Updated for "Windows 10 Anniversary Update" (Version 1607)

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1323 deletions

diff --git a/network/wlan/WDI/COMMON/Authenticator.c b/network/wlan/WDI/COMMON/Authenticator.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 1746bbc3..00000000
--- a/network/wlan/WDI/COMMON/Authenticator.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1323 +0,0 @@
-#include "Mp_Precomp.h"
-
-#if WPP_SOFTWARE_TRACE
-#include "Authenticator.tmh"
-#endif
-
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Authenticator related operations.
-//------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-// On event
-
-
-// Description:
-// Output:
-// Modify: 
-void 
-Authenticator_OnDeauthenticationRequest(
-	IN	PADAPTER				Adapter,
-	IN	PAUTH_PKEY_MGNT_TAG	pKeyMgnt
-	)
-{
-	pKeyMgnt->EvntID = ASMEID_DeauthenticationRequest;
-
-	Authenticator_StateDISCONNECTED(Adapter, pKeyMgnt->pWLanSTA);
-}
-
-
-// Description:
-// Output:
-// Modify: 
-void 
-Authenticator_OnAuthenticationRequest(
-	IN	PADAPTER				Adapter,
-	IN	PAUTH_PKEY_MGNT_TAG	pKeyMgnt
-	)
-{
-	pKeyMgnt->EvntID = ASMEID_AuthenticationRequest;
-
-	Authenticator_StateAUTHENTICATION(Adapter, pKeyMgnt->pWLanSTA);
-}
-
-
-// Description:
-// Output:
-// Modify: 
-void 
-Authenticator_OnReAuthenticationRequest(
-	IN	PADAPTER				Adapter,
-	IN	PAUTH_PKEY_MGNT_TAG	pKeyMgnt
-	)
-{
-	pKeyMgnt->EvntID = ASMEID_ReAuthenticationRequest;
-
-	Authenticator_StateAUTHENTICATION2(Adapter, pKeyMgnt->pWLanSTA);
-}
-
-
-
-
-// Description: According received EAPOL-key, enter the next state.
-// Output: void
-// Modify: Annie, 2005-07-02
-//		Discard using condition pKeyMgnt->bPTKInstalled.
-//		Instead, I add a macro KeyMgntStateIsWaitingEAPOLKey to check the state.
-void 
-Authenticator_OnEAPOLKeyRecvd(
-	IN	PADAPTER				Adapter,
-	IN	PAUTH_PKEY_MGNT_TAG	pKeyMgnt,
-	IN	OCTET_STRING			pdu
-	)
-{
-	PMGNT_INFO			pMgntInfo = &Adapter->MgntInfo;
-	PAUTH_GLOBAL_KEY_TAG	pGlInfo = &pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo;
-	PRT_WLAN_STA		pEntry = pKeyMgnt->pWLanSTA;
-	pu1Byte				pSTA_addr = Frame_pSaddr(pdu);
-	pu1Byte				pAP_addr = Frame_pDaddr(pdu);
-	PEAPOL_KEY_STRUCT	eapol_key_recvd;
-	OCTET_STRING		SNonce;
-	OCTET_STRING		RSNIE;
-	MsgType				msg_type = type_unknow;
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("===> Authenticator_OnEAPOLKeyRecvd()\n") );
-
-	pKeyMgnt->EvntID = ASMEID_EAPOLKeyRecvd;
-
-	FillOctetString(pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd,								\
-		pGlInfo->EAPOLMsgRecvd.Octet+LIB1X_EAPOL_HDRLEN,					\
-		pGlInfo->EAPOLMsgRecvd.Length-LIB1X_EAPOL_HDRLEN );				\
-
-	eapol_key_recvd = (PEAPOL_KEY_STRUCT)pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd.Octet;
-
-	//PRINT_DATA( ("EapolKeyMsgRecvd: "), pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd.Octet, pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd.Length);
-	RSNIE.Octet = NULL;
-	RSNIE.Length = 0;
-	
-	// Get the message number.
-	if( Message_KeyType(pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd) == type_Pairwise )
-	{
-		if( (Message_Error(pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd) == 1) &&
-			(Message_Request(pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd) == 1))
-		{			
-			//Enter integrity failure state...			
-			Authenticator_StateINTEGRITYFAILURE(Adapter, pEntry);	
-		}
-
-		if( (eapol_key_recvd->key_info[0]==0x01 && eapol_key_recvd->key_info[1]==0x09) ||
-		    ( eapol_key_recvd->key_info[0]==0x01 && eapol_key_recvd->key_info[1]==0x0a) ||
-		    ( eapol_key_recvd->key_info[0]==0x03 && eapol_key_recvd->key_info[1]==0x0a) ||
-		    ( eapol_key_recvd->key_info[0]==0x03 && eapol_key_recvd->key_info[1]==0x09) )
-		{
-			if( pMgntInfo->SecurityInfo.SecLvl == RT_SEC_LVL_WPA)
-			RSNIE = EAPOLkeyGetRSNIE( pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd, EID_Vendor );
-			else if( pMgntInfo->SecurityInfo.SecLvl == RT_SEC_LVL_WPA2)
-				RSNIE = EAPOLkeyGetRSNIE( pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd, EID_WPA2 );
-				
-			if( RSNIE.Length != 0 )
-				msg_type = type_4way2nd;		// with RSNIE: msg 2 (159 or 161)
-			else
-				msg_type = type_4way4th;		// msg 4 (135)
-		}
-		else
-		{
-			RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("unknow pairwise EAPOL-key: info=0x%X-0x%X\n", eapol_key_recvd->key_info[0], eapol_key_recvd->key_info[1]) );
-		}
-	}
-	else
-	{
-		// [AnnieNote] Windows zero-config may send 2-way message as 03-01.
-		//
-		//if( eapol_key_recvd->key_info[0]==0x03 && eapol_key_recvd->key_info[1]==0x11 )	// if group key index is fixed 1, key information is 03-11.
-		//	msg_type = type_2way2nd;			// group key msg2 (155)
-		//else
-		//	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("unknow group EAPOL-key: info=0x%X-0x%X\n", eapol_key_recvd->key_info[0], eapol_key_recvd->key_info[1]) );
-		
-		msg_type = type_2way2nd;
-	}
-
-	// Check state.
-	if( KeyMgntStateIsWaitingEAPOLKey(pKeyMgnt) )
-	{
-
-		if( 	(pKeyMgnt->PrState==ASMPS_PTKSTART && msg_type==type_4way2nd ) ||
-			( pKeyMgnt->PrState==ASMPS_PTKINITNEGOTIATING && msg_type==type_4way2nd ))
-		{
-			RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Recvd 4-way message 2\n"));
-			pKeyMgnt->TimeoutCtr = 0;
-
-			//  AnnieTODO: if (1)k is pairwise and (2)MICVerified , then enter ASMPS_PTKINITNEGOTIATING state
-			//  TODO: MIC Verify
-			SNonce = Message_KeyNonce( pGlInfo->EapolKeyMsgRecvd );
-			CopyMem( pKeyMgnt->SNonce, SNonce.Octet, KEY_NONCE_LEN );
-
-			
-			CalcPTK( pAP_addr, pSTA_addr, pKeyMgnt->ANonce, pKeyMgnt->SNonce,
-					 pGlInfo->PMK, PMK_LEN, pKeyMgnt->PTK_update, PTK_LEN );
-
-			if(!CheckEapolMIC(Adapter , pGlInfo->EAPOLMsgRecvd , pKeyMgnt->PTK_update , KEY_MIC_LEN ))
-			{
-				SendDeauthentication( Adapter, pSTA_addr , mic_failure );
-				PlatformStallExecution(100);
-				RT_TRACE_F(COMP_AP, DBG_TRACE, ("AsocEntry_RemoveStation\n"));
-				
-				AsocEntry_RemoveStation( Adapter , pSTA_addr);
-				RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("MIC erroe\n"));
-				return;
-			 }
-
-
-			Authenticator_StatePTKINITNEGOTIATING(Adapter, pEntry);
-		}
-		else if( pKeyMgnt->PrState==ASMPS_PTKINITNEGOTIATING && msg_type==type_4way4th )
-		{
-			RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Recvd 4-way message 4\n"));
-			pKeyMgnt->TimeoutCtr = 0;
-
-			// if (1)k is pairwise and (2)MICVerified , then enter ASMPS_PTKINITDONE state
-			if(!CheckEapolMIC(Adapter , pGlInfo->EAPOLMsgRecvd , pKeyMgnt->PTK_update , KEY_MIC_LEN ))
-			{
-				SendDeauthentication( Adapter, pSTA_addr , mic_failure );
-				PlatformStallExecution(100);
-				RT_TRACE_F(COMP_AP, DBG_TRACE, ("AsocEntry_RemoveStation case 2\n"));
-				
-				AsocEntry_RemoveStation( Adapter , pSTA_addr);
-				RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("MIC erroe\n"));
-				return;
-			 }
-
-			PlatformMoveMemory(&pEntry->perSTAKeyInfo.RxIV, &((PEAPOL_KEY_STRUCT)eapol_key_recvd)->key_rsc[0], 6);
-			pEntry->perSTAKeyInfo.RxIV &= UINT64_C(0x0000ffffffffffff);
-			//RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("pEntry->perSTAKeyInfo.RxIV = 0x%16"i64fmt"x", pEntry->perSTAKeyInfo.RxIV));
-
-			Authenticator_StatePTKINITDONE(Adapter, pEntry);		
-		}
-		else if(  pKeyMgnt->GrState == ASMGS_REKEYNEGOTIATING && msg_type==type_2way2nd )
-		{
-			RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Recvd 2-way message 2\n"));
-			pKeyMgnt->TimeoutCtr = 0;
-
-			//  if (1)k is group and (2)MICVerified , then enter ASMGS_REKEYESTABLISHED state
-			// 2012/01/17 CCW If 4-way check is ok, we need not to check 2-way again.
-			/*
-			if(!CheckEapolMIC(Adapter , pGlInfo->EAPOLMsgRecvd , pKeyMgnt->PTK_update , KEY_MIC_LEN ))
-			{
-				SendDeauthentication( Adapter, pSTA_addr , mic_failure );
-				PlatformStallExecution(100);
-				AsocEntry_RemoveStation( Adapter , pSTA_addr);
-				RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("MIC erroe\n"));
-				return;
-			}
-			*/
-			Authenticator_StateREKEYESTABLISHED(Adapter, pEntry);
-		}
-		else
-		{
-			RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Authenticator_OnEAPOLKeyRecvd(): Unexpected case: PrState=%d, GrState=%d, msg_type=%d\n",
-											pKeyMgnt->PrState, pKeyMgnt->GrState, msg_type ) );
-		}
-
-	}
-	else
-	{
-		RT_TRACE(COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Authenticator_OnEAPOLKeyRecvd(): Unexpected State!!\n"));
-		RT_TRACE(COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("--- TimeoutCounter:%d, PairwiseKeyState:%d, GroupKeyState:%d ---\n", pKeyMgnt->TimeoutCtr, pKeyMgnt->PrState, pKeyMgnt->GrState));
-	}
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("<=== Authenticator_OnEAPOLKeyRecvd()\n") );
-
-}
-
-
-// Description: Get RSNIE in parsing EAPOL-key packet.
-// Output: OCTET_STRING: RSNIE string.
-// Modify: Annie, 2005-07-11
-//		Reference: PacketGetElement(), which is only used for management frame.
-//		In fact, this two function should be merged and reused. <AnnieTodo>
-//
-OCTET_STRING 
-EAPOLkeyGetRSNIE(
-	IN	OCTET_STRING	eapolkeypkt,
-	IN	ELEMENT_ID		ID
-	)
-{
-	u2Byte			offset;
-	//u2Byte		length = eapolkeypkt.Length;
-	OCTET_STRING	ret={0,0};
-	u1Byte			WPATag[] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xf2, 0x01};
-	u1Byte			WPA2Tag[] = {0x00, 0x0f, 0xac};
-	u1Byte			temp;
-
-	offset = 95;
-	temp = eapolkeypkt.Octet[offset];
-
-	if( (temp==ID) && (!PlatformCompareMemory(eapolkeypkt.Octet+offset+2, WPATag, sizeof(WPATag) )) )
-	{
-		ret.Length = eapolkeypkt.Octet[offset+1];		// RSNIE header
-		ret.Octet = eapolkeypkt.Octet + offset +2;		// RSNIE Length field
-	}
-
-	if( (temp==ID) && (!PlatformCompareMemory(eapolkeypkt.Octet+offset+4, WPA2Tag, sizeof(WPA2Tag) )) )
-	{
-		ret.Length = eapolkeypkt.Octet[offset+1];		// RSNIE header
-		ret.Octet = eapolkeypkt.Octet + offset +2;		// RSNIE Length field
-	}
-
-	RT_TRACE(COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("PacketGetRSNIE(): Length=%d\n", ret.Length ));
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-
-
-void 
-KeyMgntTimeout(
-	PRT_TIMER		pTimer
-)
-{
-	PADAPTER	Adapter=(PADAPTER)pTimer->Adapter;
-	PMGNT_INFO	pMgntInfo = &Adapter->MgntInfo;
-	PAUTH_PKEY_MGNT_TAG	pKeyMgnt;
-	int	i;
-	int AsocNum = 0;
-	PRT_WLAN_STA	pEntry;
-
-	if( !ACTING_AS_AP(Adapter) )
-	{
-		RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning!!] KeyMgntTimeout(): STA mode\n"));
-		return;
-	}
-	else
-	{
-		//RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("KeyMgntTimeout(): AP mode, CurrentTimeSlot=%d\n", pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo.CurrentTimeSlot ));
-	}
-
-	if( pMgntInfo->SecurityInfo.AuthMode == RT_802_11AuthModeWPAPSK ||
-	    pMgntInfo->SecurityInfo.AuthMode == RT_802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK ||
-	    pMgntInfo->SecurityInfo.SecLvl == RT_SEC_LVL_WPA2)
-	{
-		// Query all stations' state and their timeout count.
-		for( i=0; i<ASSOCIATE_ENTRY_NUM; i++ )
-		{
-			if( !pMgntInfo->AsocEntry[i].bUsed )
-				continue;
-
-			pKeyMgnt = &pMgntInfo->AsocEntry[i].perSTAKeyInfo;
-
-			// Print Dbg Message. 2005-07-25, Annie.------------
-			AsocNum++;
-			pEntry = pKeyMgnt->pWLanSTA;
-			RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[STA:%d] %02X-%02X-%02X-%02X-%02X-%02X, MicErrorCnt=%d, WEPErrorCnt=%d\n",
-						i, pEntry->MacAddr[0], pEntry->MacAddr[1], pEntry->MacAddr[2], pEntry->MacAddr[3], pEntry->MacAddr[4], pEntry->MacAddr[5],
-						pKeyMgnt->MicErrorCnt, pKeyMgnt->WEPErrorCnt ) );
-			//---------------------------------------------
-
-			if( KeyMgntStateIsWaitingEAPOLKey(pKeyMgnt)  &&  pKeyMgnt->GrState != ASMGS_REKEYESTABLISHED )
-			{
-				if( pKeyMgnt->TimeoutCtr >= MAX_TIMEOUT_CNT )
-				{
-					pKeyMgnt->TimeoutCtr = 0;	
-					Authenticator_OnTimeoutCountExceeded(Adapter, pKeyMgnt);
-				}
-				else
-				{
-					if( pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo.CurrentTimeSlot != pKeyMgnt->TimeSlot_lastsend )	// consider 1st retry should wait for at least 1 second. Annie, 2005-07-12.
-					{
-						//RT_TRACE(COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("KeyMgntTimeout(): Retry! [TimeSlot:%"i64fmt"d, TimeoutCtr:%d]\n",
-							//		pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo.CurrentTimeSlot, (int)pKeyMgnt->TimeoutCtr ));
-						
-						pKeyMgnt->TimeoutCtr ++;
-
-						if( pKeyMgnt->PrState == ASMPS_PTKSTART  )		// waiting for 2nd msg in 4-way handshake
-						{
-							Authenticator_StatePTKSTART(Adapter, &pMgntInfo->AsocEntry[i]);
-						}
-						else if( pKeyMgnt->PrState == ASMPS_PTKINITNEGOTIATING )	// waiting for 4th msg in 4-way handshake
-						{
-							Authenticator_StatePTKINITNEGOTIATING(Adapter, &pMgntInfo->AsocEntry[i]);
-						}
-						else if( pKeyMgnt->GrState == ASMGS_REKEYNEGOTIATING )	// waiting for 2nd msg in 2-way handshake
-						{
-							Authenticator_StateREKEYNEGOTIATING(Adapter, &pMgntInfo->AsocEntry[i]);
-						}	
-					}
-					else
-					{
-						RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("KeyMgntTimeout(): equal TimeSlot. Not to retry.\n") );
-					}
-
-				}
-
-			}
-			
-		}
-
-		//RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("KeyMgntTimeout: AsocNum=%d, CurrentTimeSlot=%"i64fmt"d\n", AsocNum, pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo.CurrentTimeSlot ) );
-
-		// Continue setting the timer only when RT_802_11AuthModeWPAPSK.
-		pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo.CurrentTimeSlot ++;
-		PlatformSetTimer( Adapter, &pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo.KeyMgntTimer, KEY_MGNT_INTERVAL );
-		
-	}
-}
-
-
-
-
-// Description:
-// Output: void
-// Modify: Annie, 2005-07-12
-void 
-Authenticator_OnTimeoutCountExceeded(
-	IN	PADAPTER				Adapter,
-	IN	PAUTH_PKEY_MGNT_TAG	pKeyMgnt
-	)
-{
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Authenticator_OnTimeoutCountExceeded!\n") );
-	pKeyMgnt->EvntID = ASMEID_TimeOutExceeded;
-	
-	//pKeyMgnt->TimeoutCtr = 0;	// it should be cleared in KeyMgntTimeout().
-
-	if( pKeyMgnt->PrState == ASMPS_PTKSTART || pKeyMgnt->PrState == ASMPS_PTKINITNEGOTIATING )
-	{
-		Authenticator_StateDISCONNECT( Adapter, pKeyMgnt->pWLanSTA, four_way_tmout );
-
-	}
-	else if( pKeyMgnt->GrState == ASMGS_REKEYNEGOTIATING )
-	{
-		Authenticator_StateKEYERROR( Adapter, pKeyMgnt->pWLanSTA, two_way_tmout );
-	}
-	else
-	{
-		RT_TRACE(COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Authenticator_OnTimeoutCountExceeded(): Unexpected State!!\n"));
-		RT_TRACE(COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("--- PairwiseKeyState:%d, GroupKeyState:%d ---\n", pKeyMgnt->PrState, pKeyMgnt->GrState));
-	}	
-}
-
-
-// Status handle
-
-
-// Description: Disconnect the station
-// Output: void
-// Modify: Annie, 2005-07-12.
-void 
-Authenticator_StateDISCONNECT(
-	IN	PADAPTER		Adapter,
-	IN	PRT_WLAN_STA	pSTA,
-	IN	u1Byte			ReasonCode
-	)
-{
-	PAUTH_PKEY_MGNT_TAG	pKeyMgnt = &pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo;
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Authenticator_StateDISCONNECT()\n") );
-
-	if( !ACTING_AS_AP(Adapter) )
-	{
-		RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning] current: STA mode, return."));
-		return;
-	}
-	
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PrState = ASMPS_DISCONNECTE;
-
-	if( AsocEntry_IsStationAssociated( &Adapter->MgntInfo, pSTA->MacAddr ) )
-	{
-		RT_TRACE(COMP_AP, DBG_LOUD, ("Authenticator_StateDISCONNECT()  \n"));
-		AP_DisassociateStation(Adapter, pKeyMgnt->pWLanSTA, ReasonCode);
-	}
-
-	// UCT
-	//Authenticator_StateDISCONNECTED(Adapter, pSTA);	// I'll call it in AP_DisassociateStation(). Marked by Annie, 2005-07-15.
-
-}
-
-// Description:
-// Output:
-// Modify: 
-void 
-Authenticator_StateDISCONNECTED(
-	IN	PADAPTER		Adapter,
-	IN	PRT_WLAN_STA	pSTA
-	)
-{
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Authenticator_StateDISCONNECTED()\n") );
-
-	if(!ACTING_AS_AP(Adapter))
-	{
-		RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning] current: STA mode, return."));
-		return;
-	}
-
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PrState = ASMPS_DISCONNECTED;
-
-	// [AnnieTODO] GNoStations --
-
-
-	// [Note] We don't have to clear PMK, ANonce and GTK here.
-
-	// UCT
-	Authenticator_StateINITIALIZE(Adapter, pSTA);
-}
-
-// Description: Initialize the pairwise key data on input STA.
-// Output: void
-// Modify: Annie, 2005-07-02
-//		Discard using condition pKeyMgnt->bPTKInstalled.
-//		Instead, I add a macro KeyMgntStateIsWaitingEAPOLKey to check the state.
-
-void 
-Authenticator_StateINITIALIZE(
-	IN	PADAPTER		Adapter,
-	IN	PRT_WLAN_STA	pSTA
-	)
-{
-	PAUTH_PKEY_MGNT_TAG	pKeyMgnt = &pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo;
-	u1Byte	RdmBuf[20], NonceBuf[KEY_NONCE_LEN];
-	u1Byte	i = 0;
-
-	pKeyMgnt->pWLanSTA = pSTA;
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("===> Authenticator_StateINITIALIZE()\n") );
-
-	if( !ACTING_AS_AP(Adapter)
-		&& !GET_TDLS_ENABLED(&(Adapter->MgntInfo)) 
-		)
-	{
-		RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning] current: STA mode, return."));
-		return;
-	}
-
-	PlatformZeroMemory( pKeyMgnt->SNonce, KEY_NONCE_LEN );
-
-	pKeyMgnt->TimeoutCtr = 0;
-	pKeyMgnt->TimeSlot_sendstart = 0;
-	pKeyMgnt->TimeSlot_lastsend = 0;
-
-	if( Adapter->MgntInfo.SecurityInfo.AuthMode == RT_802_11AuthModeWPAPSK )
-	{
-		// 3. 802.1x::PortMode = Disable;
-		pKeyMgnt->portMode = pmt_Disable;	// [TODO] other auth mode
-		
-		// 4. 802.1x::PortSecure = 0;
-		pKeyMgnt->portSecure= psec_Unauthorized;	// [TODO] other auth mode
-	}
-
-	
-	// 1. MSK = 0 ...?
-	
-	// 2. GNoStations = 0
-	//	...it's for group key update. I don't do it currently. Annie, 2005-07-01.
-
-	// Rest ANonce
-	GetRandomBuffer( RdmBuf );
-	for( i=0; i<16; i++ )
-	{
-		NonceBuf[i] = RdmBuf[i];
-		NonceBuf[16+i] = RdmBuf[19-i];
-	}
-
-	PlatformMoveMemory( pKeyMgnt->ANonce , NonceBuf , KEY_NONCE_LEN );
-
-	
-	// 5. RemovePTK
-	PlatformZeroMemory( pKeyMgnt->PTK, PTK_LEN );
-
-	pKeyMgnt->TempEncKey = NULL;
-	pKeyMgnt->TxMICKey   = NULL;
-	pKeyMgnt->RxMICKey   = NULL;
-
-	//AP-WPA AES ,CCW
-	PlatformZeroMemory( pKeyMgnt->AESKeyBuf , AESCCMP_BLK_SIZE_TOTAL );
-	
-	//pKeyMgnt->bPTKInstalled = FALSE;
-	pKeyMgnt->PInitAKeys = FALSE;
-	pKeyMgnt->GInitAKeys = FALSE;
-	pKeyMgnt->Pair = TRUE;				// [AnnieNote] Why not FALSE?? 2005-07-18.
-
-	// TODO: 6. Revome key from CAM
-	// [AnnieNote]
-	// (1) We can only clear the MAC address (instead of total 6 double-word) in per CAM entry.
-	// (2) When called by Authenticator_GlobalReset(), it takes a lot of I/O, and is H/W depended.
-	//       Should we do it here? Or use workitem... ?
-
-	//Remove  key from SW/HW CAM table, Add by CCW
-	AP_RemoveKey( Adapter , pSTA );
-	
-	// 7. Reset ReplayCounter
-	pKeyMgnt->KeyReplayCounter = 0;
-	
-	// 8. Reset SNonce
-	PlatformZeroMemory( pKeyMgnt->SNonce, KEY_NONCE_LEN );
-
-	// 9. Initialize TimeSlot_lastIntegrityFailed.
-	pKeyMgnt->TimeSlot_lastIntegrityFailed = 0;
-
-	pKeyMgnt->RxIV   = DEFAULT_INIT_RX_IV;
-	pKeyMgnt->TxIV   = DEFAULT_INIT_TX_IV;
-	pKeyMgnt->KeyRSC = pKeyMgnt->TxIV; 
-
-	// Added by Annie for debug, 2005-07-25.
-	pKeyMgnt->MicErrorCnt = 0;
-	pKeyMgnt->WEPErrorCnt = 0;
-
-	pKeyMgnt->PrState = ASMPS_INITIALIZE;
-	pKeyMgnt->GrState = ASMGS_INITIALIZE;
-
-
-	pSTA->keyindex = 0;
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("<=== Authenticator_StateINITIALIZE()\n") );
-
-}
-
-// Description:
-// Output:
-// Modify: 
-void 
-Authenticator_StateAUTHENTICATION(
-	IN	PADAPTER		Adapter,
-	IN	PRT_WLAN_STA	pSTA
-	)
-{
-	if( !ACTING_AS_AP(Adapter) )
-	{
-		RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning] current: STA mode, return."));
-		return;
-	}
-
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PrState = ASMPS_AUTHENTICATION;
-
-	// [AnnieTODO]
-	// 1. GNoStations ++
-	// 2. PTK = 0
-	PlatformZeroMemory( pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PTK, PTK_LEN);
-
-	PlatformZeroMemory(pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.AESKeyBuf, AESCCMP_BLK_SIZE_TOTAL);
-	//pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.bPTKInstalled = FALSE;
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PInitAKeys = FALSE;
-
-	// 3. 802.1x::PortControl = Auto
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.portControl = pct_Auto;
-
-	// 4. 802.1x::PortMode = Enabled
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.portMode = pmt_Enable;
-	
-	// UCT
-	Authenticator_StateAUTHENTICATION2( Adapter, pSTA );
-}
-
-// Description:
-// Output:
-// Modify: 
-void 
-Authenticator_StateAUTHENTICATION2(
-	IN	PADAPTER		Adapter,
-	IN	PRT_WLAN_STA	pSTA
-	)
-{
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("===> Authenticator_StateAUTHENTICATION2()\n") );
-
-	if( !ACTING_AS_AP(Adapter) )
-	{
-		RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning] current: STA mode, return."));
-		return;
-	}
-
-
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PrState = ASMPS_AUTHENTICATION2;
-
-	// ANonce = Counter ++
-	Adapter->MgntInfo.globalKeyInfo.ANonce[31] ++;	//... [AnnieTODO] It needs a real addition!
-
-	// PSK
-	Authenticator_StatePTKSTART(Adapter, pSTA);
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("<=== Authenticator_StateAUTHENTICATION2()\n") );
-
-}
-
-// Description:
-// Output:
-// Modify: 
-void 
-Authenticator_StatePTKSTART(
-	IN	PADAPTER		Adapter,
-	IN	PRT_WLAN_STA	pSTA
-	)
-{
-	PMGNT_INFO	pMgntInfo = &Adapter->MgntInfo;
-	PAUTH_GLOBAL_KEY_TAG	pGlInfo = &pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo;
-	PAUTH_PKEY_MGNT_TAG	pKeyMgnt = &pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo;
-	u8Byte					KeyReplayCounter = 0;
-	u1Byte					temp[8] = {0};
-	u1Byte					indexi = 0;
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("===> Authenticator_StatePTKSTART()\n") );
-
-	if( !ACTING_AS_AP(Adapter) )
-	{
-		RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning] current: STA mode, return."));
-		return;
-	}
-
-	pKeyMgnt->PrState = ASMPS_PTKSTART;
-	pKeyMgnt->PInitAKeys = FALSE;			// To consider EAPOL-start case.
-
-	// [AnnieTODO]
-	// 1. Construct 1st message in 4-way handshake.
-	// 	EAPOL(0, 0, 1, 0, 0, p, ANonce, 0, 0)
-	// 2. Send 1st msg 
-
-	pKeyMgnt->KeyReplayCounter ++;
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Send 4-way message 1\n"));
-	//RT_TRACE(COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD , (" KeyReplayCounter = %08"i64fmt"x \n",pKeyMgnt->KeyReplayCounter  ));
-
-	
-	for( indexi = 0 ; indexi < 8 ; indexi++)
-		temp[indexi] =  (u1Byte)((pKeyMgnt->KeyReplayCounter >>( (7-indexi) *8)) &0xff );
-
-	PlatformMoveMemory( &KeyReplayCounter , temp , 8 );
-	
-	SendEapolKeyPacket(
-		Adapter, 
-		pSTA->MacAddr,	//StaAddr, 
-		NULL, // Pointer to KCK (EAPOL-Key Confirmation Key).
-		NULL, // 
-		type_Pairwise, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Key Type bit: type_Group or type_Pairwise.
-		FALSE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Install Flag.
-		TRUE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Key Ack bit.
-		FALSE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Key MIC bit. If true, we will calculate EAPOL MIC and fill it into Key MIC field. 
-		FALSE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Secure bit.
-		FALSE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Error bit. True for MIC failure report.
-		FALSE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Requst bit.
-		KeyReplayCounter, // EAPOL-KEY Replay Counter field.  //pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.KeyReplayCounter
-		pKeyMgnt->ANonce, // EAPOL-Key Key Nonce field (32-byte).
-		0, // EAPOL-Key Key RSC field (8-byte).
-		NULL, // Key Data field: Pointer to RSN IE, NULL if 
-		NULL // Key Data field: Pointer to GTK, NULL if Key Data Length = 0.
-	);
-
-	pKeyMgnt->TimeSlot_sendstart = pGlInfo->CurrentTimeSlot;	// added by Annie, 2005-07-12.
-	pKeyMgnt->TimeSlot_lastsend = pGlInfo->CurrentTimeSlot;
-
-	// [Note] Don't do pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.TimeoutCtr++ here!
-	// The counter is controlled in KeyMgntTimeout.
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("<=== Authenticator_StatePTKSTART()\n") );
-}
-
-// Description:
-// Output:
-// Modify: 
-void 
-Authenticator_StatePTKINITNEGOTIATING(
-	IN	PADAPTER		Adapter,
-	IN	PRT_WLAN_STA	pSTA
-	)
-{
-	PMGNT_INFO	pMgntInfo = &Adapter->MgntInfo;
-	PAUTH_GLOBAL_KEY_TAG	pGlInfo = &pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo;
-	PAUTH_PKEY_MGNT_TAG	pKeyMgnt = &pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo;
-
-	u8Byte					KeyReplayCounter = 0;
-	u1Byte					temp[8] = {0};
-	u1Byte					indexi = 0;
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("===> Authenticator_StatePTKINITNEGOTIATING()\n") );
-
-	if( !ACTING_AS_AP(Adapter) )
-	{
-		RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning] current: STA mode, return."));
-		return;
-	}
-
-
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PrState = ASMPS_PTKINITNEGOTIATING;
-
-	// [AnnieTODO]
-	// 1. Construct 3rd message in 4-way handshake.
-	// 	EAPOL(0, 1, 1, Pair,0, P, ANonce, MIC(PTK_update), 0)
-	// 2. Send 3rd msg 
-
-	pKeyMgnt->KeyReplayCounter ++;
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Send 4-way message 3\n"));
-	//RT_TRACE(COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD , (" KeyReplayCounter = %08"i64fmt"x \n",pKeyMgnt->KeyReplayCounter  ));
-
-	for( indexi = 0 ; indexi < 8 ; indexi++)
-		temp[indexi] =  (u1Byte)((pKeyMgnt->KeyReplayCounter >>( (7-indexi) *8)) &0xff );
-
-	PlatformMoveMemory( &KeyReplayCounter , temp , 8 );
-	
-	if( pMgntInfo->SecurityInfo.SecLvl == RT_SEC_LVL_WPA )
-	{
-	SendEapolKeyPacket(
-		Adapter, 
-		pSTA->MacAddr, 
-		pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PTK_update, // Pointer to KCK (EAPOL-Key Confirmation Key).
-		pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PTK_update + 16,
-		type_Pairwise, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Key Type bit: type_Group or type_Pairwise.
-		TRUE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Install Flag.
-		TRUE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Key Ack bit.
-		TRUE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Key MIC bit. If true, we will calculate EAPOL MIC and fill it into Key MIC field. 
-		FALSE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Secure bit.
-		FALSE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Error bit. True for MIC failure report.
-		FALSE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Requst bit.
-		KeyReplayCounter, //pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.KeyReplayCounter, // EAPOL-KEY Replay Counter field.
-				pKeyMgnt->ANonce, // EAPOL-Key Key Nonce field (32-byte).
-		pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.KeyRSC, // perSTA EAPOL-Key Key RSC field (8-byte).
-		&(pMgntInfo->SecurityInfo.RSNIE), // Key Data field: Pointer to RSN IE, NULL if 
-		NULL // Key Data field: Pointer to GTK, NULL if Key Data Length = 0.
-	);
-	}
-	else if( pMgntInfo->SecurityInfo.SecLvl == RT_SEC_LVL_WPA2 )
-	{
-		SendEapolKeyPacket(
-			Adapter, 
-			pSTA->MacAddr, 
-			pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PTK_update, // Pointer to KCK (EAPOL-Key Confirmation Key).
-			pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PTK_update + 16,
-			type_Pairwise, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Key Type bit: type_Group or type_Pairwise.
-			TRUE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Install Flag.
-			TRUE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Key Ack bit.
-			TRUE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Key MIC bit. If true, we will calculate EAPOL MIC and fill it into Key MIC field. 
-			TRUE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Secure bit.
-			FALSE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Error bit. True for MIC failure report.
-			FALSE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Requst bit.
-			KeyReplayCounter,//pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.KeyReplayCounter, // EAPOL-KEY Replay Counter field.
-			pKeyMgnt->ANonce, // EAPOL-Key Key Nonce field (32-byte).
-			pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.KeyRSC, // perSTA EAPOL-Key Key RSC field (8-byte).
-			&(pMgntInfo->SecurityInfo.RSNIE), // Key Data field: Pointer to RSN IE, NULL if 
-			pGlInfo->GTK  // Key Data field: Pointer to GTK, NULL if Key Data Length = 0.
-		);
-	}
-
-	pKeyMgnt->TimeSlot_lastsend = pGlInfo->CurrentTimeSlot;	// Added by Annie, 2005-07-12.
-
-	// [Note] Don't do pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.TimeoutCtr++ here!
-	// The counter is controlled in KeyMgntTimeout.
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("<=== Authenticator_StatePTKINITNEGOTIATING()\n") );
-
-}
-
-// Description:
-// Output:
-// Modify: 
-void 
-Authenticator_StatePTKINITDONE(
-	IN	PADAPTER		Adapter,
-	IN	PRT_WLAN_STA	pSTA
-	)
-{
-	PAUTH_PKEY_MGNT_TAG	pKeyMgnt = &pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo;
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("===> Authenticator_StatePTKINITDONE()\n") );
-
-
-	// TODO: SetKey to CAM
-
-
-	if( !ACTING_AS_AP(Adapter))
-	{
-		RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning] current: STA mode, return."));
-		return;
-	}
-
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PrState = ASMPS_PTKINITDONE;
-	
-	// TODO: Check SetKey completed, these lines were moved from Authenticator_OnEAPOLKeyRecvd() by Jay 
-	if (pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.Pair)
-	{
-		u4Byte  ucIndex = 0;
-		CopyMem(pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PTK, pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PTK_update, PTK_LEN);	// Added by Annie, 2005-07-12.
-		if( Adapter->MgntInfo.SecurityInfo.PairwiseEncAlgorithm != RT_ENC_ALG_AESCCMP )
-		{
-			pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.TempEncKey = pKeyMgnt->PTK+TKIP_ENC_KEY_POS;
-			pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.TxMICKey = pKeyMgnt->PTK+(TKIP_MIC_KEY_POS);	
-			pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.RxMICKey = pKeyMgnt->PTK+(TKIP_MIC_KEY_POS+TKIP_MIC_KEY_LEN);
-
-			//Add for AP mode HW enc,by CCW		
-			ucIndex = AP_FindFreeEntry(Adapter , pSTA->MacAddr );
-			if(ucIndex == Adapter->TotalCamEntry)
-			{
-				RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning] Authenticator_StatePTKINITDONE: Cam Entry is FULL!!!\n"));
-				return;
-			}
-		
-			//set key
-			AP_Setkey(  Adapter , 
-					      pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.pWLanSTA->MacAddr,
-					      ucIndex,  // Entey  index 
-					      CAM_TKIP,
-					      0,  // Parise key 
-					      pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.TempEncKey);	
-
-			pSTA->keyindex  = ucIndex;
-		}else{  // AES mode AP-WPA AES,CCW
-		
-			AESCCMP_BLOCK		blockKey;
-			//RT_TRACE( COMP_WPAAES, DBG_LOUD, ("====> Set Station Key."));
-			//Add for AP mode HW enc,by CCW		
-			ucIndex = AP_FindFreeEntry(Adapter , pSTA->MacAddr);
-			if(ucIndex == Adapter->TotalCamEntry)
-			{
-				RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning] Authenticator_StatePTKINITDONE: Cam Entry is FULL!!!\n"));
-				return;
-			}
-			
-			//Set Key 
-			PlatformMoveMemory( blockKey.x , pKeyMgnt->PTK+TKIP_ENC_KEY_POS , 16);
-			AES_SetKey(blockKey.x, AESCCMP_BLK_SIZE*8, (pu4Byte)pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.AESKeyBuf);
-			//set hw key
-			AP_Setkey(  Adapter , 
-					      pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.pWLanSTA->MacAddr,
-					      ucIndex,  // Entey  index 
-					      CAM_AES,
-					      0,  // Parise key 
-					     pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PTK+TKIP_ENC_KEY_POS);	
-			pSTA->keyindex  = ucIndex;
-		}
-		
-	}
-	//pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.bPTKInstalled = TRUE;
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.GInitAKeys = TRUE;
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PInitAKeys = TRUE;
-
-	// Begin 2-way handshake
-	if( Adapter->MgntInfo.SecurityInfo.SecLvl  == RT_SEC_LVL_WPA )
-		Authenticator_StateREKEYNEGOTIATING(Adapter, pSTA);  // To do 2-way
-	if( Adapter->MgntInfo.SecurityInfo.SecLvl  == RT_SEC_LVL_WPA2 )
-	{
-		Authenticator_StateREKEYESTABLISHED(Adapter, pSTA);  // No to do 2-way
-		pKeyMgnt->TimeoutCtr = 0;
-	}
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("<=== Authenticator_StatePTKINITDONE()\n") );
-}
-
-// Description:
-// Output:
-// Modify: 
-void 
-Authenticator_StateUPDATEKEYS(
-	IN	PADAPTER		Adapter,
-	IN	PRT_WLAN_STA	pSTA
-	)
-{
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Authenticator_StateUPDATEKEYS()\n") );
-
-	if( !ACTING_AS_AP(Adapter) )
-	{
-		RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning] current: STA mode, return."));
-		return;
-	}
-
-
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PrState = ASMPS_UPDATEKEYS;
-
-	Authenticator_StatePTKSTART(Adapter, pSTA);
-
-}
-
-// Description:
-// Output:
-// Modify: 
-void 
-Authenticator_StateINTEGRITYFAILURE(
-	IN	PADAPTER		Adapter,
-	IN	PRT_WLAN_STA	pSTA
-	)
-{
-#if 1 //Added by Jay 0713 for process integrity failure 
-	u8Byte			DiffTimeSlot;
-	PMGNT_INFO		pMgntInfo = &(Adapter->MgntInfo);
-#endif
-
-	if( !ACTING_AS_AP(Adapter) )
-	{
-		RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning] current: STA mode, return."));
-		return;
-	}
-
-
-	//pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PrState = ASMPS_MICFAILURE;
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PrState = ASMPS_INTEGRITYFAILURE;		// Modified by Annie, 2005-07-18.
-
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.MicErrorCnt ++;	// Added by Annie for debug, 2005-07-25.
-
-#if 1 //Added by Jay 0713 for process integrity failure 
-	//RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("IntegrityFail(): AP mode, TimeSlot_lastIntegrityFailed=%"i64fmt"d\n", pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.TimeSlot_lastIntegrityFailed ));
-	//RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("IntegrityFail(): AP mode, CurrentTimeSlot             =%"i64fmt"d\n", pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo.CurrentTimeSlot ));
-
-	DiffTimeSlot = pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo.CurrentTimeSlot - 
-					pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.TimeSlot_lastIntegrityFailed;
-		
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.TimeSlot_lastIntegrityFailed = 
-		pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo.CurrentTimeSlot;
-
-	if(DiffTimeSlot > 60)
-	{
-#if SUPPORT_WPA_VERSION_D3
-		//update the PTK with this STA and GTK with all STAs	
-		Authenticator_StateKEYUPDATE(Adapter, pSTA);
-#endif
-	}
-	else
-	{
-		RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("IntegrityFail(): AP mode, disconnects all associated STAs\n"));
-
-		// Rewrited by Annie: use AP_DisassociateAllStation(). 2005-07-18.
-		AP_DisassociateAllStation( Adapter, mic_failure );
-
-
-		pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo.TimeSlot_IntegrityFail2 = pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo.CurrentTimeSlot;
-	}
-#else
-	// UCT
-	Authenticator_StateKEYUPDATE(Adapter, pSTA);
-#endif
-}
-
-// Description:
-// Output:
-// Modify: 
-void 
-Authenticator_StateKEYUPDATE(
-	IN	PADAPTER		Adapter,
-	IN	PRT_WLAN_STA	pSTA
-	)
-{
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Authenticator_StateKEYUPDATE()\n") );
-
-	if( !ACTING_AS_AP(Adapter) )
-	{
-		RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning] current: STA mode, return."));
-		return;
-	}
-
-
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PrState = ASMPS_KEYUPDATE;
-
-	// [AnnieTODO]
-	// ANonce = Counter ++;
-	// GNonve = Counter ++;
-
-
-	// UCT
-	Authenticator_StatePTKSTART(Adapter, pSTA);
-}
-
-// Description:
-// Output:
-// Modify: 
-void 
-Authenticator_StateREKEYNEGOTIATING(
-	IN	PADAPTER		Adapter,
-	IN	PRT_WLAN_STA	pSTA
-	)
-{
-	PMGNT_INFO	pMgntInfo = &Adapter->MgntInfo;
-	PAUTH_GLOBAL_KEY_TAG	pGlInfo = &pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo;
-	PAUTH_PKEY_MGNT_TAG	pKeyMgnt = &pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo;
-
-	u8Byte					KeyReplayCounter = 0;
-	u1Byte					temp[8] = {0};
-	u1Byte					indexi = 0;
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("===> Authenticator_StateREKEYNEGOTIATING()\n") );
-
-	if( !ACTING_AS_AP(Adapter) )
-	{
-		RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning] current: STA mode, return."));
-		return;
-	}
-
-	pKeyMgnt->GrState = ASMGS_REKEYNEGOTIATING;
-
-	// [AnnieTODO]
-	// 1. Construct 1st message in 2-way handshake.
-	// 	EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, GN, G, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN] )
-	// 2. Send 1st msg in 2-way handshake.
-
-	pKeyMgnt->KeyReplayCounter ++;
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("Send 2-way message 1\n"));
-
-	for( indexi = 0 ; indexi < 8 ; indexi++)
-		temp[indexi] =  (u1Byte)((pKeyMgnt->KeyReplayCounter >>( (7-indexi) *8)) &0xff );
-
-	PlatformMoveMemory( &KeyReplayCounter , temp , 8 );
-	
-	SendEapolKeyPacket(
-		Adapter, 
-		pSTA->MacAddr, 
-		pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PTK, // Pointer to KCK (EAPOL-Key Confirmation Key).
-		pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.PTK + 16,	// [AnnieWorkaround]
-		type_Group, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Key Type bit: type_Group or type_Pairwise.
-		FALSE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Install Flag.
-		TRUE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Key Ack bit.
-		TRUE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Key MIC bit. If true, we will calculate EAPOL MIC and fill it into Key MIC field. 
-		TRUE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Secure bit.
-		FALSE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Error bit. True for MIC failure report.
-		FALSE, // EAPOL-Key Information field: Requst bit.
-		KeyReplayCounter,//pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.KeyReplayCounter, // EAPOL-KEY Replay Counter field.
-		pGlInfo->GNonce, // EAPOL-Key Key Nonce field (32-byte).
-		pGlInfo->KeyRSC, // EAPOL-Key Key RSC field (8-byte).
-		NULL, // Key Data field: Pointer to RSN IE, NULL if 
-		pGlInfo->GTK  // Key Data field: Pointer to GTK, NULL if Key Data Length = 0.
-	);
-
-	pKeyMgnt->TimeSlot_lastsend = pGlInfo->CurrentTimeSlot;	// added by Annie, 2005-07-12.
-
-	// [Note] Don't do pKeyMgnt->TimeoutCtr++ here!
-	// The counter is controlled in KeyMgntTimeout.
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("<=== Authenticator_StateREKEYNEGOTIATING()\n") );
-
-}
-
-// Description:
-// Output:
-// Modify: 
-void 
-Authenticator_StateREKEYESTABLISHED(
-	IN	PADAPTER		Adapter,
-	IN	PRT_WLAN_STA	pSTA
-	)
-{
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("===> Authenticator_StateREKEYESTABLISHED()\n") );
-
-
-	if( !ACTING_AS_AP(Adapter) )
-	{
-		RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning] current: STA mode, return."));
-		return;
-	}
-
-
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.GrState = ASMGS_REKEYESTABLISHED;
-
-	//  TODO: 1. Check MIC(PTK)
-
-	//  TODO: 2. GKeyDoneStations --;
-
-	//  3. Timeout counter is reset by Authenticator_OnEAPOLKeyRecvd().
-	//pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.TimeoutCtr  ... we don't need to write it here.
-
-	// 4. 802.1x::PortMode = 1;
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.portMode = pmt_Enable;
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("<=== Authenticator_StateREKEYESTABLISHED()\n") );
-}
-
-// Description:
-// Output:
-// Modify: 
-void 
-Authenticator_StateKEYERROR(
-	IN	PADAPTER		Adapter,
-	IN	PRT_WLAN_STA	pSTA,
-	IN	u1Byte			ReasonCode
-	)
-{
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("===> Authenticator_StateKEYERROR()\n") );
-
-	if( !ACTING_AS_AP(Adapter) )
-	{
-		RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning] current: STA mode, return."));
-		return;
-	}
-
-
-	pSTA->perSTAKeyInfo.GrState = ASMGS_KEYERROR;
-
-	// [AnnieTODO]  GKeyDoneStations --
-
-
-	// UCT
-	Authenticator_StateDISCONNECT( Adapter, pSTA, ReasonCode );
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("<=== Authenticator_StateKEYERROR()\n") );
-}
-
-
-// Description: Initialize the global key data in Authenticator.
-// Output: void
-// Modify: Annie, 2005-07-02
-//		I check the data struct again, and discard using pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo.groupKeyInfo.
-//		Now Global/group key data (PMK, GTK, ANonce): all kept in pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo.
-//		global key state: recorded in pEntry->perSTAKeyInfo.GrState. (I think it should be kept in per station.)
-//
-void 
-Authenticator_GlobalReset(
-	IN	PADAPTER		Adapter
-	)
-{
-	PMGNT_INFO	pMgntInfo = &Adapter->MgntInfo;
-	PRT_SECURITY_T	pSecInfo = &(pMgntInfo->SecurityInfo);
-	PAUTH_GLOBAL_KEY_TAG	pGlInfo = &(pMgntInfo->globalKeyInfo);
-	PRT_WLAN_STA	pEntry;
-	int 		i;
-	u1Byte	RdmBuf[20], NonceBuf[KEY_NONCE_LEN];
-	static u1Byte	CAM_CONST_BROAD[] = {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff};
-	AESCCMP_BLOCK		blockKey;	
-
-
-	//--- [AnnieWorkaround] See 11i D3.0 page91, GTK should be generated by PRF-X.
-	u1Byte	TmpGTK[] = "12345678123456781234567812345678";
-	//---
-
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("===> Authenticator_GlobalReset()\n") );
-
-	if( !ACTING_AS_AP(Adapter) )
-	{
-		RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("[Warning] current: STA mode, return."));
-		return;
-	}
-
-	pGlInfo->currentId = 0;
-
-	if(pSecInfo->SecLvl == RT_SEC_LVL_WPA)
-		pGlInfo->DescriptorType = desc_type_RSN;
-	else
-		pGlInfo->DescriptorType = desc_type_WPA2;
-
-	GetRandomBuffer( RdmBuf );
-	for( i=0; i<16; i++ )
-	{
-		NonceBuf[i] = RdmBuf[i];
-		NonceBuf[16+i] = RdmBuf[19-i];
-	}
-	NonceBuf[KEY_NONCE_LEN-1] = 0;	//[AnnieWorkaround] Remove it if ANonce addition is ready. 2005-11-25.
-	RT_PRINT_DATA( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, "Authenticator_GlobalReset(): NonceBuf", NonceBuf, KEY_NONCE_LEN );	
-
-	// 1. Install PMK
-	if( pGlInfo->PassphraseLen < 64 ){
-	PasswordHash(pGlInfo->Passphrase, pGlInfo->PassphraseLen,
-		pMgntInfo->Ssid.Octet, pMgntInfo->Ssid.Length, pGlInfo->PMK );
-	}
-	else
-	{
-		// Add for direct to set PMK 64-Hex mode...
-		if( pGlInfo->PassphraseLen == 64 )
-			PlatformMoveMemory(pGlInfo->PMK, pGlInfo->Passphrase , 32 );
-	}
-	// 2. Install GTK
-
-        //
-        // 2010/12/15 Neo Jou check in
-        // When in Linux AP mode, hostapd will set down GTK before Authenticator_GlobalReset()
-        // Thus for Linux AP mode case, we don't reset GTK here
-        //
-	PlatformZeroMemory( pGlInfo->GTK, GTK_LEN );
-	PlatformMoveMemory( pGlInfo->GTK, TmpGTK, GTK_LEN );
-	pGlInfo->TxMICKey = pGlInfo->GTK + GTK_MIC_TX_POS;
-	pGlInfo->RxMICKey = pGlInfo->GTK + GTK_MIC_RX_POS;
-
-	//AP WPA AES,CCW	
-	PlatformMoveMemory( blockKey.x , pGlInfo->GTK , 16);
-	AES_SetKey(blockKey.x, AESCCMP_BLK_SIZE*8, (pu4Byte)pGlInfo->AESGTK);
-	//
-	pSecInfo->GroupTransmitKeyIdx = 1;
-	
-			
-
-	// 3. Install ANonce
-//	CopyMem( pGlInfo->ANonce, NonceBuf, KEY_NONCE_LEN );
-	PlatformMoveMemory(pGlInfo->ANonce, NonceBuf, KEY_NONCE_LEN );
-
-	// 4. Install GNonce
-//	CopyMem( pGlInfo->GNonce, NonceBuf, KEY_NONCE_LEN );
-	PlatformMoveMemory(pGlInfo->GNonce, NonceBuf, KEY_NONCE_LEN );
-
-	// 5. Reset KeyRSC
-	pGlInfo->KeyRSC = 0;
-	
-	// 6. Reset time slot.
-	pGlInfo->CurrentTimeSlot = 0;
-
-#if 1 //Addedby Jay 0713
-	pGlInfo->TimeSlot_IntegrityFail2 = 0;
-#endif
-
-	// 7. IV
-#if 1 //Added by Jay 0712 for security IV
-	pSecInfo->TxIV = DEFAULT_INIT_TX_IV;
-#endif
-	pMgntInfo->bAPGlobRest = TRUE;
-	// Reset key information of each station.
-	for(i = 0; i < ASSOCIATE_ENTRY_NUM; i++)
-	{
-		pEntry = &(pMgntInfo->AsocEntry[i]);
-		Authenticator_StateINITIALIZE(Adapter, pEntry);
-	}
-	pMgntInfo->bAPGlobRest = FALSE;
-
-	//reset SWCamTabe and HWCamtable ,add by CCW
-	AP_ClearAllKey(Adapter);
-	
-	if( (MgntActQuery_ApType(Adapter) == RT_AP_TYPE_NORMAL ||
-	MgntActQuery_ApType(Adapter) == RT_AP_TYPE_IBSS_EMULATED 
-		 || MgntActQuery_ApType(Adapter) == RT_AP_TYPE_LINUX) && 
-     	( pMgntInfo->NdisVersion  < RT_NDIS_VERSION_6_20 ))
-	{
-	switch( pSecInfo->PairwiseEncAlgorithm )
-	{
-	case RT_ENC_ALG_TKIP:
-		AP_Setkey(  Adapter , 
-			     CAM_CONST_BROAD,
-			     1,  // Index entry
-			     CAM_TKIP,
-			     1,  // Set Group Key
-			     pGlInfo->GTK);
-		break;
-
-	case RT_ENC_ALG_AESCCMP:
-		AP_Setkey(  Adapter , 
-			     	CAM_CONST_BROAD,
-			     	1,  // Index entry
-			     	CAM_AES,
-			     	1,  // Set Group Key
-			     	pGlInfo->GTK);
-		break;
-
-	case RT_ENC_ALG_WEP40: 
-	case RT_ENC_ALG_WEP104:
-		{
-			static u1Byte	CAM_CONST_ADDR[4][6] = {
-				{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
-				{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01},
-				{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02},
-				{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03}};
-				u1Byte EncAlgo = ((pSecInfo->PairwiseEncAlgorithm == RT_ENC_ALG_WEP40) ? CAM_WEP40 : CAM_WEP104);
-	
-			for(i = 0; i < 4; i++)
-			{
-				if(pSecInfo->KeyLen[i] > 0)
-				{
-					AP_Setkey(
-						Adapter , 
-						CAM_CONST_ADDR[i],
-						i,  // Index entry
-						EncAlgo,
-						1,
-						pSecInfo->KeyBuf[i]);
-				}
-			}
-		}
-		break;
-
-	default:
-		break;
-	}
-	}
-	
-	RT_TRACE( COMP_AUTHENTICATOR, DBG_LOUD, ("<=== Authenticator_GlobalReset()\n") );
-	
-}
-
-
-
-