diff options
| author | Aristo Chen <[email protected]> | 2026-07-20 08:29:13 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]> | 2026-07-27 18:50:28 +0200 |
| commit | 7a63ea588911984ffb65893c2f31797a4bb65bf2 (patch) | |
| tree | 077ed66ec2e3e5839c280bc79113f658408b6461 | |
| parent | e85562963f1ddbdfe60ecbe8e55444743f00ade6 (diff) | |
cmd: nvedit_efi: use efi_auth_var_get_guid() for the default GUID
do_env_set_efi() hand rolls the mapping from well known variable names
to their default vendor GUID and has already drifted from the canonical
name_type[] table in efi_var_common.c: it does not know "dbr", so
"env set -e dbr" operates on the variable under EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID
instead of the image security database GUID, silently creating a
variable that nothing will ever consume.
Convert the variable name to UTF-16 before selecting the GUID and let
efi_auth_var_get_guid() do the lookup. That function knows all
authenticated variables including "dbr" and falls back to
EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID for any other name, so behaviour is unchanged
for "db", "dbx", "dbt" and non-authenticated variables. Future
additions to the table now apply to the shell command automatically.
Since the conversion now happens before the value parsing loop, free
the UTF-16 name at the common exit label so the error path there does
not leak it.
Also drop the unmap_sysmem() call right after efi_set_variable_int():
the common exit path already unmaps the value for the -i case and frees
it otherwise, so the value was unmapped twice. On sandbox the second
call triggers a spurious "Address not mapped" warning for addresses
that get a tagged mapping.
Signed-off-by: Aristo Chen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <[email protected]>
| -rw-r--r-- | cmd/nvedit_efi.c | 22 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/cmd/nvedit_efi.c b/cmd/nvedit_efi.c index 3a36f94775b..f38802e4f4d 100644 --- a/cmd/nvedit_efi.c +++ b/cmd/nvedit_efi.c @@ -448,13 +448,14 @@ int do_env_set_efi(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, return CMD_RET_USAGE; var_name = argv[0]; - if (default_guid) { - if (!strcmp(var_name, "db") || !strcmp(var_name, "dbx") || - !strcmp(var_name, "dbt")) - guid = efi_guid_image_security_database; - else - guid = efi_global_variable_guid; + var_name16 = efi_convert_string(var_name); + if (!var_name16) { + printf("## Out of memory\n"); + ret = CMD_RET_FAILURE; + goto out; } + if (default_guid) + guid = *efi_auth_var_get_guid(var_name16); if (verbose) { printf("GUID: %pUl (%pUs)\n", &guid, &guid); @@ -479,16 +480,8 @@ int do_env_set_efi(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, 16, 1, value, size, true); } - var_name16 = efi_convert_string(var_name); - if (!var_name16) { - printf("## Out of memory\n"); - ret = CMD_RET_FAILURE; - goto out; - } ret = efi_set_variable_int(var_name16, &guid, attributes, size, value, true); - free(var_name16); - unmap_sysmem(value); if (ret == EFI_SUCCESS) { ret = CMD_RET_SUCCESS; } else { @@ -518,6 +511,7 @@ int do_env_set_efi(struct cmd_tbl *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, ret = CMD_RET_FAILURE; } out: + free(var_name16); if (value_on_memory) unmap_sysmem(value); else |
