diff options
| author | Jun Nie <[email protected]> | 2018-02-27 16:55:58 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Tom Rini <[email protected]> | 2018-03-19 09:59:32 -0400 |
| commit | 5c643db4cc95c6ac6457731cb5bb75d6896e415b (patch) | |
| tree | 0fc4b285f0a0da1bc15fb9b8cb3e7d8918bb9916 /common/spl | |
| parent | 50905b55c7b9c3a20e2c5a7e5f7ae8236ecd7a8e (diff) | |
SPL: Add signature verification when loading image
U-boot proper signature is not verified by SPL on most platforms
even config SPL_FIT_SIGNATURE is enabled. Only fsl-layerscape
platform support secure boot in platform specific code. So
verified boot cannot be achieved if u-boot proper is loaded by
SPL.
This patch add signature verification to u-boot proper images
when loading FIT image in SPL. It is tested on Allwinner bananapi
zero board with H2+ SoC.
Signed-off-by: Jun Nie <[email protected]>
Diffstat (limited to 'common/spl')
| -rw-r--r-- | common/spl/spl_fit.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/common/spl/spl_fit.c b/common/spl/spl_fit.c index b705d030e77..be92ca4b4fd 100644 --- a/common/spl/spl_fit.c +++ b/common/spl/spl_fit.c @@ -174,6 +174,9 @@ static int spl_load_fit_image(struct spl_load_info *info, ulong sector, uint8_t image_comp = -1, type = -1; const void *data; bool external_data = false; +#ifdef CONFIG_SPL_FIT_SIGNATURE + int ret; +#endif if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_OS_BOOT) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_GZIP)) { if (fit_image_get_comp(fit, node, &image_comp)) @@ -252,7 +255,16 @@ static int spl_load_fit_image(struct spl_load_info *info, ulong sector, image_info->entry_point = fdt_getprop_u32(fit, node, "entry"); } +#ifdef CONFIG_SPL_FIT_SIGNATURE + printf("## Checking hash(es) for Image %s ...\n", + fit_get_name(fit, node, NULL)); + ret = fit_image_verify_with_data(fit, node, + (const void *)load_addr, length); + printf("\n"); + return !ret; +#else return 0; +#endif } static int spl_fit_append_fdt(struct spl_image_info *spl_image, |