diff options
| author | Richard Weinberger <[email protected]> | 2024-08-02 18:36:44 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Tom Rini <[email protected]> | 2024-08-15 16:14:36 -0600 |
| commit | 233945eba63e24061dffeeaeb7cd6fe985278356 (patch) | |
| tree | 2e35b6347ffc0135cd9b75c181bd6f482eee641c | |
| parent | 9b9368b5c4dc24b3b999743db26fb915981d26a9 (diff) | |
squashfs: Fix integer overflow in sqfs_resolve_symlink()
A carefully crafted squashfs filesystem can exhibit an inode size of 0xffffffff,
as a consequence malloc() will do a zero allocation.
Later in the function the inode size is again used for copying data.
So an attacker can overwrite memory.
Avoid the overflow by using the __builtin_add_overflow() helper.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Miquel Raynal <[email protected]>
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/squashfs/sqfs.c | 10 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/fs/squashfs/sqfs.c b/fs/squashfs/sqfs.c index 1430e671a5a..16a07c0622b 100644 --- a/fs/squashfs/sqfs.c +++ b/fs/squashfs/sqfs.c @@ -422,8 +422,10 @@ static char *sqfs_resolve_symlink(struct squashfs_symlink_inode *sym, char *resolved, *target; u32 sz; - sz = get_unaligned_le32(&sym->symlink_size); - target = malloc(sz + 1); + if (__builtin_add_overflow(get_unaligned_le32(&sym->symlink_size), 1, &sz)) + return NULL; + + target = malloc(sz); if (!target) return NULL; @@ -431,9 +433,9 @@ static char *sqfs_resolve_symlink(struct squashfs_symlink_inode *sym, * There is no trailling null byte in the symlink's target path, so a * copy is made and a '\0' is added at its end. */ - target[sz] = '\0'; + target[sz - 1] = '\0'; /* Get target name (relative path) */ - strncpy(target, sym->symlink, sz); + strncpy(target, sym->symlink, sz - 1); /* Relative -> absolute path conversion */ resolved = sqfs_get_abs_path(base_path, target); |
