// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ /* * Copyright (c) 2013, Google Inc. */ #ifdef USE_HOSTCC #include "mkimage.h" #include #else #include #include #include DECLARE_GLOBAL_DATA_PTR; #endif /* !USE_HOSTCC*/ #include #include #include #include #define IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES 100 #define FIT_MAX_HASH_PATH_BUF 4096 /** * fit_region_make_list() - Make a list of image regions * * Given a list of fdt_regions, create a list of image_regions. This is a * simple conversion routine since the FDT and image code use different * structures. * * @fit: FIT image * @fdt_regions: Pointer to FDT regions * @count: Number of FDT regions * @region: Pointer to image regions, which must hold @count records. If * region is NULL, then (except for an SPL build) the array will be * allocated. * @return: Pointer to image regions */ struct image_region *fit_region_make_list(const void *fit, struct fdt_region *fdt_regions, int count, struct image_region *region) { int i; debug("Hash regions:\n"); debug("%10s %10s\n", "Offset", "Size"); /* * Use malloc() except in SPL (to save code size). In SPL the caller * must allocate the array. */ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XPL_BUILD) && !region) region = calloc(sizeof(*region), count); if (!region) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { debug("%10x %10x\n", fdt_regions[i].offset, fdt_regions[i].size); region[i].data = fit + fdt_regions[i].offset; region[i].size = fdt_regions[i].size; } return region; } static int fit_image_setup_verify(struct image_sign_info *info, const void *fit, int noffset, const void *key_blob, int required_keynode, char **err_msgp) { const char *algo_name; const char *padding_name; if (fdt_totalsize(fit) > CONFIG_VAL(FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE)) { *err_msgp = "Total size too large"; return 1; } if (fit_image_hash_get_algo(fit, noffset, &algo_name)) { *err_msgp = "Can't get hash algo property"; return -1; } padding_name = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "padding", NULL); if (!padding_name) padding_name = RSA_DEFAULT_PADDING_NAME; memset(info, '\0', sizeof(*info)); info->keyname = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, FIT_KEY_HINT, NULL); info->fit = fit; info->node_offset = noffset; info->name = algo_name; info->checksum = image_get_checksum_algo(algo_name); info->crypto = image_get_crypto_algo(algo_name); info->padding = image_get_padding_algo(padding_name); info->fdt_blob = key_blob; info->required_keynode = required_keynode; printf("%s:%s", algo_name, info->keyname); if (!info->checksum || !info->crypto) { *err_msgp = "Unknown signature algorithm"; return -1; } return 0; } int fit_image_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, const void *data, size_t size, const void *key_blob, int required_keynode, char **err_msgp) { struct image_sign_info info; struct image_region region; uint8_t *fit_value; int fit_value_len; *err_msgp = NULL; if (fit_image_setup_verify(&info, fit, noffset, key_blob, required_keynode, err_msgp)) return -1; if (fit_image_hash_get_value(fit, noffset, &fit_value, &fit_value_len)) { *err_msgp = "Can't get hash value property"; return -1; } region.data = data; region.size = size; if (info.crypto->verify(&info, ®ion, 1, fit_value, fit_value_len)) { *err_msgp = "Verification failed"; return -1; } return 0; } static int fit_image_verify_sig(const void *fit, int image_noffset, const char *data, size_t size, const void *key_blob, int key_offset) { int noffset; char *err_msg = ""; int verified = 0; int ret; /* Process all hash subnodes of the component image node */ fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, fit, image_noffset) { const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL); /* * We don't support this since libfdt considers names with the * name root but different @ suffix to be equal */ if (strchr(name, '@')) { err_msg = "Node name contains @"; goto error; } if (!strncmp(name, FIT_SIG_NODENAME, strlen(FIT_SIG_NODENAME))) { ret = fit_image_check_sig(fit, noffset, data, size, key_blob, -1, &err_msg); if (ret) { puts("- "); } else { puts("+ "); verified = 1; break; } } } if (noffset == -FDT_ERR_TRUNCATED || noffset == -FDT_ERR_BADSTRUCTURE) { err_msg = "Corrupted or truncated tree"; goto error; } return verified ? 0 : -EPERM; error: printf(" error!\n%s for '%s' hash node in '%s' image node\n", err_msg, fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL), fit_get_name(fit, image_noffset, NULL)); return -1; } int fit_image_verify_required_sigs(const void *fit, int image_noffset, const char *data, size_t size, const void *key_blob, int *no_sigsp) { int verify_count = 0; int noffset; int key_node; #ifdef USE_HOSTCC if (!key_blob) return 0; #endif /* Work out what we need to verify */ *no_sigsp = 1; key_node = fdt_subnode_offset(key_blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME); if (key_node < 0) { debug("%s: No signature node found: %s\n", __func__, fdt_strerror(key_node)); return 0; } fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, key_blob, key_node) { const char *required; int ret; required = fdt_getprop(key_blob, noffset, FIT_KEY_REQUIRED, NULL); if (!required || strcmp(required, "image")) continue; ret = fit_image_verify_sig(fit, image_noffset, data, size, key_blob, noffset); if (ret) { printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n", fit_get_name(key_blob, noffset, NULL)); return ret; } verify_count++; } if (verify_count) *no_sigsp = 0; return 0; } /** * fit_config_add_hash() - Add hash nodes for one image to the node list * * Adds the image path, all its hash-* subnode paths, and its cipher * subnode path (if present) to the packed buffer. * * @fit: FIT blob * @image_noffset: Image node offset (e.g. /images/kernel-1) * @node_inc: Array of path pointers to fill * @count: Pointer to current count (updated on return) * @max_nodes: Maximum entries in @node_inc * @buf: Buffer for packed path strings * @buf_used: Pointer to bytes used in @buf (updated on return) * @buf_len: Total size of @buf * Return: 0 on success, -ve on error */ static int fit_config_add_hash(const void *fit, int image_noffset, char **node_inc, int *count, int max_nodes, char *buf, int *buf_used, int buf_len) { int noffset, hash_count, ret, len; if (*count >= max_nodes) return -ENOSPC; ret = fdt_get_path(fit, image_noffset, buf + *buf_used, buf_len - *buf_used); if (ret < 0) return -ENOENT; len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1; node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used; *buf_used += len; /* Add all this image's hash subnodes */ hash_count = 0; for (noffset = fdt_first_subnode(fit, image_noffset); noffset >= 0; noffset = fdt_next_subnode(fit, noffset)) { const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL); if (strncmp(name, FIT_HASH_NODENAME, strlen(FIT_HASH_NODENAME))) continue; if (*count >= max_nodes) return -ENOSPC; ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used, buf_len - *buf_used); if (ret < 0) return -ENOENT; len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1; node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used; *buf_used += len; hash_count++; } if (!hash_count) { printf("No hash nodes in image '%s'\n", fdt_get_name(fit, image_noffset, NULL)); return -ENOMSG; } /* Add this image's cipher node if present */ noffset = fdt_subnode_offset(fit, image_noffset, FIT_CIPHER_NODENAME); if (noffset != -FDT_ERR_NOTFOUND) { if (noffset < 0) return -EIO; if (*count >= max_nodes) return -ENOSPC; ret = fdt_get_path(fit, noffset, buf + *buf_used, buf_len - *buf_used); if (ret < 0) return -ENOENT; len = strlen(buf + *buf_used) + 1; node_inc[(*count)++] = buf + *buf_used; *buf_used += len; } return 0; } /** * fit_config_get_hash_list() - Build the list of nodes to hash * * Works through every image referenced by the configuration and collects the * node paths: root + config + all referenced images with their hash and * cipher subnodes. * * Properties known not to be image references (description, compatible, * default, load-only) are skipped, so any new image type is covered by default. * * @fit: FIT blob * @conf_noffset: Configuration node offset * @node_inc: Array to fill with path string pointers * @max_nodes: Size of @node_inc array * @buf: Buffer for packed null-terminated path strings * @buf_len: Size of @buf * Return: number of entries in @node_inc, or -ve on error */ static int fit_config_get_hash_list(const void *fit, int conf_noffset, char **node_inc, int max_nodes, char *buf, int buf_len) { const char *conf_name; int image_count; int prop_offset; int used = 0; int count = 0; int ret, len; conf_name = fit_get_name(fit, conf_noffset, NULL); /* Always include the root node and the configuration node */ if (max_nodes < 2) return -ENOSPC; len = 2; /* "/" + nul */ if (len > buf_len) return -ENOSPC; strcpy(buf, "/"); node_inc[count++] = buf; used += len; len = snprintf(buf + used, buf_len - used, "%s/%s", FIT_CONFS_PATH, conf_name) + 1; if (used + len > buf_len) return -ENOSPC; node_inc[count++] = buf + used; used += len; /* Process each image referenced by the config */ image_count = 0; fdt_for_each_property_offset(prop_offset, fit, conf_noffset) { const char *prop_name; int img_count, i; fdt_getprop_by_offset(fit, prop_offset, &prop_name, NULL); if (!prop_name) continue; /* Skip properties that are not image references */ if (!strcmp(prop_name, FIT_DESC_PROP) || !strcmp(prop_name, FIT_COMPAT_PROP) || !strcmp(prop_name, FIT_DEFAULT_PROP)) continue; img_count = fdt_stringlist_count(fit, conf_noffset, prop_name); for (i = 0; i < img_count; i++) { int noffset; noffset = fit_conf_get_prop_node_index(fit, conf_noffset, prop_name, i); if (noffset < 0) continue; ret = fit_config_add_hash(fit, noffset, node_inc, &count, max_nodes, buf, &used, buf_len); if (ret < 0) return ret; image_count++; } } if (!image_count) { printf("No images in config '%s'\n", conf_name); return -ENOMSG; } return count; } /** * fit_config_check_sig() - Check the signature of a config * * Here we are looking at a particular signature that needs verification (here * signature-1): * * configurations { * default = "conf-1"; * conf-1 { * kernel = "kernel-1"; * fdt = "fdt-1"; * signature-1 { * algo = "sha1,rsa2048"; * value = <...conf 1 signature...>; * }; * }; * * @fit: FIT to check * @noffset: Offset of the signature node being checked (e.g. * /configurations/conf-1/signature-1) * @conf_noffset: Offset of configuration node (e.g. /configurations/conf-1) * @key_blob: Blob containing the keys to check against * @required_keynode: Offset in @key_blob of the required key node, * if any. If this is given, then the configuration wil not * pass verification unless that key is used. If this is * -1 then any signature will do. * @err_msgp: In the event of an error, this will be pointed to a * help error string to display to the user. * Return: 0 if all verified ok, <0 on error */ static int fit_config_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, int conf_noffset, const void *key_blob, int required_keynode, char **err_msgp) { static char * const exc_prop[] = { FIT_DATA_PROP, FIT_DATA_SIZE_PROP, FIT_DATA_POSITION_PROP, FIT_DATA_OFFSET_PROP, }; char *node_inc[IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES]; char hash_buf[FIT_MAX_HASH_PATH_BUF]; struct image_sign_info info; const uint32_t *strings; uint8_t *fit_value; int fit_value_len; int max_regions; char path[200]; int count; debug("%s: fdt=%p, conf='%s', sig='%s'\n", __func__, key_blob, fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL), fit_get_name(key_blob, required_keynode, NULL)); *err_msgp = NULL; if (fit_image_setup_verify(&info, fit, noffset, key_blob, required_keynode, err_msgp)) return -1; if (fit_image_hash_get_value(fit, noffset, &fit_value, &fit_value_len)) { *err_msgp = "Can't get hash value property"; return -1; } /* Build the node list from the config, ignoring hashed-nodes */ count = fit_config_get_hash_list(fit, conf_noffset, node_inc, IMAGE_MAX_HASHED_NODES, hash_buf, sizeof(hash_buf)); if (count < 0) { *err_msgp = "Failed to build hash node list"; return -1; } debug("Hash nodes (%d):\n", count); for (int i = 0; i < count; ++i) debug(" '%s'\n", node_inc[i]); /* * Each node can generate one region for each sub-node. Allow for * 7 sub-nodes (hash-1, signature-1, etc.) and some extra. */ max_regions = 20 + count * 7; struct fdt_region fdt_regions[max_regions]; /* Get a list of regions to hash */ count = fdt_find_regions(fit, node_inc, count, exc_prop, ARRAY_SIZE(exc_prop), fdt_regions, max_regions - 1, path, sizeof(path), 0); if (count < 0) { *err_msgp = "Failed to hash configuration"; return -1; } if (count == 0) { *err_msgp = "No data to hash"; return -1; } if (count >= max_regions - 1) { *err_msgp = "Too many hash regions"; return -1; } /* Add the strings */ strings = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "hashed-strings", NULL); if (strings) { /* * The strings region offset must be a static 0x0. * This is set in tool/image-host.c */ fdt_regions[count].offset = fdt_off_dt_strings(fit); fdt_regions[count].size = fdt32_to_cpu(strings[1]); count++; } /* Allocate the region list on the stack */ struct image_region region[count]; fit_region_make_list(fit, fdt_regions, count, region); if (info.crypto->verify(&info, region, count, fit_value, fit_value_len)) { *err_msgp = "Verification failed"; return -1; } return 0; } /** * fit_config_verify_key() - Verify that a configuration is signed with a key * * Here we are looking at a particular configuration that needs verification: * * configurations { * default = "conf-1"; * conf-1 { * kernel = "kernel-1"; * fdt = "fdt-1"; * signature-1 { * algo = "sha1,rsa2048"; * value = <...conf 1 signature...>; * }; * }; * * We must check each of the signature subnodes of conf-1. Hopefully one of them * will match the key at key_offset. * * @fit: FIT to check * @conf_noffset: Offset of the configuration node to check (e.g. * /configurations/conf-1) * @key_blob: Blob containing the keys to check against * @key_offset: Offset of the key to check within @key_blob * @return 0 if OK, -EPERM if any signatures did not verify, or the * configuration node has an invalid name */ static int fit_config_verify_key(const void *fit, int conf_noffset, const void *key_blob, int key_offset) { int noffset; char *err_msg = "No 'signature' subnode found"; int verified = 0; int ret; /* Process all hash subnodes of the component conf node */ fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, fit, conf_noffset) { const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, noffset, NULL); if (!strncmp(name, FIT_SIG_NODENAME, strlen(FIT_SIG_NODENAME))) { ret = fit_config_check_sig(fit, noffset, conf_noffset, key_blob, key_offset, &err_msg); if (ret) { puts("- "); } else { puts("+ "); verified = 1; break; } } } if (noffset == -FDT_ERR_TRUNCATED || noffset == -FDT_ERR_BADSTRUCTURE) { err_msg = "Corrupted or truncated tree"; goto error; } if (verified) return 0; error: printf(" error!\n%s for '%s' config node\n", err_msg, fit_get_name(fit, conf_noffset, NULL)); return -EPERM; } /** * fit_config_verify_required_keys() - verify any required signatures for config * * This looks through all the signatures we expect and verifies that at least * all the required ones are valid signatures for the configuration * * @fit: FIT to check * @conf_noffset: Offset of the configuration node to check (e.g. * /configurations/conf-1) * @key_blob: Blob containing the keys to check against * @return 0 if OK, -EPERM if any signatures did not verify, or the * configuration node has an invalid name */ static int fit_config_verify_required_keys(const void *fit, int conf_noffset, const void *key_blob) { const char *name = fit_get_name(fit, conf_noffset, NULL); int noffset; int key_node; int verified = 0; int reqd_sigs = 0; bool reqd_policy_all = true; const char *reqd_mode; #ifdef USE_HOSTCC if (!key_blob) return 0; #endif /* * We don't support this since libfdt considers names with the * name root but different @ suffix to be equal */ if (strchr(name, '@')) { printf("Configuration node '%s' contains '@'\n", name); return -EPERM; } /* Work out what we need to verify */ key_node = fdt_subnode_offset(key_blob, 0, FIT_SIG_NODENAME); if (key_node < 0) { debug("%s: No signature node found: %s\n", __func__, fdt_strerror(key_node)); return 0; } /* Get required-mode policy property from DTB */ reqd_mode = fdt_getprop(key_blob, key_node, "required-mode", NULL); if (reqd_mode && !strcmp(reqd_mode, "any")) reqd_policy_all = false; debug("%s: required-mode policy set to '%s'\n", __func__, reqd_policy_all ? "all" : "any"); /* * The algorithm here is a little convoluted due to how we want it to * work. Here we work through each of the signature nodes in the * public-key area. These are in the U-Boot control devicetree. Each * node was created by signing a configuration, so we check if it is * 'required' and if so, request that it be verified. */ fdt_for_each_subnode(noffset, key_blob, key_node) { const char *required; int ret; required = fdt_getprop(key_blob, noffset, FIT_KEY_REQUIRED, NULL); if (!required || strcmp(required, "conf")) continue; reqd_sigs++; ret = fit_config_verify_key(fit, conf_noffset, key_blob, noffset); if (ret) { if (reqd_policy_all) { printf("Failed to verify required signature '%s'\n", fit_get_name(key_blob, noffset, NULL)); return ret; } } else { verified++; if (!reqd_policy_all) break; } } if (reqd_sigs && !verified) { printf("Failed to verify 'any' of the required signature(s)\n"); return -EPERM; } return 0; } int fit_config_verify(const void *fit, int conf_noffset) { return fit_config_verify_required_keys(fit, conf_noffset, gd_fdt_blob()); }