[mm] precise & readable mm fault type (#9047)

* [smart] fixup: precise mm fault type

Also, fixup arm64 read access fault

* arm64: using meaningful macro on trap

* fixup: renaming macro

4 files changed, 55 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/components/mm/mm_aspace.c b/components/mm/mm_aspace.c
index acea6cc080..38abc9002f 100644
--- a/components/mm/mm_aspace.c
+++ b/components/mm/mm_aspace.c
@@ -1743,7 +1743,7 @@ rt_err_t rt_aspace_page_put(rt_aspace_t aspace, void *page_va, void *buffer)
                     RDWR_LOCK(aspace);
                     struct rt_aspace_fault_msg msg;
                     msg.fault_op = MM_FAULT_OP_WRITE;
-                    msg.fault_type = MM_FAULT_TYPE_ACCESS_FAULT;
+                    msg.fault_type = MM_FAULT_TYPE_GENERIC_MMU;
                     msg.fault_vaddr = page_va;
                     rc = rt_varea_fix_private_locked(varea, rt_hw_mmu_v2p(aspace, page_va),
                                                     &msg, RT_TRUE);
diff --git a/components/mm/mm_fault.c b/components/mm/mm_fault.c
index 4dcef168a5..40af11d4c4 100644
--- a/components/mm/mm_fault.c
+++ b/components/mm/mm_fault.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static int _write_fault(rt_varea_t varea, void *pa, struct rt_aspace_fault_msg *
     if (rt_varea_is_private_locked(varea))
     {
         if (VAREA_IS_WRITABLE(varea) && (
-            msg->fault_type == MM_FAULT_TYPE_ACCESS_FAULT ||
+            msg->fault_type == MM_FAULT_TYPE_RWX_PERM ||
             msg->fault_type == MM_FAULT_TYPE_PAGE_FAULT))
         {
             RDWR_LOCK(aspace);
@@ -102,6 +102,44 @@ static int _exec_fault(rt_varea_t varea, void *pa, struct rt_aspace_fault_msg *m
     return err;
 }
 
+static void _determine_precise_fault_type(struct rt_aspace_fault_msg *msg, rt_ubase_t pa, rt_varea_t varea)
+{
+    if (msg->fault_type == MM_FAULT_TYPE_GENERIC_MMU)
+    {
+        rt_base_t requesting_perm;
+        switch (msg->fault_op)
+        {
+        case MM_FAULT_OP_READ:
+            requesting_perm = RT_HW_MMU_PROT_READ | RT_HW_MMU_PROT_USER;
+            break;
+        case MM_FAULT_OP_WRITE:
+            requesting_perm = RT_HW_MMU_PROT_WRITE | RT_HW_MMU_PROT_USER;
+            break;
+        case MM_FAULT_OP_EXECUTE:
+            requesting_perm = RT_HW_MMU_PROT_EXECUTE | RT_HW_MMU_PROT_USER;
+            break;
+        }
+
+        /**
+         * always checking the user privileges since dynamic permission is not
+         * supported in kernel. So those faults are never fixable. Hence, adding
+         * permission check never changes the result of checking. In other
+         * words, { 0 && (expr) } is always false.
+         */
+        if (rt_hw_mmu_attr_test_perm(varea->attr, requesting_perm))
+        {
+            if (pa == (rt_ubase_t)ARCH_MAP_FAILED)
+            {
+                msg->fault_type = MM_FAULT_TYPE_PAGE_FAULT;
+            }
+            else
+            {
+                msg->fault_type = MM_FAULT_TYPE_RWX_PERM;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 int rt_aspace_fault_try_fix(rt_aspace_t aspace, struct rt_aspace_fault_msg *msg)
 {
     int err = MM_FAULT_FIXABLE_FALSE;
@@ -121,6 +159,8 @@ int rt_aspace_fault_try_fix(rt_aspace_t aspace, struct rt_aspace_fault_msg *msg)
         if (varea)
         {
             void *pa = rt_hw_mmu_v2p(aspace, msg->fault_vaddr);
+            _determine_precise_fault_type(msg, (rt_ubase_t)pa, varea);
+
             if (pa != ARCH_MAP_FAILED && msg->fault_type == MM_FAULT_TYPE_PAGE_FAULT)
             {
                 LOG_D("%s(fault=%p) has already fixed", __func__, msg->fault_vaddr);
diff --git a/components/mm/mm_fault.h b/components/mm/mm_fault.h
index 28671aef74..9749e99918 100644
--- a/components/mm/mm_fault.h
+++ b/components/mm/mm_fault.h
@@ -34,9 +34,12 @@ enum rt_mm_fault_type
 {
     /**
      * Occurs when an instruction attempts to access a memory address that it
-     * does not have permission to access
+     * does not have R/W/X permission to access
      */
-    MM_FAULT_TYPE_ACCESS_FAULT,
+    MM_FAULT_TYPE_RWX_PERM,
+
+    /* Without privileges to access (e.g. user accessing kernel) */
+    MM_FAULT_TYPE_NO_PRIVILEGES,
 
     /**
      * Occurs when a load or store instruction accesses a virtual memory
@@ -49,6 +52,12 @@ enum rt_mm_fault_type
      */
     MM_FAULT_TYPE_BUS_ERROR,
 
+    /**
+     * Occurs when page table walk failed, permission failed, writings on
+     * non-dirty page.
+     */
+    MM_FAULT_TYPE_GENERIC_MMU,
+
     MM_FAULT_TYPE_GENERIC,
     __PRIVATE_PAGE_INSERT,
 };
diff --git a/components/mm/mm_private.h b/components/mm/mm_private.h
index 2a5666e187..7431cc35a2 100644
--- a/components/mm/mm_private.h
+++ b/components/mm/mm_private.h
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@
   ((!varea->mem_obj || !varea->mem_obj->get_name)                              \
        ? "unknow"                                                              \
        : varea->mem_obj->get_name(varea))
+
+/* only user address use COW technique, so user permission is always checked */
 #define VAREA_IS_WRITABLE(varea)                                               \
   (rt_hw_mmu_attr_test_perm(varea->attr,                                       \
                             RT_HW_MMU_PROT_USER | RT_HW_MMU_PROT_WRITE))