diff options
| author | Tom Rini <[email protected]> | 2026-08-28 09:00:06 -0600 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Tom Rini <[email protected]> | 2026-08-28 09:00:06 -0600 |
| commit | d40f495e14d6ed1ec401cbe4bdc793cd9ed87d20 (patch) | |
| tree | 30be1f2356409c85967c421c1299344b68749880 /contrib/apps/httpserver | |
| parent | 658fc6aee95784139f070f9945cb3bc5da8d7d22 (diff) | |
| parent | 923f05ed3e231c51f259bee6e2ac823bdaf1c566 (diff) | |
Merge patch series "fs/squashfs: fix two out-of-bounds reads on crafted images"
Piyush Paliwal <[email protected]> says:
Two independent out-of-bounds reads in the SquashFS driver, both reachable
by pointing U-Boot at an attacker-supplied image (e.g. ls/load on a crafted
USB/SD/netboot rootfs). Either one crashes the bootloader (DoS); patch 2 can
also copy adjacent heap memory into the loaded file (information disclosure).
1/2 sqfs_find_inode()/sqfs_inode_size() walk the decompressed inode table
using on-disk sizes with no check that the cursor stays inside the
buffer -> wild read / SEGV, e.g. from a simple "ls".
2/2 sqfs_read_nest() uses the on-disk fragment offset as an unbounded
source index into the fragment block -> out-of-bounds heap read when
loading a fragment-backed file.
Both were found by fuzzing the sandbox build (CONFIG_ASAN) of sqfsls/sqfsload
with mutated images. With the fixes, the crashing inputs are rejected
cleanly, 2000 fuzz iterations produce no further crashes, and the valid-image
path is unchanged.
These are distinct from the 2024 SquashFS CVE cluster (CVE-2024-57254..57259,
fixed in 2025.01-rc1) and from the sqfs_frag_lookup() fix (e365a269df5): the
earlier work added NULL checks at the callers and fixed the symlink-size and
fragment-table paths, but left these inode-table-walk and fragment-data
paths unbounded.
The two patches are independent and can be applied in either order.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/apps/httpserver')
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