid TLS 1.3 + TLS 1.2")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("The SSL configuration is TLS 1.3 or TLS 1.2.")); + return 0; + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("The SSL configuration is invalid.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_conf_check(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + ret = ssl_conf_version_check(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* RFC 8446 section 4.4.3 + * + * If the verification fails, the receiver MUST terminate the handshake with + * a "decrypt_error" alert. + * + * If the client is configured as TLS 1.3 only with optional verify, return + * bad config. + * + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_ephemeral_enabled( + (mbedtls_ssl_context *) ssl) && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ssl->conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + ssl->conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + ssl->conf->authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Optional verify auth mode " + "is not available for TLS 1.3 client")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + if (ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no RNG provided")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG; + } + + /* Space for further checks */ + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Setup an SSL context + */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_setup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; + + ssl->conf = conf; + + if ((ret = ssl_conf_check(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + ssl->tls_version = ssl->conf->max_tls_version; + + /* + * Prepare base structures + */ + + /* Set to NULL in case of an error condition */ + ssl->out_buf = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->in_buf_len = in_buf_len; +#endif + ssl->in_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, in_buf_len); + if (ssl->in_buf == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", in_buf_len)); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->out_buf_len = out_buf_len; +#endif + ssl->out_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, out_buf_len); + if (ssl->out_buf == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", out_buf_len)); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + memset(&ssl->dtls_srtp_info, 0, sizeof(ssl->dtls_srtp_info)); +#endif + + if ((ret = ssl_handshake_init(ssl)) != 0) { + goto error; + } + + return 0; + +error: + mbedtls_free(ssl->in_buf); + mbedtls_free(ssl->out_buf); + + ssl->conf = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + ssl->in_buf_len = 0; + ssl->out_buf_len = 0; +#endif + ssl->in_buf = NULL; + ssl->out_buf = NULL; + + ssl->in_hdr = NULL; + ssl->in_ctr = NULL; + ssl->in_len = NULL; + ssl->in_iv = NULL; + ssl->in_msg = NULL; + + ssl->out_hdr = NULL; + ssl->out_ctr = NULL; + ssl->out_len = NULL; + ssl->out_iv = NULL; + ssl->out_msg = NULL; + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining + * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. + * + * If partial is non-zero, keep data in the input buffer and client ID. + * (Use when a DTLS client reconnects from the same port.) + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int partial) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + partial = 0; +#endif + + /* Cancel any possibly running timer */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); + + mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers(ssl); + + /* Reset incoming message parsing */ + ssl->in_offt = NULL; + ssl->nb_zero = 0; + ssl->in_msgtype = 0; + ssl->in_msglen = 0; + ssl->in_hslen = 0; + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + ssl->transform_in = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_epoch = 0; +#endif + + /* Keep current datagram if partial == 1 */ + if (partial == 0) { + ssl->in_left = 0; + memset(ssl->in_buf, 0, in_buf_len); + } + + ssl->send_alert = 0; + + /* Reset outgoing message writing */ + ssl->out_msgtype = 0; + ssl->out_msglen = 0; + ssl->out_left = 0; + memset(ssl->out_buf, 0, out_buf_len); + memset(ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)); + ssl->transform_out = NULL; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset(ssl); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->transform) { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform); + ssl->transform = NULL; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform_application); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform_application); + ssl->transform_application = NULL; + + if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); + ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata = NULL; +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + ssl->handshake->transform_handshake = NULL; + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; + ssl->tls_version = ssl->conf->max_tls_version; + + mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(ssl, partial); + + /* Reset renegotiation state */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; + + ssl->verify_data_len = 0; + memset(ssl->own_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN); + memset(ssl->peer_verify_data, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN); +#endif + ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION; + + ssl->session_in = NULL; + ssl->session_out = NULL; + if (ssl->session) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session); + ssl->session = NULL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + ssl->alpn_chosen = NULL; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + int free_cli_id = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) + free_cli_id = (partial == 0); +#endif + if (free_cli_id) { + mbedtls_free(ssl->cli_id); + ssl->cli_id = NULL; + ssl->cli_id_len = 0; + } +#endif + + if ((ret = ssl_handshake_init(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Reset an initialized and used SSL context for re-use while retaining + * all application-set variables, function pointers and data. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(ssl, 0); +} + +/* + * SSL set accessors + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint) +{ + conf->endpoint = endpoint; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport) +{ + conf->transport = transport; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode) +{ + conf->anti_replay = mode; +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit) +{ + conf->badmac_limit = limit; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned allow_packing) +{ + ssl->disable_datagram_packing = !allow_packing; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + uint32_t min, uint32_t max) +{ + conf->hs_timeout_min = min; + conf->hs_timeout_max = max; +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode) +{ + conf->authmode = authmode; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy) +{ + conf->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; + conf->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + conf->f_rng = f_rng; + conf->p_rng = p_rng; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *), + void *p_dbg) +{ + conf->f_dbg = f_dbg; + conf->p_dbg = p_dbg; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p_bio, + mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send, + mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv, + mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout) +{ + ssl->p_bio = p_bio; + ssl->f_send = f_send; + ssl->f_recv = f_recv; + ssl->f_recv_timeout = f_recv_timeout; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu) +{ + ssl->mtu = mtu; +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout) +{ + conf->read_timeout = timeout; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *p_timer, + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer, + mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer) +{ + ssl->p_timer = p_timer; + ssl->f_set_timer = f_set_timer; + ssl->f_get_timer = f_get_timer; + + /* Make sure we start with no timer running */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + void *p_cache, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *f_get_cache, + mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *f_set_cache) +{ + conf->p_cache = p_cache; + conf->f_get_cache = f_get_cache; + conf->f_set_cache = f_set_cache; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_session(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ssl == NULL || + session == NULL || + ssl->session_negotiate == NULL || + ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ssl->handshake->resume == 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (session->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(session->ciphersuite); + + if (mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite( + ssl, ciphersuite_info, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("%d is not a valid TLS 1.3 ciphersuite.", + session->ciphersuite)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(ssl->session_negotiate, + session)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ssl->handshake->resume = 1; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *ciphersuites) +{ + conf->ciphersuite_list = ciphersuites; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int kex_modes) +{ + conf->tls13_kex_modes = kex_modes & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int early_data_enabled) +{ + conf->early_data_enabled = early_data_enabled; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_early_data_size( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t max_early_data_size) +{ + conf->max_early_data_size = max_early_data_size; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile) +{ + conf->cert_profile = profile; +} + +static void ssl_key_cert_free(mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = key_cert, *next; + + while (cur != NULL) { + next = cur->next; + mbedtls_free(cur); + cur = next; + } +} + +/* Append a new keycert entry to a (possibly empty) list */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_append_key_cert(mbedtls_ssl_key_cert **head, + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *key) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *new_cert; + + if (cert == NULL) { + /* Free list if cert is null */ + ssl_key_cert_free(*head); + *head = NULL; + return 0; + } + + new_cert = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_key_cert)); + if (new_cert == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + new_cert->cert = cert; + new_cert->key = key; + new_cert->next = NULL; + + /* Update head if the list was null, else add to the end */ + if (*head == NULL) { + *head = new_cert; + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur = *head; + while (cur->next != NULL) { + cur = cur->next; + } + cur->next = new_cert; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key) +{ + return ssl_append_key_cert(&conf->key_cert, own_cert, pk_key); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl) +{ + conf->ca_chain = ca_chain; + conf->ca_crl = ca_crl; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() + * cannot be used together. */ + conf->f_ca_cb = NULL; + conf->p_ca_cb = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb) +{ + conf->f_ca_cb = f_ca_cb; + conf->p_ca_cb = p_ca_cb; + + /* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() and mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() + * cannot be used together. */ + conf->ca_chain = NULL; + conf->ca_crl = NULL; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +const unsigned char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hs_sni(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t *name_len) +{ + *name_len = ssl->handshake->sni_name_len; + return ssl->handshake->sni_name; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key) +{ + return ssl_append_key_cert(&ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert, + own_cert, pk_key); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl) +{ + ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain = ca_chain; + ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl = ca_crl; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) +{ + ssl->handshake->dn_hints = crt; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode) +{ + ssl->handshake->sni_authmode = authmode; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy) +{ + ssl->f_vrfy = f_vrfy; + ssl->p_vrfy = p_vrfy; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static const uint8_t jpake_server_id[] = { 's', 'e', 'r', 'v', 'e', 'r' }; +static const uint8_t jpake_client_id[] = { 'c', 'l', 'i', 'e', 'n', 't' }; + +static psa_status_t mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password_common( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t pwd) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(); + const uint8_t *user = NULL; + size_t user_len = 0; + const uint8_t *peer = NULL; + size_t peer_len = 0; + psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(&cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_JPAKE); + psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(&cipher_suite, + PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, + PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, + 256)); + psa_pake_cs_set_hash(&cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + + status = psa_pake_setup(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, &cipher_suite); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + user = jpake_server_id; + user_len = sizeof(jpake_server_id); + peer = jpake_client_id; + peer_len = sizeof(jpake_client_id); + } else { + user = jpake_client_id; + user_len = sizeof(jpake_client_id); + peer = jpake_server_id; + peer_len = sizeof(jpake_server_id); + } + + status = psa_pake_set_user(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, user, user_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_pake_set_peer(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, peer, peer_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_pake_set_password_key(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, pwd); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok = 1; + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *pw, + size_t pw_len) +{ + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status; + + if (ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Empty password is not valid */ + if ((pw == NULL) || (pw_len == 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_JPAKE); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, pw, pw_len, + &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password_common(ssl, + ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t pwd) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + if (ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(pwd)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + status = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password_common(ssl, pwd); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *pw, + size_t pw_len) +{ + mbedtls_ecjpake_role role; + + if (ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Empty password is not valid */ + if ((pw == NULL) || (pw_len == 0)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER; + } else { + role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT; + } + + return mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + role, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, + pw, pw_len); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) +{ + if (conf->psk_identity == NULL || + conf->psk_identity_len == 0) { + return 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { + return 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) { + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +static void ssl_conf_remove_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + /* Remove reference to existing PSK, if any. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { + /* The maintenance of the PSK key slot is the + * user's responsibility. */ + conf->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (conf->psk != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(conf->psk, conf->psk_len); + conf->psk = NULL; + conf->psk_len = 0; + } + + /* Remove reference to PSK identity, if any. */ + if (conf->psk_identity != NULL) { + mbedtls_free(conf->psk_identity); + conf->psk_identity = NULL; + conf->psk_identity_len = 0; + } +} + +/* This function assumes that PSK identity in the SSL config is unset. + * It checks that the provided identity is well-formed and attempts + * to make a copy of it in the SSL config. + * On failure, the PSK identity in the config remains unset. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_conf_set_psk_identity(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + unsigned char const *psk_identity, + size_t psk_identity_len) +{ + /* Identity len will be encoded on two bytes */ + if (psk_identity == NULL || + psk_identity_len == 0 || + (psk_identity_len >> 16) != 0 || + psk_identity_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + conf->psk_identity = mbedtls_calloc(1, psk_identity_len); + if (conf->psk_identity == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + conf->psk_identity_len = psk_identity_len; + memcpy(conf->psk_identity, psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* We currently only support one PSK, raw or opaque. */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(conf)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + /* Check and set raw PSK */ + if (psk == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (psk_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((conf->psk = mbedtls_calloc(1, psk_len)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + conf->psk_len = psk_len; + memcpy(conf->psk, psk, conf->psk_len); + + /* Check and set PSK Identity */ + ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity(conf, psk_identity, psk_identity_len); + if (ret != 0) { + ssl_conf_remove_psk(conf); + } + + return ret; +} + +static void ssl_remove_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { + /* The maintenance of the external PSK key slot is the + * user's responsibility. */ + if (ssl->handshake->psk_opaque_is_internal) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque); + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque_is_internal = 0; + } + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } +#else + if (ssl->handshake->psk != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->handshake->psk, + ssl->handshake->psk_len); + ssl->handshake->psk_len = 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if (psk == NULL || ssl->handshake == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (psk_len > MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ssl_remove_psk(ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + } else { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + } + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE); + + status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, psk, psk_len, &key); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + /* Allow calling psa_destroy_key() on psk remove */ + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque_is_internal = 1; + return mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque(ssl, key); +#else + if ((ssl->handshake->psk = mbedtls_calloc(1, psk_len)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + ssl->handshake->psk_len = psk_len; + memcpy(ssl->handshake->psk, psk, ssl->handshake->psk_len); + + return 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk, + const unsigned char *psk_identity, + size_t psk_identity_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* We currently only support one PSK, raw or opaque. */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(conf)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + /* Check and set opaque PSK */ + if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(psk)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + conf->psk_opaque = psk; + + /* Check and set PSK Identity */ + ret = ssl_conf_set_psk_identity(conf, psk_identity, + psk_identity_len); + if (ret != 0) { + ssl_conf_remove_psk(conf); + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk) +{ + if ((mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(psk)) || + (ssl->handshake == NULL)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ssl_remove_psk(ssl); + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = psk; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, + size_t), + void *p_psk) +{ + conf->f_psk = f_psk; + conf->p_psk = p_psk; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_base_mode( + psa_algorithm_t alg) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + if (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + if (PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD; + } + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM; +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +static mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_base_mode( + mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + if (mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM || + mode == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ + + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +static mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_actual_mode( + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t base_mode, + int encrypt_then_mac) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + if (encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED && + base_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM; + } +#else + (void) encrypt_then_mac; +#endif + return base_mode; +} + +mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_transform( + const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t base_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_base_mode( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->psa_alg +#else + mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc) +#endif + ); + + int encrypt_then_mac = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + encrypt_then_mac = transform->encrypt_then_mac; +#endif + return mbedtls_ssl_get_actual_mode(base_mode, encrypt_then_mac); +} + +mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + int encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t base_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_key_type_t type; + size_t size; + status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) suite->cipher, + 0, &alg, &type, &size); + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { + base_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_base_mode(alg); + } +#else + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher = + mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) suite->cipher); + if (cipher != NULL) { + base_mode = + mbedtls_ssl_get_base_mode( + mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher)); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + int encrypt_then_mac = 0; +#endif + return mbedtls_ssl_get_actual_mode(base_mode, encrypt_then_mac); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +psa_status_t mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_type, + size_t taglen, + psa_algorithm_t *alg, + psa_key_type_t *key_type, + size_t *key_size) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + (void) taglen; +#endif + switch (mbedtls_cipher_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 128; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 128; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 128; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 192; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 192; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 192; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 192; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 128; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 192; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 192; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM: + *alg = taglen ? PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen) : PSA_ALG_CCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM: + *alg = PSA_ALG_GCM; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY) + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305: + *alg = PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20; + *key_size = 256; + break; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL: + *alg = MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER; + *key_type = 0; + *key_size = 0; + break; + default: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len, + const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&conf->dhm_P, dhm_P, P_len)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&conf->dhm_G, dhm_G, G_len)) != 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_get_value(dhm_ctx, MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_P, + &conf->dhm_P)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_dhm_get_value(dhm_ctx, MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_G, + &conf->dhm_G)) != 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/* + * Set the minimum length for Diffie-Hellman parameters + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + unsigned int bitlen) +{ + conf->dhm_min_bitlen = bitlen; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +/* + * Set allowed/preferred hashes for handshake signatures + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const int *hashes) +{ + conf->sig_hashes = hashes; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +/* Configure allowed signature algorithms for handshake */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const uint16_t *sig_algs) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + conf->sig_hashes = NULL; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + conf->sig_algs = sig_algs; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +/* + * Set the allowed elliptic curves + * + * mbedtls_ssl_setup() takes the provided list + * and translates it to a list of IANA TLS group identifiers, + * stored in ssl->handshake->group_list. + * + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curve_list) +{ + conf->curve_list = curve_list; + conf->group_list = NULL; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ + +/* + * Set the allowed groups + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const uint16_t *group_list) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + conf->curve_list = NULL; +#endif + conf->group_list = group_list; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname) +{ + /* Initialize to suppress unnecessary compiler warning */ + size_t hostname_len = 0; + + /* Check if new hostname is valid before + * making any change to current one */ + if (hostname != NULL) { + hostname_len = strlen(hostname); + + if (hostname_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + + /* Now it's clear that we will overwrite the old hostname, + * so we can free it safely */ + + if (ssl->hostname != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->hostname, strlen(ssl->hostname)); + } + + /* Passing NULL as hostname shall clear the old one */ + + if (hostname == NULL) { + ssl->hostname = NULL; + } else { + ssl->hostname = mbedtls_calloc(1, hostname_len + 1); + if (ssl->hostname == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(ssl->hostname, hostname, hostname_len); + + ssl->hostname[hostname_len] = '\0'; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, + const unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_sni) +{ + conf->f_sni = f_sni; + conf->p_sni = p_sni; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **protos) +{ + size_t cur_len, tot_len; + const char **p; + + /* + * RFC 7301 3.1: "Empty strings MUST NOT be included and byte strings + * MUST NOT be truncated." + * We check lengths now rather than later. + */ + tot_len = 0; + for (p = protos; *p != NULL; p++) { + cur_len = strlen(*p); + tot_len += cur_len; + + if ((cur_len == 0) || + (cur_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN) || + (tot_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_LIST_LEN)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + + conf->alpn_list = protos; + + return 0; +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl->alpn_chosen; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int support_mki_value) +{ + conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support = support_mki_value; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *mki_value, + uint16_t mki_len) +{ + if (mki_len > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + memcpy(ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_value, mki_len); + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_len; + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *profiles) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *p; + size_t list_size = 0; + + /* check the profiles list: all entry must be valid, + * its size cannot be more than the total number of supported profiles, currently 4 */ + for (p = profiles; *p != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET && + list_size <= MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH; + p++) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(*p) != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { + list_size++; + } else { + /* unsupported value, stop parsing and set the size to an error value */ + list_size = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH + 1; + } + } + + if (list_size > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH) { + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = NULL; + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = 0; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list = profiles; + conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len = list_size; + + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info) +{ + dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile; + /* do not copy the mki value if there is no chosen profile */ + if (dtls_srtp_info->chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { + dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = 0; + } else { + dtls_srtp_info->mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + memcpy(dtls_srtp_info->mki_value, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len); + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor) +{ + conf->max_tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) ((major << 8) | minor); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major, int minor) +{ + conf->min_tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) ((major << 8) | minor); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + char cert_req_ca_list) +{ + conf->cert_req_ca_list = cert_req_ca_list; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm) +{ + conf->encrypt_then_mac = etm; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems) +{ + conf->extended_ms = ems; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code) +{ + if (mfl_code >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID || + ssl_mfl_code_to_length(mfl_code) > MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + conf->mfl_code = mfl_code; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int allow_legacy) +{ + conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation = allow_legacy; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int renegotiation) +{ + conf->disable_renegotiation = renegotiation; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int max_records) +{ + conf->renego_max_records = max_records; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + const unsigned char period[8]) +{ + memcpy(conf->renego_period, period, 8); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets) +{ + conf->session_tickets = use_tickets; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_new_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + uint16_t num_tickets) +{ + conf->new_session_tickets_count = num_tickets; +} +#endif + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t *f_ticket_write, + mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t *f_ticket_parse, + void *p_ticket) +{ + conf->f_ticket_write = f_ticket_write; + conf->f_ticket_parse = f_ticket_parse; + conf->p_ticket = p_ticket; +} +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_export_keys_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys, + void *p_export_keys) +{ + ssl->f_export_keys = f_export_keys; + ssl->p_export_keys = p_export_keys; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb( + mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign, + mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt, + mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume, + mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel, + void *async_config_data) +{ + conf->f_async_sign_start = f_async_sign; + conf->f_async_decrypt_start = f_async_decrypt; + conf->f_async_resume = f_async_resume; + conf->f_async_cancel = f_async_cancel; + conf->p_async_config_data = async_config_data; +} + +void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + return conf->p_async_config_data; +} + +void *mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl->handshake == NULL) { + return NULL; + } else { + return ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx; + } +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + void *ctx) +{ + if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { + ssl->handshake->user_async_ctx = ctx; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +/* + * SSL get accessors + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl->session != NULL) { + return ssl->session->verify_result; + } + + if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL) { + return ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result; + } + + return 0xFFFFFFFF; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id_from_ssl(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + return ssl->session->ciphersuite; +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + return mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(ssl->session->ciphersuite); +} + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + switch (ssl->tls_version) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + return "DTLSv1.2"; + default: + return "unknown (DTLS)"; + } + } +#endif + + switch (ssl->tls_version) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + return "TLSv1.2"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3: + return "TLSv1.3"; + default: + return "unknown"; + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_record_size_limit(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + const size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t record_size_limit = max_len; + + if (ssl->session != NULL && + ssl->session->record_size_limit >= MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN && + ssl->session->record_size_limit < max_len) { + record_size_limit = ssl->session->record_size_limit; + } + + // TODO: this is currently untested + /* During a handshake, use the value being negotiated */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL && + ssl->session_negotiate->record_size_limit >= MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN && + ssl->session_negotiate->record_size_limit < max_len) { + record_size_limit = ssl->session_negotiate->record_size_limit; + } + + return record_size_limit; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t read_mfl; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + /* Use the configured MFL for the client if we're past SERVER_HELLO_DONE */ + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ssl->state >= MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) { + return ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->conf->mfl_code); + } +#endif + + /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ + if (ssl->session_out != NULL) { + read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_out->mfl_code); + if (read_mfl < max_len) { + max_len = read_mfl; + } + } + + /* During a handshake, use the value being negotiated */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL) { + read_mfl = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code); + if (read_mfl < max_len) { + max_len = read_mfl; + } + } + + return max_len; +} + +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + size_t max_len; + + /* + * Assume mfl_code is correct since it was checked when set + */ + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->conf->mfl_code); + + /* Check if a smaller max length was negotiated */ + if (ssl->session_out != NULL && + ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_out->mfl_code) < max_len) { + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_out->mfl_code); + } + + /* During a handshake, use the value being negotiated */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate != NULL && + ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code) < max_len) { + max_len = ssl_mfl_code_to_length(ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code); + } + + return max_len; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + /* Return unlimited mtu for client hello messages to avoid fragmentation. */ + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO)) { + return 0; + } + + if (ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->handshake->mtu == 0) { + return ssl->mtu; + } + + if (ssl->mtu == 0) { + return ssl->handshake->mtu; + } + + return ssl->mtu < ssl->handshake->mtu ? + ssl->mtu : ssl->handshake->mtu; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + (void) ssl; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ssl); + + if (max_len > mfl) { + max_len = mfl; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + const size_t record_size_limit = mbedtls_ssl_get_output_record_size_limit(ssl); + + if (max_len > record_size_limit) { + max_len = record_size_limit; + } +#endif + + if (ssl->transform_out != NULL && + ssl->transform_out->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + /* + * In TLS 1.3 case, when records are protected, `max_len` as computed + * above is the maximum length of the TLSInnerPlaintext structure that + * along the plaintext payload contains the inner content type (one byte) + * and some zero padding. Given the algorithm used for padding + * in mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(), compute the maximum length for + * the plaintext payload. Round down to a multiple of + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY and + * subtract 1. + */ + max_len = ((max_len / MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) * + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) - 1; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(ssl) != 0) { + const size_t mtu = mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(ssl); + const int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(ssl); + const size_t overhead = (size_t) ret; + + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (mtu <= overhead) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("MTU too low for record expansion")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + if (max_len > mtu - overhead) { + max_len = mtu - overhead; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + return (int) max_len; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + (void) ssl; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(ssl); + + if (max_len > mfl) { + max_len = mfl; + } +#endif + + return (int) max_len; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + return ssl->session->peer_cert; +#else + return NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_session *dst) +{ + int ret; + + if (ssl == NULL || + dst == NULL || + ssl->session == NULL || + ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Since Mbed TLS 3.0, mbedtls_ssl_get_session() is no longer + * idempotent: Each session can only be exported once. + * + * (This is in preparation for TLS 1.3 support where we will + * need the ability to export multiple sessions (aka tickets), + * which will be achieved by calling mbedtls_ssl_get_session() + * multiple times until it fails.) + * + * Check whether we have already exported the current session, + * and fail if so. + */ + if (ssl->session->exported == 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(dst, ssl->session); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Remember that we've exported the session. */ + ssl->session->exported = 1; + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +/* Serialization of TLS 1.2 sessions + * + * For more detail, see the description of ssl_session_save(). + */ +static size_t ssl_tls12_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t used = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + uint64_t start; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + size_t cert_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + /* + * Time + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + used += 8; + + if (used <= buf_len) { + start = (uint64_t) session->start; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(start, p, 0); + p += 8; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* + * Basic mandatory fields + */ + used += 1 /* id_len */ + + sizeof(session->id) + + sizeof(session->master) + + 4; /* verify_result */ + + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->id_len); + memcpy(p, session->id, 32); + p += 32; + + memcpy(p, session->master, 48); + p += 48; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->verify_result, p, 0); + p += 4; + } + + /* + * Peer's end-entity certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if (session->peer_cert == NULL) { + cert_len = 0; + } else { + cert_len = session->peer_cert->raw.len; + } + + used += 3 + cert_len; + + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(cert_len); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(cert_len); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(cert_len); + + if (session->peer_cert != NULL) { + memcpy(p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, cert_len); + p += cert_len; + } + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if (session->peer_cert_digest != NULL) { + used += 1 /* type */ + 1 /* length */ + session->peer_cert_digest_len; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_type; + *p++ = (unsigned char) session->peer_cert_digest_len; + memcpy(p, session->peer_cert_digest, + session->peer_cert_digest_len); + p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; + } + } else { + used += 2; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = (unsigned char) MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + *p++ = 0; + } + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + /* + * Session ticket if any, plus associated data + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + used += 3 + session->ticket_len + 4; /* len + ticket + lifetime */ + + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(session->ticket_len); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(session->ticket_len); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->ticket_len); + + if (session->ticket != NULL) { + memcpy(p, session->ticket, session->ticket_len); + p += session->ticket_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->ticket_lifetime, p, 0); + p += 4; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + used += 8; + + if (used <= buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE((uint64_t) session->ticket_creation_time, p, 0); + p += 8; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + /* + * Misc extension-related info + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + used += 1; + + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = session->mfl_code; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + used += 1; + + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->encrypt_then_mac); + } +#endif + + return used; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls12_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + uint64_t start; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + size_t cert_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; + + /* + * Time + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if (8 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + start = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; + + session->start = (time_t) start; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* + * Basic mandatory fields + */ + if (1 + 32 + 48 + 4 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + session->id_len = *p++; + memcpy(session->id, p, 32); + p += 32; + + memcpy(session->master, p, 48); + p += 48; + + session->verify_result = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; + + /* Immediately clear invalid pointer values that have been read, in case + * we exit early before we replaced them with valid ones. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + session->peer_cert = NULL; +#else + session->peer_cert_digest = NULL; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + session->ticket = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* + * Peer certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* Deserialize CRT from the end of the ticket. */ + if (3 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + cert_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(p, 0); + p += 3; + + if (cert_len != 0) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (cert_len > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt)); + + if (session->peer_cert == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init(session->peer_cert); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(session->peer_cert, + p, cert_len)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(session->peer_cert); + mbedtls_free(session->peer_cert); + session->peer_cert = NULL; + return ret; + } + + p += cert_len; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* Deserialize CRT digest from the end of the ticket. */ + if (2 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + session->peer_cert_digest_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) *p++; + session->peer_cert_digest_len = (size_t) *p++; + + if (session->peer_cert_digest_len != 0) { + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(session->peer_cert_digest_type); + if (md_info == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (session->peer_cert_digest_len != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (session->peer_cert_digest_len > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + session->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc(1, session->peer_cert_digest_len); + if (session->peer_cert_digest == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(session->peer_cert_digest, p, + session->peer_cert_digest_len); + p += session->peer_cert_digest_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + /* + * Session ticket and associated data + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + if (3 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + session->ticket_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(p, 0); + p += 3; + + if (session->ticket_len != 0) { + if (session->ticket_len > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + session->ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, session->ticket_len); + if (session->ticket == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(session->ticket, p, session->ticket_len); + p += session->ticket_len; + } + + if (4 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + session->ticket_lifetime = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + if (8 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->ticket_creation_time = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + /* + * Misc extension-related info + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + if (1 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + session->mfl_code = *p++; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if (1 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + session->encrypt_then_mac = *p++; +#endif + + /* Done, should have consumed entire buffer */ + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) +/* Serialization of TLS 1.3 sessions: + * + * For more detail, see the description of ssl_session_save(). + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + size_t hostname_len = (session->hostname == NULL) ? + 0 : strlen(session->hostname) + 1; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + const size_t alpn_len = (session->ticket_alpn == NULL) ? + 0 : strlen(session->ticket_alpn) + 1; +#endif + size_t needed = 4 /* ticket_age_add */ + + 1 /* ticket_flags */ + + 1; /* resumption_key length */ + + *olen = 0; + + if (session->resumption_key_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + needed += session->resumption_key_len; /* resumption_key */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + needed += 4; /* max_early_data_size */ +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + needed += 2; /* record_size_limit */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + needed += 8; /* ticket_creation_time or ticket_reception_time */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + needed += 2 /* alpn_len */ + + alpn_len; /* alpn */ +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + needed += 2 /* hostname_len */ + + hostname_len; /* hostname */ +#endif + + needed += 4 /* ticket_lifetime */ + + 2; /* ticket_len */ + + /* Check size_t overflow */ + if (session->ticket_len > SIZE_MAX - needed) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + needed += session->ticket_len; /* ticket */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + *olen = needed; + if (needed > buf_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->ticket_age_add, p, 0); + p[4] = session->ticket_flags; + + /* save resumption_key */ + p[5] = session->resumption_key_len; + p += 6; + memcpy(p, session->resumption_key, session->resumption_key_len); + p += session->resumption_key_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->max_early_data_size, p, 0); + p += 4; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(session->record_size_limit, p, 0); + p += 2; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE((uint64_t) session->ticket_creation_time, p, 0); + p += 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(alpn_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + + if (alpn_len > 0) { + /* save chosen alpn */ + memcpy(p, session->ticket_alpn, alpn_len); + p += alpn_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(hostname_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + if (hostname_len > 0) { + /* save host name */ + memcpy(p, session->hostname, hostname_len); + p += hostname_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE((uint64_t) session->ticket_reception_time, p, 0); + p += 8; +#endif + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->ticket_lifetime, p, 0); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(session->ticket_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + + if (session->ticket != NULL && session->ticket_len > 0) { + memcpy(p, session->ticket, session->ticket_len); + p += session->ticket_len; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + + if (end - p < 6) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->ticket_age_add = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + session->ticket_flags = p[4]; + + /* load resumption_key */ + session->resumption_key_len = p[5]; + p += 6; + + if (end - p < session->resumption_key_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (sizeof(session->resumption_key) < session->resumption_key_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + memcpy(session->resumption_key, p, session->resumption_key_len); + p += session->resumption_key_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (end - p < 4) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->max_early_data_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->record_size_limit = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if (end - p < 8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->ticket_creation_time = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + size_t alpn_len; + + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + alpn_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + if (end - p < (long int) alpn_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (alpn_len > 0) { + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(session, (char *) p); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += alpn_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (session->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + size_t hostname_len; + /* load host name */ + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + hostname_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + if (end - p < (long int) hostname_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (hostname_len > 0) { + session->hostname = mbedtls_calloc(1, hostname_len); + if (session->hostname == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(session->hostname, p, hostname_len); + p += hostname_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + if (end - p < 8) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->ticket_reception_time = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; +#endif + if (end - p < 4) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->ticket_lifetime = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; + + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->ticket_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + if (end - p < (long int) session->ticket_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (session->ticket_len > 0) { + session->ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, session->ticket_len); + if (session->ticket == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(session->ticket, p, session->ticket_len); + p += session->ticket_len; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + return 0; + +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + ((void) session); + ((void) buf); + ((void) buf_len); + *olen = 0; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} + +static int ssl_tls13_session_load(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len) +{ + ((void) session); + ((void) buf); + ((void) buf_len); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +/* + * Define ticket header determining Mbed TLS version + * and structure of the ticket. + */ + +/* + * Define bitflag determining compile-time settings influencing + * structure of serialized SSL sessions. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_SNI 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_SNI 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_EARLY_DATA 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_EARLY_DATA 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_RECORD_SIZE 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_RECORD_SIZE 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ALPN 1 +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ALPN 0 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT 0 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT 1 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT 2 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT 3 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT 4 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT 5 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT_BIT 6 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_SNI_BIT 7 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_EARLY_DATA_BIT 8 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_RECORD_SIZE_BIT 9 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT 10 + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ + ((uint16_t) ( \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TIME_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CRT_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_CLIENT_TICKET_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_MFL_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_KEEP_PEER_CRT_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_SNI << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_SNI_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_EARLY_DATA << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_EARLY_DATA_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_RECORD_SIZE << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_RECORD_SIZE_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ALPN << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT))) + +static const unsigned char ssl_serialized_session_header[] = { + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), +}; + +/* + * Serialize a session in the following format: + * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) + * + * TLS 1.2 session: + * + * struct { + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + * opaque ticket<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no ticket + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * #endif + * } ClientOnlyData; + * + * struct { + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + * uint64 start_time; + * #endif + * uint8 session_id_len; // at most 32 + * opaque session_id[32]; + * opaque master[48]; // fixed length in the standard + * uint32 verify_result; + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE + * opaque peer_cert<0..2^24-1>; // length 0 means no peer cert + * #else + * uint8 peer_cert_digest_type; + * opaque peer_cert_digest<0..2^8-1> + * #endif + * select (endpoint) { + * case client: ClientOnlyData; + * case server: uint64 ticket_creation_time; + * }; + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + * uint8 mfl_code; // up to 255 according to standard + * #endif + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + * uint8 encrypt_then_mac; // 0 or 1 + * #endif + * } serialized_session_tls12; + * + * + * TLS 1.3 Session: + * + * struct { + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + * opaque hostname<0..2^16-1>; + * #endif + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + * uint64 ticket_reception_time; + * #endif + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>; + * } ClientOnlyData; + * + * struct { + * uint32 ticket_age_add; + * uint8 ticket_flags; + * opaque resumption_key<0..255>; + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + * uint32 max_early_data_size; + * #endif + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + * uint16 record_size_limit; + * #endif + * select ( endpoint ) { + * case client: ClientOnlyData; + * case server: + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + * uint64 ticket_creation_time; + * #endif + * #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + * opaque ticket_alpn<0..256>; + * #endif + * }; + * } serialized_session_tls13; + * + * + * SSL session: + * + * struct { + * + * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // library version: major, minor, patch + * opaque session_format[2]; // library-version specific 16-bit field + * // determining the format of the remaining + * // serialized data. + * + * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep + * these version+format bytes. + * + * // In this version, `session_format` determines + * // the setting of those compile-time + * // configuration options which influence + * // the structure of mbedtls_ssl_session. + * + * uint8_t minor_ver; // Protocol minor version. Possible values: + * // - TLS 1.2 (0x0303) + * // - TLS 1.3 (0x0304) + * uint8_t endpoint; + * uint16_t ciphersuite; + * + * select (serialized_session.tls_version) { + * + * case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + * serialized_session_tls12 data; + * case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3: + * serialized_session_tls13 data; + * + * }; + * + * } serialized_session; + * + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char omit_header, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t used = 0; + size_t remaining_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + size_t out_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif + if (session == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + if (!omit_header) { + /* + * Add Mbed TLS version identifier + */ + used += sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header); + + if (used <= buf_len) { + memcpy(p, ssl_serialized_session_header, + sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header)); + p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header); + } + } + + /* + * TLS version identifier, endpoint, ciphersuite + */ + used += 1 /* TLS version */ + + 1 /* endpoint */ + + 2; /* ciphersuite */ + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(session->tls_version); + *p++ = session->endpoint; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(session->ciphersuite, p, 0); + p += 2; + } + + /* Forward to version-specific serialization routine. */ + remaining_len = (buf_len >= used) ? buf_len - used : 0; + switch (session->tls_version) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + used += ssl_tls12_session_save(session, p, remaining_len); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3: + ret = ssl_tls13_session_save(session, p, remaining_len, &out_len); + if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + return ret; + } + used += out_len; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + *olen = used; + if (used > buf_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Public wrapper for ssl_session_save() + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + return ssl_session_save(session, 0, buf, buf_len, olen); +} + +/* + * Deserialize session, see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() for format. + * + * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in + * case of error, and has an extra option omit_header. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char omit_header, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; + size_t remaining_len; + + + if (session == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + if (!omit_header) { + /* + * Check Mbed TLS version identifier + */ + + if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (memcmp(p, ssl_serialized_session_header, + sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH; + } + p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_session_header); + } + + /* + * TLS version identifier, endpoint, ciphersuite + */ + if (4 > (size_t) (end - p)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + session->tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) (0x0300 | *p++); + session->endpoint = *p++; + session->ciphersuite = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* Dispatch according to TLS version. */ + remaining_len = (size_t) (end - p); + switch (session->tls_version) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2: + return ssl_tls12_session_load(session, p, remaining_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3: + return ssl_tls13_session_load(session, p, remaining_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +} + +/* + * Deserialize session: public wrapper for error cleaning + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + int ret = ssl_session_load(session, 0, buf, len); + + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(session); + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Perform a single step of the SSL handshake + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_prepare_handshake_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * We may have not been able to send to the peer all the handshake data + * that were written into the output buffer by the previous handshake step, + * if the write to the network callback returned with the + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE error code. + * We proceed to the next handshake step only when all data from the + * previous one have been sent to the peer, thus we make sure that this is + * the case here by calling `mbedtls_ssl_flush_output()`. The function may + * return with the #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE error code in which case + * we have to wait before to go ahead. + * In the case of TLS 1.3, handshake step handlers do not send data to the + * peer. Data are only sent here and through + * `mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert` in case an error that triggered an + * alert occurred. + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ssl == NULL || + ssl->conf == NULL || + ssl->handshake == NULL || + ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = ssl_prepare_handshake_step(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* If ssl->conf->endpoint is not one of MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, this is the return code we give */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("client state: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_states_str((mbedtls_ssl_states) ssl->state))); + + switch (ssl->state) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; + ret = 0; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(ssl); + break; + + default: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(ssl); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(ssl); + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(ssl); +#else + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(ssl); +#endif + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step(ssl); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(ssl); + } +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(ssl); +#else + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step(ssl); +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + if (ret != 0) { + /* handshake_step return error. And it is same + * with alert_reason. + */ + if (ssl->send_alert) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert(ssl); + goto cleanup; + } + } + +cleanup: + return ret; +} + +/* + * Perform the SSL handshake + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + + /* Sanity checks */ + + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + (ssl->f_set_timer == NULL || ssl->f_get_timer == NULL)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("You must use " + "mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> handshake")); + + /* Main handshake loop */ + while (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(ssl); + + if (ret != 0) { + break; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= handshake")); + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* + * Write HelloRequest to request renegotiation on server + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write hello request")); + + ssl->out_msglen = 4; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write hello request")); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* + * Actually renegotiate current connection, triggered by either: + * - any side: calling mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(), + * - client: receiving a HelloRequest during mbedtls_ssl_read(), + * - server: receiving any handshake message on server during mbedtls_ssl_read() after + * the initial handshake is completed. + * If the handshake doesn't complete due to waiting for I/O, it will continue + * during the next calls to mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate() or mbedtls_ssl_read() respectively. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> renegotiate")); + + if ((ret = ssl_handshake_init(ssl)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* RFC 6347 4.2.2: "[...] the HelloRequest will have message_seq = 0 and + * the ServerHello will have message_seq = 1" */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING) { + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = 1; + } else { + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = 1; + } + } +#endif + + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST; + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= renegotiate")); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Renegotiate current connection on client, + * or request renegotiation on server + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* On server, just send the request */ + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING; + + /* Did we already try/start sending HelloRequest? */ + if (ssl->out_left != 0) { + return mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl); + } + + return ssl_write_hello_request(ssl); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + /* + * On client, either start the renegotiation process or, + * if already in progress, continue the handshake + */ + if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation", ret); + return ret; + } + } else { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_handshake", ret); + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + if (handshake == NULL) { + return; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ssl->handshake->group_list_heap_allocated) { + mbedtls_free((void *) handshake->group_list); + } + handshake->group_list = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + if (ssl->handshake->sig_algs_heap_allocated) { + mbedtls_free((void *) handshake->sig_algs); + } + handshake->sig_algs = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (ssl->handshake->certificate_request_context) { + mbedtls_free((void *) handshake->certificate_request_context); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if (ssl->conf->f_async_cancel != NULL && handshake->async_in_progress != 0) { + ssl->conf->f_async_cancel(ssl); + handshake->async_in_progress = 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort(&handshake->fin_sha256_psa); +#else + mbedtls_md_free(&handshake->fin_sha256); +#endif +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort(&handshake->fin_sha384_psa); +#else + mbedtls_md_free(&handshake->fin_sha384); +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_dhm_free(&handshake->dhm_ctx); +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecdh_free(&handshake->ecdh_ctx); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_pake_abort(&handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + /* + * Opaque keys are not stored in the handshake's data and it's the user + * responsibility to destroy them. Clear ones, instead, are created by + * the TLS library and should be destroyed at the same level + */ + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(handshake->psa_pake_password)) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->psa_pake_password); + } + handshake->psa_pake_password = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else + mbedtls_ecjpake_free(&handshake->ecjpake_ctx); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + mbedtls_free(handshake->ecjpake_cache); + handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; + handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_ECDSA_ANY_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + /* explicit void pointer cast for buggy MS compiler */ + mbedtls_free((void *) handshake->curves_tls_id); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { + /* The maintenance of the external PSK key slot is the + * user's responsibility. */ + if (ssl->handshake->psk_opaque_is_internal) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque); + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque_is_internal = 0; + } + ssl->handshake->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } +#else + if (handshake->psk != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(handshake->psk, handshake->psk_len); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + /* + * Free only the linked list wrapper, not the keys themselves + * since the belong to the SNI callback + */ + ssl_key_cert_free(handshake->sni_key_cert); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(&handshake->ecrs_ctx); + if (handshake->ecrs_peer_cert != NULL) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(handshake->ecrs_peer_cert); + mbedtls_free(handshake->ecrs_peer_cert); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + mbedtls_pk_free(&handshake->peer_pubkey); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)) + mbedtls_free(handshake->cookie); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 ) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + mbedtls_ssl_flight_free(handshake->flight); + mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED) + if (handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external == 0) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(handshake->transform_handshake); + mbedtls_free(handshake->transform_handshake); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(handshake->transform_earlydata); + mbedtls_free(handshake->transform_earlydata); +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + /* If the buffers are too big - reallocate. Because of the way Mbed TLS + * processes datagrams and the fact that a datagram is allowed to have + * several records in it, it is possible that the I/O buffers are not + * empty at this stage */ + handle_buffer_resizing(ssl, 1, mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen(ssl), + mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen(ssl)); +#endif + + /* mbedtls_platform_zeroize MUST be last one in this function */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(handshake, + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params)); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_session_free(mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + if (session == NULL) { + return; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + ssl_clear_peer_cert(session); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + mbedtls_free(session->hostname); +#endif + mbedtls_free(session->ticket); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + mbedtls_free(session->ticket_alpn); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(session, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT 1u + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 1u +#else +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN 0u +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT 0 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT 1 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT 2 +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT 3 + +#define SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG \ + ((uint32_t) ( \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY << \ + SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY_BIT) | \ + (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT) | \ + 0u)) + +static const unsigned char ssl_serialized_context_header[] = { + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, + MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_BITFLAG), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG), + MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_BITFLAG), +}; + +/* + * Serialize a full SSL context + * + * The format of the serialized data is: + * (in the presentation language of TLS, RFC 8446 section 3) + * + * // header + * opaque mbedtls_version[3]; // major, minor, patch + * opaque context_format[5]; // version-specific field determining + * // the format of the remaining + * // serialized data. + * Note: When updating the format, remember to keep these + * version+format bytes. (We may make their size part of the API.) + * + * // session sub-structure + * opaque session<1..2^32-1>; // see mbedtls_ssl_session_save() + * // transform sub-structure + * uint8 random[64]; // ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random + * uint8 in_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: expected incoming value + * uint8 out_cid<0..2^8-1> // Connection ID: outgoing value to use + * // fields from ssl_context + * uint32 badmac_seen; // DTLS: number of records with failing MAC + * uint64 in_window_top; // DTLS: last validated record seq_num + * uint64 in_window; // DTLS: bitmask for replay protection + * uint8 disable_datagram_packing; // DTLS: only one record per datagram + * uint64 cur_out_ctr; // Record layer: outgoing sequence number + * uint16 mtu; // DTLS: path mtu (max outgoing fragment size) + * uint8 alpn_chosen<0..2^8-1> // ALPN: negotiated application protocol + * + * Note that many fields of the ssl_context or sub-structures are not + * serialized, as they fall in one of the following categories: + * + * 1. forced value (eg in_left must be 0) + * 2. pointer to dynamically-allocated memory (eg session, transform) + * 3. value can be re-derived from other data (eg session keys from MS) + * 4. value was temporary (eg content of input buffer) + * 5. value will be provided by the user again (eg I/O callbacks and context) + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_save(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t used = 0; + size_t session_len; + int ret = 0; + + /* + * Enforce usage restrictions, see "return BAD_INPUT_DATA" in + * this function's documentation. + * + * These are due to assumptions/limitations in the implementation. Some of + * them are likely to stay (no handshake in progress) some might go away + * (only DTLS) but are currently used to simplify the implementation. + */ + /* The initial handshake must be over */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Initial handshake isn't over")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Handshake isn't completed")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* Double-check that sub-structures are indeed ready */ + if (ssl->transform == NULL || ssl->session == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Serialised structures aren't ready")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* There must be no pending incoming or outgoing data */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_pending(ssl) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("There is pending incoming data")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if (ssl->out_left != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("There is pending outgoing data")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* Protocol must be DTLS, not TLS */ + if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Only DTLS is supported")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* Version must be 1.2 */ + if (ssl->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Only version 1.2 supported")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* We must be using an AEAD ciphersuite */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead(ssl->transform) != 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Only AEAD ciphersuites supported")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + /* Renegotiation must not be enabled */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Renegotiation must not be enabled")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif + + /* + * Version and format identifier + */ + used += sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header); + + if (used <= buf_len) { + memcpy(p, ssl_serialized_context_header, + sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header)); + p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header); + } + + /* + * Session (length + data) + */ + ret = ssl_session_save(ssl->session, 1, NULL, 0, &session_len); + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + return ret; + } + + used += 4 + session_len; + if (used <= buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session_len, p, 0); + p += 4; + + ret = ssl_session_save(ssl->session, 1, + p, session_len, &session_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + p += session_len; + } + + /* + * Transform + */ + used += sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes); + if (used <= buf_len) { + memcpy(p, ssl->transform->randbytes, + sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes)); + p += sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + used += 2U + ssl->transform->in_cid_len + ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + memcpy(p, ssl->transform->in_cid, ssl->transform->in_cid_len); + p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + + *p++ = ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + memcpy(p, ssl->transform->out_cid, ssl->transform->out_cid_len); + p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* + * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure + */ + used += 4; + if (used <= buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ssl->badmac_seen, p, 0); + p += 4; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + used += 16; + if (used <= buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ssl->in_window_top, p, 0); + p += 8; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ssl->in_window, p, 0); + p += 8; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + used += 1; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = ssl->disable_datagram_packing; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + used += MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; + if (used <= buf_len) { + memcpy(p, ssl->cur_out_ctr, MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN); + p += MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + used += 2; + if (used <= buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->mtu, p, 0); + p += 2; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + { + const uint8_t alpn_len = ssl->alpn_chosen + ? (uint8_t) strlen(ssl->alpn_chosen) + : 0; + + used += 1 + alpn_len; + if (used <= buf_len) { + *p++ = alpn_len; + + if (ssl->alpn_chosen != NULL) { + memcpy(p, ssl->alpn_chosen, alpn_len); + p += alpn_len; + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + + /* + * Done + */ + *olen = used; + + if (used > buf_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "saved context", buf, used); + + return mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(ssl, 0); +} + +/* + * Deserialize context, see mbedtls_ssl_context_save() for format. + * + * This internal version is wrapped by a public function that cleans up in + * case of error. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_context_load(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char * const end = buf + len; + size_t session_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + tls_prf_fn prf_func = NULL; +#endif + + /* + * The context should have been freshly setup or reset. + * Give the user an error in case of obvious misuse. + * (Checking session is useful because it won't be NULL if we're + * renegotiating, or if the user mistakenly loaded a session first.) + */ + if (ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST || + ssl->session != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * We can't check that the config matches the initial one, but we can at + * least check it matches the requirements for serializing. + */ + if ( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->conf->disable_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED || +#endif + ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + ssl->conf->max_tls_version < MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 || + ssl->conf->min_tls_version > MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 + ) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "context to load", buf, len); + + /* + * Check version identifier + */ + if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (memcmp(p, ssl_serialized_context_header, + sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH; + } + p += sizeof(ssl_serialized_context_header); + + /* + * Session + */ + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 4) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + session_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; + + /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by + * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ + ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; + ssl->session_in = ssl->session; + ssl->session_out = ssl->session; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + + if ((size_t) (end - p) < session_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = ssl_session_load(ssl->session, 1, p, session_len); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); + return ret; + } + + p += session_len; + + /* + * Transform + */ + + /* This has been allocated by ssl_handshake_init(), called by + * by either mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int() or mbedtls_ssl_setup(). */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform; + ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform; + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + prf_func = ssl_tls12prf_from_cs(ssl->session->ciphersuite); + if (prf_func == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Read random bytes and populate structure */ + if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ret = ssl_tls12_populate_transform(ssl->transform, + ssl->session->ciphersuite, + ssl->session->master, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + prf_func, + p, /* currently pointing to randbytes */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2, /* (D)TLS 1.2 is forced */ + ssl->conf->endpoint, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + p += sizeof(ssl->transform->randbytes); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* Read connection IDs and store them */ + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ssl->transform->in_cid_len = *p++; + + if ((size_t) (end - p) < ssl->transform->in_cid_len + 1u) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memcpy(ssl->transform->in_cid, p, ssl->transform->in_cid_len); + p += ssl->transform->in_cid_len; + + ssl->transform->out_cid_len = *p++; + + if ((size_t) (end - p) < ssl->transform->out_cid_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memcpy(ssl->transform->out_cid, p, ssl->transform->out_cid_len); + p += ssl->transform->out_cid_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* + * Saved fields from top-level ssl_context structure + */ + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 4) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ssl->badmac_seen = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + p += 4; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 16) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ssl->in_window_top = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; + + ssl->in_window = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(p, 0); + p += 8; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ssl->disable_datagram_packing = *p++; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + if ((size_t) (end - p) < sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + memcpy(ssl->cur_out_ctr, p, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)); + p += sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ssl->mtu = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + { + uint8_t alpn_len; + const char **cur; + + if ((size_t) (end - p) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + alpn_len = *p++; + + if (alpn_len != 0 && ssl->conf->alpn_list != NULL) { + /* alpn_chosen should point to an item in the configured list */ + for (cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++) { + if (strlen(*cur) == alpn_len && + memcmp(p, *cur, alpn_len) == 0) { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *cur; + break; + } + } + } + + /* can only happen on conf mismatch */ + if (alpn_len != 0 && ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + p += alpn_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + + /* + * Forced fields from top-level ssl_context structure + * + * Most of them already set to the correct value by mbedtls_ssl_init() and + * mbedtls_ssl_reset(), so we only need to set the remaining ones. + */ + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER; + ssl->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + + /* Adjust pointers for header fields of outgoing records to + * the given transform, accounting for explicit IV and CID. */ + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + ssl->in_epoch = 1; +#endif + + /* mbedtls_ssl_reset() leaves the handshake sub-structure allocated, + * which we don't want - otherwise we'd end up freeing the wrong transform + * by calling mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform() + * inappropriately. */ + if (ssl->handshake != NULL) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); + ssl->handshake = NULL; + } + + /* + * Done - should have consumed entire buffer + */ + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Deserialize context: public wrapper for error cleaning + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_context_load(mbedtls_ssl_context *context, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + int ret = ssl_context_load(context, buf, len); + + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_free(context); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ + +/* + * Free an SSL context + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl == NULL) { + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> free")); + + if (ssl->out_buf != NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len; +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->out_buf, out_buf_len); + ssl->out_buf = NULL; + } + + if (ssl->in_buf != NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t in_buf_len = ssl->in_buf_len; +#else + size_t in_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN; +#endif + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->in_buf, in_buf_len); + ssl->in_buf = NULL; + } + + if (ssl->transform) { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform); + } + + if (ssl->handshake) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform_negotiate); +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session_negotiate); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform_application); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform_application); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + if (ssl->session) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + if (ssl->hostname != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->hostname, strlen(ssl->hostname)); + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + mbedtls_free(ssl->cli_id); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= free")); + + /* Actually clear after last debug message */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_context)); +} + +/* + * Initialize mbedtls_ssl_config + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_config_init(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ + memset(conf, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_config)); +} + +/* The selection should be the same as mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default in + * x509_crt.c, plus Montgomery curves for ECDHE. Here, the order matters: + * curves with a lower resource usage come first. + * See the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() for what we promise + * about this list. + */ +static const uint16_t ssl_preset_default_groups[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1, +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192, +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE +}; + +static const int ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites[] = { + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + 0 +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +/* NOTICE: + * For ssl_preset_*_sig_algs and ssl_tls12_preset_*_sig_algs, the following + * rules SHOULD be upheld. + * - No duplicate entries. + * - But if there is a good reason, do not change the order of the algorithms. + * - ssl_tls12_preset* is for TLS 1.2 use only. + * - ssl_preset_* is for TLS 1.3 only or hybrid TLS 1.3/1.2 handshakes. + */ +static const uint16_t ssl_preset_default_sig_algs[] = { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256, + // == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384, + // == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) && \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512, + // == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256, +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + + MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE +}; + +/* NOTICE: see above */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +static uint16_t ssl_tls12_preset_default_sig_algs[] = { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512), +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512), +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384), +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384), +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256), +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256), +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + + MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +/* NOTICE: see above */ +static const uint16_t ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs[] = { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256, + // == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256) +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384, + // == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384) +#endif + + MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE +}; + +/* NOTICE: see above */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) +static uint16_t ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs[] = { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256), +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384), +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ + + MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +static const uint16_t ssl_preset_suiteb_groups[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1, +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE +}; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* Function for checking `ssl_preset_*_sig_algs` and `ssl_tls12_preset_*_sig_algs` + * to make sure there are no duplicated signature algorithm entries. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_no_sig_alg_duplication(const uint16_t *sig_algs) +{ + size_t i, j; + int ret = 0; + + for (i = 0; sig_algs[i] != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { + if (sig_algs[i] != sig_algs[j]) { + continue; + } + mbedtls_printf(" entry(%04x,%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + ") is duplicated at %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET "\n", + sig_algs[i], j, i); + ret = -1; + } + } + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Load default in mbedtls_ssl_config + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + int endpoint, int transport, int preset) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + if (ssl_check_no_sig_alg_duplication(ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs)) { + mbedtls_printf("ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs has duplicated entries\n"); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + if (ssl_check_no_sig_alg_duplication(ssl_preset_default_sig_algs)) { + mbedtls_printf("ssl_preset_default_sig_algs has duplicated entries\n"); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl_check_no_sig_alg_duplication(ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs)) { + mbedtls_printf("ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs has duplicated entries\n"); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + + if (ssl_check_no_sig_alg_duplication(ssl_tls12_preset_default_sig_algs)) { + mbedtls_printf("ssl_tls12_preset_default_sig_algs has duplicated entries\n"); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + + /* Use the functions here so that they are covered in tests, + * but otherwise access member directly for efficiency */ + mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint(conf, endpoint); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(conf, transport); + + /* + * Things that are common to all presets + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + conf->authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + conf->session_tickets = MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED; +#endif + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + conf->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + conf->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + conf->f_cookie_write = ssl_cookie_write_dummy; + conf->f_cookie_check = ssl_cookie_check_dummy; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + conf->anti_replay = MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + conf->cert_req_ca_list = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED; + conf->respect_cli_pref = MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + conf->hs_timeout_min = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN; + conf->hs_timeout_max = MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + conf->renego_max_records = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT; + memset(conf->renego_period, 0x00, 2); + memset(conf->renego_period + 2, 0xFF, 6); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + const unsigned char dhm_p[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN; + const unsigned char dhm_g[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G_BIN; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin(conf, + dhm_p, sizeof(dhm_p), + dhm_g, sizeof(dhm_g))) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_early_data_size(conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE); +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_new_session_tickets( + conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS); +#endif + /* + * Allow all TLS 1.3 key exchange modes by default. + */ + conf->tls13_kex_modes = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + if (transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + conf->min_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + conf->max_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; +#else + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif + } else { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + conf->min_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + conf->max_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + conf->min_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; + conf->max_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + conf->min_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + conf->max_tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; +#else + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif + } + + /* + * Preset-specific defaults + */ + switch (preset) { + /* + * NSA Suite B + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB: + + conf->ciphersuite_list = ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only(conf)) { + conf->sig_algs = ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + conf->sig_algs = ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + conf->curve_list = NULL; +#endif + conf->group_list = ssl_preset_suiteb_groups; + break; + + /* + * Default + */ + default: + + conf->ciphersuite_list = mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + conf->cert_profile = &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only(conf)) { + conf->sig_algs = ssl_tls12_preset_default_sig_algs; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + conf->sig_algs = ssl_preset_default_sig_algs; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + conf->curve_list = NULL; +#endif + conf->group_list = ssl_preset_default_groups; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + conf->dhm_min_bitlen = 1024; +#endif + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Free mbedtls_ssl_config + */ +void mbedtls_ssl_config_free(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&conf->dhm_G); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { + conf->psk_opaque = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (conf->psk != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(conf->psk, conf->psk_len); + conf->psk = NULL; + conf->psk_len = 0; + } + + if (conf->psk_identity != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(conf->psk_identity, conf->psk_identity_len); + conf->psk_identity = NULL; + conf->psk_identity_len = 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + ssl_key_cert_free(conf->key_cert); +#endif + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(conf, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_config)); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED)) +/* + * Convert between MBEDTLS_PK_XXX and SSL_SIG_XXX + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA)) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; + } +#endif + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON; +} + +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) +{ + switch (type) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; + default: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON; + } +} + +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(unsigned char sig) +{ + switch (sig) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA: + return MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA: + return MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && + ( MBEDTLS_RSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED ) */ + +/* + * Convert from MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX to MBEDTLS_MD_XXX + */ +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(unsigned char hash) +{ + switch (hash) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5: + return MBEDTLS_MD_MD5; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + } +} + +/* + * Convert from MBEDTLS_MD_XXX to MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_XXX + */ +unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(int md) +{ + switch (md) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE; + } +} + +/* + * Check if a curve proposed by the peer is in our list. + * Return 0 if we're willing to use it, -1 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t tls_id) +{ + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); + + if (group_list == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { + if (*group_list == tls_id) { + return 0; + } + } + + return -1; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +/* + * Same as mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id() but with a mbedtls_ecp_group_id. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) +{ + uint16_t tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id); + + if (tls_id == 0) { + return -1; + } + + return mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(ssl, tls_id); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + +static const struct { + uint16_t tls_id; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_group_id; + psa_ecc_family_t psa_family; + uint16_t bits; +} tls_id_match_table[] = +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1) + { 25, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 521 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1) + { 28, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1, 512 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) + { 24, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 384 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1) + { 27, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1, 384 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) + { 23, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1) + { 22, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1, 256 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1) + { 26, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1, 256 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1) + { 21, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 224 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1) + { 20, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1, 224 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1) + { 19, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 192 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1) + { 18, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1, 192 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) + { 29, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 255 }, +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448) + { 30, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 448 }, +#endif + { 0, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, 0, 0 }, +}; + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id, + psa_key_type_t *type, + size_t *bits) +{ + for (int i = 0; tls_id_match_table[i].tls_id != 0; i++) { + if (tls_id_match_table[i].tls_id == tls_id) { + if (type != NULL) { + *type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(tls_id_match_table[i].psa_family); + } + if (bits != NULL) { + *bits = tls_id_match_table[i].bits; + } + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + } + + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; +} + +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id) +{ + for (int i = 0; tls_id_match_table[i].tls_id != 0; i++) { + if (tls_id_match_table[i].tls_id == tls_id) { + return tls_id_match_table[i].ecp_group_id; + } + } + + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; +} + +uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) +{ + for (int i = 0; tls_id_match_table[i].ecp_group_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; + i++) { + if (tls_id_match_table[i].ecp_group_id == grp_id) { + return tls_id_match_table[i].tls_id; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) +static const struct { + uint16_t tls_id; + const char *name; +} tls_id_curve_name_table[] = +{ + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1, "secp521r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1, "brainpoolP512r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1, "secp384r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1, "brainpoolP384r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1, "secp256r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1, "secp256k1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1, "brainpoolP256r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1, "secp224r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1, "secp224k1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1, "secp192r1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1, "secp192k1" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519, "x25519" }, + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448, "x448" }, + { 0, NULL }, +}; + +const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id) +{ + for (int i = 0; tls_id_curve_name_table[i].tls_id != 0; i++) { + if (tls_id_curve_name_table[i].tls_id == tls_id) { + return tls_id_curve_name_table[i].name; + } + } + + return NULL; +} +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite, + int cert_endpoint, + uint32_t *flags) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned int usage = 0; + const char *ext_oid; + size_t ext_len; + + if (cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + /* Server part of the key exchange */ + switch (ciphersuite->key_exchange) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT; + break; + + /* Don't use default: we want warnings when adding new values */ + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: + usage = 0; + } + } else { + /* Client auth: we only implement rsa_sign and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign for now */ + usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; + } + + if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(cert, usage) != 0) { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE; + ret = -1; + } + + if (cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH); + } else { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH); + } + + if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(cert, ext_oid, ext_len) != 0) { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE; + ret = -1; + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_md_type_t md, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_hash_operation_t *hash_operation_to_clone; + psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = psa_hash_operation_init(); + + *olen = 0; + + switch (md) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + hash_operation_to_clone = &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa; + break; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + hash_operation_to_clone = &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa; + break; +#endif + + default: + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_clone(hash_operation_to_clone, &hash_operation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&hash_operation, dst, dst_len, olen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + +exit: +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + (void) ssl; +#endif + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_handshake_transcript_sha384(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_md_context_t sha384; + + if (dst_len < 48) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&sha384); + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&sha384, mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_clone(&sha384, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&sha384, dst)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_finish", ret); + goto exit; + } + + *olen = 48; + +exit: + + mbedtls_md_free(&sha384); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_handshake_transcript_sha256(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_md_context_t sha256; + + if (dst_len < 32) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + mbedtls_md_init(&sha256); + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&sha256, mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_clone(&sha256, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&sha256, dst)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_finish", ret); + goto exit; + } + + *olen = 32; + +exit: + + mbedtls_md_free(&sha256); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_md_type_t md, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *olen) +{ + switch (md) { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return ssl_get_handshake_transcript_sha384(ssl, dst, dst_len, olen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return ssl_get_handshake_transcript_sha256(ssl, dst, dst_len, olen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ + + default: +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + (void) ssl; + (void) dst; + (void) dst_len; + (void) olen; +#endif + break; + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} + +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext() + * + * The `extension_data` field of signature algorithm contains a `SignatureSchemeList` + * value (TLS 1.3 RFC8446): + * enum { + * .... + * ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256( 0x0403 ), + * ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384( 0x0503 ), + * ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512( 0x0603 ), + * .... + * } SignatureScheme; + * + * struct { + * SignatureScheme supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + * } SignatureSchemeList; + * + * The `extension_data` field of signature algorithm contains a `SignatureAndHashAlgorithm` + * value (TLS 1.2 RFC5246): + * enum { + * none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5), + * sha512(6), (255) + * } HashAlgorithm; + * + * enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) } + * SignatureAlgorithm; + * + * struct { + * HashAlgorithm hash; + * SignatureAlgorithm signature; + * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; + * + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm + * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + * + * The TLS 1.3 signature algorithm extension was defined to be a compatible + * generalization of the TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension. + * `SignatureAndHashAlgorithm` field of TLS 1.2 can be represented by + * `SignatureScheme` field of TLS 1.3 + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t supported_sig_algs_len = 0; + const unsigned char *supported_sig_algs_end; + uint16_t sig_alg; + uint32_t common_idx = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + supported_sig_algs_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + memset(ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs, 0, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, supported_sig_algs_len); + supported_sig_algs_end = p + supported_sig_algs_len; + while (p < supported_sig_algs_end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, supported_sig_algs_end, 2); + sig_alg = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("received signature algorithm: 0x%x %s", + sig_alg, + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(sig_alg))); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 && + (!(mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(ssl, sig_alg) && + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(ssl, sig_alg)))) { + continue; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("valid signature algorithm: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(sig_alg))); + + if (common_idx + 1 < MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE) { + ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs[common_idx] = sig_alg; + common_idx += 1; + } + } + /* Check that we consumed all the message. */ + if (p != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("Signature algorithms extension length misaligned")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + if (common_idx == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no signature algorithm in common")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs[common_idx] = MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + +static psa_status_t setup_psa_key_derivation(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *derivation, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_algorithm_t alg, + const unsigned char *raw_psk, size_t raw_psk_length, + const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_length, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_length, + const unsigned char *other_secret, + size_t other_secret_length, + size_t capacity) +{ + psa_status_t status; + + status = psa_key_derivation_setup(derivation, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg)) { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(derivation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED, + seed, seed_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + if (other_secret != NULL) { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(derivation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET, + other_secret, other_secret_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } + + if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(key)) { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( + derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + raw_psk, raw_psk_length); + } else { + status = psa_key_derivation_input_key( + derivation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, key); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(derivation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL, + label, label_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + } else { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(derivation, capacity); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_generic(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t master_key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + if (md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + } else { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + } + + /* Normally a "secret" should be long enough to be impossible to + * find by brute force, and in particular should not be empty. But + * this PRF is also used to derive an IV, in particular in EAP-TLS, + * and for this use case it makes sense to have a 0-length "secret". + * Since the key API doesn't allow importing a key of length 0, + * keep master_key=0, which setup_psa_key_derivation() understands + * to mean a 0-length "secret" input. */ + if (slen != 0) { + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE); + + status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, secret, slen, &master_key); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + } + + status = setup_psa_key_derivation(&derivation, + master_key, alg, + NULL, 0, + random, rlen, + (unsigned char const *) label, + (size_t) strlen(label), + NULL, 0, + dlen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + psa_destroy_key(master_key); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&derivation, dstbuf, dlen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + psa_destroy_key(master_key); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_destroy_key(master_key); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(master_key)) { + status = psa_destroy_key(master_key); + } + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 || PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_generic(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +{ + size_t nb; + size_t i, j, k, md_len; + unsigned char *tmp; + size_t tmp_len = 0; + unsigned char h_i[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx); + + if ((md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + + tmp_len = md_len + strlen(label) + rlen; + tmp = mbedtls_calloc(1, tmp_len); + if (tmp == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + + nb = strlen(label); + memcpy(tmp + md_len, label, nb); + memcpy(tmp + md_len + nb, random, rlen); + nb += rlen; + + /* + * Compute P_(secret, label + random)[0..dlen] + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&md_ctx, secret, slen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp + md_len, nb); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, tmp); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + for (i = 0; i < dlen; i += md_len) { + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp, md_len + nb); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, h_i); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&md_ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&md_ctx, tmp, md_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&md_ctx, tmp); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + k = (i + md_len > dlen) ? dlen % md_len : md_len; + + for (j = 0; j < k; j++) { + dstbuf[i + j] = h_i[j]; + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx); + + if (tmp != NULL) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, tmp_len); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(h_i, sizeof(h_i)); + + mbedtls_free(tmp); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C && ( MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 || MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 ) */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_sha256(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +{ + return tls_prf_generic(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, secret, slen, + label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int tls_prf_sha384(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen, + const char *label, + const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen) +{ + return tls_prf_generic(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, secret, slen, + label, random, rlen, dstbuf, dlen); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ + +/* + * Set appropriate PRF function and other SSL / TLS1.2 functions + * + * Inputs: + * - hash associated with the ciphersuite (only used by TLS 1.2) + * + * Outputs: + * - the tls_prf, calc_verify and calc_finished members of handshake structure + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_set_handshake_prfs(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, + mbedtls_md_type_t hash) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + if (hash == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha384; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384; + } else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { + (void) hash; + handshake->tls_prf = tls_prf_sha256; + handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; + handshake->calc_finished = ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256; + } +#else + { + (void) handshake; + (void) hash; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } +#endif + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Compute master secret if needed + * + * Parameters: + * [in/out] handshake + * [in] resume, premaster, extended_ms, calc_verify, tls_prf + * (PSA-PSK) ciphersuite_info, psk_opaque + * [out] premaster (cleared) + * [out] master + * [in] ssl: optionally used for debugging, EMS and PSA-PSK + * debug: conf->f_dbg, conf->p_dbg + * EMS: passed to calc_verify (debug + session_negotiate) + * PSA-PSA: conf + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_compute_master(mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake, + unsigned char *master, + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* cf. RFC 5246, Section 8.1: + * "The master secret is always exactly 48 bytes in length." */ + size_t const master_secret_len = 48; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + unsigned char session_hash[48]; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + + /* The label for the KDF used for key expansion. + * This is either "master secret" or "extended master secret" + * depending on whether the Extended Master Secret extension + * is used. */ + char const *lbl = "master secret"; + + /* The seed for the KDF used for key expansion. + * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is not used, + * this is ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random + * (see Sect. 8.1 in RFC 5246). + * - If the Extended Master Secret extension is used, + * this is the transcript of the handshake so far. + * (see Sect. 4 in RFC 7627). */ + unsigned char const *seed = handshake->randbytes; + size_t seed_len = 64; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \ + !(defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ + (void) ssl; +#endif + + if (handshake->resume != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no premaster (session resumed)")); + return 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + if (handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED) { + lbl = "extended master secret"; + seed = session_hash; + ret = handshake->calc_verify(ssl, session_hash, &seed_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calc_verify", ret); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "session hash for extended master secret", + session_hash, seed_len); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(handshake->ciphersuite_info) == 1) { + /* Perform PSK-to-MS expansion in a single step. */ + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + mbedtls_md_type_t hash_alg = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("perform PSA-based PSK-to-MS expansion")); + + psk = mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk(ssl); + + if (hash_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + } else { + alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + } + + size_t other_secret_len = 0; + unsigned char *other_secret = NULL; + + switch (handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange) { + /* Provide other secret. + * Other secret is stored in premaster, where first 2 bytes hold the + * length of the other key. + */ + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + /* For RSA-PSK other key length is always 48 bytes. */ + other_secret_len = 48; + other_secret = handshake->premaster + 2; + break; + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + other_secret_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(handshake->premaster, 0); + other_secret = handshake->premaster + 2; + break; + default: + break; + } + + status = setup_psa_key_derivation(&derivation, psk, alg, + ssl->conf->psk, ssl->conf->psk_len, + seed, seed_len, + (unsigned char const *) lbl, + (size_t) strlen(lbl), + other_secret, other_secret_len, + master_secret_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&derivation, + master, + master_secret_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + } else +#endif + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if (handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { + psa_status_t status; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t derivation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("perform PSA-based PMS KDF for ECJPAKE")); + + handshake->pmslen = PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE; + + status = psa_key_derivation_setup(&derivation, alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(&derivation, + PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_pake_get_implicit_key(&handshake->psa_pake_ctx, + &derivation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&derivation, + handshake->premaster, + handshake->pmslen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&derivation); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + } +#endif + ret = handshake->tls_prf(handshake->premaster, handshake->pmslen, + lbl, seed, seed_len, + master, + master_secret_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "prf", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "premaster secret", + handshake->premaster, + handshake->pmslen); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(handshake->premaster, + sizeof(handshake->premaster)); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> derive keys")); + + /* Set PRF, calc_verify and calc_finished function pointers */ + ret = ssl_set_handshake_prfs(ssl->handshake, + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_set_handshake_prfs", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* Compute master secret if needed */ + ret = ssl_compute_master(ssl->handshake, + ssl->session_negotiate->master, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_compute_master", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* Swap the client and server random values: + * - MS derivation wanted client+server (RFC 5246 8.1) + * - key derivation wants server+client (RFC 5246 6.3) */ + { + unsigned char tmp[64]; + memcpy(tmp, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64); + memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes, tmp + 32, 32); + memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, tmp, 32); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + } + + /* Populate transform structure */ + ret = ssl_tls12_populate_transform(ssl->transform_negotiate, + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, + ssl->session_negotiate->master, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + ssl->handshake->tls_prf, + ssl->handshake->randbytes, + ssl->tls_version, + ssl->conf->endpoint, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls12_populate_transform", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* We no longer need Server/ClientHello.random values */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->handshake->randbytes, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->randbytes)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= derive keys")); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md) +{ + switch (md) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384: + ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384; + break; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256: + ssl->handshake->calc_verify = ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256; + break; +#endif + default: + return -1; + } +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + (void) ssl; +#endif + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static int ssl_calc_verify_tls_psa(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const psa_hash_operation_t *hs_op, + size_t buffer_size, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t cloned_op = psa_hash_operation_init(); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + (void) ssl; +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> PSA calc verify")); + status = psa_hash_clone(hs_op, &cloned_op); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&cloned_op, hash, buffer_size, hlen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= PSA calc verify")); + +exit: + psa_hash_abort(&cloned_op); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); +} +#else +static int ssl_calc_verify_tls_legacy(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_md_context_t *hs_ctx, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_context_t cloned_ctx; + + mbedtls_md_init(&cloned_ctx); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + (void) ssl; +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc verify")); + + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&cloned_ctx, mbedtls_md_info_from_ctx(hs_ctx), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_clone(&cloned_ctx, hs_ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&cloned_ctx, hash); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + *hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(mbedtls_md_info_from_ctx(hs_ctx)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calculated verify result", hash, *hlen); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc verify")); + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&cloned_ctx); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +int ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha256(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + return ssl_calc_verify_tls_psa(ssl, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, 32, + hash, hlen); +#else + return ssl_calc_verify_tls_legacy(ssl, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, + hash, hlen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +int ssl_calc_verify_tls_sha384(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, + size_t *hlen) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + return ssl_calc_verify_tls_psa(ssl, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, 48, + hash, hlen); +#else + return ssl_calc_verify_tls_legacy(ssl, &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, + hash, hlen); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex) +{ + unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster; + unsigned char *end = p + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); + const unsigned char *psk = NULL; + size_t psk_len = 0; + int psk_ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_psk(ssl, &psk, &psk_len); + + if (psk_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED) { + /* + * This should never happen because the existence of a PSK is always + * checked before calling this function. + * + * The exception is opaque DHE-PSK. For DHE-PSK fill premaster with + * the shared secret without PSK. + */ + if (key_ex != MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + } + + /* + * PMS = struct { + * opaque other_secret<0..2^16-1>; + * opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; + * }; + * with "other_secret" depending on the particular key exchange + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK) { + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(psk_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + + if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < psk_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memset(p, 0, psk_len); + p += psk_len; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { + /* + * other_secret already set by the ClientKeyExchange message, + * and is 48 bytes long + */ + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = 48; + p += 48; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + p + 2, (size_t) (end - (p + 2)), &len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(len, p, 0); + p += 2 + len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (key_ex == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t zlen; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &zlen, + p + 2, (size_t) (end - (p + 2)), + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(zlen, p, 0); + p += 2 + zlen; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; */ + if (end - p < 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(psk_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + + if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < psk_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memcpy(p, psk, psk_len); + p += psk_len; + + ssl->handshake->pmslen = (size_t) (p - ssl->handshake->premaster); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + /* If renegotiation is not enforced, retransmit until we would reach max + * timeout if we were using the usual handshake doubling scheme */ + if (ssl->conf->renego_max_records < 0) { + uint32_t ratio = ssl->conf->hs_timeout_max / ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min + 1; + unsigned char doublings = 1; + + while (ratio != 0) { + ++doublings; + ratio >>= 1; + } + + if (++ssl->renego_records_seen > doublings) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("no longer retransmitting hello request")); + return 0; + } + } + + return ssl_write_hello_request(ssl); +} +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +/* + * Handshake functions + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* No certificate support -> dummy functions */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate")); + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate")); + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ +/* Some certificate support -> implement write and parse */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t i, n; + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate")); + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + if (ssl->handshake->client_auth == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) == NULL) { + /* Should never happen because we shouldn't have picked the + * ciphersuite if we don't have a certificate. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "own certificate", mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl)); + + /* + * 0 . 0 handshake type + * 1 . 3 handshake length + * 4 . 6 length of all certs + * 7 . 9 length of cert. 1 + * 10 . n-1 peer certificate + * n . n+2 length of cert. 2 + * n+3 . ... upper level cert, etc. + */ + i = 7; + crt = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl); + + while (crt != NULL) { + n = crt->raw.len; + if (n > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 3 - i) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("certificate too large, %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + i + 3 + n, (size_t) MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + ssl->out_msg[i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); + ssl->out_msg[i + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); + ssl->out_msg[i + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); + + i += 3; memcpy(ssl->out_msg + i, crt->raw.p, n); + i += n; crt = crt->next; + } + + ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(i - 7); + ssl->out_msg[5] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(i - 7); + ssl->out_msg[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(i - 7); + + ssl->out_msglen = i; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE; + + ssl->state++; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate")); + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *crt_buf, + size_t crt_buf_len) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt const * const peer_crt = ssl->session->peer_cert; + + if (peer_crt == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + if (peer_crt->raw.len != crt_buf_len) { + return -1; + } + + return memcmp(peer_crt->raw.p, crt_buf, peer_crt->raw.len); +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *crt_buf, + size_t crt_buf_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char const * const peer_cert_digest = + ssl->session->peer_cert_digest; + mbedtls_md_type_t const peer_cert_digest_type = + ssl->session->peer_cert_digest_type; + mbedtls_md_info_t const * const digest_info = + mbedtls_md_info_from_type(peer_cert_digest_type); + unsigned char tmp_digest[MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN]; + size_t digest_len; + + if (peer_cert_digest == NULL || digest_info == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + digest_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(digest_info); + if (digest_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN) { + return -1; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md(digest_info, crt_buf, crt_buf_len, tmp_digest); + if (ret != 0) { + return -1; + } + + return memcmp(tmp_digest, peer_cert_digest, digest_len); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +/* + * Once the certificate message is read, parse it into a cert chain and + * perform basic checks, but leave actual verification to the caller + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + int crt_cnt = 0; +#endif + size_t i, n; + uint8_t alert; + + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + if (ssl->in_hslen < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + 3) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); + + /* + * Same message structure as in mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate() + */ + n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, i + 1); + + if (ssl->in_msg[i] != 0 || + ssl->in_hslen != n + 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* Make &ssl->in_msg[i] point to the beginning of the CRT chain. */ + i += 3; + + /* Iterate through and parse the CRTs in the provided chain. */ + while (i < ssl->in_hslen) { + /* Check that there's room for the next CRT's length fields. */ + if (i + 3 > ssl->in_hslen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + /* In theory, the CRT can be up to 2**24 Bytes, but we don't support + * anything beyond 2**16 ~ 64K. */ + if (ssl->in_msg[i] != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + + /* Read length of the next CRT in the chain. */ + n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, i + 1); + i += 3; + + if (n < 128 || i + n > ssl->in_hslen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* Check if we're handling the first CRT in the chain. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (crt_cnt++ == 0 && + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { + /* During client-side renegotiation, check that the server's + * end-CRTs hasn't changed compared to the initial handshake, + * mitigating the triple handshake attack. On success, reuse + * the original end-CRT instead of parsing it again. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Check that peer CRT hasn't changed during renegotiation")); + if (ssl_check_peer_crt_unchanged(ssl, + &ssl->in_msg[i], + n) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("new server cert during renegotiation")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + + /* Now we can safely free the original chain. */ + ssl_clear_peer_cert(ssl->session); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + + /* Parse the next certificate in the chain. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n); +#else + /* If we don't need to store the CRT chain permanently, parse + * it in-place from the input buffer instead of making a copy. */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy(chain, ssl->in_msg + i, n); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + switch (ret) { + case 0: /*ok*/ + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND: + /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a + prior certificate was already trusted. */ + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto crt_parse_der_failed; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + goto crt_parse_der_failed; + + default: + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; +crt_parse_der_failed: + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, alert); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret); + return ret; + } + + i += n; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "peer certificate", chain); + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + return -1; + } + + if (ssl->in_hslen == 3 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) && + ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE && + memcmp(ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), "\0\0\0", 3) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer has no certificate")); + return 0; + } + return -1; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +/* Check if a certificate message is expected. + * Return either + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED, or + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP + * indicating whether a Certificate message is expected or not. + */ +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED 0 +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP 1 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(ciphersuite_info)) { + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP; + } + + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY; + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP; + } + } +#else + ((void) authmode); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int authmode, + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + void *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + int have_ca_chain = 0; + + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *); + void *p_vrfy; + + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { + return 0; + } + + if (ssl->f_vrfy != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use context-specific verification callback")); + f_vrfy = ssl->f_vrfy; + p_vrfy = ssl->p_vrfy; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use configuration-specific verification callback")); + f_vrfy = ssl->conf->f_vrfy; + p_vrfy = ssl->conf->p_vrfy; + } + + /* + * Main check: verify certificate + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + if (ssl->conf->f_ca_cb != NULL) { + ((void) rs_ctx); + have_ca_chain = 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification")); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb( + chain, + ssl->conf->f_ca_cb, + ssl->conf->p_ca_cb, + ssl->conf->cert_profile, + ssl->hostname, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + { + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) { + ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl; + } else +#endif + { + ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl; + } + + if (ca_chain != NULL) { + have_ca_chain = 1; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( + chain, + ca_chain, ca_crl, + ssl->conf->cert_profile, + ssl->hostname, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx); + } + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "x509_verify_cert", ret); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; + } +#endif + + /* + * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0 + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + { + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &chain->pk; + + /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK. + * This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good + * enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use here. */ + if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) { + /* and in the unlikely case the above assumption no longer holds + * we are making sure that pk_ec() here does not return a NULL + */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid group ID")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, grp_id) != 0) { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (EC key curve)")); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(chain, + ciphersuite_info, + !ssl->conf->endpoint, + &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (usage extensions)")); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + } + + /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a + * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED, + * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds + * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy + * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of + * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */ + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL && + (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE)) { + ret = 0; + } + + if (have_ca_chain == 0 && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no CA chain")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED; + } + + if (ret != 0) { + uint8_t alert; + + /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons. + Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send + may be a subject of debate in some cases. */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED; + } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED) { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA; + } else { + alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN; + } + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + alert); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("! Certificate verification flags %08x", + (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result)); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Certificate verification flags clear")); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + + return ret; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *start, size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* Remember digest of the peer's end-CRT. */ + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest = + mbedtls_calloc(1, MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN); + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%d bytes) failed", + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN)); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type( + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE), + start, len, + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest); + + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_type = + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE; + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest_len = + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN; + + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_remember_peer_pubkey(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *start, size_t len) +{ + unsigned char *end = start + len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Make a copy of the peer's raw public key. */ + mbedtls_pk_init(&ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey); + ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&start, end, + &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey); + if (ret != 0) { + /* We should have parsed the public key before. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + int crt_expected; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET + ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode + : ssl->conf->authmode; +#else + const int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; +#endif + void *rs_ctx = NULL; + mbedtls_x509_crt *chain = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate")); + + crt_expected = ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate(ssl, authmode); + if (crt_expected == SSL_CERTIFICATE_SKIP) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate")); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_verify) { + chain = ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert; + ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = NULL; + goto crt_verify; + } +#endif + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { + /* mbedtls_ssl_read_record may have sent an alert already. We + let it decide whether to alert. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl_srv_check_client_no_crt_notification(ssl) == 0) { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; + + if (authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; + } + + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + + /* Clear existing peer CRT structure in case we tried to + * reuse a session but it failed, and allocate a new one. */ + ssl_clear_peer_cert(ssl->session_negotiate); + + chain = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt)); + if (chain == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc(%" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes) failed", + sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt))); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); + + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto exit; + } + mbedtls_x509_crt_init(chain); + + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_chain(ssl, chain); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_verify; + } + +crt_verify: + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { + rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx; + } +#endif + + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify(ssl, authmode, + chain, rs_ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + { + unsigned char *crt_start, *pk_start; + size_t crt_len, pk_len; + + /* We parse the CRT chain without copying, so + * these pointers point into the input buffer, + * and are hence still valid after freeing the + * CRT chain. */ + + crt_start = chain->raw.p; + crt_len = chain->raw.len; + + pk_start = chain->pk_raw.p; + pk_len = chain->pk_raw.len; + + /* Free the CRT structures before computing + * digest and copying the peer's public key. */ + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(chain); + mbedtls_free(chain); + chain = NULL; + + ret = ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest(ssl, crt_start, crt_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = ssl_remember_peer_pubkey(ssl, pk_start, pk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + } +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + /* Pass ownership to session structure. */ + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = chain; + chain = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate")); + +exit: + + if (ret == 0) { + ssl->state++; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_peer_cert = chain; + chain = NULL; + } +#endif + + if (chain != NULL) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(chain); + mbedtls_free(chain); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_generic(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, void *ctx, + unsigned char *padbuf, size_t hlen, + unsigned char *buf, int from) +{ + unsigned int len = 12; + const char *sender; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t *hs_op = ctx; + psa_hash_operation_t cloned_op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + size_t hash_size; +#else + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_context_t *hs_ctx = ctx; + mbedtls_md_context_t cloned_ctx; + mbedtls_md_init(&cloned_ctx); +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + if (!session) { + session = ssl->session; + } + + sender = (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) + ? "client finished" + : "server finished"; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc PSA finished tls")); + + status = psa_hash_clone(hs_op, &cloned_op); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_hash_finish(&cloned_op, padbuf, hlen, &hash_size); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "PSA calculated padbuf", padbuf, hlen); +#else + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> calc finished tls")); + + ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&cloned_ctx, mbedtls_md_info_from_ctx(hs_ctx), 0); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_clone(&cloned_ctx, hs_ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&cloned_ctx, padbuf); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "finished output", padbuf, hlen); + + /* + * TLSv1.2: + * hash = PRF( master, finished_label, + * Hash( handshake ) )[0.11] + */ + ssl->handshake->tls_prf(session->master, 48, sender, + padbuf, hlen, buf, len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "calc finished result", buf, len); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(padbuf, hlen); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= calc finished")); + +exit: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_hash_abort(&cloned_op); + return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status); +#else + mbedtls_md_free(&cloned_ctx); + return ret; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha256( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from) +{ + unsigned char padbuf[32]; + return ssl_calc_finished_tls_generic(ssl, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256_psa, +#else + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha256, +#endif + padbuf, sizeof(padbuf), + buf, from); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +static int ssl_calc_finished_tls_sha384( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, int from) +{ + unsigned char padbuf[48]; + return ssl_calc_finished_tls_generic(ssl, +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384_psa, +#else + &ssl->handshake->fin_sha384, +#endif + padbuf, sizeof(padbuf), + buf, from); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("=> handshake wrapup: final free")); + + /* + * Free our handshake params + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(ssl); + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake); + ssl->handshake = NULL; + + /* + * Free the previous transform and switch in the current one + */ + if (ssl->transform) { + mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(ssl->transform); + mbedtls_free(ssl->transform); + } + ssl->transform = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->transform_negotiate = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("<= handshake wrapup: final free")); +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int resume = ssl->handshake->resume; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("=> handshake wrapup")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { + ssl->renego_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE; + ssl->renego_records_seen = 0; + } +#endif + + /* + * Free the previous session and switch in the current one + */ + if (ssl->session) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + /* RFC 7366 3.1: keep the EtM state */ + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = + ssl->session->encrypt_then_mac; +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session); + } + ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + + /* + * Add cache entry + */ + if (ssl->conf->f_set_cache != NULL && + ssl->session->id_len != 0 && + resume == 0) { + if (ssl->conf->f_set_cache(ssl->conf->p_cache, + ssl->session->id, + ssl->session->id_len, + ssl->session) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cache did not store session")); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->flight != NULL) { + /* Cancel handshake timer */ + mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(ssl, 0); + + /* Keep last flight around in case we need to resend it: + * we need the handshake and transform structures for that */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip freeing handshake and transform")); + } else +#endif + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(ssl); + + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("<= handshake wrapup")); +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + unsigned int hash_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write finished")); + + mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate); + + ret = ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, ssl->out_msg + 4, ssl->conf->endpoint); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calc_finished", ret); + } + + /* + * RFC 5246 7.4.9 (Page 63) says 12 is the default length and ciphersuites + * may define some other value. Currently (early 2016), no defined + * ciphersuite does this (and this is unlikely to change as activity has + * moved to TLS 1.3 now) so we can keep the hardcoded 12 here. + */ + hash_len = 12; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; + memcpy(ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->out_msg + 4, hash_len); +#endif + + ssl->out_msglen = 4 + hash_len; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED; + + /* + * In case of session resuming, invert the client and server + * ChangeCipherSpec messages order. + */ + if (ssl->handshake->resume != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + } +#endif + } else { + ssl->state++; + } + + /* + * Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for outbound + * data. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("switching to new transform spec for outbound data")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + unsigned char i; + + /* Remember current epoch settings for resending */ + ssl->handshake->alt_transform_out = ssl->transform_out; + memcpy(ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr, ssl->cur_out_ctr, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->alt_out_ctr)); + + /* Set sequence_number to zero */ + memset(&ssl->cur_out_ctr[2], 0, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr) - 2); + + + /* Increment epoch */ + for (i = 2; i > 0; i--) { + if (++ssl->cur_out_ctr[i - 1] != 0) { + break; + } + } + + /* The loop goes to its end iff the counter is wrapping */ + if (i == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DTLS epoch would wrap")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + memset(ssl->cur_out_ctr, 0, sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr)); + + ssl->transform_out = ssl->transform_negotiate; + ssl->session_out = ssl->session_negotiate; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(ssl); + } +#endif + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write finished")); + + return 0; +} + +#define SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN 12 + +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned int hash_len = 12; + unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_HASH_LEN]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse finished")); + + ret = ssl->handshake->calc_finished(ssl, buf, ssl->conf->endpoint ^ 1); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calc_finished", ret); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + goto exit; + } + + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto exit; + } + + if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto exit; + } + + if (ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + hash_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + goto exit; + } + + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), + buf, hash_len) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len; + memcpy(ssl->peer_verify_data, buf, hash_len); +#endif + + if (ssl->handshake->resume != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; + } +#endif + } else { + ssl->state++; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl); + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse finished")); + +exit: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, hash_len); + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) +/* + * Helper to get TLS 1.2 PRF from ciphersuite + * (Duplicates bits of logic from ssl_set_handshake_prfs().) + */ +static tls_prf_fn ssl_tls12prf_from_cs(int ciphersuite_id) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info = + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite_id); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + if (ciphersuite_info != NULL && ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + return tls_prf_sha384; + } else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + { + if (ciphersuite_info != NULL && ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) { + return tls_prf_sha256; + } + } +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + (void) ciphersuite_info; +#endif + + return NULL; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ + +static mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_get_type(mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf) +{ + ((void) tls_prf); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + if (tls_prf == tls_prf_sha384) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384; + } else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + if (tls_prf == tls_prf_sha256) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256; + } else +#endif + return MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE; +} + +/* + * Populate a transform structure with session keys and all the other + * necessary information. + * + * Parameters: + * - [in/out]: transform: structure to populate + * [in] must be just initialised with mbedtls_ssl_transform_init() + * [out] fully populated, ready for use by mbedtls_ssl_{en,de}crypt_buf() + * - [in] ciphersuite + * - [in] master + * - [in] encrypt_then_mac + * - [in] tls_prf: pointer to PRF to use for key derivation + * - [in] randbytes: buffer holding ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random + * - [in] tls_version: TLS version + * - [in] endpoint: client or server + * - [in] ssl: used for: + * - ssl->conf->{f,p}_export_keys + * [in] optionally used for: + * - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C: ssl->conf->{f,p}_dbg + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls12_populate_transform(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + int ciphersuite, + const unsigned char master[48], +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + int encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + ssl_tls_prf_t tls_prf, + const unsigned char randbytes[64], + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version, + unsigned endpoint, + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned char keyblk[256]; + unsigned char *key1; + unsigned char *key2; + unsigned char *mac_enc; + unsigned char *mac_dec; + size_t mac_key_len = 0; + size_t iv_copy_len; + size_t keylen; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + psa_algorithm_t mac_alg = 0; + size_t key_bits; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#endif + + /* + * Some data just needs copying into the structure + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + transform->encrypt_then_mac = encrypt_then_mac; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + transform->tls_version = tls_version; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + memcpy(transform->randbytes, randbytes, sizeof(transform->randbytes)); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + if (tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + /* At the moment, we keep TLS <= 1.2 and TLS 1.3 transform + * generation separate. This should never happen. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + /* + * Get various info structures + */ + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite); + if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ciphersuite info for %d not found", + ciphersuite)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ssl_mode = mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + encrypt_then_mac, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + ciphersuite_info); + + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD) { + transform->taglen = + ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG ? 8 : 16; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher, + transform->taglen, + &alg, + &key_type, + &key_bits)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa", ret); + goto end; + } +#else + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher); + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cipher info for %u not found", + ciphersuite_info->cipher)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mac_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + if (mac_alg == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type for %u not found", + (unsigned) ciphersuite_info->mac)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#else + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + if (md_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("mbedtls_md info for %u not found", + (unsigned) ciphersuite_info->mac)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + /* Copy own and peer's CID if the use of the CID + * extension has been negotiated. */ + if (ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Copy CIDs into SSL transform")); + + transform->in_cid_len = ssl->own_cid_len; + memcpy(transform->in_cid, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Incoming CID", transform->in_cid, + transform->in_cid_len); + + transform->out_cid_len = ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len; + memcpy(transform->out_cid, ssl->handshake->peer_cid, + ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Outgoing CID", transform->out_cid, + transform->out_cid_len); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + + /* + * Compute key block using the PRF + */ + ret = tls_prf(master, 48, "key expansion", randbytes, 64, keyblk, 256); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "prf", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite = %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(ciphersuite))); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "master secret", master, 48); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "random bytes", randbytes, 64); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "key block", keyblk, 256); + + /* + * Determine the appropriate key, IV and MAC length. + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + keylen = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits); +#else + keylen = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info) / 8; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD) { + size_t explicit_ivlen; + + transform->maclen = 0; + mac_key_len = 0; + + /* All modes haves 96-bit IVs, but the length of the static parts vary + * with mode and version: + * - For GCM and CCM in TLS 1.2, there's a static IV of 4 Bytes + * (to be concatenated with a dynamically chosen IV of 8 Bytes) + * - For ChaChaPoly in TLS 1.2, and all modes in TLS 1.3, there's + * a static IV of 12 Bytes (to be XOR'ed with the 8 Byte record + * sequence number). + */ + transform->ivlen = 12; + + int is_chachapoly = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + is_chachapoly = (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20); +#else + is_chachapoly = (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher_info) + == MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if (is_chachapoly) { + transform->fixed_ivlen = 12; + } else { + transform->fixed_ivlen = 4; + } + + /* Minimum length of encrypted record */ + explicit_ivlen = transform->ivlen - transform->fixed_ivlen; + transform->minlen = explicit_ivlen + transform->taglen; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM || + ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC || + ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t block_size = PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type); +#else + size_t block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(cipher_info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* Get MAC length */ + mac_key_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(mac_alg); +#else + /* Initialize HMAC contexts */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&transform->md_ctx_enc, md_info, 1)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&transform->md_ctx_dec, md_info, 1)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret); + goto end; + } + + /* Get MAC length */ + mac_key_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + transform->maclen = mac_key_len; + + /* IV length */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->ivlen = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg); +#else + transform->ivlen = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(cipher_info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* Minimum length */ + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM) { + transform->minlen = transform->maclen; + } else { + /* + * GenericBlockCipher: + * 1. if EtM is in use: one block plus MAC + * otherwise: * first multiple of blocklen greater than maclen + * 2. IV + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if (ssl_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { + transform->minlen = transform->maclen + + block_size; + } else +#endif + { + transform->minlen = transform->maclen + + block_size + - transform->maclen % block_size; + } + + if (tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + transform->minlen += transform->ivlen; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; + } + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("keylen: %u, minlen: %u, ivlen: %u, maclen: %u", + (unsigned) keylen, + (unsigned) transform->minlen, + (unsigned) transform->ivlen, + (unsigned) transform->maclen)); + + /* + * Finally setup the cipher contexts, IVs and MAC secrets. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; + key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; + + mac_enc = keyblk; + mac_dec = keyblk + mac_key_len; + + iv_copy_len = (transform->fixed_ivlen) ? + transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; + memcpy(transform->iv_enc, key2 + keylen, iv_copy_len); + memcpy(transform->iv_dec, key2 + keylen + iv_copy_len, + iv_copy_len); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + key1 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2 + keylen; + key2 = keyblk + mac_key_len * 2; + + mac_enc = keyblk + mac_key_len; + mac_dec = keyblk; + + iv_copy_len = (transform->fixed_ivlen) ? + transform->fixed_ivlen : transform->ivlen; + memcpy(transform->iv_dec, key1 + keylen, iv_copy_len); + memcpy(transform->iv_enc, key1 + keylen + iv_copy_len, + iv_copy_len); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto end; + } + + if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) { + ssl->f_export_keys(ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET, + master, 48, + randbytes + 32, + randbytes, + tls_prf_get_type(tls_prf)); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->psa_alg = alg; + + if (alg != MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER) { + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key_type); + + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + key1, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits), + &transform->psa_key_enc)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(3, "psa_import_key", (int) status); + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_import_key", ret); + goto end; + } + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + key2, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits), + &transform->psa_key_dec)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_import_key", ret); + goto end; + } + } +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + cipher_info)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); + goto end; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + cipher_info)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); + goto end; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, key1, + (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info), + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); + goto end; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, key2, + (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info), + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); + goto end; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(cipher_info) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret); + goto end; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode", ret); + goto end; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) + /* For HMAC-based ciphersuites, initialize the HMAC transforms. + For AEAD-based ciphersuites, there is nothing to do here. */ + if (mac_key_len != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + transform->psa_mac_alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC(mac_alg); + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_HMAC(mac_alg)); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC); + + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + mac_enc, mac_key_len, + &transform->psa_mac_enc)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_import_mac_key", ret); + goto end; + } + + if ((transform->psa_alg == MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER) || + ((transform->psa_alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + && (transform->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED) +#endif + )) { + /* mbedtls_ct_hmac() requires the key to be exportable */ + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); + } else { + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); + } + + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + mac_dec, mac_key_len, + &transform->psa_mac_dec)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_import_mac_key", ret); + goto end; + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&transform->md_ctx_enc, mac_enc, mac_key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto end; + } + ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&transform->md_ctx_dec, mac_dec, mac_key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto end; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */ + + ((void) mac_dec); + ((void) mac_enc); + +end: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(keyblk, sizeof(keyblk)); + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round) +{ + psa_status_t status; + size_t input_offset = 0; + /* + * At round one repeat the KEY_SHARE, ZK_PUBLIC & ZF_PROOF twice + * At round two perform a single cycle + */ + unsigned int remaining_steps = (round == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE) ? 2 : 1; + + for (; remaining_steps > 0; remaining_steps--) { + for (psa_pake_step_t step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + step <= PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF; + ++step) { + /* Length is stored at the first byte */ + size_t length = buf[input_offset]; + input_offset += 1; + + if (input_offset + length > len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + status = psa_pake_input(pake_ctx, step, + buf + input_offset, length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + input_offset += length; + } + } + + if (input_offset != len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round( + psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, size_t *olen, + mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round) +{ + psa_status_t status; + size_t output_offset = 0; + size_t output_len; + /* + * At round one repeat the KEY_SHARE, ZK_PUBLIC & ZF_PROOF twice + * At round two perform a single cycle + */ + unsigned int remaining_steps = (round == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE) ? 2 : 1; + + for (; remaining_steps > 0; remaining_steps--) { + for (psa_pake_step_t step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE; + step <= PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF; + ++step) { + /* + * For each step, prepend 1 byte with the length of the data as + * given by psa_pake_output(). + */ + status = psa_pake_output(pake_ctx, step, + buf + output_offset + 1, + len - output_offset - 1, + &output_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + *(buf + output_offset) = (uint8_t) output_len; + + output_offset += output_len + 1; + } + } + + *olen = output_offset; + + return 0; +} +#endif //MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) +{ + psa_status_t status; + psa_hash_operation_t hash_operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Perform PSA-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange")); + + if ((status = psa_hash_setup(&hash_operation, + hash_alg)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_hash_setup", status); + goto exit; + } + + if ((status = psa_hash_update(&hash_operation, ssl->handshake->randbytes, + 64)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_hash_update", status); + goto exit; + } + + if ((status = psa_hash_update(&hash_operation, + data, data_len)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_hash_update", status); + goto exit; + } + + if ((status = psa_hash_finish(&hash_operation, hash, PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE, + hashlen)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_hash_finish", status); + goto exit; + } + +exit: + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); + switch (status) { + case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + } + return 0; +} + +#else + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen, + unsigned char *data, size_t data_len, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) +{ + int ret = 0; + mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg); + *hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Perform mbedtls-based computation of digest of ServerKeyExchange")); + + mbedtls_md_init(&ctx); + + /* + * digitally-signed struct { + * opaque client_random[32]; + * opaque server_random[32]; + * ServerDHParams params; + * }; + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret); + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&ctx)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_starts", ret); + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ctx, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_update", ret); + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ctx, data, data_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_update", ret); + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&ctx, hash)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_md_finish", ret); + goto exit; + } + +exit: + mbedtls_md_free(&ctx); + + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + +/* Find the preferred hash for a given signature algorithm. */ +unsigned int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned int sig_alg) +{ + unsigned int i; + uint16_t *received_sig_algs = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; + + if (sig_alg == MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON) { + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE; + } + + for (i = 0; received_sig_algs[i] != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; i++) { + unsigned int hash_alg_received = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_HASH_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG( + received_sig_algs[i]); + unsigned int sig_alg_received = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG( + received_sig_algs[i]); + + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = + mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash((unsigned char) hash_alg_received); + if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + continue; + } + + if (sig_alg == sig_alg_received) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (ssl->handshake->key_cert && ssl->handshake->key_cert->key) { + psa_algorithm_t psa_hash_alg = + mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + + if (sig_alg_received == MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA && + !mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(ssl->handshake->key_cert->key, + PSA_ALG_ECDSA(psa_hash_alg), + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH)) { + continue; + } + + if (sig_alg_received == MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA && + !mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(ssl->handshake->key_cert->key, + PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN( + psa_hash_alg), + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH)) { + continue; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + return hash_alg_received; + } + } + + return MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite( + const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version min_tls_version, + mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version max_tls_version) +{ + (void) ssl; + + if (suite_info == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + if ((suite_info->min_tls_version > max_tls_version) || + (suite_info->max_tls_version < min_tls_version)) { + return -1; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && + ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1) +#else + if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && + mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { + return -1; + } +#endif + + /* Don't suggest PSK-based ciphersuite if no PSK is available. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(suite_info) && + mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { + return -1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +/* + * Function for writing a signature algorithm extension. + * + * The `extension_data` field of signature algorithm contains a `SignatureSchemeList` + * value (TLS 1.3 RFC8446): + * enum { + * .... + * ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256( 0x0403 ), + * ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384( 0x0503 ), + * ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512( 0x0603 ), + * .... + * } SignatureScheme; + * + * struct { + * SignatureScheme supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + * } SignatureSchemeList; + * + * The `extension_data` field of signature algorithm contains a `SignatureAndHashAlgorithm` + * value (TLS 1.2 RFC5246): + * enum { + * none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5), + * sha512(6), (255) + * } HashAlgorithm; + * + * enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) } + * SignatureAlgorithm; + * + * struct { + * HashAlgorithm hash; + * SignatureAlgorithm signature; + * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; + * + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm + * supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + * + * The TLS 1.3 signature algorithm extension was defined to be a compatible + * generalization of the TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension. + * `SignatureAndHashAlgorithm` field of TLS 1.2 can be represented by + * `SignatureScheme` field of TLS 1.3 + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_write_sig_alg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *supported_sig_alg; /* Start of supported_signature_algorithms */ + size_t supported_sig_alg_len = 0; /* Length of supported_signature_algorithms */ + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("adding signature_algorithms extension")); + + /* Check if we have space for header and length field: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - supported_signature_algorithms_length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + p += 6; + + /* + * Write supported_signature_algorithms + */ + supported_sig_alg = p; + const uint16_t *sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs(ssl); + if (sig_alg == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got signature scheme [%x] %s", + *sig_alg, + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg))); + if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(ssl, *sig_alg)) { + continue; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*sig_alg, p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("sent signature scheme [%x] %s", + *sig_alg, + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg))); + } + + /* Length of supported_signature_algorithms */ + supported_sig_alg_len = (size_t) (p - supported_sig_alg); + if (supported_sig_alg_len == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No signature algorithms defined.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG, buf, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(supported_sig_alg_len + 2, buf, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(supported_sig_alg_len, buf, 4); + + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) +/* + * mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext + * + * Structure of server_name extension: + * + * enum { + * host_name(0), (255) + * } NameType; + * opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>; + * + * struct { + * NameType name_type; + * select (name_type) { + * case host_name: HostName; + * } name; + * } ServerName; + * struct { + * ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1> + * } ServerNameList; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t server_name_list_len, hostname_len; + const unsigned char *server_name_list_end; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("parse ServerName extension")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + server_name_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, server_name_list_len); + server_name_list_end = p + server_name_list_len; + while (p < server_name_list_end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, server_name_list_end, 3); + hostname_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, server_name_list_end, + hostname_len + 3); + + if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME) { + /* sni_name is intended to be used only during the parsing of the + * ClientHello message (it is reset to NULL before the end of + * the message parsing). Thus it is ok to just point to the + * reception buffer and not make a copy of it. + */ + ssl->handshake->sni_name = p + 3; + ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = hostname_len; + if (ssl->conf->f_sni == NULL) { + return 0; + } + ret = ssl->conf->f_sni(ssl->conf->p_sni, + ssl, p + 3, hostname_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_sni_wrapper", ret); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + } + return 0; + } + + p += hostname_len + 3; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t protocol_name_list_len; + const unsigned char *protocol_name_list; + const unsigned char *protocol_name_list_end; + size_t protocol_name_len; + + /* If ALPN not configured, just ignore the extension */ + if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + /* + * RFC7301, section 3.1 + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + */ + + /* + * protocol_name_list_len 2 bytes + * protocol_name_len 1 bytes + * protocol_name >=1 byte + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 4); + + protocol_name_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, protocol_name_list_len); + protocol_name_list = p; + protocol_name_list_end = p + protocol_name_list_len; + + /* Validate peer's list (lengths) */ + while (p < protocol_name_list_end) { + protocol_name_len = *p++; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, protocol_name_list_end, + protocol_name_len); + if (protocol_name_len == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + p += protocol_name_len; + } + + /* Use our order of preference */ + for (const char **alpn = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *alpn != NULL; alpn++) { + size_t const alpn_len = strlen(*alpn); + p = protocol_name_list; + while (p < protocol_name_list_end) { + protocol_name_len = *p++; + if (protocol_name_len == alpn_len && + memcmp(p, *alpn, alpn_len) == 0) { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *alpn; + return 0; + } + + p += protocol_name_len; + } + } + + /* If we get here, no match was found */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t protocol_name_len; + *out_len = 0; + + if (ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + protocol_name_len = strlen(ssl->alpn_chosen); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 7 + protocol_name_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server side, adding alpn extension")); + /* + * 0 . 1 ext identifier + * 2 . 3 ext length + * 4 . 5 protocol list length + * 6 . 6 protocol name length + * 7 . 7+n protocol name + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, p, 0); + + *out_len = 7 + protocol_name_len; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(protocol_name_len + 3, p, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(protocol_name_len + 1, p, 4); + /* Note: the length of the chosen protocol has been checked to be less + * than 255 bytes in `mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols`. + */ + p[6] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(protocol_name_len); + + memcpy(p + 7, ssl->alpn_chosen, protocol_name_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN); +#endif + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_session_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const char *hostname) +{ + /* Initialize to suppress unnecessary compiler warning */ + size_t hostname_len = 0; + + /* Check if new hostname is valid before + * making any change to current one */ + if (hostname != NULL) { + hostname_len = strlen(hostname); + + if (hostname_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + + /* Now it's clear that we will overwrite the old hostname, + * so we can free it safely */ + if (session->hostname != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(session->hostname, + strlen(session->hostname)); + } + + /* Passing NULL as hostname shall clear the old one */ + if (hostname == NULL) { + session->hostname = NULL; + } else { + session->hostname = mbedtls_calloc(1, hostname_len + 1); + if (session->hostname == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(session->hostname, hostname, hostname_len); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION && + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +int mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + const char *alpn) +{ + size_t alpn_len = 0; + + if (alpn != NULL) { + alpn_len = strlen(alpn); + + if (alpn_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + + if (session->ticket_alpn != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(session->ticket_alpn, + strlen(session->ticket_alpn)); + session->ticket_alpn = NULL; + } + + if (alpn != NULL) { + session->ticket_alpn = mbedtls_calloc(alpn_len + 1, 1); + if (session->ticket_alpn == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(session->ticket_alpn, alpn, alpn_len); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..eac6a3aaddd --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,3601 @@ +/* + * TLS client-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "ssl_client.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#include + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + *olen = 0; + + /* We're always including a TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV in the + * initial ClientHello, in which case also adding the renegotiation + * info extension is NOT RECOMMENDED as per RFC 5746 Section 3.4. */ + if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, adding renegotiation extension")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 5 + ssl->verify_data_len); + + /* + * Secure renegotiation + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(ssl->verify_data_len + 1); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(ssl->verify_data_len); + + memcpy(p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len); + + *olen = 5 + ssl->verify_data_len; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + (void) ssl; /* ssl used for debugging only */ + + *olen = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 2; + + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + + *olen = 6; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t kkpp_len = 0; + + *olen = 0; + + /* Skip costly extension if we can't use EC J-PAKE anyway */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1) { + return 0; + } +#else + if (mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) { + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, adding ecjpake_kkpp extension")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* + * We may need to send ClientHello multiple times for Hello verification. + * We don't want to compute fresh values every time (both for performance + * and consistency reasons), so cache the extension content. + */ + if (ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL || + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("generating new ecjpake parameters")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, + p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE); + if (ret != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret); + return ret; + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = mbedtls_calloc(1, kkpp_len); + if (ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("allocation failed")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, p + 2, kkpp_len); + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = kkpp_len; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("re-using cached ecjpake parameters")); + + kkpp_len = ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p + 2, end, kkpp_len); + + memcpy(p + 2, ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, kkpp_len); + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(kkpp_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *olen = kkpp_len + 4; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ext_len; + + /* + * struct { + * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; + * } ConnectionId; + */ + + *olen = 0; + if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) { + return 0; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding CID extension")); + + /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, (unsigned) (ssl->own_cid_len + 5)); + + /* Add extension ID + size */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0); + p += 2; + ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len; + memcpy(p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len); + + *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + *olen = 0; + + if (ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 5); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 1; + + *p++ = ssl->conf->mfl_code; + + *olen = 5; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + *olen = 0; + + if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + *olen = 0; + + if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, adding extended_master_secret extension")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t tlen = ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len; + + *olen = 0; + + if (ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, adding session ticket extension")); + + /* The addition is safe here since the ticket length is 16 bit. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4 + tlen); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tlen, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *olen = 4; + + if (ssl->session_negotiate->ticket == NULL || tlen == 0) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("sending session ticket of length %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, tlen)); + + memcpy(p, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, tlen); + + *olen += tlen; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t protection_profiles_index = 0, ext_len = 0; + uint16_t mki_len = 0, profile_value = 0; + + *olen = 0; + + if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || + (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL) || + (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0)) { + return 0; + } + + /* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1 + * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; + * + * struct { + * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; + * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; + * } UseSRTPData; + * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; + */ + if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED) { + mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + } + /* Extension length = 2 bytes for profiles length, + * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len * 2 (each profile is 2 bytes length ), + * 1 byte for srtp_mki vector length and the mki_len value + */ + ext_len = 2 + 2 * (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len) + 1 + mki_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding use_srtp extension")); + + /* Check there is room in the buffer for the extension + 4 bytes + * - the extension tag (2 bytes) + * - the extension length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, ext_len + 4); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* protection profile length: 2*(ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len) */ + /* micro-optimization: + * the list size is limited to MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH + * which is lower than 127, so the upper byte of the length is always 0 + * For the documentation, the more generic code is left in comments + * *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( 2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ) + * >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); + */ + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len); + + for (protection_profiles_index = 0; + protection_profiles_index < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; + protection_profiles_index++) { + profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value + (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index]); + if (profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ssl_write_use_srtp_ext, add profile: %04x", + profile_value)); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(profile_value, p, 0); + p += 2; + } else { + /* + * Note: we shall never arrive here as protection profiles + * is checked by mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles function + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, " + "illegal DTLS-SRTP protection profile %d", + ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index] + )); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + } + + *p++ = mki_len & 0xFF; + + if (mki_len != 0) { + memcpy(p, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len); + /* + * Increment p to point to the current position. + */ + p += mki_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "sending mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len); + } + + /* + * total extension length: extension type (2 bytes) + * + extension length (2 bytes) + * + protection profile length (2 bytes) + * + 2 * number of protection profiles + * + srtp_mki vector length(1 byte) + * + mki value + */ + *olen = p - buf; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + int uses_ec, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ext_len = 0; + + (void) ssl; + (void) end; + (void) uses_ec; + (void) ret; + (void) ext_len; + + *out_len = 0; + + /* Note that TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV is always added + * even if MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is not defined. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if ((ret = ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_renegotiation_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if (uses_ec) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl, p, end, + &ext_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if ((ret = ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + if ((ret = ssl_write_cid_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_cid_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + if ((ret = ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, p, end, + &ext_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + if ((ret = ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + if ((ret = ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_extended_ms_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + if ((ret = ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if ((ret = ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_write_session_ticket_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; +#endif + + *out_len = (size_t) (p - buf); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { + /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */ + if (len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len * 2 || + buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len * 2 || + mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf + 1, + ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len) != 0 || + mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len, + ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching renegotiation info")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + { + if (len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x00) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("non-zero length renegotiation info")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + /* + * server should use the extension only if we did, + * and if so the server's value should match ours (and len is always 1) + */ + if (ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE || + len != 1 || + buf[0] != ssl->conf->mfl_code) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("non-matching max fragment length extension")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + size_t peer_cid_len; + + if ( /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */ + ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM || + /* The server must only send the CID extension if we have offered it. */ + ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension unexpected")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + } + + if (len == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension invalid")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + peer_cid_len = *buf++; + len--; + + if (peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension invalid")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + if (len != peer_cid_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("CID extension invalid")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len; + memcpy(ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use of CID extension negotiated")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Server CID", buf, peer_cid_len); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED || + len != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("non-matching encrypt-then-MAC extension")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + } + + ((void) buf); + + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || + len != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("non-matching extended master secret extension")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + } + + ((void) buf); + + ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + if (ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED || + len != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("non-matching session ticket extension")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + } + + ((void) buf); + + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + size_t list_size; + const unsigned char *p; + + if (len == 0 || (size_t) (buf[0] + 1) != len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + list_size = buf[0]; + + p = buf + 1; + while (list_size > 0) { + if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || + p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) + ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p[0]); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("point format selected: %d", p[0])); + return 0; + } + + list_size--; + p++; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no point format in common")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip ecjpake kkpp extension")); + return 0; + } + + /* If we got here, we no longer need our cached extension */ + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache); + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL; + ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, buf, len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE)) != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round one", ret); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + buf, len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + size_t list_len, name_len; + const char **p; + + /* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */ + if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching ALPN extension")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + } + + /* + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + * + * the "ProtocolNameList" MUST contain exactly one "ProtocolName" + */ + + /* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */ + if (len < 4) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 0); + if (list_len != len - 2) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + name_len = buf[2]; + if (name_len != list_len - 1) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */ + for (p = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *p != NULL; p++) { + if (name_len == strlen(*p) && + memcmp(buf + 3, *p, name_len) == 0) { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *p; + return 0; + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ALPN extension: no matching protocol")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile server_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + size_t i, mki_len = 0; + uint16_t server_protection_profile_value = 0; + + /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */ + if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || + (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL) || + (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0)) { + return 0; + } + + /* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1 + * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; + * + * struct { + * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; + * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; + * } UseSRTPData; + + * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; + * + */ + if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED) { + mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + } + + /* + * Length is 5 + optional mki_value : one protection profile length (2 bytes) + * + protection profile (2 bytes) + * + mki_len(1 byte) + * and optional srtp_mki + */ + if ((len < 5) || (len != (buf[4] + 5u))) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* + * get the server protection profile + */ + + /* + * protection profile length must be 0x0002 as we must have only + * one protection profile in server Hello + */ + if ((buf[0] != 0) || (buf[1] != 2)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + server_protection_profile_value = (buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]; + server_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( + server_protection_profile_value); + if (server_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + server_protection))); + } + + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + + /* + * Check we have the server profile in our list + */ + for (i = 0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++) { + if (server_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]) { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + server_protection))); + break; + } + } + + /* If no match was found : server problem, it shall never answer with incompatible profile */ + if (ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* If server does not use mki in its reply, make sure the client won't keep + * one as negotiated */ + if (len == 5) { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = 0; + } + + /* + * RFC5764: + * If the client detects a nonzero-length MKI in the server's response + * that is different than the one the client offered, then the client + * MUST abort the handshake and SHOULD send an invalid_parameter alert. + */ + if (len > 5 && (buf[4] != mki_len || + (memcmp(ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, &buf[5], mki_len)))) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if (len > 5) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "received mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len); + } +#endif + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +/* + * Parse HelloVerifyRequest. Only called after verifying the HS type. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + const unsigned char *p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); + uint16_t dtls_legacy_version; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + uint8_t cookie_len; +#else + uint16_t cookie_len; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse hello verify request")); + + /* Check that there is enough room for: + * - 2 bytes of version + * - 1 byte of cookie_len + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 > ssl->in_msglen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("incoming HelloVerifyRequest message is too short")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion server_version; + * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; + * } HelloVerifyRequest; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server version", p, 2); + dtls_legacy_version = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* + * Since the RFC is not clear on this point, accept DTLS 1.0 (0xfeff) + * The DTLS 1.3 (current draft) renames ProtocolVersion server_version to + * legacy_version and locks the value of legacy_version to 0xfefd (DTLS 1.2) + */ + if (dtls_legacy_version != 0xfefd && dtls_legacy_version != 0xfeff) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server version")); + + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + } + + cookie_len = *p++; + if ((ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen) - p < cookie_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("cookie length does not match incoming message size")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "cookie", p, cookie_len); + + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->cookie); + + ssl->handshake->cookie = mbedtls_calloc(1, cookie_len); + if (ssl->handshake->cookie == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc failed (%d bytes)", cookie_len)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(ssl->handshake->cookie, p, cookie_len); + ssl->handshake->cookie_len = cookie_len; + + /* Start over at ClientHello */ + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(ssl); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse hello verify request")); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret, i; + size_t n; + size_t ext_len; + unsigned char *buf, *ext; + unsigned char comp; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + int renegotiation_info_seen = 0; +#endif + int handshake_failure = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse server hello")); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { + /* No alert on a read error. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + return ret; + } + + buf = ssl->in_msg; + + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { + ssl->renego_records_seen++; + + if (ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 && + ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("renegotiation requested, but not honored by server")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("non-handshake message during renegotiation")); + + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + if (buf[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("received hello verify request")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse server hello")); + return ssl_parse_hello_verify_request(ssl); + } else { + /* We made it through the verification process */ + mbedtls_free(ssl->handshake->cookie); + ssl->handshake->cookie = NULL; + ssl->handshake->cookie_len = 0; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + if (ssl->in_hslen < 38 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) || + buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* + * 0 . 1 server_version + * 2 . 33 random (maybe including 4 bytes of Unix time) + * 34 . 34 session_id length = n + * 35 . 34+n session_id + * 35+n . 36+n cipher_suite + * 37+n . 37+n compression_method + * + * 38+n . 39+n extensions length (optional) + * 40+n . .. extensions + */ + buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, version", buf, 2); + ssl->tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) mbedtls_ssl_read_version(buf, + ssl->conf->transport); + ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = ssl->tls_version; + ssl->session_negotiate->endpoint = ssl->conf->endpoint; + + if (ssl->tls_version < ssl->conf->min_tls_version || + ssl->tls_version > ssl->conf->max_tls_version) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ( + "server version out of bounds - min: [0x%x], server: [0x%x], max: [0x%x]", + (unsigned) ssl->conf->min_tls_version, + (unsigned) ssl->tls_version, + (unsigned) ssl->conf->max_tls_version)); + + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, current time: %lu", + ((unsigned long) buf[2] << 24) | + ((unsigned long) buf[3] << 16) | + ((unsigned long) buf[4] << 8) | + ((unsigned long) buf[5]))); + + memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 2, 32); + + n = buf[34]; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32); + + if (n > 32) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + if (ssl->in_hslen > mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 39 + n) { + ext_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 38 + n); + + if ((ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4) || + ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 40 + n + ext_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + } else if (ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 38 + n) { + ext_len = 0; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* ciphersuite (used later) */ + i = (int) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, n + 35); + + /* + * Read and check compression + */ + comp = buf[37 + n]; + + if (comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("server hello, bad compression: %d", comp)); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + /* + * Initialize update checksum functions + */ + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(i); + if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("ciphersuite info for %04x not found", (unsigned int) i)); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(ssl, ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, session id", buf + 35, n); + + /* + * Check if the session can be resumed + */ + if (ssl->handshake->resume == 0 || n == 0 || +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE || +#endif + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != i || + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != n || + memcmp(ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n) != 0) { + ssl->state++; + ssl->handshake->resume = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL); +#endif + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = i; + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n; + memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n); + } else { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("%s session has been resumed", + ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", (unsigned) i)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, compress alg.: %d", + buf[37 + n])); + + /* + * Perform cipher suite validation in same way as in ssl_write_client_hello. + */ + i = 0; + while (1) { + if (ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[i] == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + if (ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[i++] == + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite) { + break; + } + } + + suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite); + if (mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite(ssl, suite_info, ssl->tls_version, + ssl->tls_version) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA && + ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled = 1; + } +#endif + + if (comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + ext = buf + 40 + n; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ext_len)); + + while (ext_len) { + unsigned int ext_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 0); + unsigned int ext_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 2); + + if (ext_size + 4 > ext_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + switch (ext_id) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found renegotiation extension")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + renegotiation_info_seen = 1; +#endif + + if ((ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(ssl, ext + 4, + ext_size)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("found max_fragment_length extension")); + + if ((ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found CID extension")); + + if ((ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext(ssl, + ext + 4, + ext_size)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found encrypt_then_mac extension")); + + if ((ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("found extended_master_secret extension")); + + if ((ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found session_ticket extension")); + + if ((ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("found supported_point_formats extension")); + + if ((ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ecjpake_kkpp extension")); + + if ((ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(ssl, + ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension")); + + if ((ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found use_srtp extension")); + + if ((ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", ext_id)); + } + + ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; + ext += 4 + ext_size; + + if (ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + } + + /* + * mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys() has to be called after the parsing of the + * extensions. It sets the transform data for the resumed session which in + * case of DTLS includes the server CID extracted from the CID extension. + */ + if (ssl->handshake->resume) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return ret; + } + } + + /* + * Renegotiation security checks + */ + if (ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == + MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake")); + handshake_failure = 1; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && + renegotiation_info_seen == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)")); + handshake_failure = 1; + } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == + MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("legacy renegotiation not allowed")); + handshake_failure = 1; + } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + renegotiation_info_seen == 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)")); + handshake_failure = 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + if (handshake_failure == 1) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse server hello")); + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t dhm_actual_bitlen; + + /* + * Ephemeral DH parameters: + * + * struct { + * opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>; + * opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>; + * opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>; + * } ServerDHParams; + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_params(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + p, end)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, ("mbedtls_dhm_read_params"), ret); + return ret; + } + + dhm_actual_bitlen = mbedtls_dhm_get_bitlen(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx); + if (dhm_actual_bitlen < ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("DHM prime too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " < %u", + dhm_actual_bitlen, + ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end) +{ + uint16_t tls_id; + size_t ecpoint_len; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + size_t ec_bits = 0; + + /* + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; + * ECPoint public; + * } ServerECDHParams; + * + * 1 curve_type (must be "named_curve") + * 2..3 NamedCurve + * 4 ECPoint.len + * 5+ ECPoint contents + */ + if (end - *p < 4) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled */ + if (*(*p)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* Next two bytes are the namedcurve value */ + tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0); + *p += 2; + + /* Check it's a curve we offered */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(ssl, tls_id) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve): %u", + (unsigned) tls_id)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* Convert EC's TLS ID to PSA key type. */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id, &key_type, + &ec_bits) == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type; + handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = ec_bits; + + /* Keep a copy of the peer's public key */ + ecpoint_len = *(*p)++; + if ((size_t) (end - *p) < ecpoint_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + if (ecpoint_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, *p, ecpoint_len); + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = ecpoint_len; + *p += ecpoint_len; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + uint16_t tls_id; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT) + grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id; +#else + grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp_id; +#endif + + tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id); + if (tls_id == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDH curve: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(tls_id))); + + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, grp_id) != 0) { + return -1; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + /* + * Ephemeral ECDH parameters: + * + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; + * ECPoint public; + * } ServerECDHParams; + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_params(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + (const unsigned char **) p, end)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecdh_read_params"), ret); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; + } +#endif + return ret; + } + + if (ssl_check_server_ecdh_params(ssl) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || \ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || \ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + uint16_t len; + ((void) ssl); + + /* + * PSK parameters: + * + * opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>; + */ + if (end - (*p) < 2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0); + *p += 2; + + if (end - (*p) < len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* + * Note: we currently ignore the PSK identity hint, as we only allow one + * PSK to be provisioned on the client. This could be changed later if + * someone needs that feature. + */ + *p += len; + ret = 0; + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) +/* + * Generate a pre-master secret and encrypt it with the server's RSA key + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t offset, size_t *olen, + size_t pms_offset) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len_bytes = 2; + unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; + mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk; + + if (offset + len_bytes > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small for encrypted pms")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* + * Generate (part of) the pre-master as + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion client_version; + * opaque random[46]; + * } PreMasterSecret; + */ + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2); + + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p + 2, 46)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_rng", ret); + return ret; + } + + ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { + /* Should never happen */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* + * Now write it out, encrypted + */ + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("certificate key type mismatch")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt(peer_pk, + p, ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->out_msg + offset + len_bytes, olen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - offset - len_bytes, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt", ret); + return ret; + } + + if (len_bytes == 2) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*olen, ssl->out_msg, offset); + *olen += 2; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it. */ + mbedtls_pk_free(peer_pk); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { + /* Should never happen */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good + * enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use below. */ + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server key not ECDH capable")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*peer_pk); +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + uint16_t tls_id = 0; + psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(peer_pk); + + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, grp_id) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server certificate (ECDH curve)")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + + tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id); + if (tls_id == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ECC group %u not suported", + grp_id)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + /* If the above conversion to TLS ID was fine, then also this one will be, + so there is no need to check the return value here */ + mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id, &key_type, + &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type; + + /* Store peer's public key in psa format. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + memcpy(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, peer_pk->pub_raw, peer_pk->pub_raw_len); + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = peer_pk->pub_raw_len; + ret = 0; +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + size_t olen = 0; + ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&peer_key->grp, &peer_key->Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen, + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)); + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary"), ret); + return ret; + } + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = olen; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, peer_key, + MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecdh_get_params"), ret); + return ret; + } + + if (ssl_check_server_ecdh_params(ssl) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server certificate (ECDH curve)")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it, + * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive + * operations like ECDHE. */ + mbedtls_pk_free(peer_pk); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse server key exchange")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse server key exchange")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + ((void) p); + ((void) end); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) { + if ((ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse server key exchange")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + ((void) p); + ((void) end); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing) { + goto start_processing; + } +#endif + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + return ret; + } + + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + /* + * ServerKeyExchange may be skipped with PSK and RSA-PSK when the server + * doesn't use a psk_identity_hint + */ + if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { + /* Current message is probably either + * CertificateRequest or ServerHelloDone */ + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("server key exchange message must not be skipped")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing; + } + +start_processing: +#endif + p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); + end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server key exchange", p, (size_t) (end - p)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { + if (ssl_parse_server_psk_hint(ssl, &p, end) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + } /* FALLTHROUGH */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { + ; /* nothing more to do */ + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) { + if (ssl_parse_server_dh_params(ssl, &p, end) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA) { + if (ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params(ssl, &p, end) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* + * The first 3 bytes are: + * [0] MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE + * [1, 2] elliptic curve's TLS ID + * + * However since we only support secp256r1 for now, we check only + * that TLS ID here + */ + uint16_t read_tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 1); + uint16_t exp_tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id( + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1); + + if (exp_tls_id == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + if ((*p != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE) || + (read_tls_id != exp_tls_id)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + p += 3; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, p, end - p, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO)) != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round two", ret); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p, end - p); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature(ciphersuite_info)) { + size_t sig_len, hashlen; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); + size_t params_len = (size_t) (p - params); + void *rs_ctx = NULL; + uint16_t sig_alg; + + mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { + /* Should never happen */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* + * Handle the digitally-signed structure + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + sig_alg = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg( + sig_alg, &pk_alg, &md_alg) != 0 && + !mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(ssl, sig_alg) && + !mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(ssl, sig_alg)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("bad server key exchange message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + p += 2; + + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, pk_alg)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("bad server key exchange message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + /* + * Read signature + */ + + if (p > end - 2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + sig_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + if (p != end - sig_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "signature", p, sig_len); + + /* + * Compute the hash that has been signed + */ + if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(ssl, hash, &hashlen, + params, params_len, + md_alg); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen); + + /* + * Verify signature + */ + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, pk_alg)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server key exchange message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { + rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { + mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options rsassa_pss_options; + rsassa_pss_options.mgf1_hash_id = md_alg; + rsassa_pss_options.expected_salt_len = + mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg); + if (rsassa_pss_options.expected_salt_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(pk_alg, &rsassa_pss_options, + peer_pk, + md_alg, hash, hashlen, + p, sig_len); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(peer_pk, + md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx); + + if (ret != 0) { + int send_alert_msg = 1; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + send_alert_msg = (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS); +#endif + if (send_alert_msg) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; + } +#endif + return ret; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + /* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it, + * so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive + * operations like ECDHE. */ + mbedtls_pk_free(peer_pk); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + +exit: + ssl->state++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse server key exchange")); + + return 0; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate request")); + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate request")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t n = 0; + size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + size_t sig_alg_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + unsigned char *sig_alg; + unsigned char *dn; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate request")); + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate request")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + return ret; + } + + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + ssl->state++; + ssl->handshake->client_auth = + (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got %s certificate request", + ssl->handshake->client_auth ? "a" : "no")); + + if (ssl->handshake->client_auth == 0) { + /* Current message is probably the ServerHelloDone */ + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + goto exit; + } + + /* + * struct { + * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>; + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm + * supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>; -- TLS 1.2 only + * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateRequest; + * + * Since we only support a single certificate on clients, let's just + * ignore all the information that's supposed to help us pick a + * certificate. + * + * We could check that our certificate matches the request, and bail out + * if it doesn't, but it's simpler to just send the certificate anyway, + * and give the server the opportunity to decide if it should terminate + * the connection when it doesn't like our certificate. + * + * Same goes for the hash in TLS 1.2's signature_algorithms: at this + * point we only have one hash available (see comments in + * write_certificate_verify), so let's just use what we have. + * + * However, we still minimally parse the message to check it is at least + * superficially sane. + */ + buf = ssl->in_msg; + + /* certificate_types */ + if (ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + cert_type_len = buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)]; + n = cert_type_len; + + /* + * In the subsequent code there are two paths that read from buf: + * * the length of the signature algorithms field (if minor version of + * SSL is 3), + * * distinguished name length otherwise. + * Both reach at most the index: + * ...hdr_len + 2 + n, + * therefore the buffer length at this point must be greater than that + * regardless of the actual code path. + */ + if (ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 2 + n) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* supported_signature_algorithms */ + sig_alg_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 1 + n); + + /* + * The furthest access in buf is in the loop few lines below: + * sig_alg[i + 1], + * where: + * sig_alg = buf + ...hdr_len + 3 + n, + * max(i) = sig_alg_len - 1. + * Therefore the furthest access is: + * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len - 1 + 1], + * which reduces to: + * buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len], + * which is one less than we need the buf to be. + */ + if (ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n + sig_alg_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n; + for (size_t i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("Supported Signature Algorithm found: %02x %02x", + sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1])); + } +#endif + + n += 2 + sig_alg_len; + + /* certificate_authorities */ + dn_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 1 + n); + + n += dn_len; + if (ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + dn = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + 3 + n - dn_len; + for (size_t i = 0, dni_len = 0; i < dn_len; i += 2 + dni_len) { + unsigned char *p = dn + i + 2; + mbedtls_x509_name name; + size_t asn1_len; + char s[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE]; + memset(&name, 0, sizeof(name)); + dni_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(dn + i, 0); + if (dni_len > dn_len - i - 2 || + mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, p + dni_len, &asn1_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) != 0 || + mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + asn1_len, &name) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate request message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("DN hint: %.*s", + mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(s, sizeof(s), &name), s)); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(name.next); + } +#endif + +exit: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate request")); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse server hello done")); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + return ret; + } + + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello done message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + if (ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) || + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad server hello done message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl); + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse server hello done")); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + size_t header_len; + size_t content_len; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write client key exchange")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA) { + /* + * DHM key exchange -- send G^X mod P + */ + content_len = mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(content_len, ssl->out_msg, 4); + header_len = 6; + + ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx), + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE, + &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + header_len = 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH computation.")); + + /* + * Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange. + */ + + /* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by + * applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While + * the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes + * such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not + * yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF. + * For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation + * of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */ + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + /* Generate ECDH private key. */ + status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes, + &handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA. + * The export format is an ECPoint structure as expected by TLS, + * but we just need to add a length byte before that. */ + unsigned char *own_pubkey = ssl->out_msg + header_len + 1; + unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t) (end - own_pubkey); + size_t own_pubkey_len; + + status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len, + &own_pubkey_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + + ssl->out_msg[header_len] = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_len; + content_len = own_pubkey_len + 1; + + /* The ECDH secret is the premaster secret used for key derivation. */ + + /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ + status = psa_raw_key_agreement(PSA_ALG_ECDH, + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster), + &ssl->handshake->pmslen); + + destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS || destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } +#else + /* + * ECDH key exchange -- send client public value + */ + header_len = 4; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret) { + goto ecdh_calc_secret; + } + + mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx); + } +#endif + + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + &content_len, + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], 1000, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; + } +#endif + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_n = content_len; + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret; + } + +ecdh_calc_secret: + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { + content_len = ssl->handshake->ecrs_n; + } +#endif + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; + } +#endif + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* + * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { + /* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK, + * and we check that the server's choice is among the + * ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* uint16 to store content length */ + const size_t content_len_size = 2; + + header_len = 4; + + if (header_len + content_len_size + ssl->conf->psk_identity_len + > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + header_len; + + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(ssl->conf->psk_identity_len); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(ssl->conf->psk_identity_len); + header_len += content_len_size; + + memcpy(p, ssl->conf->psk_identity, + ssl->conf->psk_identity_len); + p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + + header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH computation.")); + + /* + * Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange. + */ + + /* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by + * applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While + * the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes + * such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not + * yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF. + * For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation + * of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */ + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + /* Generate ECDH private key. */ + status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes, + &handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA. + * The export format is an ECPoint structure as expected by TLS, + * but we just need to add a length byte before that. */ + unsigned char *own_pubkey = p + 1; + unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t) (end - own_pubkey); + size_t own_pubkey_len = 0; + + status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len, + &own_pubkey_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + *p = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_len; + content_len = own_pubkey_len + 1; + + /* As RFC 5489 section 2, the premaster secret is formed as follows: + * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the ECDH computation + * - the octet string produced by the ECDH computation + * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the PSK + * - the PSK itself + */ + unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster; + const unsigned char * const pms_end = pms + + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); + /* uint16 to store length (in octets) of the ECDH computation */ + const size_t zlen_size = 2; + size_t zlen = 0; + + /* Perform ECDH computation after the uint16 reserved for the length */ + status = psa_raw_key_agreement(PSA_ALG_ECDH, + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, + pms + zlen_size, + pms_end - (pms + zlen_size), + &zlen); + + destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(destruction_status); + } + + /* Write the ECDH computation length before the ECDH computation */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(zlen, pms, 0); + pms += zlen_size + zlen; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(ciphersuite_info)) { + /* + * opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf) == 0) { + /* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK, + * and we check that the server's choice is among the + * ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + header_len = 4; + content_len = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + + if (header_len + 2 + content_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(content_len); + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(content_len); + + memcpy(ssl->out_msg + header_len, + ssl->conf->psk_identity, + ssl->conf->psk_identity_len); + header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK) { + content_len = 0; + } else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { + if ((ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms(ssl, header_len, + &content_len, 2)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) { + /* + * ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public (DHM send G^X mod P) + */ + content_len = mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx); + + if (header_len + 2 + content_len > + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("psk identity or DHM size too long or SSL buffer too short")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(content_len); + ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(content_len); + + ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx), + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster; + unsigned char *pms_end = pms + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); + size_t pms_len; + + /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + pms + 2, pms_end - (pms + 2), &pms_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(pms_len, pms, 0); + pms += 2 + pms_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); +#endif + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { + /* + * ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public; + */ + ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + &content_len, + &ssl->out_msg[header_len], + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q); + } else +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, + (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> + key_exchange)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) { + header_len = 4; + if ((ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms(ssl, header_len, + &content_len, 0)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { + header_len = 4; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char *out_p = ssl->out_msg + header_len; + unsigned char *end_p = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - + header_len; + ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, + out_p, end_p - out_p, &content_len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO); + if (ret != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret); + return ret; + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + ssl->out_msg + header_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len, + &content_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ + { + ((void) ciphersuite_info); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ssl->out_msglen = header_len + content_len; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + + ssl->state++; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write client key exchange")); + + return 0; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate verify")); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret); + return ret; + } + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate verify")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} +#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + size_t n = 0, offset = 0; + unsigned char hash[48]; + unsigned char *hash_start = hash; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + size_t hashlen; + void *rs_ctx = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf); +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate verify")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled && + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign) { + goto sign; + } +#endif + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret); + return ret; + } + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate verify")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + + if (ssl->handshake->client_auth == 0 || + mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate verify")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + + if (mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl) == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no private key for certificate")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; + } + + /* + * Make a signature of the handshake digests + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { + ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign; + } + +sign: +#endif + + ret = ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &hashlen); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("calc_verify"), ret); + return ret; + } + + /* + * digitally-signed struct { + * opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length]; + * }; + * + * Taking shortcut here. We assume that the server always allows the + * PRF Hash function and has sent it in the allowed signature + * algorithms list received in the Certificate Request message. + * + * Until we encounter a server that does not, we will take this + * shortcut. + * + * Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and + * SHA224 in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server + * side. + */ + if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) { + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; + ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384; + } else { + md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; + ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256; + } + ssl->out_msg[5] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl)); + + /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ + hashlen = 0; + offset = 2; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled) { + rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk; + } +#endif + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl), + md_alg, hash_start, hashlen, + ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset, + out_buf_len - 6 - offset, + &n, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng, rs_ctx)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS; + } +#endif + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(n, ssl->out_msg, offset + 4); + + ssl->out_msglen = 6 + n + offset; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; + + ssl->state++; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate verify")); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t lifetime; + size_t ticket_len; + unsigned char *ticket; + const unsigned char *msg; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse new session ticket")); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + return ret; + } + + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad new session ticket message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + /* + * struct { + * uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint; + * opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>; + * } NewSessionTicket; + * + * 0 . 3 ticket_lifetime_hint + * 4 . 5 ticket_len (n) + * 6 . 5+n ticket content + */ + if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET || + ssl->in_hslen < 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad new session ticket message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + msg = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); + + lifetime = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(msg, 0); + + ticket_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(msg, 4); + + if (ticket_len + 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) != ssl->in_hslen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad new session ticket message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ticket_len)); + + /* We're not waiting for a NewSessionTicket message any more */ + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + + /* + * Zero-length ticket means the server changed his mind and doesn't want + * to send a ticket after all, so just forget it + */ + if (ticket_len == 0) { + return 0; + } + + if (ssl->session != NULL && ssl->session->ticket != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->session->ticket, + ssl->session->ticket_len); + ssl->session->ticket = NULL; + ssl->session->ticket_len = 0; + } + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len); + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = NULL; + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = 0; + + if ((ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, ticket_len)) == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ticket alloc failed")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(ticket, msg + 6, ticket_len); + + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = ticket; + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = ticket_len; + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_lifetime = lifetime; + + /* + * RFC 5077 section 3.4: + * "If the client receives a session ticket from the server, then it + * discards any Session ID that was sent in the ServerHello." + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket in use, discarding session id")); + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse new session ticket")); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +/* + * SSL handshake -- client side -- single step + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + + /* Change state now, so that it is right in mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), used + * by DTLS for dropping out-of-sequence ChangeCipherSpec records */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0) { + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; + } +#endif + + switch (ssl->state) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; + break; + + /* + * ==> ClientHello + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(ssl); + break; + + /* + * <== ServerHello + * Certificate + * ( ServerKeyExchange ) + * ( CertificateRequest ) + * ServerHelloDone + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + ret = ssl_parse_server_hello(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: + ret = ssl_parse_server_key_exchange(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_request(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: + ret = ssl_parse_server_hello_done(ssl); + break; + + /* + * ==> ( Certificate/Alert ) + * ClientKeyExchange + * ( CertificateVerify ) + * ChangeCipherSpec + * Finished + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: + ret = ssl_write_client_key_exchange(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = ssl_write_certificate_verify(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(ssl); + break; + + /* + * <== ( NewSessionTicket ) + * ChangeCipherSpec + * Finished + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + ret = ssl_parse_new_session_ticket(ssl); + break; +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("handshake: done")); + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(ssl); + break; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid state %d", ssl->state)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b49a8ae6a6f --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,4432 @@ +/* + * TLS server-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/ssl.h" +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "constant_time_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) +int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *info, + size_t ilen) +{ + if (ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_free(ssl->cli_id); + + if ((ssl->cli_id = mbedtls_calloc(1, ilen)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(ssl->cli_id, info, ilen); + ssl->cli_id_len = ilen; + + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write, + mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check, + void *p_cookie) +{ + conf->f_cookie_write = f_cookie_write; + conf->f_cookie_check = f_cookie_check; + conf->p_cookie = p_cookie; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf) +{ + if (conf->f_psk != NULL) { + return 1; + } + + if (conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || conf->psk_identity == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(conf->psk_opaque)) { + return 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if (conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0) { + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { + /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */ + if (len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len || + buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len || + mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data, + ssl->verify_data_len) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-matching renegotiation info")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + { + if (len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("non-zero length renegotiation info")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +/* + * Function for parsing a supported groups (TLS 1.3) or supported elliptic + * curves (TLS 1.2) extension. + * + * The "extension_data" field of a supported groups extension contains a + * "NamedGroupList" value (TLS 1.3 RFC8446): + * enum { + * secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019), + * x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E), + * ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102), + * ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104), + * ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF), + * ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF), + * (0xFFFF) + * } NamedGroup; + * struct { + * NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>; + * } NamedGroupList; + * + * The "extension_data" field of a supported elliptic curves extension contains + * a "NamedCurveList" value (TLS 1.2 RFC 8422): + * enum { + * deprecated(1..22), + * secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25), + * x25519(29), x448(30), + * reserved (0xFE00..0xFEFF), + * deprecated(0xFF01..0xFF02), + * (0xFFFF) + * } NamedCurve; + * struct { + * NamedCurve named_curve_list<2..2^16-1> + * } NamedCurveList; + * + * The TLS 1.3 supported groups extension was defined to be a compatible + * generalization of the TLS 1.2 supported elliptic curves extension. They both + * share the same extension identifier. + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_supported_groups_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + size_t list_size, our_size; + const unsigned char *p; + uint16_t *curves_tls_id; + + if (len < 2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + list_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 0); + if (list_size + 2 != len || + list_size % 2 != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* Should never happen unless client duplicates the extension */ + if (ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + /* Don't allow our peer to make us allocate too much memory, + * and leave room for a final 0 */ + our_size = list_size / 2 + 1; + if (our_size > MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX) { + our_size = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX; + } + + if ((curves_tls_id = mbedtls_calloc(our_size, + sizeof(*curves_tls_id))) == NULL) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id = curves_tls_id; + + p = buf + 2; + while (list_size > 0 && our_size > 1) { + uint16_t curr_tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(curr_tls_id) != + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + *curves_tls_id++ = curr_tls_id; + our_size--; + } + + list_size -= 2; + p += 2; + } + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + size_t list_size; + const unsigned char *p; + + if (len == 0 || (size_t) (buf[0] + 1) != len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + list_size = buf[0]; + + p = buf + 1; + while (list_size > 0) { + if (p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || + p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) { +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) + ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p[0]); +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("point format selected: %d", p[0])); + return 0; + } + + list_size--; + p++; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx_is_ok != 1) +#else + if (mbedtls_ecjpake_check(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx) != 0) +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip ecjpake kkpp extension")); + return 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, buf, len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE)) != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round one", ret); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + + return ret; + } +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + buf, len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* Only mark the extension as OK when we're sure it is */ + ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + if (len != 1 || buf[0] >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code = buf[0]; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + size_t peer_cid_len; + + /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */ + if (ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + /* + * struct { + * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; + * } ConnectionId; + */ + + if (len < 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + peer_cid_len = *buf++; + len--; + + if (len != peer_cid_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* Ignore CID if the user has disabled its use. */ + if (ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) { + /* Leave ssl->handshake->cid_in_use in its default + * value of MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Client sent CID extension, but CID disabled")); + return 0; + } + + if (peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; + ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len; + memcpy(ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use of CID extension negotiated")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Client CID", buf, peer_cid_len); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + if (len != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + ((void) buf); + + if (ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED) { + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + if (len != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + ((void) buf); + + if (ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED) { + ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_session session; + + mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session); + + if (ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse == NULL || + ssl->conf->f_ticket_write == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + /* Remember the client asked us to send a new ticket */ + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, len)); + + if (len == 0) { + return 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket rejected: renegotiating")); + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + /* + * Failures are ok: just ignore the ticket and proceed. + */ + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse(ssl->conf->p_ticket, &session, + buf, len)) != 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session); + + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is not authentic")); + } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is expired")); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse", ret); + } + + return 0; + } + + /* + * Keep the session ID sent by the client, since we MUST send it back to + * inform them we're accepting the ticket (RFC 5077 section 3.4) + */ + session.id_len = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + memcpy(&session.id, ssl->session_negotiate->id, session.id_len); + + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session_negotiate); + memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate, &session, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); + + /* Zeroize instead of free as we copied the content */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&session, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_session)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("session successfully restored from ticket")); + + ssl->handshake->resume = 1; + + /* Don't send a new ticket after all, this one is OK */ + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile client_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + size_t i, j; + size_t profile_length; + uint16_t mki_length; + /*! 2 bytes for profile length and 1 byte for mki len */ + const size_t size_of_lengths = 3; + + /* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */ + if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || + (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL) || + (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0)) { + return 0; + } + + /* RFC5764 section 4.1.1 + * uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2]; + * + * struct { + * SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles; + * opaque srtp_mki<0..255>; + * } UseSRTPData; + + * SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>; + */ + + /* + * Min length is 5: at least one protection profile(2 bytes) + * and length(2 bytes) + srtp_mki length(1 byte) + * Check here that we have at least 2 bytes of protection profiles length + * and one of srtp_mki length + */ + if (len < size_of_lengths) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET; + + /* first 2 bytes are protection profile length(in bytes) */ + profile_length = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1]; + buf += 2; + + /* The profile length cannot be bigger than input buffer size - lengths fields */ + if (profile_length > len - size_of_lengths || + profile_length % 2 != 0) { /* profiles are 2 bytes long, so the length must be even */ + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + /* + * parse the extension list values are defined in + * http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml + */ + for (j = 0; j < profile_length; j += 2) { + uint16_t protection_profile_value = buf[j] << 8 | buf[j + 1]; + client_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(protection_profile_value); + + if (client_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + client_protection))); + } else { + continue; + } + /* check if suggested profile is in our list */ + for (i = 0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++) { + if (client_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]) { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i]; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected srtp profile: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string( + client_protection))); + break; + } + } + if (ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { + break; + } + } + buf += profile_length; /* buf points to the mki length */ + mki_length = *buf; + buf++; + + if (mki_length > MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH || + mki_length + profile_length + size_of_lengths != len) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* Parse the mki only if present and mki is supported locally */ + if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED && + mki_length > 0) { + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = mki_length; + + memcpy(ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, buf, mki_length); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "using mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +/* + * Auxiliary functions for ServerHello parsing and related actions + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) +/* + * Return 0 if the given key uses one of the acceptable curves, -1 otherwise + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_check_key_curve(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + uint16_t *curves_tls_id) +{ + uint16_t *curr_tls_id = curves_tls_id; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + mbedtls_ecp_group_id curr_grp_id; + + while (*curr_tls_id != 0) { + curr_grp_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id); + if (curr_grp_id == grp_id) { + return 0; + } + curr_tls_id++; + } + + return -1; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Try picking a certificate for this ciphersuite, + * return 0 on success and -1 on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_pick_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm_t pk_alg = + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg(ciphersuite_info); + psa_key_usage_t pk_usage = + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage(ciphersuite_info); +#else + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + uint32_t flags; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL) { + list = ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert; + } else +#endif + list = ssl->conf->key_cert; + + int pk_alg_is_none = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + pk_alg_is_none = (pk_alg == PSA_ALG_NONE); +#else + pk_alg_is_none = (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (pk_alg_is_none) { + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite requires certificate")); + + if (list == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server has no certificate")); + return -1; + } + + for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + flags = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate", + cur->cert); + + int key_type_matches = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + key_type_matches = ((ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL || + ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL || + mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage)) && + mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(&cur->cert->pk, pk_alg, pk_usage)); +#else + key_type_matches = ( + mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(cur->key, pk_alg, pk_usage)); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ +#else + key_type_matches = mbedtls_pk_can_do(&cur->cert->pk, pk_alg); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if (!key_type_matches) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: key type")); + continue; + } + + /* + * This avoids sending the client a cert it'll reject based on + * keyUsage or other extensions. + * + * It also allows the user to provision different certificates for + * different uses based on keyUsage, eg if they want to avoid signing + * and decrypting with the same RSA key. + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(cur->cert, ciphersuite_info, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &flags) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: " + "(extended) key usage extension")); + continue; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && + ssl_check_key_curve(&cur->cert->pk, + ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: elliptic curve")); + continue; + } +#endif + + /* If we get there, we got a winner */ + break; + } + + /* Do not update ssl->handshake->key_cert unless there is a match */ + if (cur != NULL) { + ssl->handshake->key_cert = cur; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "selected certificate chain, certificate", + ssl->handshake->key_cert->cert); + return 0; + } + + return -1; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + +/* + * Check if a given ciphersuite is suitable for use with our config/keys/etc + * Sets ciphersuite_info only if the suite matches. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_ciphersuite_match(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t **ciphersuite_info) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_type; +#endif + + suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(suite_id); + if (suite_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("trying ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)", + (unsigned int) suite_id, suite_info->name)); + + if (suite_info->min_tls_version > ssl->tls_version || + suite_info->max_tls_version < ssl->tls_version) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: version")); + return 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if (suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && + (ssl->handshake->cli_exts & MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: ecjpake " + "not configured or ext missing")); + return 0; + } +#endif + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(suite_info) && + (ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id == NULL || + ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id[0] == 0)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: " + "no common elliptic curve")); + return 0; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /* If the ciphersuite requires a pre-shared key and we don't + * have one, skip it now rather than failing later */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(suite_info) && + ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(ssl->conf) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared key")); + return 0; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + /* + * Final check: if ciphersuite requires us to have a + * certificate/key of a particular type: + * - select the appropriate certificate if we have one, or + * - try the next ciphersuite if we don't + * This must be done last since we modify the key_cert list. + */ + if (ssl_pick_cert(ssl, suite_info) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: " + "no suitable certificate")); + return 0; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + /* If the ciphersuite requires signing, check whether + * a suitable hash algorithm is present. */ + sig_type = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(suite_info); + if (sig_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && + mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( + ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_type)) == MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ciphersuite mismatch: no suitable hash algorithm " + "for signature algorithm %u", (unsigned) sig_type)); + return 0; + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + + *ciphersuite_info = suite_info; + return 0; +} + +/* This function doesn't alert on errors that happen early during + ClientHello parsing because they might indicate that the client is + not talking SSL/TLS at all and would not understand our alert. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret, got_common_suite; + size_t i, j; + size_t ciph_offset, comp_offset, ext_offset; + size_t msg_len, ciph_len, sess_len, comp_len, ext_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + size_t cookie_offset, cookie_len; +#endif + unsigned char *buf, *p, *ext; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + int renegotiation_info_seen = 0; +#endif + int handshake_failure = 0; + const int *ciphersuites; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + + /* If there is no signature-algorithm extension present, + * we need to fall back to the default values for allowed + * signature-hash pairs. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + int sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client hello")); + + int renegotiating; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) +read_record_header: +#endif + /* + * If renegotiating, then the input was read with mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), + * otherwise read it ourselves manually in order to support SSLv2 + * ClientHello, which doesn't use the same record layer format. + * Otherwise in a scenario of TLS 1.3/TLS 1.2 version negotiation, the + * ClientHello has been already fully fetched by the TLS 1.3 code and the + * flag ssl->keep_current_message is raised. + */ + renegotiating = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + renegotiating = (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE); +#endif + if (!renegotiating && !ssl->keep_current_message) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, 5)) != 0) { + /* No alert on a read error. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret); + return ret; + } + } + + buf = ssl->in_hdr; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl)); + + /* + * TLS Client Hello + * + * Record layer: + * 0 . 0 message type + * 1 . 2 protocol version + * 3 . 11 DTLS: epoch + record sequence number + * 3 . 4 message length + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, message type: %d", + buf[0])); + + if (buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, message len.: %d", + MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_len, 0))); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, protocol version: [%d:%d]", + buf[1], buf[2])); + + /* For DTLS if this is the initial handshake, remember the client sequence + * number to use it in our next message (RFC 6347 4.2.1) */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE +#endif + ) { + /* Epoch should be 0 for initial handshakes */ + if (ssl->in_ctr[0] != 0 || ssl->in_ctr[1] != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + memcpy(&ssl->cur_out_ctr[2], ssl->in_ctr + 2, + sizeof(ssl->cur_out_ctr) - 2); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + if (mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check(ssl) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("replayed record, discarding")); + ssl->next_record_offset = 0; + ssl->in_left = 0; + goto read_record_header; + } + + /* No MAC to check yet, so we can update right now */ + mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(ssl); +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + msg_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_len, 0); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { + /* Set by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */ + msg_len = ssl->in_hslen; + } else +#endif + { + if (ssl->keep_current_message) { + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + } else { + if (msg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl) + msg_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(ssl); + } else +#endif + ssl->in_left = 0; + } + } + + buf = ssl->in_msg; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "record contents", buf, msg_len); + + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, msg_len); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } + + /* + * Handshake layer: + * 0 . 0 handshake type + * 1 . 3 handshake length + * 4 . 5 DTLS only: message sequence number + * 6 . 8 DTLS only: fragment offset + * 9 . 11 DTLS only: fragment length + */ + if (msg_len < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake type: %d", buf[0])); + + if (buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + { + size_t handshake_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(buf, 1); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, handshake len.: %u", + (unsigned) handshake_len)); + + /* The record layer has a record size limit of 2^14 - 1 and + * fragmentation is not supported, so buf[1] should be zero. */ + if (buf[1] != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != 0", + (unsigned) buf[1])); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */ + if (msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl) + handshake_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message: %u != %u + %u", + (unsigned) msg_len, + (unsigned) mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl), + (unsigned) handshake_len)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + /* + * Copy the client's handshake message_seq on initial handshakes, + * check sequence number on renego. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { + /* This couldn't be done in ssl_prepare_handshake_record() */ + unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (unsigned int) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, 4); + if (cli_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message_seq: " + "%u (expected %u)", cli_msg_seq, + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq++; + } else +#endif + { + unsigned int cli_msg_seq = (unsigned int) MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, 4); + ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq; + ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq + 1; + } + { + /* + * For now we don't support fragmentation, so make sure + * fragment_offset == 0 and fragment_length == length + */ + size_t fragment_offset, fragment_length, length; + fragment_offset = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 6); + fragment_length = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 9); + length = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(ssl->in_msg, 1); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 4, ("fragment_offset=%u fragment_length=%u length=%u", + (unsigned) fragment_offset, (unsigned) fragment_length, + (unsigned) length)); + if (fragment_offset != 0 || length != fragment_length) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ClientHello fragmentation not supported")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); + msg_len -= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); + + /* + * ClientHello layout: + * 0 . 1 protocol version + * 2 . 33 random bytes (starting with 4 bytes of Unix time) + * 34 . 34 session id length (1 byte) + * 35 . 34+x session id, where x = session id length from byte 34 + * 35+x . 35+x DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) + * 36+x . .. DTLS only: cookie + * .. . .. ciphersuite list length (2 bytes) + * .. . .. ciphersuite list + * .. . .. compression alg. list length (1 byte) + * .. . .. compression alg. list + * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes, optional) + * .. . .. extensions (optional) + */ + + /* + * Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions omitted) is + * 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can + * read at least up to session id length without worrying. + */ + if (msg_len < 38) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* + * Check and save the protocol version + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, version", buf, 2); + + ssl->tls_version = (mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version) mbedtls_ssl_read_version(buf, + ssl->conf->transport); + ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = ssl->tls_version; + ssl->session_negotiate->endpoint = ssl->conf->endpoint; + + if (ssl->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server only supports TLS 1.2")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + } + + /* + * Save client random (inc. Unix time) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32); + + memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32); + + /* + * Check the session ID length and save session ID + */ + sess_len = buf[34]; + + if (sess_len > sizeof(ssl->session_negotiate->id) || + sess_len + 34 + 2 > msg_len) { /* 2 for cipherlist length field */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, session id", buf + 35, sess_len); + + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len; + memset(ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, + sizeof(ssl->session_negotiate->id)); + memcpy(ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + + /* + * Check the cookie length and content + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + cookie_offset = 35 + sess_len; + cookie_len = buf[cookie_offset]; + + if (cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len + 2 > msg_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie", + buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) + if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_check != NULL +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE +#endif + ) { + if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_check(ssl->conf->p_cookie, + buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len, + ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification failed")); + ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result = 1; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification passed")); + ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result = 0; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ + { + /* We know we didn't send a cookie, so it should be empty */ + if (cookie_len != 0) { + /* This may be an attacker's probe, so don't send an alert */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("cookie verification skipped")); + } + + /* + * Check the ciphersuitelist length (will be parsed later) + */ + ciph_offset = cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + ciph_offset = 35 + sess_len; + + ciph_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, ciph_offset); + + if (ciph_len < 2 || + ciph_len + 2 + ciph_offset + 1 > msg_len || /* 1 for comp. alg. len */ + (ciph_len % 2) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist", + buf + ciph_offset + 2, ciph_len); + + /* + * Check the compression algorithm's length. + * The list contents are ignored because implementing + * MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL is mandatory and is the only + * option supported by Mbed TLS. + */ + comp_offset = ciph_offset + 2 + ciph_len; + + comp_len = buf[comp_offset]; + + if (comp_len < 1 || + comp_len > 16 || + comp_len + comp_offset + 1 > msg_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, compression", + buf + comp_offset + 1, comp_len); + + /* + * Check the extension length + */ + ext_offset = comp_offset + 1 + comp_len; + if (msg_len > ext_offset) { + if (msg_len < ext_offset + 2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + ext_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, ext_offset); + + if (msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + } else { + ext_len = 0; + } + + ext = buf + ext_offset + 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello extensions", ext, ext_len); + + while (ext_len != 0) { + unsigned int ext_id; + unsigned int ext_size; + if (ext_len < 4) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + ext_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 0); + ext_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ext, 2); + + if (ext_size + 4 > ext_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + switch (ext_id) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ServerName extension")); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(ssl, ext + 4, + ext + 4 + ext_size); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found renegotiation extension")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + renegotiation_info_seen = 1; +#endif + + ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found signature_algorithms extension")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext + 4 + ext_size); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + sig_hash_alg_ext_present = 1; + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found supported elliptic curves extension")); + + ret = ssl_parse_supported_groups_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found supported point formats extension")); + ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT; + + ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || \ + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ecjpake kkpp extension")); + + ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found max fragment length extension")); + + ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found CID extension")); + + ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found encrypt then mac extension")); + + ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found extended master secret extension")); + + ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found session ticket extension")); + + ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(ssl, ext + 4, + ext + 4 + ext_size); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found use_srtp extension")); + + ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext(ssl, ext + 4, ext_size); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", + ext_id)); + } + + ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; + ext += 4 + ext_size; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + + /* + * Try to fall back to default hash SHA1 if the client + * hasn't provided any preferred signature-hash combinations. + */ + if (!sig_hash_alg_ext_present) { + uint16_t *received_sig_algs = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; + const uint16_t default_sig_algs[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1), +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1), +#endif + MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE + }; + + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(default_sig_algs) / sizeof(default_sig_algs[0]) + <= MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE, + "default_sig_algs is too big"); + + memcpy(received_sig_algs, default_sig_algs, sizeof(default_sig_algs)); + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + + /* + * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV + */ + for (i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2) { + if (p[0] == 0 && p[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ")); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("received RENEGOTIATION SCSV " + "during renegotiation")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } +#endif + ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; + break; + } + } + + /* + * Renegotiation security checks + */ + if (ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake")); + handshake_failure = 1; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && + renegotiation_info_seen == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)")); + handshake_failure = 1; + } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("legacy renegotiation not allowed")); + handshake_failure = 1; + } else if (ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && + ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && + renegotiation_info_seen == 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)")); + handshake_failure = 1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + + if (handshake_failure == 1) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* + * Server certification selection (after processing TLS extensions) + */ + if (ssl->conf->f_cert_cb && (ret = ssl->conf->f_cert_cb(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_cert_cb", ret); + return ret; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + ssl->handshake->sni_name = NULL; + ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = 0; +#endif + + /* + * Search for a matching ciphersuite + * (At the end because we need information from the EC-based extensions + * and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension + * or certificate from server certificate selection callback.) + */ + got_common_suite = 0; + ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list; + ciphersuite_info = NULL; + + if (ssl->conf->respect_cli_pref == MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT) { + for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) { + for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { + if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) { + continue; + } + + got_common_suite = 1; + + if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], + &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { + goto have_ciphersuite; + } + } + } + } else { + for (i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++) { + for (j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2) { + if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0) != ciphersuites[i]) { + continue; + } + + got_common_suite = 1; + + if ((ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match(ssl, ciphersuites[i], + &ciphersuite_info)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { + goto have_ciphersuite; + } + } + } + } + + if (got_common_suite) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got ciphersuites in common, " + "but none of them usable")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no ciphersuites in common")); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + +have_ciphersuite: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name)); + + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i]; + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; + + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(ssl); + } +#endif + + /* Debugging-only output for testsuite */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(ciphersuite_info); + if (sig_alg != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { + unsigned int sig_hash = mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( + ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %u", + sig_hash)); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no hash algorithm for signature algorithm " + "%u - should not happen", (unsigned) sig_alg)); + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse client hello")); + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) +static void ssl_write_cid_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ext_len; + const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + + *olen = 0; + + /* Skip writing the extension if we don't want to use it or if + * the client hasn't offered it. */ + if (ssl->handshake->cid_in_use == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED) { + return; + } + + /* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX + * which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */ + if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < (unsigned) (ssl->own_cid_len + 5)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small")); + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding CID extension")); + + /* + * struct { + * opaque cid<0..2^8-1>; + * } ConnectionId; + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0); + p += 2; + ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len; + memcpy(p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len); + + *olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) +static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = NULL; + + /* + * RFC 7366: "If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension + * from a client and then selects a stream or Authenticated Encryption + * with Associated Data (AEAD) ciphersuite, it MUST NOT send an + * encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the client." + */ + suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite); + if (suite == NULL) { + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_mode_t ssl_mode = + mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite( + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac, + suite); + + if (ssl_mode != MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM) { + ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED; + } + } + + if (ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED) { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension")); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) +static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + if (ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED) { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding extended master secret " + "extension")); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket == 0) { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding session ticket extension")); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x00; + + *olen = 4; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + if (ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION) { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, secure renegotiation extension")); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0); + p += 2; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = (ssl->verify_data_len * 2 + 1) & 0xFF; + *p++ = ssl->verify_data_len * 2 & 0xFF; + + memcpy(p, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len); + p += ssl->verify_data_len; + memcpy(p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len); + p += ssl->verify_data_len; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ + { + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 0x01; + *p++ = 0x00; + } + + *olen = (size_t) (p - buf); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) +static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + + if (ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE) { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, max_fragment_length extension")); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 1; + + *p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code; + + *olen = 5; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + ((void) ssl); + + if ((ssl->handshake->cli_exts & + MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT) == 0) { + *olen = 0; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, supported_point_formats extension")); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *p++ = 0x00; + *p++ = 2; + + *p++ = 1; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; + + *olen = 6; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) +static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + size_t kkpp_len; + + *olen = 0; + + /* Skip costly computation if not needed */ + if (ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, ecjpake kkpp extension")); + + if (end - p < 4) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small")); + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0); + p += 2; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, + p + 2, (size_t) (end - p - 2), &kkpp_len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE); + if (ret != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret); + return; + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p + 2, (size_t) (end - p - 2), &kkpp_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret); + return; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(kkpp_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + + *olen = kkpp_len + 4; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) +static void ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t *olen) +{ + size_t mki_len = 0, ext_len = 0; + uint16_t profile_value = 0; + const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + + *olen = 0; + + if ((ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || + (ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET)) { + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding use_srtp extension")); + + if (ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED) { + mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len; + } + + /* The extension total size is 9 bytes : + * - 2 bytes for the extension tag + * - 2 bytes for the total size + * - 2 bytes for the protection profile length + * - 2 bytes for the protection profile + * - 1 byte for the mki length + * + the actual mki length + * Check we have enough room in the output buffer */ + if ((size_t) (end - buf) < mki_len + 9) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small")); + return; + } + + /* extension */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, buf, 0); + /* + * total length 5 and mki value: only one profile(2 bytes) + * and length(2 bytes) and srtp_mki ) + */ + ext_len = 5 + mki_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, buf, 2); + + /* protection profile length: 2 */ + buf[4] = 0x00; + buf[5] = 0x02; + profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value( + ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile); + if (profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(profile_value, buf, 6); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("use_srtp extension invalid profile")); + return; + } + + buf[8] = mki_len & 0xFF; + memcpy(&buf[9], ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len); + + *olen = 9 + mki_len; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + 4; + unsigned char *cookie_len_byte; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write hello verify request")); + + /* + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion server_version; + * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; + * } HelloVerifyRequest; + */ + + /* The RFC is not clear on this point, but sending the actual negotiated + * version looks like the most interoperable thing to do. */ + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->tls_version); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server version", p, 2); + p += 2; + + /* If we get here, f_cookie_check is not null */ + if (ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("inconsistent cookie callbacks")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Skip length byte until we know the length */ + cookie_len_byte = p++; + + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_cookie_write(ssl->conf->p_cookie, + &p, ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN, + ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_cookie_write", ret); + return ret; + } + + *cookie_len_byte = (unsigned char) (p - (cookie_len_byte + 1)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "cookie sent", cookie_len_byte + 1, *cookie_len_byte); + + ssl->out_msglen = (size_t) (p - ssl->out_msg); + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; + + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write hello verify request")); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ + +static void ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + mbedtls_ssl_session session_tmp; + mbedtls_ssl_session * const session = ssl->session_negotiate; + + /* Resume is 0 by default, see ssl_handshake_init(). + * It may be already set to 1 by ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(). */ + if (ssl->handshake->resume == 1) { + return; + } + if (session->id_len == 0) { + return; + } + if (ssl->conf->f_get_cache == NULL) { + return; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + if (ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE) { + return; + } +#endif + + mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session_tmp); + + ret = ssl->conf->f_get_cache(ssl->conf->p_cache, + session->id, + session->id_len, + &session_tmp); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + if (session->ciphersuite != session_tmp.ciphersuite) { + /* Mismatch between cached and negotiated session */ + goto exit; + } + + /* Move semantics */ + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(session); + *session = session_tmp; + memset(&session_tmp, 0, sizeof(session_tmp)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("session successfully restored from cache")); + ssl->handshake->resume = 1; + +exit: + + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session_tmp); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_time_t t; +#endif + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen, ext_len = 0, n; + unsigned char *buf, *p; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server hello")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + ssl->handshake->cookie_verify_result != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("client hello was not authenticated")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello")); + + return ssl_write_hello_verify_request(ssl); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ + + /* + * 0 . 0 handshake type + * 1 . 3 handshake length + * 4 . 5 protocol version + * 6 . 9 UNIX time() + * 10 . 37 random bytes + */ + buf = ssl->out_msg; + p = buf + 4; + + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, ssl->conf->transport, ssl->tls_version); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]", + buf[4], buf[5])); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + t = mbedtls_time(NULL); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(t, p, 0); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG, + (long long) t)); +#else + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + p += 4; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 20)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += 20; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + /* + * RFC 8446 + * TLS 1.3 has a downgrade protection mechanism embedded in the server's + * random value. TLS 1.3 servers which negotiate TLS 1.2 or below in + * response to a ClientHello MUST set the last 8 bytes of their Random + * value specially in their ServerHello. + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_enabled(ssl->conf)) { + static const unsigned char magic_tls12_downgrade_string[] = + { 'D', 'O', 'W', 'N', 'G', 'R', 'D', 1 }; + + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT( + sizeof(magic_tls12_downgrade_string) == 8, + "magic_tls12_downgrade_string does not have the expected size"); + + memcpy(p, magic_tls12_downgrade_string, + sizeof(magic_tls12_downgrade_string)); + } else +#endif + { + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 8)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + p += 8; + + memcpy(ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 6, 32); + + ssl_handle_id_based_session_resumption(ssl); + + if (ssl->handshake->resume == 0) { + /* + * New session, create a new session id, + * unless we're about to issue a session ticket + */ + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0) { + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 0; + memset(ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, 32); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + { + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32; + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, ssl->session_negotiate->id, + n)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + } else { + /* + * Resuming a session + */ + n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret); + return ret; + } + } + + /* + * 38 . 38 session id length + * 39 . 38+n session id + * 39+n . 40+n chosen ciphersuite + * 41+n . 41+n chosen compression alg. + * 42+n . 43+n extensions length + * 44+n . 43+n+m extensions + */ + *p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + memcpy(p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, session id", buf + 39, n); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("%s session has been resumed", + ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no")); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, p, 0); + p += 2; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite))); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X", + (unsigned int) MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL)); + + /* + * First write extensions, then the total length + */ + ssl_write_renegotiation_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); + ext_len += olen; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + ssl_write_cid_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM) + ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + ssl_write_extended_ms_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + ssl_write_session_ticket_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite); + if (suite != NULL && mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(suite)) { + ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); + ext_len += olen; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + unsigned char *end = buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - 4; + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen)) + != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ext_len += olen; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + ssl_write_use_srtp_ext(ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen); + ext_len += olen; +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + ext_len)); + + if (ext_len > 0) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ext_len, p, 0); + p += 2 + ext_len; + } + + ssl->out_msglen = (size_t) (p - buf); + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello")); + + return ret; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate request")); + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate request")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} +#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + uint16_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */ + size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */ + unsigned char *buf, *p; + const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN; + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; + int authmode; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate request")); + + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET) { + authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode; + } else +#endif + authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info) || + authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate request")); + return 0; + } + + /* + * 0 . 0 handshake type + * 1 . 3 handshake length + * 4 . 4 cert type count + * 5 .. m-1 cert types + * m .. m+1 sig alg length (TLS 1.2 only) + * m+1 .. n-1 SignatureAndHashAlgorithms (TLS 1.2 only) + * n .. n+1 length of all DNs + * n+2 .. n+3 length of DN 1 + * n+4 .. ... Distinguished Name #1 + * ... .. ... length of DN 2, etc. + */ + buf = ssl->out_msg; + p = buf + 4; + + /* + * Supported certificate types + * + * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>; + * enum { (255) } ClientCertificateType; + */ + ct_len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) + p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN; +#endif + + p[0] = (unsigned char) ct_len++; + p += ct_len; + + sa_len = 0; + + /* + * Add signature_algorithms for verify (TLS 1.2) + * + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; + * + * struct { + * HashAlgorithm hash; + * SignatureAlgorithm signature; + * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; + * + * enum { (255) } HashAlgorithm; + * enum { (255) } SignatureAlgorithm; + */ + const uint16_t *sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs(ssl); + if (sig_alg == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + unsigned char hash = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*sig_alg); + + if (mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, hash)) { + continue; + } + if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(ssl, *sig_alg)) { + continue; + } + + /* Write elements at offsets starting from 1 (offset 0 is for the + * length). Thus the offset of each element is the length of the + * partial list including that element. */ + sa_len += 2; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*sig_alg, p, sa_len); + + } + + /* Fill in list length. */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(sa_len, p, 0); + sa_len += 2; + p += sa_len; + + /* + * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; + * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>; + */ + p += 2; + + total_dn_size = 0; + + if (ssl->conf->cert_req_ca_list == MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED) { + /* NOTE: If trusted certificates are provisioned + * via a CA callback (configured through + * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()`, then the + * CertificateRequest is currently left empty. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->dn_hints != NULL) { + crt = ssl->handshake->dn_hints; + } else +#endif + if (ssl->conf->dn_hints != NULL) { + crt = ssl->conf->dn_hints; + } else +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) { + crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; + } else +#endif + crt = ssl->conf->ca_chain; + + while (crt != NULL && crt->version != 0) { + /* It follows from RFC 5280 A.1 that this length + * can be represented in at most 11 bits. */ + dn_size = (uint16_t) crt->subject_raw.len; + + if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < 2 + (size_t) dn_size) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("skipping CAs: buffer too short")); + break; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(dn_size, p, 0); + p += 2; + memcpy(p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size); + p += dn_size; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size); + + total_dn_size += (unsigned short) (2 + dn_size); + crt = crt->next; + } + } + + ssl->out_msglen = (size_t) (p - buf); + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(total_dn_size, ssl->out_msg, 4 + ct_len + sa_len); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate request")); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + +#if (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_pk_context *pk; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + unsigned char buf[PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + size_t key_len; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + uint16_t tls_id = 0; + psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + + pk = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); + + if (pk == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk); + + switch (pk_type) { + case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + + /* Get the attributes of the key previously parsed by PK module in + * order to extract its type and length (in bits). */ + status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &key_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type = psa_get_key_type(&key_attributes); + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attributes); + + if (pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { + /* Opaque key is created by the user (externally from Mbed TLS) + * so we assume it already has the right algorithm and flags + * set. Just copy its ID as reference. */ + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = pk->priv_id; + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external = 1; + } else { + /* PK_ECKEY[_DH] and PK_ECDSA instead as parsed from the PK + * module and only have ECDSA capabilities. Since we need + * them for ECDH later, we export and then re-import them with + * proper flags and algorithm. Of course We also set key's type + * and bits that we just got above. */ + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type)); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + status = psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, buf, sizeof(buf), &key_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, buf, key_len, + &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + /* Set this key as owned by the TLS library: it will be its duty + * to clear it exit. */ + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external = 0; + } + + ret = 0; + break; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + key = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk); + grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(grp_id); + if (tls_id == 0) { + /* This elliptic curve is not supported */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* If the above conversion to TLS ID was fine, then also this one will + be, so there is no need to check the return value here */ + mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id, &key_type, + &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type; + + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_type)); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(key, &key_len, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + break; + } + + status = psa_import_key(&key_attributes, buf, key_len, + &ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + break; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + ret = 0; + break; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ + default: + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + +exit: + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attributes); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf)); + + return ret; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + const mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); + if (private_key == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no server private key")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; + } + + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("server key not ECDH capable")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl)), + MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ecdh_get_params"), ret); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t *signature_len) +{ + /* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the + * signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange + * after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange. + * ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing + * ssl->out_msglen. */ + unsigned char *sig_start = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2; + size_t sig_max_len = (ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + - sig_start); + int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume(ssl, + sig_start, signature_len, sig_max_len); + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) { + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(ssl, NULL); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl_resume_server_key_exchange", ret); + return ret; +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */ + +/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message, up to and including + * calculating the signature if any, but excluding formatting the + * signature and sending the message. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t *signature_len) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + unsigned char *dig_signed = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ + + (void) ciphersuite_info; /* unused in some configurations */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + (void) signature_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf); +#else + size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - (size_t) (ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf); +#endif +#endif + + ssl->out_msglen = 4; /* header (type:1, length:3) to be written later */ + + /* + * + * Part 1: Provide key exchange parameters for chosen ciphersuite. + * + */ + + /* + * - ECJPAKE key exchanges + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char *out_p = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; + unsigned char *end_p = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - + ssl->out_msglen; + size_t output_offset = 0; + size_t output_len = 0; + + /* + * The first 3 bytes are: + * [0] MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE + * [1, 2] elliptic curve's TLS ID + * + * However since we only support secp256r1 for now, we hardcode its + * TLS ID here + */ + uint16_t tls_id = mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id( + MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1); + if (tls_id == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + *out_p = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tls_id, out_p, 1); + output_offset += 3; + + ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, + out_p + output_offset, + end_p - out_p - output_offset, &output_len, + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO); + if (ret != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_output", ret); + return ret; + } + + output_offset += output_len; + ssl->out_msglen += output_offset; +#else + size_t len = 0; + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( + &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen, &len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret); + return ret; + } + + ssl->out_msglen += len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + + /* + * For (EC)DHE key exchanges with PSK, parameters are prefixed by support + * identity hint (RFC 4279, Sec. 3). Until someone needs this feature, + * we use empty support identity hints here. + **/ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00; + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = 0x00; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + + /* + * - DHE key exchanges + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe(ciphersuite_info)) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + if (ssl->conf->dhm_P.p == NULL || ssl->conf->dhm_G.p == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no DH parameters set")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * Ephemeral DH parameters: + * + * struct { + * opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>; + * opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>; + * opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>; + * } ServerDHParams; + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_set_group(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + &ssl->conf->dhm_P, + &ssl->conf->dhm_G)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_set_group", ret); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_params( + &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx), + ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, &len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_params", ret); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; +#endif + + ssl->out_msglen += len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED */ + + /* + * - ECDHE key exchanges + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe(ciphersuite_info)) { + /* + * Ephemeral ECDH parameters: + * + * struct { + * ECParameters curve_params; + * ECPoint public; + * } ServerECDHParams; + */ + uint16_t *curr_tls_id = ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id; + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + /* Match our preference list against the offered curves */ + if ((group_list == NULL) || (curr_tls_id == NULL)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { + for (curr_tls_id = ssl->handshake->curves_tls_id; + *curr_tls_id != 0; curr_tls_id++) { + if (*curr_tls_id == *group_list) { + goto curve_matching_done; + } + } + } + +curve_matching_done: + if (*curr_tls_id == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no matching curve for ECDHE")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDHE curve: %s", + mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id))); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + uint8_t *p = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; + const size_t header_size = 4; // curve_type(1), namedcurve(2), + // data length(1) + const size_t data_length_size = 1; + psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + size_t ec_bits = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH computation.")); + + /* Convert EC's TLS ID to PSA key type. */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id, + &key_type, + &ec_bits) == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid ecc group parse.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type; + handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = ec_bits; + + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + /* + * ECParameters curve_params + * + * First byte is curve_type, always named_curve + */ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE; + + /* + * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*curr_tls_id, p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* Generate ECDH private key. */ + status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes, + &handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_generate_key", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* + * ECPoint public + * + * First byte is data length. + * It will be filled later. p holds now the data length location. + */ + + /* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA. + * Make one byte space for the length. + */ + unsigned char *own_pubkey = p + data_length_size; + + size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t) (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + - (own_pubkey - ssl->out_msg)); + + status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len, + &len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_export_public_key", ret); + (void) psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return ret; + } + + /* Store the length of the exported public key. */ + *p = (uint8_t) len; + + /* Determine full message length. */ + len += header_size; +#else + mbedtls_ecp_group_id curr_grp_id = + mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(*curr_tls_id); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + curr_grp_id)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecp_group_load", ret); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( + &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &len, + ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - ssl->out_msglen, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_params", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + dig_signed = ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen; +#endif + + ssl->out_msglen += len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED */ + + /* + * + * Part 2: For key exchanges involving the server signing the + * exchange parameters, compute and add the signature here. + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature(ciphersuite_info)) { + if (dig_signed == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + size_t dig_signed_len = (size_t) (ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen - dig_signed); + size_t hashlen = 0; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * 2.1: Choose hash algorithm: + * For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension + * to choose appropriate hash. + */ + + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg = + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(ciphersuite_info); + + unsigned char sig_hash = + (unsigned char) mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg( + ssl, mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg)); + + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(sig_hash); + + /* For TLS 1.2, obey signature-hash-algorithm extension + * (RFC 5246, Sec. 7.4.1.4.1). */ + if (sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE || md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + /* (... because we choose a cipher suite + * only if there is a matching hash.) */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("pick hash algorithm %u for signing", (unsigned) md_alg)); + + /* + * 2.2: Compute the hash to be signed + */ + if (md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(ssl, hash, &hashlen, + dig_signed, + dig_signed_len, + md_alg); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen); + + /* + * 2.3: Compute and add the signature + */ + /* + * We need to specify signature and hash algorithm explicitly through + * a prefix to the signature. + * + * struct { + * HashAlgorithm hash; + * SignatureAlgorithm signature; + * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; + * + * struct { + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; + * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; + * } DigitallySigned; + * + */ + + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(md_alg); + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(sig_alg); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if (ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start != NULL) { + ret = ssl->conf->f_async_sign_start(ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl), + md_alg, hash, hashlen); + switch (ret) { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH: + /* act as if f_async_sign was null */ + break; + case 0: + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; + return ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(ssl, signature_len); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS: + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS; + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_async_sign_start", ret); + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + + if (mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl) == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no private key")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; + } + + /* Append the signature to ssl->out_msg, leaving 2 bytes for the + * signature length which will be added in ssl_write_server_key_exchange + * after the call to ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange. + * ssl_write_server_key_exchange also takes care of incrementing + * ssl->out_msglen. */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl), + md_alg, hash, hashlen, + ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen + 2, + out_buf_len - ssl->out_msglen - 2, + signature_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, + ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret); + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + + return 0; +} + +/* Prepare the ServerKeyExchange message and send it. For ciphersuites + * that do not include a ServerKeyExchange message, do nothing. Either + * way, if successful, move on to the next step in the SSL state + * machine. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t signature_len = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server key exchange")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) + /* Extract static ECDH parameters and abort if ServerKeyExchange + * is not needed. */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs(ciphersuite_info)) { + /* For suites involving ECDH, extract DH parameters + * from certificate at this point. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh(ciphersuite_info)) { + ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret); + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ + + /* Key exchanges not involving ephemeral keys don't use + * ServerKeyExchange, so end here. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write server key exchange")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + /* If we have already prepared the message and there is an ongoing + * signature operation, resume signing. */ + if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("resuming signature operation")); + ret = ssl_resume_server_key_exchange(ssl, &signature_len); + } else +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) && + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) */ + { + /* ServerKeyExchange is needed. Prepare the message. */ + ret = ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange(ssl, &signature_len); + } + + if (ret != 0) { + /* If we're starting to write a new message, set ssl->out_msglen + * to 0. But if we're resuming after an asynchronous message, + * out_msglen is the amount of data written so far and mst be + * preserved. */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server key exchange (pending)")); + } else { + ssl->out_msglen = 0; + } + return ret; + } + + /* If there is a signature, write its length. + * ssl_prepare_server_key_exchange already wrote the signature + * itself at its proper place in the output buffer. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) + if (signature_len != 0) { + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(signature_len); + ssl->out_msg[ssl->out_msglen++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(signature_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "my signature", + ssl->out_msg + ssl->out_msglen, + signature_len); + + /* Skip over the already-written signature */ + ssl->out_msglen += signature_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + + /* Add header and send. */ + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; + + ssl->state++; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server key exchange")); + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_server_hello_done(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server hello done")); + + ssl->out_msglen = 4; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE; + + ssl->state++; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { + mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(ssl); + } +#endif + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && + (ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello done")); + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t n; + + /* + * Receive G^Y mod P, premaster = (G^Y)^X mod P + */ + if (*p + 2 > end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0); + *p += 2; + + if (*p + n > end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_public(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, *p, n)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_read_public", ret); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + *p += n; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *peer_pms, + size_t *peer_pmslen, + size_t peer_pmssize) +{ + int ret = ssl->conf->f_async_resume(ssl, + peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize); + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) { + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(ssl, NULL); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms", ret); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *peer_pms, + size_t *peer_pmslen, + size_t peer_pmssize) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl); + if (own_cert == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no local certificate")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; + } + mbedtls_pk_context *public_key = &own_cert->pk; + mbedtls_pk_context *private_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); + size_t len = mbedtls_pk_get_len(public_key); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + /* If we have already started decoding the message and there is an ongoing + * decryption operation, resume signing. */ + if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("resuming decryption operation")); + return ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(ssl, + peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + + /* + * Prepare to decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key + */ + if (p + 2 > end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + if (*p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(len) || + *p++ != MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + if (p + len != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* + * Decrypt the premaster secret + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if (ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start != NULL) { + ret = ssl->conf->f_async_decrypt_start(ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl), + p, len); + switch (ret) { + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH: + /* act as if f_async_decrypt_start was null */ + break; + case 0: + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; + return ssl_resume_decrypt_pms(ssl, + peer_pms, + peer_pmslen, + peer_pmssize); + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS: + ssl->handshake->async_in_progress = 1; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS; + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_async_decrypt_start", ret); + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(private_key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no RSA private key")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; + } + + ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt(private_key, p, len, + peer_pms, peer_pmslen, peer_pmssize, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *p, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t pms_offset) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; + unsigned char ver[2]; + unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48]; + size_t peer_pmslen; + mbedtls_ct_condition_t diff; + + /* In case of a failure in decryption, the decryption may write less than + * 2 bytes of output, but we always read the first two bytes. It doesn't + * matter in the end because diff will be nonzero in that case due to + * ret being nonzero, and we only care whether diff is 0. + * But do initialize peer_pms and peer_pmslen for robustness anyway. This + * also makes memory analyzers happy (don't access uninitialized memory, + * even if it's an unsigned char). */ + peer_pms[0] = peer_pms[1] = ~0; + peer_pmslen = 0; + + ret = ssl_decrypt_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, + peer_pms, + &peer_pmslen, + sizeof(peer_pms)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(ver, ssl->conf->transport, + ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version); + + /* Avoid data-dependent branches while checking for invalid + * padding, to protect against timing-based Bleichenbacher-type + * attacks. */ + diff = mbedtls_ct_bool(ret); + diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pmslen, 48)); + diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pms[0], ver[0])); + diff = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(diff, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(peer_pms[1], ver[1])); + + /* + * Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding + * must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a + * bad_record_mac later in the handshake. + * To protect against timing-based variants of the attack, we must + * not have any branch that depends on whether the decryption was + * successful. In particular, always generate the fake premaster secret, + * regardless of whether it will ultimately influence the output or not. + */ + ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, fake_pms, sizeof(fake_pms)); + if (ret != 0) { + /* It's ok to abort on an RNG failure, since this does not reveal + * anything about the RSA decryption. */ + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + if (diff != MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); + } +#endif + + if (sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster) < pms_offset || + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster) - pms_offset < 48) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48; + + /* Set pms to either the true or the fake PMS, without + * data-dependent branches. */ + mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(diff, pms, fake_pms, peer_pms, ssl->handshake->pmslen); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = 0; + uint16_t n; + + if (ssl_conf_has_psk_or_cb(ssl->conf) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no pre-shared key")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED; + } + + /* + * Receive client pre-shared key identity name + */ + if (end - *p < 2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0); + *p += 2; + + if (n == 0 || n > end - *p) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + if (ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL) { + if (ssl->conf->f_psk(ssl->conf->p_psk, ssl, *p, n) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; + } + } else { + /* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear, + * but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */ + if (n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len || + mbedtls_ct_memcmp(ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; + } + } + + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Unknown PSK identity", *p, n); + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; + } + + *p += n; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + unsigned char *p, *end; + + ciphersuite_info = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client key exchange")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)) + if ((ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) && + (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0)) { + /* We've already read a record and there is an asynchronous + * operation in progress to decrypt it. So skip reading the + * record. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("will resume decryption of previously-read record")); + } else +#endif + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 1)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + return ret; + } + + p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); + end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen; + + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + if (ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA) { + if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_dh_public"), ret); + return ret; + } + + if (p != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE, + &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || + ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t data_len = (size_t) (*p++); + size_t buf_len = (size_t) (end - p); + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Read the peer's public key.")); + + /* + * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least 1 for data) + */ + if (buf_len < 2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid buffer length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + buf_len)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + if (data_len < 1 || data_len > buf_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid data length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + data_len, buf_len)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* Store peer's ECDH public key. */ + if (data_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid public key length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET + " > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + data_len, + sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey))); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, data_len); + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = data_len; + + /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ + status = psa_raw_key_agreement( + PSA_ALG_ECDH, handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, + handshake->premaster, sizeof(handshake->premaster), + &handshake->pmslen); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_raw_key_agreement", ret); + if (handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external == 0) { + (void) psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + } + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return ret; + } + + if (handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external == 0) { + status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_destroy_key", ret); + return ret; + } + } + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + p, (size_t) (end - p))) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->handshake->premaster, + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || + MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK) { + if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); + return ret; + } + + if (p != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, + (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> + key_exchange)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + if (ssl->handshake->async_in_progress != 0) { + /* There is an asynchronous operation in progress to + * decrypt the encrypted premaster secret, so skip + * directly to resuming this operation. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("PSK identity already parsed")); + /* Update p to skip the PSK identity. ssl_parse_encrypted_pms + * won't actually use it, but maintain p anyway for robustness. */ + p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len + 2; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ + if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, 2)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_encrypted_pms"), ret); + return ret; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, + (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> + key_exchange)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK) { + if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); + return ret; + } + if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_dh_public"), ret); + return ret; + } + + if (p != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client key exchange")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster; + unsigned char *pms_end = pms + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); + size_t pms_len; + + /* Write length only when we know the actual value */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, + pms + 2, pms_end - (pms + 2), &pms_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(pms_len, pms, 0); + pms += 2 + pms_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K); +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, + (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> + key_exchange)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint8_t ecpoint_len; + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return ret; + } + + /* Keep a copy of the peer's public key */ + if (p >= end) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + ecpoint_len = *(p++); + if ((size_t) (end - p) < ecpoint_len) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* When FFDH is enabled, the array handshake->xxdh_psa_peer_key size takes into account + the sizes of the FFDH keys which are at least 2048 bits. + The size of the array is thus greater than 256 bytes which is greater than any + possible value of ecpoint_len (type uint8_t) and the check below can be skipped.*/ +#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (ecpoint_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) { + psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } +#else + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey) >= UINT8_MAX, + "peer key buffer too small"); +#endif + + memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, ecpoint_len); + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = ecpoint_len; + p += ecpoint_len; + + /* As RFC 5489 section 2, the premaster secret is formed as follows: + * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the ECDH computation + * - the octet string produced by the ECDH computation + * - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the PSK + * - the PSK itself + */ + unsigned char *psm = ssl->handshake->premaster; + const unsigned char * const psm_end = + psm + sizeof(ssl->handshake->premaster); + /* uint16 to store length (in octets) of the ECDH computation */ + const size_t zlen_size = 2; + size_t zlen = 0; + + /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ + status = psa_raw_key_agreement(PSA_ALG_ECDH, + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, + psm + zlen_size, + psm_end - (psm + zlen_size), + &zlen); + + destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(destruction_status); + } + + /* Write the ECDH computation length before the ECDH computation */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(zlen, psm, 0); + psm += zlen_size + zlen; + +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + if ((ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity(ssl, &p, end)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_client_psk_identity"), ret); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(&ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + p, (size_t) (end - p))) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster(ssl, + (mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t) ciphersuite_info-> + key_exchange)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA) { + if ((ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms(ssl, p, end, 0)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("ssl_parse_parse_encrypted_pms_secret"), ret); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + if (ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((ret = mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round( + &ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx, p, (size_t) (end - p), + MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO)) != 0) { + psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->psa_pake_password); + psa_pake_abort(&ssl->handshake->psa_pake_ctx); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_pake_input round two", ret); + return ret; + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + p, (size_t) (end - p)); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, + ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ + { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret); + return ret; + } + + ssl->state++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse client key exchange")); + + return 0; +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate verify")); + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} +#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + size_t i, sig_len; + unsigned char hash[48]; + unsigned char *hash_start = hash; + size_t hashlen; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + mbedtls_pk_context *peer_pk; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate verify")); + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(ciphersuite_info)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert_digest == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip parse certificate verify")); + ssl->state++; + return 0; + } +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* Read the message without adding it to the checksum */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0 /* no checksum update */); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_read_record"), ret); + return ret; + } + + ssl->state++; + + /* Process the message contents */ + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || + ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(ssl); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey; +#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { + /* Should never happen */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ + + /* + * struct { + * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; -- TLS 1.2 only + * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; + * } DigitallySigned; + */ + if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* + * Hash + */ + md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(ssl->in_msg[i]); + + if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(ssl, ssl->in_msg[i])) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" + " for verify message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1) + if (MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 == md_alg) { + hash_start += 16; + } +#endif + + /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ + hashlen = 0; + + i++; + + /* + * Signature + */ + if ((pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(ssl->in_msg[i])) + == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" + " for verify message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + /* + * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg + */ + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(peer_pk, pk_alg)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("sig_alg doesn't match cert key")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + i++; + + if (i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + sig_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(ssl->in_msg, i); + i += 2; + + if (i + sig_len != ssl->in_hslen) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate verify message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* Calculate hash and verify signature */ + { + size_t dummy_hlen; + ret = ssl->handshake->calc_verify(ssl, hash, &dummy_hlen); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("calc_verify"), ret); + return ret; + } + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_verify(peer_pk, + md_alg, hash_start, hashlen, + ssl->in_msg + i, sig_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(ssl); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status"), ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate verify")); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t tlen; + uint32_t lifetime; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write new session ticket")); + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; + ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; + + /* + * struct { + * uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint; + * opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>; + * } NewSessionTicket; + * + * 4 . 7 ticket_lifetime_hint (0 = unspecified) + * 8 . 9 ticket_len (n) + * 10 . 9+n ticket content + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_creation_time = mbedtls_ms_time(); +#endif + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_write(ssl->conf->p_ticket, + ssl->session_negotiate, + ssl->out_msg + 10, + ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, + &tlen, &lifetime)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write", ret); + tlen = 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(lifetime, ssl->out_msg, 4); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(tlen, ssl->out_msg, 8); + ssl->out_msglen = 10 + tlen; + + /* + * Morally equivalent to updating ssl->state, but NewSessionTicket and + * ChangeCipherSpec share the same state. + */ + ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write new session ticket")); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +/* + * SSL handshake -- server side -- single step + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("server state: %d", ssl->state)); + + switch (ssl->state) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; + break; + + /* + * <== ClientHello + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = ssl_parse_client_hello(ssl); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED; +#endif + + /* + * ==> ServerHello + * Certificate + * ( ServerKeyExchange ) + * ( CertificateRequest ) + * ServerHelloDone + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + ret = ssl_write_server_hello(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: + ret = ssl_write_server_key_exchange(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + ret = ssl_write_certificate_request(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: + ret = ssl_write_server_hello_done(ssl); + break; + + /* + * <== ( Certificate/Alert ) + * ClientKeyExchange + * ( CertificateVerify ) + * ChangeCipherSpec + * Finished + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: + ret = ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(ssl); + break; + + /* + * ==> ( NewSessionTicket ) + * ChangeCipherSpec + * Finished + */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0) { + ret = ssl_write_new_session_ticket(ssl); + } else +#endif + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("handshake: done")); + ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(ssl); + break; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid state %d", ssl->state)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ret; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int order) +{ + conf->respect_cli_pref = order; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7fcc394319f --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c @@ -0,0 +1,3181 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 client-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#include + +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "ssl_client.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + +/* Write extensions */ + +/* + * ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext(): + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>; + * } SupportedVersions; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char versions_len = (ssl->handshake->min_tls_version <= + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) ? 4 : 2; + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding supported versions extension")); + + /* Check if we have space to write the extension: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - versions_length (1 byte ) + * - versions (2 or 4 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 5 + versions_len); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(versions_len + 1, p, 2); + p += 4; + + /* Length of versions */ + *p++ = versions_len; + + /* Write values of supported versions. + * They are defined by the configuration. + * Currently, we advertise only TLS 1.3 or both TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p, MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("supported version: [3:4]")); + + + if (ssl->handshake->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(p + 2, MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("supported version: [3:3]")); + } + + *out_len = 5 + versions_len; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + ((void) ssl); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(buf, end, 2); + if (mbedtls_ssl_read_version(buf, ssl->conf->transport) != + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("unexpected version")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + if (&buf[2] != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("supported_versions ext data length incorrect")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *end = buf + len; + size_t protocol_name_list_len, protocol_name_len; + const unsigned char *protocol_name_list_end; + + /* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */ + if (ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; + * + * struct { + * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> + * } ProtocolNameList; + * + * the "ProtocolNameList" MUST contain exactly one "ProtocolName" + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + protocol_name_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, protocol_name_list_len); + protocol_name_list_end = p + protocol_name_list_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, protocol_name_list_end, 1); + protocol_name_len = *p++; + + /* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, protocol_name_list_end, protocol_name_len); + for (const char **alpn = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *alpn != NULL; alpn++) { + if (protocol_name_len == strlen(*alpn) && + memcmp(p, *alpn, protocol_name_len) == 0) { + ssl->alpn_chosen = *alpn; + return 0; + } + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_reset_key_share(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + uint16_t group_id = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id; + + if (group_id == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group_id) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group_id)) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Destroy generated private key. */ + status = psa_destroy_key(ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_destroy_key", ret); + return ret; + } + + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + return 0; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + if (0 /* other KEMs? */) { + /* Do something */ + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +} + +/* + * Functions for writing key_share extension. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_get_default_group_id(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t *group_id) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); + /* Pick first available ECDHE group compatible with TLS 1.3 */ + if (group_list == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if ((mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id( + *group_list, NULL, NULL) == PSA_SUCCESS) && + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(*group_list)) { + *group_id = *group_list; + return 0; + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(*group_list)) { + *group_id = *group_list; + return 0; + } +#endif + } +#else + ((void) ssl); + ((void) group_id); +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + + return ret; +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext + * + * Structure of key_share extension in ClientHello: + * + * struct { + * NamedGroup group; + * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareEntry; + * struct { + * KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareClientHello; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *client_shares; /* Start of client_shares */ + size_t client_shares_len; /* Length of client_shares */ + uint16_t group_id; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + + *out_len = 0; + + /* Check if we have space for header and length fields: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - client_shares_length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + p += 6; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello: adding key share extension")); + + /* HRR could already have requested something else. */ + group_id = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id; + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group_id) && + !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group_id)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_get_default_group_id(ssl, + &group_id)); + } + + /* + * Dispatch to type-specific key generation function. + * + * So far, we're only supporting ECDHE. With the introduction + * of PQC KEMs, we'll want to have multiple branches, one per + * type of KEM, and dispatch to the corresponding crypto. And + * only one key share entry is allowed. + */ + client_shares = p; +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group_id) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group_id)) { + /* Pointer to group */ + unsigned char *group = p; + /* Length of key_exchange */ + size_t key_exchange_len = 0; + + /* Check there is space for header of KeyShareEntry + * - group (2 bytes) + * - key_exchange_length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4); + p += 4; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange( + ssl, group_id, p, end, &key_exchange_len); + p += key_exchange_len; + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Write group */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(group_id, group, 0); + /* Write key_exchange_length */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(key_exchange_len, group, 2); + } else +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + if (0 /* other KEMs? */) { + /* Do something */ + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Length of client_shares */ + client_shares_len = p - client_shares; + if (client_shares_len == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No key share defined.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + /* Write extension_type */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE, buf, 0); + /* Write extension_data_length */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(client_shares_len + 2, buf, 2); + /* Write client_shares_length */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(client_shares_len, buf, 4); + + /* Update offered_group_id field */ + ssl->handshake->offered_group_id = group_id; + + /* Output the total length of key_share extension. */ + *out_len = p - buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( + 3, "client hello, key_share extension", buf, *out_len); + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE); + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * ssl_tls13_parse_hrr_key_share_ext() + * Parse key_share extension in Hello Retry Request + * + * struct { + * NamedGroup selected_group; + * } KeyShareHelloRetryRequest; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_hrr_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + const unsigned char *p = buf; + int selected_group; + int found = 0; + + const uint16_t *group_list = mbedtls_ssl_get_groups(ssl); + if (group_list == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "key_share extension", p, end - buf); + + /* Read selected_group */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + selected_group = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected_group ( %d )", selected_group)); + + /* Upon receipt of this extension in a HelloRetryRequest, the client + * MUST first verify that the selected_group field corresponds to a + * group which was provided in the "supported_groups" extension in the + * original ClientHello. + * The supported_group was based on the info in ssl->conf->group_list. + * + * If the server provided a key share that was not sent in the ClientHello + * then the client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(*group_list)) { + if ((mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id( + *group_list, NULL, NULL) == PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED) || + *group_list != selected_group) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(*group_list)) { + found = 1; + break; + } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + } + + /* Client MUST verify that the selected_group field does not + * correspond to a group which was provided in the "key_share" + * extension in the original ClientHello. If the server sent an + * HRR message with a key share already provided in the + * ClientHello then the client MUST abort the handshake with + * an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + if (found == 0 || selected_group == ssl->handshake->offered_group_id) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid key share in HRR")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + /* Remember server's preference for next ClientHello */ + ssl->handshake->offered_group_id = selected_group; + + return 0; +#else /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + (void) ssl; + (void) buf; + (void) end; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext() + * Parse key_share extension in Server Hello + * + * struct { + * KeyShareEntry server_share; + * } KeyShareServerHello; + * struct { + * NamedGroup group; + * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareEntry; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + uint16_t group, offered_group; + + /* ... + * NamedGroup group; (2 bytes) + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + group = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* Check that the chosen group matches the one we offered. */ + offered_group = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id; + if (offered_group != group) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Invalid server key share, our group %u, their group %u", + (unsigned) offered_group, (unsigned) group)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("DHE group name: %s", mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(group))); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_xxdhe_share(ssl, p, end - p); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + if (0 /* other KEMs? */) { + /* Do something */ + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext() + * Parse cookie extension in Hello Retry Request + * + * struct { + * opaque cookie<1..2^16-1>; + * } Cookie; + * + * When sending a HelloRetryRequest, the server MAY provide a "cookie" + * extension to the client (this is an exception to the usual rule that + * the only extensions that may be sent are those that appear in the + * ClientHello). When sending the new ClientHello, the client MUST copy + * the contents of the extension received in the HelloRetryRequest into + * a "cookie" extension in the new ClientHello. Clients MUST NOT use + * cookies in their initial ClientHello in subsequent connections. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + uint16_t cookie_len; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Retrieve length field of cookie */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + cookie_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, cookie_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "cookie extension", p, cookie_len); + + mbedtls_free(handshake->cookie); + handshake->cookie_len = 0; + handshake->cookie = mbedtls_calloc(1, cookie_len); + if (handshake->cookie == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("alloc failed ( %ud bytes )", + cookie_len)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(handshake->cookie, p, cookie_len); + handshake->cookie_len = cookie_len; + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_cookie_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + *out_len = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + if (handshake->cookie == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("no cookie to send; skip extension")); + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, cookie", + handshake->cookie, + handshake->cookie_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, handshake->cookie_len + 6); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding cookie extension")); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(handshake->cookie_len + 2, p, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(handshake->cookie_len, p, 4); + p += 6; + + /* Cookie */ + memcpy(p, handshake->cookie, handshake->cookie_len); + + *out_len = handshake->cookie_len + 6; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE); + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/* + * ssl_tls13_write_psk_key_exchange_modes_ext() structure: + * + * enum { psk_ke( 0 ), psk_dhe_ke( 1 ), ( 255 ) } PskKeyExchangeMode; + * + * struct { + * PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>; + * } PskKeyExchangeModes; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_psk_key_exchange_modes_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + int ke_modes_len = 0; + + ((void) ke_modes_len); + *out_len = 0; + + /* Skip writing extension if no PSK key exchange mode + * is enabled in the config. + */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_psk_enabled(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip psk_key_exchange_modes extension")); + return 0; + } + + /* Require 7 bytes of data, otherwise fail, + * even if extension might be shorter. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 7); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("client hello, adding psk_key_exchange_modes extension")); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES, p, 0); + + /* Skip extension length (2 bytes) and + * ke_modes length (1 byte) for now. + */ + p += 5; + + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_ECDHE; + ke_modes_len++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Adding PSK-ECDHE key exchange mode")); + } + + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_enabled(ssl)) { + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_PURE; + ke_modes_len++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Adding pure PSK key exchange mode")); + } + + /* Now write the extension and ke_modes length */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ke_modes_len + 1, buf, 2); + buf[4] = ke_modes_len; + + *out_len = p - buf; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES); + + return 0; +} + +static psa_algorithm_t ssl_tls13_get_ciphersuite_hash_alg(int ciphersuite) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = NULL; + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite); + + if (ciphersuite_info != NULL) { + return mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + } + + return PSA_ALG_NONE; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +static int ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + return ssl->handshake->resume && + session != NULL && session->ticket != NULL && + mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled( + ssl, mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_get_ticket_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL)); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +static int ssl_tls13_early_data_has_valid_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + return ssl->handshake->resume && + session->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 && + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_early_data(session) && + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered(ssl, session->ciphersuite); +} +#endif + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_ticket_get_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_algorithm_t *hash_alg, + const unsigned char **identity, + size_t *identity_len) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + + if (!ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(ssl)) { + return -1; + } + + *hash_alg = ssl_tls13_get_ciphersuite_hash_alg(session->ciphersuite); + *identity = session->ticket; + *identity_len = session->ticket_len; + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_algorithm_t *hash_alg, + const unsigned char **psk, + size_t *psk_len) +{ + + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + + if (!ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(ssl)) { + return -1; + } + + *hash_alg = ssl_tls13_get_ciphersuite_hash_alg(session->ciphersuite); + *psk = session->resumption_key; + *psk_len = session->resumption_key_len; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_psk_get_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_algorithm_t *hash_alg, + const unsigned char **identity, + size_t *identity_len) +{ + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf)) { + return -1; + } + + *hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256; + *identity = ssl->conf->psk_identity; + *identity_len = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len; + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_psk_get_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + psa_algorithm_t *hash_alg, + const unsigned char **psk, + size_t *psk_len) +{ + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf)) { + return -1; + } + + *hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256; + *psk = ssl->conf->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len; + return 0; +} + +static int ssl_tls13_get_configured_psk_count(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int configured_psk_count = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Ticket is configured")); + configured_psk_count++; + } +#endif + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("PSK is configured")); + configured_psk_count++; + } + return configured_psk_count; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_identity(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *identity, + size_t identity_len, + uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age, + size_t *out_len) +{ + ((void) ssl); + *out_len = 0; + + /* + * - identity_len (2 bytes) + * - identity (psk_identity_len bytes) + * - obfuscated_ticket_age (4 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 6 + identity_len); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(identity_len, buf, 0); + memcpy(buf + 2, identity, identity_len); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(obfuscated_ticket_age, buf, 2 + identity_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "write identity", buf, 6 + identity_len); + + *out_len = 6 + identity_len; + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_binder(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + int psk_type, + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *psk, + size_t psk_len, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char binder_len; + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len = 0; + + *out_len = 0; + + binder_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* + * - binder_len (1 bytes) + * - binder (binder_len bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 1 + binder_len); + + buf[0] = binder_len; + + /* Get current state of handshake transcript. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( + ssl, mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(hash_alg), + transcript, sizeof(transcript), &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(ssl, hash_alg, + psk, psk_len, psk_type, + transcript, buf + 1); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder", ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "write binder", buf, 1 + binder_len); + + *out_len = 1 + binder_len; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_identities_of_pre_shared_key_ext() structure: + * + * struct { + * opaque identity<1..2^16-1>; + * uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age; + * } PskIdentity; + * + * opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>; + * + * struct { + * PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1>; + * PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>; + * } OfferedPsks; + * + * struct { + * select (Handshake.msg_type) { + * case client_hello: OfferedPsks; + * ... + * }; + * } PreSharedKeyExtension; + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_identities_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len, size_t *binders_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int configured_psk_count = 0; + unsigned char *p = buf; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + const unsigned char *identity; + size_t identity_len; + size_t l_binders_len = 0; + size_t output_len; + + *out_len = 0; + *binders_len = 0; + + /* Check if we have any PSKs to offer. If no, skip pre_shared_key */ + configured_psk_count = ssl_tls13_get_configured_psk_count(ssl); + if (configured_psk_count == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("skip pre_shared_key extensions")); + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Pre-configured PSK number = %d", + configured_psk_count)); + + /* Check if we have space to write the extension, binders included. + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_len (2 bytes) + * - identities_len (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + p += 6; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (ssl_tls13_ticket_get_identity( + ssl, &hash_alg, &identity, &identity_len) == 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_ms_time_t now = mbedtls_ms_time(); + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session_negotiate; + /* The ticket age has been checked to be smaller than the + * `ticket_lifetime` in ssl_prepare_client_hello() which is smaller than + * 7 days (enforced in ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket()) . Thus the + * cast to `uint32_t` of the ticket age is safe. */ + uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age = + (uint32_t) (now - session->ticket_reception_time); + obfuscated_ticket_age += session->ticket_age_add; + + ret = ssl_tls13_write_identity(ssl, p, end, + identity, identity_len, + obfuscated_ticket_age, + &output_len); +#else + ret = ssl_tls13_write_identity(ssl, p, end, identity, identity_len, + 0, &output_len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + p += output_len; + l_binders_len += 1 + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + if (ssl_tls13_psk_get_identity( + ssl, &hash_alg, &identity, &identity_len) == 0) { + + ret = ssl_tls13_write_identity(ssl, p, end, identity, identity_len, 0, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + p += output_len; + l_binders_len += 1 + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("client hello, adding pre_shared_key extension, " + "omitting PSK binder list")); + + /* Take into account the two bytes for the length of the binders. */ + l_binders_len += 2; + /* Check if there is enough space for binders */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, l_binders_len); + + /* + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_len (2 bytes) + * - identities_len (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY, buf, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - buf - 4 + l_binders_len, buf, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - buf - 6, buf, 4); + + *out_len = (p - buf) + l_binders_len; + *binders_len = l_binders_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "pre_shared_key identities", buf, p - buf); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_binders_of_pre_shared_key_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + const unsigned char *psk; + size_t psk_len; + size_t output_len; + + /* Check if we have space to write binders_len. + * - binders_len (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p += 2; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len) == 0) { + + ret = ssl_tls13_write_binder(ssl, p, end, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION, + hash_alg, psk, psk_len, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + if (ssl_tls13_psk_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len) == 0) { + + ret = ssl_tls13_write_binder(ssl, p, end, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL, + hash_alg, psk, psk_len, + &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("client hello, adding PSK binder list.")); + + /* + * - binders_len (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - buf - 2, buf, 0); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "pre_shared_key binders", buf, p - buf); + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * struct { + * opaque identity<1..2^16-1>; + * uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age; + * } PskIdentity; + * + * opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>; + * + * struct { + * + * select (Handshake.msg_type) { + * ... + * case server_hello: uint16 selected_identity; + * }; + * + * } PreSharedKeyExtension; + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_server_pre_shared_key_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int selected_identity; + const unsigned char *psk; + size_t psk_len; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(buf, end, 2); + selected_identity = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 0); + ssl->handshake->selected_identity = (uint16_t) selected_identity; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected_identity = %d", selected_identity)); + + if (selected_identity >= ssl_tls13_get_configured_psk_count(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid PSK identity.")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (selected_identity == 0 && ssl_tls13_has_configured_ticket(ssl)) { + ret = ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len); + } else +#endif + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(ssl->conf)) { + ret = ssl_tls13_psk_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac) + != hash_alg) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Invalid ciphersuite for external psk.")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, psk, psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ext_len; + + *out_len = 0; + + /* Write supported_versions extension + * + * Supported Versions Extension is mandatory with TLS 1.3. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_write_supported_versions_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; + + /* Echo the cookie if the server provided one in its preceding + * HelloRetryRequest message. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_write_cookie_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext( + ssl, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + ret = ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + /* In the first ClientHello, write the early data indication extension if + * necessary and update the early data state. + * If an HRR has been received and thus we are currently writing the + * second ClientHello, the second ClientHello must not contain an early + * data extension and the early data state must stay as it is: + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED. + */ + if (!ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_flag) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_psk_enabled(ssl) && + ssl_tls13_early_data_has_valid_ticket(ssl) && + ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext( + ssl, 0, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; + + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT; + } else { + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /* For PSK-based key exchange we need the pre_shared_key extension + * and the psk_key_exchange_modes extension. + * + * The pre_shared_key extension MUST be the last extension in the + * ClientHello. Servers MUST check that it is the last extension and + * otherwise fail the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + * + * Add the psk_key_exchange_modes extension. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_write_psk_key_exchange_modes_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; +#endif + + *out_len = p - buf; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + ((void) ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + const unsigned char *psk; + size_t psk_len; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + + if (ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Set hs psk for early data when writing the first psk")); + + ret = ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk", ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, psk, psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* + * Early data are going to be encrypted using the ciphersuite + * associated with the pre-shared key used for the handshake. + * Note that if the server rejects early data, the handshake + * based on the pre-shared key may complete successfully + * with a selected ciphersuite different from the ciphersuite + * associated with the pre-shared key. Only the hashes of the + * two ciphersuites have to be the same. In that case, the + * encrypted handshake data and application data are + * encrypted using a different ciphersuite than the one used for + * the rejected early data. + */ + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite); + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; + + /* Enable psk and psk_ephemeral to make stage early happy */ + ssl->handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL; + + /* Start the TLS 1.3 key schedule: + * Set the PSK and derive early secret. + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* Derive early data key material */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform", ret); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO); +#else + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Switch to early data keys for outbound traffic")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( + ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE; +#endif + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + return 0; +} +/* + * Functions for parsing and processing Server Hello + */ + +/** + * \brief Detect if the ServerHello contains a supported_versions extension + * or not. + * + * \param[in] ssl SSL context + * \param[in] buf Buffer containing the ServerHello message + * \param[in] end End of the buffer containing the ServerHello message + * + * \return 0 if the ServerHello does not contain a supported_versions extension + * \return 1 if the ServerHello contains a supported_versions extension + * \return A negative value if an error occurred while parsing the ServerHello. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t legacy_session_id_echo_len; + const unsigned char *supported_versions_data; + const unsigned char *supported_versions_data_end; + + /* + * Check there is enough data to access the legacy_session_id_echo vector + * length: + * - legacy_version 2 bytes + * - random MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN bytes + * - legacy_session_id_echo length 1 byte + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 3); + p += MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 2; + legacy_session_id_echo_len = *p; + + /* + * Jump to the extensions, jumping over: + * - legacy_session_id_echo (legacy_session_id_echo_len + 1) bytes + * - cipher_suite 2 bytes + * - legacy_compression_method 1 byte + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, legacy_session_id_echo_len + 4); + p += legacy_session_id_echo_len + 4; + + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts( + ssl, p, end, + &supported_versions_data, &supported_versions_data_end); +} + +/* Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise + * - 1 if the last eight bytes of the ServerHello random bytes indicate that + * the server is TLS 1.3 capable but negotiating TLS 1.2 or below. + * - 0 otherwise + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_is_downgrade_negotiation(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + /* First seven bytes of the magic downgrade strings, see RFC 8446 4.1.3 */ + static const unsigned char magic_downgrade_string[] = + { 0x44, 0x4F, 0x57, 0x4E, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44 }; + const unsigned char *last_eight_bytes_of_random; + unsigned char last_byte_of_random; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(buf, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 2); + last_eight_bytes_of_random = buf + 2 + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN - 8; + + if (memcmp(last_eight_bytes_of_random, + magic_downgrade_string, + sizeof(magic_downgrade_string)) == 0) { + last_byte_of_random = last_eight_bytes_of_random[7]; + return last_byte_of_random == 0 || + last_byte_of_random == 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise + * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO or + * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR + * to indicate which message is expected and to be parsed next. + */ +#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO 0 +#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR 1 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_server_hello_is_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + + /* Check whether this message is a HelloRetryRequest ( HRR ) message. + * + * Server Hello and HRR are only distinguished by Random set to the + * special value of the SHA-256 of "HelloRetryRequest". + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; + * Random random; + * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; + * CipherSuite cipher_suite; + * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; + * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; + * } ServerHello; + * + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR( + buf, end, 2 + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic)); + + if (memcmp(buf + 2, mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic, + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic)) == 0) { + return SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR; + } + + return SSL_SERVER_HELLO; +} + +/* + * Returns a negative value on failure, and otherwise + * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO or + * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR or + * - SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2 + */ +#define SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2 2 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_preprocess_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present( + ssl, buf, end)); + + if (ret == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG( + ssl_tls13_is_downgrade_negotiation(ssl, buf, end)); + + /* If the server is negotiating TLS 1.2 or below and: + * . we did not propose TLS 1.2 or + * . the server responded it is TLS 1.3 capable but negotiating a lower + * version of the protocol and thus we are under downgrade attack + * abort the handshake with an "illegal parameter" alert. + */ + if (handshake->min_tls_version > MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 || ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + /* + * Version 1.2 of the protocol has been negotiated, set the + * ssl->keep_current_message flag for the ServerHello to be kept and + * parsed as a TLS 1.2 ServerHello. We also change ssl->tls_version to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 thus from now on mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step() + * will dispatch to the TLS 1.2 state machine. + */ + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + ssl->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, + buf, (size_t) (end - buf))); + + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + ret = ssl_tls13_reset_key_share(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + return SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2; + } + + ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = ssl->tls_version; + ssl->session_negotiate->endpoint = ssl->conf->endpoint; + + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + ret = ssl_server_hello_is_hrr(ssl, buf, end); + switch (ret) { + case SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("received ServerHello message")); + break; + case SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("received HelloRetryRequest message")); + /* If a client receives a second HelloRetryRequest in the same + * connection (i.e., where the ClientHello was itself in response + * to a HelloRetryRequest), it MUST abort the handshake with an + * "unexpected_message" alert. + */ + if (handshake->hello_retry_request_flag) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Multiple HRRs received")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + /* + * Clients must abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" + * alert if the HelloRetryRequest would not result in any change + * in the ClientHello. + * In a PSK only key exchange that what we expect. + */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("Unexpected HRR in pure PSK key exchange.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + handshake->hello_retry_request_flag = 1; + + break; + } + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_check_server_hello_session_id_echo(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char **buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = *buf; + size_t legacy_session_id_echo_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1); + legacy_session_id_echo_len = *p++; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, legacy_session_id_echo_len); + + /* legacy_session_id_echo */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != legacy_session_id_echo_len || + memcmp(ssl->session_negotiate->id, p, legacy_session_id_echo_len) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Expected Session ID", + ssl->session_negotiate->id, + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Received Session ID", p, + legacy_session_id_echo_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + p += legacy_session_id_echo_len; + *buf = p; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Session ID", ssl->session_negotiate->id, + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + return 0; +} + +/* Parse ServerHello message and configure context + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2 + * Random random; + * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; + * CipherSuite cipher_suite; + * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; + * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; + * } ServerHello; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + int is_hrr) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + size_t extensions_len; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + uint16_t cipher_suite; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + int fatal_alert = 0; + uint32_t allowed_extensions_mask; + int hs_msg_type = is_hrr ? MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST : + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO; + + /* + * Check there is space for minimal fields + * + * - legacy_version ( 2 bytes) + * - random (MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN bytes) + * - legacy_session_id_echo ( 1 byte ), minimum size + * - cipher_suite ( 2 bytes) + * - legacy_compression_method ( 1 byte ) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN + 6); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server hello", p, end - p); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, version", p, 2); + + /* ... + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2 + * ... + * with ProtocolVersion defined as: + * uint16 ProtocolVersion; + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_read_version(p, ssl->conf->transport) != + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Unsupported version of TLS.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto cleanup; + } + p += 2; + + /* ... + * Random random; + * ... + * with Random defined as: + * opaque Random[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; + */ + if (!is_hrr) { + memcpy(&handshake->randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN], p, + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes", + p, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + } + p += MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN; + + /* ... + * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; + * ... + */ + if (ssl_tls13_check_server_hello_session_id_echo(ssl, &p, end) != 0) { + fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* ... + * CipherSuite cipher_suite; + * ... + * with CipherSuite defined as: + * uint8 CipherSuite[2]; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + cipher_suite = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(cipher_suite); + /* + * Check whether this ciphersuite is valid and offered. + */ + if ((mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite(ssl, ciphersuite_info, + ssl->tls_version, + ssl->tls_version) != 0) || + !mbedtls_ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered(ssl, cipher_suite)) { + fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + /* + * If we received an HRR before and that the proposed selected + * ciphersuite in this server hello is not the same as the one + * proposed in the HRR, we abort the handshake and send an + * "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + else if ((!is_hrr) && handshake->hello_retry_request_flag && + (cipher_suite != ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite)) { + fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + if (fatal_alert == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid ciphersuite(%04x) parameter", + cipher_suite)); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Configure ciphersuites */ + mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(ssl, ciphersuite_info); + + handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: ( %04x ) - %s", + cipher_suite, ciphersuite_info->name)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* ... + * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1); + if (p[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad legacy compression method")); + fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + goto cleanup; + } + p++; + + /* ... + * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; + * ... + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* Check extensions do not go beyond the buffer of data. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello extensions", p, extensions_len); + + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + allowed_extensions_mask = is_hrr ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_HRR : + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_SH; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + const unsigned char *extension_data_end; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + extension_data_end = p + extension_data_len; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, hs_msg_type, extension_type, allowed_extensions_mask); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE: + + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext(ssl, + p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS: + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext(ssl, + p, + extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found pre_shared_key extension")); + + if ((ret = ssl_tls13_parse_server_pre_shared_key_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, ("ssl_tls13_parse_server_pre_shared_key_ext"), ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found key_shares extension")); + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { + fatal_alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (is_hrr) { + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_hrr_key_share_ext(ssl, + p, extension_data_end); + } else { + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext(ssl, + p, extension_data_end); + } + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_parse_key_share_ext", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + break; + + default: + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, hs_msg_type, handshake->received_extensions); + +cleanup: + + if (fatal_alert == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + } else if (fatal_alert == MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) +static const char *ssl_tls13_get_kex_mode_str(int mode) +{ + switch (mode) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK: + return "psk"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL: + return "ephemeral"; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL: + return "psk_ephemeral"; + default: + return "unknown mode"; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Determine the key exchange mode: + * 1) If both the pre_shared_key and key_share extensions were received + * then the key exchange mode is PSK with EPHEMERAL. + * 2) If only the pre_shared_key extension was received then the key + * exchange mode is PSK-only. + * 3) If only the key_share extension was received then the key + * exchange mode is EPHEMERAL-only. + */ + switch (handshake->received_extensions & + (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE))) { + /* Only the pre_shared_key extension was received */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY): + handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK; + break; + + /* Only the key_share extension was received */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE): + handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL; + break; + + /* Both the pre_shared_key and key_share extensions were received */ + case (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE)): + handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL; + break; + + /* Neither pre_shared_key nor key_share extension was received */ + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Unknown key exchange.")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled( + ssl, handshake->key_exchange_mode)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 2, ("Key exchange mode(%s) is not supported.", + ssl_tls13_get_kex_mode_str(handshake->key_exchange_mode))); + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("Selected key exchange mode: %s", + ssl_tls13_get_kex_mode_str(handshake->key_exchange_mode))); + + /* Start the TLS 1.3 key scheduling if not already done. + * + * If we proposed early data then we have already derived an + * early secret using the selected PSK and its associated hash. + * It means that if the negotiated key exchange mode is psk or + * psk_ephemeral, we have already correctly computed the + * early secret and thus we do not do it again. In all other + * cases we compute it here. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT || + handshake->key_exchange_mode == + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL) +#endif + { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(ssl, handshake->transform_handshake); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic")); + ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate; + +cleanup: + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + } + + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(ssl, 0); + + /* + * We are going to re-generate a shared secret corresponding to the group + * selected by the server, which is different from the group for which we + * generated a shared secret in the first client hello. + * Thus, reset the shared secret. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_reset_key_share(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->id; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->early_data_state != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT) { + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED; + } +#endif + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Wait and parse ServerHello handshake message. + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + size_t buf_len = 0; + int is_hrr = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> %s", __func__)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, &buf, &buf_len)); + + ret = ssl_tls13_preprocess_server_hello(ssl, buf, buf + buf_len); + if (ret < 0) { + goto cleanup; + } else { + is_hrr = (ret == SSL_SERVER_HELLO_HRR); + } + + if (ret == SSL_SERVER_HELLO_TLS1_2) { + ret = 0; + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_server_hello(ssl, buf, + buf + buf_len, + is_hrr)); + if (is_hrr) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr(ssl)); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, buf, buf_len)); + + if (is_hrr) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_postprocess_hrr(ssl)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + /* If not offering early data, the client sends a dummy CCS record + * immediately before its second flight. This may either be before + * its second ClientHello or before its encrypted handshake flight. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO); +#else + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_hello(ssl)); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS); + } + +cleanup: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= %s ( %s )", __func__, + is_hrr ? "HelloRetryRequest" : "ServerHello")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS + * + * The EncryptedExtensions message contains any extensions which + * should be protected, i.e., any which are not needed to establish + * the cryptographic context. + */ + +/* Parse EncryptedExtensions message + * struct { + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * } EncryptedExtensions; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t extensions_len; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "encrypted extensions", p, extensions_len); + + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + + /* + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, extension_type, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_EE); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension")); + + if ((ret = ssl_tls13_parse_alpn_ext( + ssl, p, (size_t) extension_data_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA: + + if (extension_data_len != 0) { + /* The message must be empty. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found record_size_limit extension")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext( + ssl, p, p + extension_data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, ("mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext"), ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + extension_type, "( ignored )"); + break; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + if ((handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)) && + (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH))) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ( + "Record size limit extension cannot be used with max fragment length extension")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + handshake->received_extensions); + + /* Check that we consumed all the message. */ + if (p != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("EncryptedExtension lengths misaligned")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse encrypted extensions")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + /* Process the message contents */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( + ssl_tls13_parse_encrypted_extensions(ssl, buf, buf + buf_len)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA)) { + /* RFC8446 4.2.11 + * If the server supplies an "early_data" extension, the + * client MUST verify that the server's selected_identity + * is 0. If any other value is returned, the client MUST + * abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + * + * RFC 8446 4.2.10 + * In order to accept early data, the server MUST have accepted a PSK + * cipher suite and selected the first key offered in the client's + * "pre_shared_key" extension. In addition, it MUST verify that the + * following values are the same as those associated with the + * selected PSK: + * - The TLS version number + * - The selected cipher suite + * - The selected ALPN [RFC7301] protocol, if any + * + * The server has sent an early data extension in its Encrypted + * Extension message thus accepted to receive early data. We + * check here that the additional constraints on the handshake + * parameters, when early data are exchanged, are met, + * namely: + * - a PSK has been selected for the handshake + * - the selected PSK for the handshake was the first one proposed + * by the client. + * - the selected ciphersuite for the handshake is the ciphersuite + * associated with the selected PSK. + */ + if ((!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) || + handshake->selected_identity != 0 || + handshake->ciphersuite_info->id != + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite) { + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED; + } else if (ssl->early_data_state != + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT) { + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED; + } +#endif + + /* + * In case the client has proposed a PSK associated with a ticket, + * `ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite` still contains at this point the + * identifier of the ciphersuite associated with the ticket. This is that + * way because, if an exchange of early data is agreed upon, we need + * it to check that the ciphersuite selected for the handshake is the + * ticket ciphersuite (see above). This information is not needed + * anymore thus we can now set it to the identifier of the ciphersuite + * used in this session under negotiation. + */ + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = handshake->ciphersuite_info->id; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + buf, buf_len)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST); + } +#else + ((void) ssl); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); +#endif + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse encrypted extensions")); + return ret; + +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA + * + * RFC 8446 section 4.5 + * + * struct {} EndOfEarlyData; + * + * If the server sent an "early_data" extension in EncryptedExtensions, the + * client MUST send an EndOfEarlyData message after receiving the server + * Finished. Otherwise, the client MUST NOT send an EndOfEarlyData message. + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + size_t buf_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write EndOfEarlyData")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 0)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( + mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(ssl, buf_len, 0)); + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write EndOfEarlyData")); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if ((ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) || + (!mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(ssl))) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + switch (ssl->early_data_state) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED: + return MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED; + break; + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * STATE HANDLING: CertificateRequest + * + */ +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST 0 +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP 1 +/* Coordination: + * Deals with the ambiguity of not knowing if a CertificateRequest + * will be sent. Returns a negative code on failure, or + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP + * indicating if a Certificate Request is expected or not. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_certificate_request_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + return ret; + } + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + + if ((ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) && + (ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got a certificate request")); + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("got no certificate request")); + + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP; +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_request() + * Parse certificate request + * struct { + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateRequest; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t certificate_request_context_len = 0; + size_t extensions_len = 0; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* ... + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1> + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1); + certificate_request_context_len = (size_t) p[0]; + p += 1; + + if (certificate_request_context_len > 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, certificate_request_context_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Certificate Request Context", + p, certificate_request_context_len); + + handshake->certificate_request_context = + mbedtls_calloc(1, certificate_request_context_len); + if (handshake->certificate_request_context == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("buffer too small")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(handshake->certificate_request_context, p, + certificate_request_context_len); + p += certificate_request_context_len; + } + + /* ... + * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, extension_type, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CR); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("found signature algorithms extension")); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(ssl, p, + p + extension_data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + break; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + extension_type, "( ignored )"); + break; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + handshake->received_extensions); + + /* Check that we consumed all the message. */ + if (p != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("CertificateRequest misaligned")); + goto decode_error; + } + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.3.2 + * + * The "signature_algorithms" extension MUST be specified + */ + if ((handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG)) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("no signature algorithms extension found")); + goto decode_error; + } + + ssl->handshake->client_auth = 1; + return 0; + +decode_error: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate request")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_certificate_request_coordinate(ssl)); + + if (ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_EXPECT_REQUEST) { + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_request( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + buf, buf_len)); + } else if (ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP) { + ret = 0; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate request")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_server_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_server_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_application_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->early_data_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED) { + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA); + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED); +#else + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int non_empty_certificate_msg = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, + ("Switch to handshake traffic keys for outbound traffic")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (ssl->handshake->client_auth) { + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) != NULL) { + non_empty_certificate_msg = 1; + } + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("skip write certificate")); + } +#endif + + if (non_empty_certificate_msg) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("skip write certificate verify")); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED); + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(ssl); + + if (ret == 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_client_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret ", ret); + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_flush_buffers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("handshake: done")); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(ssl); + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER); + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +/* From RFC 8446 section 4.2.10 + * + * struct { + * select (Handshake.msg_type) { + * case new_session_ticket: uint32 max_early_data_size; + * ... + * }; + * } EarlyDataIndication; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_early_data_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(buf, end, 4); + + session->max_early_data_size = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(buf, 0); + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_set_ticket_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("received max_early_data_size: %u", + (unsigned int) session->max_early_data_size)); + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + + + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + while (p < end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + int ret; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extension_data_len); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, extension_type, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_NST); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA: + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_early_data_ext( + ssl, p, p + extension_data_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_early_data_ext", + ret); + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + extension_type, "( ignored )"); + break; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + handshake->received_extensions); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * From RFC8446, page 74 + * + * struct { + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * uint32 ticket_age_add; + * opaque ticket_nonce<0..255>; + * opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>; + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-2>; + * } NewSessionTicket; + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + unsigned char **ticket_nonce, + size_t *ticket_nonce_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session; + size_t ticket_len; + unsigned char *ticket; + size_t extensions_len; + + *ticket_nonce = NULL; + *ticket_nonce_len = 0; + /* + * ticket_lifetime 4 bytes + * ticket_age_add 4 bytes + * ticket_nonce_len 1 byte + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 9); + + session->ticket_lifetime = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("ticket_lifetime: %u", + (unsigned int) session->ticket_lifetime)); + if (session->ticket_lifetime > + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_MAX_ALLOWED_TICKET_LIFETIME) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket_lifetime exceeds 7 days.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + session->ticket_age_add = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(p, 4); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("ticket_age_add: %u", + (unsigned int) session->ticket_age_add)); + + *ticket_nonce_len = p[8]; + p += 9; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, *ticket_nonce_len); + *ticket_nonce = p; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "ticket_nonce:", *ticket_nonce, *ticket_nonce_len); + p += *ticket_nonce_len; + + /* Ticket */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + ticket_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, ticket_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "received ticket", p, ticket_len); + + /* Check if we previously received a ticket already. */ + if (session->ticket != NULL || session->ticket_len > 0) { + mbedtls_free(session->ticket); + session->ticket = NULL; + session->ticket_len = 0; + } + + if ((ticket = mbedtls_calloc(1, ticket_len)) == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ticket alloc failed")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(ticket, p, ticket_len); + p += ticket_len; + session->ticket = ticket; + session->ticket_len = ticket_len; + + /* Clear all flags in ticket_flags */ + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_clear_ticket_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "ticket extension", p, extensions_len); + + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_exts(ssl, p, p + extensions_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket_exts", + ret); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Non negative return values for ssl_tls13_postprocess_new_session_ticket(). + * - POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SIGNAL, all good, we have to signal the + * application that a valid ticket has been received. + * - POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_DISCARD, no fatal error, we keep the + * connection alive but we do not signal the ticket to the application. + */ +#define POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SIGNAL 0 +#define POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_DISCARD 1 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *ticket_nonce, + size_t ticket_nonce_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + psa_algorithm_t psa_hash_alg; + int hash_length; + + if (session->ticket_lifetime == 0) { + return POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_DISCARD; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + /* Store ticket creation time */ + session->ticket_reception_time = mbedtls_ms_time(); +#endif + + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(session->ciphersuite); + if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + psa_hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psa_hash_alg); + if (hash_length == -1 || + (size_t) hash_length > sizeof(session->resumption_key)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "resumption_master_secret", + session->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret, + hash_length); + + /* Compute resumption key + * + * HKDF-Expand-Label( resumption_master_secret, + * "resumption", ticket_nonce, Hash.length ) + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + psa_hash_alg, + session->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret, + hash_length, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(resumption), + ticket_nonce, + ticket_nonce_len, + session->resumption_key, + hash_length); + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, + "Creating the ticket-resumed PSK failed", + ret); + return ret; + } + + session->resumption_key_len = hash_length; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Ticket-resumed PSK", + session->resumption_key, + session->resumption_key_len); + + /* Set ticket_flags depends on the selected key exchange modes */ + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_set_ticket_flags( + session, ssl->conf->tls13_kex_modes); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_TICKET_FLAGS(4, session->ticket_flags); + + return POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SIGNAL; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + unsigned char *ticket_nonce; + size_t ticket_nonce_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse new session ticket")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + /* + * We are about to update (maybe only partially) ticket data thus block + * any session export for the time being. + */ + ssl->session->exported = 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_new_session_ticket( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, + &ticket_nonce, &ticket_nonce_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_postprocess_new_session_ticket( + ssl, ticket_nonce, ticket_nonce_len)); + + switch (ret) { + case POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SIGNAL: + /* + * All good, we have received a new valid ticket, session data can + * be exported now and we signal the ticket to the application. + */ + ssl->session->exported = 0; + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; + break; + + case POSTPROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_DISCARD: + ret = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Discard new session ticket")); + break; + + default: + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse new session ticket")); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + + switch (ssl->state) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_server_hello(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions(ssl); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_certificate_request(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_server_certificate(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(ssl); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_server_finished(ssl); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_end_of_early_data(ssl); + break; +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate(ssl); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate_verify(ssl); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_finished(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: + ret = ssl_tls13_flush_buffers(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: + ret = ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(ssl); + break; + + /* + * Injection of dummy-CCS's for middlebox compatibility + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + break; + } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + break; + } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret == 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Switch to early data keys for outbound traffic")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( + ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); + ssl->early_data_state = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_new_session_ticket(ssl); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid state %d", ssl->state)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d448a054a91 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c @@ -0,0 +1,1853 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 functionality shared between client and server + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_invasive.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) +#endif + +const uint8_t mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic[ + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN] = +{ 0xCF, 0x21, 0xAD, 0x74, 0xE5, 0x9A, 0x61, 0x11, + 0xBE, 0x1D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xB8, 0x91, + 0xC2, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7A, 0xBB, 0x8C, 0x5E, + 0x07, 0x9E, 0x09, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x9C }; + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned hs_type, + unsigned char **buf, + size_t *buf_len) +{ + int ret; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + if (ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || + ssl->in_msg[0] != hs_type) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Receive unexpected handshake message.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* + * Jump handshake header (4 bytes, see Section 4 of RFC 8446). + * ... + * HandshakeType msg_type; + * uint24 length; + * ... + */ + *buf = ssl->in_msg + 4; + *buf_len = ssl->in_hslen - 4; + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char **supported_versions_data, + const unsigned char **supported_versions_data_end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t extensions_len; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + + *supported_versions_data = NULL; + *supported_versions_data_end = NULL; + + /* Case of no extension */ + if (p == end) { + return 0; + } + + /* ... + * Extension extensions; + * ... + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* Check extensions do not go beyond the buffer of data. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + + if (extension_type == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS) { + *supported_versions_data = p; + *supported_versions_data_end = p + extension_data_len; + return 1; + } + p += extension_data_len; + } + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * STATE HANDLING: Read CertificateVerify + */ +/* Macro to express the maximum length of the verify structure. + * + * The structure is computed per TLS 1.3 specification as: + * - 64 bytes of octet 32, + * - 33 bytes for the context string + * (which is either "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify" + * or "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"), + * - 1 byte for the octet 0x0, which serves as a separator, + * - 32 or 48 bytes for the Transcript-Hash(Handshake Context, Certificate) + * (depending on the size of the transcript_hash) + * + * This results in a total size of + * - 130 bytes for a SHA256-based transcript hash, or + * (64 + 33 + 1 + 32 bytes) + * - 146 bytes for a SHA384-based transcript hash. + * (64 + 33 + 1 + 48 bytes) + * + */ +#define SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE (64 + \ + 33 + \ + 1 + \ + MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE \ + ) + +/* + * The ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure() creates the verify structure. + * As input, it requires the transcript hash. + * + * The caller has to ensure that the buffer has size at least + * SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE bytes. + */ +static void ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure(const unsigned char *transcript_hash, + size_t transcript_hash_len, + unsigned char *verify_buffer, + size_t *verify_buffer_len, + int from) +{ + size_t idx; + + /* RFC 8446, Section 4.4.3: + * + * The digital signature [in the CertificateVerify message] is then + * computed over the concatenation of: + * - A string that consists of octet 32 (0x20) repeated 64 times + * - The context string + * - A single 0 byte which serves as the separator + * - The content to be signed + */ + memset(verify_buffer, 0x20, 64); + idx = 64; + + if (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + memcpy(verify_buffer + idx, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(client_cv)); + idx += MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN(client_cv); + } else { /* from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER */ + memcpy(verify_buffer + idx, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(server_cv)); + idx += MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN(server_cv); + } + + verify_buffer[idx++] = 0x0; + + memcpy(verify_buffer + idx, transcript_hash, transcript_hash_len); + idx += transcript_hash_len; + + *verify_buffer_len = idx; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + const unsigned char *verify_buffer, + size_t verify_buffer_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + uint16_t algorithm; + size_t signature_len; + mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + unsigned char verify_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t verify_hash_len; + + void const *options = NULL; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options rsassa_pss_options; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + + /* + * struct { + * SignatureScheme algorithm; + * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateVerify; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + algorithm = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.4.3 + * + * If the CertificateVerify message is sent by a server, the signature + * algorithm MUST be one offered in the client's "signature_algorithms" + * extension unless no valid certificate chain can be produced without + * unsupported algorithms + * + * RFC 8446 section 4.4.2.2 + * + * If the client cannot construct an acceptable chain using the provided + * certificates and decides to abort the handshake, then it MUST abort the + * handshake with an appropriate certificate-related alert + * (by default, "unsupported_certificate"). + * + * Check if algorithm is an offered signature algorithm. + */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(ssl, algorithm)) { + /* algorithm not in offered signature algorithms list */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Received signature algorithm(%04x) is not " + "offered.", + (unsigned int) algorithm)); + goto error; + } + + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg( + algorithm, &sig_alg, &md_alg) != 0) { + goto error; + } + + hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + if (hash_alg == 0) { + goto error; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Certificate Verify: Signature algorithm ( %04x )", + (unsigned int) algorithm)); + + /* + * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg + */ + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(&ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, sig_alg)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("signature algorithm doesn't match cert key")); + goto error; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + signature_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, signature_len); + + status = psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, + verify_buffer, + verify_buffer_len, + verify_hash, + sizeof(verify_hash), + &verify_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "hash computation PSA error", status); + goto error; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "verify hash", verify_hash, verify_hash_len); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + if (sig_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { + rsassa_pss_options.mgf1_hash_id = md_alg; + + rsassa_pss_options.expected_salt_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + options = (const void *) &rsassa_pss_options; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(sig_alg, options, + &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, + md_alg, verify_hash, verify_hash_len, + p, signature_len)) == 0) { + return 0; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_pk_verify_ext", ret); + +error: + /* RFC 8446 section 4.4.3 + * + * If the verification fails, the receiver MUST terminate the handshake + * with a "decrypt_error" alert. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char verify_buffer[SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t verify_buffer_len; + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate verify")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, &buf, &buf_len)); + + /* Need to calculate the hash of the transcript first + * before reading the message since otherwise it gets + * included in the transcript + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( + ssl, + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac, + transcript, sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "handshake hash", transcript, transcript_len); + + /* Create verify structure */ + ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure(transcript, + transcript_len, + verify_buffer, + &verify_buffer_len, + (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER : + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT); + + /* Process the message contents */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_certificate_verify( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, + verify_buffer, verify_buffer_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, + buf, buf_len)); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate verify")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify", ret); + return ret; +#else + ((void) ssl); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ +} + +/* + * + * STATE HANDLING: Incoming Certificate. + * + */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +/* + * Structure of Certificate message: + * + * enum { + * X509(0), + * RawPublicKey(2), + * (255) + * } CertificateType; + * + * struct { + * select (certificate_type) { + * case RawPublicKey: + * * From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo * + * opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>; + * case X509: + * opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>; + * }; + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateEntry; + * + * struct { + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; + * } Certificate; + * + */ + +/* Parse certificate chain send by the server. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t certificate_request_context_len = 0; + size_t certificate_list_len = 0; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *certificate_list_end; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 4); + certificate_request_context_len = p[0]; + certificate_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(p, 1); + p += 4; + + /* In theory, the certificate list can be up to 2^24 Bytes, but we don't + * support anything beyond 2^16 = 64K. + */ + if ((certificate_request_context_len != 0) || + (certificate_list_len >= 0x10000)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate message")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* In case we tried to reuse a session but it failed */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert); + } + + if (certificate_list_len == 0) { + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = NULL; + ret = 0; + goto exit; + } + + if ((ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = + mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt))) == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("alloc( %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " bytes ) failed", + sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt))); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_x509_crt_init(ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, certificate_list_len); + certificate_list_end = p + certificate_list_len; + while (p < certificate_list_end) { + size_t cert_data_len, extensions_len; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, certificate_list_end, 3); + cert_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(p, 0); + p += 3; + + /* In theory, the CRT can be up to 2^24 Bytes, but we don't support + * anything beyond 2^16 = 64K. Otherwise as in the TLS 1.2 code, + * check that we have a minimum of 128 bytes of data, this is not + * clear why we need that though. + */ + if ((cert_data_len < 128) || (cert_data_len >= 0x10000)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad Certificate message")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, certificate_list_end, cert_data_len); + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, + p, cert_data_len); + + switch (ret) { + case 0: /*ok*/ + break; + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND: + /* Ignore certificate with an unknown algorithm: maybe a + prior certificate was already trusted. */ + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret); + return ret; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret); + return ret; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT, + ret); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, " mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der", ret); + return ret; + } + + p += cert_data_len; + + /* Certificate extensions length */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, certificate_list_end, 2); + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, certificate_list_end, extensions_len); + + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + + /* + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, extension_type, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CT); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, + extension_type, "( ignored )"); + break; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, + handshake->received_extensions); + } + +exit: + /* Check that all the message is consumed. */ + if (p != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad Certificate message")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "peer certificate", + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert); + + return ret; +} +#else +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + ((void) ssl); + ((void) buf); + ((void) end); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) +/* Validate certificate chain sent by the server. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_validate_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + int authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED; + mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain; + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl; + const char *ext_oid; + size_t ext_len; + uint32_t verify_result = 0; + + /* If SNI was used, overwrite authentication mode + * from the configuration. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET) { + authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode; + } else +#endif + authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; + } +#endif + + /* + * If the peer hasn't sent a certificate ( i.e. it sent + * an empty certificate chain ), this is reflected in the peer CRT + * structure being unset. + * Check for that and handle it depending on the + * authentication mode. + */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("peer has no certificate")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + /* The client was asked for a certificate but didn't send + * one. The client should know what's going on, so we + * don't send an alert. + */ + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING; + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL) { + return 0; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) { + ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + { + ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain; + ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl; + } + + /* + * Main check: verify certificate + */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, + ca_chain, ca_crl, + ssl->conf->cert_profile, + ssl->hostname, + &verify_result, + ssl->conf->f_vrfy, ssl->conf->p_vrfy); + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "x509_verify_cert", ret); + } + + /* + * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0 + */ + if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH); + } else { + ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH; + ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH); + } + + if ((mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) != 0) || + (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( + ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert, + ext_oid, ext_len) != 0)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (usage extensions)")); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + } + } + + /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a + * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED, + * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds + * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy + * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. + */ + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL && + (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED || + ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE)) { + ret = 0; + } + + if (ca_chain == NULL && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no CA chain")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED; + } + + if (ret != 0) { + /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons. + Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send + may be a subject of debate in some cases. */ + if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED, ret); + } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT, ret); + } else if (verify_result & (MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE | + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE | + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE | + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK | + MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT, ret); + } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED, ret); + } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED, ret); + } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA, ret); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN, ret); + } + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if (verify_result != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("! Certificate verification flags %08x", + (unsigned int) verify_result)); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Certificate verification flags clear")); + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = verify_result; + return ret; +} +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_validate_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + ((void) ssl); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse certificate")); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + /* Parse the certificate chain sent by the peer. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate(ssl, buf, + buf + buf_len)); + /* Validate the certificate chain and set the verification results. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_validate_certificate(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, buf, buf_len)); + +cleanup: +#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + (void) ssl; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse certificate")); + return ret; +} +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * enum { + * X509(0), + * RawPublicKey(2), + * (255) + * } CertificateType; + * + * struct { + * select (certificate_type) { + * case RawPublicKey: + * // From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo + * opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>; + * + * case X509: + * opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>; + * }; + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateEntry; + * + * struct { + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; + * } Certificate; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_certificate_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl); + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *certificate_request_context = + ssl->handshake->certificate_request_context; + unsigned char certificate_request_context_len = + ssl->handshake->certificate_request_context_len; + unsigned char *p_certificate_list_len; + + + /* ... + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, certificate_request_context_len + 1); + *p++ = certificate_request_context_len; + if (certificate_request_context_len > 0) { + memcpy(p, certificate_request_context, certificate_request_context_len); + p += certificate_request_context_len; + } + + /* ... + * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 3); + p_certificate_list_len = p; + p += 3; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "own certificate", crt); + + while (crt != NULL) { + size_t cert_data_len = crt->raw.len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, cert_data_len + 3 + 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE(cert_data_len, p, 0); + p += 3; + + memcpy(p, crt->raw.p, cert_data_len); + p += cert_data_len; + crt = crt->next; + + /* Currently, we don't have any certificate extensions defined. + * Hence, we are sending an empty extension with length zero. + */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(0, p, 0); + p += 2; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE(p - p_certificate_list_len - 3, + p_certificate_list_len, 0); + + *out_len = p - buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_certificate_body(ssl, + buf, + buf + buf_len, + &msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE, buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * STATE HANDLING: Output Certificate Verify + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match(uint16_t sig_alg, + mbedtls_pk_context *key) +{ + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = (mbedtls_pk_type_t) mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(key); + size_t key_size = mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(key); + + switch (pk_type) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA: + switch (key_size) { + case 256: + return + sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256; + + case 384: + return + sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384; + + case 521: + return + sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512; + default: + break; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA: + switch (sig_alg) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512: + return 1; + + default: + break; + } + break; + + default: + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + mbedtls_pk_context *own_key; + + unsigned char handshake_hash[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t handshake_hash_len; + unsigned char verify_buffer[SSL_VERIFY_STRUCT_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t verify_buffer_len; + + uint16_t *sig_alg = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; + size_t signature_len = 0; + + *out_len = 0; + + own_key = mbedtls_ssl_own_key(ssl); + if (own_key == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( + ssl, (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac, + handshake_hash, sizeof(handshake_hash), &handshake_hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "handshake hash", + handshake_hash, + handshake_hash_len); + + ssl_tls13_create_verify_structure(handshake_hash, handshake_hash_len, + verify_buffer, &verify_buffer_len, + ssl->conf->endpoint); + + /* + * struct { + * SignatureScheme algorithm; + * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateVerify; + */ + /* Check there is space for the algorithm identifier (2 bytes) and the + * signature length (2 bytes). + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4); + + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm = PSA_ALG_NONE; + unsigned char verify_hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t verify_hash_len; + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(ssl, *sig_alg)) { + continue; + } + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported(*sig_alg)) { + continue; + } + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match(*sig_alg, own_key)) { + continue; + } + + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg( + *sig_alg, &pk_type, &md_alg) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Hash verify buffer with indicated hash function */ + psa_algorithm = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg); + status = psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm, + verify_buffer, + verify_buffer_len, + verify_hash, sizeof(verify_hash), + &verify_hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "verify hash", verify_hash, verify_hash_len); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_ext(pk_type, own_key, + md_alg, verify_hash, verify_hash_len, + p + 4, (size_t) (end - (p + 4)), &signature_len, + ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("CertificateVerify signature failed with %s", + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg))); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, "mbedtls_pk_sign_ext", ret); + + /* The signature failed. This is possible if the private key + * was not suitable for the signature operation as purposely we + * did not check its suitability completely. Let's try with + * another signature algorithm. + */ + continue; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("CertificateVerify signature with %s", + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg))); + + break; + } + + if (*sig_alg == MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no suitable signature algorithm")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(*sig_alg, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(signature_len, p, 2); + + *out_len = 4 + signature_len; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate verify")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify_body( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, + buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate verify")); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * + * STATE HANDLING: Incoming Finished message. + */ +/* + * Implementation + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_preprocess_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data( + ssl, + ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest), + &ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest_len, + ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER : MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data", ret); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + /* + * struct { + * opaque verify_data[Hash.length]; + * } Finished; + */ + const unsigned char *expected_verify_data = + ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest; + size_t expected_verify_data_len = + ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_in.digest_len; + /* Structural validation */ + if ((size_t) (end - buf) != expected_verify_data_len) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "verify_data (self-computed):", + expected_verify_data, + expected_verify_data_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "verify_data (received message):", buf, + expected_verify_data_len); + + /* Semantic validation */ + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(buf, + expected_verify_data, + expected_verify_data_len) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad finished message")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse finished message")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED, &buf, &buf_len)); + + /* Preprocessing step: Compute handshake digest */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_preprocess_finished_message(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_finished_message( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED, buf, buf_len)); + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse finished message")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * + * STATE HANDLING: Write and send Finished message. + * + */ +/* + * Implement + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_prepare_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret; + + /* Compute transcript of handshake up to now. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data(ssl, + ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out. + digest), + &ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest_len, + ssl->conf->endpoint); + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "calculate_verify_data failed", ret); + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_finished_message_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + size_t verify_data_len = ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest_len; + /* + * struct { + * opaque verify_data[Hash.length]; + * } Finished; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, verify_data_len); + + memcpy(buf, ssl->handshake->state_local.finished_out.digest, + verify_data_len); + + *out_len = verify_data_len; + return 0; +} + +/* Main entry point: orchestrates the other functions */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write finished message")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_prepare_finished_message(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED, &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_finished_message_body( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED, buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write finished message")); + return ret; +} + +void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("=> handshake wrapup")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Switch to application keys for inbound traffic")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(ssl, ssl->transform_application); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Switch to application keys for outbound traffic")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(ssl, ssl->transform_application); + + /* + * Free the previous session and switch to the current one. + */ + if (ssl->session) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(ssl->session); + mbedtls_free(ssl->session); + } + ssl->session = ssl->session_negotiate; + ssl->session_negotiate = NULL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("<= handshake wrapup")); +} + +/* + * + * STATE HANDLING: Write ChangeCipherSpec + * + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + ((void) ssl); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 1); + buf[0] = 1; + *olen = 1; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write change cipher spec")); + + /* Only one CCS to send. */ + if (ssl->handshake->ccs_sent) { + ret = 0; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Write CCS message */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec_body( + ssl, ssl->out_msg, + ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, + &ssl->out_msglen)); + + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + + /* Dispatch message */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, 0)); + + ssl->handshake->ccs_sent = 1; + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write change cipher spec")); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + +/* Early Data Indication Extension + * + * struct { + * select ( Handshake.msg_type ) { + * case new_session_ticket: uint32 max_early_data_size; + * case client_hello: Empty; + * case encrypted_extensions: Empty; + * }; + * } EarlyDataIndication; + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int in_new_session_ticket, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + const size_t needed = in_new_session_ticket ? 8 : 4; +#else + const size_t needed = 4; + ((void) in_new_session_ticket); +#endif + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, needed); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(needed - 4, p, 2); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (in_new_session_ticket) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ssl->conf->max_early_data_size, p, 4); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 4, ("Sent max_early_data_size=%u", + (unsigned int) ssl->conf->max_early_data_size)); + } +#endif + + *out_len = needed; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA); + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + size_t early_data_len) +{ + /* + * This function should be called only while an handshake is in progress + * and thus a session under negotiation. Add a sanity check to detect a + * misuse. + */ + if (ssl->session_negotiate == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.6.1 + * + * A server receiving more than max_early_data_size bytes of 0-RTT data + * SHOULD terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert. + * Note that if it is still possible to send early_data_len bytes of early + * data, it means that early_data_len is smaller than max_early_data_size + * (type uint32_t) and can fit in an uint32_t. We use this further + * down. + */ + if (early_data_len > + (ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size - + ssl->total_early_data_size)) { + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 2, ("EarlyData: Too much early data received, %u + %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " > %u", + ssl->total_early_data_size, early_data_len, + ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + } + + /* + * early_data_len has been checked to be less than max_early_data_size + * that is uint32_t. Its cast to an uint32_t below is thus safe. We need + * the cast to appease some compilers. + */ + ssl->total_early_data_size += (uint32_t) early_data_len; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +/* Reset SSL context and update hash for handling HRR. + * + * Replace Transcript-Hash(X) by + * Transcript-Hash( message_hash || + * 00 00 Hash.length || + * X ) + * A few states of the handshake are preserved, including: + * - session ID + * - session ticket + * - negotiated ciphersuite + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char hash_transcript[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + 4]; + size_t hash_len; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Reset SSL session for HRR")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac, + hash_transcript + 4, + PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE, + &hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", ret); + return ret; + } + + hash_transcript[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_MESSAGE_HASH; + hash_transcript[1] = 0; + hash_transcript[2] = 0; + hash_transcript[3] = (unsigned char) hash_len; + + hash_len += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Truncated handshake transcript", + hash_transcript, hash_len); + + /* Reset running hash and replace it with a hash of the transcript */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, hash_transcript, hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "update_checksum", ret); + return ret; + } + + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_xxdhe_share(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buf_len) +{ + uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *) buf; + const uint8_t *end = buf + buf_len; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Get size of the TLS opaque key_exchange field of the KeyShareEntry struct. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + uint16_t peerkey_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* Check if key size is consistent with given buffer length. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, peerkey_len); + + /* Store peer's ECDH/FFDH public key. */ + if (peerkey_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid public key length: %u > %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, + (unsigned) peerkey_len, + sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey))); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, peerkey_len); + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = peerkey_len; + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) +static psa_status_t mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_ffdh_info_from_tls_id( + uint16_t tls_id, size_t *bits, psa_key_type_t *key_type) +{ + switch (tls_id) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048: + *bits = 2048; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072: + *bits = 3072; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096: + *bits = 4096; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144: + *bits = 6144; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192: + *bits = 8192; + *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); + return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ + default: + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } +} +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t named_group, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes; + size_t own_pubkey_len; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + size_t bits = 0; + psa_key_type_t key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE; + psa_algorithm_t alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + size_t buf_size = (size_t) (end - buf); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Perform PSA-based ECDH/FFDH computation.")); + + /* Convert EC's TLS ID to PSA key type. */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id( + named_group, &key_type, &bits) == PSA_SUCCESS) { + alg = PSA_ALG_ECDH; + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + if (mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_ffdh_info_from_tls_id(named_group, &bits, + &key_type) == PSA_SUCCESS) { + alg = PSA_ALG_FFDH; + } +#endif + + if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + if (buf_size < PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + handshake->xxdh_psa_type = key_type; + ssl->handshake->xxdh_psa_bits = bits; + + key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&key_attributes, handshake->xxdh_psa_bits); + + /* Generate ECDH/FFDH private key. */ + status = psa_generate_key(&key_attributes, + &handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_generate_key", ret); + return ret; + + } + + /* Export the public part of the ECDH/FFDH private key from PSA. */ + status = psa_export_public_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + buf, buf_size, + &own_pubkey_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_export_public_key", ret); + return ret; + } + + *out_len = own_pubkey_len; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* RFC 8446 section 4.2 + * + * If an implementation receives an extension which it recognizes and which is + * not specified for the message in which it appears, it MUST abort the handshake + * with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + * + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int hs_msg_type, + unsigned int received_extension_type, + uint32_t hs_msg_allowed_extensions_mask) +{ + uint32_t extension_mask = mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask( + received_extension_type); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, hs_msg_type, received_extension_type, "received"); + + if ((extension_mask & hs_msg_allowed_extensions_mask) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, hs_msg_type, received_extension_type, "is illegal"); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + ssl->handshake->received_extensions |= extension_mask; + /* + * If it is a message containing extension responses, check that we + * previously sent the extension. + */ + switch (hs_msg_type) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO: + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE: + /* Check if the received extension is sent by peer message.*/ + if ((ssl->handshake->sent_extensions & extension_mask) != 0) { + return 0; + } + break; + default: + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, hs_msg_type, received_extension_type, "is unsupported"); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + +/* RFC 8449, section 4: + * + * The ExtensionData of the "record_size_limit" extension is + * RecordSizeLimit: + * uint16 RecordSizeLimit; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + uint16_t record_size_limit; + const size_t extension_data_len = end - buf; + + if (extension_data_len != + MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_EXTENSION_DATA_LENGTH) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("record_size_limit extension has invalid length: %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " Bytes", + extension_data_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + record_size_limit = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("RecordSizeLimit: %u Bytes", record_size_limit)); + + /* RFC 8449, section 4: + * + * Endpoints MUST NOT send a "record_size_limit" extension with a value + * smaller than 64. An endpoint MUST treat receipt of a smaller value + * as a fatal error and generate an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + if (record_size_limit < MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid record size limit : %u Bytes", + record_size_limit)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + ssl->session_negotiate->record_size_limit = record_size_limit; + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + unsigned char *p = buf; + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN >= MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN, + "MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN is less than the " + "minimum record size limit"); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_EXTENSION_DATA_LENGTH, + p, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN, p, 4); + + *out_len = 6; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Sent RecordSizeLimit: %d Bytes", + MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)); + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h b/library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b4506f71c7e --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_invasive.h @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_INVASIVE_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_INVASIVE_H + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#include "psa/crypto.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS13_INVASIVE_H */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..739414ea2fe --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c @@ -0,0 +1,1885 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 key schedule + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#include +#include + +#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_invasive.h" + +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many + * arguments in each translating place. */ +static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) +{ + return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors, + ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors), + psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls); +} +#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(name, string) \ + .name = string, + +struct mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_struct const mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels = +{ + /* This seems to work in C, despite the string literal being one + * character too long due to the 0-termination. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +}; + +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL + +/* + * This function creates a HkdfLabel structure used in the TLS 1.3 key schedule. + * + * The HkdfLabel is specified in RFC 8446 as follows: + * + * struct HkdfLabel { + * uint16 length; // Length of expanded key material + * opaque label<7..255>; // Always prefixed by "tls13 " + * opaque context<0..255>; // Usually a communication transcript hash + * }; + * + * Parameters: + * - desired_length: Length of expanded key material + * Even though the standard allows expansion to up to + * 2**16 Bytes, TLS 1.3 never uses expansion to more than + * 255 Bytes, so we require `desired_length` to be at most + * 255. This allows us to save a few Bytes of code by + * hardcoding the writing of the high bytes. + * - (label, label_len): label + label length, without "tls13 " prefix + * The label length MUST be less than or equal to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN + * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. + * All (label, label length) pairs used in TLS 1.3 + * can be obtained via MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(). + * - (ctx, ctx_len): context + context length + * The context length MUST be less than or equal to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN + * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure this. + * - dst: Target buffer for HkdfLabel structure, + * This MUST be a writable buffer of size + * at least SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN Bytes. + * - dst_len: Pointer at which to store the actual length of + * the HkdfLabel structure on success. + */ + +static const char tls13_label_prefix[6] = "tls13 "; + +#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN(label_len, context_len) \ + (2 /* expansion length */ \ + + 1 /* label length */ \ + + label_len \ + + 1 /* context length */ \ + + context_len) + +#define SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN \ + SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN( \ + sizeof(tls13_label_prefix) + \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN, \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN) + +static void ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label( + size_t desired_length, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, + unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_len) +{ + size_t total_label_len = + sizeof(tls13_label_prefix) + label_len; + size_t total_hkdf_lbl_len = + SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_HKDF_LABEL_LEN(total_label_len, ctx_len); + + unsigned char *p = dst; + + /* Add the size of the expanded key material. + * We're hardcoding the high byte to 0 here assuming that we never use + * TLS 1.3 HKDF key expansion to more than 255 Bytes. */ +#if MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN > 255 +#error "The implementation of ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label() is not fit for the \ + value of MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN" +#endif + + *p++ = 0; + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(desired_length); + + /* Add label incl. prefix */ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(total_label_len); + memcpy(p, tls13_label_prefix, sizeof(tls13_label_prefix)); + p += sizeof(tls13_label_prefix); + memcpy(p, label, label_len); + p += label_len; + + /* Add context value */ + *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(ctx_len); + if (ctx_len != 0) { + memcpy(p, ctx, ctx_len); + } + + /* Return total length to the caller. */ + *dst_len = total_hkdf_lbl_len; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len) +{ + unsigned char hkdf_label[SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_HKDF_LABEL_LEN]; + size_t hkdf_label_len = 0; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + if (label_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN) { + /* Should never happen since this is an internal + * function, and we know statically which labels + * are allowed. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + if (ctx_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN) { + /* Should not happen, as above. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + if (buf_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN) { + /* Should not happen, as above. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label(buf_len, + label, label_len, + ctx, ctx_len, + hkdf_label, + &hkdf_label_len); + + status = psa_key_derivation_setup(&operation, PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash_alg)); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + secret, + secret_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO, + hkdf_label, + hkdf_label_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&operation, + buf, + buf_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + abort_status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&operation); + status = (status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hkdf_label, hkdf_label_len); + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, + unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, + unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + hash_alg, + secret, secret_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(key), + NULL, 0, + key, key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + hash_alg, + secret, secret_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(iv), + NULL, 0, + iv, iv_len); + return ret; +} + +/* + * The traffic keying material is generated from the following inputs: + * + * - One secret value per sender. + * - A purpose value indicating the specific value being generated + * - The desired lengths of key and IV. + * + * The expansion itself is based on HKDF: + * + * [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "key", "", key_length ) + * [sender]_write_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, "iv" , "", iv_length ) + * + * [sender] denotes the sending side and the Secret value is provided + * by the function caller. Note that we generate server and client side + * keys in a single function call. + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *client_secret, + const unsigned char *server_secret, size_t secret_len, + size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys) +{ + int ret = 0; + + ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key( + hash_alg, client_secret, secret_len, + keys->client_write_key, key_len, + keys->client_write_iv, iv_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key( + hash_alg, server_secret, secret_len, + keys->server_write_key, key_len, + keys->server_write_iv, iv_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + keys->key_len = key_len; + keys->iv_len = iv_len; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, + int ctx_hashed, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dstbuf_len) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char hashed_context[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + if (ctx_hashed == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED) { + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, ctx, ctx_len, hashed_context, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg), &ctx_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + return ret; + } + } else { + if (ctx_len > sizeof(hashed_context)) { + /* This should never happen since this function is internal + * and the code sets `ctx_hashed` correctly. + * Let's double-check nonetheless to not run at the risk + * of getting a stack overflow. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + memcpy(hashed_context, ctx, ctx_len); + } + + return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label(hash_alg, + secret, secret_len, + label, label_len, + hashed_context, ctx_len, + dstbuf, dstbuf_len); + +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret_old, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + unsigned char *secret_new) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_status_t abort_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t hlen; + unsigned char tmp_secret[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 }; + const unsigned char all_zeroes_input[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE] = { 0 }; + const unsigned char *l_input = NULL; + size_t l_input_len; + + psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; + + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + hlen = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* For non-initial runs, call Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "") + * on the old secret. */ + if (secret_old != NULL) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + secret_old, hlen, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(derived), + NULL, 0, /* context */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED, + tmp_secret, hlen); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + } + + ret = 0; + + if (input != NULL && input_len != 0) { + l_input = input; + l_input_len = input_len; + } else { + l_input = all_zeroes_input; + l_input_len = hlen; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_setup(&operation, + PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash_alg)); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT, + tmp_secret, + hlen); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(&operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + l_input, l_input_len); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(&operation, + secret_new, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + abort_status = psa_key_derivation_abort(&operation); + status = (status == PSA_SUCCESS ? abort_status : status); + ret = (ret == 0 ? PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) : ret); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_secret, sizeof(tmp_secret)); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *early_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets *derived) +{ + int ret; + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* + * 0 + * | + * v + * PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c e traffic", ClientHello) + * | = client_early_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "e exp master", ClientHello) + * | = early_exporter_master_secret + * v + */ + + /* Create client_early_traffic_secret */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + early_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(c_e_traffic), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->client_early_traffic_secret, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Create early exporter */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + early_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(e_exp_master), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->early_exporter_master_secret, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *handshake_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *derived) +{ + int ret; + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* + * + * Handshake Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c hs traffic", + * | ClientHello...ServerHello ) + * | = client_handshake_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s hs traffic", + * | ClientHello...ServerHello ) + * | = server_handshake_traffic_secret + * + */ + + /* + * Compute client_handshake_traffic_secret with + * Derive-Secret( ., "c hs traffic", ClientHello...ServerHello ) + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + handshake_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(c_hs_traffic), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->client_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* + * Compute server_handshake_traffic_secret with + * Derive-Secret( ., "s hs traffic", ClientHello...ServerHello ) + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + handshake_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(s_hs_traffic), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->server_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *application_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets *derived) +{ + int ret; + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* Generate {client,server}_application_traffic_secret_0 + * + * Master Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...server Finished ) + * | = client_application_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...Server Finished ) + * | = server_application_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "exp master", + * | ClientHello...server Finished) + * | = exporter_master_secret + * + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + application_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(c_ap_traffic), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->client_application_traffic_secret_N, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + application_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(s_ap_traffic), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->server_application_traffic_secret_N, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + application_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(exp_master), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->exporter_master_secret, + hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Generate resumption_master_secret for use with the ticket exchange. + * + * This is not integrated with mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets() + * because it uses the transcript hash up to and including ClientFinished. */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_resumption_master_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *application_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets *derived) +{ + int ret; + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + application_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(res_master), + transcript, transcript_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED, + derived->resumption_master_secret, + hash_len); + + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * \brief Transition into application stage of TLS 1.3 key schedule. + * + * The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine + * with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and + * this function represents the Handshake -> Application transition. + * + * In the handshake stage, ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys() + * can be used to derive the handshake traffic keys. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in key schedule + * stage \c Handshake. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + psa_algorithm_t const hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type( + (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); + + /* + * Compute MasterSecret + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret( + hash_alg, + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake, + NULL, 0, + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( + 4, "Master secret", + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app, PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_calc_finished_core(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *base_key, + unsigned char const *transcript, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t *dst_len) +{ + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + unsigned char finished_key[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + int ret; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* TLS 1.3 Finished message + * + * struct { + * opaque verify_data[Hash.length]; + * } Finished; + * + * verify_data = + * HMAC( finished_key, + * Hash( Handshake Context + + * Certificate* + + * CertificateVerify* ) + * ) + * + * finished_key = + * HKDF-Expand-Label( BaseKey, "finished", "", Hash.length ) + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + hash_alg, base_key, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(finished), + NULL, 0, + finished_key, hash_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + alg = PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC); + + status = psa_import_key(&attributes, finished_key, hash_len, &key); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + goto exit; + } + + status = psa_mac_compute(key, alg, transcript, hash_len, + dst, hash_len, dst_len); + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + +exit: + + status = psa_destroy_key(key); + if (ret == 0) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(finished_key, sizeof(finished_key)); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *actual_len, + int from) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + + unsigned char *base_key = NULL; + size_t base_key_len = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *tls13_hs_secrets = + &ssl->handshake->tls13_hs_secrets; + + mbedtls_md_type_t const md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; + + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type( + (mbedtls_md_type_t) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data")); + + if (from == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + base_key = tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret; + base_key_len = sizeof(tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret); + } else { + base_key = tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret; + base_key_len = sizeof(tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret); + } + + if (dst_len < hash_len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto exit; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, + transcript, sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", ret); + goto exit; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "handshake hash", transcript, transcript_len); + + ret = ssl_tls13_calc_finished_core(hash_alg, base_key, + transcript, dst, actual_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "verify_data for finished message", dst, hash_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data")); + +exit: + /* Erase handshake secrets */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(base_key, base_key_len); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transcript, sizeof(transcript)); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *psk, size_t psk_len, + int psk_type, + unsigned char const *transcript, + unsigned char *result) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned char binder_key[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char early_secret[PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t const hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + size_t actual_len; + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for debug */ + ((void) ssl); +#endif + + /* We should never call this function with an unknown hash, + * but add an assertion anyway. */ + if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* + * 0 + * | + * v + * PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "ext binder" | "res binder", "") + * | = binder_key + * v + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret(hash_alg, + NULL, /* Old secret */ + psk, psk_len, /* Input */ + early_secret); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret); + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder", + early_secret, hash_len); + + if (psk_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + early_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(res_binder), + NULL, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED, + binder_key, hash_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Derive Early Secret with 'res binder'")); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + hash_alg, + early_secret, hash_len, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(ext_binder), + NULL, 0, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED, + binder_key, hash_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Derive Early Secret with 'ext binder'")); + } + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret", ret); + goto exit; + } + + /* + * The binding_value is computed in the same way as the Finished message + * but with the BaseKey being the binder_key. + */ + + ret = ssl_tls13_calc_finished_core(hash_alg, binder_key, transcript, + result, &actual_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "psk binder", result, actual_len); + +exit: + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(early_secret, sizeof(early_secret)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(binder_key, sizeof(binder_key)); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + int endpoint, int ciphersuite, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set const *traffic_keys, + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl /* DEBUG ONLY */) +{ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + int ret; + mbedtls_cipher_info_t const *cipher_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + unsigned char const *key_enc; + unsigned char const *iv_enc; + unsigned char const *key_dec; + unsigned char const *iv_dec; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + size_t key_bits; + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + ssl = NULL; /* make sure we don't use it except for those cases */ + (void) ssl; +#endif + + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(ciphersuite); + if (ciphersuite_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("ciphersuite info for %d not found", + ciphersuite)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(ciphersuite_info->cipher); + if (cipher_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cipher info for %u not found", + ciphersuite_info->cipher)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * Setup cipher contexts in target transform + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + cipher_info)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + cipher_info)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setup", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) { + key_enc = traffic_keys->server_write_key; + key_dec = traffic_keys->client_write_key; + iv_enc = traffic_keys->server_write_iv; + iv_dec = traffic_keys->client_write_iv; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) { + key_enc = traffic_keys->client_write_key; + key_dec = traffic_keys->server_write_key; + iv_enc = traffic_keys->client_write_iv; + iv_dec = traffic_keys->server_write_iv; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + { + /* should not happen */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + memcpy(transform->iv_enc, iv_enc, traffic_keys->iv_len); + memcpy(transform->iv_dec, iv_dec, traffic_keys->iv_len); + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_enc, + key_enc, (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info), + MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&transform->cipher_ctx_dec, + key_dec, (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info), + MBEDTLS_DECRYPT)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_cipher_setkey", ret); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* + * Setup other fields in SSL transform + */ + + if ((ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG) != 0) { + transform->taglen = 8; + } else { + transform->taglen = 16; + } + + transform->ivlen = traffic_keys->iv_len; + transform->maclen = 0; + transform->fixed_ivlen = transform->ivlen; + transform->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; + + /* We add the true record content type (1 Byte) to the plaintext and + * then pad to the configured granularity. The minimum length of the + * type-extended and padded plaintext is therefore the padding + * granularity. */ + transform->minlen = + transform->taglen + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + /* + * Setup psa keys and alg + */ + if ((status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher, + transform->taglen, + &alg, + &key_type, + &key_bits)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa", PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status)); + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + transform->psa_alg = alg; + + if (alg != MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER) { + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key_type); + + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + key_enc, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits), + &transform->psa_key_enc)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "psa_import_key", PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status)); + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT); + + if ((status = psa_import_key(&attributes, + key_dec, + PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits), + &transform->psa_key_dec)) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "psa_import_key", PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status)); + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info( + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info, + size_t *key_len, size_t *iv_len) +{ + psa_key_type_t key_type; + psa_algorithm_t alg; + size_t taglen; + size_t key_bits; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ciphersuite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG) { + taglen = 8; + } else { + taglen = 16; + } + + status = mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ciphersuite_info->cipher, taglen, + &alg, &key_type, &key_bits); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + *key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits); + + /* TLS 1.3 only have AEAD ciphers, IV length is unconditionally 12 bytes */ + *iv_len = 12; + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +/* + * ssl_tls13_generate_early_key() generates the key necessary for protecting + * the early application data and handshake messages as described in section 7 + * of RFC 8446. + * + * NOTE: Only one key is generated, the key for the traffic from the client to + * the server. The TLS 1.3 specification does not define a secret and thus + * a key for server early traffic. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_generate_early_key(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; + size_t hash_len; + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + size_t key_len = 0; + size_t iv_len = 0; + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets tls13_early_secrets; + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + handshake->ciphersuite_info; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_tls13_generate_early_key")); + + ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(ciphersuite_info, &key_len, &iv_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac; + + hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, + transcript, + sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets( + hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early, + transcript, transcript_len, &tls13_early_secrets); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( + 4, "Client early traffic secret", + tls13_early_secrets.client_early_traffic_secret, hash_len); + + /* + * Export client handshake traffic secret + */ + if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) { + ssl->f_export_keys( + ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET, + tls13_early_secrets.client_early_traffic_secret, + hash_len, + handshake->randbytes, + handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */); + } + + ret = ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key( + hash_alg, + tls13_early_secrets.client_early_traffic_secret, + hash_len, traffic_keys->client_write_key, key_len, + traffic_keys->client_write_iv, iv_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_make_traffic_key", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + traffic_keys->key_len = key_len; + traffic_keys->iv_len = iv_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client early write_key", + traffic_keys->client_write_key, + traffic_keys->key_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client early write_iv", + traffic_keys->client_write_iv, + traffic_keys->iv_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_tls13_generate_early_key")); + +cleanup: + /* Erase early secrets and transcript */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( + &tls13_early_secrets, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transcript, sizeof(transcript)); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys; + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_earlydata = NULL; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Next evolution in key schedule: Establish early_data secret and + * key material. */ + ret = ssl_tls13_generate_early_key(ssl, &traffic_keys); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_generate_early_key", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + transform_earlydata = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); + if (transform_earlydata == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( + transform_earlydata, + ssl->conf->endpoint, + handshake->ciphersuite_info->id, + &traffic_keys, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + handshake->transform_earlydata = transform_earlydata; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&traffic_keys, sizeof(traffic_keys)); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(transform_earlydata); + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + unsigned char *psk = NULL; + size_t psk_len = 0; + + if (handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("cipher suite info not found")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(ssl, &psk, &psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk", + ret); + return ret; + } + } +#endif + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret(hash_alg, NULL, psk, psk_len, + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + mbedtls_free((void *) psk); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early", + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); + return 0; +} + +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 handshake traffic keys. + * + * ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys() generates keys necessary for + * protecting the handshake messages, as described in Section 7 of + * RFC 8446. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in + * key schedule stage \c Handshake, see + * ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(). + * \param traffic_keys The address at which to store the handshake traffic + * keys. This must be writable but may be uninitialized. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; + size_t hash_len; + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + size_t key_len = 0; + size_t iv_len = 0; + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = + handshake->ciphersuite_info; + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *tls13_hs_secrets = + &handshake->tls13_hs_secrets; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys")); + + ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(ciphersuite_info, &key_len, &iv_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret); + return ret; + } + + md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac; + + hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, + transcript, + sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript", + ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets( + hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake, + transcript, transcript_len, tls13_hs_secrets); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets", + ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Client handshake traffic secret", + tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Server handshake traffic secret", + tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len); + + /* + * Export client handshake traffic secret + */ + if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) { + ssl->f_export_keys( + ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len, + handshake->randbytes, + handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */); + + ssl->f_export_keys( + ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len, + handshake->randbytes, + handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: FIX! */); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys( + hash_alg, + tls13_hs_secrets->client_handshake_traffic_secret, + tls13_hs_secrets->server_handshake_traffic_secret, + hash_len, key_len, iv_len, traffic_keys); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys", ret); + goto exit; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client_handshake write_key", + traffic_keys->client_write_key, + traffic_keys->key_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server_handshake write_key", + traffic_keys->server_write_key, + traffic_keys->key_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client_handshake write_iv", + traffic_keys->client_write_iv, + traffic_keys->iv_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server_handshake write_iv", + traffic_keys->server_write_iv, + traffic_keys->iv_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys")); + +exit: + + return ret; +} + +/** + * \brief Transition into handshake stage of TLS 1.3 key schedule. + * + * The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine + * with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and + * this function represents the Early -> Handshake transition. + * + * In the handshake stage, ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys() + * can be used to derive the handshake traffic keys. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in key schedule + * stage \c Early. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + psa_algorithm_t const hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type( + (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); + unsigned char *shared_secret = NULL; + size_t shared_secret_len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + /* + * Compute ECDHE secret used to compute the handshake secret from which + * client_handshake_traffic_secret and server_handshake_traffic_secret + * are derived in the handshake secret derivation stage. + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_ephemeral(ssl)) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(handshake->offered_group_id) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(handshake->offered_group_id)) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + psa_algorithm_t alg = + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(handshake->offered_group_id) ? + PSA_ALG_ECDH : PSA_ALG_FFDH; + + /* Compute ECDH shared secret. */ + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + &key_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + shared_secret_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES( + psa_get_key_bits(&key_attributes)); + shared_secret = mbedtls_calloc(1, shared_secret_len); + if (shared_secret == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_raw_key_agreement( + alg, handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey, + handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len, + shared_secret, shared_secret_len, &shared_secret_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_raw_key_agreement", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + status = psa_destroy_key(handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + ret = PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "psa_destroy_key", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + handshake->xxdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Group not supported.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + /* + * Compute the Handshake Secret + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret( + hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.early, + shared_secret, shared_secret_len, + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Handshake secret", + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.handshake, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg)); + +cleanup: + if (shared_secret != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(shared_secret, shared_secret_len); + } + + return ret; +} + +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 application traffic keys. + * + * ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys() generates application traffic + * keys, since any record following a 1-RTT Finished message MUST be + * encrypted under the application traffic key. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in + * key schedule stage \c Application, see + * ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(). + * \param traffic_keys The address at which to store the application traffic + * keys. This must be writable but may be uninitialized. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *traffic_keys) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Address at which to store the application secrets */ + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets * const app_secrets = + &ssl->session_negotiate->app_secrets; + + /* Holding the transcript up to and including the ServerFinished */ + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + + /* Variables relating to the hash for the chosen ciphersuite. */ + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; + + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg; + size_t hash_len; + + /* Variables relating to the cipher for the chosen ciphersuite. */ + size_t key_len = 0, iv_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> derive application traffic keys")); + + /* Extract basic information about hash and ciphersuite */ + + ret = ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info(handshake->ciphersuite_info, + &key_len, &iv_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_get_cipher_key_info", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; + + hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac); + hash_len = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* Compute current handshake transcript. It's the caller's responsibility + * to call this at the right time, that is, after the ServerFinished. */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, + transcript, sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Compute application secrets from master secret and transcript hash. */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets( + hash_alg, handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app, + transcript, transcript_len, app_secrets); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Derive first epoch of IV + Key for application traffic. */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys( + hash_alg, + app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N, + app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N, + hash_len, key_len, iv_len, traffic_keys); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Client application traffic secret", + app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N, + hash_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Server application traffic secret", + app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N, + hash_len); + + /* + * Export client/server application traffic secret 0 + */ + if (ssl->f_export_keys != NULL) { + ssl->f_export_keys( + ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + app_secrets->client_application_traffic_secret_N, hash_len, + handshake->randbytes, + handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: this should be replaced by + a new constant for TLS 1.3! */); + + ssl->f_export_keys( + ssl->p_export_keys, + MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET, + app_secrets->server_application_traffic_secret_N, hash_len, + handshake->randbytes, + handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE /* TODO: this should be replaced by + a new constant for TLS 1.3! */); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client application_write_key:", + traffic_keys->client_write_key, key_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server application write key", + traffic_keys->server_write_key, key_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "client application write IV", + traffic_keys->client_write_iv, iv_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server application write IV", + traffic_keys->server_write_iv, iv_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= derive application traffic keys")); + +cleanup: + /* randbytes is not used again */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->handshake->randbytes, + sizeof(ssl->handshake->randbytes)); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(transcript, sizeof(transcript)); + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys; + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_handshake = NULL; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + /* Compute handshake secret */ + ret = ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_handshake(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_master_secret", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Next evolution in key schedule: Establish handshake secret and + * key material. */ + ret = ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys(ssl, &traffic_keys); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_generate_handshake_keys", + ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + transform_handshake = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); + if (transform_handshake == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( + transform_handshake, + ssl->conf->endpoint, + handshake->ciphersuite_info->id, + &traffic_keys, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + handshake->transform_handshake = transform_handshake; + +cleanup: + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&traffic_keys, sizeof(traffic_keys)); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(transform_handshake); + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + unsigned char transcript[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 2, ("=> mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret")); + + md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(ssl, md_type, + transcript, sizeof(transcript), + &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_resumption_master_secret( + mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type), + handshake->tls13_master_secrets.app, + transcript, transcript_len, + &ssl->session_negotiate->app_secrets); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Erase master secrets */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&handshake->tls13_master_secrets, + sizeof(handshake->tls13_master_secrets)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( + 4, "Resumption master secret", + ssl->session_negotiate->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type))); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 2, ("<= mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret")); + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_application_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_key_set traffic_keys; + mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_application = NULL; + + ret = ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys(ssl, &traffic_keys); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_generate_application_keys", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + transform_application = + mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_transform)); + if (transform_application == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto cleanup; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform( + transform_application, + ssl->conf->endpoint, + ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->id, + &traffic_keys, + ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform", ret); + goto cleanup; + } + + ssl->transform_application = transform_application; + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&traffic_keys, sizeof(traffic_keys)); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(transform_application); + } + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **psk, + size_t *psk_len) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *psk_len = 0; + *psk = NULL; + + if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque, &key_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + + *psk_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(psa_get_key_bits(&key_attributes)); + *psk = mbedtls_calloc(1, *psk_len); + if (*psk == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + status = psa_export_key(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque, + (uint8_t *) *psk, *psk_len, psk_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + mbedtls_free((void *) *psk); + *psk = NULL; + return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + return 0; +#else + *psk = ssl->handshake->psk; + *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len; + if (*psk == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d3a4c6c9926 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.h @@ -0,0 +1,651 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 key schedule + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H + +/* This requires MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL( idx, name, string ) to be defined at + * the point of use. See e.g. the definition of mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_union + * below. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(finished, "finished") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(resumption, "resumption") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(traffic_upd, "traffic upd") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(exporter, "exporter") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(key, "key") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(iv, "iv") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(c_hs_traffic, "c hs traffic") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(c_ap_traffic, "c ap traffic") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(c_e_traffic, "c e traffic") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(s_hs_traffic, "s hs traffic") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(s_ap_traffic, "s ap traffic") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(s_e_traffic, "s e traffic") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(e_exp_master, "e exp master") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(res_master, "res master") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(exp_master, "exp master") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(ext_binder, "ext binder") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(res_binder, "res binder") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(derived, "derived") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(client_cv, "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify") \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(server_cv, "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify") + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED 1 + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION 1 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL(name, string) \ + const unsigned char name [sizeof(string) - 1]; + +union mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_union { + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +}; +struct mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_struct { + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL_LIST +}; +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LABEL + +extern const struct mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_struct mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels; + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN(LABEL) \ + sizeof(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels.LABEL) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(LABEL) \ + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels.LABEL, \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_LEN(LABEL) + +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_LABEL_LEN \ + sizeof(union mbedtls_ssl_tls13_labels_union) + +/* The maximum length of HKDF contexts used in the TLS 1.3 standard. + * Since contexts are always hashes of message transcripts, this can + * be approximated from above by the maximum hash size. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_CONTEXT_LEN \ + PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + +/* Maximum desired length for expanded key material generated + * by HKDF-Expand-Label. + * + * Warning: If this ever needs to be increased, the implementation + * ssl_tls13_hkdf_encode_label() in ssl_tls13_keys.c needs to be + * adjusted since it currently assumes that HKDF key expansion + * is never used with more than 255 Bytes of output. */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_SCHEDULE_MAX_EXPANSION_LEN 255 + +/** + * \brief The \c HKDF-Expand-Label function from + * the TLS 1.3 standard RFC 8446. + * + * + * HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, Label, Context, Length ) = + * HKDF-Expand( Secret, HkdfLabel, Length ) + * + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash algorithm to use. + * \param secret The \c Secret argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p secret_len Bytes. + * \param secret_len The length of \p secret in Bytes. + * \param label The \c Label argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p label_len Bytes. + * \param label_len The length of \p label in Bytes. + * \param ctx The \c Context argument to \c HKDF-Expand-Label. + * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ctx_len Bytes. + * \param ctx_len The length of \p context in Bytes. + * \param buf The destination buffer to hold the expanded secret. + * This must be a writable buffer of length \p buf_len Bytes. + * \param buf_len The desired size of the expanded secret in Bytes. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len); + +/** + * \brief This function is part of the TLS 1.3 key schedule. + * It extracts key and IV for the actual client/server traffic + * from the client/server traffic secrets. + * + * From RFC 8446: + * + * + * [sender]_write_key = HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, "key", "", key_length) + * [sender]_write_iv = HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, "iv", "", iv_length)* + * + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash algorithm to be used + * for the HKDF-based expansion of the secret. + * \param client_secret The client traffic secret. + * This must be a readable buffer of size + * \p secret_len Bytes + * \param server_secret The server traffic secret. + * This must be a readable buffer of size + * \p secret_len Bytes + * \param secret_len Length of the secrets \p client_secret and + * \p server_secret in Bytes. + * \param key_len The desired length of the key to be extracted in Bytes. + * \param iv_len The desired length of the IV to be extracted in Bytes. + * \param keys The address of the structure holding the generated + * keys and IVs. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *client_secret, + const unsigned char *server_secret, size_t secret_len, + size_t key_len, size_t iv_len, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set *keys); + +/** + * \brief The \c Derive-Secret function from the TLS 1.3 standard RFC 8446. + * + * + * Derive-Secret( Secret, Label, Messages ) = + * HKDF-Expand-Label( Secret, Label, + * Hash( Messages ), + * Hash.Length ) ) + * + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash function used for the + * applications of HKDF. + * \param secret The \c Secret argument to the \c Derive-Secret function. + * This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p secret_len Bytes. + * \param secret_len The length of \p secret in Bytes. + * \param label The \c Label argument to the \c Derive-Secret function. + * This must be a readable buffer of length + * \p label_len Bytes. + * \param label_len The length of \p label in Bytes. + * \param ctx The hash of the \c Messages argument to the + * \c Derive-Secret function, or the \c Messages argument + * itself, depending on \p ctx_hashed. + * \param ctx_len The length of \p ctx in Bytes. + * \param ctx_hashed This indicates whether the \p ctx contains the hash of + * the \c Messages argument in the application of the + * \c Derive-Secret function + * (value MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_HASHED), or whether + * it is the content of \c Messages itself, in which case + * the function takes care of the hashing + * (value MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_CONTEXT_UNHASHED). + * \param dstbuf The target buffer to write the output of + * \c Derive-Secret to. This must be a writable buffer of + * size \p dtsbuf_len Bytes. + * \param dstbuf_len The length of \p dstbuf in Bytes. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret, size_t secret_len, + const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, + const unsigned char *ctx, size_t ctx_len, + int ctx_hashed, + unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dstbuf_len); + +/** + * \brief Derive TLS 1.3 early data key material from early secret. + * + * This is a small wrapper invoking mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret() + * with the appropriate labels. + * + * + * Early Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "c e traffic", ClientHello) + * | = client_early_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret(., "e exp master", ClientHello) + * . = early_exporter_master_secret + * . + * . + * + * + * \note To obtain the actual key and IV for the early data traffic, + * the client secret derived by this function need to be + * further processed by mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys(). + * + * \note The binder key, which is also generated from the early secret, + * is omitted here. Its calculation is part of the separate routine + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(). + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm associated with the PSK for which + * early data key material is being derived. + * \param early_secret The early secret from which the early data key material + * should be derived. This must be a readable buffer whose + * length is the digest size of the hash algorithm + * represented by \p md_size. + * \param transcript The transcript of the handshake so far, calculated with + * respect to \p hash_alg. This must be a readable buffer + * whose length is the digest size of the hash algorithm + * represented by \p md_size. + * \param derived The address of the structure in which to store + * the early data key material. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_early_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *early_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets *derived); + +/** + * \brief Derive TLS 1.3 handshake key material from the handshake secret. + * + * This is a small wrapper invoking mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret() + * with the appropriate labels from the standard. + * + * + * Handshake Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c hs traffic", + * | ClientHello...ServerHello ) + * | = client_handshake_traffic_secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s hs traffic", + * . ClientHello...ServerHello ) + * . = server_handshake_traffic_secret + * . + * + * + * \note To obtain the actual key and IV for the encrypted handshake traffic, + * the client and server secret derived by this function need to be + * further processed by mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys(). + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm associated with the ciphersuite + * that's being used for the connection. + * \param handshake_secret The handshake secret from which the handshake key + * material should be derived. This must be a readable + * buffer whose length is the digest size of the hash + * algorithm represented by \p md_size. + * \param transcript The transcript of the handshake so far, calculated + * with respect to \p hash_alg. This must be a readable + * buffer whose length is the digest size of the hash + * algorithm represented by \p md_size. + * \param derived The address of the structure in which to + * store the handshake key material. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_handshake_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *handshake_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets *derived); + +/** + * \brief Derive TLS 1.3 application key material from the master secret. + * + * This is a small wrapper invoking mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret() + * with the appropriate labels from the standard. + * + * + * Master Secret + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "c ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...server Finished ) + * | = client_application_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "s ap traffic", + * | ClientHello...Server Finished ) + * | = server_application_traffic_secret_0 + * | + * +-----> Derive-Secret( ., "exp master", + * . ClientHello...server Finished) + * . = exporter_master_secret + * . + * + * + * \note To obtain the actual key and IV for the (0-th) application traffic, + * the client and server secret derived by this function need to be + * further processed by mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys(). + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm associated with the ciphersuite + * that's being used for the connection. + * \param master_secret The master secret from which the application key + * material should be derived. This must be a readable + * buffer whose length is the digest size of the hash + * algorithm represented by \p md_size. + * \param transcript The transcript of the handshake up to and including + * the ServerFinished message, calculated with respect + * to \p hash_alg. This must be a readable buffer whose + * length is the digest size of the hash algorithm + * represented by \p hash_alg. + * \param derived The address of the structure in which to + * store the application key material. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_application_secrets( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *master_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets *derived); + +/** + * \brief Derive TLS 1.3 resumption master secret from the master secret. + * + * This is a small wrapper invoking mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_secret() + * with the appropriate labels from the standard. + * + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm used in the application for which + * key material is being derived. + * \param application_secret The application secret from which the resumption master + * secret should be derived. This must be a readable + * buffer whose length is the digest size of the hash + * algorithm represented by \p md_size. + * \param transcript The transcript of the handshake up to and including + * the ClientFinished message, calculated with respect + * to \p hash_alg. This must be a readable buffer whose + * length is the digest size of the hash algorithm + * represented by \p hash_alg. + * \param transcript_len The length of \p transcript in Bytes. + * \param derived The address of the structure in which to + * store the resumption master secret. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_derive_resumption_master_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *application_secret, + unsigned char const *transcript, size_t transcript_len, + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets *derived); + +/** + * \brief Compute the next secret in the TLS 1.3 key schedule + * + * The TLS 1.3 key schedule proceeds as follows to compute + * the three main secrets during the handshake: The early + * secret for early data, the handshake secret for all + * other encrypted handshake messages, and the master + * secret for all application traffic. + * + * + * 0 + * | + * v + * PSK -> HKDF-Extract = Early Secret + * | + * v + * Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "" ) + * | + * v + * (EC)DHE -> HKDF-Extract = Handshake Secret + * | + * v + * Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "" ) + * | + * v + * 0 -> HKDF-Extract = Master Secret + * + * + * Each of the three secrets in turn is the basis for further + * key derivations, such as the derivation of traffic keys and IVs; + * see e.g. mbedtls_ssl_tls13_make_traffic_keys(). + * + * This function implements one step in this evolution of secrets: + * + * + * old_secret + * | + * v + * Derive-Secret( ., "derived", "" ) + * | + * v + * input -> HKDF-Extract = new_secret + * + * + * \param hash_alg The identifier for the hash function used for the + * applications of HKDF. + * \param secret_old The address of the buffer holding the old secret + * on function entry. If not \c NULL, this must be a + * readable buffer whose size matches the output size + * of the hash function represented by \p hash_alg. + * If \c NULL, an all \c 0 array will be used instead. + * \param input The address of the buffer holding the additional + * input for the key derivation (e.g., the PSK or the + * ephemeral (EC)DH secret). If not \c NULL, this must be + * a readable buffer whose size \p input_len Bytes. + * If \c NULL, an all \c 0 array will be used instead. + * \param input_len The length of \p input in Bytes. + * \param secret_new The address of the buffer holding the new secret + * on function exit. This must be a writable buffer + * whose size matches the output size of the hash + * function represented by \p hash_alg. + * This may be the same as \p secret_old. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret( + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + const unsigned char *secret_old, + const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, + unsigned char *secret_new); + +/** + * \brief Calculate a TLS 1.3 PSK binder. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context. This is used for debugging only and may + * be \c NULL if MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C is disabled. + * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm associated to the PSK \p psk. + * \param psk The buffer holding the PSK for which to create a binder. + * \param psk_len The size of \p psk in bytes. + * \param psk_type This indicates whether the PSK \p psk is externally + * provisioned (#MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL) or a + * resumption PSK (#MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION). + * \param transcript The handshake transcript up to the point where the + * PSK binder calculation happens. This must be readable, + * and its size must be equal to the digest size of + * the hash algorithm represented by \p hash_alg. + * \param result The address at which to store the PSK binder on success. + * This must be writable, and its size must be equal to the + * digest size of the hash algorithm represented by + * \p hash_alg. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const psa_algorithm_t hash_alg, + unsigned char const *psk, size_t psk_len, + int psk_type, + unsigned char const *transcript, + unsigned char *result); + +/** + * \bref Setup an SSL transform structure representing the + * record protection mechanism used by TLS 1.3 + * + * \param transform The SSL transform structure to be created. This must have + * been initialized through mbedtls_ssl_transform_init() and + * not used in any other way prior to calling this function. + * In particular, this function does not clean up the + * transform structure prior to installing the new keys. + * \param endpoint Indicates whether the transform is for the client + * (value #MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) or the server + * (value #MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER). + * \param ciphersuite The numerical identifier for the ciphersuite to use. + * This must be one of the identifiers listed in + * ssl_ciphersuites.h. + * \param traffic_keys The key material to use. No reference is stored in + * the SSL transform being generated, and the caller + * should destroy the key material afterwards. + * \param ssl (Debug-only) The SSL context to use for debug output + * in case of failure. This parameter is only needed if + * #MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C is set, and is ignored otherwise. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, \p transform is ready to + * be used with mbedtls_ssl_transform_decrypt() and + * mbedtls_ssl_transform_encrypt(). + * \return A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform, + int endpoint, + int ciphersuite, + mbedtls_ssl_key_set const *traffic_keys, + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/* + * TLS 1.3 key schedule evolutions + * + * Early -> Handshake -> Application + * + * Small wrappers around mbedtls_ssl_tls13_evolve_secret(). + */ + +/** + * \brief Begin TLS 1.3 key schedule by calculating early secret. + * + * The TLS 1.3 key schedule can be viewed as a simple state machine + * with states Initial -> Early -> Handshake -> Application, and + * this function represents the Initial -> Early transition. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 resumption master secret. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in + * key schedule stage \c Application, see + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(). + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Calculate the verify_data value for the client or server TLS 1.3 + * Finished message. + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. This must be in + * key schedule stage \c Handshake, see + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_application(). + * \param dst The address at which to write the verify_data value. + * \param dst_len The size of \p dst in bytes. + * \param actual_len The address at which to store the amount of data + * actually written to \p dst upon success. + * \param which The message to calculate the `verify_data` for: + * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT for the Client's Finished message + * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER for the Server's Finished message + * + * \note Both client and server call this function twice, once to + * generate their own Finished message, and once to verify the + * peer's Finished message. + + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_calculate_verify_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *dst, + size_t dst_len, + size_t *actual_len, + int which); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 early transform + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + * + * \warning The function does not compute the early master secret. Call + * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early() before to + * call this function to generate the early master secret. + * \note For a client/server endpoint, the function computes only the + * encryption/decryption part of the transform as the decryption/ + * encryption part is not defined by the specification (no early + * traffic from the server to the client). + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 handshake transform + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. The early secret must have been + * computed. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +/** + * \brief Compute TLS 1.3 application transform + * + * \param ssl The SSL context to operate on. The early secret must have been + * computed. + * + * \returns \c 0 on success. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_application_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/** + * \brief Export TLS 1.3 PSK from handshake context + * + * \param[in] ssl The SSL context to operate on. + * \param[out] psk PSK output pointer. + * \param[out] psk_len Length of PSK. + * + * \returns \c 0 if there is a configured PSK and it was exported + * successfully. + * \returns A negative error code on failure. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char **psk, + size_t *psk_len); +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEYS_H */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2760d76a5d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -0,0 +1,3599 @@ +/* + * TLS 1.3 server-side functions + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + +#include "debug_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + +#include "ssl_misc.h" +#include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" +#include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" + + +static const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ssl_tls13_validate_peer_ciphersuite( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned int cipher_suite) +{ + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered(ssl, cipher_suite)) { + return NULL; + } + + ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(cipher_suite); + if ((mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite(ssl, ciphersuite_info, + ssl->tls_version, + ssl->tls_version) != 0)) { + return NULL; + } + return ciphersuite_info; +} + +static void ssl_tls13_select_ciphersuite( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *cipher_suites, + const unsigned char *cipher_suites_end, + int psk_ciphersuite_id, + psa_algorithm_t psk_hash_alg, + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t **selected_ciphersuite_info) +{ + *selected_ciphersuite_info = NULL; + + /* + * In a compliant ClientHello the byte-length of the list of ciphersuites + * is even and this function relies on this fact. This should have been + * checked in the main ClientHello parsing function. Double check here. + */ + if ((cipher_suites_end - cipher_suites) & 1) { + return; + } + + for (const unsigned char *p = cipher_suites; + p < cipher_suites_end; p += 2) { + /* + * "cipher_suites_end - p is even" is an invariant of the loop. As + * cipher_suites_end - p > 0, we have cipher_suites_end - p >= 2 and it + * is thus safe to read two bytes. + */ + uint16_t id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info = + ssl_tls13_validate_peer_ciphersuite(ssl, id); + if (info == NULL) { + continue; + } + + /* + * If a valid PSK ciphersuite identifier has been passed in, we want + * an exact match. + */ + if (psk_ciphersuite_id != 0) { + if (id != psk_ciphersuite_id) { + continue; + } + } else if (psk_hash_alg != PSA_ALG_NONE) { + if (mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) info->mac) != + psk_hash_alg) { + continue; + } + } + + *selected_ciphersuite_info = info; + return; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("No matched ciphersuite, psk_ciphersuite_id=%x, psk_hash_alg=%x", + (unsigned) psk_ciphersuite_id, psk_hash_alg)); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/* From RFC 8446: + * + * enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode; + * struct { + * PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>; + * } PskKeyExchangeModes; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_key_exchange_modes_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t ke_modes_len; + int ke_modes = 0; + + /* Read ke_modes length (1 Byte) */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1); + ke_modes_len = *p++; + /* Currently, there are only two PSK modes, so even without looking + * at the content, something's wrong if the list has more than 2 items. */ + if (ke_modes_len > 2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, ke_modes_len); + + while (ke_modes_len-- != 0) { + switch (*p++) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_PURE: + ke_modes |= MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Found PSK KEX MODE")); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_ECDHE: + ke_modes |= MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Found PSK_EPHEMERAL KEX MODE")); + break; + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + } + + ssl->handshake->tls13_kex_modes = ke_modes; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Non-error return values of + * ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match_ticket() and + * ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match(). They are positive to + * not collide with error codes that are negative. Zero + * (SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) in case of success as it may be propagated + * up by the callers of this function as a generic success condition. + * + * The return value SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE means + * that the pre-shared-key identity matches that of a ticket or an externally- + * provisioned pre-shared-key. We have thus been able to retrieve the + * attributes of the pre-shared-key but at least one of them does not meet + * some criteria and the pre-shared-key cannot be used. For example, a ticket + * is expired or its version is not TLS 1.3. Note eventually that the return + * value SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE does not have + * anything to do with binder check. A binder check is done only when a + * suitable pre-shared-key has been selected and only for that selected + * pre-shared-key: if the binder check fails, we fail the handshake and we do + * not try to find another pre-shared-key for which the binder check would + * succeed as recommended by the specification. + */ +#define SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH 2 +#define SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE 1 +#define SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH 0 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_ephemeral_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match_ticket( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *identity, + size_t identity_len, + uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *ticket_buffer; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + mbedtls_ms_time_t now; + mbedtls_ms_time_t server_age; + uint32_t client_age; + mbedtls_ms_time_t age_diff; +#endif + + ((void) obfuscated_ticket_age); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> check_identity_match_ticket")); + + /* Ticket parser is not configured, Skip */ + if (ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse == NULL || identity_len == 0) { + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH; + } + + /* We create a copy of the encrypted ticket since the ticket parsing + * function is allowed to use its input buffer as an output buffer + * (in-place decryption). We do, however, need the original buffer for + * computing the PSK binder value. + */ + ticket_buffer = mbedtls_calloc(1, identity_len); + if (ticket_buffer == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + memcpy(ticket_buffer, identity, identity_len); + + ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse(ssl->conf->p_ticket, + session, + ticket_buffer, identity_len); + switch (ret) { + case 0: + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is expired")); + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket is not authentic")); + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH; + break; + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ticket_parse", ret); + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH; + } + + /* We delete the temporary buffer */ + mbedtls_free(ticket_buffer); + + if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) { + goto exit; + } + + /* + * The identity matches that of a ticket. Now check that it has suitable + * attributes and bet it will not be the case. + */ + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE; + + if (session->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Ticket TLS version is not 1.3.")); + goto exit; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + now = mbedtls_ms_time(); + + if (now < session->ticket_creation_time) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("Invalid ticket creation time ( now = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME + ", creation_time = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME " )", + now, session->ticket_creation_time)); + goto exit; + } + + server_age = now - session->ticket_creation_time; + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.6.1 + * + * Servers MUST NOT use any value greater than 604800 seconds (7 days). + * + * RFC 8446 section 4.2.11.1 + * + * Clients MUST NOT attempt to use tickets which have ages greater than + * the "ticket_lifetime" value which was provided with the ticket. + * + */ + if (server_age > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_MAX_ALLOWED_TICKET_LIFETIME * 1000) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("Ticket age exceeds limitation ticket_age = %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME, + server_age)); + goto exit; + } + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.2.10 + * + * For PSKs provisioned via NewSessionTicket, a server MUST validate that + * the ticket age for the selected PSK identity (computed by subtracting + * ticket_age_add from PskIdentity.obfuscated_ticket_age modulo 2^32) is + * within a small tolerance of the time since the ticket was issued. + * + * NOTE: The typical accuracy of an RTC crystal is ±100 to ±20 parts per + * million (360 to 72 milliseconds per hour). Default tolerance + * window is 6s, thus in the worst case clients and servers must + * sync up their system time every 6000/360/2~=8 hours. + */ + client_age = obfuscated_ticket_age - session->ticket_age_add; + age_diff = server_age - (mbedtls_ms_time_t) client_age; + if (age_diff < -MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE || + age_diff > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("Ticket age outside tolerance window ( diff = %" + MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME ")", + age_diff)); + goto exit; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + /* + * All good, we have found a suitable ticket. + */ + ret = SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH; + +exit: + if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) { + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(session); + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= check_identity_match_ticket")); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *identity, + size_t identity_len, + uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age, + int *psk_type, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ((void) session); + ((void) obfuscated_ticket_age); + *psk_type = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "identity", identity, identity_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + ret = ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match_ticket( + ssl, identity, identity_len, obfuscated_ticket_age, session); + if (ret == SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) { + *psk_type = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, + session->resumption_key, + session->resumption_key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "Ticket-resumed PSK:", + session->resumption_key, + session->resumption_key_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("ticket: obfuscated_ticket_age: %u", + (unsigned) obfuscated_ticket_age)); + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH; + } else if (ret == SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE) { + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH_BUT_PSK_NOT_USABLE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + /* Check identity with external configured function */ + if (ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL) { + if (ssl->conf->f_psk( + ssl->conf->p_psk, ssl, identity, identity_len) == 0) { + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH; + } + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(5, "identity", identity, identity_len); + /* Check identity with pre-configured psk */ + if (ssl->conf->psk_identity != NULL && + identity_len == ssl->conf->psk_identity_len && + mbedtls_ct_memcmp(ssl->conf->psk_identity, + identity, identity_len) == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, ssl->conf->psk, ssl->conf->psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret); + return ret; + } + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH; + } + + return SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_DOES_NOT_MATCH; +} + +/* + * Non-error return values of ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match(). + * They are positive to not collide with error codes that are negative. Zero + * (SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_MATCH) in case of success as it may be propagated up + * by the callers of this function as a generic success condition. + */ +#define SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_DOES_NOT_MATCH 1 +#define SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_MATCH 0 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *binder, size_t binder_len, + int psk_type, psa_algorithm_t psk_hash_alg) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + unsigned char transcript[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t transcript_len; + unsigned char *psk; + size_t psk_len; + unsigned char server_computed_binder[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE]; + + if (binder_len != PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psk_hash_alg)) { + return SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_DOES_NOT_MATCH; + } + + /* Get current state of handshake transcript. */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript( + ssl, mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psk_hash_alg), + transcript, sizeof(transcript), &transcript_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_export_handshake_psk(ssl, &psk, &psk_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_create_psk_binder(ssl, psk_hash_alg, + psk, psk_len, psk_type, + transcript, + server_computed_binder); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + mbedtls_free((void *) psk); +#endif + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("PSK binder calculation failed.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "psk binder ( computed ): ", + server_computed_binder, transcript_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "psk binder ( received ): ", binder, binder_len); + + if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(server_computed_binder, + binder, + PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psk_hash_alg)) == 0) { + return SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_MATCH; + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(server_computed_binder, + sizeof(server_computed_binder)); + return SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_DOES_NOT_MATCH; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_session_copy_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst, + const mbedtls_ssl_session *src) +{ + dst->ticket_age_add = src->ticket_age_add; + dst->ticket_flags = src->ticket_flags; + dst->resumption_key_len = src->resumption_key_len; + if (src->resumption_key_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + memcpy(dst->resumption_key, src->resumption_key, src->resumption_key_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + dst->max_early_data_size = src->max_early_data_size; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(dst, src->ticket_alpn); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA*/ + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +struct psk_attributes { + int type; + int key_exchange_mode; + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; +}; +#define PSK_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { 0, 0, NULL } + +/* Parser for pre_shared_key extension in client hello + * struct { + * opaque identity<1..2^16-1>; + * uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age; + * } PskIdentity; + * + * opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>; + * + * struct { + * PskIdentity identities<7..2^16-1>; + * PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>; + * } OfferedPsks; + * + * struct { + * select (Handshake.msg_type) { + * case client_hello: OfferedPsks; + * .... + * }; + * } PreSharedKeyExtension; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_pre_shared_key_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext, + const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext_end, + const unsigned char *ciphersuites, + const unsigned char *ciphersuites_end, + struct psk_attributes *psk) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *identities = pre_shared_key_ext; + const unsigned char *p_identity_len; + size_t identities_len; + const unsigned char *identities_end; + const unsigned char *binders; + const unsigned char *p_binder_len; + size_t binders_len; + const unsigned char *binders_end; + int matched_identity = -1; + int identity_id = -1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "pre_shared_key extension", + pre_shared_key_ext, + pre_shared_key_ext_end - pre_shared_key_ext); + + /* identities_len 2 bytes + * identities_data >= 7 bytes + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(identities, pre_shared_key_ext_end, 7 + 2); + identities_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(identities, 0); + p_identity_len = identities + 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p_identity_len, pre_shared_key_ext_end, + identities_len); + identities_end = p_identity_len + identities_len; + + /* binders_len 2 bytes + * binders >= 33 bytes + */ + binders = identities_end; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(binders, pre_shared_key_ext_end, 33 + 2); + binders_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(binders, 0); + p_binder_len = binders + 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p_binder_len, pre_shared_key_ext_end, binders_len); + binders_end = p_binder_len + binders_len; + + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum(ssl, pre_shared_key_ext, + identities_end - pre_shared_key_ext); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } + + while (p_identity_len < identities_end && p_binder_len < binders_end) { + const unsigned char *identity; + size_t identity_len; + uint32_t obfuscated_ticket_age; + const unsigned char *binder; + size_t binder_len; + int psk_ciphersuite_id; + psa_algorithm_t psk_hash_alg; + int allowed_key_exchange_modes; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_session session; + mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&session); +#endif + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p_identity_len, identities_end, 2 + 1 + 4); + identity_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p_identity_len, 0); + identity = p_identity_len + 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(identity, identities_end, identity_len + 4); + obfuscated_ticket_age = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(identity, identity_len); + p_identity_len += identity_len + 6; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p_binder_len, binders_end, 1 + 32); + binder_len = *p_binder_len; + binder = p_binder_len + 1; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(binder, binders_end, binder_len); + p_binder_len += binder_len + 1; + + identity_id++; + if (matched_identity != -1) { + continue; + } + + ret = ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match( + ssl, identity, identity_len, obfuscated_ticket_age, + &psk->type, &session); + if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_IDENTITY_MATCH) { + continue; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("found matched identity")); + + switch (psk->type) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_EXTERNAL: + psk_ciphersuite_id = 0; + psk_hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SHA_256; + allowed_key_exchange_modes = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL; + break; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION: + psk_ciphersuite_id = session.ciphersuite; + psk_hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_flags = session.ticket_flags; + allowed_key_exchange_modes = + session.ticket_flags & + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL; + break; +#endif + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + psk->key_exchange_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE; + + if ((allowed_key_exchange_modes & + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL) && + ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_ephemeral_available(ssl)) { + psk->key_exchange_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL; + } else if ((allowed_key_exchange_modes & + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK) && + ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_available(ssl)) { + psk->key_exchange_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK; + } + + if (psk->key_exchange_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("No suitable PSK key exchange mode")); + continue; + } + + ssl_tls13_select_ciphersuite(ssl, ciphersuites, ciphersuites_end, + psk_ciphersuite_id, psk_hash_alg, + &psk->ciphersuite_info); + + if (psk->ciphersuite_info == NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session); +#endif + /* + * We consider finding a ciphersuite suitable for the PSK as part + * of the validation of its binder. Thus if we do not find one, we + * abort the handshake with a decrypt_error alert. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + ret = ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match( + ssl, binder, binder_len, psk->type, + mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) psk->ciphersuite_info->mac)); + if (ret != SSL_TLS1_3_BINDER_MATCH) { + /* For security reasons, the handshake should be aborted when we + * fail to validate a binder value. See RFC 8446 section 4.2.11.2 + * and appendix E.6. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session); +#endif + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Invalid binder.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_binder_match", ret); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return ret; + } + + matched_identity = identity_id; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + if (psk->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION) { + ret = ssl_tls13_session_copy_ticket(ssl->session_negotiate, + &session); + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&session); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + } + + if (p_identity_len != identities_end || p_binder_len != binders_end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("pre_shared_key extension decode error")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* Update the handshake transcript with the binder list. */ + ret = ssl->handshake->update_checksum( + ssl, identities_end, (size_t) (binders_end - identities_end)); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } + if (matched_identity == -1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("No usable PSK or ticket.")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; + } + + ssl->handshake->selected_identity = (uint16_t) matched_identity; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Pre shared key found")); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * struct { + * select ( Handshake.msg_type ) { + * .... + * case server_hello: + * uint16 selected_identity; + * } + * } PreSharedKeyExtension; + */ +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_pre_shared_key_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *olen) +{ + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) buf; + + *olen = 0; + + int not_using_psk = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + not_using_psk = (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)); +#else + not_using_psk = (ssl->handshake->psk == NULL); +#endif + if (not_using_psk) { + /* We shouldn't have called this extension writer unless we've + * chosen to use a PSK. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding pre_shared_key extension")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(2, p, 2); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->handshake->selected_identity, p, 4); + + *olen = 6; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("sent selected_identity: %u", + ssl->handshake->selected_identity)); + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY); + + return 0; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +/* From RFC 8446: + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>; + * } SupportedVersions; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t versions_len; + const unsigned char *versions_end; + uint16_t tls_version; + int found_supported_version = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 1); + versions_len = p[0]; + p += 1; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, versions_len); + versions_end = p + versions_len; + while (p < versions_end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, versions_end, 2); + tls_version = mbedtls_ssl_read_version(p, ssl->conf->transport); + p += 2; + + if (MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 == tls_version) { + found_supported_version = 1; + break; + } + + if ((MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 == tls_version) && + mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_enabled(ssl->conf)) { + found_supported_version = 1; + break; + } + } + + if (!found_supported_version) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("No supported version found.")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Negotiated version: [%04x]", + (unsigned int) tls_version)); + + return (int) tls_version; +} + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) +/* + * + * From RFC 8446: + * enum { + * ... (0xFFFF) + * } NamedGroup; + * struct { + * NamedGroup named_group_list<2..2^16-1>; + * } NamedGroupList; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_supported_groups_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + const unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t named_group_list_len; + const unsigned char *named_group_list_end; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "supported_groups extension", p, end - buf); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + named_group_list_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, named_group_list_len); + named_group_list_end = p + named_group_list_len; + ssl->handshake->hrr_selected_group = 0; + + while (p < named_group_list_end) { + uint16_t named_group; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, named_group_list_end, 2); + named_group = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("got named group: %s(%04x)", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(named_group), + named_group)); + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_offered(ssl, named_group) || + !mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_supported(named_group) || + ssl->handshake->hrr_selected_group != 0) { + continue; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, + ("add named group %s(%04x) into received list.", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(named_group), + named_group)); + + ssl->handshake->hrr_selected_group = named_group; + } + + return 0; + +} +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ + +#define SSL_TLS1_3_PARSE_KEY_SHARES_EXT_NO_MATCH 1 + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +/* + * ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext() verifies whether the information in the + * extension is correct and stores the first acceptable key share and its + * associated group. + * + * Possible return values are: + * - 0: Successful processing of the client provided key share extension. + * - SSL_TLS1_3_PARSE_KEY_SHARES_EXT_NO_MATCH: The key shares provided by + * the client does not match a group supported by the server. A + * HelloRetryRequest will be needed. + * - A negative value for fatal errors. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char const *p = buf; + unsigned char const *client_shares_end; + size_t client_shares_len; + + /* From RFC 8446: + * + * struct { + * KeyShareEntry client_shares<0..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareClientHello; + * + */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 2); + client_shares_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, client_shares_len); + + ssl->handshake->offered_group_id = 0; + client_shares_end = p + client_shares_len; + + /* We try to find a suitable key share entry and copy it to the + * handshake context. Later, we have to find out whether we can do + * something with the provided key share or whether we have to + * dismiss it and send a HelloRetryRequest message. + */ + + while (p < client_shares_end) { + uint16_t group; + size_t key_exchange_len; + const unsigned char *key_exchange; + + /* + * struct { + * NamedGroup group; + * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareEntry; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, client_shares_end, 4); + group = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + key_exchange_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + key_exchange = p; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, client_shares_end, key_exchange_len); + p += key_exchange_len; + + /* Continue parsing even if we have already found a match, + * for input validation purposes. + */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_offered(ssl, group) || + !mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_supported(group) || + ssl->handshake->offered_group_id != 0) { + continue; + } + + /* + * ECDHE and FFDHE groups are supported + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(group) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(group)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ECDH/FFDH group: %s (%04x)", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(group), + group)); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_xxdhe_share( + ssl, key_exchange - 2, key_exchange_len + 2); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Unrecognized NamedGroup %u", + (unsigned) group)); + continue; + } + + ssl->handshake->offered_group_id = group; + } + + + if (ssl->handshake->offered_group_id == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no matching key share")); + return SSL_TLS1_3_PARSE_KEY_SHARES_EXT_NO_MATCH; + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int exts_mask) +{ + int masked = ssl->handshake->received_extensions & exts_mask; + return masked == exts_mask; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_ephemeral_key_exchange( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG)); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_psk_key_exchange( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES)); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_psk_ephemeral_key_exchange( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + return ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts( + ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES)); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED) + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_enabled(ssl) && + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_supported(ssl) && + ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_psk_key_exchange(ssl); +#else + ((void) ssl); + return 0; +#endif +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_psk_ephemeral_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_enabled(ssl) && + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_supported(ssl) && + ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_psk_ephemeral_key_exchange(ssl); +#else + ((void) ssl); + return 0; +#endif +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_ephemeral_available(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_ephemeral_enabled(ssl) && + ssl_tls13_client_hello_has_exts_for_ephemeral_key_exchange(ssl); +#else + ((void) ssl); + return 0; +#endif +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +static psa_algorithm_t ssl_tls13_iana_sig_alg_to_psa_alg(uint16_t sig_alg) +{ + switch (sig_alg) { + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256: + return PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384: + return PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512: + return PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_SHA_512); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(PSA_ALG_SHA_512); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512: + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_SHA_512); + default: + return PSA_ALG_NONE; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +/* + * Pick best ( private key, certificate chain ) pair based on the signature + * algorithms supported by the client. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert, *key_cert_list; + const uint16_t *sig_alg = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL) { + key_cert_list = ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + key_cert_list = ssl->conf->key_cert; + + if (key_cert_list == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server has no certificate")); + return -1; + } + + for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) { + if (!mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(ssl, *sig_alg)) { + continue; + } + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported(*sig_alg)) { + continue; + } + + for (key_cert = key_cert_list; key_cert != NULL; + key_cert = key_cert->next) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm_t psa_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(3, "certificate (chain) candidate", + key_cert->cert); + + /* + * This avoids sending the client a cert it'll reject based on + * keyUsage or other extensions. + */ + if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( + key_cert->cert, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) != 0 || + mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage( + key_cert->cert, MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: " + "(extended) key usage extension")); + continue; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:" + "check signature algorithm %s [%04x]", + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg), + *sig_alg)); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_alg = ssl_tls13_iana_sig_alg_to_psa_alg(*sig_alg); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match( + *sig_alg, &key_cert->cert->pk) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + && psa_alg != PSA_ALG_NONE && + mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(&key_cert->cert->pk, psa_alg, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) == 1 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + ) { + ssl->handshake->key_cert = key_cert; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:" + "selected signature algorithm" + " %s [%04x]", + mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_to_str(*sig_alg), + *sig_alg)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( + 3, "selected certificate (chain)", + ssl->handshake->key_cert->cert); + return 0; + } + } + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert:" + "no suitable certificate found")); + return -1; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * + * STATE HANDLING: ClientHello + * + * There are three possible classes of outcomes when parsing the ClientHello: + * + * 1) The ClientHello was well-formed and matched the server's configuration. + * + * In this case, the server progresses to sending its ServerHello. + * + * 2) The ClientHello was well-formed but didn't match the server's + * configuration. + * + * For example, the client might not have offered a key share which + * the server supports, or the server might require a cookie. + * + * In this case, the server sends a HelloRetryRequest. + * + * 3) The ClientHello was ill-formed + * + * In this case, we abort the handshake. + * + */ + +/* + * Structure of this message: + * + * uint16 ProtocolVersion; + * opaque Random[32]; + * uint8 CipherSuite[2]; // Cryptographic suite selector + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS v1.2 + * Random random; + * opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>; + * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>; + * opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>; + * Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>; + * } ClientHello; + */ + +#define SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_OK 0 +#define SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_HRR_REQUIRED 1 +#define SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_TLS1_2 2 + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned char *p = buf; + const unsigned char *random; + size_t legacy_session_id_len; + const unsigned char *legacy_session_id; + size_t cipher_suites_len; + const unsigned char *cipher_suites; + const unsigned char *cipher_suites_end; + size_t extensions_len; + const unsigned char *extensions_end; + const unsigned char *supported_versions_data; + const unsigned char *supported_versions_data_end; + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + int hrr_required = 0; + int no_usable_share_for_key_agreement = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + int got_psk = 0; + struct psk_attributes psk = PSK_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext = NULL; + const unsigned char *pre_shared_key_ext_end = NULL; +#endif + + /* + * ClientHello layout: + * 0 . 1 protocol version + * 2 . 33 random bytes + * 34 . 34 session id length ( 1 byte ) + * 35 . 34+x session id + * .. . .. ciphersuite list length ( 2 bytes ) + * .. . .. ciphersuite list + * .. . .. compression alg. list length ( 1 byte ) + * .. . .. compression alg. list + * .. . .. extensions length ( 2 bytes, optional ) + * .. . .. extensions ( optional ) + */ + + /* + * Minimal length ( with everything empty and extensions omitted ) is + * 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can + * read at least up to session id length without worrying. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, 38); + + /* ... + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2 + * ... + * with ProtocolVersion defined as: + * uint16 ProtocolVersion; + */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_read_version(p, ssl->conf->transport) != + MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Unsupported version of TLS.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + } + p += 2; + + /* ... + * Random random; + * ... + * with Random defined as: + * opaque Random[32]; + */ + random = p; + p += MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN; + + /* ... + * opaque legacy_session_id<0..32>; + * ... + */ + legacy_session_id_len = *(p++); + legacy_session_id = p; + + /* + * Check we have enough data for the legacy session identifier + * and the ciphersuite list length. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, legacy_session_id_len + 2); + p += legacy_session_id_len; + + /* ... + * CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-2>; + * ... + * with CipherSuite defined as: + * uint8 CipherSuite[2]; + */ + cipher_suites_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + cipher_suites = p; + + /* + * The length of the ciphersuite list has to be even. + */ + if (cipher_suites_len & 1) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + + /* Check we have enough data for the ciphersuite list, the legacy + * compression methods and the length of the extensions. + * + * cipher_suites cipher_suites_len bytes + * legacy_compression_methods 2 bytes + * extensions_len 2 bytes + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, cipher_suites_len + 2 + 2); + p += cipher_suites_len; + cipher_suites_end = p; + + /* + * Search for the supported versions extension and parse it to determine + * if the client supports TLS 1.3. + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts( + ssl, p + 2, end, + &supported_versions_data, &supported_versions_data_end); + if (ret < 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + ("mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts"), ret); + return ret; + } + + if (ret == 0) { + return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_TLS1_2; + } + + if (ret == 1) { + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext(ssl, + supported_versions_data, + supported_versions_data_end); + if (ret < 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + ("ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext"), ret); + return ret; + } + + /* + * The supported versions extension was parsed successfully as the + * value returned by ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext() is + * positive. The return value is then equal to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 or MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3, defining + * the TLS version to negotiate. + */ + if (MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 == ret) { + return SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_TLS1_2; + } + } + + /* + * We negotiate TLS 1.3. + */ + ssl->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; + ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; + ssl->session_negotiate->endpoint = ssl->conf->endpoint; + + /* + * We are negotiating the version 1.3 of the protocol. Do what we have + * postponed: copy of the client random bytes, copy of the legacy session + * identifier and selection of the TLS 1.3 cipher suite. + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, random bytes", + random, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + memcpy(&handshake->randbytes[0], random, MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + + if (legacy_session_id_len > sizeof(ssl->session_negotiate->id)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad client hello message")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = legacy_session_id_len; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, session id", + legacy_session_id, legacy_session_id_len); + memcpy(&ssl->session_negotiate->id[0], + legacy_session_id, legacy_session_id_len); + + /* + * Search for a matching ciphersuite + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello, list of cipher suites", + cipher_suites, cipher_suites_len); + + ssl_tls13_select_ciphersuite(ssl, cipher_suites, cipher_suites_end, + 0, PSA_ALG_NONE, &handshake->ciphersuite_info); + + if (handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = handshake->ciphersuite_info->id; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("selected ciphersuite: %04x - %s", + ((unsigned) handshake->ciphersuite_info->id), + handshake->ciphersuite_info->name)); + + /* ... + * opaque legacy_compression_methods<1..2^8-1>; + * ... + */ + if (p[0] != 1 || p[1] != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad legacy compression method")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + p += 2; + + /* ... + * Extension extensions<8..2^16-1>; + * ... + * with Extension defined as: + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + extensions_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, end, extensions_len); + extensions_end = p + extensions_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "client hello extensions", p, extensions_len); + handshake->received_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + while (p < extensions_end) { + unsigned int extension_type; + size_t extension_data_len; + const unsigned char *extension_data_end; + uint32_t allowed_exts = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CH; + + if (ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_flag) { + /* Do not accept early data extension in 2nd ClientHello */ + allowed_exts &= ~MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA); + } + + /* RFC 8446, section 4.2.11 + * + * The "pre_shared_key" extension MUST be the last extension in the + * ClientHello (this facilitates implementation as described below). + * Servers MUST check that it is the last extension and otherwise fail + * the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + if (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("pre_shared_key is not last extension.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, 4); + extension_type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 0); + extension_data_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(p, 2); + p += 4; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(p, extensions_end, extension_data_len); + extension_data_end = p + extension_data_len; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, extension_type, + allowed_exts); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + switch (extension_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found ServerName extension")); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(ssl, p, + extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_parse_servername_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found supported group extension")); + + /* Supported Groups Extension + * + * When sent by the client, the "supported_groups" extension + * indicates the named groups which the client supports, + * ordered from most preferred to least preferred. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_supported_groups_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_parse_supported_groups_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH*/ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found key share extension")); + + /* + * Key Share Extension + * + * When sent by the client, the "key_share" extension + * contains the endpoint's cryptographic parameters for + * ECDHE/DHE key establishment methods. + */ + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret == SSL_TLS1_3_PARSE_KEY_SHARES_EXT_NO_MATCH) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("No usable share for key agreement.")); + no_usable_share_for_key_agreement = 1; + } + + if (ret < 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS: + /* Already parsed */ + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("found psk key exchange modes extension")); + + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_key_exchange_modes_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_parse_key_exchange_modes_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + + break; +#endif + + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found pre_shared_key extension")); + if ((handshake->received_extensions & + MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES)) == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /* Delay processing of the PSK identity once we have + * found out which algorithms to use. We keep a pointer + * to the buffer and the size for later processing. + */ + pre_shared_key_ext = p; + pre_shared_key_ext_end = extension_data_end; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found alpn extension")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, ("mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext"), ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found signature_algorithms extension")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("found record_size_limit extension")); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext( + ssl, p, extension_data_end); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, ("mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext"), ret); + return ret; + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXT( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + extension_type, "( ignored )"); + break; + } + + p += extension_data_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + handshake->received_extensions); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(ssl, + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + p - buf); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + /* Update checksum with either + * - The entire content of the CH message, if no PSK extension is present + * - The content up to but excluding the PSK extension, if present. + * Always parse the pre-shared-key extension when present in the + * ClientHello even if some pre-requisites for PSK key exchange modes are + * not met. That way we always validate the syntax of the extension. + */ + if (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY)) { + ret = handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, + pre_shared_key_ext - buf); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } + ret = ssl_tls13_parse_pre_shared_key_ext(ssl, + pre_shared_key_ext, + pre_shared_key_ext_end, + cipher_suites, + cipher_suites_end, + &psk); + if (ret == 0) { + got_psk = 1; + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_parse_pre_shared_key_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */ + { + ret = handshake->update_checksum(ssl, buf, p - buf); + if (0 != ret) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, ("update_checksum"), ret); + return ret; + } + } + + /* + * Determine the key exchange algorithm to use. + * There are three types of key exchanges supported in TLS 1.3: + * - (EC)DH with ECDSA, + * - (EC)DH with PSK, + * - plain PSK. + * + * The PSK-based key exchanges may additionally be used with 0-RTT. + * + * Our built-in order of preference is + * 1 ) (EC)DHE-PSK Mode ( psk_ephemeral ) + * 2 ) Certificate Mode ( ephemeral ) + * 3 ) Plain PSK Mode ( psk ) + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (got_psk && (psk.key_exchange_mode == + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL)) { + handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("key exchange mode: psk_ephemeral")); + + } else +#endif + if (ssl_tls13_key_exchange_is_ephemeral_available(ssl)) { + handshake->key_exchange_mode = + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("key exchange mode: ephemeral")); + + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + else if (got_psk && (psk.key_exchange_mode == + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK)) { + handshake->key_exchange_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("key exchange mode: psk")); + } +#endif + else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, + ("ClientHello message misses mandatory extensions.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_MISSING_EXTENSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (handshake->key_exchange_mode & + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL) { + handshake->ciphersuite_info = psk.ciphersuite_info; + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = psk.ciphersuite_info->id; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Select PSK ciphersuite: %04x - %s", + ((unsigned) psk.ciphersuite_info->id), + psk.ciphersuite_info->name)); + + if (psk.type == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_RESUMPTION) { + handshake->resume = 1; + } + } +#endif + + if (handshake->key_exchange_mode != + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK) { + hrr_required = (no_usable_share_for_key_agreement != 0); + } + + mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(ssl, handshake->ciphersuite_info); + + return hrr_required ? SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_HRR_REQUIRED : SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_OK; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +static int ssl_tls13_check_early_data_requirements(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; + + if (ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, + ("EarlyData: rejected, feature disabled in server configuration.")); + return -1; + } + + if (!handshake->resume) { + /* We currently support early data only in the case of PSKs established + via a NewSessionTicket message thus in the case of a session + resumption. */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, not a session resumption.")); + return -1; + } + + /* RFC 8446 4.2.10 + * + * In order to accept early data, the server MUST have accepted a PSK cipher + * suite and selected the first key offered in the client's "pre_shared_key" + * extension. In addition, it MUST verify that the following values are the + * same as those associated with the selected PSK: + * - The TLS version number + * - The selected cipher suite + * - The selected ALPN [RFC7301] protocol, if any + * + * NOTE: + * - The TLS version number is checked in + * ssl_tls13_offered_psks_check_identity_match_ticket(). + */ + + if (handshake->selected_identity != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, the selected key in " + "`pre_shared_key` is not the first one.")); + return -1; + } + + if (handshake->ciphersuite_info->id != + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, the selected ciphersuite is not the one " + "of the selected pre-shared key.")); + return -1; + + } + + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_early_data(ssl->session_negotiate)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, + ("EarlyData: rejected, early_data not allowed in ticket " + "permission bits.")); + return -1; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + const char *alpn = mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol(ssl); + size_t alpn_len; + + if (alpn == NULL && ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_alpn == NULL) { + return 0; + } + + if (alpn != NULL) { + alpn_len = strlen(alpn); + } + + if (alpn == NULL || + ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_alpn == NULL || + alpn_len != strlen(ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_alpn) || + (memcmp(alpn, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_alpn, alpn_len) != 0)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("EarlyData: rejected, the selected ALPN is different " + "from the one associated with the pre-shared key.")); + return -1; + } +#endif + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +/* Update the handshake state machine */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int hrr_required) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* + * Server certificate selection + */ + if (ssl->conf->f_cert_cb && (ret = ssl->conf->f_cert_cb(ssl)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_cert_cb", ret); + return ret; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + ssl->handshake->sni_name = NULL; + ssl->handshake->sni_name_len = 0; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "mbedtls_ssl_tls1_3_key_schedule_stage_early", ret); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA)) { + ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted = + (!hrr_required) && (ssl_tls13_check_early_data_requirements(ssl) == 0); + + if (ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform", ret); + return ret; + } + } else { + ssl->discard_early_data_record = + hrr_required ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD : + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD; + } + } +#else + ((void) hrr_required); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Main entry point from the state machine; orchestrates the otherfunctions. + */ + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf = NULL; + size_t buflen = 0; + int parse_client_hello_ret; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> parse client hello")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, + &buf, &buflen)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_parse_client_hello(ssl, buf, + buf + buflen)); + parse_client_hello_ret = ret; /* Store positive return value of + * parse_client_hello, + * as negative error codes are handled + * by MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG. */ + + /* + * Version 1.2 of the protocol has to be used for the handshake. + * If TLS 1.2 is not supported, abort the handshake. Otherwise, set the + * ssl->keep_current_message flag for the ClientHello to be kept and parsed + * as a TLS 1.2 ClientHello. We also change ssl->tls_version to + * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 thus from now on mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step() + * will dispatch to the TLS 1.2 state machine. + */ + if (SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_TLS1_2 == parse_client_hello_ret) { + /* Check if server supports TLS 1.2 */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_enabled(ssl->conf)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("TLS 1.2 not supported.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + } + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + ssl->tls_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + return 0; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( + ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello(ssl, parse_client_hello_ret == + SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_HRR_REQUIRED)); + + if (SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_OK == parse_client_hello_ret) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO); + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST); + } + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= parse client hello")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_prepare_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *server_randbytes = + ssl->handshake->randbytes + MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN; + + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, server_randbytes, + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "f_rng", ret); + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes", server_randbytes, + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time(NULL); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ + + return ret; +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_supported_versions_ext (): + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion selected_version; + * } SupportedVersions; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_supported_versions_ext( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, write selected version")); + + /* Check if we have space to write the extension: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - selected_version (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 6); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, buf, 0); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(2, buf, 2); + + mbedtls_ssl_write_version(buf + 4, + ssl->conf->transport, + ssl->tls_version); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("supported version: [%04x]", + ssl->tls_version)); + + *out_len = 6; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask( + ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS); + + return 0; +} + + + +/* Generate and export a single key share. For hybrid KEMs, this can + * be called multiple times with the different components of the hybrid. */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_key_share(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t named_group, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + *out_len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(named_group) || + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(named_group)) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange( + ssl, named_group, buf, end, out_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange", + ret); + return ret; + } + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + if (0 /* Other kinds of KEMs */) { + } else { + ((void) ssl); + ((void) named_group); + ((void) buf); + ((void) end); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext + * + * Structure of key_share extension in ServerHello: + * + * struct { + * NamedGroup group; + * opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; + * } KeyShareEntry; + * struct { + * KeyShareEntry server_share; + * } KeyShareServerHello; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + uint16_t group = ssl->handshake->offered_group_id; + unsigned char *server_share = buf + 4; + size_t key_exchange_length; + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, adding key share extension")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("server hello, write selected_group: %s (%04x)", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(group), + group)); + + /* Check if we have space for header and length fields: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - group (2 bytes) + * - key_exchange_length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 8); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(group, server_share, 0); + p += 8; + + /* When we introduce PQC-ECDHE hybrids, we'll want to call this + * function multiple times. */ + ret = ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_key_share( + ssl, group, server_share + 4, end, &key_exchange_length); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += key_exchange_length; + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(key_exchange_length, server_share + 2, 0); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - server_share, buf, 2); + + *out_len = p - buf; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_hrr_key_share_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + uint16_t selected_group = ssl->handshake->hrr_selected_group; + /* key_share Extension + * + * struct { + * select (Handshake.msg_type) { + * ... + * case hello_retry_request: + * NamedGroup selected_group; + * ... + * }; + * } KeyShare; + */ + + *out_len = 0; + + /* + * For a pure PSK key exchange, there is no group to agree upon. The purpose + * of the HRR is then to transmit a cookie to force the client to demonstrate + * reachability at their apparent network address (primarily useful for DTLS). + */ + if (!mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_ephemeral(ssl)) { + return 0; + } + + /* We should only send the key_share extension if the client's initial + * key share was not acceptable. */ + if (ssl->handshake->offered_group_id != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Skip key_share extension in HRR")); + return 0; + } + + if (selected_group == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no matching named group found")); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* Check if we have enough space: + * - extension_type (2 bytes) + * - extension_data_length (2 bytes) + * - selected_group (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(buf, end, 6); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE, buf, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(2, buf, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(selected_group, buf, 4); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("HRR selected_group: %s (%x)", + mbedtls_ssl_named_group_to_str(selected_group), + selected_group)); + + *out_len = 6; + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Structure of ServerHello message: + * + * struct { + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS v1.2 + * Random random; + * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; + * CipherSuite cipher_suite; + * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; + * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; + * } ServerHello; + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len, + int is_hrr) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + unsigned char *p_extensions_len; + size_t output_len; + + *out_len = 0; + ssl->handshake->sent_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + /* ... + * ProtocolVersion legacy_version = 0x0303; // TLS 1.2 + * ... + * with ProtocolVersion defined as: + * uint16 ProtocolVersion; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(0x0303, p, 0); + p += 2; + + /* ... + * Random random; + * ... + * with Random defined as: + * opaque Random[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN]; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + if (is_hrr) { + memcpy(p, mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic, + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + } else { + memcpy(p, &ssl->handshake->randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN], + MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello, random bytes", + p, MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN); + p += MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN; + + /* ... + * opaque legacy_session_id_echo<0..32>; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 1 + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + *p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + if (ssl->session_negotiate->id_len > 0) { + memcpy(p, &ssl->session_negotiate->id[0], + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "session id", ssl->session_negotiate->id, + ssl->session_negotiate->id_len); + } + + /* ... + * CipherSuite cipher_suite; + * ... + * with CipherSuite defined as: + * uint8 CipherSuite[2]; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite, p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, + ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s ( id=%d )", + mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite), + ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite)); + + /* ... + * uint8 legacy_compression_method = 0; + * ... + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 1); + *p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; + + /* ... + * Extension extensions<6..2^16-1>; + * ... + * struct { + * ExtensionType extension_type; (2 bytes) + * opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; + * } Extension; + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p_extensions_len = p; + p += 2; + + if ((ret = ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_supported_versions_ext( + ssl, p, end, &output_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_supported_versions_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_ephemeral(ssl)) { + if (is_hrr) { + ret = ssl_tls13_write_hrr_key_share_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + } else { + ret = ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + } + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + if (!is_hrr && mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) { + ret = ssl_tls13_write_server_pre_shared_key_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_write_server_pre_shared_key_ext", + ret); + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - p_extensions_len - 2, p_extensions_len, 0); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "server hello extensions", + p_extensions_len, p - p_extensions_len); + + *out_len = p - buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "server hello", buf, *out_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, is_hrr ? MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST : + MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, + ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); + + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_finalize_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform", + ret); + return ret; + } + + return ret; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write server hello")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_prepare_server_hello(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_body(ssl, buf, + buf + buf_len, + &msg_len, + 0)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_finalize_server_hello(ssl)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + /* The server sends a dummy change_cipher_spec record immediately + * after its first handshake message. This may either be after + * a ServerHello or a HelloRetryRequest. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO); +#else + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write server hello")); + return ret; +} + + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_prepare_hello_retry_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + if (ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_flag) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Too many HRRs")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } + + /* + * Create stateless transcript hash for HRR + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("Reset transcript for HRR")); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr", ret); + return ret; + } + mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(ssl, 0); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_hello_retry_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write hello retry request")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_prepare_hello_retry_request(ssl)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_body(ssl, buf, + buf + buf_len, + &msg_len, + 1)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO, buf, msg_len)); + + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(ssl, buf_len, + msg_len)); + + ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_flag = 1; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + /* The server sends a dummy change_cipher_spec record immediately + * after its first handshake message. This may either be after + * a ServerHello or a HelloRetryRequest. + */ + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST); +#else + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + +cleanup: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write hello retry request")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS + */ + +/* + * struct { + * Extension extensions<0..2 ^ 16 - 1>; + * } EncryptedExtensions; + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t extensions_len = 0; + unsigned char *p_extensions_len; + size_t output_len; + + *out_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p_extensions_len = p; + p += 2; + + ((void) ssl); + ((void) ret); + ((void) output_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext( + ssl, 0, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + if (ssl->handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext( + ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } +#endif + + extensions_len = (p - p_extensions_len) - 2; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(extensions_len, p_extensions_len, 0); + + *out_len = p - buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "encrypted extensions", buf, *out_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(ssl, + ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("switching to handshake transform for outbound data")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write encrypted extensions")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions_body( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(ssl)) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST); + } +#else + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); +#endif + +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write encrypted extensions")); + return ret; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SEND_REQUEST 0 +#define SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP 1 +/* Coordination: + * Check whether a CertificateRequest message should be written. + * Returns a negative code on failure, or + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SEND_REQUEST + * - SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP + * indicating if the writing of the CertificateRequest + * should be skipped or not. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_certificate_request_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int authmode; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + if (ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET) { + authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode; + } else +#endif + authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; + + if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) { + ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY; + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP; + } + + ssl->handshake->certificate_request_sent = 1; + + return SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SEND_REQUEST; +} + +/* + * struct { + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * Extension extensions<2..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateRequest; + * + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_certificate_request_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + size_t output_len = 0; + unsigned char *p_extensions_len; + + *out_len = 0; + + /* Check if we have enough space: + * - certificate_request_context (1 byte) + * - extensions length (2 bytes) + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 3); + + /* + * Write certificate_request_context + */ + /* + * We use a zero length context for the normal handshake + * messages. For post-authentication handshake messages + * this request context would be set to a non-zero value. + */ + *p++ = 0x0; + + /* + * Write extensions + */ + /* The extensions must contain the signature_algorithms. */ + p_extensions_len = p; + p += 2; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_sig_alg_ext(ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + p += output_len; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - p_extensions_len - 2, p_extensions_len, 0); + + *out_len = p - buf; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); + + return 0; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_certificate_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write certificate request")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_certificate_request_coordinate(ssl)); + + if (ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SEND_REQUEST) { + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_certificate_request_body( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + buf, msg_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); + } else if (ret == SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_SKIP) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write certificate request")); + ret = 0; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE); +cleanup: + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write certificate request")); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + if ((ssl_tls13_pick_key_cert(ssl) != 0) || + mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(ssl) == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("No certificate available.")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +/* + * RFC 8446 section A.2 + * + * | Send ServerHello + * | K_send = handshake + * | Send EncryptedExtensions + * | [Send CertificateRequest] + * Can send | [Send Certificate + CertificateVerify] + * app data | Send Finished + * after --> | K_send = application + * here +--------+--------+ + * No 0-RTT | | 0-RTT + * | | + * K_recv = handshake | | K_recv = early data + * [Skip decrypt errors] | +------> WAIT_EOED -+ + * | | Recv | | Recv EndOfEarlyData + * | | early data | | K_recv = handshake + * | +------------+ | + * | | + * +> WAIT_FLIGHT2 <--------+ + * | + * +--------+--------+ + * No auth | | Client auth + * | | + * | v + * | WAIT_CERT + * | Recv | | Recv Certificate + * | empty | v + * | Certificate | WAIT_CV + * | | | Recv + * | v | CertificateVerify + * +-> WAIT_FINISHED <---+ + * | Recv Finished + * + * + * The following function handles the state changes after WAIT_FLIGHT2 in the + * above diagram. We are not going to receive early data related messages + * anymore, prepare to receive the first handshake message of the client + * second flight. + */ +static void ssl_tls13_prepare_for_handshake_second_flight( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + if (ssl->handshake->certificate_request_sent) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("skip parse certificate")); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("skip parse certificate verify")); + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED); + } +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_server_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_application_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return ret; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted) { + /* See RFC 8446 section A.2 for more information */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Switch to early keys for inbound traffic. " + "( K_recv = early data )")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform( + ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA); + return 0; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic " + "( K_recv = handshake )")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + + ssl_tls13_prepare_for_handshake_second_flight(ssl); + + return 0; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA + */ +#define SSL_GOT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA 0 +#define SSL_GOT_EARLY_DATA 1 +/* Coordination: + * Deals with the ambiguity of not knowing if the next message is an + * EndOfEarlyData message or an application message containing early data. + * Returns a negative code on failure, or + * - SSL_GOT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA + * - SSL_GOT_EARLY_DATA + * indicating which message is received. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_end_of_early_data_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); + return ret; + } + ssl->keep_current_message = 1; + + if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE && + ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Received an end_of_early_data message.")); + return SSL_GOT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; + } + + if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) { + if (ssl->in_offt == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Received early data")); + /* Set the reading pointer */ + ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(ssl, ssl->in_msglen); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + return SSL_GOT_EARLY_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; +} + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_parse_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + const unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + /* RFC 8446 section 4.5 + * + * struct {} EndOfEarlyData; + */ + if (buf != end) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * RFC 8446 section A.2 + * + * | Send ServerHello + * | K_send = handshake + * | Send EncryptedExtensions + * | [Send CertificateRequest] + * Can send | [Send Certificate + CertificateVerify] + * app data | Send Finished + * after --> | K_send = application + * here +--------+--------+ + * No 0-RTT | | 0-RTT + * | | + * K_recv = handshake | | K_recv = early data + * [Skip decrypt errors] | +------> WAIT_EOED -+ + * | | Recv | | Recv EndOfEarlyData + * | | early data | | K_recv = handshake + * | +------------+ | + * | | + * +> WAIT_FLIGHT2 <--------+ + * | + * +--------+--------+ + * No auth | | Client auth + * | | + * | v + * | WAIT_CERT + * | Recv | | Recv Certificate + * | empty | v + * | Certificate | WAIT_CV + * | | | Recv + * | v | CertificateVerify + * +-> WAIT_FINISHED <---+ + * | Recv Finished + * + * The function handles actions and state changes from 0-RTT to WAIT_FLIGHT2 in + * the above diagram. + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_end_of_early_data_coordinate(ssl)); + + if (ret == SSL_GOT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) { + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_end_of_early_data( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic" + "( K_recv = handshake )")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform( + ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_handshake); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, + buf, buf_len)); + + ssl_tls13_prepare_for_handshake_second_flight(ssl); + + } else if (ret == SSL_GOT_EARLY_DATA) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data")); + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_process_client_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_resumption_master_secret", ret); + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("handshake: done")); + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(ssl); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) +/* TODO: Remove the check of SOME_PSK_ENABLED since SESSION_TICKETS requires + * SOME_PSK_ENABLED to be enabled. Here is just to make CI happy. It is + * expected to be resolved with issue#6395. + */ + /* Sent NewSessionTicket message only when client supports PSK */ + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_some_psk_supported(ssl)) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + } else +#endif + { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER); + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET + */ +#define SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SKIP 0 +#define SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_WRITE 1 +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + /* Check whether the use of session tickets is enabled */ + if (ssl->conf->f_ticket_write == NULL) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("NewSessionTicket: disabled," + " callback is not set")); + return SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SKIP; + } + if (ssl->conf->new_session_tickets_count == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("NewSessionTicket: disabled," + " configured count is zero")); + return SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SKIP; + } + + if (ssl->handshake->new_session_tickets_count == 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("NewSessionTicket: all tickets have " + "been sent.")); + return SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_SKIP; + } + + return SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_WRITE; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_prepare_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *ticket_nonce, + size_t ticket_nonce_size) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session; + mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; + psa_algorithm_t psa_hash_alg; + int hash_length; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> prepare NewSessionTicket msg")); + + /* Set ticket_flags depends on the advertised psk key exchange mode */ + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_clear_ticket_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_set_ticket_flags( + session, ssl->handshake->tls13_kex_modes); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED && + ssl->conf->max_early_data_size > 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_set_ticket_flags( + session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA); + session->max_early_data_size = ssl->conf->max_early_data_size; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_TICKET_FLAGS(4, session->ticket_flags); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + if (session->ticket_alpn == NULL) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(session, ssl->alpn_chosen); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif + + /* Generate ticket_age_add */ + if ((ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, + (unsigned char *) &session->ticket_age_add, + sizeof(session->ticket_age_add)) != 0)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "generate_ticket_age_add", ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket_age_add: %u", + (unsigned int) session->ticket_age_add)); + + /* Generate ticket_nonce */ + ret = ssl->conf->f_rng(ssl->conf->p_rng, ticket_nonce, ticket_nonce_size); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "generate_ticket_nonce", ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "ticket_nonce:", + ticket_nonce, ticket_nonce_size); + + ciphersuite_info = + (mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *) ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info; + psa_hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) ciphersuite_info->mac); + hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(psa_hash_alg); + if (hash_length == -1 || + (size_t) hash_length > sizeof(session->resumption_key)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + + /* In this code the psk key length equals the length of the hash */ + session->resumption_key_len = hash_length; + session->ciphersuite = ciphersuite_info->id; + + /* Compute resumption key + * + * HKDF-Expand-Label( resumption_master_secret, + * "resumption", ticket_nonce, Hash.length ) + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hkdf_expand_label( + psa_hash_alg, + session->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret, + hash_length, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_LBL_WITH_LEN(resumption), + ticket_nonce, + ticket_nonce_size, + session->resumption_key, + hash_length); + + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(2, + "Creating the ticket-resumed PSK failed", + ret); + return ret; + } + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "Ticket-resumed PSK", + session->resumption_key, + session->resumption_key_len); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(3, "resumption_master_secret", + session->app_secrets.resumption_master_secret, + hash_length); + + return 0; +} + +/* This function creates a NewSessionTicket message in the following format: + * + * struct { + * uint32 ticket_lifetime; + * uint32 ticket_age_add; + * opaque ticket_nonce<0..255>; + * opaque ticket<1..2^16-1>; + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-2>; + * } NewSessionTicket; + * + * The ticket inside the NewSessionTicket message is an encrypted container + * carrying the necessary information so that the server is later able to + * re-start the communication. + * + * The following fields are placed inside the ticket by the + * f_ticket_write() function: + * + * - creation time (ticket_creation_time) + * - flags (ticket_flags) + * - age add (ticket_age_add) + * - key (resumption_key) + * - key length (resumption_key_len) + * - ciphersuite (ciphersuite) + * - max_early_data_size (max_early_data_size) + */ +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +static int ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, + unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len, + unsigned char *ticket_nonce, + size_t ticket_nonce_size) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + mbedtls_ssl_session *session = ssl->session; + size_t ticket_len; + uint32_t ticket_lifetime; + unsigned char *p_extensions_len; + + *out_len = 0; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write NewSessionTicket msg")); + + /* + * ticket_lifetime 4 bytes + * ticket_age_add 4 bytes + * ticket_nonce 1 + ticket_nonce_size bytes + * ticket >=2 bytes + */ + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 4 + 4 + 1 + ticket_nonce_size + 2); + + /* Generate ticket and ticket_lifetime */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + session->ticket_creation_time = mbedtls_ms_time(); +#endif + ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_write(ssl->conf->p_ticket, + session, + p + 9 + ticket_nonce_size + 2, + end, + &ticket_len, + &ticket_lifetime); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "write_ticket", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* RFC 8446 section 4.6.1 + * + * ticket_lifetime: Indicates the lifetime in seconds as a 32-bit + * unsigned integer in network byte order from the time of ticket + * issuance. Servers MUST NOT use any value greater than + * 604800 seconds (7 days) ... + */ + if (ticket_lifetime > MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_MAX_ALLOWED_TICKET_LIFETIME) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Ticket lifetime (%u) is greater than 7 days.", + (unsigned int) ticket_lifetime)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ticket_lifetime, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket_lifetime: %u", + (unsigned int) ticket_lifetime)); + + /* Write ticket_age_add */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(session->ticket_age_add, p, 4); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("ticket_age_add: %u", + (unsigned int) session->ticket_age_add)); + + /* Write ticket_nonce */ + p[8] = (unsigned char) ticket_nonce_size; + if (ticket_nonce_size > 0) { + memcpy(p + 9, ticket_nonce, ticket_nonce_size); + } + p += 9 + ticket_nonce_size; + + /* Write ticket */ + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(ticket_len, p, 0); + p += 2; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "ticket", p, ticket_len); + p += ticket_len; + + /* Ticket Extensions + * + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-2>; + */ + ssl->handshake->sent_extensions = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 2); + p_extensions_len = p; + p += 2; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_early_data(session)) { + size_t output_len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext( + ssl, 1, p, end, &output_len)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext", ret); + return ret; + } + p += output_len; + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 4, ("early_data not allowed, " + "skip early_data extension in NewSessionTicket")); + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(p - p_extensions_len - 2, p_extensions_len, 0); + + *out_len = p - buf; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(4, "ticket", buf, *out_len); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write new session ticket")); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS( + 3, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ssl->handshake->sent_extensions); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET + */ +static int ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket_coordinate(ssl)); + + if (ret == SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_WRITE) { + unsigned char ticket_nonce[MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH]; + unsigned char *buf; + size_t buf_len, msg_len; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_prepare_new_session_ticket( + ssl, ticket_nonce, sizeof(ticket_nonce))); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + &buf, &buf_len)); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket_body( + ssl, buf, buf + buf_len, &msg_len, + ticket_nonce, sizeof(ticket_nonce))); + + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg( + ssl, buf_len, msg_len)); + + /* Limit session tickets count to one when resumption connection. + * + * See document of mbedtls_ssl_conf_new_session_tickets. + */ + if (ssl->handshake->resume == 1) { + ssl->handshake->new_session_tickets_count = 0; + } else { + ssl->handshake->new_session_tickets_count--; + } + + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH); + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER); + } + +cleanup: + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +/* + * TLS 1.3 State Machine -- server side + */ +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("tls13 server state: %s(%d)", + mbedtls_ssl_states_str((mbedtls_ssl_states) ssl->state), + ssl->state)); + + switch (ssl->state) { + /* start state */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); + ret = 0; + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_client_hello(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_process_client_hello", ret); + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_hello_retry_request(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_write_hello_retry_request", ret); + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_server_hello(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions", ret); + return ret; + } + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_certificate_request(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_server_certificate(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(ssl); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + + /* + * Injection of dummy-CCS's for middlebox compatibility + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret == 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + break; + } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_server_finished(ssl); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data(ssl); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: + ret = ssl_tls13_process_client_finished(ssl); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: + ret = ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(ssl); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate(ssl); + if (ret == 0) { + if (ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert != NULL) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY); + } else { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("skip parse certificate verify")); + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED); + } + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(ssl); + if (ret == 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED); + } + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET: + ret = ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, + "ssl_tls13_write_new_session_ticket ", + ret); + } + break; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH: + /* This state is necessary to do the flush of the New Session + * Ticket message written in MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET + * as part of ssl_prepare_handshake_step. + */ + ret = 0; + + if (ssl->handshake->new_session_tickets_count == 0) { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER); + } else { + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + } + break; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + + default: + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid state %d", ssl->state)); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/library/threading.c b/library/threading.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..85db243f213 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/threading.c @@ -0,0 +1,195 @@ +/* + * Threading abstraction layer + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +/* + * Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be defined before + * mbedtls_config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms. + */ +#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L +#endif + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) + +#if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \ + defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \ + defined(__MACH__))) +#include +#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || + * (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) */ + +#if !((defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L) || \ + (defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS) && \ + _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L)) +/* + * This is a convenience shorthand macro to avoid checking the long + * preprocessor conditions above. Ideally, we could expose this macro in + * platform_util.h and simply use it in platform_util.c, threading.c and + * threading.h. However, this macro is not part of the Mbed TLS public API, so + * we keep it private by only defining it in this file + */ + +#if !(defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)) +#define THREADING_USE_GMTIME +#endif /* ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) */ + +#endif /* !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \ + ( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \ + _POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 200112L ) ) */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) +static void threading_mutex_init_pthread(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) +{ + if (mutex == NULL) { + return; + } + + /* One problem here is that calling lock on a pthread mutex without first + * having initialised it is undefined behaviour. Obviously we cannot check + * this here in a thread safe manner without a significant performance + * hit, so state transitions are checked in tests only via the state + * variable. Please make sure any new mutex that gets added is exercised in + * tests; see tests/src/threading_helpers.c for more details. */ + (void) pthread_mutex_init(&mutex->mutex, NULL); +} + +static void threading_mutex_free_pthread(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) +{ + if (mutex == NULL) { + return; + } + + (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(&mutex->mutex); +} + +static int threading_mutex_lock_pthread(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) +{ + if (mutex == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (pthread_mutex_lock(&mutex->mutex) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int threading_mutex_unlock_pthread(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) +{ + if (mutex == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (pthread_mutex_unlock(&mutex->mutex) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } + + return 0; +} + +void (*mbedtls_mutex_init)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *) = threading_mutex_init_pthread; +void (*mbedtls_mutex_free)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *) = threading_mutex_free_pthread; +int (*mbedtls_mutex_lock)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *) = threading_mutex_lock_pthread; +int (*mbedtls_mutex_unlock)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *) = threading_mutex_unlock_pthread; + +/* + * With pthreads we can statically initialize mutexes + */ +#define MUTEX_INIT = { PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER, 1 } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) +static int threading_mutex_fail(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) +{ + ((void) mutex); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +} +static void threading_mutex_dummy(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) +{ + ((void) mutex); + return; +} + +void (*mbedtls_mutex_init)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *) = threading_mutex_dummy; +void (*mbedtls_mutex_free)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *) = threading_mutex_dummy; +int (*mbedtls_mutex_lock)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *) = threading_mutex_fail; +int (*mbedtls_mutex_unlock)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *) = threading_mutex_fail; + +/* + * Set functions pointers and initialize global mutexes + */ +void mbedtls_threading_set_alt(void (*mutex_init)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *), + void (*mutex_free)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *), + int (*mutex_lock)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *), + int (*mutex_unlock)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *)) +{ + mbedtls_mutex_init = mutex_init; + mbedtls_mutex_free = mutex_free; + mbedtls_mutex_lock = mutex_lock; + mbedtls_mutex_unlock = mutex_unlock; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex); +#endif +#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) + mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); + mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); + mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif +} + +/* + * Free global mutexes + */ +void mbedtls_threading_free_alt(void) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + mbedtls_mutex_free(&mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex); +#endif +#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) + mbedtls_mutex_free(&mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex); +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); + mbedtls_mutex_free(&mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex); + mbedtls_mutex_free(&mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex); +#endif +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ + +/* + * Define global mutexes + */ +#ifndef MUTEX_INIT +#define MUTEX_INIT +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex MUTEX_INIT; +#endif +#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex MUTEX_INIT; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex MUTEX_INIT; +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex MUTEX_INIT; +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex MUTEX_INIT; +#endif + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ diff --git a/library/timing.c b/library/timing.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..58f1c1ec2eb --- /dev/null +++ b/library/timing.c @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +/* + * Portable interface to the CPU cycle counter + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + +#include "mbedtls/timing.h" + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT) + +#if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ + !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) +#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_TIMING_C in mbedtls_config.h" +#endif + +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + +#include +#include + +struct _hr_time { + LARGE_INTEGER start; +}; + +#else + +#include +#include +#include +/* time.h should be included independently of MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME. If the + * platform matches the ifdefs above, it will be used. */ +#include +#include +struct _hr_time { + struct timeval start; +}; +#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +/** + * \brief Return the elapsed time in milliseconds + * + * \warning May change without notice + * + * \param val points to a timer structure + * \param reset If 0, query the elapsed time. Otherwise (re)start the timer. + * + * \return Elapsed time since the previous reset in ms. When + * restarting, this is always 0. + * + * \note To initialize a timer, call this function with reset=1. + * + * Determining the elapsed time and resetting the timer is not + * atomic on all platforms, so after the sequence + * `{ get_timer(1); ...; time1 = get_timer(1); ...; time2 = + * get_timer(0) }` the value time1+time2 is only approximately + * the delay since the first reset. + */ +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer(struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset) +{ + struct _hr_time *t = (struct _hr_time *) val; + + if (reset) { + QueryPerformanceCounter(&t->start); + return 0; + } else { + unsigned long delta; + LARGE_INTEGER now, hfreq; + QueryPerformanceCounter(&now); + QueryPerformanceFrequency(&hfreq); + delta = (unsigned long) ((now.QuadPart - t->start.QuadPart) * 1000ul + / hfreq.QuadPart); + return delta; + } +} + +#else /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer(struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset) +{ + struct _hr_time *t = (struct _hr_time *) val; + + if (reset) { + gettimeofday(&t->start, NULL); + return 0; + } else { + unsigned long delta; + struct timeval now; + gettimeofday(&now, NULL); + delta = (now.tv_sec - t->start.tv_sec) * 1000ul + + (now.tv_usec - t->start.tv_usec) / 1000; + return delta; + } +} + +#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */ + +/* + * Set delays to watch + */ +void mbedtls_timing_set_delay(void *data, uint32_t int_ms, uint32_t fin_ms) +{ + mbedtls_timing_delay_context *ctx = (mbedtls_timing_delay_context *) data; + + ctx->int_ms = int_ms; + ctx->fin_ms = fin_ms; + + if (fin_ms != 0) { + (void) mbedtls_timing_get_timer(&ctx->timer, 1); + } +} + +/* + * Get number of delays expired + */ +int mbedtls_timing_get_delay(void *data) +{ + mbedtls_timing_delay_context *ctx = (mbedtls_timing_delay_context *) data; + unsigned long elapsed_ms; + + if (ctx->fin_ms == 0) { + return -1; + } + + elapsed_ms = mbedtls_timing_get_timer(&ctx->timer, 0); + + if (elapsed_ms >= ctx->fin_ms) { + return 2; + } + + if (elapsed_ms >= ctx->int_ms) { + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Get the final delay. + */ +uint32_t mbedtls_timing_get_final_delay( + const mbedtls_timing_delay_context *data) +{ + return data->fin_ms; +} +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ diff --git a/library/version.c b/library/version.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..04397332bbf --- /dev/null +++ b/library/version.c @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* + * Version information + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) + +#include "mbedtls/version.h" +#include + +unsigned int mbedtls_version_get_number(void) +{ + return MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER; +} + +void mbedtls_version_get_string(char *string) +{ + memcpy(string, MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING, + sizeof(MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING)); +} + +void mbedtls_version_get_string_full(char *string) +{ + memcpy(string, MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL, + sizeof(MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL)); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ diff --git a/library/version_features.c b/library/version_features.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..406161d4c78 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/version_features.c @@ -0,0 +1,841 @@ +/* + * Version feature information + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) + +#include "mbedtls/version.h" + +#include + +static const char * const features[] = { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) + #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) + "HAVE_ASM", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION) + "NO_UDBL_DIVISION", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION) + "NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2) + "HAVE_SSE2", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) + "HAVE_TIME", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) + "HAVE_TIME_DATE", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) + "PLATFORM_MEMORY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) + "PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT) + "PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) + "PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) + "PLATFORM_TIME_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) + "PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) + "PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) + "PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) + "PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) + "PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT) + "PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT) + "PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT) + "PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT) + "PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) + "DEPRECATED_WARNING", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) + "DEPRECATED_REMOVED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT) + "TIMING_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT) + "AES_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT) + "ARIA_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT) + "CAMELLIA_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT) + "CCM_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT) + "CHACHA20_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT) + "CHACHAPOLY_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) + "CMAC_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT) + "DES_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT) + "DHM_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT) + "ECJPAKE_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) + "GCM_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT) + "NIST_KW_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT) + "MD5_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT) + "POLY1305_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT) + "RIPEMD160_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + "RSA_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT) + "SHA1_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) + "SHA256_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) + "SHA512_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) + "ECP_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT) + "MD5_PROCESS_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT) + "RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT) + "SHA1_PROCESS_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT) + "SHA256_PROCESS_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT) + "SHA512_PROCESS_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT) + "DES_SETKEY_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) + "DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT) + "DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT) + "AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) + "AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT) + "AES_ENCRYPT_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) + "AES_DECRYPT_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) + "ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) + "ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) + "ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) + "ECDSA_SIGN_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) + "ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) + "ECP_INTERNAL_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) + "ECP_NO_FALLBACK", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) + "ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) + "ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) + "ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) + "ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) + "ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) + "ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) + "ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) + "ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT) + "ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES) + "AES_ROM_TABLES", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES) + "AES_FEWER_TABLES", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) + "AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) + "AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY) + "CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING) + "CHECK_RETURN_WARNING", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) + "CIPHER_MODE_CBC", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) + "CIPHER_MODE_CFB", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + "CIPHER_MODE_CTR", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB) + "CIPHER_MODE_OFB", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) + "CIPHER_MODE_XTS", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) + "CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) + "CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS) + "CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN) + "CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS) + "CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) + "CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED) + "ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) + "ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) + "ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) + "ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) + "ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) + "ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) + "ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) + "ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) + "ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) + "ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) + "ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) + "ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) + "ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) + "ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM) + "ECP_NIST_OPTIM", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + "ECP_RESTARTABLE", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT) + "ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + "ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) + "KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) + "KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) + "KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) + "KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) + "KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) + "KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) + "PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED) + "PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY) + "ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) + "GENPRIME", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + "FS_IO", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES) + "NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY) + "NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) + "ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) + "ENTROPY_NV_SEED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER) + "PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) + "MEMORY_DEBUG", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) + "MEMORY_BACKTRACE", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) + "PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) + "PKCS1_V15", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) + "PKCS1_V21", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) + "PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) + "PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) + "PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) + "PSA_CRYPTO_SPM", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED) + "PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) + "PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS) + "PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) + "RSA_NO_CRT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) + "SELF_TEST", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER) + "SHA256_SMALLER", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER) + "SHA512_SMALLER", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES) + "SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) + "SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT) + "SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) + "SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) + "SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) + "SSL_DEBUG_ALL", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) + "SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) + "SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) + "SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) + "SSL_RENEGOTIATION", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) + "SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + "SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) + "SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) + "SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + "SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED) + "SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + "SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) + "SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + "SSL_EARLY_DATA", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) + "SSL_PROTO_DTLS", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) + "SSL_ALPN", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) + "SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) + "SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) + "SSL_DTLS_SRTP", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) + "SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) + "SSL_SESSION_TICKETS", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) + "SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) + "SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) + "TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND) + "TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) + "TEST_HOOKS", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) + "THREADING_ALT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) + "THREADING_PTHREAD", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + "USE_PSA_CRYPTO", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) + "PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) + "VERSION_FEATURES", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + "X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) + "X509_REMOVE_INFO", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + "X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) + "AESNI_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) + "AESCE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) + "AES_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) + "ASN1_PARSE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) + "ASN1_WRITE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C) + "BASE64_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) + "BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + "BIGNUM_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) + "CAMELLIA_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) + "ARIA_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) + "CCM_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C) + "CHACHA20_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) + "CHACHAPOLY_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) + "CIPHER_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) + "CMAC_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + "CTR_DRBG_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + "DEBUG_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) + "DES_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) + "DHM_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) + "ECDH_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) + "ECDSA_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) + "ECJPAKE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + "ECP_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) + "ENTROPY_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) + "ERROR_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) + "GCM_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE) + "GCM_LARGE_TABLE", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) + "HKDF_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) + "HMAC_DRBG_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) + "LMS_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LMS_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) + "LMS_PRIVATE", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) + "NIST_KW_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) + "MD_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) + "MD5_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) + "MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) + "NET_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) + "OID_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) + "PADLOCK_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + "PEM_PARSE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + "PEM_WRITE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) + "PK_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) + "PK_PARSE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) + "PK_WRITE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) + "PKCS5_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C) + "PKCS7_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) + "PKCS12_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) + "PLATFORM_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C) + "POLY1305_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + "PSA_CRYPTO_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) + "PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) + "PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) + "PSA_ITS_FILE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) + "RIPEMD160_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + "RSA_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + "SHA1_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) + "SHA224_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA224_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) + "SHA256_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) + "SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) + "SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) + "SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) + "SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) + "SHA384_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) + "SHA512_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C) + "SHA3_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA3_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) + "SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) + "SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) + "SSL_CACHE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C) + "SSL_COOKIE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) + "SSL_TICKET_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + "SSL_CLI_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + "SSL_SRV_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) + "SSL_TLS_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + "THREADING_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) + "TIMING_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C) + "VERSION_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) + "X509_USE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + "X509_CRT_PARSE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + "X509_CRL_PARSE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) + "X509_CSR_PARSE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) + "X509_CREATE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) + "X509_CRT_WRITE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) + "X509_CSR_WRITE_C", //no-check-names +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES */ + NULL +}; + +int mbedtls_version_check_feature(const char *feature) +{ + const char * const *idx = features; + + if (*idx == NULL) { + return -2; + } + + if (feature == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + if (strncmp(feature, "MBEDTLS_", 8)) { + return -1; + } + + feature += 8; + + while (*idx != NULL) { + if (!strcmp(*idx, feature)) { + return 0; + } + idx++; + } + return -1; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */ diff --git a/library/x509.c b/library/x509.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f97fb44589e --- /dev/null +++ b/library/x509.c @@ -0,0 +1,1776 @@ +/* + * X.509 common functions for parsing and verification + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10) + * + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) + +#include "x509_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include +#endif + +#define CHECK(code) \ + do { \ + if ((ret = (code)) != 0) { \ + return ret; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#define CHECK_RANGE(min, max, val) \ + do { \ + if ((val) < (min) || (val) > (max)) { \ + return ret; \ + } \ + } while (0) + +/* + * CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_serial(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *serial) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((end - *p) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA); + } + + if (**p != (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRIMITIVE | 2) && + **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + + serial->tag = *(*p)++; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, &serial->len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL, ret); + } + + serial->p = *p; + *p += serial->len; + + return 0; +} + +/* Get an algorithm identifier without parameters (eg for signatures) + * + * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(p, end, alg)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse an algorithm identifier with (optional) parameters + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(p, end, alg, params)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Convert md type to string + */ +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) && defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + +static inline const char *md_type_to_string(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) +{ + switch (md_alg) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return "MD5"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return "SHA1"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return "SHA224"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return "SHA256"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return "SHA384"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return "SHA512"; +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return "RIPEMD160"; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_NONE: + return NULL; + default: + return NULL; + } +} + +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) && defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) +/* + * HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + * + * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } + * + * For HashAlgorithm, parameters MUST be NULL or absent. + */ +static int x509_get_hash_alg(const mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p; + const unsigned char *end; + mbedtls_x509_buf md_oid; + size_t len; + + /* Make sure we got a SEQUENCE and setup bounds */ + if (alg->tag != (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + + p = alg->p; + end = p + alg->len; + + if (p >= end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA); + } + + /* Parse md_oid */ + md_oid.tag = *p; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &md_oid.len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + md_oid.p = p; + p += md_oid.len; + + /* Get md_alg from md_oid */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&md_oid, md_alg)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + /* Make sure params is absent of NULL */ + if (p == end) { + return 0; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL)) != 0 || len != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * RSASSA-PSS-params ::= SEQUENCE { + * hashAlgorithm [0] HashAlgorithm DEFAULT sha1Identifier, + * maskGenAlgorithm [1] MaskGenAlgorithm DEFAULT mgf1SHA1Identifier, + * saltLength [2] INTEGER DEFAULT 20, + * trailerField [3] INTEGER DEFAULT 1 } + * -- Note that the tags in this Sequence are explicit. + * + * RFC 4055 (which defines use of RSASSA-PSS in PKIX) states that the value + * of trailerField MUST be 1, and PKCS#1 v2.2 doesn't even define any other + * option. Enforce this at parsing time. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params(const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md, + int *salt_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p; + const unsigned char *end, *end2; + size_t len; + mbedtls_x509_buf alg_id, alg_params; + + /* First set everything to defaults */ + *md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + *mgf_md = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; + *salt_len = 20; + + /* Make sure params is a SEQUENCE and setup bounds */ + if (params->tag != (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + + p = (unsigned char *) params->p; + end = p + params->len; + + if (p == end) { + return 0; + } + + /* + * HashAlgorithm + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + 0)) == 0) { + end2 = p + len; + + /* HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier (without parameters) */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null(&p, end2, &alg_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&alg_id, md_alg)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + if (p != end2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + if (p == end) { + return 0; + } + + /* + * MaskGenAlgorithm + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + 1)) == 0) { + end2 = p + len; + + /* MaskGenAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier (params = HashAlgorithm) */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg(&p, end2, &alg_id, &alg_params)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Only MFG1 is recognised for now */ + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_MGF1, &alg_id) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND); + } + + /* Parse HashAlgorithm */ + if ((ret = x509_get_hash_alg(&alg_params, mgf_md)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (p != end2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + if (p == end) { + return 0; + } + + /* + * salt_len + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + 2)) == 0) { + end2 = p + len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end2, salt_len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + if (p != end2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + if (p == end) { + return 0; + } + + /* + * trailer_field (if present, must be 1) + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + 3)) == 0) { + int trailer_field; + + end2 = p + len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end2, &trailer_field)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + if (p != end2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + if (trailer_field != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG; + } + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, ret); + } + + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + +/* + * AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { + * type AttributeType, + * value AttributeValue } + * + * AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * + * AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType + */ +static int x509_get_attr_type_value(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_name *cur) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + mbedtls_x509_buf *oid; + mbedtls_x509_buf *val; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret); + } + + end = *p + len; + + if ((end - *p) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA); + } + + oid = &cur->oid; + oid->tag = **p; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &oid->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret); + } + + oid->p = *p; + *p += oid->len; + + if ((end - *p) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA); + } + + if (**p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING && + **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING && + **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING && **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING && + **p != MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + + val = &cur->val; + val->tag = *(*p)++; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, &val->len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret); + } + + val->p = *p; + *p += val->len; + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + cur->next = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Name ::= CHOICE { -- only one possibility for now -- + * rdnSequence RDNSequence } + * + * RDNSequence ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName + * + * RelativeDistinguishedName ::= + * SET OF AttributeTypeAndValue + * + * AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { + * type AttributeType, + * value AttributeValue } + * + * AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * + * AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType + * + * The data structure is optimized for the common case where each RDN has only + * one element, which is represented as a list of AttributeTypeAndValue. + * For the general case we still use a flat list, but we mark elements of the + * same set so that they are "merged" together in the functions that consume + * this list, eg mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(). + * + * On success, this function may allocate a linked list starting at cur->next + * that must later be free'd by the caller using mbedtls_free(). In error + * cases, this function frees all allocated memory internally and the caller + * has no freeing responsibilities. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_name(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_name *cur) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t set_len; + const unsigned char *end_set; + mbedtls_x509_name *head = cur; + + /* don't use recursion, we'd risk stack overflow if not optimized */ + while (1) { + /* + * parse SET + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &set_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET)) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME, ret); + goto error; + } + + end_set = *p + set_len; + + while (1) { + if ((ret = x509_get_attr_type_value(p, end_set, cur)) != 0) { + goto error; + } + + if (*p == end_set) { + break; + } + + /* Mark this item as being no the only one in a set */ + cur->next_merged = 1; + + cur->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_name)); + + if (cur->next == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + + /* + * continue until end of SEQUENCE is reached + */ + if (*p == end) { + return 0; + } + + cur->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_name)); + + if (cur->next == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; + goto error; + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + +error: + /* Skip the first element as we did not allocate it */ + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(head->next); + head->next = NULL; + + return ret; +} + +static int x509_date_is_valid(const mbedtls_x509_time *t) +{ + unsigned int month_days; + unsigned int year; + switch (t->mon) { + case 1: case 3: case 5: case 7: case 8: case 10: case 12: + month_days = 31; + break; + case 4: case 6: case 9: case 11: + month_days = 30; + break; + case 2: + year = (unsigned int) t->year; + month_days = ((year & 3) || (!(year % 100) + && (year % 400))) + ? 28 : 29; + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; + } + + if ((unsigned int) (t->day - 1) >= month_days || /* (1 - days in month) */ + /* (unsigned int) (t->mon - 1) >= 12 || */ /* (1 - 12) checked above */ + (unsigned int) t->year > 9999 || /* (0 - 9999) */ + (unsigned int) t->hour > 23 || /* (0 - 23) */ + (unsigned int) t->min > 59 || /* (0 - 59) */ + (unsigned int) t->sec > 59) { /* (0 - 59) */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int x509_parse2_int(const unsigned char *p) +{ + uint32_t d1 = p[0] - '0'; + uint32_t d2 = p[1] - '0'; + return (d1 < 10 && d2 < 10) ? (int) (d1 * 10 + d2) : -1; +} + +/* + * Parse an ASN1_UTC_TIME (yearlen=2) or ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME (yearlen=4) + * field. + */ +static int x509_parse_time(const unsigned char *p, mbedtls_x509_time *tm, + size_t yearlen) +{ + int x; + + /* + * Parse year, month, day, hour, minute, second + */ + tm->year = x509_parse2_int(p); + if (tm->year < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; + } + + if (4 == yearlen) { + x = tm->year * 100; + p += 2; + tm->year = x509_parse2_int(p); + if (tm->year < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; + } + } else { + x = (tm->year < 50) ? 2000 : 1900; + } + tm->year += x; + + tm->mon = x509_parse2_int(p + 2); + tm->day = x509_parse2_int(p + 4); + tm->hour = x509_parse2_int(p + 6); + tm->min = x509_parse2_int(p + 8); + tm->sec = x509_parse2_int(p + 10); + + return x509_date_is_valid(tm); +} + +/* + * Time ::= CHOICE { + * utcTime UTCTime, + * generalTime GeneralizedTime } + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_time(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_time *tm) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len, year_len; + unsigned char tag; + + if ((end - *p) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA); + } + + tag = **p; + + if (tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME) { + year_len = 2; + } else if (tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME) { + year_len = 4; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + + (*p)++; + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, &len); + + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, ret); + } + + /* len is 12 or 14 depending on year_len, plus optional trailing 'Z' */ + if (len != year_len + 10 && + !(len == year_len + 11 && (*p)[(len - 1)] == 'Z')) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE; + } + + (*p) += len; + return x509_parse_time(*p - len, tm, year_len); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + int tag_type; + + if ((end - *p) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA); + } + + tag_type = **p; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(p, end, &len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE, ret); + } + + sig->tag = tag_type; + sig->len = len; + sig->p = *p; + + *p += len; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Get signature algorithm from alg OID and optional parameters + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, + void **sig_opts) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (*sig_opts != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg(sig_oid, md_alg, pk_alg)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG, ret); + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + if (*pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { + mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; + + pss_opts = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options)); + if (pss_opts == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params(sig_params, + md_alg, + &pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id, + &pss_opts->expected_salt_len); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(pss_opts); + return ret; + } + + *sig_opts = (void *) pss_opts; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + { + /* Make sure parameters are absent or NULL */ + if ((sig_params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL && sig_params->tag != 0) || + sig_params->len != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * X.509 Extensions (No parsing of extensions, pointer should + * be either manually updated or extensions should be parsed!) + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_ext(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* Extension structure use EXPLICIT tagging. That is, the actual + * `Extensions` structure is wrapped by a tag-length pair using + * the respective context-specific tag. */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &ext->len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | tag); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + ext->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | tag; + ext->p = *p; + end = *p + ext->len; + + /* + * Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if (end != *p + len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +static char nibble_to_hex_digit(int i) +{ + return (i < 10) ? (i + '0') : (i - 10 + 'A'); +} + +/* + * Store the name in printable form into buf; no more + * than size characters will be written + */ +int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, j, n, asn1_len_size, asn1_tag_size, asn1_tag_len_buf_start; + /* 6 is enough as our asn1 write functions only write one byte for the tag and at most five bytes for the length*/ + unsigned char asn1_tag_len_buf[6]; + unsigned char *asn1_len_p; + unsigned char c, merge = 0; + const mbedtls_x509_name *name; + const char *short_name = NULL; + char lowbits, highbits; + char s[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE], *p; + int print_hexstring; + + memset(s, 0, sizeof(s)); + + name = dn; + p = buf; + n = size; + + while (name != NULL) { + if (!name->oid.p) { + name = name->next; + continue; + } + + if (name != dn) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, merge ? " + " : ", "); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + + print_hexstring = (name->val.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING) && + (name->val.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING) && + (name->val.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name(&name->oid, &short_name)) == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s=", short_name); + } else { + if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(p, n, &name->oid)) > 0) { + n -= ret; + p += ret; + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "="); + print_hexstring = 1; + } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\?\?="); + } + } + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if (print_hexstring) { + s[0] = '#'; + + asn1_len_p = asn1_tag_len_buf + sizeof(asn1_tag_len_buf); + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&asn1_len_p, asn1_tag_len_buf, name->val.len)) < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + asn1_len_size = ret; + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&asn1_len_p, asn1_tag_len_buf, name->val.tag)) < 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + asn1_tag_size = ret; + asn1_tag_len_buf_start = sizeof(asn1_tag_len_buf) - asn1_len_size - asn1_tag_size; + for (i = 0, j = 1; i < asn1_len_size + asn1_tag_size; i++) { + if (j + 1 >= sizeof(s) - 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + c = asn1_tag_len_buf[asn1_tag_len_buf_start+i]; + lowbits = (c & 0x0F); + highbits = c >> 4; + s[j++] = nibble_to_hex_digit(highbits); + s[j++] = nibble_to_hex_digit(lowbits); + } + for (i = 0; i < name->val.len; i++) { + if (j + 1 >= sizeof(s) - 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + c = name->val.p[i]; + lowbits = (c & 0x0F); + highbits = c >> 4; + s[j++] = nibble_to_hex_digit(highbits); + s[j++] = nibble_to_hex_digit(lowbits); + } + } else { + for (i = 0, j = 0; i < name->val.len; i++, j++) { + if (j >= sizeof(s) - 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + c = name->val.p[i]; + // Special characters requiring escaping, RFC 4514 Section 2.4 + if (c == '\0') { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } else { + if (strchr(",=+<>;\"\\", c) || + ((i == 0) && strchr("# ", c)) || + ((i == name->val.len-1) && (c == ' '))) { + if (j + 1 >= sizeof(s) - 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + s[j++] = '\\'; + } + } + if (c < 32 || c >= 127) { + if (j + 3 >= sizeof(s) - 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + s[j++] = '\\'; + lowbits = (c & 0x0F); + highbits = c >> 4; + s[j++] = nibble_to_hex_digit(highbits); + s[j] = nibble_to_hex_digit(lowbits); + } else { + s[j] = c; + } + } + } + s[j] = '\0'; + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s", s); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + merge = name->next_merged; + name = name->next; + } + + return (int) (size - n); +} + +/* + * Store the serial in printable form into buf; no more + * than size characters will be written + */ +int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *serial) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i, n, nr; + char *p; + + p = buf; + n = size; + + nr = (serial->len <= 32) + ? serial->len : 28; + + for (i = 0; i < nr; i++) { + if (i == 0 && nr > 1 && serial->p[i] == 0x0) { + continue; + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%02X%s", + serial->p[i], (i < nr - 1) ? ":" : ""); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + + if (nr != serial->len) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "...."); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + + return (int) (size - n); +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +/* + * Helper for writing signature algorithms + */ +int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const void *sig_opts) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + char *p = buf; + size_t n = size; + const char *desc = NULL; + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc(sig_oid, &desc); + if (ret != 0) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "???"); + } else { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s", desc); + } + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { + const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts; + + pss_opts = (const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *) sig_opts; + + const char *name = md_type_to_string(md_alg); + const char *mgf_name = md_type_to_string(pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id); + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, " (%s, MGF1-%s, 0x%02X)", + name ? name : "???", + mgf_name ? mgf_name : "???", + (unsigned int) pss_opts->expected_salt_len); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } +#else + ((void) pk_alg); + ((void) md_alg); + ((void) sig_opts); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ + + return (int) (size - n); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ + +/* + * Helper for writing "RSA key size", "EC key size", etc + */ +int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper(char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name) +{ + char *p = buf; + size_t n = buf_size; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s key size", name); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_time *t1, + const mbedtls_x509_time *t2) +{ + int x; + + x = (((t1->year << 9) | (t1->mon << 5) | (t1->day)) - + ((t2->year << 9) | (t2->mon << 5) | (t2->day))); + if (x != 0) { + return x; + } + + x = (((t1->hour << 12) | (t1->min << 6) | (t1->sec)) - + ((t2->hour << 12) | (t2->min << 6) | (t2->sec))); + return x; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +int mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time_t tt, mbedtls_x509_time *now) +{ + struct tm tm; + + if (mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(&tt, &tm) == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + now->year = tm.tm_year + 1900; + now->mon = tm.tm_mon + 1; + now->day = tm.tm_mday; + now->hour = tm.tm_hour; + now->min = tm.tm_min; + now->sec = tm.tm_sec; + return 0; +} + +static int x509_get_current_time(mbedtls_x509_time *now) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time(NULL), now); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(const mbedtls_x509_time *to) +{ + mbedtls_x509_time now; + + if (x509_get_current_time(&now) != 0) { + return 1; + } + + return mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(to, &now) < 0; +} + +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(const mbedtls_x509_time *from) +{ + mbedtls_x509_time now; + + if (x509_get_current_time(&now) != 0) { + return 1; + } + + return mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(from, &now) > 0; +} + +#else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ + +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(const mbedtls_x509_time *to) +{ + ((void) to); + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(const mbedtls_x509_time *from) +{ + ((void) from); + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ + +/* Common functions for parsing CRT and CSR. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) +/* + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + * + * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { + * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } + * + * NOTE: we currently only parse and use otherName of type HwModuleName, + * as defined in RFC 4108. + */ +static int x509_get_other_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_alt_name, + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name) +{ + int ret = 0; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p = subject_alt_name->p; + const unsigned char *end = p + subject_alt_name->len; + mbedtls_x509_buf cur_oid; + + if ((subject_alt_name->tag & + (MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK)) != + (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME)) { + /* + * The given subject alternative name is not of type "othername". + */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + cur_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + cur_oid.p = p; + cur_oid.len = len; + + /* + * Only HwModuleName is currently supported. + */ + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, &cur_oid) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + other_name->type_id = cur_oid; + + p += len; + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC)) != + 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if (end != p + len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if (end != p + len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.p = p; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.len = len; + + p += len; + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p = p; + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len = len; + p += len; + if (p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + return 0; +} + +/* Check mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name for detailed description. + * + * In some cases while parsing subject alternative names the sequence tag is optional + * (e.g. CertSerialNumber). This function is designed to handle such case. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t tag_len; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; + + while (*p < end) { + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name tmp_san_name; + mbedtls_x509_buf tmp_san_buf; + memset(&tmp_san_name, 0, sizeof(tmp_san_name)); + + tmp_san_buf.tag = **p; + (*p)++; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, &tag_len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + tmp_san_buf.p = *p; + tmp_san_buf.len = tag_len; + + if ((tmp_san_buf.tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK) != + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + + /* + * Check that the SAN is structured correctly by parsing it. + * The SAN structure is discarded afterwards. + */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(&tmp_san_buf, &tmp_san_name); + /* + * In case the extension is malformed, return an error, + * and clear the allocated sequences. + */ + if (ret != 0 && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(subject_alt_name->next); + subject_alt_name->next = NULL; + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(&tmp_san_name); + /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ + if (cur->buf.p != NULL) { + if (cur->next != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS; + } + + cur->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_sequence)); + + if (cur->next == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED); + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + + cur->buf = tmp_san_buf; + *p += tmp_san_buf.len; + } + + /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ + cur->next = NULL; + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames + * + * GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName + * + * GeneralName ::= CHOICE { + * otherName [0] OtherName, + * rfc822Name [1] IA5String, + * dNSName [2] IA5String, + * x400Address [3] ORAddress, + * directoryName [4] Name, + * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName, + * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, + * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, + * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER } + * + * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE { + * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id } + * + * EDIPartyName ::= SEQUENCE { + * nameAssigner [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL, + * partyName [1] DirectoryString } + * + * We list all types, but use the following GeneralName types from RFC 5280: + * "dnsName", "uniformResourceIdentifier" and "hardware_module_name" + * of type "otherName", as defined in RFC 4108. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* Get main sequence tag */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if (*p + len != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(p, end, subject_alt_name); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *ns_cert_type) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(p, end, &bs)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + /* A bitstring with no flags set is still technically valid, as it will mean + that the certificate has no designated purpose at the time of creation. */ + if (bs.len == 0) { + *ns_cert_type = 0; + return 0; + } + + if (bs.len != 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH); + } + + /* Get actual bitstring */ + *ns_cert_type = *bs.p; + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned int *key_usage) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL }; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(p, end, &bs)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + /* A bitstring with no flags set is still technically valid, as it will mean + that the certificate has no designated purpose at the time of creation. */ + if (bs.len == 0) { + *key_usage = 0; + return 0; + } + + /* Get actual bitstring */ + *key_usage = 0; + for (i = 0; i < bs.len && i < sizeof(unsigned int); i++) { + *key_usage |= (unsigned int) bs.p[i] << (8*i); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + switch (san_buf->tag & + (MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK)) { + /* + * otherName + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME): + { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name; + + ret = x509_get_other_name(san_buf, &other_name); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME; + memcpy(&san->san.other_name, + &other_name, sizeof(other_name)); + + } + break; + /* + * uniformResourceIdentifier + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER): + { + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER; + + memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name, + san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf)); + + } + break; + /* + * dNSName + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME): + { + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME; + + memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name, + san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf)); + } + break; + /* + * IP address + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS): + { + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS; + // Only IPv6 (16 bytes) and IPv4 (4 bytes) types are supported + if (san_buf->len == 4 || san_buf->len == 16) { + memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name, + san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf)); + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + break; + /* + * rfc822Name + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME): + { + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME; + memcpy(&san->san.unstructured_name, san_buf, sizeof(*san_buf)); + } + break; + /* + * directoryName + */ + case (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME): + { + size_t name_len; + unsigned char *p = san_buf->p; + memset(san, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name)); + san->type = MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, p + san_buf->len, &name_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + name_len, + &san->san.directory_name)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + break; + /* + * Type not supported + */ + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + return 0; +} + +void mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san) +{ + if (san->type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME) { + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(san->san.directory_name.next); + } +} + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +int mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence + *subject_alt_name, + const char *prefix) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t i; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = subject_alt_name; + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name san; + int parse_ret; + + while (cur != NULL) { + memset(&san, 0, sizeof(san)); + parse_ret = mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(&cur->buf, &san); + if (parse_ret != 0) { + if (parse_ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + cur = cur->next; + continue; + } + + switch (san.type) { + /* + * otherName + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME: + { + mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *other_name = &san.san.other_name; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s otherName :", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME, + &other_name->type_id) == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware module name :", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = + mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware type : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(p, + n, + &other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = + mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s hardware serial number : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + for (i = 0; i < other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len; i++) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, + n, + "%02X", + other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p[i]); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + }/* MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME */ + } + break; + /* + * uniformResourceIdentifier + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER: + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s uniformResourceIdentifier : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + if (san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n) { + if (n > 0) { + *p = '\0'; + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len); + p += san.san.unstructured_name.len; + n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len; + } + break; + /* + * dNSName + * RFC822 Name + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME: + { + const char *dns_name = "dNSName"; + const char *rfc822_name = "rfc822Name"; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, + "\n%s %s : ", + prefix, + san.type == + MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME ? dns_name : rfc822_name); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + if (san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n) { + if (n > 0) { + *p = '\0'; + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + memcpy(p, san.san.unstructured_name.p, san.san.unstructured_name.len); + p += san.san.unstructured_name.len; + n -= san.san.unstructured_name.len; + } + break; + /* + * iPAddress + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS: + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s %s : ", + prefix, "iPAddress"); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + if (san.san.unstructured_name.len >= n) { + if (n > 0) { + *p = '\0'; + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + + unsigned char *ip = san.san.unstructured_name.p; + // Only IPv6 (16 bytes) and IPv4 (4 bytes) types are supported + if (san.san.unstructured_name.len == 4) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%u.%u.%u.%u", ip[0], ip[1], ip[2], ip[3]); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } else if (san.san.unstructured_name.len == 16) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, + "%X%X:%X%X:%X%X:%X%X:%X%X:%X%X:%X%X:%X%X", + ip[0], ip[1], ip[2], ip[3], ip[4], ip[5], ip[6], + ip[7], ip[8], ip[9], ip[10], ip[11], ip[12], ip[13], + ip[14], ip[15]); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } else { + if (n > 0) { + *p = '\0'; + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + } + break; + /* + * directoryName + */ + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME: + { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s directoryName : ", prefix); + if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= n) { + mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(&san); + } + + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(p, n, &san.san.directory_name); + + if (ret < 0) { + mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(&san); + if (n > 0) { + *p = '\0'; + } + return ret; + } + + p += ret; + n -= ret; + } + break; + /* + * Type not supported, skip item. + */ + default: + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + break; + } + + /* So far memory is freed only in the case of directoryName + * parsing succeeding, as mbedtls_x509_get_name allocates memory. */ + mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(&san); + cur = cur->next; + } + + *p = '\0'; + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return 0; +} + +#define PRINT_ITEM(i) \ + do { \ + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s" i, sep); \ + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \ + sep = ", "; \ + } while (0) + +#define CERT_TYPE(type, name) \ + do { \ + if (ns_cert_type & (type)) { \ + PRINT_ITEM(name); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +int mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned char ns_cert_type) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const char *sep = ""; + + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT, "SSL Client"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER, "SSL Server"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL, "Email"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING, "Object Signing"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED, "Reserved"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA, "SSL CA"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA, "Email CA"); + CERT_TYPE(MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA, "Object Signing CA"); + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return 0; +} + +#define KEY_USAGE(code, name) \ + do { \ + if ((key_usage) & (code)) { \ + PRINT_ITEM(name); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +int mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned int key_usage) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const char *sep = ""; + + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE, "Digital Signature"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION, "Non Repudiation"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT, "Key Encipherment"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT, "Data Encipherment"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT, "Key Agreement"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN, "Key Cert Sign"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN, "CRL Sign"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY, "Encipher Only"); + KEY_USAGE(MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY, "Decipher Only"); + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ diff --git a/library/x509_create.c b/library/x509_create.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..839b5df226f --- /dev/null +++ b/library/x509_create.c @@ -0,0 +1,563 @@ +/* + * X.509 base functions for creating certificates / CSRs + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) + +#include "x509_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" + +#include + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" + +/* Structure linking OIDs for X.509 DN AttributeTypes to their + * string representations and default string encodings used by Mbed TLS. */ +typedef struct { + const char *name; /* String representation of AttributeType, e.g. + * "CN" or "emailAddress". */ + size_t name_len; /* Length of 'name', without trailing 0 byte. */ + const char *oid; /* String representation of OID of AttributeType, + * as per RFC 5280, Appendix A.1. encoded as per + * X.690 */ + int default_tag; /* The default character encoding used for the + * given attribute type, e.g. + * MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING for UTF-8. */ +} x509_attr_descriptor_t; + +#define ADD_STRLEN(s) s, sizeof(s) - 1 + +/* X.509 DN attributes from RFC 5280, Appendix A.1. */ +static const x509_attr_descriptor_t x509_attrs[] = +{ + { ADD_STRLEN("CN"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("commonName"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("C"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("countryName"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("O"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("organizationName"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("L"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("locality"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("R"), + MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("OU"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("organizationalUnitName"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("ST"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("stateOrProvinceName"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("emailAddress"), + MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("serialNumber"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("postalAddress"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("postalCode"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("dnQualifier"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("title"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("surName"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("SN"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("givenName"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("GN"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("initials"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("pseudonym"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("generationQualifier"), + MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("domainComponent"), + MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING }, + { ADD_STRLEN("DC"), + MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING }, + { NULL, 0, NULL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL } +}; + +static const x509_attr_descriptor_t *x509_attr_descr_from_name(const char *name, size_t name_len) +{ + const x509_attr_descriptor_t *cur; + + for (cur = x509_attrs; cur->name != NULL; cur++) { + if (cur->name_len == name_len && + strncmp(cur->name, name, name_len) == 0) { + break; + } + } + + if (cur->name == NULL) { + return NULL; + } + + return cur; +} + +static int hex_to_int(char c) +{ + return ('0' <= c && c <= '9') ? (c - '0') : + ('a' <= c && c <= 'f') ? (c - 'a' + 10) : + ('A' <= c && c <= 'F') ? (c - 'A' + 10) : -1; +} + +static int hexpair_to_int(const char *hexpair) +{ + int n1 = hex_to_int(*hexpair); + int n2 = hex_to_int(*(hexpair + 1)); + + if (n1 != -1 && n2 != -1) { + return (n1 << 4) | n2; + } else { + return -1; + } +} + +static int parse_attribute_value_string(const char *s, + int len, + unsigned char *data, + size_t *data_len) +{ + const char *c; + const char *end = s + len; + unsigned char *d = data; + int n; + + for (c = s; c < end; c++) { + if (*c == '\\') { + c++; + + /* Check for valid escaped characters as per RFC 4514 Section 3 */ + if (c + 1 < end && (n = hexpair_to_int(c)) != -1) { + if (n == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + *(d++) = n; + c++; + } else if (c < end && strchr(" ,=+<>#;\"\\", *c)) { + *(d++) = *c; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + } else { + *(d++) = *c; + } + + if (d - data == MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + } + *data_len = (size_t) (d - data); + return 0; +} + +/** Parse a hexstring containing a DER-encoded string. + * + * \param s A string of \p len bytes hexadecimal digits. + * \param len Number of bytes to read from \p s. + * \param data Output buffer of size \p data_size. + * On success, it contains the payload that's DER-encoded + * in the input (content without the tag and length). + * If the DER tag is a string tag, the payload is guaranteed + * not to contain null bytes. + * \param data_size Length of the \p data buffer. + * \param data_len On success, the length of the parsed string. + * It is guaranteed to be less than + * #MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE. + * \param tag The ASN.1 tag that the payload in \p data is encoded in. + * + * \retval 0 on success. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME if \p s does not contain + * a valid hexstring, + * or if the decoded hexstring is not valid DER, + * or if the payload does not fit in \p data, + * or if the payload is more than + * #MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE bytes, + * of if \p *tag is an ASN.1 string tag and the payload + * contains a null byte. + * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED on low memory. + */ +static int parse_attribute_value_hex_der_encoded(const char *s, + size_t len, + unsigned char *data, + size_t data_size, + size_t *data_len, + int *tag) +{ + /* Step 1: preliminary length checks. */ + /* Each byte is encoded by exactly two hexadecimal digits. */ + if (len % 2 != 0) { + /* Odd number of hex digits */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + size_t const der_length = len / 2; + if (der_length > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE + 4) { + /* The payload would be more than MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE + * (after subtracting the ASN.1 tag and length). Reject this early + * to avoid allocating a large intermediate buffer. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + if (der_length < 1) { + /* Avoid empty-buffer shenanigans. A valid DER encoding is never + * empty. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } + + /* Step 2: Decode the hex string into an intermediate buffer. */ + unsigned char *der = mbedtls_calloc(1, der_length); + if (der == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + /* Beyond this point, der needs to be freed on exit. */ + for (size_t i = 0; i < der_length; i++) { + int c = hexpair_to_int(s + 2 * i); + if (c < 0) { + goto error; + } + der[i] = c; + } + + /* Step 3: decode the DER. */ + /* We've checked that der_length >= 1 above. */ + *tag = der[0]; + { + unsigned char *p = der + 1; + if (mbedtls_asn1_get_len(&p, der + der_length, data_len) != 0) { + goto error; + } + /* Now p points to the first byte of the payload inside der, + * and *data_len is the length of the payload. */ + + /* Step 4: payload validation */ + if (*data_len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE) { + goto error; + } + /* Strings must not contain null bytes. */ + if (MBEDTLS_ASN1_IS_STRING_TAG(*tag)) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < *data_len; i++) { + if (p[i] == 0) { + goto error; + } + } + } + + /* Step 5: output the payload. */ + if (*data_len > data_size) { + goto error; + } + memcpy(data, p, *data_len); + } + mbedtls_free(der); + + return 0; + +error: + mbedtls_free(der); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; +} + +int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + int parse_ret = 0; + const char *s = name, *c = s; + const char *end = s + strlen(s); + mbedtls_asn1_buf oid = { .p = NULL, .len = 0, .tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL }; + const x509_attr_descriptor_t *attr_descr = NULL; + int in_attr_type = 1; + int tag; + int numericoid = 0; + unsigned char data[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE]; + size_t data_len = 0; + + /* Clear existing chain if present */ + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(head); + + while (c <= end) { + if (in_attr_type && *c == '=') { + if ((attr_descr = x509_attr_descr_from_name(s, (size_t) (c - s))) == NULL) { + if ((mbedtls_oid_from_numeric_string(&oid, s, (size_t) (c - s))) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } else { + numericoid = 1; + } + } else { + oid.len = strlen(attr_descr->oid); + oid.p = mbedtls_calloc(1, oid.len); + memcpy(oid.p, attr_descr->oid, oid.len); + numericoid = 0; + } + + s = c + 1; + in_attr_type = 0; + } + + if (!in_attr_type && ((*c == ',' && *(c-1) != '\\') || c == end)) { + if (s == c) { + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } else if (*s == '#') { + /* We know that c >= s (loop invariant) and c != s (in this + * else branch), hence c - s - 1 >= 0. */ + parse_ret = parse_attribute_value_hex_der_encoded( + s + 1, (size_t) (c - s) - 1, + data, sizeof(data), &data_len, &tag); + if (parse_ret != 0) { + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + return parse_ret; + } + } else { + if (numericoid) { + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME; + } else { + if ((parse_ret = + parse_attribute_value_string(s, (int) (c - s), data, + &data_len)) != 0) { + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + return parse_ret; + } + tag = attr_descr->default_tag; + } + } + + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur = + mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data(head, (char *) oid.p, oid.len, + (unsigned char *) data, + data_len); + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + oid.p = NULL; + if (cur == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + // set tagType + cur->val.tag = tag; + + while (c < end && *(c + 1) == ' ') { + c++; + } + + s = c + 1; + in_attr_type = 1; + + /* Successfully parsed one name, update ret to success */ + ret = 0; + } + c++; + } + if (oid.p != NULL) { + mbedtls_free(oid.p); + } + return ret; +} + +/* The first byte of the value in the mbedtls_asn1_named_data structure is reserved + * to store the critical boolean for us + */ +int mbedtls_x509_set_extension(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur; + + if (val_len > (SIZE_MAX - 1)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((cur = mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data(head, oid, oid_len, + NULL, val_len + 1)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + cur->val.p[0] = critical; + memcpy(cur->val.p + 1, val, val_len); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * RelativeDistinguishedName ::= + * SET OF AttributeTypeAndValue + * + * AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { + * type AttributeType, + * value AttributeValue } + * + * AttributeType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * + * AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType + */ +static int x509_write_name(unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur_name) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + const char *oid = (const char *) cur_name->oid.p; + size_t oid_len = cur_name->oid.len; + const unsigned char *name = cur_name->val.p; + size_t name_len = cur_name->val.len; + + // Write correct string tag and value + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, + cur_name->val.tag, + (const char *) name, + name_len)); + // Write OID + // + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(p, start, oid, + oid_len)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET)); + + return (int) len; +} + +int mbedtls_x509_write_names(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur = first; + + while (cur != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, x509_write_name(p, start, cur)); + cur = cur->next; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} + +int mbedtls_x509_write_sig(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t size, + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + int write_null_par; + size_t len = 0; + + if (*p < start || (size_t) (*p - start) < size) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + len = size; + (*p) -= len; + memcpy(*p, sig, len); + + if (*p - start < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + *--(*p) = 0; + len += 1; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING)); + + // Write OID + // + if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA) { + /* + * The AlgorithmIdentifier's parameters field must be absent for DSA/ECDSA signature + * algorithms, see https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5480#page-17 and + * https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5758#section-3. + */ + write_null_par = 0; + } else { + write_null_par = 1; + } + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(p, start, oid, oid_len, + 0, write_null_par)); + + return (int) len; +} + +static int x509_write_extension(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *ext) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(p, start, ext->val.p + 1, + ext->val.len - 1)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, ext->val.len - 1)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)); + + if (ext->val.p[0] != 0) { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_bool(p, start, 1)); + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(p, start, ext->oid.p, + ext->oid.len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, ext->oid.len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} + +/* + * Extension ::= SEQUENCE { + * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, + * extnValue OCTET STRING + * -- contains the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value + * -- corresponding to the extension type identified + * -- by extnID + * } + */ +int mbedtls_x509_write_extensions(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur_ext = first; + + while (cur_ext != NULL) { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, x509_write_extension(p, start, cur_ext)); + cur_ext = cur_ext->next; + } + + return (int) len; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ diff --git a/library/x509_crl.c b/library/x509_crl.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7901992e20d --- /dev/null +++ b/library/x509_crl.c @@ -0,0 +1,713 @@ +/* + * X.509 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) parsing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10) + * + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32) +#include +#endif + +/* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1) } + */ +static int x509_crl_get_version(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *ver) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, ver)) != 0) { + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + *ver = 0; + return 0; + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * X.509 CRL v2 extensions + * + * We currently don't parse any extension's content, but we do check that the + * list of extensions is well-formed and abort on critical extensions (that + * are unsupported as we don't support any extension so far) + */ +static int x509_get_crl_ext(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *ext) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (*p == end) { + return 0; + } + + /* + * crlExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL + * -- if present, version MUST be v2 + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ext(p, end, ext, 0)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + end = ext->p + ext->len; + + while (*p < end) { + /* + * Extension ::= SEQUENCE { + * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, + * extnValue OCTET STRING } + */ + int is_critical = 0; + const unsigned char *end_ext_data; + size_t len; + + /* Get enclosing sequence tag */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + end_ext_data = *p + len; + + /* Get OID (currently ignored) */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + *p += len; + + /* Get optional critical */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(p, end_ext_data, + &is_critical)) != 0 && + (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + /* Data should be octet string type */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + /* Ignore data so far and just check its length */ + *p += len; + if (*p != end_ext_data) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + /* Abort on (unsupported) critical extensions */ + if (is_critical) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + } + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * X.509 CRL v2 entry extensions (no extensions parsed yet.) + */ +static int x509_get_crl_entry_ext(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *ext) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + /* OPTIONAL */ + if (end <= *p) { + return 0; + } + + ext->tag = **p; + ext->p = *p; + + /* + * Get CRL-entry extension sequence header + * crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL -- if present, MUST be v2 + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &ext->len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + ext->p = NULL; + return 0; + } + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + end = *p + ext->len; + + if (end != *p + ext->len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + while (*p < end) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + *p += len; + } + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * X.509 CRL Entries + */ +static int x509_get_entries(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t entry_len; + mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur_entry = entry; + + if (*p == end) { + return 0; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &entry_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) != 0) { + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + return 0; + } + + return ret; + } + + end = *p + entry_len; + + while (*p < end) { + size_t len2; + const unsigned char *end2; + + cur_entry->raw.tag = **p; + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len2, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + cur_entry->raw.p = *p; + cur_entry->raw.len = len2; + end2 = *p + len2; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial(p, end2, &cur_entry->serial)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time(p, end2, + &cur_entry->revocation_date)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = x509_get_crl_entry_ext(p, end2, + &cur_entry->entry_ext)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (*p < end) { + cur_entry->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crl_entry)); + + if (cur_entry->next == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + cur_entry = cur_entry->next; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse one CRLs in DER format and append it to the chained list + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL; + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2; + mbedtls_x509_crl *crl = chain; + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if (crl == NULL || buf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memset(&sig_params1, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf)); + memset(&sig_params2, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf)); + memset(&sig_oid2, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf)); + + /* + * Add new CRL on the end of the chain if needed. + */ + while (crl->version != 0 && crl->next != NULL) { + crl = crl->next; + } + + if (crl->version != 0 && crl->next == NULL) { + crl->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crl)); + + if (crl->next == NULL) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + mbedtls_x509_crl_init(crl->next); + crl = crl->next; + } + + /* + * Copy raw DER-encoded CRL + */ + if (buflen == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + p = mbedtls_calloc(1, buflen); + if (p == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(p, buf, buflen); + + crl->raw.p = p; + crl->raw.len = buflen; + + end = p + buflen; + + /* + * CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE { + * tbsCertList TBSCertList, + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signatureValue BIT STRING } + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + if (len != (size_t) (end - p)) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + /* + * TBSCertList ::= SEQUENCE { + */ + crl->tbs.p = p; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + end = p + len; + crl->tbs.len = (size_t) (end - crl->tbs.p); + + /* + * Version ::= INTEGER OPTIONAL { v1(0), v2(1) } + * -- if present, MUST be v2 + * + * signature AlgorithmIdentifier + */ + if ((ret = x509_crl_get_version(&p, end, &crl->version)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg(&p, end, &crl->sig_oid, &sig_params1)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return ret; + } + + if (crl->version < 0 || crl->version > 1) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION; + } + + crl->version++; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(&crl->sig_oid, &sig_params1, + &crl->sig_md, &crl->sig_pk, + &crl->sig_opts)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG; + } + + /* + * issuer Name + */ + crl->issuer_raw.p = p; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + len, &crl->issuer)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return ret; + } + + crl->issuer_raw.len = (size_t) (p - crl->issuer_raw.p); + + /* + * thisUpdate Time + * nextUpdate Time OPTIONAL + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time(&p, end, &crl->this_update)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time(&p, end, &crl->next_update)) != 0) { + if (ret != (MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG)) && + ret != (MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA))) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return ret; + } + } + + /* + * revokedCertificates SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { + * userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber, + * revocationDate Time, + * crlEntryExtensions Extensions OPTIONAL + * -- if present, MUST be v2 + * } OPTIONAL + */ + if ((ret = x509_get_entries(&p, end, &crl->entry)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return ret; + } + + /* + * crlExtensions EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL + * -- if present, MUST be v2 + */ + if (crl->version == 2) { + ret = x509_get_crl_ext(&p, end, &crl->crl_ext); + + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return ret; + } + } + + if (p != end) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + end = crl->raw.p + crl->raw.len; + + /* + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signatureValue BIT STRING + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg(&p, end, &sig_oid2, &sig_params2)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return ret; + } + + if (crl->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len || + memcmp(crl->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crl->sig_oid.len) != 0 || + sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len || + (sig_params1.len != 0 && + memcmp(sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len) != 0)) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig(&p, end, &crl->sig)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return ret; + } + + if (p != end) { + mbedtls_x509_crl_free(crl); + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse one or more CRLs and add them to the chained list + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t use_len = 0; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; + int is_pem = 0; + + if (chain == NULL || buf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + do { + mbedtls_pem_init(&pem); + + // Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated + // string + if (buflen == 0 || buf[buflen - 1] != '\0') { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT; + } else { + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, + "-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----", + "-----END X509 CRL-----", + buf, NULL, 0, &use_len); + } + + if (ret == 0) { + /* + * Was PEM encoded + */ + is_pem = 1; + + buflen -= use_len; + buf += use_len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der(chain, + pem.buf, pem.buflen)) != 0) { + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); + return ret; + } + } else if (is_pem) { + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); + return ret; + } + + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); + } + /* In the PEM case, buflen is 1 at the end, for the terminated NULL byte. + * And a valid CRL cannot be less than 1 byte anyway. */ + while (is_pem && buflen > 1); + + if (is_pem) { + return 0; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + return mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der(chain, buf, buflen); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load one or more CRLs and add them to the chained list + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crl_parse(chain, buf, n); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +/* + * Return an informational string about the certificate. + */ +#define BEFORE_COLON 14 +#define BC "14" +/* + * Return an informational string about the CRL. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crl_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + char *p; + const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry; + + p = buf; + n = size; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%sCRL version : %d", + prefix, crl->version); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sissuer name : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(p, n, &crl->issuer); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sthis update : " \ + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, + crl->this_update.year, crl->this_update.mon, + crl->this_update.day, crl->this_update.hour, + crl->this_update.min, crl->this_update.sec); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%snext update : " \ + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, + crl->next_update.year, crl->next_update.mon, + crl->next_update.day, crl->next_update.hour, + crl->next_update.min, crl->next_update.sec); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + entry = &crl->entry; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sRevoked certificates:", + prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + while (entry != NULL && entry->raw.len != 0) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sserial number: ", + prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_serial_gets(p, n, &entry->serial); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, " revocation date: " \ + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", + entry->revocation_date.year, entry->revocation_date.mon, + entry->revocation_date.day, entry->revocation_date.hour, + entry->revocation_date.min, entry->revocation_date.sec); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + entry = entry->next; + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(p, n, &crl->sig_oid, crl->sig_pk, crl->sig_md, + crl->sig_opts); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n"); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + return (int) (size - n); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ + +/* + * Initialize a CRL chain + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crl_init(mbedtls_x509_crl *crl) +{ + memset(crl, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crl)); +} + +/* + * Unallocate all CRL data + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crl_free(mbedtls_x509_crl *crl) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_cur = crl; + mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_prv; + mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry_cur; + mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *entry_prv; + + while (crl_cur != NULL) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + mbedtls_free(crl_cur->sig_opts); +#endif + + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(crl_cur->issuer.next); + + entry_cur = crl_cur->entry.next; + while (entry_cur != NULL) { + entry_prv = entry_cur; + entry_cur = entry_cur->next; + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(entry_prv, + sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crl_entry)); + } + + if (crl_cur->raw.p != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(crl_cur->raw.p, crl_cur->raw.len); + } + + crl_prv = crl_cur; + crl_cur = crl_cur->next; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(crl_prv, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crl)); + if (crl_prv != crl) { + mbedtls_free(crl_prv); + } + } +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/library/x509_crt.c b/library/x509_crt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2fd56fbd79d --- /dev/null +++ b/library/x509_crt.c @@ -0,0 +1,3301 @@ +/* + * X.509 certificate parsing and verification + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10) + * + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf + * + * [SIRO] https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Chunghwatelecom201503cabforumV4.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#include "pk_internal.h" + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) +#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN +#include +#else +#include +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +#include +#if !defined(_WIN32) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32) +#include +#include +#if defined(__MBED__) +#include +#else +#include +#endif /* __MBED__ */ +#include +#endif /* !_WIN32 || EFIX64 || EFI32 */ +#endif + +/* + * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it + */ +typedef struct { + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; + uint32_t flags; +} x509_crt_verify_chain_item; + +/* + * Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root + */ +#define X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE (MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2) + +/* Default profile. Do not remove items unless there are serious security + * concerns. */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default = +{ + /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above. Note that this selection + * should be aligned with ssl_preset_default_hashes in ssl_tls.c. */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512), + 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level. Note that this selection + * should be aligned with ssl_preset_default_curves in ssl_tls.c. */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1) | + 0, +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + 0, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + 2048, +}; + +/* Next-generation profile. Currently identical to the default, but may + * be tightened at any time. */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next = +{ + /* Hashes from SHA-256 and above. */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512), + 0xFFFFFFF, /* Any PK alg */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) + /* Curves at or above 128-bit security level. */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1), +#else + 0, +#endif + 2048, +}; + +/* + * NSA Suite B Profile + */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb = +{ + /* Only SHA-256 and 384 */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384), + /* Only ECDSA */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY), +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + /* Only NIST P-256 and P-384 */ + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) | + MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1), +#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + 0, +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + 0, +}; + +/* + * Empty / all-forbidden profile + */ +const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_none = +{ + 0, + 0, + 0, + (uint32_t) -1, +}; + +/* + * Check md_alg against profile + * Return 0 if md_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise + */ +static int x509_profile_check_md_alg(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) +{ + if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) { + return -1; + } + + if ((profile->allowed_mds & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(md_alg)) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + return -1; +} + +/* + * Check pk_alg against profile + * Return 0 if pk_alg is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise + */ +static int x509_profile_check_pk_alg(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg) +{ + if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { + return -1; + } + + if ((profile->allowed_pks & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(pk_alg)) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + return -1; +} + +/* + * Check key against profile + * Return 0 if pk is acceptable for this profile, -1 otherwise + */ +static int x509_profile_check_key(const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ + const mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) { + if (mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(pk) >= profile->rsa_min_bitlen) { + return 0; + } + + return -1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA || + pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || + pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH) { + const mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk); + + if (gid == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + return -1; + } + + if ((profile->allowed_curves & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(gid)) != 0) { + return 0; + } + + return -1; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + + return -1; +} + +/* + * Like memcmp, but case-insensitive and always returns -1 if different + */ +static int x509_memcasecmp(const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t len) +{ + size_t i; + unsigned char diff; + const unsigned char *n1 = s1, *n2 = s2; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + diff = n1[i] ^ n2[i]; + + if (diff == 0) { + continue; + } + + if (diff == 32 && + ((n1[i] >= 'a' && n1[i] <= 'z') || + (n1[i] >= 'A' && n1[i] <= 'Z'))) { + continue; + } + + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return 0 if name matches wildcard, -1 otherwise + */ +static int x509_check_wildcard(const char *cn, const mbedtls_x509_buf *name) +{ + size_t i; + size_t cn_idx = 0, cn_len = strlen(cn); + + /* We can't have a match if there is no wildcard to match */ + if (name->len < 3 || name->p[0] != '*' || name->p[1] != '.') { + return -1; + } + + for (i = 0; i < cn_len; ++i) { + if (cn[i] == '.') { + cn_idx = i; + break; + } + } + + if (cn_idx == 0) { + return -1; + } + + if (cn_len - cn_idx == name->len - 1 && + x509_memcasecmp(name->p + 1, cn + cn_idx, name->len - 1) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + return -1; +} + +/* + * Compare two X.509 strings, case-insensitive, and allowing for some encoding + * variations (but not all). + * + * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise. + */ +static int x509_string_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_buf *a, const mbedtls_x509_buf *b) +{ + if (a->tag == b->tag && + a->len == b->len && + memcmp(a->p, b->p, b->len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + if ((a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING) && + (b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING) && + a->len == b->len && + x509_memcasecmp(a->p, b->p, b->len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + return -1; +} + +/* + * Compare two X.509 Names (aka rdnSequence). + * + * See RFC 5280 section 7.1, though we don't implement the whole algorithm: + * we sometimes return unequal when the full algorithm would return equal, + * but never the other way. (In particular, we don't do Unicode normalisation + * or space folding.) + * + * Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise. + */ +static int x509_name_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_name *a, const mbedtls_x509_name *b) +{ + /* Avoid recursion, it might not be optimised by the compiler */ + while (a != NULL || b != NULL) { + if (a == NULL || b == NULL) { + return -1; + } + + /* type */ + if (a->oid.tag != b->oid.tag || + a->oid.len != b->oid.len || + memcmp(a->oid.p, b->oid.p, b->oid.len) != 0) { + return -1; + } + + /* value */ + if (x509_string_cmp(&a->val, &b->val) != 0) { + return -1; + } + + /* structure of the list of sets */ + if (a->next_merged != b->next_merged) { + return -1; + } + + a = a->next; + b = b->next; + } + + /* a == NULL == b */ + return 0; +} + +/* + * Reset (init or clear) a verify_chain + */ +static void x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE; i++) { + ver_chain->items[i].crt = NULL; + ver_chain->items[i].flags = (uint32_t) -1; + } + + ver_chain->len = 0; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ +} + +/* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } + */ +static int x509_get_version(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *ver) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + 0)) != 0) { + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + *ver = 0; + return 0; + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + end = *p + len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, ver)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret); + } + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { + * notBefore Time, + * notAfter Time } + */ +static int x509_get_dates(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_time *from, + mbedtls_x509_time *to) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, ret); + } + + end = *p + len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time(p, end, from)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_time(p, end, to)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * X.509 v2/v3 unique identifier (not parsed) + */ +static int x509_get_uid(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *uid, int n) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (*p == end) { + return 0; + } + + uid->tag = **p; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &uid->len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + n)) != 0) { + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + return 0; + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + uid->p = *p; + *p += uid->len; + + return 0; +} + +static int x509_get_basic_constraints(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *ca_istrue, + int *max_pathlen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* + * BasicConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { + * cA BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, + * pathLenConstraint INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } + */ + *ca_istrue = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ + *max_pathlen = 0; /* endless */ + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if (*p == end) { + return 0; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(p, end, ca_istrue)) != 0) { + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, ca_istrue); + } + + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if (*ca_istrue != 0) { + *ca_istrue = 1; + } + } + + if (*p == end) { + return 0; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, max_pathlen)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + /* Do not accept max_pathlen equal to INT_MAX to avoid a signed integer + * overflow, which is an undefined behavior. */ + if (*max_pathlen == INT_MAX) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH); + } + + (*max_pathlen)++; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId + * + * KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + */ +static int x509_get_ext_key_usage(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *ext_key_usage) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(p, end, ext_key_usage, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + /* Sequence length must be >= 1 */ + if (ext_key_usage->buf.p == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= KeyIdentifier + * + * KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING + */ +static int x509_get_subject_key_id(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *subject_key_id) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0u; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + subject_key_id->len = len; + subject_key_id->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + subject_key_id->p = *p; + *p += len; + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + * keyIdentifier [0] KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, + * authorityCertIssuer [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL, + * authorityCertSerialNumber [2] CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL } + * + * KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING + */ +static int x509_get_authority_key_id(unsigned char **p, + unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_authority *authority_key_id) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0u; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if (*p + len != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC); + + /* KeyIdentifier is an OPTIONAL field */ + if (ret == 0) { + authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.len = len; + authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.p = *p; + /* Setting tag of the keyIdentfier intentionally to 0x04. + * Although the .keyIdentfier field is CONTEXT_SPECIFIC ([0] OPTIONAL), + * its tag with the content is the payload of on OCTET STRING primitive */ + authority_key_id->keyIdentifier.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; + + *p += len; + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if (*p < end) { + /* Getting authorityCertIssuer using the required specific class tag [1] */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + 1)) != 0) { + /* authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber MUST both + be present or both be absent. At this point we expect to have both. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + /* "end" also includes the CertSerialNumber field so "len" shall be used */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(p, + (*p+len), + &authority_key_id->authorityCertIssuer); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Getting authorityCertSerialNumber using the required specific class tag [2] */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.len = len; + authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.p = *p; + authority_key_id->authorityCertSerialNumber.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER; + *p += len; + } + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } + * + * anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 } + * + * certificatePolicies ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF PolicyInformation + * + * PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE { + * policyIdentifier CertPolicyId, + * policyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF + * PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL } + * + * CertPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER + * + * PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + * policyQualifierId PolicyQualifierId, + * qualifier ANY DEFINED BY policyQualifierId } + * + * -- policyQualifierIds for Internet policy qualifiers + * + * id-qt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 2 } + * id-qt-cps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 1 } + * id-qt-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qt 2 } + * + * PolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ( id-qt-cps | id-qt-unotice ) + * + * Qualifier ::= CHOICE { + * cPSuri CPSuri, + * userNotice UserNotice } + * + * CPSuri ::= IA5String + * + * UserNotice ::= SEQUENCE { + * noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL, + * explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL } + * + * NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE { + * organization DisplayText, + * noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER } + * + * DisplayText ::= CHOICE { + * ia5String IA5String (SIZE (1..200)), + * visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)), + * bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)), + * utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) } + * + * NOTE: we only parse and use anyPolicy without qualifiers at this point + * as defined in RFC 5280. + */ +static int x509_get_certificate_policies(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies) +{ + int ret, parse_ret = 0; + size_t len; + mbedtls_asn1_buf *buf; + mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur = certificate_policies; + + /* Get main sequence tag */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if (*p + len != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + /* + * Cannot be an empty sequence. + */ + if (len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + while (*p < end) { + mbedtls_x509_buf policy_oid; + const unsigned char *policy_end; + + /* + * Get the policy sequence + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + policy_end = *p + len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, policy_end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + policy_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + policy_oid.len = len; + policy_oid.p = *p; + + /* + * Only AnyPolicy is currently supported when enforcing policy. + */ + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, &policy_oid) != 0) { + /* + * Set the parsing return code but continue parsing, in case this + * extension is critical. + */ + parse_ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + /* Allocate and assign next pointer */ + if (cur->buf.p != NULL) { + if (cur->next != NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS; + } + + cur->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_sequence)); + + if (cur->next == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED); + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + + buf = &(cur->buf); + buf->tag = policy_oid.tag; + buf->p = policy_oid.p; + buf->len = policy_oid.len; + + *p += len; + + /* + * If there is an optional qualifier, then *p < policy_end + * Check the Qualifier len to verify it doesn't exceed policy_end. + */ + if (*p < policy_end) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, policy_end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != + 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + /* + * Skip the optional policy qualifiers. + */ + *p += len; + } + + if (*p != policy_end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + } + + /* Set final sequence entry's next pointer to NULL */ + cur->next = NULL; + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return parse_ret; +} + +/* + * X.509 v3 extensions + * + */ +static int x509_get_crt_ext(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *end_ext_data, *start_ext_octet, *end_ext_octet; + + if (*p == end) { + return 0; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ext(p, end, &crt->v3_ext, 3)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + end = crt->v3_ext.p + crt->v3_ext.len; + while (*p < end) { + /* + * Extension ::= SEQUENCE { + * extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, + * critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, + * extnValue OCTET STRING } + */ + mbedtls_x509_buf extn_oid = { 0, 0, NULL }; + int is_critical = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ + int ext_type = 0; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + end_ext_data = *p + len; + + /* Get extension ID */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + extn_oid.p = *p; + *p += extn_oid.len; + + /* Get optional critical */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(p, end_ext_data, &is_critical)) != 0 && + (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + /* Data should be octet string type */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + start_ext_octet = *p; + end_ext_octet = *p + len; + + if (end_ext_octet != end_ext_data) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + /* + * Detect supported extensions + */ + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type(&extn_oid, &ext_type); + + if (ret != 0) { + /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension */ + if (cb != NULL) { + ret = cb(p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical, *p, end_ext_octet); + if (ret != 0 && is_critical) { + return ret; + } + *p = end_ext_octet; + continue; + } + + /* No parser found, skip extension */ + *p = end_ext_octet; + + if (is_critical) { + /* Data is marked as critical: fail */ + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + continue; + } + + /* Forbid repeated extensions */ + if ((crt->ext_types & ext_type) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS; + } + + crt->ext_types |= ext_type; + + switch (ext_type) { + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: + /* Parse basic constraints */ + if ((ret = x509_get_basic_constraints(p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->ca_istrue, &crt->max_pathlen)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE: + /* Parse key usage */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->key_usage)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE: + /* Parse extended key usage */ + if ((ret = x509_get_ext_key_usage(p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->ext_key_usage)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER: + /* Parse subject key identifier */ + if ((ret = x509_get_subject_key_id(p, end_ext_data, + &crt->subject_key_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER: + /* Parse authority key identifier */ + if ((ret = x509_get_authority_key_id(p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->authority_key_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME: + /* Parse subject alt name + * SubjectAltName ::= GeneralNames + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->subject_alt_names)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE: + /* Parse netscape certificate type */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES: + /* Parse certificate policies type */ + if ((ret = x509_get_certificate_policies(p, end_ext_octet, + &crt->certificate_policies)) != 0) { + /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension + * if it contains unsupported policies */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && cb != NULL && + cb(p_ctx, crt, &extn_oid, is_critical, + start_ext_octet, end_ext_octet) == 0) { + break; + } + + if (is_critical) { + return ret; + } else + /* + * If MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is returned, then we + * cannot interpret or enforce the policy. However, it is up to + * the user to choose how to enforce the policies, + * unless the extension is critical. + */ + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) { + return ret; + } + } + break; + + default: + /* + * If this is a non-critical extension, which the oid layer + * supports, but there isn't an x509 parser for it, + * skip the extension. + */ + if (is_critical) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } else { + *p = end_ext_octet; + } + } + } + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse and fill a single X.509 certificate in DER format + */ +static int x509_crt_parse_der_core(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end; + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params1, sig_params2, sig_oid2; + + memset(&sig_params1, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf)); + memset(&sig_params2, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf)); + memset(&sig_oid2, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf)); + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if (crt == NULL || buf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Use the original buffer until we figure out actual length. */ + p = (unsigned char *) buf; + len = buflen; + end = p + len; + + /* + * Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { + * tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signatureValue BIT STRING } + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + end = crt_end = p + len; + crt->raw.len = (size_t) (crt_end - buf); + if (make_copy != 0) { + /* Create and populate a new buffer for the raw field. */ + crt->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc(1, crt->raw.len); + if (crt->raw.p == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(crt->raw.p, buf, crt->raw.len); + crt->own_buffer = 1; + + p += crt->raw.len - len; + end = crt_end = p + len; + } else { + crt->raw.p = (unsigned char *) buf; + crt->own_buffer = 0; + } + + /* + * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { + */ + crt->tbs.p = p; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + end = p + len; + crt->tbs.len = (size_t) (end - crt->tbs.p); + + /* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } + * + * CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER + * + * signature AlgorithmIdentifier + */ + if ((ret = x509_get_version(&p, end, &crt->version)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial(&p, end, &crt->serial)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg(&p, end, &crt->sig_oid, + &sig_params1)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return ret; + } + + if (crt->version < 0 || crt->version > 2) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION; + } + + crt->version++; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(&crt->sig_oid, &sig_params1, + &crt->sig_md, &crt->sig_pk, + &crt->sig_opts)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return ret; + } + + /* + * issuer Name + */ + crt->issuer_raw.p = p; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + len, &crt->issuer)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return ret; + } + + crt->issuer_raw.len = (size_t) (p - crt->issuer_raw.p); + + /* + * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { + * notBefore Time, + * notAfter Time } + * + */ + if ((ret = x509_get_dates(&p, end, &crt->valid_from, + &crt->valid_to)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return ret; + } + + /* + * subject Name + */ + crt->subject_raw.p = p; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if (len && (ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + len, &crt->subject)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return ret; + } + + crt->subject_raw.len = (size_t) (p - crt->subject_raw.p); + + /* + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo + */ + crt->pk_raw.p = p; + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&p, end, &crt->pk)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return ret; + } + crt->pk_raw.len = (size_t) (p - crt->pk_raw.p); + + /* + * issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, + * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3 + * subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, + * -- If present, version shall be v2 or v3 + * extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL + * -- If present, version shall be v3 + */ + if (crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3) { + ret = x509_get_uid(&p, end, &crt->issuer_id, 1); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return ret; + } + } + + if (crt->version == 2 || crt->version == 3) { + ret = x509_get_uid(&p, end, &crt->subject_id, 2); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return ret; + } + } + + if (crt->version == 3) { + ret = x509_get_crt_ext(&p, end, crt, cb, p_ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return ret; + } + } + + if (p != end) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + end = crt_end; + + /* + * } + * -- end of TBSCertificate + * + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signatureValue BIT STRING + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg(&p, end, &sig_oid2, &sig_params2)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return ret; + } + + if (crt->sig_oid.len != sig_oid2.len || + memcmp(crt->sig_oid.p, sig_oid2.p, crt->sig_oid.len) != 0 || + sig_params1.tag != sig_params2.tag || + sig_params1.len != sig_params2.len || + (sig_params1.len != 0 && + memcmp(sig_params1.p, sig_params2.p, sig_params1.len) != 0)) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig(&p, end, &crt->sig)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return ret; + } + + if (p != end) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(crt); + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse one X.509 certificate in DER format from a buffer and add them to a + * chained list + */ +static int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt = chain, *prev = NULL; + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if (crt == NULL || buf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + while (crt->version != 0 && crt->next != NULL) { + prev = crt; + crt = crt->next; + } + + /* + * Add new certificate on the end of the chain if needed. + */ + if (crt->version != 0 && crt->next == NULL) { + crt->next = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt)); + + if (crt->next == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + prev = crt; + mbedtls_x509_crt_init(crt->next); + crt = crt->next; + } + + ret = x509_crt_parse_der_core(crt, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + if (prev) { + prev->next = NULL; + } + + if (crt != chain) { + mbedtls_free(crt); + } + + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(chain, buf, buflen, 0, NULL, NULL); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen, + int make_copy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(chain, buf, buflen, make_copy, cb, p_ctx); +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_internal(chain, buf, buflen, 1, NULL, NULL); +} + +/* + * Parse one or more PEM certificates from a buffer and add them to the chained + * list + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, + const unsigned char *buf, + size_t buflen) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + int success = 0, first_error = 0, total_failed = 0; + int buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER; +#endif + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if (chain == NULL || buf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* + * Determine buffer content. Buffer contains either one DER certificate or + * one or more PEM certificates. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + if (buflen != 0 && buf[buflen - 1] == '\0' && + strstr((const char *) buf, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----") != NULL) { + buf_format = MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM; + } + + if (buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER) { + return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain, buf, buflen); + } +#else + return mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain, buf, buflen); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + if (buf_format == MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; + + /* 1 rather than 0 since the terminating NULL byte is counted in */ + while (buflen > 1) { + size_t use_len; + mbedtls_pem_init(&pem); + + /* If we get there, we know the string is null-terminated */ + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----", + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----", + buf, NULL, 0, &use_len); + + if (ret == 0) { + /* + * Was PEM encoded + */ + buflen -= use_len; + buf += use_len; + } else if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA) { + return ret; + } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) { + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); + + /* + * PEM header and footer were found + */ + buflen -= use_len; + buf += use_len; + + if (first_error == 0) { + first_error = ret; + } + + total_failed++; + continue; + } else { + break; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(chain, pem.buf, pem.buflen); + + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); + + if (ret != 0) { + /* + * Quit parsing on a memory error + */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED) { + return ret; + } + + if (first_error == 0) { + first_error = ret; + } + + total_failed++; + continue; + } + + success = 1; + } + } + + if (success) { + return total_failed; + } else if (first_error) { + return first_error; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load one or more certificates and add them to the chained list + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(chain, buf, n); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path) +{ + int ret = 0; +#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) + int w_ret; + WCHAR szDir[MAX_PATH]; + char filename[MAX_PATH]; + char *p; + size_t len = strlen(path); + + WIN32_FIND_DATAW file_data; + HANDLE hFind; + + if (len > MAX_PATH - 3) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + memset(szDir, 0, sizeof(szDir)); + memset(filename, 0, MAX_PATH); + memcpy(filename, path, len); + filename[len++] = '\\'; + p = filename + len; + filename[len++] = '*'; + + /* + * Note this function uses the code page CP_ACP which is the system default + * ANSI codepage. The input string is always described in BYTES and the + * output length is described in WCHARs. + */ + w_ret = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, filename, (int) len, szDir, + MAX_PATH - 3); + if (w_ret == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + hFind = FindFirstFileW(szDir, &file_data); + if (hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + + len = MAX_PATH - len; + do { + memset(p, 0, len); + + if (file_data.dwFileAttributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) { + continue; + } + w_ret = WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP, 0, file_data.cFileName, + -1, p, (int) len, NULL, NULL); + if (w_ret == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + + w_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(chain, filename); + if (w_ret < 0) { + ret++; + } else { + ret += w_ret; + } + } while (FindNextFileW(hFind, &file_data) != 0); + + if (GetLastError() != ERROR_NO_MORE_FILES) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + +cleanup: + FindClose(hFind); +#else /* _WIN32 */ + int t_ret; + int snp_ret; + struct stat sb; + struct dirent *entry; + char entry_name[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN]; + DIR *dir = opendir(path); + + if (dir == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex)) != 0) { + closedir(dir); + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb)); + + while ((entry = readdir(dir)) != NULL) { + snp_ret = mbedtls_snprintf(entry_name, sizeof(entry_name), + "%s/%s", path, entry->d_name); + + if (snp_ret < 0 || (size_t) snp_ret >= sizeof(entry_name)) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + goto cleanup; + } else if (stat(entry_name, &sb) == -1) { + if (errno == ENOENT) { + /* Broken symbolic link - ignore this entry. + stat(2) will return this error for either (a) a dangling + symlink or (b) a missing file. + Given that we have just obtained the filename from readdir, + assume that it does exist and therefore treat this as a + dangling symlink. */ + continue; + } else { + /* Some other file error; report the error. */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } + } + + if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { + continue; + } + + // Ignore parse errors + // + t_ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(chain, entry_name); + if (t_ret < 0) { + ret++; + } else { + ret += t_ret; + } + } + +cleanup: + closedir(dir); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex) != 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + +#endif /* _WIN32 */ + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +#define PRINT_ITEM(i) \ + do { \ + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s" i, sep); \ + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; \ + sep = ", "; \ + } while (0) + +#define CERT_TYPE(type, name) \ + do { \ + if (ns_cert_type & (type)) { \ + PRINT_ITEM(name); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#define KEY_USAGE(code, name) \ + do { \ + if (key_usage & (code)) { \ + PRINT_ITEM(name); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +static int x509_info_ext_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *extended_key_usage) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const char *desc; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = extended_key_usage; + const char *sep = ""; + + while (cur != NULL) { + if (mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage(&cur->buf, &desc) != 0) { + desc = "???"; + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + sep = ", "; + + cur = cur->next; + } + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return 0; +} + +static int x509_info_cert_policies(char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *certificate_policies) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const char *desc; + size_t n = *size; + char *p = *buf; + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = certificate_policies; + const char *sep = ""; + + while (cur != NULL) { + if (mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies(&cur->buf, &desc) != 0) { + desc = "???"; + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s%s", sep, desc); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + sep = ", "; + + cur = cur->next; + } + + *size = n; + *buf = p; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Return an informational string about the certificate. + */ +#define BEFORE_COLON 18 +#define BC "18" +int mbedtls_x509_crt_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + char *p; + char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON]; + + p = buf; + n = size; + + if (NULL == crt) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\nCertificate is uninitialised!\n"); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + return (int) (size - n); + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%scert. version : %d\n", + prefix, crt->version); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%sserial number : ", + prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_serial_gets(p, n, &crt->serial); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sissuer name : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(p, n, &crt->issuer); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssubject name : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(p, n, &crt->subject); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sissued on : " \ + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, + crt->valid_from.year, crt->valid_from.mon, + crt->valid_from.day, crt->valid_from.hour, + crt->valid_from.min, crt->valid_from.sec); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sexpires on : " \ + "%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d", prefix, + crt->valid_to.year, crt->valid_to.mon, + crt->valid_to.day, crt->valid_to.hour, + crt->valid_to.min, crt->valid_to.sec); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(p, n, &crt->sig_oid, crt->sig_pk, + crt->sig_md, crt->sig_opts); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + /* Key size */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper(key_size_str, BEFORE_COLON, + mbedtls_pk_get_name(&crt->pk))) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s%-" BC "s: %d bits", prefix, key_size_str, + (int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&crt->pk)); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + /* + * Optional extensions + */ + + if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sbasic constraints : CA=%s", prefix, + crt->ca_istrue ? "true" : "false"); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if (crt->max_pathlen > 0) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, ", max_pathlen=%d", crt->max_pathlen - 1); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + } + + if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name :", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(&p, &n, + &crt->subject_alt_names, + prefix)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%scert. type : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(&p, &n, crt->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%skey usage : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(&p, &n, crt->key_usage)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%sext key usage : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if ((ret = x509_info_ext_key_usage(&p, &n, + &crt->ext_key_usage)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%scertificate policies : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if ((ret = x509_info_cert_policies(&p, &n, + &crt->certificate_policies)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n"); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + return (int) (size - n); +} + +struct x509_crt_verify_string { + int code; + const char *string; +}; + +#define X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(err, err_str, info) { err, info }, +static const struct x509_crt_verify_string x509_crt_verify_strings[] = { + MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO_LIST + { 0, NULL } +}; +#undef X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + uint32_t flags) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const struct x509_crt_verify_string *cur; + char *p = buf; + size_t n = size; + + for (cur = x509_crt_verify_strings; cur->string != NULL; cur++) { + if ((flags & cur->code) == 0) { + continue; + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%s%s\n", prefix, cur->string); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + flags ^= cur->code; + } + + if (flags != 0) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%sUnknown reason " + "(this should not happen)\n", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + + return (int) (size - n); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + unsigned int usage) +{ + unsigned int usage_must, usage_may; + unsigned int may_mask = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY + | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY; + + if ((crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + usage_must = usage & ~may_mask; + + if (((crt->key_usage & ~may_mask) & usage_must) != usage_must) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + usage_may = usage & may_mask; + + if (((crt->key_usage & may_mask) | usage_may) != usage_may) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + const char *usage_oid, + size_t usage_len) +{ + const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur; + + /* Extension is not mandatory, absent means no restriction */ + if ((crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + /* + * Look for the requested usage (or wildcard ANY) in our list + */ + for (cur = &crt->ext_key_usage; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + const mbedtls_x509_buf *cur_oid = &cur->buf; + + if (cur_oid->len == usage_len && + memcmp(cur_oid->p, usage_oid, usage_len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, cur_oid) == 0) { + return 0; + } + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) +/* + * Return 1 if the certificate is revoked, or 0 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl) +{ + const mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *cur = &crl->entry; + + while (cur != NULL && cur->serial.len != 0) { + if (crt->serial.len == cur->serial.len && + memcmp(crt->serial.p, cur->serial.p, crt->serial.len) == 0) { + return 1; + } + + cur = cur->next; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Check that the given certificate is not revoked according to the CRL. + * Skip validation if no CRL for the given CA is present. + */ +static int x509_crt_verifycrl(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *crl_list, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const mbedtls_x509_time *now) +{ + int flags = 0; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm; +#else + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + size_t hash_length; + + if (ca == NULL) { + return flags; + } + + while (crl_list != NULL) { + if (crl_list->version == 0 || + x509_name_cmp(&crl_list->issuer, &ca->subject) != 0) { + crl_list = crl_list->next; + continue; + } + + /* + * Check if the CA is configured to sign CRLs + */ + if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(ca, + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN) != 0) { + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; + break; + } + + /* + * Check if CRL is correctly signed by the trusted CA + */ + if (x509_profile_check_md_alg(profile, crl_list->sig_md) != 0) { + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD; + } + + if (x509_profile_check_pk_alg(profile, crl_list->sig_pk) != 0) { + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(crl_list->sig_md); + if (psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm, + crl_list->tbs.p, + crl_list->tbs.len, + hash, + sizeof(hash), + &hash_length) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */ + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; + break; + } +#else + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(crl_list->sig_md); + hash_length = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + if (mbedtls_md(md_info, + crl_list->tbs.p, + crl_list->tbs.len, + hash) != 0) { + /* Note: this can't happen except after an internal error */ + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + if (x509_profile_check_key(profile, &ca->pk) != 0) { + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + } + + if (mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(crl_list->sig_pk, crl_list->sig_opts, &ca->pk, + crl_list->sig_md, hash, hash_length, + crl_list->sig.p, crl_list->sig.len) != 0) { + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED; + break; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) + /* + * Check for validity of CRL (Do not drop out) + */ + if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&crl_list->next_update, now) < 0) { + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED; + } + + if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&crl_list->this_update, now) > 0) { + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE; + } +#else + ((void) now); +#endif + + /* + * Check if certificate is revoked + */ + if (mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked(crt, crl_list)) { + flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED; + break; + } + + crl_list = crl_list->next; + } + + return flags; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */ + +/* + * Check the signature of a certificate by its parent + */ +static int x509_crt_check_signature(const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + size_t hash_len; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; + md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(child->sig_md); + hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info); + + /* Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error */ + if (mbedtls_md(md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash) != 0) { + return -1; + } +#else + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(child->sig_md); + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + status = psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, + child->tbs.p, + child->tbs.len, + hash, + sizeof(hash), + &hash_len); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + /* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */ + if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(&parent->pk, child->sig_pk)) { + return -1; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && child->sig_pk == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA) { + return mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(&parent->pk, + child->sig_md, hash, hash_len, + child->sig.p, child->sig.len, &rs_ctx->pk); + } +#else + (void) rs_ctx; +#endif + + return mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk, + child->sig_md, hash, hash_len, + child->sig.p, child->sig.len); +} + +/* + * Check if 'parent' is a suitable parent (signing CA) for 'child'. + * Return 0 if yes, -1 if not. + * + * top means parent is a locally-trusted certificate + */ +static int x509_crt_check_parent(const mbedtls_x509_crt *child, + const mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, + int top) +{ + int need_ca_bit; + + /* Parent must be the issuer */ + if (x509_name_cmp(&child->issuer, &parent->subject) != 0) { + return -1; + } + + /* Parent must have the basicConstraints CA bit set as a general rule */ + need_ca_bit = 1; + + /* Exception: v1/v2 certificates that are locally trusted. */ + if (top && parent->version < 3) { + need_ca_bit = 0; + } + + if (need_ca_bit && !parent->ca_istrue) { + return -1; + } + + if (need_ca_bit && + mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(parent, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) != 0) { + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Find a suitable parent for child in candidates, or return NULL. + * + * Here suitable is defined as: + * 1. subject name matches child's issuer + * 2. if necessary, the CA bit is set and key usage allows signing certs + * 3. for trusted roots, the signature is correct + * (for intermediates, the signature is checked and the result reported) + * 4. pathlen constraints are satisfied + * + * If there's a suitable candidate which is also time-valid, return the first + * such. Otherwise, return the first suitable candidate (or NULL if there is + * none). + * + * The rationale for this rule is that someone could have a list of trusted + * roots with two versions on the same root with different validity periods. + * (At least one user reported having such a list and wanted it to just work.) + * The reason we don't just require time-validity is that generally there is + * only one version, and if it's expired we want the flags to state that + * rather than NOT_TRUSTED, as would be the case if we required it here. + * + * The rationale for rule 3 (signature for trusted roots) is that users might + * have two versions of the same CA with different keys in their list, and the + * way we select the correct one is by checking the signature (as we don't + * rely on key identifier extensions). (This is one way users might choose to + * handle key rollover, another relies on self-issued certs, see [SIRO].) + * + * Arguments: + * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent + * - [in] candidates: chained list of potential parents + * - [out] r_parent: parent found (or NULL) + * - [out] r_signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0 + * - [in] top: 1 if candidates consists of trusted roots, ie we're at the top + * of the chain, 0 otherwise + * - [in] path_cnt: number of intermediates seen so far + * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed intermediates seen so far + * (will never be greater than path_cnt) + * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations + * + * Return value: + * - 0 on success + * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise + */ +static int x509_crt_find_parent_in( + mbedtls_x509_crt *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt *candidates, + mbedtls_x509_crt **r_parent, + int *r_signature_is_good, + int top, + unsigned path_cnt, + unsigned self_cnt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, + const mbedtls_x509_time *now) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *fallback_parent; + int signature_is_good = 0, fallback_signature_is_good; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* did we have something in progress? */ + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent != NULL) { + /* restore saved state */ + parent = rs_ctx->parent; + fallback_parent = rs_ctx->fallback_parent; + fallback_signature_is_good = rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good; + + /* clear saved state */ + rs_ctx->parent = NULL; + rs_ctx->fallback_parent = NULL; + rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0; + + /* resume where we left */ + goto check_signature; + } +#endif + + fallback_parent = NULL; + fallback_signature_is_good = 0; + + for (parent = candidates; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next) { + /* basic parenting skills (name, CA bit, key usage) */ + if (x509_crt_check_parent(child, parent, top) != 0) { + continue; + } + + /* +1 because stored max_pathlen is 1 higher that the actual value */ + if (parent->max_pathlen > 0 && + (size_t) parent->max_pathlen < 1 + path_cnt - self_cnt) { + continue; + } + + /* Signature */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +check_signature: +#endif + ret = x509_crt_check_signature(child, parent, rs_ctx); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + /* save state */ + rs_ctx->parent = parent; + rs_ctx->fallback_parent = fallback_parent; + rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good; + + return ret; + } +#else + (void) ret; +#endif + + signature_is_good = ret == 0; + if (top && !signature_is_good) { + continue; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) + /* optional time check */ + if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&parent->valid_to, now) < 0 || /* past */ + mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&parent->valid_from, now) > 0) { /* future */ + if (fallback_parent == NULL) { + fallback_parent = parent; + fallback_signature_is_good = signature_is_good; + } + + continue; + } +#else + ((void) now); +#endif + + *r_parent = parent; + *r_signature_is_good = signature_is_good; + + break; + } + + if (parent == NULL) { + *r_parent = fallback_parent; + *r_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Find a parent in trusted CAs or the provided chain, or return NULL. + * + * Searches in trusted CAs first, and return the first suitable parent found + * (see find_parent_in() for definition of suitable). + * + * Arguments: + * - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent, followed + * by a chain of possible intermediates + * - [in] trust_ca: list of locally trusted certificates + * - [out] parent: parent found (or NULL) + * - [out] parent_is_trusted: 1 if returned `parent` is trusted, or 0 + * - [out] signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0 + * - [in] path_cnt: number of links in the chain so far (EE -> ... -> child) + * - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed certs in the chain so far + * (will always be no greater than path_cnt) + * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations + * + * Return value: + * - 0 on success + * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise + */ +static int x509_crt_find_parent( + mbedtls_x509_crt *child, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crt **parent, + int *parent_is_trusted, + int *signature_is_good, + unsigned path_cnt, + unsigned self_cnt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx, + const mbedtls_x509_time *now) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_x509_crt *search_list; + + *parent_is_trusted = 1; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* restore then clear saved state if we have some stored */ + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted != -1) { + *parent_is_trusted = rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted; + rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1; + } +#endif + + while (1) { + search_list = *parent_is_trusted ? trust_ca : child->next; + + ret = x509_crt_find_parent_in(child, search_list, + parent, signature_is_good, + *parent_is_trusted, + path_cnt, self_cnt, rs_ctx, now); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + /* save state */ + rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = *parent_is_trusted; + return ret; + } +#else + (void) ret; +#endif + + /* stop here if found or already in second iteration */ + if (*parent != NULL || *parent_is_trusted == 0) { + break; + } + + /* prepare second iteration */ + *parent_is_trusted = 0; + } + + /* extra precaution against mistakes in the caller */ + if (*parent == NULL) { + *parent_is_trusted = 0; + *signature_is_good = 0; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Check if an end-entity certificate is locally trusted + * + * Currently we require such certificates to be self-signed (actually only + * check for self-issued as self-signatures are not checked) + */ +static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt *cur; + + /* must be self-issued */ + if (x509_name_cmp(&crt->issuer, &crt->subject) != 0) { + return -1; + } + + /* look for an exact match with trusted cert */ + for (cur = trust_ca; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + if (crt->raw.len == cur->raw.len && + memcmp(crt->raw.p, cur->raw.p, crt->raw.len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + } + + /* too bad */ + return -1; +} + +/* + * Build and verify a certificate chain + * + * Given a peer-provided list of certificates EE, C1, ..., Cn and + * a list of trusted certs R1, ... Rp, try to build and verify a chain + * EE, Ci1, ... Ciq [, Rj] + * such that every cert in the chain is a child of the next one, + * jumping to a trusted root as early as possible. + * + * Verify that chain and return it with flags for all issues found. + * + * Special cases: + * - EE == Rj -> return a one-element list containing it + * - EE, Ci1, ..., Ciq cannot be continued with a trusted root + * -> return that chain with NOT_TRUSTED set on Ciq + * + * Tests for (aspects of) this function should include at least: + * - trusted EE + * - EE -> trusted root + * - EE -> intermediate CA -> trusted root + * - if relevant: EE untrusted + * - if relevant: EE -> intermediate, untrusted + * with the aspect under test checked at each relevant level (EE, int, root). + * For some aspects longer chains are required, but usually length 2 is + * enough (but length 1 is not in general). + * + * Arguments: + * - [in] crt: the cert list EE, C1, ..., Cn + * - [in] trust_ca: the trusted list R1, ..., Rp + * - [in] ca_crl, profile: as in verify_with_profile() + * - [out] ver_chain: the built and verified chain + * Only valid when return value is 0, may contain garbage otherwise! + * Restart note: need not be the same when calling again to resume. + * - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations + * + * Return value: + * - non-zero if the chain could not be fully built and examined + * - 0 is the chain was successfully built and examined, + * even if it was found to be invalid + */ +static int x509_crt_verify_chain( + mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + /* Don't initialize any of those variables here, so that the compiler can + * catch potential issues with jumping ahead when restarting */ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + uint32_t *flags; + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur; + mbedtls_x509_crt *child; + mbedtls_x509_crt *parent; + int parent_is_trusted; + int child_is_trusted; + int signature_is_good; + unsigned self_cnt; + mbedtls_x509_crt *cur_trust_ca = NULL; + mbedtls_x509_time now; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) + if (mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time(NULL), &now) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; + } +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + /* resume if we had an operation in progress */ + if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->in_progress == x509_crt_rs_find_parent) { + /* restore saved state */ + *ver_chain = rs_ctx->ver_chain; /* struct copy */ + self_cnt = rs_ctx->self_cnt; + + /* restore derived state */ + cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len - 1]; + child = cur->crt; + flags = &cur->flags; + + goto find_parent; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + + child = crt; + self_cnt = 0; + parent_is_trusted = 0; + child_is_trusted = 0; + + while (1) { + /* Add certificate to the verification chain */ + cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len]; + cur->crt = child; + cur->flags = 0; + ver_chain->len++; + flags = &cur->flags; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) + /* Check time-validity (all certificates) */ + if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&child->valid_to, &now) < 0) { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED; + } + + if (mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(&child->valid_from, &now) > 0) { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE; + } +#endif + + /* Stop here for trusted roots (but not for trusted EE certs) */ + if (child_is_trusted) { + return 0; + } + + /* Check signature algorithm: MD & PK algs */ + if (x509_profile_check_md_alg(profile, child->sig_md) != 0) { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD; + } + + if (x509_profile_check_pk_alg(profile, child->sig_pk) != 0) { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK; + } + + /* Special case: EE certs that are locally trusted */ + if (ver_chain->len == 1 && + x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(child, trust_ca) == 0) { + return 0; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +find_parent: +#endif + + /* Obtain list of potential trusted signers from CA callback, + * or use statically provided list. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + if (f_ca_cb != NULL) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result); + mbedtls_free(ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result); + ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; + + ret = f_ca_cb(p_ca_cb, child, &ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result); + if (ret != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; + } + + cur_trust_ca = ver_chain->trust_ca_cb_result; + } else +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + { + ((void) f_ca_cb); + ((void) p_ca_cb); + cur_trust_ca = trust_ca; + } + + /* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */ + ret = x509_crt_find_parent(child, cur_trust_ca, &parent, + &parent_is_trusted, &signature_is_good, + ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx, + &now); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + /* save state */ + rs_ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_find_parent; + rs_ctx->self_cnt = self_cnt; + rs_ctx->ver_chain = *ver_chain; /* struct copy */ + + return ret; + } +#else + (void) ret; +#endif + + /* No parent? We're done here */ + if (parent == NULL) { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED; + return 0; + } + + /* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs. + * These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO], + * and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */ + if (ver_chain->len != 1 && + x509_name_cmp(&child->issuer, &child->subject) == 0) { + self_cnt++; + } + + /* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA, + * and if parent is trusted it's not an intermediate CA */ + if (!parent_is_trusted && + ver_chain->len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA) { + /* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; + } + + /* signature was checked while searching parent */ + if (!signature_is_good) { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED; + } + + /* check size of signing key */ + if (x509_profile_check_key(profile, &parent->pk) != 0) { + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) + /* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */ + *flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl, profile, &now); +#else + (void) ca_crl; +#endif + + /* prepare for next iteration */ + child = parent; + parent = NULL; + child_is_trusted = parent_is_trusted; + signature_is_good = 0; + } +} + +#ifdef _WIN32 +#ifdef _MSC_VER +#pragma comment(lib, "ws2_32.lib") +#include +#include +#elif (defined(__MINGW32__) || defined(__MINGW64__)) && _WIN32_WINNT >= 0x0600 +#include +#include +#else +/* inet_pton() is not supported, fallback to software version */ +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON +#endif +#elif defined(__sun) +/* Solaris requires -lsocket -lnsl for inet_pton() */ +#elif defined(__has_include) +#if __has_include() +#include +#endif +#if __has_include() +#include +#endif +#endif + +/* Use whether or not AF_INET6 is defined to indicate whether or not to use + * the platform inet_pton() or a local implementation (below). The local + * implementation may be used even in cases where the platform provides + * inet_pton(), e.g. when there are different includes required and/or the + * platform implementation requires dependencies on additional libraries. + * Specifically, Windows requires custom includes and additional link + * dependencies, and Solaris requires additional link dependencies. + * Also, as a coarse heuristic, use the local implementation if the compiler + * does not support __has_include(), or if the definition of AF_INET6 is not + * provided by headers included (or not) via __has_include() above. + * MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON is a bypass define to force testing of this code //no-check-names + * despite having a platform that has inet_pton. */ +#if !defined(AF_INET6) || defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON) //no-check-names +/* Definition located further below to possibly reduce compiler inlining */ +static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst); + +#define li_cton(c, n) \ + (((n) = (c) - '0') <= 9 || (((n) = ((c)&0xdf) - 'A') <= 5 ? ((n) += 10) : 0)) + +static int x509_inet_pton_ipv6(const char *src, void *dst) +{ + const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *) src; + int nonzero_groups = 0, num_digits, zero_group_start = -1; + uint16_t addr[8]; + do { + /* note: allows excess leading 0's, e.g. 1:0002:3:... */ + uint16_t group = num_digits = 0; + for (uint8_t digit; num_digits < 4; num_digits++) { + if (li_cton(*p, digit) == 0) { + break; + } + group = (group << 4) | digit; + p++; + } + if (num_digits != 0) { + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(group, addr, nonzero_groups); + nonzero_groups++; + if (*p == '\0') { + break; + } else if (*p == '.') { + /* Don't accept IPv4 too early or late */ + if ((nonzero_groups == 0 && zero_group_start == -1) || + nonzero_groups >= 7) { + break; + } + + /* Walk back to prior ':', then parse as IPv4-mapped */ + int steps = 4; + do { + p--; + steps--; + } while (*p != ':' && steps > 0); + + if (*p != ':') { + break; + } + p++; + nonzero_groups--; + if (x509_inet_pton_ipv4((const char *) p, + addr + nonzero_groups) != 0) { + break; + } + + nonzero_groups += 2; + p = (const unsigned char *) ""; + break; + } else if (*p != ':') { + return -1; + } + } else { + /* Don't accept a second zero group or an invalid delimiter */ + if (zero_group_start != -1 || *p != ':') { + return -1; + } + zero_group_start = nonzero_groups; + + /* Accept a zero group at start, but it has to be a double colon */ + if (zero_group_start == 0 && *++p != ':') { + return -1; + } + + if (p[1] == '\0') { + ++p; + break; + } + } + ++p; + } while (nonzero_groups < 8); + + if (*p != '\0') { + return -1; + } + + if (zero_group_start != -1) { + if (nonzero_groups > 6) { + return -1; + } + int zero_groups = 8 - nonzero_groups; + int groups_after_zero = nonzero_groups - zero_group_start; + + /* Move the non-zero part to after the zeroes */ + if (groups_after_zero) { + memmove(addr + zero_group_start + zero_groups, + addr + zero_group_start, + groups_after_zero * sizeof(*addr)); + } + memset(addr + zero_group_start, 0, zero_groups * sizeof(*addr)); + } else { + if (nonzero_groups != 8) { + return -1; + } + } + memcpy(dst, addr, sizeof(addr)); + return 0; +} + +static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst) +{ + const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *) src; + uint8_t *res = (uint8_t *) dst; + uint8_t digit, num_digits = 0; + uint8_t num_octets = 0; + uint16_t octet; + + do { + octet = num_digits = 0; + do { + digit = *p - '0'; + if (digit > 9) { + break; + } + + /* Don't allow leading zeroes. These might mean octal format, + * which this implementation does not support. */ + if (octet == 0 && num_digits > 0) { + return -1; + } + + octet = octet * 10 + digit; + num_digits++; + p++; + } while (num_digits < 3); + + if (octet >= 256 || num_digits > 3 || num_digits == 0) { + return -1; + } + *res++ = (uint8_t) octet; + num_octets++; + } while (num_octets < 4 && *p++ == '.'); + return num_octets == 4 && *p == '\0' ? 0 : -1; +} + +#else + +static int x509_inet_pton_ipv6(const char *src, void *dst) +{ + return inet_pton(AF_INET6, src, dst) == 1 ? 0 : -1; +} + +static int x509_inet_pton_ipv4(const char *src, void *dst) +{ + return inet_pton(AF_INET, src, dst) == 1 ? 0 : -1; +} + +#endif /* !AF_INET6 || MBEDTLS_TEST_SW_INET_PTON */ //no-check-names + +size_t mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_cn_inet_pton(const char *cn, void *dst) +{ + return strchr(cn, ':') == NULL + ? x509_inet_pton_ipv4(cn, dst) == 0 ? 4 : 0 + : x509_inet_pton_ipv6(cn, dst) == 0 ? 16 : 0; +} + +/* + * Check for CN match + */ +static int x509_crt_check_cn(const mbedtls_x509_buf *name, + const char *cn, size_t cn_len) +{ + /* try exact match */ + if (name->len == cn_len && + x509_memcasecmp(cn, name->p, cn_len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + /* try wildcard match */ + if (x509_check_wildcard(cn, name) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + return -1; +} + +static int x509_crt_check_san_ip(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san, + const char *cn, size_t cn_len) +{ + uint32_t ip[4]; + cn_len = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_cn_inet_pton(cn, ip); + if (cn_len == 0) { + return -1; + } + + for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) cur->buf.tag & + MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK; + if (san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS && + cur->buf.len == cn_len && memcmp(cur->buf.p, ip, cn_len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + } + + return -1; +} + +static int x509_crt_check_san_uri(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san, + const char *cn, size_t cn_len) +{ + for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + const unsigned char san_type = (unsigned char) cur->buf.tag & + MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK; + if (san_type == MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER && + cur->buf.len == cn_len && memcmp(cur->buf.p, cn, cn_len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + } + + return -1; +} + +/* + * Check for SAN match, see RFC 5280 Section 4.2.1.6 + */ +static int x509_crt_check_san(const mbedtls_x509_sequence *san, + const char *cn, size_t cn_len) +{ + int san_ip = 0; + int san_uri = 0; + /* Prioritize DNS name over other subtypes due to popularity */ + for (const mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = san; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + switch ((unsigned char) cur->buf.tag & MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK) { + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: + if (x509_crt_check_cn(&cur->buf, cn, cn_len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + break; + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS: + san_ip = 1; + break; + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER: + san_uri = 1; + break; + /* (We may handle other types here later.) */ + default: /* Unrecognized type */ + break; + } + } + if (san_ip) { + if (x509_crt_check_san_ip(san, cn, cn_len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + } + if (san_uri) { + if (x509_crt_check_san_uri(san, cn, cn_len) == 0) { + return 0; + } + } + + return -1; +} + +/* + * Verify the requested CN - only call this if cn is not NULL! + */ +static void x509_crt_verify_name(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + const char *cn, + uint32_t *flags) +{ + const mbedtls_x509_name *name; + size_t cn_len = strlen(cn); + + if (crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME) { + if (x509_crt_check_san(&crt->subject_alt_names, cn, cn_len) == 0) { + return; + } + } else { + for (name = &crt->subject; name != NULL; name = name->next) { + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, &name->oid) == 0 && + x509_crt_check_cn(&name->val, cn, cn_len) == 0) { + return; + } + } + + } + + *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH; +} + +/* + * Merge the flags for all certs in the chain, after calling callback + */ +static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( + uint32_t *flags, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned i; + uint32_t cur_flags; + const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur; + + for (i = ver_chain->len; i != 0; --i) { + cur = &ver_chain->items[i-1]; + cur_flags = cur->flags; + + if (NULL != f_vrfy) { + if ((ret = f_vrfy(p_vrfy, cur->crt, (int) i-1, &cur_flags)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + *flags |= cur_flags; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Verify the certificate validity, with profile, restartable version + * + * This function: + * - checks the requested CN (if any) + * - checks the type and size of the EE cert's key, + * as that isn't done as part of chain building/verification currently + * - builds and verifies the chain + * - then calls the callback and merges the flags + * + * The parameters pairs `trust_ca`, `ca_crl` and `f_ca_cb`, `p_ca_cb` + * are mutually exclusive: If `f_ca_cb != NULL`, it will be used by the + * verification routine to search for trusted signers, and CRLs will + * be disabled. Otherwise, `trust_ca` will be used as the static list + * of trusted signers, and `ca_crl` will be use as the static list + * of CRLs. + */ +static int x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, + mbedtls_x509_crt *, + int, + uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type; + mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain; + uint32_t ee_flags; + + *flags = 0; + ee_flags = 0; + x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(&ver_chain); + + if (profile == NULL) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto exit; + } + + /* check name if requested */ + if (cn != NULL) { + x509_crt_verify_name(crt, cn, &ee_flags); + } + + /* Check the type and size of the key */ + pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(&crt->pk); + + if (x509_profile_check_pk_alg(profile, pk_type) != 0) { + ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK; + } + + if (x509_profile_check_key(profile, &crt->pk) != 0) { + ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; + } + + /* Check the chain */ + ret = x509_crt_verify_chain(crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb, profile, + &ver_chain, rs_ctx); + + if (ret != 0) { + goto exit; + } + + /* Merge end-entity flags */ + ver_chain.items[0].flags |= ee_flags; + + /* Build final flags, calling callback on the way if any */ + ret = x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb(flags, &ver_chain, f_vrfy, p_vrfy); + +exit: + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) + mbedtls_x509_crt_free(ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result); + mbedtls_free(ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result); + ver_chain.trust_ca_cb_result = NULL; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) + if (rs_ctx != NULL && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) { + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(rs_ctx); + } +#endif + + /* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback - VERIFY_FAILED would be ignored by + * the SSL module for authmode optional, but non-zero return from the + * callback means a fatal error so it shouldn't be ignored */ + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR; + } + + if (ret != 0) { + *flags = (uint32_t) -1; + return ret; + } + + if (*flags != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED; + } + + return 0; +} + + +/* + * Verify the certificate validity (default profile, not restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy) +{ + return x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + NULL, NULL, + &mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default, + cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL); +} + +/* + * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, not restartable) + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy) +{ + return x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + NULL, NULL, + profile, cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) +/* + * Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, CA callback, + * not restartable). + */ +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb, + void *p_ca_cb, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy) +{ + return x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt, NULL, NULL, + f_ca_cb, p_ca_cb, + profile, cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */ + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, + mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, + mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, + const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, + const char *cn, uint32_t *flags, + int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *), + void *p_vrfy, + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx) +{ + return x509_crt_verify_restartable_ca_cb(crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, + NULL, NULL, + profile, cn, flags, + f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx); +} + + +/* + * Initialize a certificate chain + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_init(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) +{ + memset(crt, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt)); +} + +/* + * Unallocate all certificate data + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_free(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) +{ + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_cur = crt; + mbedtls_x509_crt *cert_prv; + + while (cert_cur != NULL) { + mbedtls_pk_free(&cert_cur->pk); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + mbedtls_free(cert_cur->sig_opts); +#endif + + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(cert_cur->issuer.next); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(cert_cur->subject.next); + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->ext_key_usage.next); + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->subject_alt_names.next); + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->certificate_policies.next); + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(cert_cur->authority_key_id.authorityCertIssuer.next); + + if (cert_cur->raw.p != NULL && cert_cur->own_buffer) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(cert_cur->raw.p, cert_cur->raw.len); + } + + cert_prv = cert_cur; + cert_cur = cert_cur->next; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cert_prv, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_crt)); + if (cert_prv != crt) { + mbedtls_free(cert_prv); + } + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) +/* + * Initialize a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init(mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_pk_restart_init(&ctx->pk); + + ctx->parent = NULL; + ctx->fallback_parent = NULL; + ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0; + + ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1; + + ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_none; + ctx->self_cnt = 0; + x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(&ctx->ver_chain); +} + +/* + * Free the components of a restart context + */ +void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx) +{ + if (ctx == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_pk_restart_free(&ctx->pk); + mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init(ctx); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */ + +int mbedtls_x509_crt_get_ca_istrue(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt) +{ + if ((crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS) != 0) { + return crt->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_istrue); + } + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/library/x509_csr.c b/library/x509_csr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..813d64466cc --- /dev/null +++ b/library/x509_csr.c @@ -0,0 +1,639 @@ +/* + * X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) parsing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * The ITU-T X.509 standard defines a certificate format for PKI. + * + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt (Certificates and CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3279.txt (Alg IDs for CRLs) + * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt (CSRs, aka PKCS#10) + * + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.680-0207.pdf + * http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || defined(EFIX64) || defined(EFI32) +#include +#endif + +/* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } + */ +static int x509_csr_get_version(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + int *ver) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, ver)) != 0) { + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { + *ver = 0; + return 0; + } + + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION, ret); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse CSR extension requests in DER format + */ +static int x509_csr_parse_extensions(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *end_ext_data, *end_ext_octet; + + while (*p < end) { + mbedtls_x509_buf extn_oid = { 0, 0, NULL }; + int is_critical = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ + int ext_type = 0; + + /* Read sequence tag */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + end_ext_data = *p + len; + + /* Get extension ID */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + extn_oid.p = *p; + *p += extn_oid.len; + + /* Get optional critical */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(p, end_ext_data, &is_critical)) != 0 && + (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + /* Data should be octet string type */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_ext_data, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + end_ext_octet = *p + len; + + if (end_ext_octet != end_ext_data) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + /* + * Detect supported extensions and skip unsupported extensions + */ + ret = mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type(&extn_oid, &ext_type); + + if (ret != 0) { + /* Give the callback (if any) a chance to handle the extension */ + if (cb != NULL) { + ret = cb(p_ctx, csr, &extn_oid, is_critical, *p, end_ext_octet); + if (ret != 0 && is_critical) { + return ret; + } + *p = end_ext_octet; + continue; + } + + /* No parser found, skip extension */ + *p = end_ext_octet; + + if (is_critical) { + /* Data is marked as critical: fail */ + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG); + } + continue; + } + + /* Forbid repeated extensions */ + if ((csr->ext_types & ext_type) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA); + } + + csr->ext_types |= ext_type; + + switch (ext_type) { + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE: + /* Parse key usage */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(p, end_ext_data, + &csr->key_usage)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME: + /* Parse subject alt name */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(p, end_ext_data, + &csr->subject_alt_names)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + + case MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE: + /* Parse netscape certificate type */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(p, end_ext_data, + &csr->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + break; + default: + /* + * If this is a non-critical extension, which the oid layer + * supports, but there isn't an x509 parser for it, + * skip the extension. + */ + if (is_critical) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } else { + *p = end_ext_octet; + } + } + } + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse CSR attributes in DER format + */ +static int x509_csr_parse_attributes(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx) +{ + int ret; + size_t len; + unsigned char *end_attr_data; + unsigned char **p = (unsigned char **) &start; + + while (*p < end) { + mbedtls_x509_buf attr_oid = { 0, 0, NULL }; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + end_attr_data = *p + len; + + /* Get attribute ID */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_attr_data, &attr_oid.len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + attr_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; + attr_oid.p = *p; + *p += attr_oid.len; + + /* Check that this is an extension-request attribute */ + if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ, &attr_oid) == 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != + 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, ret); + } + + if ((ret = x509_csr_parse_extensions(csr, p, *p + len, cb, p_ctx)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (*p != end_attr_data) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + } + + *p = end_attr_data; + } + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse a CSR in DER format + */ +static int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_internal(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end; + mbedtls_x509_buf sig_params; + + memset(&sig_params, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_buf)); + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if (csr == NULL || buf == NULL || buflen == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + mbedtls_x509_csr_init(csr); + + /* + * first copy the raw DER data + */ + p = mbedtls_calloc(1, len = buflen); + + if (p == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + memcpy(p, buf, buflen); + + csr->raw.p = p; + csr->raw.len = len; + end = p + len; + + /* + * CertificationRequest ::= SEQUENCE { + * certificationRequestInfo CertificationRequestInfo, + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signature BIT STRING + * } + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free(csr); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + if (len != (size_t) (end - p)) { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free(csr); + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + /* + * CertificationRequestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + */ + csr->cri.p = p; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free(csr); + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + end = p + len; + csr->cri.len = (size_t) (end - csr->cri.p); + + /* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } + */ + if ((ret = x509_csr_get_version(&p, end, &csr->version)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free(csr); + return ret; + } + + if (csr->version != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free(csr); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION; + } + + csr->version++; + + /* + * subject Name + */ + csr->subject_raw.p = p; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free(csr); + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(&p, p + len, &csr->subject)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free(csr); + return ret; + } + + csr->subject_raw.len = (size_t) (p - csr->subject_raw.p); + + /* + * subjectPKInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(&p, end, &csr->pk)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free(csr); + return ret; + } + + /* + * attributes [0] Attributes + * + * The list of possible attributes is open-ended, though RFC 2985 + * (PKCS#9) defines a few in section 5.4. We currently don't support any, + * so we just ignore them. This is a safe thing to do as the worst thing + * that could happen is that we issue a certificate that does not match + * the requester's expectations - this cannot cause a violation of our + * signature policies. + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC)) != + 0) { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free(csr); + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if ((ret = x509_csr_parse_attributes(csr, p, p + len, cb, p_ctx)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free(csr); + return ret; + } + + p += len; + + end = csr->raw.p + csr->raw.len; + + /* + * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + * signature BIT STRING + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_alg(&p, end, &csr->sig_oid, &sig_params)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free(csr); + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(&csr->sig_oid, &sig_params, + &csr->sig_md, &csr->sig_pk, + &csr->sig_opts)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free(csr); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_get_sig(&p, end, &csr->sig)) != 0) { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free(csr); + return ret; + } + + if (p != end) { + mbedtls_x509_csr_free(csr); + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse a CSR in DER format + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_internal(csr, buf, buflen, NULL, NULL); +} + +/* + * Parse a CSR in DER format with callback for unknown extensions + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_with_ext_cb(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen, + mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t cb, + void *p_ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_internal(csr, buf, buflen, cb, p_ctx); +} + +/* + * Parse a CSR, allowing for PEM or raw DER encoding + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t use_len; + mbedtls_pem_context pem; +#endif + + /* + * Check for valid input + */ + if (csr == NULL || buf == NULL || buflen == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) + /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */ + if (buf[buflen - 1] == '\0') { + mbedtls_pem_init(&pem); + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", + "-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", + buf, NULL, 0, &use_len); + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) { + ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem, + "-----BEGIN NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", + "-----END NEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----", + buf, NULL, 0, &use_len); + } + + if (ret == 0) { + /* + * Was PEM encoded, parse the result + */ + ret = mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(csr, pem.buf, pem.buflen); + } + + mbedtls_pem_free(&pem); + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) { + return ret; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */ + return mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(csr, buf, buflen); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +/* + * Load a CSR into the structure + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + unsigned char *buf; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509_csr_parse(csr, buf, n); + + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */ + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +#define BEFORE_COLON 14 +#define BC "14" +/* + * Return an informational string about the CSR. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_csr_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix, + const mbedtls_x509_csr *csr) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t n; + char *p; + char key_size_str[BEFORE_COLON]; + + p = buf; + n = size; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%sCSR version : %d", + prefix, csr->version); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssubject name : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + ret = mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(p, n, &csr->subject); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssigned using : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + ret = mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(p, n, &csr->sig_oid, csr->sig_pk, csr->sig_md, + csr->sig_opts); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper(key_size_str, BEFORE_COLON, + mbedtls_pk_get_name(&csr->pk))) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%s%-" BC "s: %d bits\n", prefix, key_size_str, + (int) mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&csr->pk)); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + /* + * Optional extensions + */ + + if (csr->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%ssubject alt name :", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(&p, &n, + &csr->subject_alt_names, + prefix)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + if (csr->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%scert. type : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(&p, &n, csr->ns_cert_type)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + if (csr->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n%skey usage : ", prefix); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(&p, &n, csr->key_usage)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } + + if (csr->ext_types != 0) { + ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "\n"); + MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF; + } + + return (int) (size - n); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */ + +/* + * Initialize a CSR + */ +void mbedtls_x509_csr_init(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr) +{ + memset(csr, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_csr)); +} + +/* + * Unallocate all CSR data + */ +void mbedtls_x509_csr_free(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr) +{ + if (csr == NULL) { + return; + } + + mbedtls_pk_free(&csr->pk); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) + mbedtls_free(csr->sig_opts); +#endif + + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(csr->subject.next); + mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(csr->subject_alt_names.next); + + if (csr->raw.p != NULL) { + mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(csr->raw.p, csr->raw.len); + } + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(csr, sizeof(mbedtls_x509_csr)); +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */ diff --git a/library/x509_internal.h b/library/x509_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..8a2d2ed0074 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/x509_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +/** + * \file x509.h + * + * \brief Internal part of the public "x509.h". + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_X509_INTERNAL_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif + +int mbedtls_x509_get_name(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_name *cur); +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg); +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) +int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params(const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md, + int *salt_len); +#endif +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig); +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, + void **sig_opts); +int mbedtls_x509_get_time(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_time *t); +int mbedtls_x509_get_serial(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *serial); +int mbedtls_x509_get_ext(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const void *sig_opts); +#endif +int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper(char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name); +int mbedtls_x509_set_extension(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, const unsigned char *val, + size_t val_len); +int mbedtls_x509_write_extensions(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first); +int mbedtls_x509_write_names(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first); +int mbedtls_x509_write_sig(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t size, + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg); +int mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *ns_cert_type); +int mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned int *key_usage); +int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name); +int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name); +int mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence + *subject_alt_name, + const char *prefix); +int mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned char ns_cert_type); +int mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned int key_usage); + +int mbedtls_x509_write_set_san_common(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **extensions, + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/library/x509write.c b/library/x509write.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4704900d386 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/x509write.c @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +/* + * X.509 internal, common functions for writing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#include "common.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#include "md_psa.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#define CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(a, b) \ + do \ + { \ + if (a > SIZE_MAX - (b)) \ + { \ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; \ + } \ + a += b; \ + } while (0) + +int mbedtls_x509_write_set_san_common(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **extensions, + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list) +{ + int ret = 0; + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *cur; + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char *p; + size_t len; + size_t buflen = 0; + + /* Determine the maximum size of the SubjectAltName list */ + for (cur = san_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { + /* Calculate size of the required buffer */ + switch (cur->node.type) { + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME: + /* length of value for each name entry, + * maximum 4 bytes for the length field, + * 1 byte for the tag/type. + */ + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, cur->node.san.unstructured_name.len); + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, 4 + 1); + break; + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME: + { + const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *chunk = &cur->node.san.directory_name; + while (chunk != NULL) { + // Max 4 bytes for length, +1 for tag, + // additional 4 max for length, +1 for tag. + // See x509_write_name for more information. + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, 4 + 1 + 4 + 1); + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, chunk->oid.len); + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, chunk->val.len); + chunk = chunk->next; + } + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, 4 + 1); + break; + } + default: + /* Not supported - return. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + } + + /* Add the extra length field and tag */ + CHECK_OVERFLOW_ADD(buflen, 4 + 1); + + /* Allocate buffer */ + buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, buflen); + if (buf == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + p = buf + buflen; + + /* Write ASN.1-based structure */ + cur = san_list; + len = 0; + while (cur != NULL) { + size_t single_san_len = 0; + switch (cur->node.type) { + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER: + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS: + { + const unsigned char *unstructured_name = + (const unsigned char *) cur->node.san.unstructured_name.p; + size_t unstructured_name_len = cur->node.san.unstructured_name.len; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( + &p, buf, + unstructured_name, unstructured_name_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( + &p, buf, unstructured_name_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | cur->node.type)); + } + break; + case MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME: + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, + mbedtls_x509_write_names(&p, buf, + (mbedtls_asn1_named_data *) & + cur->node + .san.directory_name)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, buf, single_san_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(single_san_len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME)); + break; + default: + /* Error out on an unsupported SAN */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + goto cleanup; + } + cur = cur->next; + /* check for overflow */ + if (len > SIZE_MAX - single_san_len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + goto cleanup; + } + len += single_san_len; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_set_extension(extensions, + MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME), + 0, + buf + buflen - len, len); + + /* If we exceeded the allocated buffer it means that maximum size of the SubjectAltName list + * was incorrectly calculated and memory is corrupted. */ + if (p < buf) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } +cleanup: + mbedtls_free(buf); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/library/x509write_crt.c b/library/x509write_crt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..72f5a10a17b --- /dev/null +++ b/library/x509write_crt.c @@ -0,0 +1,682 @@ +/* + * X.509 certificate writing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * References: + * - certificates: RFC 5280, updated by RFC 6818 + * - CSRs: PKCS#10 v1.7 aka RFC 2986 + * - attributes: PKCS#9 v2.0 aka RFC 2985 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) + +#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" +#include "mbedtls/md.h" + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509write_cert)); + + ctx->version = MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3; +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_free(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(&ctx->subject); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(&ctx->issuer); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(&ctx->extensions); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_x509write_cert)); +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + int version) +{ + ctx->version = version; +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) +{ + ctx->md_alg = md_alg; +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + mbedtls_pk_context *key) +{ + ctx->subject_key = key; +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + mbedtls_pk_context *key) +{ + ctx->issuer_key = key; +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *subject_name) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(&ctx->subject, subject_name); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *issuer_name) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(&ctx->issuer, issuer_name); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const mbedtls_mpi *serial) +{ + int ret; + size_t tmp_len; + + /* Ensure that the MPI value fits into the buffer */ + tmp_len = mbedtls_mpi_size(serial); + if (tmp_len > MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->serial_len = tmp_len; + + ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(serial, ctx->serial, tmp_len); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif // MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned char *serial, size_t serial_len) +{ + if (serial_len > MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + ctx->serial_len = serial_len; + memcpy(ctx->serial, serial, serial_len); + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *not_before, + const char *not_after) +{ + if (strlen(not_before) != MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN - 1 || + strlen(not_after) != MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN - 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + strncpy(ctx->not_before, not_before, MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN); + strncpy(ctx->not_after, not_after, MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN); + ctx->not_before[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN - 1] = 'Z'; + ctx->not_after[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN - 1] = 'Z'; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_alternative_name(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_write_set_san_common(&ctx->extensions, san_list); +} + + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, + const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_set_extension(&ctx->extensions, oid, oid_len, + critical, val, val_len); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + int is_ca, int max_pathlen) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[9]; + unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf); + size_t len = 0; + + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + + if (is_ca && max_pathlen > 127) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (is_ca) { + if (max_pathlen >= 0) { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(&c, buf, + max_pathlen)); + } + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_bool(&c, buf, 1)); + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return + mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS), + is_ca, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len); +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +static int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + int is_ca, + unsigned char tag) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE * 2 + 20]; /* tag, length + 2xMPI */ + unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf); + size_t len = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t hash_length; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&c, + buf, + is_ca ? + ctx->issuer_key : + ctx->subject_key)); + + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + status = psa_hash_compute(PSA_ALG_SHA_1, + buf + sizeof(buf) - len, + len, + buf + sizeof(buf) - 20, + 20, + &hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } +#else + ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1), + buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len, + buf + sizeof(buf) - 20); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + c = buf + sizeof(buf) - 20; + len = 20; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, tag)); + + if (is_ca) { // writes AuthorityKeyIdentifier sequence + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, + buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + } + + if (is_ca) { + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(ctx, + MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( + MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER), + 0, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len); + } else { + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(ctx, + MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( + MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER), + 0, buf + sizeof(buf) - len, len); + } +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_identifier(ctx, + 0, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_identifier(ctx, + 1, + (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0)); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */ + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned int key_usage) +{ + unsigned char buf[5] = { 0 }, ku[2] = { 0 }; + unsigned char *c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const unsigned int allowed_bits = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY | + MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY; + + /* Check that nothing other than the allowed flags is set */ + if ((key_usage & ~allowed_bits) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; + } + + c = buf + 5; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE(key_usage, ku, 0); + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring(&c, buf, ku, 9); + + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } else if (ret < 3 || ret > 5) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE), + 1, c, (size_t) ret); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ext_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + const mbedtls_asn1_sequence *exts) +{ + unsigned char buf[256]; + unsigned char *c = buf + sizeof(buf); + int ret; + size_t len = 0; + const mbedtls_asn1_sequence *last_ext = NULL; + const mbedtls_asn1_sequence *ext; + + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + + /* We need at least one extension: SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId */ + if (exts == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Iterate over exts backwards, so we write them out in the requested order */ + while (last_ext != exts) { + for (ext = exts; ext->next != last_ext; ext = ext->next) { + } + if (ext->buf.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(&c, buf, ext->buf.p, ext->buf.len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, ext->buf.len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)); + last_ext = ext; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(ctx, + MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE), + 1, c, len); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned char ns_cert_type) +{ + unsigned char buf[4] = { 0 }; + unsigned char *c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + c = buf + 4; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring(&c, buf, &ns_cert_type, 8); + if (ret < 3 || ret > 4) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE), + 0, c, (size_t) ret); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int x509_write_time(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *t, size_t size) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + + /* + * write MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME if year < 2050 (2 bytes shorter) + */ + if (t[0] < '2' || (t[0] == '2' && t[1] == '0' && t[2] < '5')) { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(p, start, + (const unsigned char *) t + 2, + size - 2)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME)); + } else { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(p, start, + (const unsigned char *) t, + size)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME)); + } + + return (int) len; +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const char *sig_oid; + size_t sig_oid_len = 0; + unsigned char *c, *c2; + unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t hash_length = 0; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + size_t sub_len = 0, pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; + int write_sig_null_par; + + /* + * Prepare data to be signed at the end of the target buffer + */ + c = buf + size; + + /* Signature algorithm needed in TBS, and later for actual signature */ + + /* There's no direct way of extracting a signature algorithm + * (represented as an element of mbedtls_pk_type_t) from a PK instance. */ + if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(ctx->issuer_key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) { + pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; + } else if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(ctx->issuer_key, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA)) { + pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg(pk_alg, ctx->md_alg, + &sig_oid, &sig_oid_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* + * Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension + */ + + /* Only for v3 */ + if (ctx->version == MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3) { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_x509_write_extensions(&c, + buf, ctx->extensions)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 3)); + } + + /* + * SubjectPublicKeyInfo + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, + mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(ctx->subject_key, + buf, (size_t) (c - buf))); + c -= pub_len; + len += pub_len; + + /* + * Subject ::= Name + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_x509_write_names(&c, buf, + ctx->subject)); + + /* + * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { + * notBefore Time, + * notAfter Time } + */ + sub_len = 0; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(sub_len, + x509_write_time(&c, buf, ctx->not_after, + MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(sub_len, + x509_write_time(&c, buf, ctx->not_before, + MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN)); + + len += sub_len; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, sub_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + /* + * Issuer ::= Name + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_x509_write_names(&c, buf, + ctx->issuer)); + + /* + * Signature ::= AlgorithmIdentifier + */ + if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA) { + /* + * The AlgorithmIdentifier's parameters field must be absent for DSA/ECDSA signature + * algorithms, see https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5480#page-17 and + * https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5758#section-3. + */ + write_sig_null_par = 0; + } else { + write_sig_null_par = 1; + } + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(&c, buf, + sig_oid, strlen(sig_oid), + 0, write_sig_null_par)); + + /* + * Serial ::= INTEGER + * + * Written data is: + * - "ctx->serial_len" bytes for the raw serial buffer + * - if MSb of "serial" is 1, then prepend an extra 0x00 byte + * - 1 byte for the length + * - 1 byte for the TAG + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(&c, buf, + ctx->serial, ctx->serial_len)); + if (*c & 0x80) { + if (c - buf < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; + } + *(--c) = 0x0; + len++; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, + ctx->serial_len + 1)); + } else { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, + ctx->serial_len)); + } + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)); + + /* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } + */ + + /* Can be omitted for v1 */ + if (ctx->version != MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1) { + sub_len = 0; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(sub_len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_int(&c, buf, ctx->version)); + len += sub_len; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, sub_len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)); + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + /* + * Make signature + */ + + /* Compute hash of CRT. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + psa_algorithm = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ctx->md_alg); + + status = psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm, + c, + len, + hash, + sizeof(hash), + &hash_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } +#else + if ((ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(ctx->md_alg), c, + len, hash)) != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(ctx->issuer_key, ctx->md_alg, + hash, hash_length, sig, sizeof(sig), &sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Move CRT to the front of the buffer to have space + * for the signature. */ + memmove(buf, c, len); + c = buf + len; + + /* Add signature at the end of the buffer, + * making sure that it doesn't underflow + * into the CRT buffer. */ + c2 = buf + size; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(sig_and_oid_len, mbedtls_x509_write_sig(&c2, c, + sig_oid, sig_oid_len, + sig, sig_len, pk_alg)); + + /* + * Memory layout after this step: + * + * buf c=buf+len c2 buf+size + * [CRT0,...,CRTn, UNUSED, ..., UNUSED, SIG0, ..., SIGm] + */ + + /* Move raw CRT to just before the signature. */ + c = c2 - len; + memmove(c, buf, len); + + len += sig_and_oid_len; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} + +#define PEM_BEGIN_CRT "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" +#define PEM_END_CRT "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +int mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem(mbedtls_x509write_cert *crt, + unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509write_crt_der(crt, buf, size, + f_rng, p_rng)) < 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(PEM_BEGIN_CRT, PEM_END_CRT, + buf + size - ret, ret, + buf, size, &olen)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */ diff --git a/library/x509write_csr.c b/library/x509write_csr.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d3ddbcc03d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/x509write_csr.c @@ -0,0 +1,331 @@ +/* + * X.509 Certificate Signing Request writing + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +/* + * References: + * - CSRs: PKCS#10 v1.7 aka RFC 2986 + * - attributes: PKCS#9 v2.0 aka RFC 2985 + */ + +#include "common.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) + +#include "x509_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" +#include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "psa_util_internal.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + +#include +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +#include "mbedtls/pem.h" +#endif + +#include "mbedtls/platform.h" + +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_init(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx) +{ + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_x509write_csr)); +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_free(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx) +{ + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(&ctx->subject); + mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(&ctx->extensions); + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_x509write_csr)); +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg) +{ + ctx->md_alg = md_alg; +} + +void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key) +{ + ctx->key = key; +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + const char *subject_name) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(&ctx->subject, subject_name); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, + const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_set_extension(&ctx->extensions, oid, oid_len, + critical, val, val_len); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_alternative_name(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list) +{ + return mbedtls_x509_write_set_san_common(&ctx->extensions, san_list); +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char key_usage) +{ + unsigned char buf[4] = { 0 }; + unsigned char *c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + c = buf + 4; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring(&c, buf, &key_usage, 8); + if (ret < 3 || ret > 4) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension(ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE), + 0, c, (size_t) ret); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + unsigned char ns_cert_type) +{ + unsigned char buf[4] = { 0 }; + unsigned char *c; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + c = buf + 4; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring(&c, buf, &ns_cert_type, 8); + if (ret < 3 || ret > 4) { + return ret; + } + + ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension(ctx, MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE), + 0, c, (size_t) ret); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int x509write_csr_der_internal(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, + unsigned char *buf, + size_t size, + unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const char *sig_oid; + size_t sig_oid_len = 0; + unsigned char *c, *c2; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t pub_len = 0, sig_and_oid_len = 0, sig_len; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + size_t hash_len; + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(ctx->md_alg); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + + /* Write the CSR backwards starting from the end of buf */ + c = buf + size; + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_x509_write_extensions(&c, buf, + ctx->extensions)); + + if (len) { + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( + &c, buf, MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ))); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(pub_len, mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(ctx->key, + buf, (size_t) (c - buf))); + c -= pub_len; + len += pub_len; + + /* + * Subject ::= Name + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_x509_write_names(&c, buf, + ctx->subject)); + + /* + * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } + */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(&c, buf, 0)); + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + /* + * Sign the written CSR data into the sig buffer + * Note: hash errors can happen only after an internal error + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + if (psa_hash_compute(hash_alg, + c, + len, + hash, + sizeof(hash), + &hash_len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; + } +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(ctx->md_alg), c, len, hash); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } +#endif + if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_sign(ctx->key, ctx->md_alg, hash, 0, + sig, sig_size, &sig_len, + f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(ctx->key, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) { + pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; + } else if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(ctx->key, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA)) { + pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + } else { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg(pk_alg, ctx->md_alg, + &sig_oid, &sig_oid_len)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* + * Move the written CSR data to the start of buf to create space for + * writing the signature into buf. + */ + memmove(buf, c, len); + + /* + * Write sig and its OID into buf backwards from the end of buf. + * Note: mbedtls_x509_write_sig will check for c2 - ( buf + len ) < sig_len + * and return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL if needed. + */ + c2 = buf + size; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(sig_and_oid_len, + mbedtls_x509_write_sig(&c2, buf + len, sig_oid, sig_oid_len, + sig, sig_len, pk_alg)); + + /* + * Compact the space between the CSR data and signature by moving the + * CSR data to the start of the signature. + */ + c2 -= len; + memmove(c2, buf, len); + + /* ASN encode the total size and tag the CSR data with it. */ + len += sig_and_oid_len; + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&c2, buf, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, + mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( + &c2, buf, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + /* Zero the unused bytes at the start of buf */ + memset(buf, 0, (size_t) (c2 - buf)); + + return (int) len; +} + +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, + size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret; + unsigned char *sig; + + if ((sig = mbedtls_calloc(1, MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE)) == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; + } + + ret = x509write_csr_der_internal(ctx, buf, size, + sig, MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE, + f_rng, p_rng); + + mbedtls_free(sig); + + return ret; +} + +#define PEM_BEGIN_CSR "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\n" +#define PEM_END_CSR "-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\n" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) +int mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t olen = 0; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_x509write_csr_der(ctx, buf, size, + f_rng, p_rng)) < 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(PEM_BEGIN_CSR, PEM_END_CSR, + buf + size - ret, + ret, buf, size, &olen)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ -- cgit v1.2.3