ci(claude): scope Bash allowlist instead of wide-open (Codex P1)

Codex flagged that @claude can be summoned on a fork PR (the review
workflow even directs fork PRs here), so the checked-out PR content is
potentially attacker-controlled. Unrestricted Bash in this write-token +
OAuth-secret job let prompt injection steer Claude into arbitrary
shell/network commands.

Scope Bash to the repo's actual verification commands (cmake, ninja,
make, ctest, python/python3, pre-commit, clang-format, codespell, git).
This blocks the injection-to-arbitrary-command path while still letting
Claude build/test before committing. Building fork code itself is already
done by the existing CircleCI, so that surface is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

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